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Our Right to Water: The Human Right to Water in Palestine

Authors:

Abstract and Figures

New developments in the global recognition of the human right to water and sanitation have given new momentum to global water justice campaigns. But can UN resolutions end the unequal water distribution between Israel and Palestine, and bring Israel to account for violations of Palestinian water rights? Israel continues to defy UN resolutions recognizing the right of return of Palestinian refugees displaced in 1948, calling for an end to Israeli military rule of lands occupied in 19671 and many other resolutions calling on Israel to end the demolition of Palestinian homes and confiscation of Palestinian lands in Jerusalem, and it is unlikely that new UN resolutions alone will bring an end to Israeli violations of Palestinians’ right to water and sanitation.2 But UN recognition of the right to water and sanitation is being used as a springboard for campaigns to put real pressure on Israel to end its violations. This paper is one of a series of reports commissioned by the Blue Planet Project which examine the state of the human right to water and sanitation around the globe.
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THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER IN PALESTINE 1
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER IN PALESTINE
Susan Koppelman & Zayneb Alshalalfeh for LifeSource
OUR RIGHT TO WATER
2 OUR RIGHT TO WATER
About the Authors
Susan Koppelman is the Internaonal Campaigns Coordinator for LifeSource. Since the founding of the
Palesnian-led collecve, Susan has supported LifeSource in its mission to grow a popular movement for
Palesnian water jusce by focusing on research iniaves, documentary work, and internaonal advocacy
with a popular focus. Susan has a Masters degree from the University of Washington in Seale in internaonal
development and community organizing.
Zayneb Alshalalfeh is the Central Coordinator for LifeSource in the West Bank. Prior to working with
LifeSource, Zayneb worked with Miah, a Palesnian iniave for women’s rights. Zayneb is passionate about
water rights and the leadership of women in popular organizing and Palesnian society.
Cover photo by AcveSlls.org.
The maps that appear in this report have been produced by LifeSource.
This paper is one of a series of reports commissioned by the Blue Planet Project which examine the state of
the human right to water and sanitaon around the globe.
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER IN PALESTINE 3
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER IN PALESTINE
Susan Koppelman & Zayneb Alshalalfeh
Contents
Introducon ......................................................................................................................................... 4
Unequal Water Distribuon .................................................................................................................. 4
Understanding the Water Resources .....................................................................................................4
The Coastal Aquifer .................................................................................................................................. 4
The Mountain Aquifer and the Western Aquifer Basin ............................................................................ 5
The Jordan River ....................................................................................................................................... 5
Mekorot supply ........................................................................................................................................ 5
Israeli Violaons of the Right to Water .................................................................................................5
Occupaon ............................................................................................................................................... 5
Area C ....................................................................................................................................................... 6
The Wall ................................................................................................................................................... 7
Siege on Gaza ........................................................................................................................................... 7
Sanitaon ................................................................................................................................................. 8
Prepaid Water Meters: Water Rights Violaons by the Palesnian Authority ........................................ 8
Prepaid water meters under occupaon ................................................................................................. 9
Need for protecons for the poor .......................................................................................................... 10
Lack of opons for addional water sources ......................................................................................... 10
Extremely low consumpon .................................................................................................................. 10
Need for more research ......................................................................................................................... 10
Need for educaon ................................................................................................................................ 11
Arming the Applicability of Human Rights Legislaon ...................................................................... 11
Resistance to Violaons of the Human Right to Water and Sanitaon in Palesne .............................. 11
Human rights advocacy and reporng ................................................................................................... 12
Art .......................................................................................................................................................... 12
Civil disobedience .................................................................................................................................. 12
Rebel water infrastructure ..................................................................................................................... 12
Popular demonstraons ........................................................................................................................ 13
BDS for Palesnian water jusce............................................................................................................ 13
Youth movement in Gaza and all of historic Palesne ........................................................................... 14
Parcipaon in global networks............................................................................................................. 15
Recommendaons.............................................................................................................................. 15
Endnotes ............................................................................................................................................ 16
4 OUR RIGHT TO WATER
Introduction
New developments in the global recognion of the human right to water and sanitaon have given new momentum to
global water jusce campaigns. But can UN resoluons end the unequal water distribuon between Israel and Palesne,
and bring Israel to account for violaons of Palesnian water rights?
Israel connues to defy UN resoluons recognizing the right of return of Palesnian refugees displaced in 1948, calling
for an end to Israeli military rule of lands occupied in 19671 and many other resoluons calling on Israel to end the
demolion of Palesnian homes and conscaon of Palesnian lands in Jerusalem, and it is unlikely that new UN
resoluons alone will bring an end to Israeli violaons of Palesnians’ right to water and sanitaon.2 But UN recognion
of the right to water and sanitaon is being used as a springboard for campaigns to put real pressure on Israel to end its
violaons.
Unequal Water Distribution
Palesne is actually very rich in water resources, but unequal water distribuon is beneng Israel and Israeli selers
while Palesnians struggle for basic water access.
Palesnians have insucient access to clean piped water or local lling points. As a result many households purchase
expensive tankered water, collect water from unprotected springs and rely on harvesng rainwater during the winter.
Because there is no centralized water network with sucient water owing through it, it is dicult to calculate exact
water consumpon.
According to the World Bank, aer losses from the network, average net consumpon at the household level is 50 liters
(13.2 gallons) per person per day. This is just 50 per cent of the World Health Organizaon’s minimum recommended
daily allowance of 100 liters. To contextualize just how lile water this is, note that a quick shower uses 50 liters of water,
and it takes 9 liters (2.4 gallons) to ush the toilet.3
Almost one quarter of the communies connected to the water network receive less than 50 liters per person per day.
The World Bank also reports that, “In the southern towns, supply to 16% of people living in connected households is less
than 20 liters [5.3 gallons] per capita per day.” These extremely low consumpon gures are for communies connected
to a water network. Ten per cent of the populaon is sll not connected to a water network.4
Average Israeli domesc water consumpon is 300 liters per person per day.5 Many of Israel’s selements in the
West Bank, all of which are illegal under internaonal law, contain industries that are using and pollung local water
resources.6 Other illegal selements, parcularly in the Jordan Valley, grow water intensive agricultural products that are
exported to Europe, virtually exporng the water used to grow the produce as well.
According to a report released by Amnesty Internaonal, “The 450,000 Israeli selers, who live in the West Bank in
violaon of internaonal law, use as much or more water than the Palesnian populaon of some 2.3 million.7
Understanding the Water Resources
The water resources available in the West Bank are very dierent from the water resources available in Gaza. The water-
rich West Bank is increasingly dependent on supply from Israel, while the water-poor Gaza has to look for its own water.
The Coastal Aquifer
In Gaza, the Coastal Aquifer is basically the only source of “freshwater,” although it is highly polluted and the salinity level
is sharply increasing. Up to 95 per cent of the 116 municipal supply wells in Gaza that tap into the aquifer produce water
that isn’t t for human consumpon.8 Since 2005 Israel has damaged or destroyed more than 300 wells in a “buer zone”
unilaterally imposed by Israel inside of the territory of Gaza.9 Currently the people of Gaza must desalinate the brackish
water supplied by municipal wells, but the ongoing siege levied by Israel and the internaonal community is prevenng
entry of parts, chemicals and materials needed to properly treat the water so that it may be drinkable.
It is important to note that, according to internaonal water law, Gaza has a right to an equitable and reasonable share
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER IN PALESTINE 5
of water from the Coastal Aquifer within Israel. Also, it is important to note that Gaza is a city and is best supplied like
other cies. Most cies, like New York, London, Geneva or Jerusalem (all of which have far more humid climates), are
not supplied from within city boundaries. Yet for years Israel’s posion has been that the city of Gaza ought to focus on
highly expensive, unsustainable, easily disrupted and un-ecological fossil fuel-red desalinaon plants. The Palesnian
Authority’s posion in recent years has been conforming to this Israeli posion, despite the advice of hydrological
experts and Palesnian rights under internaonal law.
The Mountain Aquifer and the Western Aquifer Basin
In contrast, the West Bank lies in a mostly sub-humid climate where bounful rainfall provides for high groundwater
recharge rates into the shared Mountain Aquifer, which consists of three basins – the Eastern, North-Eastern and
Western Aquifer basins. Among these three basins the Western Aquifer Basin, or Western Aquifer, is the purest and
most abundant groundwater reserve in the region. Israel has prevented Palesnians from drilling a single new well in the
Western Aquifer since 1967.
According to a World Bank study, “about 85% of the recharge of the Western Aquifer is in the West Bank.10 But the
Israeli military is liming Palesnians to a mere six per cent of this precious resource. If Palesnians had access to only
half of the sustainable yield of this aquifer, Palesnians’ total water supply in the West Bank would double.11
The Jordan River
Israel controls 100 per cent of the waters of the Jordan River.12 Israel diverts the lower Jordan River to Israel’s coastal
plain and then to the Negev desert in the south, with major repercussions today for the health of the ecosystem,13
peace in the region and access to water for many Palesnians and Jordanians,14 who have depended on this resource for
centuries. In the 1967 Six-Day War and shortly aerwards, Israel destroyed or conscated all 140 pumping staons on
the east and west banks of the Jordan River.15
Mekorot supply
Palesnians in the West Bank purchase more than half of their domesc water supply from the Israeli naonal water
company Mekorot. Mekorot also supplies the vast majority of water consumed by illegal selements from wells inside
of Israel and from the 42 wells that it controls and operates in the West Bank in violaon of internaonal law. Being
dependent on water supply from Israel leaves Palesnians in a highly vulnerable posion. Mekorot frequently cuts water
supply to Palesnian villages and neighborhoods. While it is true that Israel is selling Palesnians far more water than
it is obligated according to the water component of the 1995 Oslo II Agreement (Arcle 40), it is also true that Israel is
prevenng Palesnians from developing addional quanes of water from new Palesnian wells approved under Oslo.16
Israel’s obstrucon of Palesnian water development has forced Palesnians into a state of dependence on purchasing
water from Israel.
Israeli Violations of the Right to Water
Israeli violaons of the right to water and sanitaon take a number of dierent forms. An overview of the occupaon,
Area C, the Wall, and the siege on Gaza will serve to illustrate some of these dierent violaons. The sanitaon situaon
is very telling as well.
Occupation
With the beginning of the 1967 occupaon, Israel issued a series of military orders claiming that all of the region’s water
resources belonged to Israel and prevenng Palesnians from drilling wells or even seng up irrigaon systems.17 Israel
also began drilling in the West Bank in violaon of the Fourth Geneva Convenon, which prohibits use of resources
within occupied territory for the benet of an occupier’s cizens. Sll, today, as the occupaon approaches its 45th
year, Israel is bureaucracally obstrucng new Palesnian wells and networks, and demolishing Palesnian water
infrastructure with bulldozers and during military incursions. Israel also connues to drill deep wells that lower the water
table and cause exisng wells to be less producve, or dry up altogether.
The 1993-95 Oslo “Peace” Accords only served to legimize Israel’s military orders. For all intents and purposes, all of the
6 OUR RIGHT TO WATER
policies stayed the same. The Israeli military commander sll has nal say over all water and sanitaon development in
the West Bank. Today, a so-called “Joint Water Commiee” (JWC) occasionally approves water or sanitaon projects18
though only some of the approved projects are allowed to be implemented.
The World Bank reported in April 2009 that only 50 per cent of the projects presented to the Commiee had been
approved, and only one-third implemented. 19 Furthermore, “106 water projects and 12 large scale wastewater projects
are awaing JWC approval, some of them since 1999.20 These gures do not include the many projects that are no
longer brought to the Commiee because it is clear that the occupaon would not allow them. Since 1967, despite there
being a “joint” water commiee, Israel has not approved a single new Palesnian well in the Western Aquifer.21
Area C
In the West Bank, Israel connues to zone 61 per cent of
internaonally recognized Palesnian territory as “Area C
and o-limits to Palesnian development of any kind,22 while
Israeli selements connue to sprout up with water and
sewage networks. The fact that Area C meanders between
and around enclaves where Palesnians are permied limited
development means that Palesnians are prevented by Israeli
restricons imposed in Area C from developing regional water
conveyance networks to improve water supply in Palesnian
enclaves. Even simple water projects that are not in Area C are
impacted by restricons on workers and equipment passing
through Area C.
Area C weaves throughout the West Bank transforming
Palesnian populated areas into a series of enclaves that
are cut o from one another and oen from agricultural
land and water resources outside of municipal areas. These
disconnected enclaves are also aptly referred to as Bantustans,
a term derived from the name of the territories set aside for
black inhabitants of South Africa under apartheid and now
used to describe a region that lacks legimacy. Ninety per cent
of the Jordan Valley is o-limits to Palesnian development,
while illegal selements in the Jordan Valley export water-
intensive crops such as grapes, dates and owers to Europe.
Sixty thousand Palesnians are prevented from construcng
water connecons in their homes.23 Households that do not
have a tap must rely on transporng water. Tankered water
costs up to 12 mes as much as water from the tap and carries
increased risk of water-borne disease.24
Israel rounely destroys rainwater-harvesng cisterns
that farmers use to irrigate small patches of land and that
shepherds depend on for providing their herds with water. In 2011, Israel demolished a cistern in the village of Susia that
dated back to Roman mes, displacing the families that depended on it for survival. Israel’s demolion of Palesnian
water infrastructure increased this past year, bringing total demolions of water and sanitaon infrastructure since
2009 to over 100 structures in the West Bank alone.25 Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and
sanitaon, Catarina de Albuquerque, underscored the importance of addressing these demolions in a news release by
the Oce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.26
While many organizaons are bringing media aenon to Israeli restricons and demolions in Area C, few are
challenging Israel’s policy of demolion directly on the ground. Internaonal humanitarian and development
organizaons for the most part are following Israeli policy in Area C in order to avoid having their projects demolished or
other repercussions from Israel. With rare excepons, organizaons only implement projects in the other 39 per cent of
Israel considers 61% of the occupied West Bank to be Area C and
o-limits to Palesnians despite many UN Resoluons urging
Israel to end its occupaon of the West Bank
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER IN PALESTINE 7
the West Bank, which is already overcrowded. In doing so, well-meaning organizaons are actually creang incenves for
Palesnians in 61 per cent of the West Bank to abandon their land and relocate to the overcrowded Bantustans where
they may have more aordable and more reliable water access.
The Wall
In 2002 Israel began to construct a segregaon barrier,
referred to by many as the “Apartheid Wall.” It impacts
Palesnians’ current access to water, but more importantly
will have a much greater impact on future access if it becomes
an internaonally recognized border. Alternately composed
of 7-meter high concrete slabs, razor wire and a 50 to
100-meter-wide array of fences, patrol roads and ditches, in
places it is twice the size of the Berlin Wall. The route of the
Wall meanders both near and far from the internaonally
recognized 1949 Armisce Demarcaon Line, or Green Line,
between Israel and occupied Palesnian territory, at mes
jung far into the West Bank, grabbing Palesnian land and
water to “Israel’s side” of the Wall. The Wall grabs Palesnian
wells, springs and cisterns that Palesnians have depended
on for centuries. The Wall is also designed to capture most
of the few future potenal Palesnian abstracon zones of
the Western Aquifer. Only a relavely narrow strip along the
Green Line has producve condions because the slopes
and mountains are unproducve. The Wall stands to cut
Palesnians o from areas that would yield an addional
90 million cubic meters annually.27 Compare this amount to
Palesnians’ total current water supply in the West Bank,
which is just 180 million cubic meters according to the Israeli
Water Authority.28
Today Israel dominates the Western Aquifer by prevenng
Palesnians from drilling new wells, imposing quotas on
exisng Palesnian wells and drilling many very deep wells
on Israel’s side of the Green Line for Israeli use. Israel’s
deep producve wells tap into the Western Aquifer almost
exclusively from within Israeli territory, compared to less than
a handful of Israeli wells accessing the Western Aquifer from inside Palesnian territory. If the Wall becomes the new
internaonally recognized border between Israel and Palesne, then Israel will have pre-empted negoaons over an
increase in Palesnian shares and abstracons in this shared basin. Israel will retain near-exclusive control of this basin
and its benets, even though it is recharged largely inside the West Bank. Thus it would be able to prevent Palesnians
from accessing signicant reserves in the Western Aquifer even aer the formal military occupaon is over.
Siege on Gaza
Israel’s siege on Gaza prevents the entry of spare parts, materials and energy needed for the day-to-day funconing of
the water and wastewater networks, and furthermore obstructs much needed development of these systems.
The harsh reality imposed by the siege has been made worse by repeated Israeli military oensives, the worst being
the Gaza War of 2008–09.29 Over the span of just 23 days, Israeli military killed 1,400 Palesnians and intenonally
targeted and destroyed wells, pipes, wastewater facilies, water reservoirs and the main power staon,30 causing
an esmated $6 million USD of damage to water and sanitaon infrastructure.31 Those responsible for Israel’s use of
collecve punishment and disproporonate force are yet to be brought to jusce.32 The ongoing siege interferes with
reconstrucon.
Israel has drilled 42 wells in the West Bank in violaon of
internaonal law, and Israel is overdrawing the Western Aquifer
beyond its agreed upon allocaon from within Israel
8 OUR RIGHT TO WATER
Sanitation
The sanitaon situaon in Gaza seems to be on track to improve, as a wastewater treatment project approved in 2004 is
praccally the only project in Gaza receiving access to materials through crossings from Israel. Scheduled to be complete
in 2014, the project will treat about half of Gaza City’s sewage. All sanitaon projects in Gaza had been on hold unl
the past year as a result of the ongoing siege, which has been restricng entry of needed parts and materials, and also
due to Israeli military oensives, which destroy completed work and make it dicult for workers to connue with new
construcon. In 2003, construcon of a planned regional desalinaon plant halted when one of the workers was killed.
For years Gazans have been lobbying to get access to the materials they need to upgrade emergency projects to be able
to fully treat their wastewater and re-inltrate the treated water into the ground to improve the health of the depleted
aquifer. The current project will be the rst project in Gaza with inltraon basins, while other wastewater treatment
plants release euents into the sea. Israel began facilitang the current project again, despite the siege, aer studies
showed that untreated and parally treated sewage released into the sea from Gaza was being detected at the Ashkelon
desalinaon plant located 12.5 kms (7.8 miles) directly north of Gaza.33
In the West Bank there is a lack of wastewater treatment facilies due to Israeli obstrucon through the use of
bureaucracy and its military. Israeli leaders have claimed that Palesnians are waging a “sewage infada” on Israel.
The Israeli Water Authority states that the lack of treatment facilies “illustrates the lack of interest on their part to
treat wastewater.34 But the World Bank lists 12 wastewater treatment facilies pending Israeli/Joint Water Commiee
approval – 10 of these projects were brought to the Commiee in the 1990s and were pending approval for 15 years.
Adel Yasin, who represents the Palesnians at the Joint Water Commiee in negoang permits for wastewater projects,
explains how, meeng by meeng, year aer year, the Israeli side asks the engineers to make changes to the plans for
“security reasons.” The Palesnian side complies each me, by moving the route of the trunkline, for example, but then
at the next meeng the Israeli side insists on a new change.
In one case, the Joint Water Commiee actually approved the Salt wastewater treatment facility. It was permied and
tendered, but in the rst month of construcon the military declared the site a closed military zone and shut the project
down. In the end, Israel paid the contractor a 1 million shekel selement, adming its guilt.
Only 30 per cent of Palesnian communies in the West Bank are connected to a sewage network.35 Many households
use cesspits, pung domesc water supply at risk of contaminaon. Water supply is also at risk as a result of domesc
and industrial sewage originang from Israeli selements.36
Prepaid Water Meters: Water Rights Violations by the Palestinian Authority
Within the context of Israeli human rights violaons and the increasing interconnectedness of the Palesnian Authority
with the occupaon and donor states, there is a major issue on the horizon. This issue concerns the recent and
increasing commodicaon of water, which may be seng the stage for the privazaon of water resources in Palesne.
In 2007 Salam Fayyad’s caretaker government released the Palesnian Reform and Development Program (PRDP),
authored by the Brish and the World Bank.37 The main focus of the PRDP is infrastructure repair and improved service
delivery in the short term, to ensure “that public infrastructure and ulies are managed on a commercially oriented and
nancially viable basis and ... [to] increase the level of private sector investment and parcipaon in infrastructure and
ulies.38 The PRDP champions prepaid electricity meters, and alludes to prepaid water meters.39
Salam Fayyad and his Council of Ministers, operang unelected in their roles since 2007, have been promong the pro-
privazaon neoliberal agenda of the World Bank. Neoliberalism seeks to promote open markets and maximize the role
of the private sector in determining global polical and economic priories.40 Pressuring Palesne to open their borders
to the Israeli economy and to integrate Israel into the regional economy is a major priority of Israel, the U.S., Britain
and the World Bank. This has already been happening for some me.41 Supporng the commodicaon of water and
prepaid water meters as a way to “recover costs” or, worse yet, set the stage for prot-seeking ventures is an extreme
interpretaon of the neoliberal doctrine.
Prepaid water meters t all too neatly into the PRDP’s plan to develop local infrastructure with donor money and then
turning it over for private prot.42 Services and people are likely to suer. We’ve seen this same horror story in too
many countries, both poor and rich. Under the guise of humanitarianism, donor money is invested, water networks are
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER IN PALESTINE 9
upgraded, service is improved and consumers are sased, and then the private sector leaps in and reduces services,
and public investment becomes private prot.
Prepaid water meters have been implemented in two areas in the north of the West Bank. These communies, like many
other communies throughout the West Bank, have developed large debts by failing to collect payment from cizens
for water supplied by the Israeli naonal water company. In 2009, following support from internaonal donors, the
Palesnian naonal bulk water ulity and the Palesnian Ministry of Finance reached an agreement that some villages
would have all of their development projects frozen by the Ministry of Finance – including upgrades to water networks,
roads and schools – unless the local councils began paying.
These communies, like many Palesnians, get most of their water from the West Bank Water Department (WBWD),
which is a water ulity directly connected to the Israeli naonal water company Mekorot. Failure to collect payment for
water bills from cizens has translated into large debts to the WBWD for the supply of Mekorot water. The Palesnian
Water Authority (PWA) reports that Palesnian local councils’ debt for water reached 600 million shekels (approximately
$158 million USD) in 2009.43 Israel has transferred these debts from Mekorot and the WBWD to the Palesnian Authority
by deducng the total debt from Israel’s collecon of Palesnians’ value-added taxes (VATs) owed to Palesnians.
Despite the fact that the root of the problem lies in the occupaon and its manufacturing of a powerless and dependent
economy, the neoliberal authority determined that the local councils would pay their debts.
Faced with pressure to either schedule debt payment or forfeit all public infrastructure upgrades, local councils and
mayors began applying to the Council of Ministers for permission to implement prepaid water meters. Prepaid electricity
meters have been implemented throughout the West Bank since 200444 and increasingly so since the PRDP was released
in 2007. The mayor of the rst village to apply for prepaid water meters reasoned that if there are prepaid electricity
meters, surely there must be prepaid water meters – and he was right. He got permission from the Council of Ministers
and entered into a contract with the Turkish company Elektromed for both prepaid electricity and prepaid water meters.
Construcon was nearly completed before the PWA held a meeng to discuss the issue with local players.45 By this me,
a second regional council of 11 small villages in West Jenin had already applied and received permission to implement
prepaid water meters as well. The PWA agreed at the meeng that it would be irresponsible to implement prepaid water
meters without a study to evaluate the social and economic eects, as well as the appropriate technical requirements for
the meters.
In an announcement published in the newspaper AlQuds in June 2009, the PWA explained that prepaid water meters
were being allowed on a trial basis only in these two communies to examine “the social and economic eects, and the
people’s acceptance in order to know the advantages and disadvantages of these meters.46 The Council of Ministers
contradicted this posion, issuing a series of resoluons allowing local councils to implement prepaid water meters, and
the Council of Ministers even decided to subsidize these projects by paying 50 per cent of the cost of the meters.
More than two-and-a-half years have passed, and the PWA has not yet begun the study on the social and economic
eects that it announced should be completed in about a year’s me. At the request of the Council of Ministers, the PWA
completed a study on the dra technical requirements with the Palesnian Ministry of Local Government.47 The PWA’s
posion now is that they will conduct a study on the social and economic eects only if the Council of Ministers requests
one as well.
There is clearly a need for more research on the economic, social and cultural eects of prepaid water meters, as well
as their legality under Palesnian law.48 From the perspecve of LifeSource, a Palesnian organizaon working at the
grassroots to grow a popular movement for the right to water, it is important that addional research is carried out by a
team well-versed in human rights in general, and in economic, social and cultural rights in parcular. LifeSource recently
conducted a small study revealing violaons of the human right to water, and poinng to some pressing needs. Below
are some of the most important issues from LifeSource’s study and from the work done so far.
Prepaid water meters under occupation
Many people interviewed believed that prepaid water meters were not appropriate for Palesne because of the
polical situaon, parcularly following the Second Infada with its increases in closures and concurrent eects on the
economy.49 If there is a curfew, consumers will not get their basic rights and services. A curfew in the village of Awarta, in
Nablus, meant that for several days people were forbidden by the army from leaving their homes. During this incursion
10 OUR RIGHT TO WATER
there was no way for people to get electricity if they ran out of credit. The Minister of Energy admied: “We made a
mistake by not using smart prepaid electricity meters.50
Need for protections for the poor
In a workshop hosted by the Palesnian Hydrology Group (PHG) in June 2011, PHG explained that they are against
prepaid water meters because with the prepaid system, people cannot access water if they cannot aord it. Meanwhile,
the rich will consume high quanes of water, increasing the consumpon gap between the rich and the poor, and water
will become a commodity. LifeSource’s study conrmed this. LifeSource’s study revealed a range in consumpon from
14 liters per person per day (family of seven using three cubic meters per month) to 116 liters per person per day (family
of four using 14 cubic meters per month). LifeSource’s ndings provide evidence that a number of households in these
areas are living in extreme poverty and face extra hardship aer being forced to use prepaid water meters.
LifeSource’s study also conrmed what every other study has revealed: that there are no protecons in place for
households in extreme poverty. It has been more than two years since prepaid water meters were rst implemented.
While proponents are pushing to implement prepaid water meters in more and more communies, protecons for
the poor and vulnerable have yet to be implemented.51 From interviews with dierent stakeholders it is clear that
human rights acvists will need to be involved in developing these protecons in order to ensure that cizens are not
sacricing dignity for their human right to water. Of course from LifeSource’s perspecve, free basic water for all people
is preferable to any system that singles out people living in poverty.
In Palesne, prepaid systems are being forced on cizens without giving them a choice.52 Once a local council gets
permission from the Council of Ministers to replace the meters, all meters are replaced, whether or not cizens agree.
This is a violaon of cizens’ right to self-determinaon.
Lack of options for additional water sources
Proponents point out that in emergency cases, people can get three or ve cubic meters credit to be paid at their next
recharge – the amount is dierent in the two villages. The director of the West Jenin Service Council also adds: “There is
a tap in every village where people can ll jerry cans for free if they can’t pay.” In our survey, none of the cizens in either
village knew of such a tap, and they don’t believe it is true.
Extremely low consumption
According to the director of the West Jenin Service Council, water consumpon per person per day remained constant
at 27 liters. This is extremely low. The World Health Organizaon’s minimum recommended daily allowance is 100
liters. The director explains that the amount of water the villages receive now is the same as the amount received
prior to changing the meters. According to his theory, which is also supported by many residents, with the old system
some families used water without conserving, consuming more than 27 liters per person, and some families were
going without water because the ow didn’t reach all of the households. He reasons that now water is reaching all
of the households because families are being more careful to conserve, and now everyone is geng 27 liters a day.
Representaves of the PWA also touted prepaid water meters as a water conservaon mechanism. While water
conservaon is a valuable principle, it is extremely problemac to look at a community that receives less than 50 liters
per person per day due to human rights violaons commied by an occupying power, and suggest that the soluon is
conservaon and improving bill collecon.
Need for more research
The majority of cizens do not know the quanty of water they consume each month or the price they are paying per
cubic meter, but, with the excepon of those living in extreme poverty, they are generally sased with their level of
supply following the change to prepaid meters. Forty-ve per cent of those surveyed knew the total cost they were
paying each month.53 The majority of respondents were women who were not the household member responsible for
paying the bills.54 Further research is needed to independently measure the quanty of water actually consumed in each
household and to assess people’s lifestyles to see if families really are consuming only 27 liters per person per day or less
– and to beer understand what sacrices people are making.
Also, it is suspect that supply to the villages was the same before and aer the prepaid water meters were introduced. Of
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER IN PALESTINE 11
course, it goes without saying that someone who is accustomed to using 27 liters per person per day is sased as long
as this supply connues, but it does not line up that people who were consuming 50 liters per person per day with the
old meters would be sased using even less.55
Need for education
People are going to be in favour of whichever system provides them with the best service and accords them their human
rights. Many people do not see that having to prepay for water is a violaon of their human rights. Educang people
about their human right to water and sanitaon is an important prerequisite to consumer sasfacon studies.
It is also important to encourage people to think through the implicaons of water privazaon and to make the
connecons between prepaid water meters and water privazaon so that they can take an informed posion.
The Palesnian Hydrology Group (PHG) recommends from their 2009 study on prepaid water meters in Jaroshiya that:
“The water sector, and especially drinking and domesc use water, should not be privazed and should be provided by
the government, with monitoring and evaluaon to guarantee the durability of the supply and the reach of it to the poor
families” (translated from Arabic).
LifeSource adds that prepaid water meters must be prevented now in order to avert the privazaon of water in
Palesne in the future.
LifeSource invites others to review the LifeSource study and to connue to research this topic more. The Palesnian
Society for Consumer Protecon has been extremely proacve and consistent on this issue, demonstrang exceponal
leadership and vision. The PHG has shown some strong leadership as well.
LifeSource plans to work with these groups and others to use this study as a basis for popular educaon, popular
research and popular acon to build alliances within Palesne and to connect with a global solidarity movement to resist
prepaid water meters and water privazaon.
Afrming the Applicability of Human Rights Legislation
Israel refers to the occupied Palesnian territory as “disputed territory” and insists that it is not occupying the territory
according to internaonal law. Israel furthermore claims that it is not responsible for the human rights of Palesnians,
parcularly in areas under Palesnian control. But the UN and the Internaonal Court of Jusce (ICJ) disagree.56
The UN Human Rights Commiee is clear that “State party’s obligaons under the Covenant apply to all territories and
populaons under its eecve control. The Commiee repeats its posion that even in a situaon of armed conict
or occupaon, fundamental human rights must be respected and that economic, social and cultural rights, as part of
the minimum standards of human rights, are guaranteed under customary internaonal law and are also prescribed by
internaonal humanitarian law. Moreover, the applicability of rules of humanitarian law does not by itself impede the
applicaon of the Covenant or the accountability of the State under Arcle 2 (1) for the acons of its agents.57
The UN Commiee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted that it was “parcularly concerned about limited
access to and distribuon and availability of water for Palesnians in the occupied territories, as a result of inequitable
management, extracon and distribuon of shared water resources, which are predominantly under Israeli control.58
The UN Commiee on the Eliminaon of Racial Discriminaon similarly called on Israel to “ensure equal access to water
resources for all without any discriminaon.59
Israel and the Palesnian Authority both have obligaons to respect, protect and fulll the human rights of Palesnians
to clean drinking water and adequate sanitaon.
Resistance to Violations of the Human Right to Water and Sanitation in Palestine
Resistance to these violaons has taken a number of forms, from popular demonstraons in protest, to refusal to pay
Mekorot bills, to “illegal connecons,” art, boycos, reporng and human rights advocacy.
12 OUR RIGHT TO WATER
Human rights advocacy and reporting
Amnesty Internaonal spotlighted Israeli violaons of the human right to water and sanitaon in its report Troubled
Waters: Palesnians Denied Fair Access to Water released October 2009. Harper’s published a feature on “Israel’s Water
War With Palesne,” in December 2011. The rst major report to bring Israeli violaons of the human right to water to
center stage was actually a World Bank report published April 2009. This report was published just as the rst prepaid
water meters were being implemented in Palesne. The report, tled “Assessment of Restricons on Palesnian Water
Sector Development,” was in fact not about the human right to water at all. However, in assessing Israeli restricons on
Palesnian water and sanitaon development, likely with a vision toward privazing water supply, the report detailed
agrant human rights violaons and has been an asset to groups organizing to resist these violaons.
Organizaons, coalions, communies and individuals have submied reports to UN agencies conducng normal
reviews of member states’ compliance with human rights convenons. When Israel was up for review in 2010 for their
compliance with the Internaonal Covenant on Civil and Polical Rights, and again in 2011 concerning the Internaonal
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the UN agencies had many reports and adavits to consider. In
both reviews, Israel was found to be in violaon of the human right to water and sanitaon. It is unlikely that UN
recommendaons will be put into pracce without considerable pressure.
Art
A number of Palesnian arsts feature the water and sanitaon crisis in their work. The Palesnian hip hop arsts DAM,
who are discriminated against as Palesnians inside of Israel, rap in Hebrew about Israel’s denial of sanitaon services
to Arab neighborhoods as a tool for displacement: “Health care centers – surrounded by sewage / Kindergarten –
surrounded by sewage / There’s no excuse for this / It’s just the city doesn’t care about Arabs / Because the government
has a wish: / Maximum Jews – on maximum land / Minimum Arabs – on minimum land.” This parcular song is called
“Born Here.
There have been a number of prominent mural projects in the West Bank and Gaza depicng Palesnians’ struggle
for their right to water. The rst was a project that arose out of a LifeSource workshop with youth in Jabalya camp in
northern Gaza, and was featured on Al Jazeera. The Maia Mural Brigade co-created a number of murals with youth
depicng water themes at schools in the Gaza Strip, where water puricaon systems installed by the Middle East
Children’s Alliance are providing clean drinking water to 30,000 children. Some of the gra on the Wall represenng
freedom of expression and resistance also captures the restricons placed on water access.
There are many lms arully depicng the water situaon, including Rima Issa’s Drying Up Palesne, Pietro Bellorini’s
Filling Point60 and others.
Civil disobedience
Palesnians have a vibrant spirit of civil disobedience and non-violent resistance dang back to the First Infada (1987
to 1993) and earlier61. The First Infada is oen remembered by violent images of unarmed Palesnians throwing stones
at armored tanks. In fact, most of the resistance taccs of the First Infada were nonviolent, and they brought Israel to
the negoang table. These included general strikes, boycos on Israeli products, burning ID cards, refusal to pay taxes,
barricades and gra.
Today a number of Palesnian villages, parcularly in the Jordan Valley, refuse to pay their water bills as an act of civil
disobedience to protest Israel’s illegal wells that have dried up their wells.62 But when Palesnian local councils don’t
pay for water purchased from the Israeli naonal water company Mekorot, Israel deducts the amount from the VATs it
collects on behalf of the Palesnian Authority, and Israel gets the money in the end.
Rebel water infrastructure
“Illegal water connecons,” or “rebel water infrastructure,” are another form of civil disobedience. In response to Israel’s
prevenon of Palesnians’ access to sucient quanes of water, some Palesnians are taking water meant for the
illegal selements. Illegal connecons may also aect Palesnian wells. In recent years, Mekorot has been charging the
Palesnian Authority for unauthorized use of water in Area C, even though Palesnians have no authority in Area C and
are prevented from connecng communies to local springs and lling points.
In 2010, the United States Agency for Internaonal Development (USAID) replaced a major pipeline in the south of the
West Bank to get rid of all of the illegal connecons on it and to make it more dicult for Palesnians to take addional
quanes of water. Prepaid water meters also have mechanisms to prevent water the.
In 2009, LifeSource supported communies in the Jordan Valley in receiving water from Palesnian wells and pipes using
permied agricultural pipes. These projects did not technically need Israeli permission by virtue of the sources and the
materials that were chosen. However, there are plenty of instances of Israel conscang or destroying plasc agricultural
pipes or demolishing ancient cisterns that do not need Israeli permission. Of the two 2009 LifeSource projects, one is sll
providing water to about 30 families. The other was destroyed, along with the enre village.
This type of resistance is extremely risky, and it is important to coordinate it in such a way that access to water for
other Palesnian communies is not negavely aected, water resources are protected, and individuals, communies
or villages cannot be singled out for retribuon by Israel or the Palesnian Authority. It is possible that these projects
may no longer be strategic if Israel is sure to place the burden on Palesnian coers and deduct the quanes from
Palesnian allowances.
Popular demonstrations
Palesne has become famous for its popular demonstraons during the First Infada and its ongoing popular
demonstraons today. A number of villages host weekly demonstraons against the Apartheid Wall to resist the the of
their land and water resources. Bili’in63 and Budrus64 may be the most famous due to their successes in reroung the Wall
and their portrayal in lms and the media. Jayyous, another well-known Palesnian village, protested the route of the
Wall, which isolated all six of the groundwater wells on their land onto Israel’s side of the Wall, along with 72 per cent
of their land. Jayyous was successful in moving the Wall to take less land and in geng permission to use one of their
wells behind the Wall, but all wells remained behind the Wall.65 Weekly demonstraons in Nabi Saleh march symbolically
toward the village’s freshwater spring, located on the other side of the Wall. Leaders of these demonstraons
are frequently imprisoned by Israel under allegaons of “incitement.” Israel uses disproporonate force at these
demonstraons, and connues to use weapons that are not permied by the Israeli military commander or in a manner
that doesn’t t the army’s internal code.66
Demonstraons for water have a long history in Palesne. We’ve recently witnessed spontaneous demonstraons in
Bethlehem when Dheisheh refugee camp went into their second, third and fourth weeks of straight water cuts.67 In other
areas, altercaons have broken out when Israel has tried to impose a curfew on Palesnians who had been waing all
day to ll up their water tanks at a lling point. Demonstraons against the Palesnian Water Authority have become
increasingly common in recent years.
BDS for Palestinian water justice
The movement for Boyco, Divestment and Sancons (BDS) arose from a 2005 call from Palesnian civil society for
those in solidarity with the Palesnian people to use BDS to pressure Israel and companies prong from the occupaon
to comply with internaonal law and to respect human rights. This call came following the ICJ ruling that the Wall is
illegal and must be dismantled. According to the ICJ ruling, other countries are obligated to impose sancons on Israel
unl Israel complies with this ruling, yet most countries are sll not doing so. BDS has become a rallying call for those
distressed by Israeli impunity and by the inability of UN resoluons and the ICJ ruling on their own to hold Israel to
account. BDS has received increased momentum following the 2008-09 Gaza War. BDS is a nonviolent tool and is one of
the mechanisms credited with ending Apartheid in South Africa.
LifeSource has a program called “BDS for Palesnian Water Jusce,” supporng boyco campaigns globally with facts and
messaging concerning Israel’s violaons of the human right to water and sanitaon. The goal is for acvists to use this
informaon in popular educaon, targeted campaigns and global movement building to end these violaons. LifeSource
also leads a boyco of Israeli boled water and juice in the West Bank.
Eden Springs boles water in the occupied Golan Heights for prot, and this same company sells water throughout
Europe.68 Israeli water boling companies prot from Israel’s appropriaon of Palesnian and Syrian water resources.
Meanwhile, Palesnians are denied sucient water and must purchase either tankered water – with increased cost
and risk of waterborne disease – or boled water, which costs even more. LifeSource supported the London School of
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER IN PALESTINE 13
14 OUR RIGHT TO WATER
Economics in their successful campaign to boyco Eden Springs water on their campus in 2010.
Carmel-Agrexco used to be Israel’s leading exporter of agricultural products before they went under, due in part
to successful boyco campaigns in Italy, France and Britain. Carmel-Agrexco exported water-intensive crops from
large agricultural selements in the Jordan Valley, while Israel conscated water pumps, destroyed water pipes and
demolished enre communies. The Mehadrin Group has replaced Carmel-Agrexco as Israel’s largest agricultural
enterprise exporng water intensive crops to Europe, and as a target for BDS. Mehadrin operates 19 wells in the coastal
and mountain aquifers to supply water to Israeli farmers, and supplies millions of cubic meters of drinking water for
domesc consumpon in Israel through Mekorot,69 while Palesnians are consistently denied their equitable and
reasonable share.
Mekorot has been responsible for water rights violaons since the 1950s when it built Israel’s naonal water carrier,
which is diverng the Jordan River from the West Bank and Jordan to serve Israeli communies along the coast and in
the southern desert. In 1982 Mekorot purchased all Palesnian water infrastructure being controlled by Israel’s military
commander for one symbolic shekel. For years Mekorot has been cung o water supply to enre Palesnian villages
and serving illegal Israeli selements without disrupon. Today, Palesnian villages that are supplied water by Mekorot
are the ones receiving the greatest pressure to adopt prepaid water meters, which are increasing the consumpon gap
between the rich and the poor. Mekorot is prong from signicant contracts in Portugal, Argenna and elsewhere,
despite these violaons.
Veolia Water is a leading privazer of water globally, buying up our shared water commons for private prot. Veolia
has more than 389 water and sanitaon contracts in the U.S. alone, serving “approximately 14 million people in 600
communies.70 Veolia is a permanent operator in 67 countries, supplying 100 million people with drinking water
worldwide.71 There are countless stories of Veolia failing to deliver on its water and sanitaon contracts, while sll
collecng public money. Veolia is also acve in public transportaon and solid waste disposal.
Veolia has the contract with Israel for the controversial Jerusalem Light Rail project, which is connecng illegal Israeli
selements to West Jerusalem. Veolia buses also discriminate against Palesnians in their service to the selements,
denying service to Palesnians. Veolia has a landll in the Jordan Valley that is dumping garbage from Israel in occupied
Palesnian territory in violaon of the Fourth Geneva Convenon. LifeSource research helped break the story that waste
being brought to the landll originated inside Israel.72
LifeSource is acve in supporng a boyco against Veolia even though Veolia has no water or sanitaon contracts in
occupied Palesnian territory at this me. However, LifeSource is against the privazaon of water and sees that this
campaign can bring together water rights acvists and Palesnian solidarity acvists to support each other in both the
local and global struggle.
These boyco campaigns are both a pressure tacc and educaonal. As global cizens in an increasingly interconnected
world, our acons at home and our choices in which products we buy and which government contracts we allow or resist
have direct implicaons on the freedom of our brothers and sisters to live in dignity, with access to clean drinking water
and adequate sanitaon.
Youth movement in Gaza and all of historic Palestine
The youth movement throughout historic Palesne holds a lot of promise for unity, economic freedom and water jusce.
Arising as part of the Arab Spring in March 2011, the Palesne Youth Movement used facebook as a tool early on in their
development to communicate and build a common voice. They then began meeng face-to-face, as polical boundaries
allowed.
The primary aim of the Palesne Youth Movement is unity between all polical pares, primarily Fatah and Hamas.
The youth are also hungry for economic opportunity and social freedom.73 The right to water is already part of their
messaging, as they see that there is no drinking water in their homes, that drinking water is expensive, and that this
expense puts a lot of stress on families. Palesnian unity is an important factor in maintaining a healthy climate for the
joint struggle for water. A common struggle for water may also bring cizens together.
Popular iniaves on the ground, however, require a lot of bravery due to the polical situaon.74 In the West Bank,
Gaza and Israel there is a lot of polical repression from the Fatah government, the Hamas government and the Israeli
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER IN PALESTINE 15
government. In each of these territories, acvists crical of the local government or crical of Israel are targeted, and
media are silenced. People face beangs, other violent “crowd dispersion” techniques or other forms of retribuon. This
makes organizing in Palesne very dicult and all the more important. Despite the tumultuous polical situaon, these
brave youth remain steadfast in their patrioc and spiritual pursuit of unity and jusce.
Participation in global networks
Parcipaon in global networks and movements is a solid way of following through on a commitment to solidarity and
joint struggle. Global networks also provide an opportunity to share lessons learned.
LifeSource is planning a lm fesval for the right to water in Palesne, featuring lms and popular leaders from dierent
local struggles for the right to water from around the world – from Cochabamba, to South Africa, to Mexico, to India, to
First Naons, to Palesne.
Global solidarity is an important tool for ending the impunity of powerful States and non-State actors.
Recommendations
The human rights violaons speak for themselves.
The way forward is through popular research, popular educaon and popular acon rooted in the principle of global
solidarity.
UN ndings that Israel is violang the human right to water and sanitaon are already being used as a springboard for
acon.
It is the recommendaon of this report that global cizens connue boyco, divestment and sancons and other
forms of resistance that are proving successful in building a global movement, with the aim of generang a global
consensus around defying Israel’s illegal restricons on Palesnian water and sanitaon development. This would
include establishing a viable port at Gaza, drilling wells in the Western Aquifer, freely construcng water and sanitaon
infrastructure in Area C, and ending Israeli impunity for human rights violaons, including the human right to water and
sanitaon.
The movement for boyco, divestment and sancons is also an important way to enforce corporate accountability for
human rights violaons, such as the demolion of water infrastructure rounely carried out with Caterpillar, Volvo and
Hyundai bulldozers, and water cuts by the Israeli naonal water company Mekorot, which is receiving lucrave research
and development contracts worldwide.
Furthermore, it is recommended that humanitarian organizaons and donors support Palesnians with the resources
and cover that they need to drill wells in the Western Aquifer and construct a port at Gaza. Also, agencies should
immediately begin construcon of water networks, reservoirs and lling points in the 61 per cent of internaonally
recognized Palesnian territory in the West Bank labelled “Area C” to protect the human right to water and right to life
for the vulnerable communies living there.
Finally, Palesnians and the Palesnian Authority should play a lead role in asserng Palesnians’ rights to the Western
Aquifer, the Jordan River and a share of the Coastal Aquifer inside Israel, along with the Palesnian Authority’s right to
provide water and sanitaon to Palesnians in all of internaonally recognized Palesnian territory. It is recommended
that the Palesnian Authority reject prepaid water meters and align itself in solidarity with a global movement for
recognion of the human right to water and sanitaon, including water for all, regardless of ability to pay.
16 OUR RIGHT TO WATER
Endnotes
1 UN Resoluon 194 recognizes Palesnian refugees’ right of return; UN Resoluon 242 calls for an end to the occupaon.
2 Israel has deed or is defying many of the 224 UN resoluons directly concerning Israel issued over the course of nearly 45 years. A complete
list of the 224 resoluons may be found here: hp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_Naons_resoluons_concerning_Israel
3 50 litres for a quick shower and 9 litres to ush a toilet are conservave esmates from Yotam Feldman and Uri Blau’s arcle in Ha’aretz
Magazine, “A dry and thirsty land” (August 14, 2009). These numbers originally came from a pamphlet published by the Israeli Water Authority.
Other esmates for compariston: the water usage calculator at hp://www.csgnetwork.com/waterusagecalc.html says a ve-minute shower
with a standard shower head ow rate of 3.8 consumes 19 gallons (72 liters) of water, a standard toilet takes ve gallons (18.9 liters) of water
to ush and a reduced-ush toilet takes 1.6 gallons (six liters). According to hp://www.uswitch.com/water/how-much-water-use, a standard
shower is 80 liters and a standard ush is eight liters.
4 Average network water losses are 34 per cent. This contributes to the low consumpon gure. World Bank, “Assessment of Restricons on
Palesnian Water Sector Development,” 2009, p. 17.
5 Israeli water consumpon includes freshwater and desalinated seawater. Recycled wastewater is used signicantly as well in the agriculture
sector.
6 B’Tselem, “Foul Play: Israel’s Neglect of Wastewater Treatment in the West Bank,” 2009.
7 Amnesty Internaonal, “Troubled Waters: Palesnians Denied Fair Access to Water,” October 2010, p. 4.
8 Today, the chloride levels are greater than 250 mg/l. It is important to note that the Brish Hydrological Service observed overpumping of the
Coastal Aquifer in 1933 before the territory became overcrowded as a result of the 1948 War.
9 United Naons Oce for the Coordinaon of Humanitarian Aairs, “Between the Fence and a Hard Place: The Humanitarian Impact of Israeli-
Imposed Restricons on Access to Land and Sea in the Gaza Strip,” August 2010. hp://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_special_
focus_2010_08_19_english.pdf
10 World Bank, 2009, p. 35.
11 The “esmated potenal” of the Western Aquifer at the me of Oslo was 362 million cubic metres. According to the Israeli Water Authority,
total water supply to Palesnians today is 180 million cubic metres annually in the West Bank. Israel Water Authority, “ The Issue of Water
Between Israel and the Palesnians,” April 2009, p. 15.
12 The diversion of the Jordan River is a central feature of Israel’s Naonal Water Carrier. Mekorot, the Israeli naonal water company, was the
contractor for this project, completed in 1957.
13 Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are diverng tributaries to the Jordan River within their territories, which is also contribung to the reducon in
ow of the Jordan River.
14 Although Israel is occupying Syrian territory to control the Jordan River system, including the Sea of Galilee and its tributaries in the Golan
Heights, Israel’s diversion of the Jordan River doesn’t have a major impact on access to water in Syria.
15 Palesnian Authority Department of Environment, “Right to Water in the Arab Occupied Territories,” 2006, p.2; and, Alice Gray,
“Environmental Dimensions of Zionism in the Negev and West Bank,” Babylon Journal on the Middle East and North Africa, vol. 5, September
2007.
16 Israel agreed to allow Palesnians to develop addional quanes of water as “immediate needs” to be realized before the year 2000, as well
as “future needs.” Although Israel is indeed selling Palesnians more than they are obligated to sell, it is also the case that lile over half of the
addional quanes that Palesnians were promised to be able to develop as “immediate needs” have actually been realized today, and Israel is
currently withholding approval for 82 well drilling projects that would allow Palesnians the quanes approved under Oslo. World Bank, 2009,
p. 36.
17 August 15, 1967 Military Order No. 92: water considered a strategic resource belonging to Israel. Military Order No. 158 of 1967: it is not
permissible for any person to set up or to assemble or to possess or to operate a water installaon unless a license has been obtained from the
area commander. This order applies to all wells and irrigaon installaons. The area commander can refuse to grant any license without the
need for juscaon. Military Order No. 291 and No. 457 of 1972, 484 of 1972, 494 of 1972, 715 of 1977 and 1376 of 1991: to achieve complete
control over Palesnian water resources.
18 Amongst the well drilling projects not approved by JWC or sll pending JWC or CA [Civil Administraon] approval, were 82 well drilling
projects which were presented by the PWA as part of the agreed quantum under Arcle 40.” World Bank, 2009, p. 49.
19 “Out of the $121 million of projects presented to JWC in the 2001-2008 period, 50% by value ($60.4 million) have been approved, and one
third have been implemented or begun implementaon.” World Bank, 2009, p. ix.
20 World Bank, 2009, p. ix.
21 The one excepon is in Azzun, in Qalqilya district, where under special circumstances a “replacement well” was allowed on condion that the
original well be shut down.
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER IN PALESTINE 17
22 Area C was established as part of the Oslo II accords.
23 OCHA, “Restricng Space: The Planning Regime Applied by Israel in Area C of the West Bank: Special Focus,” December 2009. Also in EWASH
Fact Sheet 5: Access to Water, Sanitaon and Hygiene in Area C, “The Water, Sanitaon and Hygiene (WASH) cluster in the oPt esmates that
60,000 of those living in Area C are not connected to a water network.
24 “up to twelve mes as much as water from the tap” calculated using gures from the WASH rapid assessment water scarcity data from July
2011, collected by UNICEF.
25 Diakonia, “Israel’s Administrave Destrucon of Cisterns in Area C LEGAL Brief,” September 2011.
26 “‘At least 20 cisterns and 12 wells have been demolished since the beginning of 2011, aecng access to drinking water for tens of thousands
of Palesnians,’ underscored the Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitaon, Catarina de Albuquerque.
OHCHR, September 27, 2011. West Bank: Demolions and Aacks Against Palesnians Must Stop – UN Experts. News Release.
27 Clemens Messerschmid, “The Last Sip: Water Crisis in Palesne [Arabic publicaon],” 2011, p. 6.
28 Israel Water Authority, “The Issue of Water Between Israel and the Palesnians,” April 2009, p. 15.
29 Also known as Operaon Cast Lead, which was the Israeli army’s name for its military operaon.
30 The United Naons Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conict found that water and sanitaon resources and infrastructure were intenonally
targeted by Israel. “Report of the United Naons Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conict,” para. 1023, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, September 15,
2009.
31 Coastal Municipalies Water Ulity, Damage Assessment Report: Water and Waste Water Infrastructure and Facilies, January 2009,
p. 5. Quoted in LifeSource “Israel’s military bombardment and ongoing siege of Gaza is threatening residents with a water and sanitaon
catastrophe,” January 2009.
32 The UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conict found that Israel’s military operaon was directed at the people of Gaza as a whole,
amounng to collecve punishment, in a deliberate policy of disproporonate force aimed at the civilian populaon.
33 United Naons Environment Programme, “Environmental Assessment of the Gaza Strip: Following the Escalaon of Hoslies in December
2008 – January 2009,” 2009.
34 Israel Water Authority, “The Issue of Water Between Israel and the Palesnians,” April 2009, p.13.
35 World Bank, 2009, p. 20.
36 B’Tselem, “Foul Play: Israel’s Neglect of Wastewater Treatment in the West Bank,” 2009.
37 The PRDP is a map for public sector involvement. Its stated guiding principles include supporng and sustaining “the steadfast determinaon
of the Palesnian people to remain on their land and to connue to pursue their livelihoods and build their naon, not succumbing to the
pressures placed upon them by the Occupaon” (p. 4) and the protecon of human rights, vulnerable groups, religious tolerance and gender
equality. However, the 140 page document is really about one goal, to “create an enabling environment for a free and open market economy.
Throughout the text, Palesnian sovereignty and control is discussed in terms of increasing private sector involvement. A prime example of this
is: “The culture of non payment which, along with other factors described above [namely, ‘lack of sovereignty and control’, ‘polical instability
and poor security,’ ‘territorial fragmentaon,’ ‘instuonal capacity and coordinaon,’ and ‘donor dependency’ are all] ... a powerful disincenve
to private sector parcipaon in the sector” (p. 82). There is no menon that all of these issues contribute to human rights violaons.
38 PRDP, p. 83.
39 The PRDP boldly promotes the implementaon of 300,000 prepaid electricity meters by 2010. Although it does not discuss prepaid water
meters specically, the PRDP discusses at length the problem of lack of payment of water and promotes “enforcement measures such as a
requirement for cizens to present a ‘cercate of payment’ of ulity bills in order to receive public services,” specifying meanwhile that, “these
measures will be accompanied by provisions to ensure connued access to ulies and other services for those suering extreme poverty.
PRDP, p. 43.
40 hp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neoliberalism
41 Agreement by Palesnian leaders to support Israeli integraon into the regional market began with the Israel–PLO Protocol on Economic
Relaons of 1994. Pressure on Palesnian leadership can be traced back to the Madrid Conference in 1991.
42 Coincidentally or not, the World Bank’s April 2009 report on Assessment of Restricons on Palesnian Water Sector Development was
released at the same me that construcon of the rst prepaid water meters in Palesne was completed.
43 AlQuds newspaper, February 27, 2009, p. 21.
44 Norwegians had already introduced prepaid electricity meters to Palesne in 2004. Scanteam Analysts and Advisors, “Review of Norwegian
Assistance to the Energy Sector, the Palesnian Territories,” March 2004.
45 AlQuds newspaper, February 27, 2009, p. 21.
18 OUR RIGHT TO WATER
46 On June 2, 2009, the PWA issued an announcement in the paper stang that the “PWA did not decide to use this type of meter yet. It will
do an experimental study on the ground for a specic me period. The study will show the social and economic eects, and the people’s
acceptance.” AlQuds newspaper, June 2, 2009, p. 15. Then, six days later the PWA announced that they would begin a study, that they expected
the study to take one year, and that in order “to make this study PWA approves the use of these meters in two areas, Jaroshiya and West Jenin
villages.” AlQuds newspaper, June 8, 2009, p. 8.
47 To date we know of only two completed studies considering the social and economic eects of prepaid water meters: a very simple report
based on an interview with the mayor and nine consumers in Jaroshiya conducted by the Palesnian Hydrology Group, August–September 2009;
and an excellent study on West Jenin conducted by Fayez Abu-Hilou and Ayman Jarrar, who both happen to work at the Projects Management
Unit of the Palesnian Water Authority, and who embarked on this research independently aer geng interested through their work. They
presented their results at a conference for Arab Water Week in Amman in December 2010. Today the only ocial study on prepaid water meters
is one completed by the PWA and the Palesnian Ministry of Local Government, a dra technical requirements study requested by the Council
of Ministers. In order to nalize this study, prepaid water meters will need to be implemented in more areas with the dra technical standards.
48 According to Civil Procedure and Palesnian Trade Law No. 2 for the year 2001, Arcle 112, “it’s the right of customer to complain in front of
the court if the water service was cut, regardless the reason.” According to Ahmed Bishtawi from the PWA legal department, the interpretaon
of this law is that the judge will ask that the water be turned back on for the consumer immediately, before even looking at the reason for the
cut. Even if the consumer is found guilty, the judgement can never be cung the water supply. Currently there are no penales for cung water
supply.
49 Interview with Ehab Bargouthi, Consumer Protecon Society.
50 Fayez Abu-Hilou and Ayman Jarrar, “Prepaid Water Meters, a Maer of Debate: Assessment Study for a Pilot Project in the Palesnian Water
Sector,” December 2010.
51 According to a study by the Palesnian Hydrology Group, the Prime Minister sent the mayor of Jaroshiya a memo in 2009 asking him to pay for
families living in extreme poverty. But this was never implemented. In June 2010 the Council of Ministers issued Resoluon (F.S/O.M/31/51/03)
stang that the Ministry of Social Aairs was preparing a study called “the strategy of cash transfer” to develop a program for providing
governmental support to people who cannot aord water using the social security mechanism. The Ministry of Social Aairs has not yet
established this program.
52 Cizens who chose to abandon the regular meters earlier may be the only cizens who had been given a choice. They had disconnected their
water meter to avoid paying the minimum connecon fee while water wasn’t reaching their home. These cizens were using expensive and risky
water tankers in the interim and have been happy to have water delivered to their homes for a fracon of the cost. There is no monthly charge
with the prepaid meters.
53 LifeSource learned the cost was six shekels per cubic metre and was able to calculate consumpon based on this.
54 This gure is expected to be higher if those responsible for paying the bills were surveyed.
55 Israel has already made a name for itself with its water games. In the village of Qarawa Beni Zayid in 2009, Israel led the PWA and the WBWD
to believe that it was not reducing water supply. But when LifeSource invesgated, LifeSource learned that although annual supply increased,
Mekorot was in fact supplying excessive quanes in the winter when the community relied on rainwater harvesng. In the summer the
community was receiving a quarter of the supply it had received just three years prior (LifeSource data and press release, “In protest of Israeli
Water Authority and Mekorot policies,” April 2009). Israel’s ocial response was that the months of low supply during the summer were in fact
normal supply but the meter was broken. According to the WBWD, Mekorot rounely replaces meters aer months of low supply and this is
sucient to absolve Mekorot of responsibility for reducing supply (LifeSource interview with Khalil Ghabeesh, Director of WBWD, 2008).
56 “UN General Assembly and Security Council resoluons such as Resoluon 242 and Resoluon 338 do not follow Israel’s legal interpretaon
and consider the oPt to be under belligerent (hosle) occupaon.” Diakonia website arcle: hp://www.diakonia.se/sa/node.asp?node=940
57 EWASH Parallel Report to ICESCR, p. 23.
58 UN Commiee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observaons of the Commiee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights:
Israel, 2003. UN doc.E/C.12/1/Add.90., para. 26.
59 UN Commiee on the Eliminaon of Racial Discriminaon, Concluding Observaons of the Commiee on the Eliminaon of Racial
Discriminaon: Israel, 2007. UN Doc. CERD/C/ISR/CO/13, para. 35.
60 Watch this 15 minute lm online: www.lifesource.ps/llingpoint
61 For example, the six-month general strike of 1936.
62 At Bardala, in the North Eastern corner of Tubas Governorate, eight Palesnian wells were constructed before 1967 for domesc and
agricultural purposes, with depths ranging from 30 to 65 meters. Aer the 1967 war, Israel constructed two deep wells (Bardala 1 in 1968 and
Bardala 2 in 1979) a few hundred meters from the Palesnian wells. The water level in the Palesnian wells dropped at the rate of 2 meters a
year, and salinity increased. Now the Palesnian wells are dry, as are most of the local springs used by Palesnian consumers for domesc and
agricultural purposes.
At Fasayil in Jericho governorate, Israel has drilled six producon wells. The yield of the single Palesnian well in the area has fallen to zero, and
the formerly abundant local springs have dried up.
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER IN PALESTINE 19
At Auja, the very producve Auja spring, which formerly discharged up to 9 MCM a year, has dried up for months on end through the acon of
ve nearby Israeli producon wells. A formerly water- abundant village is now buying back water from nearby selements.” World Bank, 2009,
p. 12.
63 Bili’in won a ruling of the Israeli Supreme Court to move the route of the Wall to conscate less land.
64 Budrus is now famous for their joint grassroots struggle and their success in reroung the Wall, thanks to the lm Budrus by director Julia
Bacha.
65 On military incursions into Jayyous, Israel has threatened to cut the village’s water and electricity if they don’t cooperate. If Jayyous had a well
inside the village boundaries, Israel couldn’t carry this threat out as easily. However, there are also cases of Palesnians being shot or beaten for
trying to get water while under curfew. (From a private interview with a resident of Bar, near Bethlehem, brutally beaten when he was trying to
get water for his sick infant brother. Their father later built a cistern and named it aer his son, who thankfully survived.)
66 These include shoong rubber-coated lead bullets less than 50 meters from demonstrators, ring regular teargas canisters at less than a 45
degree angle and using high velocity teargas canisters, which are designed for certain taccal situaons to blow through a wall and then release
teargas, and which have been ruled inappropriate for crowd dispersal by the Israeli army itself. Inappropriate use of these canisters have caused
countless casuales, including Palesnian Bassem Abu Rahmeh, who was killed in 2009 when one hit his chest, and Tristan Anderson of Oakland,
California, who is suering from brain damage, paralysis and seizures aer he was hit in the head by a canister at a 2009 demonstraon.
67 Ma’an News Agency, “Water cuts in Dheishe Camp exceed 25 days” [translated from Arabic], September 28, 2011. Also: Al Watan Voice,
“People in Hebron call for the dismissal of the manager of the Palesnian Water Authority, Shaddad Ali” [translated from Arabic], August 21,
2010. hp://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/news/2010/08/21/153141.html
68 Note: Same company, but boled from local sources.
69 The Mehadrin Group company prole as part of “Dun’s 100 Israel’s Largest Enterprises.” hp://duns100.dundb.co.il/ts.cgi?tsscript=comp_
eng&duns=600019582
70 “600-plus communies served; 190-plus wastewater treatment plants operated and maintained; 90-plus water treatment plants operated and
maintained; 74 industrial wastewater treatment facilies; 35 industrial water treatment facilies; 2,900 employees in North America; More than
2.2 billion gallons of water and wastewater treated everyday; Services to approximately 14 million people in 600 communies,” from hp://
www.veoliawater.com/about/locaons/united-states.htm. Visit the following website to see if they are acve in your community (U.S. residents
only): hp://www.globalexchange.org/economicacvism/veolia/contracts
71 hp://www.veoliawater.com/about/key-gures/#c87f2013z1
72 Who Prots, “Veolia’s Involvement in the Occupied Jordan Valley – An Update,” October 10, 2011. hp://www.whoprots.org/content/
veolias-involvement-occupied-jordan-valley-%E2%80%93-update
73 Frankly, the youth want to have normal young adult social lives, they want to date regardless of which facon the other’s family comes from,
they want to have spare change to buy a coee, and they want to be able to listen to loud music and dance.
74 In March 2011, youth in Gaza passed out owers door-to-door to cizens and to police ocers as a token of forgiveness and unity, but the
police responded with brutality.
For more information contact:
The Blue Planet Project
700-170 Laurier Ave. West
Ottawa, ON, K1P 5V5
1-800-387-7177
blueplanetproject.net / canadians.org
March, 2012
Chapter
What can a political economy of waste demonstrate about contemporary Palestine? With Oslo Palestinian refuse came to be defined as the de facto property of the would-be Palestinian state. The PA authorized itself to become the sole actor in charge of defining, valuing, and arranging waste in space. The PA achieved this through centralization of waste disposal in two regional, PA-run landfills beginning in 2007 and through the subsequent closure of hundreds of municipal dumpsites across the West Bank. This dramatically raised disposal costs to municipalities. Refuse became a financial burden that each garbage-producing individual, business, or locality was expected to pay. This essay focuses on the technique the PA deployed to extract payment for waste services from residents: it connected waste management fees to prepaid electricity meters being installed across the territory. I draw on long-term fieldwork in Palestine beginning in 2007 to explore how the decision to connect waste fees to prepaid electricity meters was made thinkable and practicable. Through automation of waste fee payment, the relationship between Palestinian governance and its subjects was rearranged. I argue that connection of waste fees to prepaid electricity meters transformed the mediating role of waste in the relationship between residents and municipal service. It rendered the municipality a more extractive and simultaneously less intimate actor in residents’ lives. It served to separate residents from their waste and made their refuse both more public and less polysemic.
Article
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the current water supply can aid in achieving economic growth in Palestine through the agricultural sector. Thus an attempt was made to answer the question whether it is worthwhile for the Palestinian Authority (PA) to invest in the agricultural sector to achieve a certain level of sustainable development. A time-series regression analysis is performed to investigate whether the current amount of water can sustain economic growth in Palestine for 1998-2018. Findings have indicated that there is no relationship between the agricultural sector and the two sources of water. Meanwhile, there is a cointegration relationship between the agricultural sector and the spring water. Accordingly, water is not achieving economic growth in Palestine due to a shrinking agricultural sector. Moreover, the Palestinian agricultural sector faces several challenges during the expansion period, most importantly in terms of the insufficient subsidies provided to the Palestinian farmers by the PA.
Israel's Administrative Destruction of Cisterns in Area C LEGAL Brief
Diakonia, "Israel's Administrative Destruction of Cisterns in Area C LEGAL Brief," September 2011.
The Last Sip: Water Crisis in Palestine
  • Clemens Messerschmid
Clemens Messerschmid, "The Last Sip: Water Crisis in Palestine [Arabic publication]," 2011, p. 6.
The Issue of Water Between Israel and the Palestinians
  • Authority Israel Water
Israel Water Authority, "The Issue of Water Between Israel and the Palestinians," April 2009, p. 15.
Foul Play: Israel's Neglect of Wastewater Treatment in the West Bank
  • B' Tselem
B'Tselem, "Foul Play: Israel's Neglect of Wastewater Treatment in the West Bank," 2009.
Water cuts in Dheishe Camp exceed 25 days " [translated from Arabic Also: Al Watan Voice People in Hebron call for the dismissal of the manager of the Palestinian Water Authority, Shaddad Attili " [translated from Arabic
  • Ma 'an News
  • Agency
Ma'an News Agency, " Water cuts in Dheishe Camp exceed 25 days " [translated from Arabic], September 28, 2011. Also: Al Watan Voice, " People in Hebron call for the dismissal of the manager of the Palestinian Water Authority, Shaddad Attili " [translated from Arabic], August 21, 2010. http://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/news/2010/08/21/153141.html 68 Note: Same company, but bottled from local sources.
the youth want to have normal young adult social lives, they want to date regardless of which faction the other's family comes from, they want to have spare change to buy a coffee, and they want to be able to listen to loud music and dance
  • Frankly
Frankly, the youth want to have normal young adult social lives, they want to date regardless of which faction the other's family comes from, they want to have spare change to buy a coffee, and they want to be able to listen to loud music and dance.
Average network water losses are 34 per cent. This contributes to the low consumption figure
Average network water losses are 34 per cent. This contributes to the low consumption figure. World Bank, "Assessment of Restrictions on Palestinian Water Sector Development," 2009, p. 17.
The Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) cluster in the oPt estimates that 60,000 of those living in Area C are not connected to a water network
OCHA, "Restricting Space: The Planning Regime Applied by Israel in Area C of the West Bank: Special Focus," December 2009. Also in EWASH Fact Sheet 5: Access to Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in Area C, "The Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) cluster in the oPt estimates that 60,000 of those living in Area C are not connected to a water network." 24 "up to twelve times as much as water from the tap" calculated using figures from the WASH rapid assessment water scarcity data from July 2011, collected by UNICEF.
At least 20 cisterns and 12 wells have been demolished since the beginning of 2011, affecting access to drinking water for tens of thousands of Palestinians,' underscored the Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque
"'At least 20 cisterns and 12 wells have been demolished since the beginning of 2011, affecting access to drinking water for tens of thousands of Palestinians,' underscored the Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque." OHCHR, September 27, 2011. West Bank: Demolitions and Attacks Against Palestinians Must Stop -UN Experts. News Release.
People in Hebron call for the dismissal of the manager of the Palestinian Water Authority, Shaddad Attili
  • Ma'an News
  • Agency
Ma'an News Agency, "Water cuts in Dheishe Camp exceed 25 days" [translated from Arabic], September 28, 2011. Also: Al Watan Voice, "People in Hebron call for the dismissal of the manager of the Palestinian Water Authority, Shaddad Attili" [translated from Arabic], August 21, 2010. http://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/news/2010/08/21/153141.html 68 Note: Same company, but bottled from local sources.