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Strategies of Successful Anti-Dam Movements: Evidence from Myanmar
and Thailand
Scholars are rarely able to examine anti-dam movements that result in project
suspensions or cancellations since these cases are rare empirically. Yet they are central
to understanding how anti-dam movements can succeed. This paper analyzes the
movements against Myanmar’s Myitsone Dam and Thailand’s Kaeng Suea Ten Dam.
Likely the most successful anti-dam movements in Southeast Asia in recent years, they
achieved suspension over six and 37 years, respectively. The research is based on 60
semi-structured interviews carried out over a period of eight months. Leveraging
thinking from both the constructionist and structural schools within the field of social
movement studies, it is found that the framing of the Myitsone Dam as a project
threatening the national cultural heritage of Myanmar (in combination with political
change in the country in 2010/2011) largely explains the movement’s success.
Meanwhile, the set of sophisticated tactics (including inter alia demonstrations, Thai
Baan research, 24/7 monitoring of the dam site, and spiritual activities) was decisive for
the efficacy of the movement against Thailand’s Kaeng Suea Ten Dam.
Key words: social movements, anti-dam movements, protests, large dams, Myanmar,
Myitsone Dam, Thailand, Kaeng Suea Ten Dam, issue framing, political opportunity
structures
1. Introduction
A surge in dam construction since the early 2000s is projected to continue for the foreseeable
future (Zarfl et al. 2015, 161). Although dams have been built for nearly 5,000 years,
challenges in mitigating their vast environmental and social impacts continue, which can be
This is a pre-print version of the paper.
The published version is available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2017.1364455
Cite as:
Kirchherr (2017). Strategies of Successful Anti-Dam Movements: Evidence from
Myanmar and Thailand. Society and Natural Resources. Available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2017.1364455
seen as part of the technical requirements of dam construction (Urban et al. 2015; Haas and
Skinner 2015; Scudder 2012). Hence, it can be questioned if dams are an appropriate
technology to employ (WCD 2000; Ansar et al. 2014). The failure to mitigate their negative
impacts has led to many anti-dam campaigns, with perhaps the most famous being the one
initiated against India’s Narmada dam projects in the late 1980s (Khagram 2004, 65).
Examples of current large dam projects contested are those in India’s state of Sikkim (Huber
and Joshi 2015) and those to be built on the Mekong River in Laos and Cambodia (Molle et
al. 2009).
Despite the current boom in dam construction and the prevalence of anti-dam protests,
Rodríguez-Labajos and Martínez-Alier (2015, 538) find that ‘water conflicts and water-based
activism [have] not been given much [scholarly] attention’. Anti-dam movements in the
developing world resulting in project suspensions or cancellations have been largely neglected
by the scientific community (these are defined as ‘successful anti-dam movements’
throughout this paper). The likely reason is that these cases are extremely rare empirically
(further outlined in the next section). Yet they can illuminate how anti-dam movements can be
successful (albeit that non-successful movements can contribute relevant insights as well).
This paper aims to exemplify how anti-dam movements can succeed via a comparative study
of the campaigns against Myanmar’s Myitsone Dam and Thailand’s Kaeng Suea Ten Dam.
Two of the most successful such movements in Southeast Asia in recent years, they achieved
suspension over six and 37 years, respectively.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the
methodology adopted, while Section 3 frames the analyses within the field of social
movement studies. Section 4 outlines environmental activism in Myanmar and Thailand.
Section 5 narrates the struggles against Myanmar’s Myitsone Dam and Thailand’s Kaeng
Suea Ten Dam. Section 6 discusses these cases, and Section 7 summarizes the argument.
2. Methods
A comparative case study method was chosen as a research design to analyse anti-dam
movements, as such small-N research is believed to be valuable in developing nuanced
theoretical insights (Lijphart 1971). Indeed, my review of the relevant literature suggests that
more theory development and nuancing may be needed regarding successful anti-dam
movements. In this review, more than 30 scholarly articles on the strategies of anti-dam
movements were identified (see Appendix for methods used to generate this list of articles), of
which only five analysed a cancelled or suspended project. As per Hou (2001), Jain (2000),
and Moore (1998), three of them are projects in the developed world, with the respective
movements possibly not being identical with those in the developing world due to the entirely
different contexts in which activists operate (McAdam et al. 2010, 403). Chandra (2013) and
Sneddon and Fox (2008) are the only scholarly case studies identified that analyse successful
anti-dam movements in the developing world — a minuscule body of literature, considering
that such movements are likely of most interest to environmental nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) as well as international donors and dam developers. I hypothesize that
few cases of successful anti-dam movements have been studied because they are quite rare
empirically. Indeed, an activist interviewed acknowledged that most movements are unable to
stop a dam project (TNI15; see next paragraph for details on this code). Why anti-dam
movements are mostly unsuccessful is not the focus of this paper, however.
To develop a narrative regarding both movements presented in this paper, semi-
structured interviews were conducted in Myanmar and Thailand over a period of eight months
in 2015 and 2016. Interviews were carried out via telephone/Skype as well as face-to-face
(see table of interviewees in the Appendix). Information regarding interviewee recruitment
and sample termination can be found in Kirchherr et al. (2017). As detailed there, all
interviews were coded. The first letter indicates the mode of interview (T for
telephone/Skype, F for face-to-face, O for online survey/e-mail) and the second the type (AA
for adversely affected people, G for government, I for international donor, NI for international
NGO, NL for local NGO, P for private sector). The number designates the overall interview
number within a type.
3. Theoretical Framing
An anti-dam movement is a social movement (SM), defined as ‘a set of opinions and beliefs
in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social
structure and/or reward distribution of a society’ (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1217–18). In this
paper, the term refers to the belief that one or more dams must not be constructed due to
various environmental and/or social impacts. A movement’s preferences are implemented via
its strategy, defined as ‘how we turn what we have into what we need’ (Ganz 2000, 1010).
The strategy, in turn, can be implemented by one or more SM organizations (SMOs).
Comprising formal organizations such as the environmental NGO International Rivers, these
identify with the preferences of a SM (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1212).
The role of SMOs in a movement’s success is contested among scholars. Within
contemporary SM studies, the constructionist and the structural schools are rivals, with the
structuralists allegedly being dominant (Goodwin and Jasper 2004, 12; Smith and Fetner
2010, 44). Adopted as analytical lenses throughout this paper, both approaches cover ‘an
enormous terrain’ (Smith and Fetner 2010, 15). Hence, the summaries of them in this section
can only present what I view as cornerstones of particular relevance for this paper.
I begin by outlining the likely common denominator of both schools: the concept of
political opportunity structures (POS), defined as ‘dimensions of the political environment
which either encourage or discourage people from using collective action’ (Tarrow 1994, 19).
These dimensions are commonly operationalized by democracy indicators such as those of the
Polity IV project (McAdam et al. 2010, 415). Originally introduced by the structural school
(Goodwin et al. 1999, 27), the POS concept is said by critics (e.g., Gamson and Meyer 1996)
to ‘suffocate social movement research’ (Koopmans 1999, 93). However, both the
constructionist and structural schools currently acknowledge POS as the context that
significantly influences a movement’s emergence and eventual success, with relatively open
POS generally viewed as conducive for SMs (Della Porta and Diani 2015; Smith and Fetner
2010, 6).
Within this context, scholars adhering to the constructionist approach emphasize the
importance of culture to gain popular support for a movement, while downplaying the role of
particular SMOs (Buechler 2000, 11; Smith and Fetner 2010). Culture ‘consists of […] shared
mental worlds and their perceived embodiments’ (Jasper 2010, 60), exemplified by practices
such as mass prayer ceremonies. These shared mental worlds are created via ‘framing’ of the
movement’s issue(s). Goffman popularized this term, defining it as a ‘schemata of
interpretation’ (Goffman 1974, 21). Framing is particularly successful in creating shared
mental worlds if it evokes emotions, a concept entirely ‘repressed […] under structural
models’ (Jasper 2010, 80). Many constructionists believe an emotional framing of an issue
that appeals to a broad popular base to be decisive for a movement’s success (Goodwin and
Jasper 2004; Della Porta and Diani 2015).
Its very name suggests that scholars adhering to the structural approach pay particular
attention to SMOs and additional formal organizations in their analysis of an SM and its
struggles (Smith and Fetner 2010, 13). In this school, ‘the most widely appreciated kinds of
[SMO] resources’ (Edwards and McCarthy 2003, 1) are movement leadership, constituents,
and organization (including external networks), along with internal and external financial
resources for self-administration and outreach (see also McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1216 and
Opp 2009, 128). Due to the emphasis on resources, selected scholars sometimes also call the
structural approach the ‘resource mobilization approach’, although ‘structural approach’
seems to be more common (Opp 2009, 127). Many adherents to the structural school believe
capable movement leadership, constituents, and organization paired with ample financial
resources as most decisive in a movement’s success (Della Porta and Diani 2015; Smith and
Fetner 2010).
The remainder of this paper reflects the theoretical framing presented in this section.
Section 4 mostly discusses POS in Myanmar and Thailand, with the environmental activism
in both countries providing a context for the subsequent analyses. These analyses build on the
attempts to bridge the constructionist and structural schools within SM studies (see Della
Porta 2014). Section 5 introduces the two narratives with a discussion of the framing of the
movement’s cause (reflecting thinking from the constructionist school), followed by an
analysis of the movement leadership, constituents and organization as well as its financial
backing (reflecting thinking from the structural school).
4. Environmental Activism in Myanmar and Thailand
Environmental activists in Myanmar and Thailand have operated under different POS in the
past decades, which has impacted environmental activism in these countries. Myanmar was
under the rule of an oppressive military junta from 1962 to 2011, and any civil society/pro-
democracy protests, such as the 1988 protests facilitated by the 88 Generation Students
Group, were brutally suppressed (FNL23; Simpson 2013, 74). Thailand, on the other hand,
has switched repeatedly between democracy and the rule of an oppressive military junta. The
latest military coup d’état took place in 2014, with the Royal Armed Forces still in power in
early 2017 (TNL17; Forsyth 2010, 462). In Thailand, phases of democratic rule proved vital
for the development of the country’s civil society. In contrast to Myanmar, however (Forsyth
and Walker 2014, 412), lively environmental activism existed even when the junta was in
power, since ‘the strictures faced by Thai activists were generally much less severe than those
in Myanmar, although [some] repression was not uncommon [in Thailand either]’ (Simpson
2014, 90).
Environmental activism in both countries is interlinked because the repression of
environmental activists in Myanmar resulted in the fleeing of activists to (inter alia) Thailand;
activists began returning to Myanmar after its opening up from 2011 onwards (Simpson 2014,
55). It could be argued that many returnees now campaigning against dam projects in
Myanmar were influenced by environmental activism in Thailand. Thai activism intensified in
the late 1980s (Middleton 2012, 293), with sweeping resistance against such projects
preventing policy-makers from completing any large dams after the controversial Pak Mun
Dam in 1994 (Hirsch 2010, 315; Sneddon and Fox 2008, 632).
Thai policy-makers then began to search abroad to satisfy the country’s growing
energy demand and power its economy, negotiating (inter alia) the construction of projects
such as Laos’ operational 1,070 MW Nam Theun 2 (NT2) Dam1 and several others on
Myanmar’s Salween River, such as the controversial Mong Ton Dam (Middleton 2012, 293;
Simpson 2007, 549). Deregulation and resulting profit motives of companies in the Thai
energy sector further drove this search (Matthews 2012, 396; Baird and Quastel 2015, 1224).2
In addition, the search was facilitated by financiers such as the World Bank, which can pursue
dam projects (such as the Kaeng Suea Tean Dam) to use surplus capital and hence meet
annual spending targets (most simply accomplished via large and thus costly projects; Ahlers,
Zwarteveen, and Bakker 2017, 562; Park 2010). According to Molle et al. (2009, 11),
communities are ‘exploited by [such] private companies [and] financiers’.
Yet these communities frequently spurn projects that threaten the environment on
which they depend, a resistance dubbed ‘environmentalism by the poor’ by Martinez-Alier
(2002, 10). Indeed, environmental activism in Thailand has frequently been carried out by
1 93% of the electricity of the NT2 Dam is exported to Thailand, with this dam thus ‘sending more
hydropower across national borders than any other project in the history of Southeast Asia’ (Baird
and Quastel 2015, 1224).
2 It is noted, though, that the Thai energy sector is not yet fully privatized (Baird and Quastel 2015).
villagers protesting against various infrastructure projects that threaten their livelihoods
(Forsyth and Walker 2014, 412). Yet the middle class as well as international NGOs such as
the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) also play a large role (Forsyth 2007), the latter thanks to
Thailand’s comparatively open POS. Meanwhile, Myanmar’s restrictive POS limited the
involvement of international NGOs prior to its opening, and communities adversely affected
by dam construction and local NGOs continue to stir much of the activism there (FI8;
Simpson 2013, 113; further discussed in section 5.1).
5. Evidence on Successful Anti-Dam Movements from Myanmar and Thailand
This section narrates the struggles against Myanmar’s Myitsone Dam and Thailand’s Kaeng
Suea Ten Dam. Key information on both projects is provided in Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2.
> Table 1 here <
5.1 The Struggle against Myanmar’s Myitsone Dam
Issue framing: FNL3, FNL6, and TNL13 framed the river the Myitsone Dam is supposed to
be built on emotionally, as an embodiment of the national cultural heritage of Myanmar.
(‘This dam impacts our holy river [the Irrawaddy], the heart of this country’; FNL3). These
interviewees also pointed to this framing as the main reason why the Myitsone Dam is widely
opposed — by up to 85% of people in Myanmar, according to one survey (FNL3). Yet this
specific framing and the resulting opposition apparently developed over time.
> Figure 1 here <
A pastor displaced because of the dam claimed to have first heard about it by
coincidence, in 2003 (FAA1; further discussed by Kiik 2016, 380). The pastor then reached
out to various civil society organizations (CSOs) and policy-makers in Kachin State for
protest support. Hence, the movement started as ‘environmentalism of the poor’, as the initial
resistance emerged in the communities whose livelihoods the project threatened. The pastor
framed the dam construction as a ‘threat to the culture of the whole Kachin tribe’ (FAA1), but
decision-makers in Kachin State did not initially believe that such a dam would be built (FG7,
FAA1).
This situation changed only upon the national government’s announcement of the
project in a newspaper in 2007 (FG7, TNL17). Reported to be the leading environmental
NGO advocating against the dam (FNL21), Kachin Development Networking Group
(KDNG) released a major report against the project the same year (KDNG 2007), notably
under the rule of the military junta. Most arguments in it focus on displacement and
environmental impacts (KDNG 2007, 23). Kiik (2016, 376) hypothesizes that Kachin activists
chose this framing (instead of the pastor’s) for audiences outside of their ethnic group, while
truly seeing the project ‘as part of an alarming set of existential threats to Kachin [cultural]
survival’. Yet despite this framing, the project gathered significant attention only once the
November 2010 elections had taken place (FNL21, FNL23), as it was viewed as suitable by
many to test the novel, allegedly now civilian government. ‘This was one of the few not-so-
political issues out there. Protesting against [it] was certainly less dangerous than protesting
for the release of political prisoners’ (FI8).
The framing of the project focused on the dam’s national cultural impacts only when
the movement reached Yangon3. According to activists interviewed, this emphasis was a
conscious choice. Some of them had been abroad during the rule of the military junta, gaining
valuable campaign experience, such as work in environmental NGOs in Thailand (stated inter
alia by FNL3, FNL20, and FNL21). ‘We [thus] understood that we needed a sticky message
to appeal to a wider audience’ (FNL20). Not resonating as much with the notion of
3 Those supporting the movement in Yangon also framed the project as benefitting the elites only
(Kirchherr, Charles, and Walton 2016, 44). This was not the dominant framing, though, according to
my field research. Thus, I am not discussing it in this paper.
‘environmentalism of the poor’, these activists eventually chose the project’s national cultural
impacts as the movement’s key message over human rights violations. Due to the project’s
malpractice resettlement (FAA2, FAA3, FAA5), the latter framing would also have been a
possibility, but they deemed human rights to be ‘a too well-known message already’
(FNL20).
To implement this wider framing, various tactics were chosen. Prominent performers
released songs on the cultural significance of the Irrawaddy River (FNL6), and a three-day art
exhibition on the beauty of the Irrawaddy River featuring work by environmental
photographer Myint Zaw was launched in a Yangon art gallery in mid-September 2011 (the
Myitsone Dam project was suspended only six days after the end of the exhibition; FI8,
FNL6). Notably, many activists did not explicitly mention the Myitsone Dam in their
campaign framing until project suspension, referring only to the Irrawaddy River as a national
cultural heritage to be saved. Indicating how risky activists generally considered any protest
activity, early demonstrations against the Mytisone Dam in Kachin State were also masked as
mass prayer ceremonies for the Irrawaddy River (FNL3; KDNG, 2007). No open discourse
regarding the dam took place between the government and activists, as also found by Kiik
(2016, 376).
Movement leadership, constituents, and organization: These descriptions can be read
as if the campaign against the Myitsone Dam was shaped by particular movement leaders.
Indeed, Myint Zaw was awarded the prestigious Goldman Environmental Prize for his
‘underground “Save the Irrawaddy” campaign’ (FNL21). However, this honor was criticized
by activists interviewed in Kachin State, who pointed out that Myint Zaw only joined the
campaign once it had reached Yangon (FNL21, FNL23). Interviewees such as FNL12,
TNL17, or FNL23 also conveyed that no single activist or organization was instrumental in
the campaign. While none of the interviewees stated this explicitly, the impression based on
the interviews is that the campaign against the Myitsone Dam overall was rather disjointed,
but became less so once it had reached Yangon and attracted additional constituents. Yet it
seems that no overall organizational structure was maintained within the movement at any
point in time.
Financial resources: The movement not only became more focused, but funding also
likely increased once it reached Yangon. Because many organizations participated, a concrete
estimate of the movement’s overall budget could not be created. KDNG’s annual budget
varies between USD 30,000 and 50,000, and all of the funds were spent on outreach, thanks to
volunteers who handled the administration (TNL17). As a comparison, CPI has already spent
up to 800 million on the project (Lwin 2015). When the campaign reached Yangon, local
elites (such as several famous Burmese writers) also contributed to the movement’s outreach
budget (FNL6). Funding from outside sources included the U.S. embassy in Myanmar (FNL3;
U.S. Embassy, 2011). International NGOs funded the movement and its direct protest
activities only upon project suspension, with the most notable example likely being
International Rivers (2013). Initially, local NGOs hesitated to build relations with
international ones because simply contacting them could result in three-year prison sentences
during the military junta rule (Simpson 2013, 113). Organizations such as International Rivers
continue to play a marginal role in the campaign against the Myitsone Dam in the belief that
‘the local movement [is] very strong [so there is] no clear need or role for … involvement’
(FNI14).
While none of my interviewees mentioned funding as crucial for the movement, it
undoubtedly contributed to its success by helping to spread the movement’s message. The
culmination of the movement’s protests in the suspension of the project still surprised
interviewees such as FNL3, TI7, and FP19. This decision was not solely attributed to the
campaign. First, interviewees also suggested that the national government wanted to display
its strength against China. Many in Myanmar perceived the country to be a ‘client state of
China’ (FP19), an image portraying the national government as weak (which it was thus keen
to rebut; Simpson 2014, 20; 121 ff.; FP19). Second, the new government also viewed the
suspension as a symbolic gesture, as evidence ‘that they are now listening to the people’
(FNL12; largely echoed inter alia by TI7, FI8, and TP24). Due to this unique context of
political change, an activist hypothesized that this movement may be difficult to replicate
(TNL13).
5.2 The Struggle against Thailand’s Kaeng Suea Ten Dam
Issue framing: Most interviewees opposed the project primarily because it required them to
resettle (e.g., FAA8, FAA14, or FAA28). ‘We love it here. This is our home’ (FAA28). Yet
environmental framing was also mentioned, although apparently it was introduced only after
collaboration with NGOs (FAA7, FAA10, FAA29). From 1989 onwards, the first NGO
collaborating with the villagers was Wildlife Fund Thailand (WFT), which was particularly
active at that time (Forsyth 2007, 2118). It helped the villagers understand the dams’ socio-
economic impacts, through actions such as organizing visits to communities resettled because
of the Siriki and Bhumibol Dam (FAA24, FAA27, TNL10, TNL26). Yet WFT’s primary
concern was not the project’s socio-economic impacts (the framing of the villagers) but its
environmental ones (TNL26): the project would flood teak forests that WFT wanted to protect
(TNL26). When WFT arrived, villagers were cutting down teak trees to sell (TNL26). The
conservation framing was eventually adopted by the villagers (in addition to the still-
dominant socio-economic framing), with WFT claiming that no support could be gathered for
villagers exploiting their forests (TLN26). ‘Convincing them took two years’, WFT staff said
(TNL26).
> Figure 2 here <
Yet the dam project continues to be framed not only by the villagers and WFT, but
also by the government and people downstream of the potential site. They view it as a prime
solution to their flooding and drought issues and are thus seen as key antagonists by the
villagers (acknowledged by FAA31, FAA39, and FAA45).
Movement leadership, constituents, and organization: The movement is largely
organized by the villages’ anti-dam committees (140 members; FAA40), and it thus resonates
particularly with the notion of ‘environmentalism of the poor’. It is amplified by networks to
various NGOs (FAA41, TG5, FNL18). The committee is led by an elected chair (FAA31) and
a secretary who administers its funding (see the end of this section; FAA42). Each of the
affected villages also has a specific movement chair who reports to the overall chair. At times,
these specific chairpersons appoint sub-leaders (FAA42, FA44), which exemplifies the
movement’s sophisticated organizational structure. The committee monitors governmental
efforts toward dam construction and adjusts its level of activity accordingly. Few protests
have occurred since 2014, when the current military government indicated that the project
would not be a priority (FAA44). The committee also takes majority decisions regarding
which tactics to implement (‘and everyone accepts these’; FAA44), which are then passed
down to the villagers via the described structure.
The tactics developed by the committee and implemented by the villagers (with 22 of
23 villagers asked reporting having taken part in them) evolved over time, partly as a response
to the framing of the project by downstream communities and the government (‘In the
beginning, we had no system’; FAA24). Because the government did not take the resistance
seriously (FAA24), a different campaign approach was needed. In particular, the NGO Living
River Siam Association was credited with teaching the villagers how to campaign. It
introduced Thai Baan research,4 which includes the development of alternatives to the
4 Thai Baan research is research conducted by villagers. This approach was developed in 2000 in the
aftermath of the Pak Mun Dam project to enable villagers ‘to ‘write their own story’ [of impacts]
(Käkönen and Hirsch 2009, 346) and it is now used not only in Thailand, but also (inter alia) in
Cambodia and Vietnam (Käkönen and Hirsch 2009, 346).
construction of the dam (FNL18). Thai Baan research helped the villagers carry out factual
conversations with those proposing the project, and these arguments (particularly the
alternatives suggested) are apparently sought by journalists writing about the project (TG5,
FAA31). Assembly of the Poor (AoP; Missingham 2002) was also credited, particularly for
inviting the villagers to various mass demonstrations in Bangkok and Chiang Mai (these were
carried out by villagers from all over Thailand who feared dam-induced displacement and
were possibly due to the country’s relatively open POS; FAA40). The demonstrations ensure
that the protests against the project remain visible to key decision-makers.
The current protest system comprises not only demonstrations and Thai Baan
research, but also 24/7 monitoring of the potential site, spiritual activities such as puppet
burning, and collaborations with villages downstream. The monitoring ensures that project
proponents cannot take the villagers by surprise, with all of them gathering at the dam site to
defend it if dam proponents approach (FAA10). The puppet burning usually targets specific
officials within Thailand’s Royal Irrigation Department (‘one official whose puppet we burnt
even came to our villages and asked us to remove the curse’ said FAA40). Last, an NGO-
funded project in the late 1990s (with a follow up in the mid-2000s) brought together people
from the 11 provinces on the Yom River to exchange views (FAA31, FAA40), and villagers
such as FAA30 argued that the support of downstream people for the dam lessened as a result
of these exchanges.
Constituting a ‘system of protest’ (FAA61), their activities are seen by various
interviewees (e.g., FAA11, FAA16) as the key reason why the dam has not yet been
constructed. My reading of the case also suggests that this system of protest is the most
decisive for this movement’s success.
Financial resources: Outreach activities such as travel to protests in Bangkok are
mostly financed via a dam opposition fund (FAA41). A fund of ~4,000 USD was set up and is
maintained by volunteer movement leaders (FAA40). Approximately 2,000 USD is gathered
via a ‘mandatory payment’ (FAA40, FAA41), with households asked to contribute 3 USD
each whenever funding runs low (FAA38, FAA41). The remainder is collected via donations
from villagers, with amounts averaging 3 USD per interviewee per year (FAAA32, FAA33).
The average annual household income in the villages was reported be USD 718 (FAA40). If
this estimate is correct, the entire fund would only amount to the combined income of six
village households (although government data indicate that the annual income may be higher).
It is acknowledged that the NGOs involved also require funding to support the
movement (e.g., AoP for organizing protests of multiple villages in Bangkok), and their staff
members are usually paid with the overall movement, thus facing some self-administration
costs. Relevant funding data of the various NGOs involved could not be obtained. It is
assumed that the bulk of relevant movement funding is covered by the dam opposition fund,
although villagers’ travel costs to a protest are likely to be much higher than organizing one,
for instance. Hence, the sophisticated system of protest described can likely be implemented
without much funding.
6. Discussion
The previous section presented two case studies of successful anti-dam campaigns that
highlight the importance of framing when analysing such campaigns. Echoing the
constructionist school within social movement studies, I contend that the framing of a dam
project is the key starting point for understanding an anti-dam movement. The instrumental
role of framing for an anti-dam movement has already been highlighted by Moore (1998,
299), Hou (2000, 2), and Sneddon and Fox (2008, 637). The emotional framing of the
Myitsone Dam case as a project threatening Myanmar’s national cultural heritage was
identified as the main reason for the movement’s success, with most of the interviewees
pointing out that this framing helped unite an ethnically divided country against the project.
While an alternative explanation of a sophisticated protest system was suggested in the case
of the Kaeng Suea Ten Dam, I argue that the contestation over framing this project prepared
the ground for the movement’s eventual success.
Indeed, tactics implemented by the movement against this dam project (with its
sophisticated system of protest leading to its suspension for 37 years) may be seen as a result
of competing framings. Yong and Grundy-Warr (2012, 1045) also imply this proposition in
their analysis of the Lower Mekong mainstream dam debates, finding that activists engaged in
scientific research on dams’ impacts as a response to a narrative from pro-hydropower
advocates. Similarly, I found that activists adopted more sophisticated strategies, such as
conducting Thai Baan research and suggesting dam project alternatives as a response to their
promotion by government and downstream communities as a solution to flood and drought
issues. No comparable activities were observed in the case of Myanmar’s Myitsone Dam
because activists did not have to compete with a domestic pro-dam narrative. The military
junta refused to explain its stance or respond to protests until project suspension, while 90%
of the project’s electricity would have been exported to China, which many view as
Myanmar’s main antagonist (FNL3; Kiik 2016, 375).
These case studies further suggest that a movement’s framing broadens over time and
that this expansion is vital for its success. Tarrow (1998, 105) states that movements ‘must
frame their demands in ways that will attract [many] followers’, a view shared by many
constuctionists (as shown in Section 3). Authors on social movements such as Kilgore (1999,
194) or Kim (2011, 320) assume the framing appealing to a popular base to be static.
However, the framing of Myanmar’s Myitsone Dam developed from a narrative of
displacement and threat to the Kachin people and their culture to one that addressed the entire
country via a focus on the Irrawaddy River’s cultural significance for Myanmar. Due to this
framing beyond the local scale, many more citizens were led to perceive a stake in the project.
In Thailand, the movement’s framing of the Kaeng Suea Ten Dam evolved from a narrative
on displacement to one that also stressed the project’s environmental implications (echoing
findings on environmental activism in Thailand by Forsyth, 2007).
The case studies further suggest that changes in the movement’s constituents induced
changes in framing and in its primary tactics, thus being key for the movement’s success
(echoing the structural school within social movement studies). Ganz (2004, 178–179) noted
that the failure to focus on movement leadership and constituents is a ‘serious shortcoming of
social movement theory’, a claim largely echoed by Morris (2004, 209). This alleged
shortcoming has been addressed by scholars on anti-dam movements in recent years such as
Young (2008, 183). These case studies replicate these findings, stressing that the national
cultural framing of the Myitsone Dam campaign was consciously adopted as the most ‘sticky
message’ (FNL20), with emotional appeal for a wide audience. Some of the activists joining
the movement in Yangon had returned to Myanmar from exile only upon its opening up,
leveraging their campaign experience gathered when abroad (including in Thailand). They
understood that significant solidarity for the issue of those to be displaced could only be
gathered if the movement’s framing was broadened (as stated by FNL3, FNL20, and FNL21).
Similarly, the environmental framing of the Kaeng Suea Ten Dam campaign was introduced
only when it developed beyond ‘environmentalism of the poor’, with WFT joining in and
linking their knowledge (claims) regarding framing to the movement. Due to its relatively
open POS at that time, WFT was active in Thailand, and the movement thus benefitted from
these relatively open POSs. Furthermore, NGOs introduced novel tactics to villagers subject
to displacement by Thailand’s Kaeng Suea Ten Dam. These ranged from demonstrations to
Thai Baan research, which proved decisive for the movement’s success (FAA40, FNL18).
This finding echoes those of Islam and Islam (2016, 12), who also describe how constituents
introduced novel tactics, such as a petition to the United Nations in the international
movement against India’s Tipaimukh Dam.
The framing regarding both dam projects is grounded in their environmental, social,
and cultural impacts. Yet the case studies suggest that massive impacts do not seem to be a
necessary condition for a campaign that results in project suspension. After all, the impacts of
the Kaeng Suae Ten Dam are rather limited compared to those of the much larger Myitsone
Dam (as shown in Table 1). Nevertheless, a successful campaign still emerged against this
project, which is rooted in the initial resistance of those to be displaced by it — a resistance
that allowed additional constituents to join in and broaden the movement’s framing. This
finding may be of particular interest to those in Southeast Asia wondering if successful
campaigns can be staged not only against the various extremely large dams planned on the
Mekong, but also against the smaller ones planned on its tributaries.
Lastly, I found (echoing Chandra 2013, 55) that the amount of campaign funding
seems to be largely irrelevant for the success of anti-dam movements in developing countries,
which can control much of their costs (including self-administration costs) via volunteers. Yet
Moore (1998, 310) argued that the struggle of the Sierra Club against the United States’ New
Los Padres Dam was successful since it ‘spent the most of any oppositional group’. This
research suggests that thanks to many volunteers, even the sophisticated protest system
developed by the villagers fearing displacement because of the Kaeng Suea Ten Dam was
implementable with limited financial backing (with the entire dam opposition fund amounting
to the combined income of six of the 1,206 households in the relevant villages). While the
overall budget of the movement against Myanmar’s Myitsone Dam could not be estimated,
data suggest that it was minuscule, particularly when compared to the budgets of project
advocates. (The leading environmental NGO against the dam reported an annual budget of up
to USD 50,000 for outreach activities, compared to 800 million spent by the developer;
TNL17; Lwin, 2015). This finding may be particularly encouraging for environmental NGOs
that frequently struggle to secure significant funding for their work.
7. Conclusion
Anti-dam campaigns are omnipresent, and they can significantly impact project conduct, such
as the implementation of consultation or resettlement schemes (Hall 1994, 1805). Yet those
resulting in project suspensions or cancellations remain rare empirically (TNI15). Hence,
scholars have had limited opportunities to study the strategies of such successes. Indeed, only
two scholarly case studies were identified that discussed anti-dam movements in the
developing world that led to project suspensions or cancellations: Chandra (2013) and
Sneddon and Fox (2008).
This paper’s objective was to explore how anti-dam movements can succeed. For this
purpose, I have analysed two pertinent movements in Southeast Asia. Likely the most
successful ones in recent years, they achieved project suspensions for six and 37 years,
respectively. It was found that the movement against the Myitsone Dam in Myanmar was
successful largely due to the framing eventually adopted, which described the project
emotionally as a threat to the country’s national cultural heritage. It thus appealed to a wide
popular base, with the political change in the country in 2010/2011 creating conducive
conditions for the movement. Meanwhile, the movement against the Kaeng Suea Ten Dam in
Thailand ensured its success via a sophisticated campaign strategy that developed at least
partly as a response to the competing framings regarding the project (with those opposing it
framing it as a threat to villagers’ livelihoods and the environment and those advocating it
framing it as a solution to flood and drought issues).
The case studies overall highlight the importance of framing as well as movement
constituents when studying anti-dam campaigns. Emotional framing that appeals beyond the
local scale can explain an anti-dam movement’s success, and competing framings can result
in sophisticated tactics that eventually also lead to project suspension (even for projects which
are not extremely large and thus feature comparatively moderate impacts). Framing was found
to be evolving in both cases studied, with its gradual broadening being driven by the
respective movements’ changing constituents. They linked their knowledge and experience
with the respective movements, which originated as ‘environmentalism of the poor’ but
benefitted greatly from developing beyond this notion.
The case studies suggest that thinking from both the constructionist and structural
schools within social movement studies can be helpful analytical lenses to help explain an
anti-dam movement’s success. Yet both studies are embedded in specific contexts (e.g., the
Myitsone Dam case study may be an anomaly due to the sudden political change in Myanmar
in 2011). Thus, caution is warranted regarding the external validity of any findings presented.
The context is different for any dam project and resulting movement, and this paper does not
aim to imply that anti-dam movements not resulting in project suspension (such as those
against projects on the Mekong River) lack suitable framing. Rather, these campaigns may be
impeded by the much more restrictive POS in countries such as Laos and Cambodia. Yet
further case study research will be needed to test this hypothesis.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
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[One reference withheld to ensure blinded peer-review]
Tables
Table 1: Key facts regarding the Myitsone Dam and the Kaeng Suea Ten Dam
Myitsone Dam Kaeng Suea Ten Dam
Key milestones 2009: Start of pre-
construction works
2011: Suspension of project
1980: Decision by Thai
government to build dam
Main purpose Electricity exports to China
(90% of dam’s electricity to be
exported in exchange for USD
500 million annually)
Flood control (dam supposed
to hold 1,200 m3 water to
prevent flooding particularly in
Sukhotai Province)
Capacity (MW) 6,000 (15
th
largest hydropower
plan in the world if completed)
49
Construction
costs (USD
million)
3,600 100
Resettlement 12,000 people 2,960 people
Project sponsor China Power Investment
Cooperation (CPI) in
cooperation with Asia World,
Burmese developer
No sponsor (World Bank
pulled out as a sponsor in the
1990s)
Sources: Bünte et al. (2012, p. 145 ff.), U. S. Embassy (2011), KDNG (2007), FAA20, FAA41, FNL21
