Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols
Abstract
"Like Dewey, he has revolted against the empiricist dogma and the Kantian dualisms which have compartmentalized philosophical thought. . . . Unlike Dewey, he has provided detailed incisive argumentation, and has shown just where the dogmas and dualisms break down." --Richard Rorty, The Yale Review
... However, some philosophers have argued that a reasonably faithful replica of a work of visual art (a painting or carved sculpture) can serve as a sort of aesthetic surrogate or proxy for the original, even if that copy cannot be (and should not be considered) a genuine instance of the work, suggesting that a work can be experienced at least to some degree even if that work itself has been destroyed or access to the original form has been curtailed in some way (Budd, 2003;Livingston, 2003;Mitias, 1972;cf. Eaton, 2001;Goodman, 1976). ...
... We predict that if people think of visual art as existing in singular genuine instances but nonvisual artworks as having multiple genuine instances (D. Davies, 2004;Goodman, 1976;Levinson, 1987), then the ability to experience a work whose original form is destroyed should be significantly hampered for visual artworks compared to nonvisual artworks. By asking people whether artworks can still be experienced at levels of destruction past just the original piece, such as destroying all physical copies, we can test the limits of when people think they can experience art and how important the original of the piece is to that experience. ...
... This is not what our participants indicated by endorsing that such a work might continue to exist following the destruction of the original and all its copies. The idea that a musical or literary work might continue to exist following the destruction of all copies and memories of that work does in fact have some adherents (see Dodd, 2002;Goodman, 1976;Kivy, 1993), but these philosophers do not typically hold the same view about works of visual art. Further, there are no a priori reasons offered in philosophical theory to explain why people are more willing to endorse nonvisual works than visual works as ultimately impossible to destroy, suggesting new avenues for philosophical theory. ...
Drawing from philosophical and psychological literatures, we explored people’s beliefs about the experience and nature of art. Across three experiments, we asked participants (N = 420) to rate the ability to experience different artworks after the original work, copies, and memories of the work had been destroyed. People endorsed destroying the original of an artwork as more damaging to the experience of a visual work (paintings, carved sculptures) than a nonvisual work (novel, play, poem, classical music, popular music). However, people endorsed that famous and nonfamous artworks could still be experienced until people’s memories of the pieces were destroyed. Overall, our findings suggest that people believe the identity of artworks exist past the destruction of their physical form, suggesting interesting implications for theories of object identity and the valuation of art.
... On yet another trail, one finds theories that follow Herbert Spencer's suggestion that artworks 'make us share in the joys and sorrows of others ' (1988: 418), and theories that stress the imaginative knowledge of artworks (Kieran 1996, Currie 1998, Schellekens 2007. A last track within the cognitivist debate, following the influential work by Ernst Gombrich (1959), Nelson Goodman (1976 and Catherine Elgin (1993), conceives of artistic cognition as a form of orientation, offering exemplifications (Goodman) or perspectives (Young 2001) on the world through which hidden phenomena become salient. ...
... Of course, many philosophers have criticised the Greek representationalist paradigm that we inherited in aesthetics (e.g. Hanslick 1986, Goodman 1976). However, most of the critique on representation tacitly identifies representational truth with correct correspondence. ...
This thesis aims to emancipate the ancient Greek question of artistic truth. First, I will demonstrate that the question of artistic truth is raised rather than answered by Plato. Second, I will show that this question is extended rather than solved by Aristotle’s attempt to answer it. Third, I claim that, partly as a consequence of this Aristotelian heritage, the question is currently absent in contemporary aesthetics, yet needed for contemporary art practices. Through my discussion of Plato and Aristotle, I develop a conceptual framework that can help to employ, develop and compare various theories of artistic truth. In short, this conceptual framework encompasses a transcendental scheme of three truth conceptions (i.e. metaphysical truth, discursive correctness and aesthetic plausibility) of which each corresponds to a distinct metaphysical modality (i.e. necessity, reality and possibility) and a specific form of representation (i.e. preceding, succeeding and simultaneous with the represented). With this differentiated account of truth, I present a systematic metaphysical framework in which truth is not identical with correctness, thinking not with discursive thinking, and the intellectual value of art not with the knowledge it bears. With this, I aim to aid a more critical inquiry into the conditions and possibilities of non-discursive thought in general, and its value of truth in particular.
... The score is at center of what Nelson Goodman calls "allographic arts", i.e., arts where there is a distinction between writing and realization. Goodman gives a definition of the opposite category of "autographic arts": an art is autographic "if and only if the distinction between original and forgery of it is significant" [14] (p. 113). ...
Any human action can be repeated; none can be repeated exactly. In fact, most human actions will be repeated—in its most basic sense, culture is the establishment of forms and standards of repeatability. The performing arts are based on this fact, they make it explicit and explore it, albeit in very different ways. In light of these differences, it becomes obvious that ontological questions in music and the performing arts have a cultural index—rather than asking about the nature of identity and repetition, we should ask what counts as identical under what circumstances. These circumstances differ widely across cultures as well as across disciplines, and they are subject to change. Drawing on examples from performance art and music, this paper will explore the different constellations of repeatability we find in these fields. This comparative perspective promises to reshape some gridlocked debates in music as well as in the theory of performance. In particular, Christopher Bedford’s idea of a “viral ontology” of performance and the displacement of the concept of the work by Bruno Nettl’s notion of the model prove fruitful.
... Questions and discussions around this concept are continuously debated by the academic community, alongside the growing conservation and restoration practices. Despite the chosen strategy, artworks are allographic [14] and especially "dynamic system" as defined by Pip Laurenson [15], which means that they exist only when they are installed or performed, and sooner or later they will be deactivated. Laurenson places time-based media art "on the ontological continuum somewhere between performance and sculpture," and defines it as allographic since it is "similar to works that are performed" and therefore belongs to those artworks "created in a two-stage process". ...
This paper presents the work carried out by the Centro di Sonologia Computazionale (CSC) of the University of Padua, regarding the reactivation and preservation of time-based media artworks, including computer music, live electronics, performances, and multimedia art installations. During the last few years, the CSC has been developing a specific approach for archiving, documenting, and reactivating time-based media artworks, which led to the definition of the Multilevel Dynamic Preservation (MDP) model. Through in-depth analysis, various approaches are examined in the reactivation of several case studies, including digitisation, restoration, migration, and virtualisation of the artworks. The selected case studies involve various forms of art expression, such as video art, computer music, expanded cinema, and interactive performance. This contribution offers a comprehensive overview of the challenges encountered in the process of reactivating and preserving multimedia art, investigating the possible solutions offered by new technologies in preserving, digitising and virtualizing some of its forms, such as multimedia installations, expanded cinema, and video art performances.
... Sobre a imagem como um todo, consulteGoodman (1976),Thom (1983) e Dondero (2020). ...
A inteligência artificial simula hoje, de maneira cada vez mais satisfatória, a complexidade da linguagem e das ações humanas. Neste artigo abordamos as inteligências artificiais com instrumentos semióticos. Aqui, assumiremos o ponto de vista da teoria da enunciação de É. Benveniste, especialmente dos desenvolvimentos em semiótica pós-greimasiana, e sobretudo de Jacques Fontanille aplicados ao estudo da inteligência artificial. Essa base teórica nos possibilitará discutir, primeiramente, a relação entre banco de dados de imagens e algoritmos na análise de grandes coleções de imagens por meio da computer vision, além dos modos de diálogo do usuário com o modelo de inteligência artificial generativa Midjourney, que nos permitirá tratar a criatividade da máquina.
... Regardless of their origin, non-notational elements are an inevitable part of any musical performance. According to Goodman's (1976) perspectives, their presence is not merely incidental but is instrumental to the aesthetic qualities of the Art of performance. Variations in the interpretation of a score among different performers, or even in successive performances by the same musician, generate the aesthetic interest that attracts us to concert performances of repertoire pieces. ...
In scores from the Western Classical tradition, the ambiguity between the notated music and the actual performance and perception continues to draw audiences to live concerts. This discrepancy presents dilemmas that are challenging to resolve but warrant further investigation: What could be notated but is deemed unnecessary or unfeasible? What constitutes 'licence'? Where do the boundaries lie between cultural norms and personal expression? To what extent can a composer's intentions be discerned? Which of these considerations should be integrated into music education? The aim of this conceptual article is to enhance the theoretical understanding of musical score interpretation by drawing on existing empirical and theoretical insights from different fields. It seeks to identify relationships, contradictions, gaps, and inconsistencies in existing literature, highlight their shortcomings, and outline future directions to address these questions. I conclude that current research on this topic does not yet provide universally accepted answers, thereby hindering the development of a comprehensive, explanatory model of musical score interpretation. Lastly, I propose a novel hermeneutic approach aligned with Elliott’s praxial philosophy in music education and Ricoeur’s concept of Mimesis. This approach offers a new framework for conducting interdisciplinary studies aimed at developing a holistic model for understanding musical score interpretation.
... Eine mimetische Beziehung zwischen dem Fußball und anderen sozialen Welten anzunehmen impliziert, dass das Fußballfeld anderen sozialen Feldern nicht nachgeordnet ist, sondern -ähnlich wie die Kunst -einen Bereich bildet, in dem durch Noch-Einmal-Machen und Umarbeiten eine eigene Version der Welt erzeugt(Goodman, 2013), oder -mit Luhmann (2017 gesprochen -Realität verdoppelt wird. Als eigenlogische Version der Welt ...
... A fep!"), this activates an expectation that whatever follows is both referential and generic. In other words, the event infants observe becomes an act of exemplification (Goodman, 1976). Exemplification is when an object, by virtue of being the kind of object it is, stands in as a representative of its kind. ...
Object individuation studies have been a valuable tool in understanding the development of kind concepts. In this article, we review evidence from object individuation paradigms to argue that by their first birthday, infants represent at least three superordinate-level sortal kinds: OBJECT, ANIMATE, and AGENT (possibly also ARTIFACT). These superordinate sortal-kind concepts share key characteristics of adult kind concepts, such as prioritizing causal properties and having inductive potential. We then discuss the implications of this body of research. First, we discuss how the early development of these sortal-kind concepts (i.e., OBJECT, ANIMATE, and AGENT) relate to the two major theories of concepts: core knowledge and psychological essentialism. Second, we suggest that superordinate kind concepts set the stage for later development of basic-level kind concepts and present evidence that human communication, either in the form of language or pedagogical demonstration, plays a key role in constructing basic-level kinds. Third, we compare feature-based versus kind-based object individuation studies and put forth the hypothesis that they may reflect two modes of construal theory. Last, we discuss several open theoretical and empirical questions about sortal-kind concepts and suggest directions for future research. Overall, our review underscores the importance of object individuation methods as a powerful research tool for investigating the development of kind concepts, mechanisms of learning, and the relationship between language and thoughts.
... Recognising objects or faces requires attention, focus, context anddepending on one's school of thought -even consciousness or emotions. Human recognition is therefore completely different from automatically finding differences of brightness in pictures to determine the shape and class of an expected object (Goodman 1976). Furthermore, consciously remembering something is a highly complex process for humans which is more comparable to living through imagined events again and by that even changing what is being remembered. ...
In the interdisciplinary field of artificial intelligence (AI) the problem of clear terminology is especially momentous. This paper claims, that AI debates are still characterised by a lack of critical distance to metaphors like 'training', 'learning' or 'deciding'. As consequence, reflections regarding responsibility or potential use-cases are greatly distorted. Yet, if relevant decision-makers are convinced that AI can develop an 'understanding' or properly 'interpret' issues, its regular use for sensitive tasks like deciding about social benefits or judging court cases looms. The chapter argues its claim by analysing central notions of the AI debate and tries to contribute by proposing more fitting terminology and hereby enabling more fruitful debates. It is a conceptual work at the intersection of critical computer science and philosophy of language.
... The rise of structuralism and the "cognitive revolution" starting in the 1950s overshadowed this tradition by turning towards code models of communication. But even many code theorists acknowledged that the actual use of a code in a real situation is not accounted for by the code itself (Eco 1968;Goodman 1968). Many phenomenologists, linguists and semioticians continued to embrace the dynamic character of sign use (Coseriu 1985;Zlatev 2023). ...
This paper relates the concept of relevance to its biological foundations by combining Alfred Schutz’s social phenomenology and Helmuth Plessner’s theory of organic life and philosophical anthropology. Relevance interlinks human sign use with the human “lifeworld” (Husserl) as a whole. The biological foundations of relevance, in turn, interlink that lifeworld with the “world of life” that includes us among other lifeforms. I analyze human relevance as an interplay of two tendencies, termed “closedness” and “openness,” that underlies our production of “meaning” (Schutz). Relevance in this general sense involves not only the mind, but also the body of homo sapiens. To provide a unified theoretical framework, I reconstruct Plessner’s “philosophical biology.” According to Plessner, organic life consists in a tension between closedness and openness. This tension unfolds through the “levels” of plants, animals, and humans. Plessner’s analysis of humans as “excentric” animals helps explain the two tendencies that drive human relevance and distinguish our experience from that of our closest animal relatives. At the same time, Plessner traces a robust continuity between us and other lifeforms. The human “level” merely makes “explicit” certain elements (including the Cartesian distinction between “mind” and “body”) that all organisms implicitly possess.
... La ejemplificación es una noción clave en la filosofía estética de NelsonGoodman (1976). ...
: ¿Cómo apreciar la relación entre escritura e imagen en los libros de artistas contemporáneos? A lo largo del siglo XX ha habido un intento por deshacerse de la tutela discursiva por parte de los pintores que ya no se contentan con “ilustrar” el texto sino que aportan nuevas dimensiones para conformar un objeto nuevo. En este artículo, me propongo reflexionar sobre la interacción entre el arte visual y la escritura en Avía un río, poemario de Gustavo Mujica acompañado de imágenes de Vivian Scheihing. Mujica, “El Grillo”, inventa un lenguaje en el que resuenan otras lenguas, espacios y tiempos, que mantiene a raya la profunda desazón del exiliado. La pintora comparte esta experiencia. En sus dibujos responde a fragmentos del texto a la vez que introduce motivos personales, en concordancia con la tonalidad del poemario. A un texto navegando entre lo cósmico y mundos en descomposición, responden unos dibujos donde se dan a ver los signos de un viaje entre nostálgico y sin rumbo, pero con una misión: anotar “neoencuentros” y “buscar presencia i vida”
... Syntactic repleteness (Goodman, 1976, cited in Kulvicki, 2013 provides one level of analyses where the syntactic features of the sign may correspond more or less with the syntactic features of the referent. Kulvicki (2013) considers an example of a black and white picture of a real-world scene, which is less replete than a color picture of that scene. ...
Iconicity is a term used in cognitive science and gesture studies to denote an informative relation between the form of an utterance and the meaning of that utterance. With good iconic design, the form of an utterance can directly invite a suitable perceiver with a certain degree of initiation, to grasp a meaning in the right direction. Despite the now increasingly touted importance of iconicity for understanding human languages, it proves difficult to define more formally. When the term is defined, researchers tend to base iconicity on resemblances, such that A is iconic of B, if A resembles B in some relevant respect. In the philosophy of depiction fundamental issues have been raised against resemblance-based accounts. Even when barring such metaphysical issues, it has recently been argued that for all practical research purposes, a 'state-of-the-art' definition of iconicity should also do away with resemblances. Instead iconicity is in the eye of the beholder (mind-to-world relation) as opposed to a property of the environment (world-to-mind relation). In this paper I suggest for all practical purposes that there is an alternative explanatory route available to us, which is paved more broadly by 4E approaches (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended) and the philosophy of depiction. Taking this road should lead to a "distributed" view, where iconicity arises in a niche-constructed organism-environment system. This paper provides the bare bones for such a view, broadening the discussion, and hopefully drawing other perspectives in so that a distributed view of iconicity can become fully fleshed out.
... Consequently the assumptions we make about the ways we perceive the world and the visual images we make of it become especially relevant. While some theorists (Goodman, 1967;Sekula, 1982) have assumed that we need to learn to 'read' pictures in order to make the connection between image and reality, I propose that the polarized positions of the conventional nature of images, on the one hand, contrasting with beliefs in the straightforward (photographic-type) realism of pictures, on the other, do not fully account either for our understanding of imagery or for the way it functions in its specific cultural setting. I argue not only that the process is much more complex, but also that neither of the hitherto influential positions is particularly helpful, or much use at all, to those whose business it is to capture or create visual images and make them understandable to a contemporary viewership. ...
... Nelson Goodman's theory of symbols and representations aligns with recycled art's use of found objects. He posits that "art does not merely reflect reality but constructs a new reality through its symbolic forms" (Goodman, 1976). Recycled art exemplifies this by transforming everyday objects into artworks that communicate environmental and social messages. ...
Recycled art represents a transformative approach to creativity, where discarded materials are reimagined into meaningful artistic expressions. This innovative practice challenges traditional notions of artistic value and sustainability, offering a unique perspective on contemporary art. By utilizing waste materials, artists reduce environmental impact while conveying powerful social and environmental messages. This essay explores recycled art through the lens of philosophical theories and mathematical frameworks. We examine how different art forms, core concepts, and materials interact, influencing the creation and interpretation of recycled art. Understanding the hierarchical structure governing recycled art is crucial for appreciating how different permutations produce unique artistic outcomes. Drawing on the works of Paul Crowther, Nelson Goodman, John Dewey, Arthur Danto, and Lucy Lippard, we delve into the theoretical underpinnings that enhance our understanding of recycled art. Each philosopher offers a unique perspective: Crowther's emphasis on aesthetic embodiment, Goodman's theory of symbols, Dewey's concept of art as experience, Danto's notion of the artworld, and Lippard's idea of dematerialization. These insights provide a robust framework for analyzing recycled art. We will discuss the operational subcategories of recycled art-Inspiration, Waste Material Collection, Design, Assembly, and Impact-using case studies of artists such as Vic Muniz, El Anatsui, Nick Cave, Gillian Lowndes, Wangechi Mutu, and Haroshi. These examples illustrate the diverse and impactful artworks that arise from different combinations of art forms, concepts, and materials. Ultimately, this essay highlights the significance of recycled art in the contemporary art world. By promoting sustainability and challenging societal norms, recycled art fosters ecological awareness and inspires innovative artistic practices. Through this exploration, we aim to deepen the appreciation of recycled art and its potential to drive positive change in society.
... Second, the relationship between expression and content is asymmetrical. While it makes sense to say that a photograph represents the actual apple depicted, it is unreasonable to claim that the actual apple represents the photo (Costall, 1997;Goodman, 1968). Third, asymmetry between expression and content can also be observed at the level of the user's experience. ...
The paper examines the semiotic and cognitive status of interactive exhibits at science centers, taking the Copernicus Science Center in Warsaw (CSC) as an example. Such science centers support bottom-up interactions, encouraging visitors to spontaneously explore the exhibits in various ways. We analyze one distinctive way of interaction, when young visitors ignore an exhibit’s instruction and use it as if it were a kind of a toy or machine to play with (this is particularly common with exhibits that are unfamiliar “open-ended objects”). Drawing on cognitive semiotics we describe this particular way of interacting with exhibits as the reality mode of experience, in which the user ignores an intended exhibit’s representational function. We consider whether such interactive objects can be framed as cognitive artifacts, given that standard conceptualizations of artifacts emphasize their representational function. How can we convincingly describe the process by which the cognitive function of an exhibit experienced in reality mode is constituted? In this paper we apply concept of ecological cognitive artifact and the idea of the enactive signification to these questions. We argue that exhibits experienced in reality mode do indeed perform cognitive functions, even in the absence of a representational relation. Our investigation provides insights into the cognitive functions of exhibits and contributes to the conceptualization of non-representational cognitive artifacts.
... Curriculum developers and scholars have variously subscribed to a range of orientations to making art. Conceptualisations include making as development of technical proficiency (Piaget, 1972;Golomb, 1992), as aesthetic competence (Winner & Gardner, 1981), as cognitive development via creative and mental growth (Lowenfeld & Brittain, 1932), as visual language (Goodman, 1968) and as experience (Dewey, 1934(Dewey, , 1938. These enduring conceptualisations resurface in art curricula, where artworks reveal learning progress and artistic development. ...
Abstract
The paper compares conceptions of making, pedagogy, and assessment in the International Baccalaureate Diploma Programme and the New South Wales Stage 6 Visual Arts Syllabus. Both curricula are taught in New South Wales. Despite similar philosophical roots, these curricula have evolved to offer differentiated ontological and epistemological orientations to teaching, creating, and assessing studio art, with diverse conceptualisations of pedagogy, making and assessment. Both curricula provide scope for praxis-oriented experiences that support students’ burgeoning autonomy as developing artists, demonstrating potentially impressive levels of achievement in high-stakes examinations in the final year of schooling.
Keywords: art education, assessment, International Baccalaureate Diploma Programme in visual arts, New South Wales Stage 6 Visual Arts, pedagogy
... 17 Following this basic epistemic meaning, I understand aesthetic processes as symbolic processes (cf. Goodman 1968). Mythical thinking as a symbolic form (as defined by Cassirer) shares this semiotic character of aesthetics, as expounded by Nelson Goodman. ...
Fantasy novels are products of popular culture. They owe their popularity also to the visualization of medievalist artifacts on book covers and designs, illustrations, maps, and marketing: Castles on towering cliffs, cathedral-like architecture, armored heroes and enchanting fairies, fierce dragons and mages follow mythical archetypes and develop pictorial aesthetics of fantasy, completed by gothic fonts, maps and page layout that refer to medieval manuscripts and chronicles. The contributors to this volume explore the patterns and paradigms of a specific medievalist iconography and book design of fantasy which can be traced from the 19th century to the present.
This Element lays the foundation, introduces a framework, and sketches the program for a systematic study of mathematical notations. It is written for everyone who is curious about the world of symbols that surrounds us, in particular researchers and students in philosophy, history, cognitive science, and mathematics education. The main characteristics of mathematical notations are introduced and discussed in relation to the intended subject matter, the language in which the notations are verbalized, the cognitive resources needed for learning and understanding them, the tasks that they are used for, their material basis, and the historical context in which they are situated. Specific criteria for the design and assessment of notations are discussed, as well as ontological, epistemological, and methodological questions that arise from the study of mathematical notations and of their use in mathematical practice.
The paper attempts to clarify a fundamental similarity and some relevant differences between empirical-scientific and fictional thought experiments. For this purpose, the second section of the paper provides a brief outline of a quasi-Kantian account of thought experiments (TE) in the empirical sciences from the viewpoint of a radically functional, strictly not material, a priori. On the basis of this account, a fundamental similarity and two main differences between empirical-scientific and narrative thought experiments are brought to the fore: the counterfactual construction of idealised scenarios is a fundamental characteristic that is shared by scientific and fictional thought experiments (and, more generally, by science and art). The differences depend on the different intentionalities to which this construction is subordinated. Fictional TEs, instead of resolving the dimension of counterfactuality in real empirical facts or processes, use it to transpose certain cultural contents (thoughts, feelings, possible courses of action, etc.) into a dimension outside any particular space and time, which are able to produce a symbolic shelter that protects us from the particular adverse events of concrete life. This, on the one hand, generates in us the feeling of pleasure or enjoyment that tradition has so often linked to artistic enjoyment and, on the other, urges us, implicitly or explicitly, to re-enact those contents in the first person and to take an evaluative stance towards them.
Of all seventeenth-century Dutch painters, Frans Hals is the most controversial in as far as the exact scope of his oeuvre is concerned. The most prominent twentieth-century Hals experts, Harvard Professor Seymour Slive (1920–2014) and his German peer Professor Claus Grimm (born 1940) disagreed about no less than a third of Hals’s oeuvre. Moreover, some of the fiercest public debates and legal battles about attributions in this field concern paintings in the style of Frans Hals. This chapter provides an overview of the evolving insights in this field, both in theory and in practice.
This text addresses the connection between the work of Charles Goodwin in interactional linguistics and contemporary semiotics, notably that of the structuralist Paris School, known today as Greimasian and post-Greimasian semiotics. The latter constitutes scholarship having further developed some great distinctions formulated by Ferdinand de Saussure, such as the one between langue and parole , in the study of multimodality (relations between natural and nonverbal languages). However, Goodwin’s texts consider not only Saussure’s structuralist semiology but also another semiotics, that is, the American cognitive Peircean tradition, specifically regarding the topic of diagrammatic reasoning in multimodal discourse. This article seeks to discuss these two semiotic approaches that I consider as a semiotic foundation of Goodwin’s work, helping him to study the creativity at play in multimodal languages and in scientific diagrammatic devices. I will first return to Goodwin’s contributions in order to reformulate the question of the relations between verbal, visual, and gestural languages in his notational system (transcription of exchanges). Second, I will examine the case of the dynamics of inscriptions in science, raising the issue of the diagram. Third, I will explore the points of encounter between Goodwin’s conception of the substrate of interactions and Jacques Fontanille’s enunciative praxis, in order to consider the dynamic relationship between sedimentation and transformation in social and scientific practices.
This article presents the results of the Laboratory of Art and Spirituality (LAS), in which a group of seven Colombian artists investigated, over a period of 10 months, how artistic creation contributes to understanding spiritual experiences. The research-creation methodology involved spaces of spiritual practice, artistic exploration, and autoethnographic reflection. With the help of these spaces, the artists produced various materials that were subsequently analyzed using a hermeneutic phenomenological orientation. As a result, we developed a model of artistic understanding based on the idea that meaning-making is a process of unfolding meaning that goes through different interpretative moments or loci (experience, the creative process, the artwork, the artist’s life, and autoethnographic reflection). This model entails five meaning-making mechanisms: perception, knowing-how, emotional understanding, seeing-as, and perceiving mystery. The article aims to let the artists speak for themselves, disclosing in their journals and dialogues these fundamental structures of spiritual understanding through artistic creation.
In a day and age when the ability to accommodate uncertainty into one’s lifelong developmental processes has become critical to survival, creativity has garnered an indisputable place in education. Labelled as one of the critical skills of twenty-first-century education, creativity is, however, more than just a skill. It is an attribute of a socio-psychological structure that manifests itself in the continuous interaction between the self, the other and the World, capable of reconciling diverse perspectives and interpretations of the World and opening new meaning-making (and thus developmentally transformative) possibilities. In this chapter, I present a critical analysis of how creativity, as a construct, is approached in educational contexts, as well as the potential consequences for one’s psychological developmental process. Moreover, I emphasize the importance of worldmaking as a key component of educational experiences that, while embracing the uncertainty of contemporary living encourage students and teachers to collaborate in the process of combining old and new meaningful knowledge, critically positioning themselves in the face of individual and collective societal challenges. In this light, I discuss how approaching educational contexts as settings of re-constructive exploration can broaden the developmental possibilities of every person involved in the learning process, specifically by allowing them to question, explore, and actively construct their choices, with indelible consequences on their creativity, agency, and sociocognitive complexity.
The psychological, pedagogical and political implications of this paradigm shift are addressed, aiming to contribute to the ongoing debate about how to cultivate creative-nurturing learning environments.
This Element introduces a young field, the 'philosophy of mathematical practice'. We first offer a general characterisation of the approach to the philosophy of mathematics that takes mathematical practice seriously and contrast it with 'mathematical philosophy'. The latter is traced back to Bertrand Russell and the orientation referred to as 'scientific philosophy' that was active between 1850 and 1930. To give a better sense of the field, the Element further contains two examples of topics studied, that of mathematical structuralism and visual thinking in mathematics. These are in part presented from a methodological point of view, focussing on mathematics as an activity and questions related to how mathematics develops. In addition, the Element contains several examples from mathematics, both historical and contemporary , to illustrate and support the philosophical points.
We revisit the concept of art as an open system, a theme foundational to our prior discussions. We contrast this with the closed systems of strategy games where AI outperforms human skill. We present a cognitive framework for art’s open system, grounded in Herbert Simon’s design science, where artists and AI collaboratively innovate, echoing a long-standing tradition of artistic cooperation. This chapter further explores how AI elevates the role of language in art, enabling the visualization of complex ideas and fostering generative cross-modal connections between text, imagery, and sound in music. This analysis reaffirms that art’s receptiveness to AI heralds a future enriched by centauric partnerships that amplify creative potential.
After viewing a painting, reading a novel, or seeing a film, audiences often feel that they improve their cognitive standing on the world beyond the canvas, page, or screen. To learn from art in this way, I argue, audiences must employ high degrees of epistemic autonomy and creativity, engaging in a process I call ‘insight through art’. Some have worried that insight through art uses audience achievements to explain an artwork’s cognitive and artistic value, thereby failing to properly appreciate the cognitive and artistic achievements of artists. I move against this worry by arguing that in order to learn via insight through art, audiences must collaborate with artists, sharing the labour and credit for the cognitive achievements they co-produce. I claim this co-productive outlook reveals that our appreciation of art’s cognitive and artistic value involves far more audience participation than has hitherto been realized.
Artistic appropriation, the notion of purposely combining pre-existing materials into wholes not known before, is the subject of this chapter. It will examine the political implications of the conscious appropriation of material from visual art into contemporary dance. As Walter Benjamin argues, when “the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic production, the total function of art is reversed. Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to be based on another practice—politics” (“The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” in Illumination, 166–195. ed. Hannah Arendt. New York: Schocken Books, 1969, p. 6). It will focus on two choreographers appropriating movement from visual art to dance. The exact movements, gestures, and poses of models drawn by the Viennese painter Egon Schiele that some were characterized as pornographic are appropriated by Lea Anderson for her dance The Featherstonehaughs Draw on the Sketch Books of Egon Schiele (1998). With her all-male company, she plays with and deconstructs his gender and desire representations, thus elaborating on discourses of feminist critique of her era. Arkadi Zaides’ solo Archive (2014) was created from violent materials filmed by Palestinian volunteers of Israeli settlers in the West Bank, for the Camera Distribution Project B’Tselem (the Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights). Zaides performs the movements and gestures of the Israelis and their reactions in a variety of situations, captured by the cameras. At the same time, he focuses the viewers’ attention on the movements, voices, and perspectives of the Palestinians behind the camera. In doing so, Zaides confronts and identifies with the archival materials, but when reviving it through his body, he raises questions dealing with his responsibility and participation in what is happening.
There exist hardly any foundational, systematically developed essays or books that—moving beyond more or less traditional artistic genres (e.g., the novel, the feature film)—integrate popular objects and phenomena into their definitions of art, as has been done in the field of modern art, e.g., with the emergency of ‘Readymade,’ automatic writing, and aleatoric music. Still, there are several important aspects that we can readily adapt to develop such an approach. These include, above all, the following concepts and phenomena: useful artifacts; entertainment; event, environment, performance; show; and laypeople/amateurs.
Η εργασία αυτή εξετάζει την τέχνη ως μορφή γραμματισμού και προσπαθεί να διερευνήσει τη σύνδεση της τέχνης με τις έννοιες του γραμματισμού και των πολυγραμματισμών. Αντιπαραβάλει τις παραδοσιακές προσεγγίσεις του γραμματισμού με τις σύγχρονες θεωρήσεις των πολυγραμματισμών και των πολυτροπικών γραμματισμών, υιοθετώντας μια ολιστική και συνθετική οπτική για τη συμβολή της τέχνης στην προώθηση του γραμματισμού και των πολυγραμματισμών. Επιπλέον, η τέχνη ως μορφή γραμματισμού αντιπροσωπεύει ένα νέο παράδειγμα για την εκπαίδευση, το οποίο έχει επιφέρει ουσιαστικές αλλαγές στον τρόπο που αντιλαμβανόμαστε την εκπαίδευση, τη διαπολιτισμική κατανόηση, τις δεξιότητες ζωής καθώς και τις λειτουργίες του πολιτισμού.
The main thesis defended in this paper is that, interpreted in the light of reflections of Peirce and Poincaré, one can found in mathematical reasoning a non-logical symptom that may be aesthetic in Goodman’s sense. This symptom is called exemplification and serves to distinguish between only logically correct and even explanatory proofs. It broadens the scope of aesthetics to include all activities involving symbolic systems and blurs the boundaries between logic and aesthetics in mathematics. It gives a better understanding of Poincaré’s thesis that to affect aesthetic value to certain properties is not simply an added value, a bonus that somehow rewards the mathematician’s mechanical labor, but on the contrary, taking the aesthetic value into account can be helpful to mathematical practice. As an example, three proofs of the irrationality of √2 are compared for their aesthetic functioning.
According to the mainstream view in the philosophy of music, the only way to authentically perform works of past centuries is according to the ideal of Historically Authentic Performance (HAP). This paper aims to show that, despite recent defences of the mainstream view, it lacks motivation, and hence should be abandoned or revised. As we shall see, first, there is no plausible account of HAP as a final and intrinsic value consistent with the work-focused teleology of work-performance. Second, a plausible account of the value of HAP in work-performance regards HAP as a way of performing works of past centuries convincingly. However, this approach does not support the mainstream view because this only leaves HAP as an interpretive option. Finally, an alternative defence of the value of HAP in the form of an indispensability argument is considered: HAP is indispensable to accurately comply with a work’s score, and thus to perform it faithfully. This strategy supports the demands of the mainstream view, but we will see that, if we take this option seriously, HAP must be understood in a substantively different manner than the mainstream view does, such that it ultimately amounts to the second option analysed above.
Tree diagrams are the prevailing form of visualization in biological classification and phylogenetics. Already during the time of the so-called Systematist Wars from the mid-1960s until the 1980s most journal articles and textbooks published by systematists contained tree diagrams. Although this episode of systematics is well studied by historians and philosophers of biology, most analyses prioritize scientific theories over practices and tend to emphasize conflicting theoretical assumptions. In this article, I offer an alternative perspective by viewing the conflict through the lens of representational practices with a case study on tree diagrams that were used by numerical taxonomists (phenograms) and cladists (cladograms). I argue that the current state of molecular phylogenetics should not be interpreted as the result of a competition of views within systematics. Instead, molecular phylogenetics arose independently of systematics and elements of cladistics and phenetics were integrated into the framework of molecular phylogenetics, facilitated by the compatibility of phenetic and cladistic practices with the quantitative approach of molecular phylogenetics. My study suggests that this episode of scientific change is more complex than common narratives of battles and winners or conflicts and compromises. Today, cladograms are still used and interpreted as specific types of molecular phylogenetic trees. While phenograms and cladograms represented different forms of knowledge during the time of the Systematist Wars, today they are both used to represent evolutionary relationships. This indicates that diagrams are versatile elements of scientific practice that can change their meaning, depending on the context of use within theoretical frameworks.
This article explores the question as to whether images generated by Artificial Intelligence such as DALL-E 2 can be considered artworks. After providing a brief primer on how technologies such as DALL-E 2 work in principle, I give an overview of three contemporary accounts of art and then show that there is at least one case where an AI-generated image meets the criteria for art membership under all three accounts. I suggest that our collective hesitancy to call AI-generated images art stems from the lack of a clear author figure. I propose two possible complementary solutions. First, that some AI-generated images as artworks are conjunctively authored by both the developers of the AI and the prompt-giver. Second, that AI image generators can themselves be considered works of art authored by the developers. I conclude by way of suggesting that we might have separate art competitions specifically for AI-generated artworks.
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