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September 2017
Volume: 14, No: 3, pp. 371– 383
ISSN: 1741-8984
e-ISSN: 1741-8992
www.migrationletters.com
Copyright @ 2017 MIGRATION LETTERS © Transna tional Press London
Article history: Received 14 August 2016; Accepted 22 May 2017
Migration and security: in search of
reconciliation
Islam Ahmed
Abstract
In this paper a case is made for the necessity of an inter-disciplinary treatment of the migration
phenomenon. The paper addresses the relation between migration and security from a
reconciliatory perspective after a brief analysis of the migration-security nexus and how migration
got securitised. Based on the Foucauldian notion of biopolitics, one can argue that what
contributes heavily to the securitisation of migration is the emergence of biopower and biopolitics
which are primarily concerned with the control over lives of the population within a given
territory. This makes states and societies consider migration as a matter that should be under
control, since it is related to the hygiene of the population and nationals of a given state. I,
therefore, discuss the EU and other European countries’ policies regarding migration and how
biopolitics have influenced securitising the EU’s migration policies. The main argument is that
migration can, and should, be treated as an advantage rather than a threat, though it does not
deny the security concerns that alway accompany such social phenomenon. The impact of culture
and history on migration policies, and how identity politics shape a given country’s policies are
discussed. Perceiving migration as either a threat or an opportunity, the way in which a country
perceives migrants shapes its migration policies, whether restrictive or multiculturally-tolerant.
Keywords: migration; security; biopolitics; Foucault; EU; Europe; refugees.
Introduction
‘Migration studies’ as a scholarly discipline is still a relatively new subfield in
International Relations. This is primarily because migration policies and migrant-
related issues were mainly considered, between 1945 and 1980, a kind of ‘low
politics’ or domestic issues that concern only the related receiving/host country
itself, as opposed to ‘high politics,’ which is concerned with foreign policies and
inter-state relations. This was a result of the less impact that migration policies had
on the balance of power during the Cold War, and especially in the political and
social milieu in the United States. Given the fact that International Relations is a
US-dominated discipline
1
, it is thus quite understandable why it had
underestimated the relevance of migration policies to be studied and analysed
deeply in its subfields (Hollifield, 2008, p. 183), especially ‘security studies’ which
relied on a state-centric approach. It is only after the end of the Cold War that IR
scholars came to realise the ‘new’ insecurities that needed to be analysed and
Islam Ahmed, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Al Tarfa Street, Zone 70, Qatar.
E-mail: islamnajeh@gmail.com.
1
For an elaboration on this point, see: Smith, S. (2002). “The United States and the Discipline of
International Relations: Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline.” International Studies Review, 4(2):
67-85.
372 Migration and security: in search of reconciliation
www.migrationletters.com
discussed, apart from the military-based notion of security that dominated the field
throughout the course of the Cold War period (Huysmans and Squire, 2009, pp. 1-
2).
To begin with, one may need to define who a ‘migrant’ is and what ‘migration’, as
a social phenomenon, is. In order to provide a definition of who a ‘migrant’ is, in
the first place, Thomas Nail looks back into the history of migration insofar as it is
related to cosmopolitanism and the ‘cosmopolitan hope.’ Yet, he then gives a
comprehensive definition that attributes the word ‘migrant’ as “the collective
name for all the political figures in history who have been territorially, politically,
juridically, and economically displaced from their homes by force” (Nail, 2013). The
‘force’ here would be a broader concept that includes economic drives and
motives.
2
Thus, even when migrants ‘choose’ to migrate, for better life conditions
and economic privileges, they are still ‘forced’ to move for the sake of improvement
and for developmental goals, since otherwise people would, psychologically, opt
to stay safe in their homes with their families and their old memories. One can add
also education as another need that drives people to continue ‘on the move,’
seeking better chances of a high-quality education.
‘Migration’ is defined as a “permanent or semipermanent change of residence”
(Lee, 1966, p. 49). It can also be defined as “the process by which individuals,
families, or groups move from one country of residence to work or settle in
another” (Parry, 2007, p. 565). Parry adds that the concept’s meaning has changed
over time, shifting from concerns over economic reasons of migration to ‘a variety
of reasons’.
The migration-security nexus
The relation between security and migration is double-sided. Security concerns can
be found in destination countries, just the same as they are of the main reasons
that drive migrants to start their journeys.
3
Analysing the migration-security nexus
is not an easy task to be carried out, mainly due to the subjectivity of the two
concepts. Therefore, their linkage should be analysed within a structural-realist
framework of the English School that bridges both the objectivity of realism to the
subjectivity of constructivism, emphasising the connection between migration,
identity, and security according to the different levels of analysis that spread from
the individual, the state, to the international system, following ‘the logic of
anarchy’ (Stivachtis, 2008, p. 2). Yet, some neo-realists acknowledged that non-
state actors in international relations can still constitute “a threat to the autonomy,
2
For analysis of the relation between insecurity and migration, see Sirkeci, 2005. Transnational mobility
and migration are but endeavours to attain human security and escape human insecurity, that is very
present in conflict zones — conflict being something beyond physical violence; see Sirkeci, 2009, p. 7.
3
For more conceptual work on conflict, insecurity and migration, see Sirkeci, 2006; Cohen & Sirkeci, 2011;
Sirkeci & Cohen, 2016; Cohen & Sirkeci, 2016, and Truong & Gasper, 2011.
Ahmed 373
Copyright @ 2017 MIGRATION LETTERS © Transna tional Press London
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the state with the potential ability to cause
disputes or even conflicts between countries,” and this acknowledgement came in
line with the new agenda of security studies, proposed by the Copenhagen School
4
(Thompson, 2013), and especially promoted in the writings of its director Barry
Buzan, who, along with Ole Wæver, was one of the most important figures in the
School and the new scopes it brought to security studies. Therefore, to count
migration as a security issue and to incorporate it into security studies is a part of
the trend to expand the issues and topics covered in security studies so as to go
further beyond the realist state-centric and military-focused approach (Krause and
Williams, 1996, pp. 229-31).
It is out of rational realism and security dilemma that states come to consider
migration as a security threat and its policies as a matter of national security
protection, for this might be a clear manifestation of the national interest and
political sovereignty. Yet, this is related to how powerful a state is within the
international system to practice its national sovereignty in the global arena
(Hollifield, 2008, p. 201). Further exemplary elaboration from the post-Cold War
era is given in the Brettell and Hollifield’s volume on Migration Theory.
5
Besides,
ethnic security dilemma that leads to such conflictual situation is when a certain
ethnicity perceives another’s advantages or well-being as a threat to its own, and
thus see their reactions as a zero-sum game, a win-lose situation (Ramsbotham et
al., 2012).
To move ahead on the securitisation discourse, we face questions of the type: Who
is a migrant? Which issue is to be taken as a security one? Answers to both
questions are still subject to vary according to the different perspectives and lenses
through which they are looked at and analysed (Pinyol-Jiménez, n.d.). As Williams
Walters argues, the two issues fit together, for they are as associated as ‘law and
order’ or ‘peace and stability.’ They are even depicted like a ‘proverbial happy
couple.’ The interconnectedness of ‘security’ and ‘migration’ can be traced back to
the end of the Cold War and the ensuing inter-ethnic conflicts and the huge number
of both refugees and economic migrants
6
, fleeing the devastating conflicts or
seeking better economic chances (Walters, 2010, pp. 217-8). To deal properly with
the relation between security and migration, there is a need to a comprehensive
approach to security that would examine all of its aspects
7
, and thus produce an
integrated policy-framework that fits the issue better. Such policies are the
4
Officially the ‘Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI)’.
5
Brettell, C. B. and Hollifield, J. F. (eds.) (2008). Migration Theory: Talking across Disciplines. London, UK:
Routledge.
6
Though the paper would set a distinction between migrants and refugees, as an issue of legal and
technical definitions, it would treat them later interchangeably, under the name of ‘migrants,’ since
refugee are not but forced migrants. Sirkeci also calls for such interchangeability of terms, as he argues
that this is a false dichotomy, as both categories “share the same needs.” see: Sirkeci, 2006; Sirkeci and
Cohen, 2016.
7
E.g. political, socio-economic, cultural, but not limited to the state-centric military aspect.
374 Migration and security: in search of reconciliation
www.migrationletters.com
prerequisite for an effective multilateralism in the treatment of the debate over
‘the interconnectedness of migration and security,’ so as to efficiently coordinate
the efforts of all local, regional, and international institutions that work in the field.
For example, the linkage between the North African migrants and terrorism
8
is a
common mistake that most of us make. The potentiality of becoming terrorists
mentioned in Gebrewold’s argument is a subjective concern rather than a real
threat (Gebrewold, 2008, p. 116). Moreover, as argued by Ambassador William
Lacy Swing, the Director-General of the International Organisation for Migration
(IOM), there is no statistical approved connection between migrants and violence
in the receiving states. Hence his call to ‘decriminalise migrants,’ namely to see the
potential in them and to see them as fellow humans who are willing to participate
and contribute (Swing, 2013). In accordance with this call came the IOM campaign
‘Migrants Contribute’ under slogans like ‘It is Amazing What Migrants Bring,’ calling
the receiving states to be ready to gain the potential benefits migrants might bring
such as ‘brain gains’ (IOM, 2015). To give a positive side of its relation to security,
it is argued that among the impressive aspects of international migration is that it
can act as a reinforcing element for global security when it is considered and
analysed from a cosmopolitan perspective. According to Nail (2013), they are
migrants who really foster what Catriona McKinnon of Reading University calls ‘the
cosmopolitan hope’ (McKinnon, 2005), since they—while away from homes—feel
deprived from anything but their labour, and thus they develop a true sense of
solidarity and cooperation, a real fraternity feelings, offering new and alternative
social orders. This is how he comes to the conclusion that migrants “are the true
agents of political inclusion and cosmopolitanism” (Nail, 2013). Political inclusion
definitely promotes global security, as it brings about stability and order nationally
and internationally, inside and outside.
To label migrants and migration as a ‘threat’ or a ‘security issue’ is to affirm a
stereotype that is too populist with no empirical evidence to support it, while it
ignores the real beneficial contributions that migrants provide to their ‘adoptive
societies’ and their support for economic development in their homes through
remittances. Such labelling is a dangerous act, for it divides peoples and increases
xenophobia and anti-migrant sentiments (Thompson, 2013), especially in the
developed countries
9
despite their need for this migrant labour. These sentiments
are in an unexampled level already, in an age of huge human mobility and great
numbers of ‘people on the move,’
10
resembling a ‘cruel irony,’ as Swing called it
(Swing, 2013).
8
And thus creating a security issue out of their migration—as Gebrewold does, basing his argument on
few recent incidents.
9
Which are targeted by migration waves.
10
Almost one seventh of the world population. When looking at both international and domestic
migration; since there are about 230 million international migrants and 740 million domestic migrants
(Swing, 2013).
Ahmed 375
Copyright @ 2017 MIGRATION LETTERS © Transna tional Press London
Additionally, as Koser (2011) argues, there is no clear evidence of criminality,
terrorism tendencies, nor epidemic diseases among migrants and refugees. He also
argues that overemphasising these imagined and ‘extreme risks’ blocks the sight
from realising the ‘real threats’ that migration may bring about, which according to
him, are not systematic rather are related to specific conditions and contexts that
raise the possibility of migration being a security issue; otherwise they are ordinary
labour. Among these conditions is the subjective perception of national security
and social harmony—from a homogeneous understanding—that raises hostilities
among the public opinion towards migrants, regardless of them being a real threat
or not.
Securitisation and the impact of 9/11
Although it has been systematically securitised in the aftermath of 9/11 events, it
is no new phenomenon to securitise ‘migration’ and to look at it through security
lenses. Throughout history, and during periods of conflicts, migrants were
considered as a potential threat to the receiving country, especially when the
receiving country and their countries of origin are in direct confrontations and
conflicts; as they might cooperate with their countries of origin, acting like a ‘fifth
column.’ The Germans in the UK and the Japanese in the US during the two world
wars of the twentieth century are contemporary examples (Koser, 2011). The fall
of Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union
brought about a new understanding of security threats that was broader than the
conventional military-based one (Pinyol-Jiménez, n.d.), hence the wide rang of
issues that qualified as security-related issues, including migration, environment,
identity, etc.
The securitisation of international migration has then intensified in the aftermath
of 9/11 (Pinyol-Jiménez, n.d.). Since the attacks were executed by non-state actors
and networks, Buzan’s call to broaden the agenda of security studies and to
reconsider security threats has found a great reinforcing element, bringing about a
shift in the object of security studies; from states being the threatened object, to
cover other non-state objects including individuals and social groups (Buzan, 1983,
cited in CRER, 2013). Therefore, when we come to analyse the process of
securitising migration, we need to refer to the broadened agenda of security
studies, with much credit goes to Buzan for his affirmation that the state is not the
only possible threatened or threatening object, rather non-state actors are also
potential objects that may come under threat or resemble a threat. To name a few,
one can mention environmental, economic, and societal issues that came to the
fore of security studies (Tallmeister, 2013); hence the concern over migration as a
possible security threat from an economic, social, and cultural perspective.
Migrants are then considered as a threat by ‘natives’ as they are seen as ‘aliens,’
who might instil a threat to the economic privileges that ‘natives’ have, as well as
to their culture, identity, and social harmony (van Gerwen, 1995, p. 8).
376 Migration and security: in search of reconciliation
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Biopolitics
Biopolitics is a relatively new term that emerged in the last century to define the
range of politics that is directly related to life controls. The Foucauldian notion of
biopolitics, applied here, is a historical and relational one. It is, thus, centred around
life as the main domain of political actions (Lemke, 2010, pp. 124-5). For the French
philosopher Michel Foucault, biopower is the set of mechanisms through which the
basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political
strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the
eighteenth century, modern western societies took on board the fundamental
biological fact that human beings are a species. This is roughly what I have called
bio power (2009, pp.1-2).
One of these ‘basic biological features of the human species’ is that they do migrate
and move from one place to another. Therefore, one can argue that what
contributes heavily to the securitisation of migration is this emergence of biopower
and biopolitics, as these concepts are primarily concerned with the control over
lives of populations within a given territory. This makes states and societies
consider migration as a matter that should be under control, since it is related to
the hygiene of the population and nationals of a given state (Foucault, 1997).
Racism and racist policies, as un-militarised war against foreigners and ‘the other,’
cannot but take migration as a security threat to the ‘purity’ of the nation that
constitutes such-and-such a state. It is a continuous process of ‘otherisation’.
From the reverse perspective, migration is also taken to be one of the tactics
through which biopower is practiced, hence the securitisation of the phenomenon,
since it is a method that might be deployed to penetrate into the politics and the
societal realm of other states. Therefore, one may argue that racism is of a great
impact on the securitisation of migration policies. Cultural concerns reinforced with
racism lead to the European image of migrant flows as a ‘cultural threat’ that would
destabilise the bases of the liberal democratic Western societies (Brimelow, 1995,
cited in Brettell and Hollifield, ed., 2008, p. 202). In the first glance, it is because of
the different backgrounds from which migrants come
11
that migration can be taken
as a cultural threat. However, as these migrants ‘choose’ to leave and migrate to
these countries, they might be willing and open to learn more about, and even
adopt, their new societal ideals. The next generations are more likely to go into this
process of the so-called ‘assimilation’ through education and cultural interaction.
Yet, even if they do not get totally assimilated and preserve there original identity,
one may argue that this is quite understandable and natural in the age of
globalisation and cosmopolitan cities; when and where no society can be totally
homogenous unless it is altogether isolated.
Globalisation has also brought about a new phenomenon that requires the state to
seek skilled labour from different regions, yet remain concerned with the potential
11
Mainly from rural areas, with no experience or encounter with Western liberal values.
Ahmed 377
Copyright @ 2017 MIGRATION LETTERS © Transna tional Press London
threats that might be included in the uncontrolled flows of migrants. Therefore,
the state still plays this game of biopolitics: controlling the flows of migrants
crossing its borders, as it is within the scope of biopolitics that the state would
attempt to control the populations’ mobility into and out of its territory. This is also
associated with the process of urbanisation (Walters, 2010, p. 222), as a significant
number of migrants come originally from rural areas, yet end up settling in ‘big
cities,’ where they may find difficulties to adopt the rapid lifestyle and the urban
customs. This might be a sociological aspect of migration which is better left for
sociologists to elaborate on.
The EU and biopolitics
Since most European countries now face a crisis of an ageing population, it is
understandable that they would consider migrants as a threat to their social
cohesion and the ‘purity’ of the European continent as a territory dominated by
the Judaeo-Christian tradition throughout its long history and heritage. In this
context comes the name of the Italian operation ‘Mare Nostrum,’
12
considering it
as ‘their sea,’ reflecting also a Eurocentric view of world politics and international
relations. It also was not much effective as it depended on Italian financial support,
while other EU member states almost considered it as ‘mare vostrum,’
13
as if the
Mediterranean is an Italian border, not one of the EU in its whole (Motta, 2014).
This shows a lack of coordination among European countries in respect to their
migration policies. However, irregular migration, in the sense of ‘crossing borders
illegally,’ should not be the main concern of the receiving states, as, statistically
speaking, the majority of irregular migrants have crossed borders legally initially,
but later broke the laws and stayed illegally in their destinations and host countries
(Koser, 2011).
Moreover, the FrontEx agency was established by the EU to secure its external
borders against possible threats to the ‘racial purity’ of Europe. It was established
to control whom to allow to enter and whom to deny entrance to Europe,
regardless of the diverse backgrounds from which those migrants/refugees come.
This was not for mere economic reasons, but it must have some connection to
biopolitics that is associated with control of life and regulation of population health
and hygiene (Foucault, 1997). Thus, protection of refugees in a regional context
14
would be interrelated to issues of both cultural identity and security concerns (van
Selm, 2005, p. 24). The securitisation of migration is a result of perceived dangers
that it might impose on the social order and harmony, and this is why the EU
agencies that design its migration policies take it as an obstacle to the internal and
domestic cohesion of the member states (Huysmans, 2000, p. 757).
12
From Latin for ‘our sea.’ — A mission to rescue any drowning migrants’ boats, but also to ward off
irregular migration in the Mediterranean, and it was replaced in 2014 by the FrontEx’s Triton mission.
13
‘Your sea,’ as addressing the Italians.
14
Such as the case of EU member states receiving migrants and refugees from Asia and Africa.
378 Migration and security: in search of reconciliation
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Different approaches to identity bring solutions
As politics affect migration policies, so do history and culture. Different histories
affect the perception of migration, and whether a country considers it as a security
threat or not (Tallmeister, 2013), hence the different policies that these states
would take to promote their social integration. The way a country perceives
migrants significantly shapes its migration policies, whether restrictive or
culturally-tolerant, as the political and social identity of a society is consolidated
more assertively in response to an imagined threat of migration (Huysmans, 2000,
p. 757). It is mainly the cultural and social concerns that participate heavily in the
perception of migrants as a social threat to the national fabric, stereotyping them
as criminals or potential terrorists, especially in the post-9/11 era. This perception
of migrants presupposes that homogenous societies were a possibility at all in
history, and that they even can be reconstructed again, though in such a globalised
world. This imagination is misleading both socially and historically (Huysmans,
2000, p. 758). Therefore, it is up to how states see themselves and the multiplicity
of their societies that they come to perceive migration vis-à-vis security differently.
To give few examples, we may consider Canada and France. Canada perceives its
social identity as a multicultural and inclusive one and thus it permits linguistic
differences to the extent that a big province of its is permitted to have its own
educational and political preferences and its own official language. Quebec might
extend these privileges to go into a referendum on independence. On the other
hand, the French concept of identity is one of a homogenous society around liberal
secular values, and hence the French restrictive and exclusive migration policies
(Esses et al., 2006, cited in Tallmeister, 2013).
Economic reasons have their own share as well to impact on migration policies.
Migrants are mostly seen as a threat to the financial capacities of the receiving
state (Stivachtis, 2008, p. 17), hence the call for restrictive migration policies;
neglecting the potential economic benefits and ‘brain gains’ from such keen
individuals who would do much better so as to prove themselves worthy of the
social security they are to receive in their new societies (Swing, 2013), as they
would have no more than their own labour to give to the host societies. Moreover,
migrants are continuously accused of ‘stealing the nationals’ jobs,’ despite the fact
that this perception is a mere subjective concern that has no empirical support or
statistical proofs, as it, argues Chomsky, is based on the fallacious idea that the jobs
are determined only by the number of people who seek employment (Chomsky,
2007, cited in Tallmeister, 2013).
Reconciliation
In order to reconcile this double-edged goal of getting labour, especially in ageing
societies, yet keeping social harmony and security unaffected — there is a need to
seek relatively objective policies that set aside the subjective concerns of threat
possibilities, though it also requires states to put some restrictions that assist them
to achieve their goals with security dimension still in the scope (Walters, 2010, p.
Ahmed 379
Copyright @ 2017 MIGRATION LETTERS © Transna tional Press London
218). This might be a reason behind dumbing migration as one of the discontents
of globalisation, for it is not only about forced migrants or refugees rather most
other migrants recorded in the IOM’s statistics are economic ones, seeking better
work conditions and economic benefits (van Selm, 2005, p. 11).
Moreover, population movements and state policies are mutually-affected and
their relations are tightly tied to each other. This is manifested, for example, in the
impact of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its impact on the Palestinian migrants there.
Additionally, around 1.5 million of the Egyptian labour in Iraq, who were economic
migrants, were recruited in the Iraqi army during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988
(Weiner, 1990, p. 1). Drawing on this connection between stability and population
movements, a new framework for understanding the causes and effects of
international migration can be established so as to broaden the scope of migration
studies to include security and political dimensions as well as economic one. These
different frameworks would also lead to different analysis of international
migration, that probably would welcome it positively (Weiner, ibid, 2-3).
It can be argued that irregular migration is that what may resemble a security
concern to the EU, for example, since it results from the lack of real European
investment efforts in ‘the South’—so as to limit the probabilities of economic
migration—and/or from the absence of an effective ‘quota-system of planned
migration’ (van Gerwen, 1995, p. 8, emphasis in the origin), hence the vital need
for homogenous EU migration policies that could fit more the age of globalisation
and the liberal value of a free movement of people. The liberal ideal of a free trade
would imply more openness regarding the human capital movement and also open
borders that would facilitate the modern global trade; while still concerned with
national security and protecting national borders. This dichotomy puts the modern
liberal state on the horns of a dilemma (Sassen, 1996, cited in Lahav, 2003, p. 90).
Moreover, it is argued that whether irregular migration threatens national
sovereignty or not is an issue that is subject to debate and cannot be settled once
and forever. Another dilemma here is that national sovereignty
15
and respect for
human rights are somehow in a conflict vis-à-vis migration policies, because policy-
makers would face tremendous difficulties in their attempts to reconcile these two
concerns (Koser, 2005).
A practical consequence of harmonised migration plans within a specific region,
e.g. the EU, is to achieve a burden-sharing policies that would prevent the countries
which follow ‘open door’ policies and multicultural approach—as the EU lacks a
unified migration policies—from falling in the ‘prisoner dilemma’ trap, i.e. carrying
alone the burdens of migrants’ accommodation and social protection as a result of
their tolerant policies (van Gerwen, 1995, pp. 6,8). From another concern,
providing and sustaining an economic security and developmental plans in
15
In the sense of controlling who to be allowed or denied entrance and crossing national borders.
380 Migration and security: in search of reconciliation
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potential migrants’ countries
16
with the assistance of developed and rich countries
would secure the future of these potential migrants in their homes. Additionally,
an effective mechanism of conflict resolution so as to reduce armed and ethnic
conflicts is of a great help in this context, so as to reduce the number of refugees.
This would render the European continent receiving less numbers of refugees and
economic migrants, thus reducing its security concerns (van Gerwen, 1995, p. 7).
With respect to actors that are concerned with the security-migration nexus, as
mentioned earlier, the scope is broader than states as political institutions. The
scope of actors now includes international organisations, security agencies, and
transportation companies. This requires security analysts to look from new
perspectives that are broader than the conventional conception of security—
concerned with state policies and military-based notion of security—so as to find
out more about the non-state actors that play on the ground in the filed of
populations movements (Lahav, 2003, p. 91). From a human-centric security
perspective, human lives are of a higher priority than states’ borders and the
subjective perception of ‘national security.’ This is the logic according to which
Amnesty International has launched its campaign ‘People before Borders’ in
response to the Mediterranean tragedies recently (2014-2016). Its logic relies on
legalising free human mobility, so as to stop human rights violations, with the
expectations of better economic benefits to stem out of multicultural human
interaction, providing labour to ageing Europe. Yet, obviously Amnesty
International’s campaign is based on more humanitarian concerns than security
ones, which somehow render it irrelative to security studies unless it is considered
as an attempt to neutralise the nationalistic/ethnic revival in approaching security
issues and threats by raising the global awareness of interconnectedness of
humanity in its fate and destiny (AI, 2014).
A new approach to the migration-security nexus is to consider migrants as the
threatened side, rather than the source of threat to the receiving state and society.
Therefore we need to put a greater emphasis on the reasons that drive migrants to
leave their home countries seeking better life conditions or fleeing armed clashes.
This approach attempts mainly to analyse economic (in)security, structural
violence in underdeveloped countries, and direct violence; with the latter coming
in the form of armed conflicts, political oppression, or other sever human rights
violations (Thompson, 2013). To debate the state-centric and human-centric
approaches to security-migration relations is of a greater impact on the public
opinion as well as the policy-making process, so as to find a middle ground to
reconcile this nexus; as the latter is concerned with human rights and economic
exploitation of migrants, while the former focuses on state-centric notion of
security. Therefore, a further and elaborative look that compares and contrasts
both perspectives is needed (CRER, 2013).
16
The source of possible migration waves.
Ahmed 381
Copyright @ 2017 MIGRATION LETTERS © Transna tional Press London
Conclusion
Therefore, we can conclude that although the state and its governmental agencies
currently play biopolitics and biopower as they control populations’ mobility into
and out of the state’s territory — political activism and human rights associations’
campaigns, on the other side, need to emphasise and stress on inclusive approach
to the issue, such as cosmopolitanism, in order to reconcile national security
concerns with the flows of migrants in such globalised age.
Moreover, tolerant migration policies would result in political and social inclusion
that eventually promote global security, as they help connecting people and
developing a true sense of solidarity and cooperation, offering new and alternative
social orders. Globalisation is a source and reinforcing element of diverse and
multicultural identities in our age, and thus the game of biopolitics to prevent
migration so as to keep the social ‘purity’ and homogeneity is doomed to fail, unless
such states and societies opt to stay totally isolated. And this is not an option in the
age of globalisation.
Acknowledgement
Islam Ahmed, the author, is a graduate of Istanbul Sehir University. He would like
to extend his gratitude to Assistant Professor İsmail Yaylacı (of Istanbul Şehir
University) who encouraged the author to write this piece while attending his
course on International Security at the University. He would also like to deeply
thank Razan al-Qaddour, a friend and a colleague at Şehir University, for her
support and encouragement.
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