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Außergewöhnliche Ereignisse und responsives Regieren Die Auswirkungen der Energiewende auf das Vertrauen in politische Institutionen
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Why do policy responses to one and the same event often vary so markedly between different jurisdictions? This contribution sheds light on conditions and processes that link crises to policy change or policy stability. Drawing on public policy theories and accounts from crisis management, the type of policy subsystem that is hit by a crisis is theorized to be a decisive factor when it comes to explaining variation in crisis-induced policy reactions. The theoretical arguments are explored based on a comparative case study of Fukushima's differential impact on nuclear power policymaking in Japan and Germany. In order to systematically analyze interaction patterns of policy elites, the study capitalizes on recent methodological advances and applies a method called discourse network analysis. The analysis yields topographies of policy discourses around the Fukushima crisis in both countries and shows that crises can trigger major policy shifts when " anchors " for policy change—i.e., alternative policy ideas and proposals put forward by a minority coalition— are readily available. If a pre-crisis subsystem is unitary, on the other hand, the pressure on incumbents is rather low and policy shifts are prevented from going beyond mere incremental adjustments..
In this article, the authors evaluate the origins of generalized trust. In addition to examining individual-level determinants, the analytic focus is on the political-institutional context. In contrast to most of the analyses to date, the authors conduct hierarchical analyses of the World Values Surveys (1995-1997 and 1999-2001) to simultaneously test for differences among respondents in 58 countries and for variations in levels of trust between countries with different institutional configurations. In addition, the authors extend the institutional theory of trust by introducing the power-sharing quality of institutions—a rather neglected institutional dimension hitherto. With regard to the most important contextual factors, the authors find that countries whose authorities are seen as incorruptible, whose institutions of the welfare state reduce income disparities, and whose political interests are represented in a manner proportional to their weight have citizens who are more likely to place trust in one another.
The analysis of the quality of democracy requires a joint definition of democratic quality – that is, a definition of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ democracies. Its complex nature necessitates the introduction of five principal dimensions – the rule of law, accountability, responsiveness, freedom and equality/solidarity – for empirical definition of the democratic quality and, more importantly, for the identification of the factors that subvert the democratic balance in old and new regimes. This analytical framework differs from other studies by advancing the importance of combining both quantitative and qualitative measures in studying the quality of democracy.
This paper confronts two models of policy: the party model states that policy-making is an orderly process initiated by parties implementing their party programme and carrying out their electoral promises; the external pressure model contends that policy change is a non-orderly process but rather a disjoint process coming in large bursts that are difficult to predict. Drawing upon eight policy agendas in Belgium covering the period from 1991 to 2000 we put both models to the test. Policy measures are operationalized via the budget and legislation. We found that budgets are as good as disconnected from any other policy agenda in Belgium. Legislation and the evolving legislative attention for issues in Belgium can be traced back to some extent to parties and external pressure at the same time. In terms of static policy priorities, we found that the party model indicators, party programmes and government agreements, are fairly good predictors of the legislative attention an issue will receive during the governmental term. Regarding dynamic policy change from year to year, we found that the external pressure indicators – parliamentary pressure, media coverage and street protest – performed much better and were able to grasp some variance in issue emphasis in legislation.
The policy literature often mentions the agenda-setting influence of focusing events, but few policy studies systematically examine the dynamics of these events. This article closes this gap by examining focusing events, group mobilization and agenda-setting. Using natural disasters and industrial accidents as examples, most focusing events change the dominant issues on the agenda in a policy domain, they can lead to interest group mobilization, and groups often actively seek to expand or contain issues after a focusing event. I explain how differences in the composition of policy communities and the nature of the events themselves influence group and agenda dynamics. The organization of policy communities is an important factor in agenda setting, but agenda setting and group politics vary considerably with the type of event and the nature of the policy community.
This essay explores the possibilities and limits of partisan influence on public policy in democratic nations. It will be pointed out, that differences in party composition of government, in general, matter in public policy in constitutional democracy. However, the extent to which parties influence public policy is to a significant extent contingent upon the type of democracy and countermajoritarian institutional constraints of central state government. Large partisan effects typify majoritarian democracies and states, in which the legislature and the executive are ‘sovereign’. More complex and more difficult to identify is the partisan influence on public policy in consensus democracies and in states, in which the political-institutional circumstances allow for co-governance of the opposition party. Narrowly circumscribed is the room to manoeuvre available to incumbent parties above all in political systems which have been marked by countermajoritarian institutional pluralism or institutional ‘semi-sovereignty’. The article suggests, that it would be valuable if direct effects and interaction effects of the party composition of government and state structures featured more prominently in future research on comparative public policy.
A new conventional wisdom characterizes the comparative study of electoral politics. Social cleavages, once a stabilizing factor of electoral behavior in Western Europe, are on the wane. Voting decisions have become individualized and old social cleavages have been superseded by new value-related cleavages. This article challenges that view as an exaggeration. Social cleavages have not dis-appeared and are not in universal decline, as demonstrated by an examination of data from seven countries from 1975 to 2002. Religious–secular voting is mostly stable, while class voting shows an unambiguous decline in only some of the countries under study. Further, neither rising levels of cognitive mobilization nor a dissemination of postmaterialist value priorities can account for these changes in class voting. The exaggeration of limited changes to general trends seems to rest on a disregard of the effects of party competition on patterns of electoral behavior. I suggest that further research should focus on the effects of parties' electoral strategies on the electoral relevance of social cleavages.
The analysis of voting behaviour – and particularly the reasons for the increasing vote share of the National Socialists – in the Weimar Republic and the socio-structural composition of the electorate of the NSDAP are scrutinized by numerous studies. However, a detailed analysis of the results of the Reichstag election on 12 November 1933 is still missing. In this election, the electorate had indeed only the possibility to vote for the NSDAP, but there was a considerable part of spoiled ballot papers that varied significantly over the districts and district-free cities as did the share of non-voters. This article aims at answering the question whether and how indicators for the regional social background can help to explain the different spreading of turnout and void ballots at this so called election. Based on theoretically derived expectations and the election results on the district level, this contribution shows by means of multivariate regression analyses that even if controlling for other factors like the number of inhabitants and the city status, particularly the share of industrial workers and therefore the regional strength of the socialist milieu caused the increased part of invalid votes and non-voters, and not the catholic milieu that was considered to be resilient against National Socialism during the 1920s and early 1930s.
„In God We Trust: Everyone Else Pays Cash.“ Vor mehr als 35 Jahren waren dies die einleitenden Worte Jack Citrins in seinem Artikel über „The Political Relevance of Trust in Government“, in welchem er einen stetigen Rückgang des Vertrauens der USamerikanischenBürger in deren Regierung dokumentierte (Citrin 1974, S. 973; vgl.auch Miller 1974a, 1974b).
Die Bundesrepublik erlebte zu Beginn des zweiten Jahrzehntes des 21. Jahrhunderts innerhalb kürzester Zeit zwei Krisen um das Amt des Bundespräsidenten. Zuerst trat Horst Köhler 2010 im Zusammenhang mit einer neuartigen Medienkritik (vgl. Pörksen und Detel 2012) an seinen Äußerungen zu Bundeswehreinsätzen mit der Begründung zurück: „Ich bin zurückgetreten, um Schaden vom Amt abzuwenden.
Demokratie ist untrennbar mit politischer Gleichheit verbunden. Kollektiv bindende Entscheidungen können Legitimität für sich beanspruchen, wenn alle Interessen die gleiche Chance haben, berücksichtigt zu werden, und weder einzelne noch Gruppen unbeauftragt und unkontrolliert im Namen aller entscheiden (Dahl 1989: 98). In seiner großen Studie zu Demokratietheorien von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart stellt Manfred G. Schmidt deshalb auf der ersten Seite der Einleitung fest, dass Demokratien „der Anspruch gemeinsam [ist], die Herrschaft im Staate auf die Norm politischer Gleichheit der Vollbürger zu verpflichten, auf den Willen der Gesamtheit oder zumindest eines maßgebenden Teils der Stimmbürgerschaft zu gründen und die zeitlich befristet Regierenden auf Rechenschaft gegenüber den Regierten festzulegen“ (Schmidt 2010: 17).
2011 war für die deutsche Energiepolitik ein schicksalhaftes Jahr. Zwar war der Umbau der Energielandschaft schon beschlossene Sache – das Energiekonzept der Bundesregierung vom Herbst 2010 legte bereits einen Fahrplan ins Zeitalter der Erneuerbaren Energien fest. Doch war damals die oberste Prämisse der Klimaschutz. Das Erreichen der ehrgeizigen CO2-Ziele Deutschlands sollte vor allem über den Stromsektor erreicht werden. Das war sowohl in den Energieszenarien der Wissenschaftler zur Vorbereitung des Energiekonzepts (Schlesinger/Lindenberger/Lutz 2010) als auch im Energiekonzept selbst die zentrale Begründung für die Verlängerung der Laufzeiten der deutschen Kernkraftwerke. Entsprechend war auch vorgesehen, mindestens die Hälfte der sogenannten Zusatzgewinne aus der Atomenergie für den Klimaschutz abzuschöpfen (Bundesregierung 2010).
Retrospective voting studies typically examine policies where the public has common interests. By contrast, climate policy has broad public support but concentrated opposition in communities where costs are imposed. This spatial distribution of weak supporters and strong local opponents mirrors opposition to other policies with diffuse public benefits and concentrated local costs. I use a natural experiment to investigate whether citizens living in proximity to wind energy projects retrospectively punished an incumbent government because of its climate policy. Using both fixed effects and instrumental variable estimators, I identify electoral losses for the incumbent party ranging from 4 to 10%, with the effect persisting 3 km from wind turbines. There is also evidence that voters are informed, only punishing the government responsible for the policy. I conclude that the spatial distribution of citizens' policy preferences can affect democratic accountability through ‘spatially distorted signalling’, which can exacerbate political barriers to addressing climate change.
Research on democratic representation and public opinion formation has largely ignored one another. Once one considers the reality of the political communication environment, a fundamental tension between these two literatures emerges. In this essay, I review work on each, highlighting problems with both how “quality opinion” is often defined and how representation is typically studied. I then offer a way forward.
Like all political parties in modern democracies, the major German parties face challenges caused by changes both in the social structure of the electorate and in value orientations. Generally speaking, parties have to adopt policy positions that take into account changes in the preferences and structure of the electorate in order to maximise their share of votes. This article focuses on the programmatic development of the German Christian Democrats since reunification and discusses the incentives and constraints faced by the CDU and CSU to change their policy positions over time. By discussing patterns of social change, voting behaviour and (intra-)party competition in the German multi-level system, we derive several hypotheses about the programmatic development of the CDU and CSU since 1990. We evaluate these expectations on the basis of a dataset that covers information on the policy positions of all the major German parties – the CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, the Greens and the PDS/‘Linke’ – on the federal and state level in the time period from 1990 to 2011. The results show that there is no distinct trend in the programmatic development of the Christian Democrats. However, we do find evidence to suggest that the German Christian Democrats take the ‘setting’ of an election into account; that is, they adopt policy positions according to the social structural profile of the electorate when the CDU or the CSU compete for votes in elections for the Länder parliaments.
The Great Recession that started in 2007/2008 has been the worst economic downturn since the crisis of the 1930s in Europe. It led to a major sovereign debt crisis, which is arguably the biggest challenge for the European Union (EU) and its common currency. Not since the 1950s have advanced democracies experienced such a dramatic external imposition of austerity and structural reform policies through inter- or supranational organisations such as the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or as implicitly requested by international financial markets. Did this massive interference with the room for maneuver of parliaments and governments in many countries erode support for national democracy in the crisis since 2007? Did citizens realise that their national democratic institutions were no longer able to effectively decide on major economic and social policies, on economic and welfare state institutions? And did they react by concluding that this constrained democracy no longer merited further support? These are the questions guiding this article, which compares 26 EU countries in 2007–2011 and re-analyses 78 national surveys. Aggregate data from these surveys is analysed in a time-series cross-section design to examine changes in democratic support at the country level. The hypotheses also are tested at the individual level by estimating a series of cross-classified multilevel logistic regression models. Support for national democracy – operationalised as satisfaction with the way democracy works and as trust in parliament – declined dramatically during the crisis. This was caused both by international organisations and markets interfering with national democratic procedures and by the deteriorating situation of the national economy as perceived by individual citizens.
Let me begin by defining terms. For present purposes, “democracy” is identified by the institutional features of universal adult suffrage, free and competitive elections to choose policy makers, multiple information sources, multiple political parties, and civil and political rights. “Democratic responsiveness” is what occurs when the democratic process induces the government to form and implement policies that the citizens want. When the process induces such policies consistently, we consider democracy to be of higher quality. Indeed, responsiveness in this sense is one of the justifications for democracy itself. 1 Responsiveness is not the only measure of democratic quality. Freedom, equality, vertical and horizontal accountability, and the rule of law contribute directly to the quality of democracy. These features also facilitate democratic responsiveness, as we shall see. Democratic responsiveness is a complex process, somewhat like a chain whose links are causally connected (see the figure below). It begins with the policy preferences held by citizens, and moves link by causal link through such stages as voting, election outcomes, the formation of policy-making coalitions, the process of policy making between elections, and public policies themselves. The process is ongoing and dynamic: The policies that are actually adopted and the consequences that flow from them affect the future preferences of citizens. Connections, whether actual or at least anticipated, must exist between each of the stages. The severing of any of the major linkages— G. Bingham Powell, Jr., is the Marie C. Wilson and Joseph C. Wilson Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester. His recent publications include Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions (2000) and the coedited text Comparative Politics Today (2004). He is a former editor of the American Political Science Review.
It has been said about the United States that it is now suffering ‘a crisis of regime’. Europe, we have been told, is in little better condition: ‘all over Europe the First World War broke up the structure of society which, before 1914, had provided the necessary basis of confidence between government and governed. There no longer exists, except in a few places such as Switzerland, that general acceptance of the conduct of national affairs that adds to the vigor of government and society alike.’ ¹ These are the kinds of practical political problems to which the concept of political support, as found in systems analysis, has been directed.
This paper presents the results of a study of public attitudes to onshore windfarm development in south-west Scotland. Specifically, it explores the influences of different development models on attitudes to windfarms by comparing public attitudes towards a community-owned windfarm on the Isle of Gigha with attitudes towards several developer-owned windfarms on the adjacent Kintyre peninsula. The study, conducted in 2006, used a questionnaire-based survey (n = 106) to test the hypothesis that community ownership would lead to greater public acceptance of windfarms. It also examined the attitudes of both residents and tourists towards the impacts of onshore windfarms on landscapes and seascapes, including cumulative impacts. The data show that the Gigha respondents were consistently more positive about wind power than were the Kintyre residents. However, the differences were differences of degree rather than diametrically opposing viewpoints. The most significant concerns about windfarms were intermittent production and visual impact, but majorities in both areas nevertheless regarded their visual impact as positive. The data also indicate that local attitudes could become even more positive if future windfarms were owned by local communities. The fact that the residents of Gigha have affectionately dubbed their turbines ‘the Three Dancing Ladies’ is indicative of the positive psychological effects of community ownership. These results support the contention that a change of development model towards community ownership could have a positive effect on public attitudes towards windfarm developments in Scotland.
'Im politischen System der Bundesrepublik sind die politischen Parteien die zentrale Institution der Vermittlung zwischen Bürgern und Regierungssystem. Affektive Identifikationen mit Parteien stellen eine der wichtigsten Prägekräfte des Wählerverhaltens dar. Die parteipolitisch ungebundenen Bürger spielen als mobilste Wählergruppe eine Schlüsselrolle im Hinblick auf die Ergebnisse von Wahlen. Der Identifikation von Wandlungstendenzen kommt ein zentraler Stellenwert zum Verständnis des Wählerverhaltens der Bürger in Ost- und Westdeutschland zu: Wechsel der Parteiidentifikation, aber auch eine Veränderung in der Neigung sich überhaupt mit einer politischen Partei zu identifizieren, können tiefgreifende Änderungen im Wahlverhalten mit sich bringen. Anhand der Daten des Sozio-ökonomischen Panels (SOEP), einer jährlichen Wiederholungsbefragung von insgesamt mehr als 26.600 Personen, wird in diesem Beitrag für den Zeitraum 1984 bis 1999 untersucht, wie dauerhaft individuelle Parteibindungen sind und wovon ihre Stabilität abhängt.' (Autorenreferat)
Wie in vielen etablierten Demokratien sinkt auch in Deutschland die Wahlbeteiligung, während alternative Formen politischer Teilhabe zunehmen. Gemeinsam schaden beide Trends dem demokratischen Ideal politischer Gleichheit, weil Wahlen weniger als andere Arten politischen Engagements sozial verzerrt sind.
While the literature on trust has produced various conceptual models, there is also some confusion concerning different types of trust and their formation. In this article, three contested points are empirically clarified. First, are there really different forms of trust as much of the literature suggests? Second, if so, then how are these different types of trust related to each other? Third, what are the foundations of these different forms of trust? Relying on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, it is concluded that two types of trust can be empirically identified: an intimate trust in people close to the truster, as well as an abstract trust in people in general. Although these types of trust constitute separate dimensions, they are positively related to each other. Furthermore, this article challenges the widely held assumption that experiences are most relevant for particularised trust, while generalised trust is based on psychological predispositions. It is argued instead for a spherespecific logic of trust formation: It is the radius of experiences and predispositions that matters for the radius of trust. Finally, the analysis goes beyond the existing research by highlighting hitherto unknown conditions under which trust in familiar domains is more or less likely to extend to generalised trust.
On any given day, policymakers are required to address a multitude of problems and make decisions about a variety of issues, from the economy and education to health care and defense. This has been true for years, but until now no studies have been conducted on how politicians manage the flood of information from a wide range of sources. How do they interpret and respond to such inundation? Which issues do they pay attention to and why? Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner answer these questions on decision-making processes and prioritization in The Politics of Attention. Analyzing fifty years of data, Jones and Baumgartner's book is the first study of American politics based on a new information-processing perspective. The authors bring together the allocation of attention and the operation of governing institutions into a single model that traces public policies, public and media attention to them, and governmental decisions across multiple institutions. The Politics of Attention offers a groundbreaking approach to American politics based on the responses of policymakers to the flow of information. It asks how the system solves, or fails to solve, problems rather than looking to how individual preferences are realized through political action.
Windkraft: Keine Zerstörung hessischer Waldflächen und Kulturlandschaften, Resolution, beschlossen auf dem Landesparteitag am 15
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