Incomplete nature: how mind emerged from matter
... Duality is an iconic example of a categorical difference in physics. such as those described by quantum theory, remains an open question (Deely 2001;Deacon 2011;Rogers 2022). By focusing on the physics of a simple biological cell, the formal model developed in this paper can be placed on this boundary between the organic and the inorganic, understood as two different categories. ...
... While not unified in themselves, these two categories of causation can be unified through a higher-level category that subsumes the two categories and their relations, namely the category of final causation (rest). In the development of the formal model in this paper, this paradigmatic and unifying movement of final causation (Deacon 2011) -which involves increase towards completion (fulfilment or unfolding) -is brought about through a relation of "synchronicity" which is light-like. Likewise, the logical unfolding in this paper is intended to develop organically towards a final form, rather than through systematical construction, as key formal components of the logic are distinguished and brought into relation with other formal components towards the fulfilment of an integrated whole. ...
... Time-like relations (namely reference) can point outside of a given system of entailments to reference something new and currently not present in the syntactical structure. It is the ability to entrain absence or negation (Deacon 2011;Rogers 2022: 374-393) and bring it into a syntax of determination that sets apart time-like relations from space-like relations. This introduces final causes (Deacon 2011) which cannot be referenced through pure syntax, which is to say they cannot be referenced in the classical description. ...
A formal model of the physical processes of digestion in a hypothetical cell is developed and discussed as a case study of how the threefold logic of Peircean semiotics works within Rosen’s paradigm of relational ontology. The formal model is used to demonstrate several fundamental differences between a relational description of biological processes and a mechanistic description. The formal model produces a logic of embodied generalization that is mediated and determined by the cell through its interactions with the environment. Specifically, the synchronization of the functions of pattern recognition and semantic attribution results in an open and adaptive learning system that is stabilized by a hermeneutic circle. The relational principles of biosemiotics demonstrated through this case study are applicable to other biological systems, as well as to the relational ontology of systems theory and relativistic quantum theory.
... Despite these difficulties with the concept and centuries of efforts to replace teleological accounts of biological processes with purely mechanistic accounts, it has proven impossible to purge teleological notions of organism form and activities from biological explanation. Many attempts to reduce teleology to more basic forms of explanations or eliminate it altogether have failed to convince many of the wisdom of this strategy (Jonas, 1966;Woodfield, 1976;Jacobs, 1986;Bedau, 1991Bedau, , 1992Hacker, 2007;Thompson, 2007;Deacon, 2012;Moreno & Mossio, 2015;Walsh, 2015;Nguyen, 2021). ...
... In recent years, the concept of constraint has received increasing attention (e.g., Shannon, 1948;Polanyi, 1968, Kauffman et al., 2008Deacon, 2012;Hooker, 2013;Moreno & Mossio, 2015). Its utility in analyzing both biological and informational processes is beyond dispute. ...
... Since 2006, Deacon has been exploring the likely properties of a molecular thought experiment that, although simpler than a virus, exhibits the basic features of biological teleology introduced in Sect. 2. It can be described as an autogenic virus or autogen, for short. The details of this model system have been described elsewhere (e.g., Deacon, 2006, 2012, Deacon & García-Valdecasas, 2023. Deacon (2012) calls the dynamic that gives rise to the autogen teleodynamic. ...
To naturalize the concept of teleological causality in biology it is not enough to avoid assuming backward causation or positing the existence of an inscrutable teleological essence like the élan vital. We must also specify how the causality of organisms is distinct from the causality of designed artifacts like thermostats or asymmetrically oriented processes like the ubiquitous increase of entropy. Historically, the concept of teleological causality in biology has been based on an analogy to the familiar experience of purposeful action. This is experienced by us as a disposition to achieve a general type of end that is represented in advance, and which regulates the selection of efficient means to achieve it. Inspired by this analogy, to bridge the gap between biology and human agency we describe a simple molecular process called autogenesis that shows how two linked complementary self-organizing processes can give rise to higher-order relations that resemble purposeful dispositions, though expressed in terms of constraints on molecular processes. Because the autogenic model is described in sufficient detail to be empirically realizable, it provides a proof of principle demonstrating a simple form of teleological causality.
... It is not our aim here to provide a careful review of all of those traditions (although we will do our best to refer to them wherever relevant). Instead, we see relevance realization as a promising framework that could provide a conceptual bridge between empirical approaches to organismic biology and the cognitive neurosciences, research into artificial intelligence, and intellectual traditions such as evolutionary epistemology (see, for example, Campbell, 1974;Lorenz, 1977;Bradie, 1986;Cziko, 1995;Bradie and Harms, 2023; but also Wimsatt, 2007), ecological psychology (Gibson, 1966(Gibson, , 1979, 4E cognition (Di Paolo et al., 2017;Durt et al., 2017;Newen et al., 2018;Carney, 2020;Shapiro and Spaulding, 2021), and biosemiotics (Favareau, 2010;Deacon, 2011Deacon, , 2015Pattee and Rączaszek-Leonardi, 2012;Barbieri, 2015). We draw from all of these in our argument. ...
... On top of all this, an organism must be motivated to pursue its goals. Motivation ultimately stems from our fragility and mortality (Jonas, 1966;Weber and Varela, 2002;Thompson, 2007;Deacon, 2011;Moreno and Mossio, 2015). While it is possible to impose external motivation on a system that mimics aspects of internal motivation, true internal motivation can only arise from precariousness. ...
... Such basic natural agency does not primarily rely on causal indeterminacy or randomness. Instead, it rests in the peculiar self-referential and hierarchical causal regime that underlies the organization of living matter (see, for example, Rosen, 1958aRosen, ,b, 1959Rosen, , 1972Rosen, , 1991Piaget, 1967;Varela et al., 1974;Varela, 1979;Maturana and Varela, 1980;Juarrero, 1999Juarrero, , 2023Kauffman, 2000;Weber and Varela, 2002;Di Paolo, 2005;Thompson, 2007;Barandiaran et al., 2009;Louie, 2009Louie, , 2013Louie, , 2017aDeacon, 2011;Montévil and Mossio, 2015;Moreno and Mossio, 2015;Mossio and Bich, 2017;DiFrisco and Mossio, 2020;Hofmeyr, 2021;Harrison et al., 2022;Mitchell, 2023;Mossio, 2024a). ...
The way organismic agents come to know the world, and the way algorithms solve problems, are fundamentally different. The most sensible course of action for an organism does not simply follow from logical rules of inference. Before it can even use such rules, the organism must tackle the problem of relevance. It must turn ill-defined problems into well-defined ones, turn semantics into syntax. This ability to realize relevance is present in all organisms, from bacteria to humans. It lies at the root of organismic agency, cognition, and consciousness, arising from the particular autopoietic, anticipatory, and adaptive organization of living beings. In this article, we show that the process of relevance realization is beyond formalization. It cannot be captured completely by algorithmic approaches. This implies that organismic agency (and hence cognition as well as consciousness) are at heart not computational in nature. Instead, we show how the process of relevance is realized by an adaptive and emergent triadic dialectic (a trialectic), which manifests as a metabolic and ecological-evolutionary co-constructive dynamic. This results in a meliorative process that enables an agent to continuously keep a grip on its arena, its reality. To be alive means to make sense of one’s world. This kind of embodied ecological rationality is a fundamental aspect of life, and a key characteristic that sets it apart from non-living matter.
... On a separate note, genes are often characterized as the quintessential carriers of biological information, encoding the instructions necessary for the organization and functioning of living organisms. This conceptualization aligns with Deacon's (2013) theoretical framework, which articulates a relationship between the arrangement of matter and the abstraction known as information. Deacon (2013) contended that, by the second law of thermodynamics, the inherent tendency of matter is towards a state of maximal entropy or disorder. ...
... This conceptualization aligns with Deacon's (2013) theoretical framework, which articulates a relationship between the arrangement of matter and the abstraction known as information. Deacon (2013) contended that, by the second law of thermodynamics, the inherent tendency of matter is towards a state of maximal entropy or disorder. Conversely, the manifestation of organization within matter is the product of certain constraints that limit its natural propensity towards randomness, effectively embodying a form of information: ...
... Expanding on this premise, Deacon's (2013) interpretation of DNA serves as a foundational illustration. DNA's structure, characterized by its double helix, is not a random assembly of molecules but a highly ordered sequence that dictates the synthesis of proteins and the regulation of various biological processes. ...
This scholarly inquiry initiates a nuanced exploration into the Islamic conceptualization of _Allah_ as ‘_Al-Aleem_’ (the All-Knowing) and ‘_Al-Khabir_’ (the All-Aware), postulating a reconciliation wherein Allah is identified as the quintessential Intelligence and truth. _Allah_’s attributes of divine omniscience and ubiquitous awareness underscore a divine understanding enveloping all of existence, positioning Him as the epitome of All-Information. This paper delves into the intersection of Islamic theological constructs and modern information theory, proposing a novel interpretation that aligns _Allah_’s divine omniscience with the theory's principles. Information theory posits that the foundation of all information is inherently probabilistic, mirroring the probabilistic outcomes observed in quantum mechanics. This seemingly contradicts ‘_Al-Qadar_’, an All-Knowing Allah's predetermined will or predestination. However, we can bridge this gap by considering _Allah _as the embodiment of all information. This paper facilitates a richer understanding of _Allah_’s predetermined will in Islam and builds bridges with the randomness and unpredictable nature witnessed in the quantum world. This research aims to augment _Allah_ as the Infinite Information through an interdisciplinary lens, bridging quantum indeterminacy and Islamic Omnipotence. This quantum-religious interface reconciles quantum information theory with Islamic theological constructs.
... It is not our aim here to provide a careful review of all of those traditions (although we will do our best to refer to them wherever relevant). Instead, we see relevance realization as a promising framework that could provide a conceptual bridge between empirical approaches to organismic biology and the cognitive neurosciences, research into artificial intelligence, and intellectual traditions such as evolutionary epistemology (see, for example, Campbell, 1974;Lorenz, 1977;Bradie, 1986;Cziko, 1995;Bradie and Harms, 2023; but also Wimsatt, 2007), ecological psychology (Gibson, 1966(Gibson, , 1979, 4E cognition (Di Paolo et al., 2017;Durt et al., 2017;Newen et al., 2018;Carney, 2020;Shapiro and Spaulding, 2021), and biosemiotics (Favareau, 2010;Deacon, 2011Deacon, , 2015Pattee and Rączaszek-Leonardi, 2012;Barbieri, 2015). We draw from all of these in our argument. ...
... On top of all this, an organism must be motivated to pursue its goals. Motivation ultimately stems from our fragility and mortality (Jonas, 1966;Weber and Varela, 2002;Thompson, 2007;Deacon, 2011;Moreno and Mossio, 2015). While it is possible to impose external motivation on a system that mimics aspects of internal motivation, true internal motivation can only arise from precariousness. ...
... Such basic natural agency does not primarily rely on causal indeterminacy or randomness. Instead, it rests in the peculiar self-referential and hierarchical causal regime that underlies the organization of living matter (see, for example, Rosen, 1958aRosen, ,b, 1959Rosen, , 1972Rosen, , 1991Piaget, 1967;Varela et al., 1974;Varela, 1979;Maturana and Varela, 1980;Juarrero, 1999Juarrero, , 2023Kauffman, 2000;Weber and Varela, 2002;Di Paolo, 2005;Thompson, 2007;Barandiaran et al., 2009;Louie, 2009Louie, , 2013Louie, , 2017aDeacon, 2011;Montévil and Mossio, 2015;Moreno and Mossio, 2015;Mossio and Bich, 2017;DiFrisco and Mossio, 2020;Hofmeyr, 2021;Harrison et al., 2022;Mitchell, 2023;Mossio, 2024a). ...
The way organismic agents come to know the world, and the way algorithms solve problems, are fundamentally different. The most sensible course of action for an organism does not simply follow from logical rules of inference. Before it can even use such rules, the organism must tackle the problem of relevance. It must turn ill-defined problems into well-defined ones, turn semantics into syntax. This ability to realize relevance is present in all organisms, from bacteria to humans. It lies at the root of organismic agency, cognition, and consciousness, arising from the particular autopoietic, anticipatory, and adaptive organization of living beings. In this paper, we show that the process of relevance realization is beyond formalization. It cannot be captured completely by algorithmic approaches. This implies that organismic agency (and hence cognition as well as consciousness) are at heart not computational in nature. Instead, we show how the process of relevance is realized by an adaptive and emergent triadic dialectic (a trialectic), which manifests as a metabolic and ecological-evolutionary co-constructive dynamic. This results in a meliorative process that enables an agent to continuously keep a grip on its arena, its reality. To be alive means to make sense of one's world. This kind of embodied ecological rationality is a fundamental aspect of life, and a key characteristic that sets it apart from non-living matter.
... In a world that is increasingly shaped by multimodal communication, this bias cannot hold. Furthermore, literature on how societies develop from the (multimodal) semiosic interactions between people is emerging from fields like philosophy (Searle 1995;, anthropology (Deacon 2013;Parmentier 2016), sociology (Latour 2007;Luhmann 1995) and development studies (Pieterse 2010) and challenging the linguistic bias that is inherent in translation studies. Chibamba's (2018) and Ajayi's (2018) recent doctoral theses further argue for an intersemiotic correction in translation studies, and this position is supported by my own work (Marais 2017;Marais & Kull 2016). ...
... Translation is also a complex process. The processes of living organisms, including their semiotic processes, are complex because these are emergent, non-linear, sensitive to initial and boundary conditions, hierarchically nested and non-reductive (Deacon, 2013). This means that, even for interlingual translations, there is no one cause that can explain the translation and no translation has one effect only. ...
Studying the relationship between translation and development is a fledgling enterprise. Apart from my own work, a number of postgraduate studies and projects have been attempted in this regard. As the whole of Africa is usually regarded as a “developmental context” or “un(der)developed” (see criticism against this view in Marais & Delgado Luchner, 2018), the sociological turn in translation studies dictates that a debate about the nature and implications of ‘development’ should be high on the agenda of translation studies in Africa. In socio-economic terms, translation in Africa is constrained by a particular developmental context while simultaneously contributing to the development of that context.
... Bremond's three-step logic can be transposed onto Deacon's autogenic process as follows: (1) The autogen as molecular structure contains the potentiality to selfreplicate through the autogenic process which it embodies in relation to its milieu, (2) the autogen's containment structure can be broken open to actualize the process necessary for self-replication, or not open and "maintain this potential across vast epochs of time" (Deacon, 2013), and (3) in having spilled its innards into the substrate the resulting process of self-assembly contains the attainment or non-attainment of the potential recognized as the end which its dynamic is directed at-self-replication and the potentiality of returning to (1) and start the cycle anew. ...
... Teleodynamics is differentiated from other dynamics in part by the fact that it constrains the dissipative tendencies of thermodynamics towards its own self-replication (Deacon, 2013). In the autogen model this is exemplified by the self-assembly creating a container which separates part of the substrate in which the autogen came about to autocatalyze the reactants necessary for eventual attainment of self-replication. ...
This article reexamines meaning, agency, and interpretation by challenging the view that they require primary or secondary agency. Using Paul Ricœur’s narrative temporality, it explores Terrence Deacon’s autogenic theory, reinterpreting it as a narrative process with non-agentic meaning by distinguishing between distended and displaced temporal relations. Distended relations pertain to agency and biosemiosis, while displaced relations involve the meaning found not in the entity but the processes which gave it a functionally historicized existence. Applying Ricœur’s analysis of temporal aporia and Deacon’s concept of zero, the article suggests that meaning in Deacon’s model mirrors the normative process of narrative interpretation. It emphasizes that primary agency requires meaningful organization for agentic action to have a self for which decisions matter, concluding that meaning, life, and primary agency are grounded in already existing displaced temporal relations resultant from proto-interpretative relations not bounded within an organism.
... (The fact that many genetic products function to regulate and uphold the genetic machinery does not change this general argument.) More specifically, meaning seems to equip each gene with a final (Falcon, 2023), ultimate (Tinbergen, 1963) cause (Deacon, 2011): to result in some characteristic of some organism that furthers that organism's survival and/or reproduction, or, more specifically understood, to further the copying of the gene itself. Note, however, that the same observation can be stated without invoking purpose: the meaning that exists has previously provided characteristics of organisms that have furthered their survival and/or reproduction. ...
... As in the case with genes, meaning seems to equip utterances with a final, ultimate cause (Deacon, 2011): in this case to result in some changed opinion or behavior in a recipient organism that furthers the subsistence and/or transmission of that information. This potential final cause can be realized more or less successfully, resulting in more or less numerous copies of the specific information content in question. ...
A somewhat prominent view in the literature is that language provides opportunity to program the brain with ‘cognitive gadgets’, or ‘virtual machines’. Here, I explore the possibility that thinking itself – internal symbolic responses to stimuli that are either intrinsic or extrinsic, and computational procedures that operate on these internal symbolic representations – is such a software product rather than just an emergent phenomenon of the brain’s hardware being ‘complex enough’, or the brain processing information in a manner that is ‘integrated enough’. I also present a testable hypothesis that would indicate the presence of such a thought-gadget, and briefly overview some evolutionary pre-requisites for its existence. Further, I explore some consequences the existence of such a gadget would entail for our understanding of consciousness. The nature of the gadget is left unspecified as the article is not a blueprint for the thinking gadget, but an argument in favor of its existence.
... Peter Ossorio (2006) and Christian Smith (2010) have suggested possible definitions of what characterizes persons, and their suggestions are briefly discussed below. Other researchers who have written about relevant topics in this context are Mark Bickhard (2016) and Terence Deacon (2012), although with a primary focus on less complex individuals. The purpose of the following discussion is to point to some important topics in this area that deserve further discussion and more detailed analyses. ...
... In my previous paper (Lundh, 2023), and inspired by Deacon (2012), I focused on one specific aspect of personenvironment interactions: the individual's ability to relate to possible interactions before a real interaction takes place, and to act based on the experience of such possibilities. In the most general sense, this can be exemplified by the perceptually guided interactions with the environment that are described by Gibson (1979) in his ecological approach to perception, where the most important information provided via our senses is about the environment's affordances. ...
In a previous paper (Lundh, 2023), it was argued that psychological science can be seen as having three main branches, corresponding to three levels of research: research at the person level, at the population level, and at the mechanism level. The purpose of the present paper is to discuss the critique that has been raised against this model by Lamiell (2024) and Nilsson (2024) and to elaborate and specify the three-branch model in more detail. This is done by an incorporation of Nilsson’s concept of person-sensitivity into the model, and by a clearer differentiation between the two contrasts involved: (1) the methodological focus either on individual persons or on populations of individuals; and (2) the theoretical focus either on whole-person functioning or on sub-personal mechanisms.
... Peter Ossorio (2006) and Christian Smith (2010) have suggested possible definitions of what characterizes persons, and their suggestions are briefly discussed below. Other researchers who have written about relevant topics in this context are Mark Bickhard (2016) and Terence Deacon (2012), although with a primary focus on less complex individuals. The purpose of the following discussion is to point to some important topics in this area that deserve further discussion and more detailed analyses. ...
... In my previous paper (Lundh, 2023), and inspired by Deacon (2012), I focused on one specific aspect of personenvironment interactions: the individual's ability to relate to possible interactions before a real interaction takes place, and to act based on the experience of such possibilities. In the most general sense, this can be exemplified by the perceptually guided interactions with the environment that are described by Gibson (1979) in his ecological approach to perception, where the most important information provided via our senses is about the environment's affordances. ...
In a previous paper (Lundh, 2023), it was argued that psychological science can be seen as having three main branches, corresponding to three levels of research: research at the person level, at the population level, and at the mechanism level. The purpose of the present paper is to discuss the critique that has been raised against this model by Lamiell (2024) and Nilsson (2024) and to elaborate and specify the three-branch model in more detail. This is done by an incorporation of Nilsson's concept of person-sensitivity into the model, and by a clearer differentiation between the two contrasts involved: (1) the methodological focus either on individual persons or on populations of individuals; and (2) the theoretical focus either on whole-person functioning or on sub-personal mechanisms.
... According to the Second Law, the work capacity and potential energy of any closed system tend to decrease over time, along with the system's internal order or organisation. Conversely, the system's original state of higher energy becomes dissipated in the form of heat or, in the case of a machine, also its working effects (e.g., transfer of force over a distance) (Kauffman 2000;Kauffman and Clayton 2008;Deacon 2011). However, as energy is transferred or transformed, increasing amounts of it are lostand this applies also to work-performing mechanisms. ...
... This has left open the key question of how to account for the observation that, in living systems, the work they perform may lead to decreasing entropy production at rest and, conversely, to increasing degrees of internal organisation and anti-entropic resilience? The basic normative and anticipatory aspects of semiotic functioning may, however, be closely tied to the maintenance of such non-equilibrium energetic dynamics (Deacon 2011). In fact, many developmental and evolutionary processes seem to reflect this hyper-restorative pattern and may depend on it, as seen below (sections 5 and 6). ...
The problems of organismal agency and phenotypic plasticity present significant interest for modern developmental and evolutionary biology, as well as comparative and biosemiotic approaches. At the same time, the question of how behavioural and other proximal phenotypic factors may potentially drive developmental and evolutionary variation remains open, particularly in relation to life-history and allometric theory (where the issue of agency has been seldom explored). To fill these gaps, this chapter revisits the anti-entropic (negentropic) approach to ontogeny developed by I.A. Arshavsky (1903–1996) and his school. Within this tradition, diverse developmental processes and organisms were studied in order to understand how biological agency and phenotypic plasticity can be interrelated and together affect the formation and integration of biological traits – including the remarkable physiological and morphological features distinguishing primarily altricial (immaturely born) from primarily precocial (maturely born) eutherians. This chapter revisits these concepts and results in the light of current research. In particular, that Arshavsky’s non-equilibrium approach may still help to frame new questions and integrative concepts is shown with respect to certain unresolved problems of metabolic scaling, including the apparent biophysical paradox of increased work capacity and bioenergetic reserves in larger/more precocial organisms. Finally, we shall also consider a novel anti-entropic hypothesis regarding possible agential origins of the prolonged gestation and reduced offspring numbers in such animals, which may have a variety of implications for current work in biology and biosemiotics.
... И если раньше говорилось о том, что некоторые биохимические сущности (например, кодирующие сегменты ДНК) можно описывать как знаки, то теперь становится ясным, что это не только модус описания -в самих биосистемах возникают условия, при которых молекулы функционируют как знаки и, стало быть, они и есть знаки (см. в статье А. В. Спирова изложение последней концепции Теренса Дикона (Deacon, 2021), которая знаменует переход от метафорических и семиметафорических уподоблений биомолекул знаковым системам к достаточно строгим теориям 1 ). Таким образом, снимается вопрос о том, что дает семиотическое описание биопроцессов для их понимания. ...
This article demonstrates that the concept proposed by Alexander Spirov reflects the ongoing paradigm shift and inspires new approaches in biosemiotics and semiotic pragmatics. The shift involves a move from describing coding languages to describing languages that regulate them. This requires considering the agentivity (or quasi-subjectivity) of sign systems, which leads to a scenario where the sign system functions as both its subject and object, thus reviving Peirce's idea of the sign as a quasi-mind. An analysis of the primary regulatory mechanisms shows that regulatory codes: (a) create specific conditions for coding, (b) govern and control coding processes, and (c) consist of the same elements as coding elements, although are interpreted differently. Their interpretant is not amino acids or proteins but the processes of activation or suppression. Communication and information processes at the biomolecular level allow pragmatics to be understood as semiotic operations associated with intra-system self-regulation and the system's external interaction with its context (environment). The processes within a system, as described by Alexander Spirov, create contexts and interfaces for interaction between different systems. This implies that a system of signs can act as an agent that communicates or interprets, akin to Peirce's notion of the quasi-mind. This understanding has the potential to significantly reshape the current approaches to pragmatics and semiosis.
... Human fights in the dark ages once and for all have ended or, to be transparent reformed to another form, much more closer than ever to the intellectual discussion rather than the past; at least for sure, we now truly understand that human beings should appreciate and conceptualize their ideas properly rather fighting or war; thus, as we might hopefully learn in our history; undeveloped countries' resources are used, exploited and colonized by developed countries such as Europe and later in the United States came to an end, but it was costly for both sides; meaning even developed countries are now paying for this over usage of sources and humans (10,11). This process emerged like a phenomenon wrongly; rather, this path should be named the experienced practicality of history, in which, without acceptance of the correct narrative, they shall fall into the darkness of the conceptual world (12,13). You may ask reasonably how to distinct our perception of the light, and I would say it depends on your perception and consciousness; it is like being wise enough to understand the intangible world of quantum physique rules while our scope is on classic physiques like in philosophy; might be able to bridge the gap between ontology and epistemology (13-15). ...
Indeed, concepts come from one's perception of the material world of ours, as this symposium truly rightly senses a feeling of an uncertain future about risks that are hidden in the future. My thoughts might be close enough to my perceptions to represent the risks hidden beneath a multipolar world of the future. In my stance, philosophical point of view, I shall be able to light this path; I believe economic advancements as past paradigms reveals can not properly prevent this systematic risk of a fearful future, and indeed, some unwise policymakers want to feed their ego by this opportunity. This essay will discuss about the root of these risks, in-depth enough for those who might truly think about paradigms and a better future for all. as in medical terms, differential diagnoses of intellectual ones, ones who are wise enough to self-regulate are the most important part, then when your consciousness can feel safety your pathway step by step shall be more clear. Wise policymakers, by employing wiser advisors who advocate discussion about society and what population may be afraid by these hidden risks, can enhance this brightness to society as well. I tried to decipher this future in my stance in my words to wise men who may think deeply enough to be able to share worst-case scenarios, just to be ready to feel what has been hidden in past paradigms. By simple acts of true goodwill, spreading true love, inclusive online teaching atmosphere, spreading joy, laughter and love by celebrating life and feeling the true nature in action, I believe this risk would fade away, at least for this upcoming multipolar world in which some may do not know the intention of others. In conclusion, I tried to conceptualize in-depth philosophy and enhance my reader's horizons about society to hopefully play my part in history and celebrate a true act of goodwill. May the future reveal me as a good and wise teacher, making past teachers proud of their work.
... There is a causal power of the real-or the Žižekian meeting of reals-that has determinate effects on subjectivity (Last, 2021). Specifically, cerebral non-rapport has the effect of producing more-than-natural phenomena out of the brain alone (Deacon, 2011;Johnston, 2019;Linden, 2008). ...
Neuropsychoanalysis places subjective and objective perspectives on equal epistemological footing. This philosophical position of “dual-aspect monism” sees mind and brain as two appearances of the same part of nature. Here, I propose a method for shifting between these perspectives, to build a non-bio-reductive meta-neuropsychology. Additionally, by drawing on Adrian Johnston’s Transcendental Materalism, I develop a specific philosophical basis for a Lacanian neuropsychoanalysis which allows a formulation of the antagonistic real in nature itself. I also specify a Lacanian neuropsychoanalytic clinical position which explicitly aims at non-normative intervention.
... This "sense of self" becomes an organizing feature in the neural sphere (Deacon, 2011). Indeed, Friston (2021) considers the sense of self-as-agent as one of the brain's higher-order inferences, its best explanation of its own behavior and sensory states. ...
While the neuropsychoanalytic field marches ahead, its critics continue to problematize the essential question of the discipline: how does neuroscience, a system of objective knowledge, contribute to psychoanalysis, a system of subjectivity? Critics charge neuropsychoanalysis with not providing a clear formula for toggling between neuroscience and psychoanalysis, leaving the field vulnerable to criticisms of theoretical imprecision. Lacanian and non-Lacanian critics alike warn that these epistemological missteps lead to harmful bio-reductionism. Taking these criticisms seriously, this paper reframes this debate from a Lacanian neuropsychoanalytic standpoint. Whereas the debaters disagree over the validity of neuropsychoanalytic epistemology, they leave (natural) ontology relatively unquestioned, implying a simply existing substrate. A Lacanian neuropsychoanalysis-rooted in the philosophical framework of Transcendental Materialism-problematizes the nature of this natural ontology. Beyond a Thing grasped from two divergent lenses, the ontological level itself is characterized by gaps, discontinuities, and antagonisms. Instead of (just) correlating neuroscientific and psychoanalytic concepts, this stance seeks connections at the limits or contradictions within epistemological frameworks. This antagonistic ontology fundamentally reframes the issues raised in the neuropsychoanalysis debate, opening a pathway for novel future bridges.
... 39,40 These connections to arousal, energetics, and metabolism suggest that the dynamic core may be concerned with its own dynamical persistence-a concept that Varela referred to as autopoiesis (self-making) and that Deacon has referred to as the ''teleodynamic'' core of the brain. 126,127 On the basis of the above theoretical and empirical work, we conceptually consider the ongoing dynamics of EEG spectra as ''sew-saw,'' with the fulcrum at the alpha band, 128 and all rhythmic activity emerging from the beam of aperiodic activity ( Figure 7A). The dynamics of the aperiodic spectral tilt or rotation reflect states of arousal, 129 with alpha dynamics reflecting whether attention is directed externally or internally and modulated by thalamocortical inhibition. ...
Multidimensional reconstruction of brain attractors from electroencephalography (EEG) data enables the analysis of geometric complexity and interactions between signals in state space. Utilizing resting-state data from young and older adults, we characterize periodic (traditional frequency bands) and aperiodic (broadband exponent) attractors according to their geometric complexity and shared dynamical signatures, which we refer to as a geometric cross-parameter coupling. Alpha and aperiodic attractors are the least complex, and their global shapes are shared among all other frequency bands, affording alpha and aperiodic greater predictive power. Older adults show lower geometric complexity but greater coupling, resulting from dedifferentiation of gamma activity. The form and content of resting-state thoughts were further associated with the complexity of attractor dynamics. These findings support a process-developmental perspective on the brain’s dynamic core, whereby more complex information differentiates out of an integrative and global geometric core.
... So middle of the way gerunds seem to surface. Participles can also 5 Heideggerian term Werke (plural of das Werk) happily corresponds to the Greek term ἔργα (plural of ἔργον) as used by Hesiod in his seminal poem "Works and Days" or to the term work by Terrence Deacon (Deacon 2011). ...
Enlanguaged practices bring together social semiosis working as an interfacial verge or axle for even greater domains of human existence. They have mental, bodily and communicative aspects, mingle with respective practices and thus bring them all together. 4E approaches to practices help to couple them. On the one hand embodying consolidates bodies and things while on the other enacting results in processes and practices. Linguistic bodies and things are shaped as nouns and nominal forms while processes and practices mold as verbs, predicatives and other rhematic formats.
... In a learning-first theory of life, minds are a vital part of the explanation for how biology works; therefore if this view is accepted they will acquire the status of real, causally important entities that can act on the physical world. In a learning-first theory minds are not something outside of physics, but rather a name for the way physical matter-energy is causally disposed [27]. ...
... It's a process in which the things animals do guide their own evolution" (Bickerton 2009: 11). Unfortunate metaphors, such as the "blueprint metaphor" (that genes provide a blueprint for behavior) or "code biology" as the study of "codes of life" (from the "genetic code" all the way up to the "codes" of language and culture), are extremely misleading (Deacon 2012;P. Bateson 2017;Kravchenko 2020a), and ecological genetics (Ford 1964;Real 1994) has become an important field of study in biology. ...
Linguists are learning to speak differently about language. They see a continuity between life and language in languaging, a uniquely human activity with which humans form a unity in their cognitive domain as organism-environment systems. The chapter explores this aspect around an ecolinguistic understanding of language and deals with how the ability for languaging brings humans' responsibility for the global ecology.
... En effet, le modèle sémiogénétique ne reconduit pas la variation à une simple contingence qui viendrait perturber de l'extérieur des systèmes sociaux conçus sur le modèle de systèmes 8 Cf. Deacon (2011). 9 Cf. ...
Dans ce numéro de Signifiances (Signifiyng) on se focalisera d’un point de vue théorique et dynamique sur les dimensions langagières et sémiotiques à l’œuvre dans la constitution de l’expérience individuelle et collective. Le but est d’analyser dans le détail l’hypothèse d’une compatibilité constitutive entre deux caractéristiques fondamentales du sens, à savoir sa perceptibilité et sa socialité. Ces caractères seront ressaisis dans la perspective d’une anthropologie sémiotique à vocation phénoménologique, expressiviste et morphodynamique. Il s’agitd ‘une perspective qui est intéressée de prime abord à la formation des plans d’expression qui médiatisent l’inscription et l’engagement des sujets au sein de la vie sociale. Ainsi, les différentes contributions discuteront un cadre théorique englobant que l’on appelle sémiogénétique, qui permet d’expliciter les formes et les enjeux sémiotiques et sémiolinguistiques spécifiques qui s’imposent aux acteurs et redirigent en permanence leur attention.
... Few plausible hypotheses have been advanced for the coming-into-existence of such arrangements (however, see Refs. [68,69]). ...
... Of particular significance are strongly nonlinear open systems that demonstrate chaos and operate in the vicinity of strange attractors [53]. While the mathematical theory behind these systems is highly intricate, recent proposals have suggested that self-organization through chaos in complex open dynamical systems could offer a novel way to understand intelligence without relying on strictly computational methods [54]. For instance, the concept of chaos cannot be adequately comprehended using conventional computing theory [55]. ...
This paper introduces a multidisciplinary conceptual perspective encompassing artificial intelligence (AI), artificial general intelligence (AGI), and cybernetics, framed within what we call the formalism of generalized neuromorphism. Drawing from recent advancements in computing, such as neuromorphic computing and spiking neural networks, as well as principles from the theory of open dynamical systems and stochastic classical and quantum dynamics, this formalism is tailored to model generic networks comprising abstract processing events. A pivotal aspect of our approach is the incorporation of the memory space and the intrinsic non-Markovian nature of the abstract generalized neuromorphic system. We envision future computations taking place within an expanded space (memory space) and leveraging memory states. Positioned at a high abstract level, generalized neuromorphism facilitates multidisciplinary applications across various approaches within the AI community.
... Accordingly, there will be a corresponding unintelligible decrease in that material process' observable efficacy to create material differences. This is somewhat akin to the proposal of relational constraints as the material basis for mental content, in that both of them also cannot be directly measured [44]. However, irruption theory goes further by specifying that there is an irreducible element of unintelligibility: the material process that is making a difference to the subjective mind undergoes an unpredictable reduction in their otherwise expected efficacy to make material differences, for which we introduce a novel term, absorption. ...
Cognitive science is confronted by several fundamental anomalies deriving from the mind–body problem. Most prominent is the problem of mental causation and the hard problem of consciousness, which can be generalized into the hard problem of agential efficacy and the hard problem of mental content. Here, it is proposed to accept these explanatory gaps at face value and to take them as positive indications of a complex relation: mind and matter are one, but they are not the same. They are related in an efficacious yet non-reducible, non-observable, and even non-intelligible manner. Natural science is well equipped to handle the effects of non-observables, and so the mind is treated as equivalent to a hidden ‘black box’ coupled to the body. Two concepts are introduced given that there are two directions of coupling influence: (1) irruption denotes the unobservable mind hiddenly making a difference to observable matter, and (2) absorption denotes observable matter hiddenly making a difference to the unobservable mind. The concepts of irruption and absorption are methodologically compatible with existing information-theoretic approaches to neuroscience, such as measuring cognitive activity and subjective qualia in terms of entropy and compression, respectively. By offering novel responses to otherwise intractable theoretical problems from first principles, and by doing so in a way that is closely connected with empirical advances, irruption theory is poised to set the agenda for the future of the mind sciences.
... In this regard, irruption theory is consistent with a host of proposals that highlight how our bodies are organized as selfproducing, thermodynamically open systems, situated dynamically at the edge of chaos, with a meta-stable grip on the world (for more detailed comparisons, see, e.g., Froese and Karelin, 2023;. Its specific contribution is an alternative conceptualization of how to cash out the role of subjectively guided mental activity non-reductively: not in terms of the popular appeal to top-down constraints (e.g., Kelso, 1995;Freeman, 1999;Juarrero, 1999;Deacon, 2012), but rather as the destabilization of such Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 03 frontiersin.org spontaneously emergent constraints by irruptions. ...
Hyperscanning approaches to human neuroscience aim to uncover the neural mechanisms of social interaction. They have been largely guided by the expectation that increased levels of engagement between two persons will be supported by higher levels of inter-brain synchrony (IBS). A common approach to measuring IBS is phase synchrony in the context of EEG hyperscanning. Yet the growing number of experimental findings does not yield a straightforward interpretation, which has prompted critical reflections about the field’s theoretical and methodological principles. In this perspective piece, we make a conceptual contribution to this debate by considering the role of a possibly overlooked effect of inter-brain desynchronization (IBD), as for example measured by decreased phase synchrony. A principled reason to expect this role comes from the recent proposal of irruption theory, which operationalizes the efficacy of a person’s subjective involvement in behavior generation in terms of increased neural entropy. Accordingly, IBD is predicted to increase with one or more participant’s socially motivated subjective involvement in interaction, because of the associated increase in their neural entropy. Additionally, the relative prominence of IBD compared to IBS is expected to vary in time, as well as across frequency bands, depending on the extent that subjective involvement is elicited by the task and/or desired by the person. If irruption theory is on the right track, it could thereby help to explain the notable variability of IBS in social interaction in terms of a countertendency from another factor: IBD due to subjective involvement.
... Epistemologicamente, consideramos que a ciência não é positiva, pois é bem menos efetiva no que afirma, do que naquilo que nega (modus tollens). É muito mais apropriada para buscar, desconstruir, contestar, do que para oferecer soluções, que serão, naturalmente, sempre parciais (Deacon, 2012). Assim, poderíamos sugerir que a maior positividade (ou utilidade) da ciência é sua negatividade, que Bachelard apanhou em sua "filosofia do não" (2009). ...
Há educadores que defendem uma pedagogia positiva, aquela que foca apenas o lado positivo da educação, como se fosse um apelo missionário. É um positivismo, no sentido de ver a realidade pela metade, no lado positivo (que, epistemologicamente, é o lado mensurável, experimental). O negativo esconde-se. Há o médico que, descobrindo um câncer no paciente, resolve dizer que é resfriado, para o agradar. Há o educador adepto da “crítica positiva”, desconhecendo que esta não critica nada – a alma da crítica é sua negatividade, necessária, por exemplo, para ler a realidade em sentido emancipatório. A crítica positiva espera do opressor a libertação. É a lógica da autoajuda, não como “deveria ser” na acepção do termo (saber ajudar-se, evitando depender; todos precisam de ajuda, mas não de dependência), mas da prática das fórmulas positivas buzinadas para esquecer o lado difícil da vida. É também uma contradição lógica: não é viável falar do lado positivo sem implicar o negativo e vice-versa. Por vezes há uma boa intenção na jogada: afastar críticas apenas destrutivas, ferinas, ferozes. A realidade vista de um lado só é manca. Pedagogia positiva é covarde.
Sinding, Michael, Heydenreich, Aura and Mecke, Klaus. Narrative and Cognition in Literature and Science, De Gruyter, 2025.
https://www.degruyter.com/document/isbn/9783110782844/
This chapter explores ways in which VR environments can enhance existing methods for representing information and for guiding interactions compared to other kinds of interfaces. In particular, we relate the theory of cognitive infocommunication channels to virtual reality spaces, and investigate how it applies to the design of VR spaces and user experiences therein. Examples are provided from the MaxWhere VR platform.
The universe is a vast and intricate system, capable of generating complexity from seemingly simple beginnings. From the formation of galaxies and the evolution of life to the emergence of human consciousness, the universe continuously unfolds in ways that suggest both natural self-organization and purposeful design. This paper explores a synthesis between pantheism—which views the universe as synonymous with the divine—and Intelligent Design, which argues that the universe’s fine-tuning reflects intentionality. By examining the principles of emergence, we argue that the complexity we observe in the universe can be seen as both a divine process and a self-organizing system. This synthesis offers a new framework for understanding the relationship between science and spirituality. Emergent complexity, from cosmological structures to biological evolution, can be interpreted as expressions of a divinely structured universe that evolves without the need for constant intervention. This perspective bridges the gap between scientific explanations of complexity and spiritual interpretations of the divine, offering profound implications for cosmology, biology, and theology.
Keywords: emergence, pantheism, Intelligent Design, self-organization, cosmology, fine-tuning, evolution, consciousness, theology, divine design, complexity, spirituality, metaphysics, process theology, cosmological principles.
The article advocates updating the research concerning divided societies and complexly organized states. It addresses the genesis and advancement of complex identities of social actors and political agency. The discussion focuses on the correlation between the structuration and content saturation of identities. The use of operational interfaces from fundamental distinctions to various kinds of divides, demarcations and polarizations leaves still unresolved the problem of qualitative parameters of identities, and ways to represent and analyze them. Innovative approaches developed by Russian political scientists take into account the relationship between the processes of world development and the identity of its development drivers and agency from individual political actors to complex social movements. The article shows that the effective deployment of the respective research program requires not only external accounting of the temporal parameters, but full integration of modern evolutionary approaches into their methodology. It is necessary to overcome the usual interpretations of identity in the singular as an abstract universal idea. Equally it is necessary to move to the study of the complex interaction of the acting forces of development and the formation of a dynamic flow of individual and mutual identifications in the plural. To this end, it is suggested not only to update the Rokkanian paradigm of demarcations by expanding the set of distinctions and making the whole structure more dynamic, but also to use the possibilities of extended evolutionary synthesis.
Sarasvati, the Goddess of creativity, learning, and knowledge in Hinduism, is the Muse par excellence. Richly endowed with iconography, songs, and poetry, her mythology consists of endless permutations of one central theme: That is, as the embodiment of cosmic creative energy and the creative process, Sarasvati has the power to bestow intelligence and creativity to all knowledge production in literature, music, dance, science, and philosophy, as well as the power to enhance the spiritual capacity for transcendence, self-knowledge, and supreme bliss. In the age of machine intelligence, Sarasvati may run into some tough competitions. When all our desiderata, ranging from enhanced capacity in creativity to knowledge production in science, can be had by programming intelligent machines, is Muse still needed? If so, for what purpose; and if not, what do we stand to lose? This chapter will explore some of the reasons why Sarasvati is needed if we want to halt the collapse of human civilizations in the age of the machine.
While a universal definition of religion eludes the field of religious studies, it certainty seems that people are becoming differently religious rather than a-religious, especially since the latter half of the twentieth century. To explain the enduring relevance of religion in human experience, this article expands on recent evolutionary and sociological research in the systems theory of religion and develops a philosophical approach to understanding religion as a complex adaptive system. Frameworks of meaning and beliefs communicated by religious systems emerge and adapt in relation to interpretive selection pressures communicated by individuals-in-community relative to entropy’s role in one’s contingent experience as a “teleodynamic self” in the arrow of time. Religious systems serve an entropy-reducing function in the minds of individuals, philosophically speaking, because their sign and symbol systems communicate an “anentropic” dimension to meaning that prevents uncertainty ad infinitum (e.g., maximum Shannon entropy) concerning matters of existential concern for phenomenological systems, i.e., persons. Religious systems will continue to evolve, and new religious movements will spontaneously emerge, as individuals find new ways to communicate their intuition of this anentropic dimension of meaning in relation to their experience of contingency in the arrow of time.
Hay diferentes maneras de delimitar, en términos transcendentales, la coexistencia con lo otro-quelo-humano (suponiendo que se trate sólo de eso). Proponemos, en este sentido, explorar tres paradigmas alternativos y sus eventuales entrecruzamientos: un paradigma eco-tecnológico, basado en la idea de maquin-ismo o conectividad universal, à la Hörl; otro que cabría calificar de óptico-perspectivista, a partir de la lec-tura pragmática del multinaturalismo de Viveiros de Castro; y otro, por último, de inspiración hölderliniana, que proponemos denominar meta-poético, y al que la antropología estructural ofrecería algo así como una semántica ontológica comparada y la filosofía heideggeriana el bajo cifrado.
In this final chapter, I return to where I began in Chap. 2, with the metaphysical continuity of mind and life, and show how human rationality, consciousness, and free agency are not only (i) metaphysically continuous with organismic life and with non-living uncomputable, negentropic, irreversible, processual, purposive, self-organizing, and time-unidirectional or time-asymmetric, non-equilibrium thermodynamic organic systems, from the Big Bang forward, but also (ii) primitive, irreducible facts about the natural universe, just like the four fundamental forces—gravitation, electromagnetism, strong nuclear force, and weak nuclear force. Indeed, I even claim that consciousness is a fifth fundamental force. Then I conclude the book by showing how the neo-organicist approach to cosmology has an essential elective affinity with what Stephen Hawking and Thomas Hertog call top-down cosmology.
What I’ve been calling the explanatory inversion thesis says that all mechanical systems whatsoever, whether formal or natural, are explanatorily and ontologically dependent upon, and indeed nothing but systematic abstractions from, fundamentally organic systems, and not the other way around. In this chapter, I apply the explanatory inversion thesis to formal science, and in particular, to mathematical logic.
In this short chapter, I argue that just as the inherent logico-mechanical Gödel-incompleteness of Principia Mathematica-style systems of mathematical logic needs to be completed by the capacity for mathematical intuition possessed by rational human animals, so too contemporary physics, according to the Standard Models of cosmology and particle physics, is itself inherently physico-mechanically incomplete and needs to be completed by a robust neo-organicist metaphysics of rational human animal free agency in particular and a neo-organicist worldview more generally.
This article presents formal correspondences between the ontological and logical structures of Deleuze's theory of sense-events in the Logic of Sense as a "post-Cantorian orientation of thought" (Livingston 2012), grappling with an essential incompleteness or inconsistency at the heart of both Being and thought, one which Deleuze champions positively under the equation Ungrounding = Becoming. Through it, Deleuze's sometimes slippery use of the concept of singularity (and its relation to the virtual) is elaborated, elucidating a post-Cantorian metaphysics of events, distinct from and preceding Badiou's, that concretely defines the role of the singular in Deleuze's early major works.
Encouraging biologists to factor semiotics into their research is likely to fall on deaf ears because they already factor it in through an accepted life science methodological standard here called Abstract Parallel Engineering (APE). Biosemiotics’ most significant contribution to biology – a contribution that biologists would come to depend upon – would be a more rigorous alternative methodology to APE through a proof-of-concept explanation for how semiotics – here defined as beings making functional interpretive effort – can emerge within nothing but physical phenomena. It would explain organisms’ most basic agency – their struggle for existence – ergodynamically (i.e., an emergent change in likely physical work) that results in work (effort) that works (functions) to keep a chemical system working (a being) in semiotic response to their workspace (interpretation).
The aim of this chapter is to shed some light on the fascinating interplay between agency and memory in biological systems and to explore how these concepts can inform our understanding of organismal evolution. Memory phenomena can be observed on various levels of organismal organisation and evolution, from epigenetic marking on chromatin all the way to developmental regulatory networks. If we view such things as memory instead of mere heredity, we might be able to better explain the purposeful behaviour and biological teleology of the living, whereby any such explanation is necessarily linked to the concept of organismal closure.
This review admires Michael Marder’s inquiry as a parallel for which biosemiotics can find points of conceptual resonance, even as methodological differences remain. By looking at the dump of ungrounded semiosis – the semiotics of dislocating referents from objects, and its effects – we can better do the work of applying biosemiotics not just towards the wonders of living relations, but also to the manifold ways in which industrial civilization is haphazardly yet systematically destroying the possibility for spontaneous yet contextualized semiogenesis. Biosemiotics has much to gain by understanding the ways, gross and subtle, in which Anthropocenic hubris undercuts our own ability to make sense of the world, doubling down on overconfidence at the expense of meaning-making.
Semiosis is an irreversible process: meaning-making cannot be “unmade”. Time asymmetry, that is, the irreversibility of processes, is closely tied to the concept of entropy, defined as the way in which the order of a system is measured. The second law of thermodynamics states that there is a universal tendency towards disorder, meaning that entropy, as the index for irreversible change, can be interpreted as The Arrow of Time. Hence, we can affirm that the concepts of order/disorder and time are intrinsically linked. Further, we can understand semiosis as an organisation countering disorder. From that point, I propose a transdisciplinary dialogue on the level of self-description between the semiotics of culture and thermodynamics. Centred around the opposition order/disorder, a complementary synthesising framework is created, displaying how thermodynamics can work with Lotman’s semiosphere. The characterisation of the semiosphere as something pertaining (and yet not reducible) to natural law can offer innovative ways to understand the importance of its dynamic character – the constant motion of semiotic mechanisms, boundary, translation processes, and information generation over time. Thus, this framework is built on the intersecting boundaries between cultural and natural studies, potentially applicable to both fields.
Peircean semiotics can improve our understanding of meaning-making in Episodic Memory (EM), also known as ‘autobiographical memory’. It has the potential to complement current hypotheses of EM’s phenomenology by shedding light on the cognitive role of interpretation on behalf of an interpreter, which is central to understanding episodic Mental Time Travel (MTT) beyond the classic computational terms of information processing. I make this case by examining subjective (lived) time in the work of Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914), father of Pragmaticism, and in the work of Endel Tulving (1927–2023), father of EM theory. As a result, I observe that both scientists emphasize that cognitive processes, different from unidirectional mechanical causation, are anticipatory and pragmatic. The first section sets the stage for the reader to understand the historical relevance of connecting Tulving with Peirce. With this aim, I briefly contextualize the psychological research of both scientists and highlight the overlap between their hypotheses. The second section applies Peirce’s concept of semiosis to Tulving’s views on MTT, chronesthesia, and autonoesis. The third section introduces Tulving’s famous triadic class-inclusion hierarchy, according to which memory systems are dynamically controlled by three different types of consciousness. If Peirce had lived to see this evidence-based hierarchy, I conclude, he could have framed it as the semiotic thresholds of self-control in the human mind.
We propose a semiotic framework to underpin a posthumanist philosophy of education, as contrasted to technological determinism. A recent approach to educational processes as semiotic phenomena lends itself as a philosophy to understand the current interplay between education and technology. This view is aligned with the transhumanist movement to defend techno-scientific progress as fundamental to human development. Particularly, we adopt a semiotic approach to education to tackle certain tensions in current debates on the human. Transhumanism scholars share the optimistic belief that there is no limit to how the ethical use of technology can help alleviate suffering and increase our health and wisdom. From this perspective, it appears possible to acquire capacities that require rethinking the notion of human altogether. For others, this undermining of essentialist concepts of humanity entails serious risks, especially related to ethical egalitarianism. We adopte the perspective of edusemiotics, a framework that brings together semiotics, educational theory and philosophy of education. As a theoretical-practical framework, edusemiotics affords a hermeneutic and semiotic method for our approach. Peirce’s logic of signs is used to analyze socio- educational interactions as environmental. We observe two lines of thought. On the one hand, technological transhumanism enhances Cartesian mind–body dualism. On the other hand, philosophical posthumanism seeks to overcome this dichotomy. The former proposal construes human transformation as an artifactualization derived from techno-scientific enhancements. The latter position proposes an integrative posthumanism, capable not only to include edusemiotic theory but also to rethink the concept of learning as mutual to that of human.
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