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Copyright © 2017 SAGE Publications www.sagepublications.com
(Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC and Melbourne)
Vol 33(3): 376–400. DOI: 10.1177/0169796X17717005
The State of Human Rights and Human
Security in FDRE: A Comparative Case
Study of Tigray and Afar Regional States
Assefa Le-ake Gebru
PhD Student, ECNU-IGPP, Department of Politics, Shanghai,
China; Assistant Professor, Political Science, Mekelle University, Ethiopia
ABSTRACT
This study is the result of a comparative case study about the protection of human
right from the vintage point of the promotion of human security in Tigray and
Afar National Regional States in Ethiopia. Despite the multifaceted differences
between the two regions, the study shows how the universality of human rights and
contextual nature of human security plays off and has comparatively examined the
protection and promotion of human right and human security in the study area.
In the academic literature, glossy either condemnation or admiration of the state
of human right and human security in FDRE (Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia) is a common representation. However, this study contends that there are
similarities and stark differences in the state of human rights and human security
between the two regions. Still, human right violations remain to significantly hinder
the promotion of human security. Besides political (threats and risks) insecurity,
which is common to regions, livelihood insecurity in Afar, personal and physical
insecurities in Tigray are major indicators of slack in human right protection.
Keywords: FDRE, human rights, human security, Afar, Tigray, Pastoral and
Agrarian
Introduction
Ensuring the complementarity and interdependence of human rights
and human security in theory and in practice under constitutionally
guaranteed modality has become the tune of the day. Human rights
as normative frameworks and human security as empirical indicators
go hand in glove, institutionalization of which different though. The
broad values and principles of human rights include universality and
Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
Gebru: The State of Human Right and Human Security 377
indivisibility, equality and non-discrimination, participation and the inclu-
sion of vulnerable groups, accountability and the rule of law. Most of these
principles form part of the constitutions of most states and should guide
the work of parliaments and legislators in their law-making endeavors,
including human rights institutions to ensure human security goals. In this,
the latter as indicators of negation of human rights serve as flag points of
human right-based interventions.
Human rights can be well-understood as referring to those rights that
are inherent to the person and belong equally to all human beings regard-
less of their race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth, or other status. They deal with
freedom from fear and want, and call for respect, protection, promotion,
and fulfillment from duty-bearers. And this reflects the notion of human
security in broader context.
Human security on the other hand is freedom from all form of fear
and want which constitutes both from classical sources of insecurity, such
as war violence, crime, and police brutality as well as the new sources of
structural insecurity, such as decease, starvation, and marginalization.
Positively speaking human security is enlarging freedom which in turn
constitutes the protection and promotion of basic human rights. In this, the
complementarity and interdependence of the two concepts are cemented.
Yet, this does not rule out their differences. While human security carries
element of subjectivity, human rights is considered universally application.
Because some human security needs are socially constructed. Human
security as empirical framework of identifying threats and risks against
human rights, because of its subjectivity, is wider and more agile to accom-
modate the subjective needs of society. This enables it to be a parameter of
assessing the practice of human rights. Moreover, the comprehensive and
accommodative nature of human security makes it a common framework
to be shared as human rights among different societies.
Therefore, in practical terms, for instance the framework of human secu-
rity and human right is apt enough to examine the overall federal experi-
ment, democratic nation building, how in fact these concepts are played
out in various regional states of the federation. By doing so, how much
the promise of the democratic constitution and emergent wealth is cashing
into tangible gains measurable in terms of the degree of human security
and hence protection of human rights can be carried out. Accordingly, it
is with this spirit the principles and concepts of human rights and human
security are used here.
378 Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
The post-1991 constitutional order in Ethiopia has ushered unprec-
edented constitutional regime of democracy at least in principle. The
bumpy nature of the practice of democratic rights notwithstanding,
the country, at federal and regional levels, has constitutional enshrined
the responsibility to protect and promote human rights and human secu-
rity. Many among external and internal critiques paint totally oblique
and dark image of the human right condition in Ethiopia as much as the
incumbent government give absolute opposite image of the later.
The primary objective of this article is to embark a comparative pro-
moting case study of the practice of human rights from the vintage point
of human security objectives in Afar and Tigray regions. As a case study,
instead of the often-contested generalizations of human rights reports, it
generates an in-depth understanding of the phenomena and their rela-
tionship in the two regions. Afar and Tigray regions are selected due to
their stark difference in economic and social organization (pastoral vs
agrarian, clan-based egalitarianism vs hierarchical individual), political
role (historical periphery and historical center), and the political party
ruling the region (EPRDF affiliated vs EPRDF core). Without prejudice
to these differences, how the cases under investigation-human rights and
human security-are plaid out in the two regions gives a comparative and
vivid perspective of the phenomena in question.
The case study data were mainly gathered using semi-structured inter-
view and Focus Group discussions carried out in Tigray and Afar regions.
Accordingly, 30 interview informants, 18 from five zone towns in Tigray
and 12 from four towns in Afar, were randomly selected. The towns are
selected in Tigray because of their zone status and central geographic
position; the selection of the towns was made based on considerations
of each wereda to represent the nature of human security problems
identified by pilot study. Similarly, five FGDs (Focus Group Discussion)
were carried out in the five zone towns of Tigray and four in Afar towns
composed of six discussants each selected by purposive snowballing. In
total, the numbers of people involved in the study were 84. The qualitative
analysis of the qualitative data was carried out using thematic selection,
categorization, description and interpretation of ideas; informant views
were also used in direct quotes to transmit people’s experience of threats
and risks of human security.
Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
Gebru: The State of Human Right and Human Security 379
Assessment of Human Right and Human Security
in the Study Area
This part divulges into assessment of human security in Afar and Tigray
regions based on the identifications of threats to livelihood security, per-
sonal and physical security, and political security that constitutes violation
of human right. Livelihood security in Afar was assessed against threat
factors of loss of pastoral land that in turn caused social and economic
insecurity. Also, personal and physical security in Afar was assessed
against threats of police abuse, illegal detention, and inhuman treatment
of inmates based on data from the assessment reports of five prison
administration in the region and informant sources. In Tigray region,
human security is assessed in terms of personal and physical security, and
political security by threats of police abuse, illegal detention, and access
to justice based on data from the informant sources in four towns. This
chapter, therefore, has identified and assessed the state of human security
in the two regions on comparative perspective from the vintage point of
aforementioned factors in their respective contexts.
Setting the Regional Contexts: Afar and Tigray
Afar region is one of the nine national regional states of FDRE with a
population of 1.6 million people organized in 32 weredas and five zones;
the Afar people have intricate clan system that guide egalitarian com-
munal social organization dependent on dominantly pastoralist economic
production and social reproduction. Given, the dominantly arid and semi-
arid climate and shortage of resources to pastoral production conflicts are
common around access to and control over pastoral resources. Hence,
personal and physical security is highly threatened by violent-armed
conflicts (FDRE-MoFA, 2014). Of the total population, 96 percent are
pastoralist and lives in rural areas without access to basic amenities and
modern infrastructure that made the region the poorest in all human
development parameters the worst hit (UNDP, 2013). According to
US-FEW reports, for last 15 years, the region is the most vulnerable to
drought, famine and massive animal death, and overall food insecurity;
annually 46 percent of the population lives on emergency food aid that
declines to 36 percent during good rain and abundance (US-FEW, 2014).
The Afar people resolve conflicts using customary conflict resolu-
tion systems. According to official reports, 96 percent of conflicts are
handled by customary mechanisms led by elders and enforced by youth
380 Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
institutions. Currently, their role has severely deteriorated owing to the
change on the socio-economic and political bases they used to be effec-
tive. The region faces pastoralist eviction and displacement causing loss
of pastoralist livelihood, and incipient conflicts with the state and among
themselves (AHRO, 2015). Moreover, owing to the infantile nature of
modern state institutions and law enforcement, the practice of security
and law enforcement organs including correctional centers is considered
one of the worst in Ethiopia (PFE, 2014).
Human Security in Afar Region: Livelihood
Security Assessment
The state of human security in Afar region is rendered precarious by
various factors internal and external to the region: geographic, demo-
graphic, economic, environmental, political, and military security issues
overlap affecting the overall state of human security. Human insecurity
is expressed mainly in loss of pastoralist livelihood. Historically, victims
of double marginalization, exploitation and repression, the Afar pastoral-
ists have seen improvements in many respects in post-1991 Ethiopia. By
and large, comparing to the past, the improvement in social amenities
and services in most urban areas are appreciable.
However, in terms of the tangible returns to the pastoralist commons
during the last two decades, there are none in earnest positive records.
This does not mean that federal government has not made efforts for
the improvement in the life of the pastoralist commons; but owing to
rampant corruption, institutional inefficiency, political inaptness, conflict
and misguided development programs, the protection of human right and
ensuring human security have not been a success (AHRO, 2015).
Survey results of Afar commons in four weredas have confounded
that the major problems with their lives are the ever-deteriorating phe-
nomena of continuing to practice pastoralist mode of life that questions
its viability in some place any longer. Informants refer to three major
threats of human security, development-induced displacement, loss
of land, violent conflict and state violence (Abdu, 2014; Lale, 2014; Sule,
2014; Yayo, 2014). According to reports, the inhuman and degrading
conditions of the accused and the convict in correctional centers along
with the problem of justice dispensation have added to the personal
and physical insecurities caused by the factors stated previously
(AJSAB-PA, 2012). However, these factors do not have applicability to
all areas covered in the study areas: Ayisa’eta, Dubti, Mile, and Gewane
Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
Gebru: The State of Human Right and Human Security 381
Weredas. While in the former two displacement by Tendaho project and
absence of viable resettlement, police action, and political coercion are
major, in Mile Issa violence and state violence, and in Gewane invest-
ment caused land loss, Issa and state violence are major ones (Abdu,
2014; Lale, 2014; Sule, 2014; Yayo, 2014). Therefore, the assessment of
human security in the four Weredas is presented in terms of the economic,
social, personal, and physical insecurities caused by these varying factors.
Economic Security
One of the major challenges against the economic viability of the
pastoralist production is the shrinking space of pastoral ecosystem by
the emergence of mega projects, such as Tendaho Sugar factory and
plantation. The project has taken the major source of sustainability and
resource supply for the animal economy and social function of the Awussa
Afar, Ayisa’eta, and Dubti. The project is a Federal government plan to
settled agrarian economy and social life that pastoralists of the Awussa
area devoid of access to and control over their historical economic
and social space of production and movement. They are prescribed
for transformation into life in permanent settlement as a pastoralist.
However, similar approaches to developing the pastoralist commons in
other African and Asian states and past attempts during the Dergue
period in Middle Awash valley have been proven a total disaster. Despite
in such cases, the federal government persuade its project displacing
15,000 pastoralists in the lower Awash valley of Awussa area causing
economic and economic insecurities, and personal and physical insecurity
caused by the subsequent violent clashes with state organs (ibid.).
In Mile and Gewane, the causes of insecurities have the violent con-
flict with the Issa Somali clan behind the declining quality of pastoralist
livelihood in addition to the invasion of 60 percent of the remaining land
by the invasive weed known as Prosopies Julufora. The impact of the last
element is not a point addressed in this study and must be addressed by
a separate study. Yet, the violent conflict with the Issa and clashes with
states organs because of the push from the former in Mile, and in Gewane
the land loss caused by leasing to private investors and Issa invasion
have compounded to exacerbating community grievance and clashes
against the state. In effect, it exacerbated the already precarious states
of economic, social, personal, and physical security in the areas.
In Ayisa’eta and Dubti Wereda before the commencement of the
project, it was habitual for pastoralists to migrate to the grazing lands
382 Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
Chefa Wereda in Oromia Nationality Administrative Zone in Amhara
Region during the dry seasons of Afar. Pastoralists often loss 50 percent
of their stock during the travel to Chefa, 320 kilometer from Awsusa,
often accompanied by violent clashes with agriculturalist of Highland
Amhara and Oromo. Because of this since 2008, seasonal migration has
been disrupted to be contained by their own dry season retreat and graz-
ing in Awussa. But the required land is no longer available to pastoralists
that they face serious challenges of either violating state prohibitions
and in effect go into clashes with state law enforcement or face starva-
tion in silence. The compensation and resettlement funds went to few
elite pockets leaving the people to predicament of losing all (Haysema,
2014; Kaire, 2014)
The predicament of sustaining old life without the availability of vital
conditions that make the life viable is a lamp, the throat of impoverished
pastoralists. An informant from Ayisa’eta rural kebele said that “they are
pretending to have worked well in changing our life by showing couples of
young men fishing and working in the plantation but that is a sham;” and
added that “they are trying to hide their crimes of impoverishing us which
the federal government know but do not care to respond in their disfavor.
Who will care for a people betrayed by his own kin?”(Hummed, 2014)
This is evident from many appeals they made to the federal office of
the project, pastoralist affairs, and office of the prime minister, MoFA
and human right commission for immediate rectification. Unfortunately,
nothing good came there from but worsening conditions. “Neither the
federal nor the regional authorities are showing positive responses that
labeling us resisting development endeavors mean to change the country
economy” said an informant from Dubti (Indirs, 2014).
The early warning dimension of the US-FEW report of the same year
has confound the fear of loss of pastoralist livelihood in 10–15 years pro-
vided the decline in productivity 10 percent observed in last 5 years in
the area continues unabated (US-FEW, 2014). Contrary to this, the Afar
region TV program on the national media is showing daily the project
as success case of livelihood transformation that has ended the misery
of transhumant pastoralist livelihood of trekking after the cattle (EBC,
2015). Another informant from Dubti describes the economic insecurity
from demographic and market vintage point as follows,
I am a woman and do know more than our men the changes in the market after
the coming of 16 thousand highlander workers for who thousands of homes
Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
Gebru: The State of Human Right and Human Security 383
are built; but neither new market for the new comers nor new income for us
is created. Rather they are competing with us with the limited market paying
high values for which they are paid as salary. The prices of flour and supplies
have doubled from the price it was a year ago. We are slapped in the face
thrice: first by unrewarded displacement (that led to poverty), second by loss
of the market and third by the absence of a judge to appeal to. (Hawa, 2014)
The resonance caused by the aforementioned development project is
shared by the view of discussant of FGDs carried out in Ayisa’eta and
Dubti town. The summarized theme of the view of the economic inse-
curity was that they knew from their learned kin’s abroad that they are
been systematically dispossessed of their land, pastoralist livelihood,
and the Afar social way of life, which can only sustain in the former
(FGD-Ayisa’eta, 2014; FGD-Dubti, 2014). The economic insecurity in
Mile and Gewane Weredas are the same with that of Ayisa’eta and Dubti
but economic insecurity is accompanied by armed violence attack by the
Issa Somali and intra-clan violent conflicts in the former.
Mile and Gewane Weredas are located at the Issa-Afar hot spots of
violent conflict zone; often mutual provocation and invasions happen to
cause the balance sheet of death and wounded toll lopsided to the Afar.
Despite persistent appeal to federal government and armed resistance
against Issa, the Afar of Mile and Gewane could not manage to deter the
damages thereof. The personal and physical insecurities are discussed in
the subsequent sections; here let us look at the economic insecurities.
In both weredas, the gradual violent incursion and eviction of Afar dry
season retreats have constricted the mobility and access to vital grazing
land and water points for the Afar; consequently, scarcity in resources
base has made the banks of Mile river and Awash banks to be the only
safe green zone to survive (Lale, 2014; Sule, 2014). They complain against
the reluctance and finally open support that the federal government has
shown by rewarding the Issa to self-rule within Afar territory making
the next violent invasion proximate. The economic vagaries of the Issa
violence they argue can be seen to anyone in the decline in milk and cattle
productivity because of which 56 percent of the people in Mile and 34
percent of people in Gewane had to depend on safety net supplies (ibid.).
In Gewane, the leasing of the fertile river bank of Awash to investors
for income and to deter Issa penetration by pawning federal govern-
ment interest worked a while by generating ample clan remuneration
and forestalling Issa attack. However, this lasted until the new fortune
beckoned inter-clan competition to control the new capital that in turn
384 Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
awakened Issa violence. Consequently, major grazing land on and around
Ayelu Mountain, a major ecosystem for both dry and wet season, and
the green pastures of Mateka locality became unchartered territories
(Dawud, 2014).
According to an elderly informant, the decline in animal production
and lack of milk in all the villages around Gewane have not been seen in
no other period than during the great famine of 1985. He also explained
that the shift to charcoal production is becoming an alternative to the
Afar of Gewane and its environs that this might be the proactive adap-
tation from the awareness of the sealed future of pastoralism. After the
rumor of federal government to have decided in favor of the Issa as usual
couple of years ago, the new practice is said to have grown like wild fire
(Lale, 2014).
Finally, the economic insecurity in the Mille and Gewane wereda has
been exacerbated by the very escalating tempo of commercial cattle
resettling in the area. Traditionally, cattle raiding for cultural and social
utility are the norm among pastoralist Issa and Afar. Since the last two
decades, the nature of the practice is said to have been transformed
into commercial rustling to supply for internal and external black markets
that generate millions of dollars. The mutual practice has devastating
impact for the Afar at the front Kebelle which are always at the debit
side of the calculus and are left with meager capacity of restocking.
The FGD discussants remorsefully lament on the bilk hope of continue
practicing pastoral way of life with the fear of not facing the inevitabil-
ity they dread to speak of (FGD-Gewane, 2014)(FGD-Mile, 2014). The
insecurity in the economic sphere is also reflected in the social security
of the pastoral system briefly discussed further.
Social Security
Pastoralist cattle economy is the substratum from which the endogamous
and cross-cousin marriage, customary conflict resolution, performance of
religious and social rituals, clan alliance and solidarity came out and sus-
tains to function. However, in the absence of the vital pastoral resources
and the subsequent decline of the cattle economy, informants in the
study area unanimously describe that they are on fast track of livelihood
deterioration. As loss of cattle constitutes loss of everything, they con-
sider the challenge is against their social identity (FGD-Gewane, 2014).
Another observation by FGD discussants has identified the dete-
rioration of clan alliances made and sustained for hundreds of years,
Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
Gebru: The State of Human Right and Human Security 385
and expressed in sharing of blood many and providing refuge during
drought and famine have begun being overlooked as trivial in Awussa
area. The implication on the overall social solidarity of Afar identity in
the face of emergent changes because of the economic insecurity never
addressed properly was repeatedly indicated in the middle of discussion
(FGD-Dubti, 2014).
Another dimension of social insecurity is corresponded with the van-
ishing of multiple ecosystem-pastoral social spaces which contributes
to the healthy functioning of the social alchemy. The shrinking pastoral-
ist space caused by the aforementioned factors has precluded practicing
satellite camping, remote trekking and surviving and protecting cattle
safety used as rite of passage from childhood to youth then to adult
stages of development in Afar society. Moreover, social spaces like mount-
ing to the top of Ayelu Mountain in Gewane to make spiritual rituals are
no longer advisable in the face of insecurities not only economic but also
physical security discussed further (FGD-Gewane, 2014).
However, it seems both the federal and the regional governments
did make sense of what it means the loss of such social systems and
practices that give continuity to the family, the clan, and at last the Afar
identity. They sarcastically reflected as “The urban life has changed and
plagued our people badly. If the rural people keep on leaving old social
customs (Qaddas) maybe it will be preserved in Addis Ababa like our
Lucy”(FGD-Ayisa’eta, 2014).
Personal and Physical Security
Personal and physical insecurities here are used to mean threat of/an
attack, mental and emotional instability, fear or restriction of mobility,
damage on the body or violence on the life of a person by sheer use of
force, illegal process or using structural power that limit the realiza-
tion human potentiality. The focus of the discussion also has added the
arbitrary arrest and detention, an attack on dignity and inhuman treat-
ment of inmates and detainees by law enforcement organs. To begin
from the last, the condition of law in Afar region can be called a mere
legal fiction than source of authority for the protection of basic human
and democratic rights of citizens. A report on the state of human right
protection of the accused and suspects, the observance of principle of
habeas corpus and freedom from arbitrary detention and arrest are
not the rule but exception.
386 Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
The report covering the five prison administrations has identified
that illegal detention for longer than 6 months constituted 32 percent,
13 percent, 23 percent, 25 percent and 24 percent of the total number
of inmates in the five prisons in the five zones with respective order
of naming (AJSAB-PA, 2012). According to an anonymous informant,
police brutality and prolonged detention are represented in the col-
loquium of the Afar local language as Berra-Behha-Berra-Behha to
connote the endless cycle of tomorrow–after noon using which individuals
are kept for years moving from police custody to prison administration
without being conviction and even without charge (Anonymous, 2014).
Similarly, the report identified all prisoners except the North zone prison
in Aba’ala, which is one of the most deteriorated, with very crowed
cells leaving no enough room to any down, unclean and unsafe for life;
the inmate treatment, quality and quantity of food, discipline of correction
and protection are the worst of the national level (AJSAB-PA, 2012).
According to AHRO, Afar Diaspora Human right group has reported
that many of clan leaders and influential persons who objected the afore-
mentioned conditions are kept in such prison conditions to get them
broken/die in the process or set as bad example for the people to obey
silently (AHRO, 2015). Furthermore, the FGD discussants in the three
towns have identified prolonged detention without charge to have been
the trend against resisting the implementation of the displacement scheme
in Tendaho area. At times, powerful individuals use prisons to get their
rivals locked unaccounted that conflicts and disputes are rarely taken to
formal courts for fear of this. In case of inter-clan rivalry, the clan with
powerful ties to authorities in high place of the region readily resort to
falsely making charges of connection with the illicit armed group, ille-
gal human trafficking or arms trade to easily get ones enemy convicted
(FGD-Ayisa’eta, 2014; FGD-Dubti, 2014).
With the Issa connection, individuals not in good terms with authori-
ties are reported to have been detained since 2012 to date without due
process of law on the pretext of organizing armed raid on neighboring
settlements adjacent to Mile and Gewane Wereda. In sum, the function
of law enforcement in the region has been posing several violation on
the personal and physical liberty of citizens; the degree of fear and
intimidation associated with such unlawful practices are compound-
ing the incessant fear of violent attacks from the Issa clan of Somali
(FGD-Gewane, 2014)(FGD-Mile, 2014).
The worst form of fear and personal and physical security in the study
area has long been associated with the protracted armed clashes with
Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
Gebru: The State of Human Right and Human Security 387
the Issa. The US-FEW has been reporting since 2002 the co-occurrence
of rising fear in the area along with every Issa-Afar small-scale violent
clashes on both sides. The Afar side of mortality and physical disabil-
ity has been immense that among the Afar mention of Issa is used by
mothers to get kids into sleep or stop crying. In the two front weredas of
Mile and Gewane, the impact of armed clashes is believed to half attended
every extended family in bereavement and loss (ibid.).
Even though regional authorities are as much aggrieved an angry
by the life, physical, and psychological damage imparted by the inces-
sant violence, however, they are said to have been rendered hapless
and helpless to resist federal government without running the risk of
losing the place of political power and influence. Consequently, the
insecurity in this respect and lack of concerted action against the situa-
tion of fear they regard unjust has weakened clan-men code of solidarity
and mutual honor traditionally regarded high (Abdela, 2014).
Therefore, from the discussion of the parameters of the aforemen-
tioned human insecurity indicators, it can be inferred that the state of
human right protection and promotion expected from both regional and
federal government organs (in the absence or presence of human right
commission invariably) are compromised. The much-challenged custom-
ary institutions under pressure from the insecurities referred, nonetheless,
are providing mitigation functions which can be used as entry point for
the rectification of the problem of human insecurity and human right
violation observed.
Human Security in Tigray Region
Assessing the current state of human security in Tigray reminds us
the beginning of the federal system which it joined carrying the blunt
of war and bending under the heavy weight of post-war reconstruction.
During this period, Tigray was next to none from the bottom list of poor
human security. Poverty had the good of the people that economists
had to stipulate new nomenclatural of poverty as poor (Dikha), impover-
ished (Tsa’eda Dikha), destitute (Betekh), and incapacitated (Dombaw).
The share of rural population living on safety net program and emer-
gency relief aid was substantial; the scope and quality of basic amenities
and services have required beginning from the scratch; in short, the
state of human security was best caught in the naming “war devastated
region”. The community-state and local NGO’s coordinated efforts
has achieved ample improvements on all correlates of human security;
388 Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
since the last 5 years, exemplary practices of ensuring food security,
livelihood transformation, environmental healing (according to official
reports) the quantum leap significantly reducing infant and maternal mor-
tality, gender violence and expansion safe water supply, schooling, health
and electrification have been reported from Tigray. However, with the
emerging development, new human insecurities associated with inequal-
ity, explosion of violent crimes, health and traffic hazards, corruption
and nepotism, police brutality and political repression by an emerging
new elite group have emerged. Therefore, the following assessment of
human security was made based on three variables of human security:
personal and physical, social and political security.
Personal and Physical Security
Personal and physical security constitute any risk, vulnerability and threat
of damage and fear of damage on the safety and security of the body,
life, property, family, honor, dignity, character, or personal, relationship
with and role in society. This could be caused by divergent factors, indi-
vidual, societal, state, and natural agents. The assessment in this study
focusing mainly in urban centers has taken note of personal and physical
security against threats of violent crimes, property crimes and police
action.
According to the information from the urban centers in the five admin-
istrative zones, assault and mugging were identified to be the two most
fearful types of violent crimes in major urban centers. For instance, in
the capital of the South zone Maychew, Alamata and Mekony residents
are reported highly affected (Gebru, 2014). Except Aksum assault,
mugging and assault robbery are frequented in many towns includ-
ing Mekelle city. Most attacks are believed among informants to have
been perpetrated by people having acquaintances, with the knowledge
and preparation of committing the acts. The presences of hired assault
by rich and influential persons are emerging in Mekelle, Adigrate and
Shire are being frequented (Haylu, 2014). The case in Shire is described
in association with the rising trend of crime rate along with the sur-
plus income earned by young people from the artisanal gold mining
economy in the neighborhood of Shire (Kuaul, 2014).
An informant from Adigrat adds transnational factor to the new trend
implying failure to reintegrate returnees from migration in the Middle
East as central factor. He indicated the lack of engaging the returnees
in constructive manner but to benefit from what they came back with
Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
Gebru: The State of Human Right and Human Security 389
and promise to cause them act in a wired way and violent behavior is
one (Senay, 2014). The FGD discussants have expressed violent crimes
to have limited the mobility and interaction for productive activities
and social duties in their respective locality (FGD-Maychew, 2014).
This is the canning scenario for the regional police and law enforce-
ment that keeps the person under fear of victimization for himself,
family members and distant relatives as well as acquaintances. Moreover,
causing inability to people from discharging their social roles is damage
against their personal security: role and place in society which constitutes
an aspect of social insecurity.
Property and home are the extension of a person’s identity that viola-
tion on them is violation on the security of the person. Petty theft, hit
and run, and burglary are the three major property crimes identified by
informants as most frequent but not most feared ones as compared to
violent crimes, such as assault robbery, which involves use of violence to
commit crime against property. The nature of property crimes like petty
theft has followed a unique pattern with specific nodal points of depar-
ture and arrival. According to a police officer in Maichew, the petty theft
has a network of relay stations of organized groups connecting Adigrat
and Semera. Most of the thefts on an attractive and vulnerable victim
take travelling along with the target until perpetrating the act of theft.
The nodal points are Alemata, Mekelle, Adigrat, and Semera, at times
such criminals communicate on phone the identity of a potential victim
transmitting the act of theft to be commuted by their allies in another
town (Police-office-1, 2014).
Unlike the common place pick pocket petty theft, the recent nature
of property crime has evolved into a gang nature invisible to victims and
the law enforcement. The networking involved appears much concern-
ing because potential target lucky to escape from a criminal of a town is
systematically relied into the hands of criminals in the other town until
the final destination.
Transport nodal points, such as bus stops and taxi stations, are known
for property crime like theft. But by now the act of travelling by itself
has become a stage of theft which makes it hardly controllable. The
observation of a minibus driver working on the Mekelle Semera rout
has it that even drivers and taxi conductors are collaborating with the
tacit agreement or thought over understanding of sharing the stolen assets
of victims (Diver1, 2014).
Another category of targets of property crime is boutique and
jewelry shops. Crimes in the business areas are committed using multiple
390 Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
destructions involving coordinative drama of creating a scene and collecting
the valuables done by multiple actors this is a common property crime
in the south zone in particular in Alemata town (Police-office-1, 2014).
The involvement of assault and robbery is a unique security con-
cern of potential victims because the chance of using life-threatening
force in the act of impeding robbery may mean that the perpetrator is
programmed to kill the victim to escape identification and legal culpa-
bility therefore unlike property crime the prevalence of assault robbery
and mugging because of the threat they carry on life and physical of vic-
tims they constitute grave personal and physical insecurity.
The case from Mekelle and Maichew has shown a steady increase in
assault robbery and mugging. The use of the new transportation which
excludes the presence of other committers to deter crime in a Bajaj has
made them mobile boxes of assault and robbery. Hence, residents are
not advised to take a Bajaj ride with a stranger (mekonen, 2014). This
is an indication of how threats against the personal and physical security
of residents are adapting to new technologies and opportunities meant
for making life easier.
The aforementioned discussion raises a question on the role of the
law enforcement in general and the quality of policy–community rela-
tions in particular, in deterring threats from being realized into risks
and reducing vulnerabilities from attracting threats against personal
and physical security. In this respect, the information from civilian
informants corroborates the claim of police performance that successful
community policing has been implemented and command posts are set
for every locality-empowering community participation in combating
crime in general. However, the inability to significantly control assault
robbery and mugging is an indication of gaps in implementation of the
policing strategies; however, the new petty theft is requiring a different
strategy that could combine mobile policing which by itself appears
impractical given the current areal-based and station-based. Regarding
burglary, the view of informants and police sources tends to imply an
underestimation of the risks because of the fact that this type of crime
is not most frequented; however, the fear and feeling of unsafe which
is a dimension of insecurity even such rare crimes impact on residents
cannot be underestimated because, the high level of fear of burglary
in towns is an indication of though not victimization but the degree of
vulnerability in the eye of residents. Hence, there got to be a reorienta-
tion to such crimes by both civilians and police. Another unanswered
Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
Gebru: The State of Human Right and Human Security 391
question to explain the gap between good community policing perfor-
mance and increasing frequency of victimization by theft, assault robbery,
and mugging lies on how residents perceive the police (ibid.).
In this respect, there is a sociological difference among infor-
mants. While youth informants are suspicious of the police and do not
readily report and seek police support let adult and elderly informants as
well as female informants have contrary perceptions toward the police.
On the youth side, most informants believe that police are linked with the
criminals in sharing benefits, yet the second category has a healthy doth
of confidence that the police will not risk their profession and legal
accountability to help criminals. Although the gap of explanation in this
respect is not addressed by this study and is prescriptive of a separate
research of its own nevertheless it establishes a degree of involvement
of the police either by omission of responsibility or by commission of
an act of crime by collaborating with criminals. On another plane, relat-
ing police with personal and physical security is the most frequently
mentioned fact of police force by the youth informants. According to
youth informants, the police practice unreasonable and excessive uses
of force were doing so is not necessary at all. On incidents impeding
no risk of arrest or attempt of escape or any concern necessitating active
police involvement, police officers are observed to ritual like flogging of
unfortunate person who fall in their hands. This is they say one tangible
reason for the lack of confidence on the law enforcement, in particular
the police (FGD-Maychew, 2014).
This is also reported continue in police custody including with elon-
gated detention without charge and use of force as tool of investigation.
The popular compliant on police abuse of the detainee and flagrant
violation of the personal safety honor dignity and sanctity of the human
person and physical constitution is one major source of insecurity of
urban residents. Besides, the luck of confidence and knowledge of
filling complaints against such violation with the assumption that no one
is there to handle the case in their favor appears to be the reason behind
the continued violation by police use of force (ibid.). To summarize,
the compounded outcome of the multiple variables of human security
discussed herein previously do show serious concerns of intervention by
both society and state organs.
Social Security: It refers to a combination of multiple factors referring
to the protection and promotion of healthy social behavior considered
392 Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
acceptable by the respective society. Behaviors like carrying for the old,
child, and frail protection of the week and poor fairness, to the power-
less, along with ethical social behaviors constitute the prevalence of
social security. The inverse negation would be a dimension of insecu-
rity. Under this section, social security is assessed in terms of antisocial
behaviors, such as prostitution, hooliganism, lawlessness, and addiction
to alcoholic and drugs. Most major urban centers in Tigray are attract-
ing business activities that happen to commercialize social spaces. Here,
some are good while others are bad. The negative aspect of this is widely
reflected in the expansion of chat verdures, bars, and drug traffickers like
a wild fire. A mere observation of the regional capital Mekelle confirms
an ever-growing demand for more bars than being opened. This is a
direct corollary to the growing tendency of alcoholism, prostitution, and
other evils thereof. According to anonymous sources, a drug trafficking
underworld is being created under the camouflage of legal chat vendors,
so the associations of these multiple damaging behaviors do constitute a
threat to the social value construction and norm of a people known for
conservative ethical norms.
One concern behind these threats to social security is associated with
the growing insatiable commercialism and consumerism creping in the
country. On the other hand, the emerging dominant sense of wealth gap
and fear of being left behind has contributed to the pursuit of achieving
success by any way possible including illegal acts this is further bourgeoned
by the culture introduced by human traffickers and returnees from the
Arab labor market. The returnees came back home with the illusion
of belonging to a dazzling world of Arab consumerism and fetishism
mixed with lived trauma and abuse in alien country. Up on arrival get-
ting neither meaningful resettlement and reintegration to hope to live at
home nor they despair to go back, they project their confusion in a form
of antisocial diaspora custom of reflecting the norm of the host country.
This in effect has shown significant impact on the behavior and action of
the youth and adults reflected previously. A case in point is the expan-
sion of shisha vendor houses and vulgar language and disrespect to own
custom norms in the totality of way of life is a big threat to the social
health. The total desertion of teachers of a junior high school in Mehoni
wereda to Arab country reflects how much the impact of the social
security threats discussed previously is imminent.
One the other hand, the infamous human trafficking network stretch-
ing from Edaga-hamus up to countries beyond the Gulf of Aden run by
Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
Gebru: The State of Human Right and Human Security 393
traffickers and their government moles are behind the prevalent tendency
among the youth and adult to resolute to even fatal ways of securing
success. A common saying in the eastern zone among those preparing
to leave to Arabia “our family shall receive a box of money or our coffin
box upon our return”, is an apparent expression of social degeneration
in long term could engendered social death. Therefore, the concern for
social security could boil down to an aspiration to attain to the emergent
new economic elite and the unethical social behavior of the later to the
established norm of empathy care symbiosis and reciprocity values of
Tigray people.
Political Security: It is all about the protection and promotion of demo-
cratic rights to promote ones political view and support political programs
of one’s choice in a legally acceptable manner. Many of the informants
including opposition political party members do not want their identity
to be mentioned in this study which by itself is an indication of fear of
political repression from the governing party. They complain absence of
political space and institutional orientation in the region to accommodate
diversity of political parties and programs as well as any political descent
at individual level. They allegedly accuse the state apparatuses in the
region invariably advocate in promoting one party interest though at least
in principle courts are to be independent of patrician political interplay.
Unfortunately, the judiciary as much as the one party dominated regional
council is tied to the aprons of the executive organ of government which
is nothing but the party power house. Such allegations are by far aggres-
sively forwarded by ex-fighters of TPLF and its political dissidents who
remorsefully question why they should have been made to spent the
flowery ages of their life in the bitter armed struggle to empower such
a repressive regime. They wonder why the regime exceptionally denies
rights and minimum freedoms the rest of the Ethiopian people simply
enjoy. They lament on being haunted by party clandestine watch full eyes
and violated structural measures of institutions which are supposed to
stand for their political freedoms and basic liberties.
Not few appear to support with unique partiality to such views and pro-
vide their own personal experiences of abuse and violation for forward-
ing political opinions wrongly considered antirevolutionary and hence
anti-people of Tigray. Informant teachers of the secular and religious
establishments carefully state the need for opening free air of political
expression and assembly for the sake of enlarging the freedom of Tigray
people for the realization of which hundreds of thousands are maimed
394 Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
and killed. In their view, the imposition of partisan agendas both in the
secular and religious establishments is causing negations on the roles and
functions of those institutions should stand for. Indeed, it contravenes
the constitutional principles of secularism and the unconditional right
of citizens for self-expression, political assembly and participation in the
national affairs.
The other sides of the coin do carry equivalent reactions from sup-
porters of the ruling party sympathizers who do not hesitate to express
their identity in public, perhaps because of the polar opposite reason of
the former or because of genuine believe in the ideals of the party. They
argue that complaints of the political dissidents in Tigray and those who
are expelled from the party are nothing but the raving of ruminants of
the old regime and surrogates of the chauvinist centrist force relentlessly
working for the destruction of the Tigray people. They are nothing but
wolves in sheep skin but our revolution is not to falter under whatever
pressure of such kind.
The middle ground of the fierce mutual incrimination is inhabited by
ordinary folks who are anxious about the instability that may be bread
by the polarized positions and do identify same degree of insecurity on
this account. In essence, the chance of mutually agreed sense of politi-
cal security as enshrined in the federal and regional constitutions hangs
on the scale of political dialog and democratic toleration. However, in
the meantime, the political chasm yawns unbridgeable political threats
and risks based on mutually exclusive political calculaces. Such a case is
taken as binary politics that negatively affects the political security of all
forces that are democratic or antidemocratic. However in the interplay,
as the popular saying has it “when two elephants fight it is the grass that
suffers”, it remains as the responsibility of all ethical democratic and
good-wishing citizen of the region.
Comparing the State of Human Security
in Afar and Tigray
Taking these differences as they may and comparing the standardized
variables of human security in the two regions are apt for the comparison
to draw lessons for the promotion and protection of human rights and
human security. First the degree of human security in Afar and in Tigray
is appearing incomparably wide in two counts, one the human security
in Afar is reflected in the most immediate and the most strategic long-
Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
Gebru: The State of Human Right and Human Security 395
lasting security needs of food security, the security of life from protracted
violence, and livelihood security which corresponds to identity security.
Whereas in Tigray, the source of personal and physical security is reflected
in crime victimization, fear of crime and social and political insecurity
mainly caused by crime, social anomies, and political polarization.
Except for the latter, the two factors for human insecurity crime and
social anomies provided proper understanding and orientation is their
they don’t constitute long lasting strategic human insecurity because any
country with the best records of human security in other dimensions as
in countries of the northern hemisphere may be liable to impact of crime
and social anomies of emergent economic development and consumer-
ism. However, this does not mean that they fully apply to the case of
Tigray. Because, the level of development and the nature of emergent
wealth distribution are not ascertained by this study for either equity or
inequity but the motivation to get rich by any way is possible. Thus, it
requires reading the picture carefully in further research before rushing
on making hasty comparative generalization neither against the north
nor other regions in Ethiopia but Afar.
The Afar side of the picture, however, is positively certain that the
loose of livelihood and disposition without equivalent and simultaneous
transformation of livelihood or any other careful creativity to handle the
insecurity of historically victims of double marginalization, pastoralist
commons, it means the end of a way of life and an identity which is the
last frontier of human insecurity and its last line of defense, whereas the
two variables of human insecurity in Tigray do not amount to survival
but to the degree of quality of life as measured by freedom from fear and
risk of crime and social anomies.
Adding the Issa-afar violence, to the aforementioned picture makes a
back-bending burden to the federal government and the nation at large to
handle. However, in Tigray, the most concerning but not all encompassing
dimension of political insecurity which may unless be wisely transformed
may constitute strategic human security predicament is manageable
within the politics of Tigray. Thus, the level of scope and scale of con-
cern the time frame require to address and the level of intervention for
transformation are widely different between Tigray and Afar. Thus, our
human security understanding of the various Ethiopian regions has to
take into account the institutional development of respective regions, as
the better institutional development in Tigray has added to the success
in many dimensions of human security and reduce the pervasiveness of
396 Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
the three variables considered. On the contrary, the infantile stage of
institutionalization in Afar has adverse effects on dimensions of human
insecurity which could have been avoided otherwise.
In both cases, despite the aforementioned difference, all societies do
have susceptibility to social insecurity and anomies whether the rule
is greater human security or insecurity as in the case of Tigray, being
affected by the social insecurity of anomies, and Afar social degenera-
tion by violence and loose of livelihood. On the third scale, societies as
much different as Afar and Tigray do share the need for the preservation
of social norms customs and values to avoid the degenerating impact of
exogenous influence on its population. This is apparent from the impact
of the introduction of foreign customs, fetish consumerism and cruel
pragmatism of the Arab returnees and the new economic elite in Tigray
so did the introduction of centralized and hierarchical political culture of
the modern Ethiopian state institutions, agrarian production, and labor
force in Afar region.
In sum, the comparative assessment is instructive of a subjective
approach toward the transformation of human security conditions in
an interdependent and comprehensive manner in relation to respective
violations each dimension of human insecurity constitutes. Thus, in light
of this, further inquiry on the specific gap indicated in this chapter and the
variables considered here are commendable to generate an elaborated
and dependable empirical date for a reliable policy recommendation
ahead. However, within the scope of this study, brief conclusion and
recommendations are provided herein further.
Conclusions
The experience from the two regions have confounded human security
is not affected solely by internal factors and by negative interventions.
Instead as in the case in Tigray and Afar, briefed in the last section of
chapter four well-intentioned development planes and effects of socio-
economic transformation can be accompanied by unintended negative
repercussions on human security. In the same token, the identification
of causes of threats and risks to human security can be glossed over by
overlapping concerns of political security and societal factors, as observed
in the Issa-Afar conflict, the power interplay in Afar region and regional
security considerations. So did the problem of political insecurity in
Tigray region articulated in terms of subjective security dilemma of the
Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
Gebru: The State of Human Right and Human Security 397
ruling party and the opposition that left the middle-ground unchartered
territory for both to come up with a negotiated solution.
The challenges notwithstanding, the positive achievements of human
security in Tigray region can be taken as exemplary of institutionalizing
human security concerns and achieving positive results in Afar region. On
the other hand, the problems of human security in Afar region are mainly
rooted in the continuity of structural and historical double marginaliza-
tion pastoralist commons in whose world view successive governments
have seldom envisioned to deal with their problems. While addressing
the security concerns in Tigray region, there is an indication of the
need for a coordinated and comprehensive approach to human security
approach requiring democratic toleration and political dialogue to be
successful, where the case in Afar is an apparent case of crises of modern
state institution which managed neither to overwhelm and replace nor to
complement customary institutions and traditional livelihood mechanisms
of sustaining human security in a harsh environment. Vital to replicate
the successes as in Tigray in two area of high human insecurity as in Afar
may not take into account the facts that the former despite its positive
achievements do suffer from luck of observance of law by organs of law
enforcement as it is apparent from the police brutality discussed. Finally,
the discussion of both regions is an eclectic scenario of a success in one
but continuing challenges of human security in the other while in Afar
it is a bleak feature of human insecurity. Viewed at the bigger picture of
national insecurity constitutes a failing organ in a healthy system.
Recommendations
From the aforementioned summery conclusions, it is therefore logical
to take note of the following recommendations to promote and protect
human security and human rights in the two regions. First, the Afar case
has to be approached not only as an effort for a separate treatment of
the causes of human security but an overall approach within the context
of the constructive transformation of pastoralist livelihood sustainability.
Second, in so doing the cultural and structural variability of the hierar-
chical and centralized agrarian economy-based state institutions need to
undergo change and metamorphose to fit into the pastoral reality before
they are put in place for the protection and promotion of human rights-
human security.
Third, the reduction of direct violence involving Issa-Afar conflict as
an immediate security need of both groups and strategic interventions
398 Journal of Developing Societies 33, 3 (2017): 376–400
have to be synchronized with wider human security concerns and the two
recommendations mentioned previously.
Fourth, the source of personal insecurity related with violent crimes in
Tigray should be treated in a new pragmatic approach and creative polic-
ing strategy of out maneuvering ever involving tactics of crime against the
person. This requires a new approach to improve community confidence
on the law enforcement and transform police community relations in a
joint action against violence. Fifth the emergent normlessness and anti-
social behavior associated with the new consumerism and pragmatism
modeling the new economic elite should be engaged in a strict enforce-
ment of rule of law and successive programs of raising awareness on the
ethical and social responsibility of citizens.
Sixth the immigrant problem contributing to the anomies must be
addressed not by media rhetoric of the inhuman treatment they face in
the hand of illegal traffickers but by a unique coordinated reintegration
program of returnees that practically can give them a meaning full and
productive place in their society. Such program need to carefully manage
post-traumatic stress alleviation programs to transform their violations
into a positive energy for change. Seventh the political security dilemma
of the political forces in Tigray and the fear thereof impacting wider
community should be taken as an opportunity to transform the tense
political relations into a cooperative competition environment of politi-
cal toleration. Finally, all efforts have to take an overall synchronization
of achieved successes and reduction of vulnerabilities in a way it in sum
adds tangible value to the promotion and protection of human security
and human rights.
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Assefa Le-ake Gebru has studied Political Science and International
Relations (B.A. and M.A. from Addis Ababa University). He taught
Politics and Government at different colleges. From 2006 to 2014, he
has been teaching Political Science at Mekelle University. Since 2016,
Assefa has taught as Assistant Professor of Political International
Relations, teaching the Post-Graduate course on Political Economy
and Regional Integration at Mekelle University, Department of Law
and Governance. Currently, he is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of
Beijing, Department of Political Science.