Promoting ‘fundamental British values’ in schools: a critical race perspective

Abstract

Fear and anxiety about the ‘Muslim other’, the failure of state multiculturalism, and the perception of a disjuncture between white British values and that of Islam have become a concerning feature of the British policy landscape. The government—in response to the so-called ‘Muslim threat’—has called for a ‘muscular’ promotion of fundamental British values in the nation’s schools. As a result, ‘the rule of law’, ‘individual liberty’, ‘mutual respect’, and ‘tolerance’ have been advanced as fundamentally British principles “we should try to live by every day” (Cameron 2014). Informed by critical race theory, this paper raises important and timely questions about the dangers of conflating democratic values with British national identity, outlining how the current policy climate has served to: decivilize Muslim lifestyles and identities; construct ‘white British’ norms and mores as culturally superior; portray young Muslims as pre-disposed to extremist views and violent behaviors; and force the country’s teachers to take up roles as instruments of surveillance and defenders of the white hegemonic order.

Full text

POINT AND COUNTERPOINT
Promoting ‘fundamental British values’in schools: a critical
race perspective
Claire E. Crawford
1
#Australian Curriculum Studies Association 2017
Abstract Fear and anxiety about the ‘Muslim other’,thefailure
of state multiculturalism, and the perception of a disjuncture be-
tween white British values and that of Islam have become a
concerning feature of the British policy landscape. The govern-
ment—in response to the so-called ‘Muslim threat’—has called
for a ‘muscular’promotion of fundamental British values in the
nation’sschools.Asaresult,‘the rule of law’,‘individual liberty’,
‘mutual respect’,and‘tolerance’have been advanced as
fundamentally British principles Bwe should try to live by every
day^(Cameron 2014). Informed by critical race theory, this paper
raises important and timely questions about the dangers of con-
flating democratic values with British national identity, outlining
how the current policy climate has served to: decivilize Muslim
lifestyles and identities; construct ‘white British’norms and mo-
res as culturally superior; portray young Muslims as pre-disposed
to extremist views and violent behaviors; and force the country’s
teachers to take up roles as instruments of surveillance and de-
fenders of the white hegemonic order.
Keywords Anti-Muslim racism .Fundamental british
values .Cultural supremacy .Critical race theory
Introduction
Britain’sschoolsareonthefrontlineoftwenty-firstcenturyideo-
logical wars, and have become home to a rebranded exclusionary
version of ‘Britishness’(Alexander and Weekes-Bernard 2017;
Tom lin son 2015). For several years, the governmenthas engaged
in a campaign of rhetorical attacks on the idea of multicultural-
ism, which the previous Prime Minister (David Cameron) de-
scribed as a ‘failure’that encourages ‘different cultures’to live
‘separate lives’(Wright and Taylor 2011). A supposed link be-
tween ‘being Muslim’and engaging in acts of terror has become
an increasingly dangerous feature of British political discourse;
threatening the very foundation ofaneducationformulticultur-
alism and a diverse society.
In the media, Muslims are presented as posing a very specific
threat to the health and stability of modern Britain. For example,
headlines from mainstream national newspapers include: ‘1in5
Brit Muslims’sympathy for jihadis’(The Sun, 2015), ‘PM: UK
Muslims helping jihadis’(Daily Express, 2015), ‘UK mosques
give cash for terror’(Daily Star, 2015), ‘Muslims tell British: go
to hell!’(Daily Express, 2010), ‘Hundreds more UK Muslims
choose jihad than army’(The Times, 2014), ‘Muslim loonies hi-
jack election: Fundamentalists won’tstopuntilUKisanIslamic
State’(Daily Star, 2005), ‘Muslims tell us how to run our schools’
(Daily Express, 2007), and ‘Muslim schools ban our culture’
(Daily Express, 2009).
Britain’spoliticalattitudestomulticulturalism have become
increasingly exclusionary, with a ‘values deficit’being identi-
fied as stemming from cultural diversity and faith communities
(Kymlicka 2003; Torres 2013). A supposed clash between
Wes t e rn (whi t e B r i tish) ‘values’and those of Islam can be seen
in the British government’scallfora‘muscular promotion’of
British values in 2014 (Cameron 2014). Prime Minister
Cameron claimed that British values have Bavitalroletoplay
in uniting us^.Cameronalsoclaimedthatthelackofbeliefin
values to include democracy, equality, and tolerance amongst
certain groups Bhas not just led to division, it has also allowed
extremism—of both the violent and non-violent kind—to
flourish^.HeconcludedbysuggestingthatitisBamatterof
pride and patriotism^to promote British values, urging people
to stop being ‘squeamish’about doing so (Cameron 2014).
*Claire E. Crawford
c.e.crawford@bham.ac.uk
1
University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
Curric Perspect (2017) 37:197–204
DOI 10.1007/s41297-017-0029-3

Since 2015, schools alongside other authorities in Britain
(police, national health service, local councils) have had a
legal duty—known as the ‘Prevent Duty’—to stop people
from being drawn into terrorism. Prevent requires education-
alists to Bbuild pupils’resilience to radicalization by promot-
ing fundamental British values and enabling them to challenge
extremist views^(Department for Education 2015).
Building on a strong tradition of critical race scholarship in
education, this paper examines the introduction of ‘fundamen-
tal British values’into the nation’s schools, and explores some
of the damaging implications thereof.
Critical race theory in education
Critical race theory (CRT) is a perspective focused on an ex-
amination of the association between race and racism at the
intersection of power; in particular, the approach seeks to
identify and resist the routine but devastating racism that sat-
urates the everyday world of ‘business-as-usual’in nations
such as the United States, the UK, and Australia (Delgado
and Stefancic 2012; Yosso 2005). Originating in the 1970s
in the works of activist and critical legal scholars, including
Derrick Bell, Kimberlé Crenshaw, and Richard Delgado, the
movement has expanded into a number of important fields,
including education (Crenshaw et al. 1995; Delgado and
Stefancic 2000,2001; Gillborn 2006,2008;Ladson-Billings
1998;LynnandParker2006; Solórzano and Yosso 2002; Tate
1997; Wing and Stefancic 2007).
This paper is underpinned by a number of basic CRT in-
sights. The first is that ‘race’and ‘racism’are a product of
social thought and power relations (Lynn and Parker 2006).
Second, the ideology and assumptions of racism are so deeply
entrenched in the socio, legal, and political structures of
Britain, that it is viewed as ‘natural’and ‘ordinary’(Delgado
and Stefancic 2000,2001). Third, that racism is a ‘permanent’
and ‘pervasive’feature of society (Bell 1973; Delgado and
Stefancic 2012; Taylor et al. 2009). Finally, that CRT empha-
sizes the importance of the experiential knowledge of
minoritized groups and, hence, challenges the experience of
‘white’people as normative (Lynn and Parker 2006).
CRT encourages scholars to look Bbeyond the superficial
rhetoric of policies and practices, in order to focus on the
material and ideological work^that perpetuates and further
entrenches white dominance (Gillborn 2005: 492). Thus,
CRT can be meaningfully employed in this case to firstly
outline the controversial introduction of fundamental British
values (FBVs) and associated political rhetoric, before explor-
ing: (1) If FBVs can be considered ‘fundamentally British’,
(2) whether there are cultural racisms present in the FBVs
project, (3) how teachers are positioned in the government’s
securitization agenda, and (4) whether ‘British’is too
contested an identity to be a source of unity that transcends
cultural boundaries.
Post-multiculturalism: fundamental British values
Prior to 2014, the political construction of a ‘British value’had
no real impact on schools or schooling in the UK (Smith
2016). The need to develop a ‘muscular’approach to asserting
British national identity in schools (Cameron 2014) was argu-
ably a retort to the so-called ‘Muslim plot’to take over the
governing bodies of a small number of schools in
Birmingham, England. The origin of the ‘Trojan Horse affair’
(as it became colloquially known) was a short newspaper item
published in 2014, which reported the existence of a letter that
‘evidenced’the promotion of strict Islamist values being pro-
mulgated in the nation’s schools (Insted Consultancy 2014).
Despite the letter being proven to be a malicious forgery
(Richardson 2015) and the then Education Secretary
confirming that there Bhas been no evidence of direct radical-
ization or violent extremism^found at any of the schools
involved (Morgan 2014), the British government quickly laid
out a proliferation of securitized requirements that markedly
changed the policy landscape in education.
The new policies affected all kinds of education provisions,
including state-funded and fee-paying schools, nursery provi-
sions, and childcare schemes. Duties were also assigned to
Britain’s universities and colleges of further education. The
new policieswere also powerfully incorporated into theofficial
education inspectorate(Ofsted), who were granted the capacity
to conduct‘no-notice inspections’toensure that the Bpromotion
of fundamental British values are at the heart of the school’s
work^(Ofsted School Inspection Handbook 2015:42).Chief
Inspector of Schools, Sir Michael Wilshaw, argued that
Binspecting how British values are taught is one of the most
important things we are doing at the moment... [since] schools,
particularly in monocultural areas, are on the frontline in terms
of helpingour society to become a cohesiveone^(Weale2015).
According to the Department of Education: schools should
Bactively promote the fundamental British values of democra-
cy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and
tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs.^Actively
promoting FBVs is said to be the Bchallenging [of] opinions or
behaviours in school that are contrary to fundamental British
values^(Department for Education 2014:5).Notinsignifi-
cantly, the list of values outlined above were first introduced
by the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy: BExtremism is a vocal
or active opposition to fundamental British values, including
democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual re-
spect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs^(HMG
2011). In 2015, the FBVs project was reinforced by the re-
vised Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, which now re-
quired schools, universities, and other authorities to have
198 Curric Perspect (2017) 37:197–204

Bdue regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn
into terrorism^(HMG 2015), a legal requirement that was
subsequently included in the Professional Standards
Framework for Teachers.
Some commentators have expressed deep concern with the
government’sapproachtoeducatingamulticultural,multilin-
gual, and multiethnic Britain. Richardson (2015), for example,
has argued that the concept is ambiguous, as its key princi-
ples—rule of law, liberty, democracy, and tolerance—are open
to conflicting interpretation, and, over the years, have had
quite different meanings at different times, in different con-
texts. Starkey (2015) contends that no one value can stand
alone: each has to be balanced by or conflated with another,
i.e., rule of law by justice, tolerance by inclusion (and a sense
of belonging), and that democracy does not always guarantee
liberty.
Other commentators have questioned the unprecedented
policy response of the British government to current national
security affairs, especially when compared with the terrorist
threat posed by the IRA in 1960s and 1970s (Lander 2016).
Richardson (2015) has drawn attention to the dangerous and
explicit ideas about radicalism, terrorism, and the ‘Muslim
other’that underpin the introduction of the FBVs project,
specifically criticizing the aim (albeit implied) of assimilating
the ‘Muslim other’into the dominant norms and values of
white Britain (Richardson and Bolloten 2015).
Fundamentally (white) British values
The most evident question raised from the obligation to teach
FBVs in Britain’s schools is whether, and in what ways, these
‘values’are exclusively and fundamentally British. Is ‘mutual
respect’and ‘tolerance’a fundamentally British principle?
What about ‘democracy’,‘liberty’,andthe‘rule of law’?
Whilst the list of values may be well regarded by the British
polity, the notion that they are inherently British is deeply
troubling, especially given that Britain is a country founded
upon colonialism, enslavement, and racism. For example,
how do FBVs apply to students who have ancestry in coun-
tries that have been at the mercy of British colonialism? The
Indian Constitution of 1949, written following the withdrawal
of Britain in 1947, explicitly supports the values of democra-
cy, the rule of law, liberty, and tolerance. Many British
Muslims would also reason that the values of freedom, toler-
ance, and the rule of law are enshrined in, or derived from,
verses in the Qur’an (Mumisa 2014). However, despite simi-
larities in values, there is no escaping the ‘imperialistic pre-
sumption of superiority’in the British government’spromo-
tion of FBVs (Smith 2016).
Fear and anxiety about the ‘Muslim other’and the notion
of a disjuncture between white British values and that of Islam
is a concerning feature of current education policy. ‘Va l u es ’in
the context of FBVs are racially coded and arguably refer to
native (white British) cultural norms and mores only, as evi-
denced by David Cameron when he asserted that FBVs are as
BBritish as the Union Flag, as football, (and) as fish and chips^
(Cameron 2014). As argued by Hand (2014):
The danger of presenting these values as British, and
suggesting that their appeal as analogous to that of foot-
ball and fish and chips, is that children invest in them, if
at all, for entirely the wrong reasons. Attachment to
Britain is no justification at all for allegiance to liberal
democratic values. And where allegiance is secured on
this basis, it is likely to be precarious.
The term ‘values’(or perceived lack thereof) is presented
concurrently as a problem and solution in British political
rhetoric, a problem where it is presumed that certain individ-
uals and groups do not possess the same fundamental values
as the white British native, and solution in the sense that ‘mus-
cular’promotion of FBVs is necessary for national security,
and for the health and stability of British democracy. The
government’s efforts to foster unity around FBVs (as defined
by majority white politicians as social elites), has resulted in a
stratification of citizenship into: (1) the native majority (white
British), (2) those perceived to have assimilated or integrated,
and (3) and those who do not belong, to include the ‘Muslim
other’(Lander 2016;seealsoHoque2015;Taras2013).
Policies such as FBVs arguably serve to ‘decivilize’Muslim
lifestyles and identities (Meer and Modood 2009; Mennell
2007; Vertigans 2010), with ‘the British way oflife’construct-
ed as more ‘modern’,‘civil’, and culturally superior by com-
parison (Smith 2016).
Fundamental British values as an act of cultural
supremacy
One of the biggest dangers presented by the FBVs project is
not the supposed conflict between British and Muslim values
per se, but, more damagingly, that young Muslim children are
being raised in a school system in which a fallacious binary is
made real, a culturally supremacist binary that is reinforced by
British politicians and the media (Mumisa 2014). The former
chairman of the UK’s Equality and Human Rights
Commission, Sir Trevor Phillips, exemplified this when he
suggested that extremist views are ‘flourishing’amongst
British Muslims who live in ‘a nation within a nation’,calling
for a limit (no more than 50%) on the presence of any ethnic
minority group in the nation’s schools (Barrett 2016).
The culturally supremacist political and media rhetoric sur-
rounding the introduction of FBVs is arguably motivated by a
defensive version of (white) British nationalism, the so-called
‘war on terror’(or, rather, perceived ‘Muslim threat’), and the
Curric Perspect (2017) 37:197–204 199

increased visibility and size of Britain’s minority ethnic pop-
ulations (Galindo and Vigil 2006; Lippard 2011). The volume
of anti-terror legislation
1
that has been announced in the last
two decades has only served to demarcate an entire population
of Muslims in Britain as Billiberal, ignorant and fanatical,
perpetual semi-citizens unable and unwilling to resolve the
assumed inherent contradictions of their commitments to
Islamic and British lifestyles^(Karlsen and Nazroo 2015:
760; see also McGhee 2008;Parekh2006).
Some commentators would argue that Britain’snewmeasures,
although couched in the palatable language of security, give the
British government and its associate agencies (to include the legal
and education systems) far-reaching control of Muslim commu-
nities (Patel 2017). Some have even described the laws as an act of
‘relegitimised state racism’(Bhattacharyya 2008). Given that
Muslims living in Britain are not considered to be a group defined
by race, there is an erroneous assertion that their group cannot
experience racism. As such, it is asserted that any violence and
vitriol directed at their group (individual or systemic) cannot be
racially driven (Garner 2010;Halliday1999). Under the arguably
more palatable banner of ‘Islamophobia’—broadly considered to
be a fear of the ideology and/or practices of Islam, rather than the
racialized collective itself—political, media, and societal discrim-
ination against the group is justified as a rational and genuine
response to the handful of high-profile acts of terror in Britain,
2
and beyond. As seen in the opening section, however, what is more
accurately being fueled in Britain is anti-Muslim racism,which
more accurately defines the discrimination faced by anyone be-
lieved to be Muslim, usually determined by ideas about physical
appearance and religious custom (Modood 2007).
Damaging racist statements by individuals in positions of
power reinforce the perception that all young Muslims across
Britain are pre-disposed to extremism, which British counter-
terror legislation equates with the propensity to commit vio-
lent acts of terror. David Cameron claimed (Wright 2015):
Like any extreme doctrine, it can seem energising, es-
pecially to young people... They (young Muslims) are
watching videos that eulogise Isil (Isis) as a pioneering
state taking on the world that makes celebrities of vio-
lent murderers.
Thus, young Muslims in Britain’s schools (or, more accu-
rately, those deemed to be Muslim) are unapologetically
judged as a potential terrorist by the government and labeled
by policies to include FBVs as ‘appropriate objects for state
intervention’(Coppock and McGovern 2014). Equally
concerning is that, in this commitment to the teaching of fun-
damentally British values, the overwhelmingly ‘white British’
teaching force (86.5% of teachers identify as white British and
93.1% of school leaders
3
) become instruments of the state
4
(Lander 2016).
Teachers as instruments of the state
As outlined earlier, Prevent’srequirementnottoundermine
FBVs is specified in the ‘Teac hers ’standards’(DfE 2012), and
the legal duty to have ‘due regard to the need to prevent
people from being drawn into terrorism’is enforced in the
revised Prevent guidance (HMG 2015). Together, both docu-
ments mirror the underlying climate of mistrust levied against
young Muslims in Britain’sschools.Inthisneweraofsecu-
ritization policies, teachers and educationalists have become
‘custodians of national values’(Bryan 2012)andduty-bound
‘instruments of surveillance’(Lander 2016).
Despite the Prevent Duty applying to a wide variety of
sectors (including local city and town councils, registered
child care providers, the National Health Service, the prison
and probation services, and the police), under-18s accounted
for 54% of all referrals to the government’s counter-terrorism
program in 2015, and the number of referrals overall had
‘tripled’compared to the previous year (National Police
Chiefs’Council data, in Ratcliffe 2016). Given that 87.1%
of the UK population identify as ‘white British
5
’and 4.4%
as ‘Muslim’(ONS 2011), a grossly disproportionate number
of all referrals made to Prevent in 2015 identified as ‘Muslim’
(88%), despite Prevent’s remit also extending to those who
believe in extreme right-wing ideologies or are vulnerable to
far-right radicalization (National Police Chiefs’Council data,
in Ratcliffe 2016).
Overall, a third of all Prevent referrals were made by edu-
cation settings (Dickens 2015). It is perhaps not surprising that
there have been accusations made about ‘over-enthusiastic’
teachers when it comes to this duty, leaving young Muslims
feeling isolated from their peers and like ‘targets’in Britain’s
classrooms (Qurashi 2016). It is deeply unsettling that
teachers, with little to no formal guidance or instruction in
counter-terror work, have the enormous (and powerful) re-
sponsibility to ‘identify’and ‘report’students they believe to
be harboring so-called ‘extremist views’or are at risk of being
‘drawn into terrorism’.
1
To include: Extension of the Terrorism Act 2000; Anti-terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 2001; Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; Terrorism Act 2006;
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008; and Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015).
2
To in cl ude t he ‘7/7’central London bombings (July 2005), the Glasgow
airport attack (June 2007), the murder and decapitation of British soldier Lee
Rigby (May 2013), the shooting of Labour MP Jo Cox (June 2016), the
Manchester Arena bombing (May 2017), and the recent London attacks
(Westminster March 2017/London Bridge June 2017 attacks).
3
Head teachers
4
School Workforce in England: November 2016 (SFR 25/2017) (DfE 2016)
5
Defined in the 2011 Census as White English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/
British
200 Curric Perspect (2017) 37:197–204

In the pursuit ‘not to undermine fundamental British
values’, young British Muslims have become understandably
Bfearful of exercising their rights to freedom of expression and
belief^in Britain’s schools (Rights Watch UK 2016: 4), which
has the detrimental effect of driving young people to explore
important issues pertaining to their own identity and belief
system outside the school walls, often in unsafe spaces (such
as the Internet), where unsophisticated, dangerous, and ex-
treme narratives can be freely promoted without challenge.
The National Union of Teachers has been vocal in its criticism
of the government’s current agenda (Press Association 2015):
Schools should be places where young people can dis-
cuss events in a spirit of enquiry and openness...
teachers are well placed to facilitate such discussions
and deal with the expressionofunacceptableview-
points... the government’s promotion of British Values
[and] the Prevent agenda... is having the effect of closing
down spaces for such discussion…many school staff
are now unwilling to allow discussions in their class-
room for fear of the consequences.
Freedom of speech and the ability to enable debate within the
law is an essential feature of a true democracy. The Muslim
Council of Britain argues that key to preventing terrorist violence
is to Ballow grievances on ideology, identity and foreign policy to
be vigorously and aggressively discussed and challenged in open
debate^(MCB 2016:18).Withoutthecapacityforcriticalcul-
tural dialog in Britain’sschools,thewhitemajorityteachingforce
is likely to inadvertently rely on imperialist constructions of
Britishness (as often presented in taught materials) and, thereby,
perpetuate the assumed cultural supremacy associated with a
British national identity.
British: a contested identity
The idea of Britishness, although conceptually vague and pli-
able over time, continues to be utilized as a powerful and
exclusionary force (Smith 2016).
Couched in homely language, the British government
wants the polity to feel about fundamental British values the
way David Cameron feels about ‘football and fish and chips’;
he also suggested that Bwe can be a bit squeamish... even
bashful about our Britishness^(Cameron 2014). However,
when British Muslims want to assert their own identity, they
are subjected to increasing violence on the nation’s streets
(Samuelson 2017) and accused of being self-segregating by
the political and media mainstream, i.e., ‘Muslims are Bnot
like us^and we should just accept they will never integrate’
(Duell 2016).The idea that Britain can overcomethe so-called
‘problems of multiculturalism’by reinventing a unified
British identity, and conflate that identity with an allegiance
to fundamentally British values, is deeply questionable.
Successive British governments continue to mandate the
adherence to a rebranded version of Britishness (Parekh
2006), with the current Prime Minister, Theresa May, warning
that there has been Bfar too much tolerance of extremism^to
date and that Bone area where there is room to improve is the
active promotion of fundamental British values in our
schools^(Yorke 2017). British identity has been solidified
into a discourse of values, with British identity being
‘reinvented’as a retort to the supposed ‘Muslim threat’,a
discourse which has led to a dangerous impression of an ir-
reconcilable gulf between Islamic and British identity
(McGhee 2008). Given government and political rhetoric sur-
rounding Muslim communities in Britain, ‘British’may have
become too contested an identity for unity (Sales 2012).
Many young people in Britain’s schools today do not iden-
tify as British, or at least not primarily so. Many prefer to iden-
tify themselves as a member of a religiously identified group,
with religious affiliation found to be an ‘important aspect of
personal identity’(Karlsen and Nazroo 2002; Modood et al.
1994; Thomas and Sanderson 2011).However, thereare impor-
tant questions to be asked regarding the terms and extent upon
which ‘British’as an identity was everopen to, and appropriate
for, young Muslims living in the UK.
There is an assumption identified in the British media and
political rhetoric that the presenceofanIslamiclifestyleprohibits
access to other forms of social identity, refuting the notion of
concurrent or multiplicity of identities (Aughey 2001;Lamand
Smith 2009). Modood contends that reaffirmingBaplural,chang-
ing, inclusive British identity... is critical to isolating and
defeating extremism’(Modood 2005). As argued by Hand
(2014), there is little to be gained from tying democratic values
to British national identity, and much to be lost. The notion of
‘fundamentally British’severely obscures thepositiverationale
behind endorsing democratic values:
If we’re going to promote these values in schools... we
have a duty to furnish children with sound reasons for
them. Such reasons are readily available (to include
powerful lessons from history and compelling argu-
ments in ethics, sociology and philosophy) but they
have nothing to do with being British.
Conclusion
The ‘rapid insertion’of counter-terror measures into Britain’s
schools—joined with the statutory requirements to teach fun-
damental British values—has unquestionably altered the edu-
cation policy landscape. In times of increased surveillance and
nationalist anxiety about the ‘Muslim other’, young Muslims
Curric Perspect (2017) 37:197–204 201

in the nation’s schools are being constructed through a lan-
guage of disobedience, deviance, and criminality (Said 1979).
It is not a coincidence that the fundamental British values
project is more politically powerful and influential than other
social cohesion projects that have preceded it (Richardson
2015). The British government’sraciallybiasedprescription
of ‘fundamental British values’to treat the supposed value
deficit between the (white British) native over that of the
non-native (Muslim other) does little but defend white native
superiority and reproduce and reinforce white hegemony
(Huber et al. 2008). There is an urgent need for the white
hegemonic discourse of British values to be highlighted,
disrupted, and transformed to embrace an inclusive notion of
‘Britishness’that reinforces a sense of belonging to a multi-
cultural, multilingual, and multiethnic Britain.
British teachers’professionalism has been eroded and
undermined by the introduction of fundamental British values
which have created a climate in which teachers become sub-
jects of the culturally supremacist discourse of whiteness,
whose purpose is to advance assimilation of the ‘Muslim oth-
er’(Lander 2016). There is an urgent need for the creation of
spaces to engage in professional dialog, critique, and critical
discussions about values and identities, and how (and when)
these should be taught in schools. There is also a desperate
need for a serious commitment to establishing: (1) which
types of educational experience can genuinely prevent youth
attractions towards extremism and terrorism, (2) what ap-
proaches can best enable young people to reframe the discus-
sions around identity and democratic values, and (3) how
educationalists can help develop the critical skills needed to
assess the content, sources, and trustworthiness of what young
people may read and hear beyond school walls.
It is essential that the British government re-enable Britain’s
schools to create safe spaces where young people of all back-
grounds can openly share their views and have them subjected
to ‘rigorous and informed challenge and debate’(Thomas 2016).
Arguably,the experience of participating in difficult and complex
dialogues about identity and belief in a controlled space can only
serve to enhance a sense of belonging, truly demonstrating how a
common value system can be developed, despite the multiplicity
of identities in any room (Kiwan 2008).
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