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AN ANALYSIS OF TWO CORRIDORS IN CHINA'S ONE BELT ONE ROAD INITIATIVE: CHINA-PAKISTAN AND CHINA CENTRAL-WEST ASIA

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The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative is transforming China's position across multiple regions. In particular, its role in South and Central Asia is increasing significantly, commensurate with its rising interests in both regions. Central to OBOR are five cooperation priorities: policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds. This paper presents case studies of two corridors, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the China-Central West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC), mapping political and economic interactions to each of these cooperation priorities. This paper will analyze levels of existing interdependence between China and the states in question in order to determine which cooperation priorities require greater resources and which have already achieved a measure of success. As such, it anticipates future areas of focus for Chinese policy in both regions, indicating a possible trajectory of China's political and economic interactions in South and Central Asia.
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Proceedings of International Conference on Inter-Regional Connectivity: South Asia and Central Asia 2016
43
Department of Political Science / Centre of Excellence China Studies, GC University Lahore, Pakistan
AN ANALYSIS OF TWO CORRIDORS IN CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD
INITIATIVE: CHINA-PAKISTAN AND CHINA CENTRAL-WEST ASIA
Jonathan Fulton
Abstract: The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative is transforming China’s position across multiple regions.
In particular, its role in South and Central Asia is increasing significantly, commensurate with its rising
interests in both regions. Central to OBOR are five cooperation priorities: policy coordination, facilities
connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds. This paper presents case
studies of two corridors, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the China-Central West Asia
Economic Corridor (CCWAEC), mapping political and economic interactions to each of these cooperation
priorities. This paper will analyze levels of existing interdependence between China and the states in question
in order to determine which cooperation priorities require greater resources and which have already achieved
a measure of success. As such, it anticipates future areas of focus for Chinese policy in both regions, indicating
a possible trajectory of China’s political and economic interactions in South and Central Asia.
Keywords: Chinese Foreign Policy, One Belt One Road, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, China-Central Asia
Economic Corridor, Central-South Asian Connectivity
Introduction
The Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, or One Belt, One Road (OBOR)
has signaled China’s plan for a greater presence across Eurasia, and Central and South Asia have prominent
roles in the development of the architecture of OBOR.
Central to OBOR are five cooperation priorities articulated by the Chinese government in its policy
document released in March 2015.
1
These priorities - policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded
trade, financial integration, and people-to people-bonds indicate the shape of OBOR cooperation, and also
indicate the what kind of role individual states can be expected to play within OBOR. Policy coordination calls
for intergovernmental cooperation, enhanced political trust, expanding shared interests, and coordinated
economic development strategies and policies. Facilities connectivity calls for improved connectivity through
infrastructure projects. Unimpeded trade calls for removal of trade and investment barriers, with the goal of
establishing regional free trade agreements. Financial integration calls for developing a common economic
system throughout OBOR, under the framework of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), BRICS
New Development Bank, Silk Road Fund, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization Development Bank. People-
to-People bonds are the soft power initiatives of OBOR, promoting cultural and educational exchanges, tourism,
and media cooperation.
This paper begins with a short discussion of the introduction of OBOR in late 2013 and its immediate
impact as the signature foreign policy initiative under President Xi Jinping. It then analyzes two OBOR
economic corridors, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and China-Central West Asia Economic
Corridor (CCWAEC), assessing four of the five policy goals: policy coordination, facilities connectivity,
unimpeded trade, and financial integration. Measured against these goals, CPEC is clearly the better developed
corridor for the time being, and the bilateral nature of CPEC, as opposed to the multilateral CCWAEC, indicates
that China’s OBOR objectives can be more easily achieved with CPEC than CCWAEC.
The Development of One Belt, One Road
In September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping gave a speech at Nazarbayev University in
Kazakhstan, in which he announced a cooperative initiative in which China and Central Asian states would
build what he called the Silk Road Economic Belt. In articulating this policy initiative, Xi discussed a range of
issues in which China and Central Asian states could enhance cooperation, such as improved transportation
networks, facilitated trade and investment, an increase in people-to-people exchanges, and sharing economic
strategies with the goal of finding ways to complement development.
2
Given the existing membership of China
Instructor, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Zayed University, Abu Dhabi, UAE (Email:
jonathan.fulton@zu.ac.ae).
An Analysis of Two Corridors Fulton
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Academic Session-2: Geopolitics of Corridors: Building Economic Linkages-I
and the Central Asian states in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), this policy announcement
appeared to be building upon SCO initiatives.
In October 2013, President Xi delivered a speech to the Indonesian Parliament in which he called for
“a more closely-knit China-ASEAN community of common destiny so as to bring more benefits to both China
and ASEAN and to the people in the region.”
3
He presented a five-point strategy: build trust and develop good-
neighborliness, work for win-win cooperation, stand together and assist each other, enhance mutual
understanding and friendship, and stick to openness and inclusiveness. Within these general policy expressions
were the seeds of what has become known as the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. He suggested upgrading the
China-ASEAN Free Trade agreement with the goal of expanding trade to $1 trillion by 2020, and announced
the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), stating that it would prioritize
development projects in ASEAN states. He said that China was interested in enhancing security cooperation
with ASEAN states, and also called for greater people-to-people exchanges between China and ASEAN
countries, referring to the China-ASEAN relationship as a “community of shared destiny.”
4
As with the speech
in Kazakhstan, this speech appeared significant only as an extension of existing Sino-ASEAN relationships, and
did not represent a bold policy shift for China.
One month later, the significance of these two speeches became clearer, as the Third Plenary Session
of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China formally endorsed the construction of OBOR.
This gave the initiative a much higher profile, and its scope started to come into greater focus. Throughout 2014
and 2015 a wide range of bilateral agreements were announced as part of OBOR, and planned multilateral
programs, such as the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, indicated that the its geographic
focus extended beyond Central Asia and South-East Asia. Ultimately, it became clear that OBOR was going to
connect China to the Middle East, Africa, and Europe as well, meaning it potentially connects China to over 4
billion people in over 60 emerging market countries, representing 65% of global land trade and 30% of global
maritime trade.
5
With OBOR’s increased profile, it has clearly become the signature foreign policy initiative of the Xi
administration. Wu Jianmin, former president of China’s Foreign Affairs University and a member of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Foreign Policy Advisory Committee, has described it as “the most significant and
far-reaching initiative that China has ever put forward.”
6
It has also been described as “the largest programme
of economic diplomacy since the U.S.-led Marshall Plan.”
7
One western diplomat concluded that rather than a
new doctrine, OBOR is instead “a new slogan on stuff they’ve wanted to do for a long time.”
8
However it is
conceptualized, the Chinese government is committing tremendous emphasis on it, with OBOR the key focus
of Chinese diplomacy since it was announced. One Chinese observer made this point, commenting, “The fact
that a single initiative is taken as the focus of China’s diplomatic work for the whole year shows the weight
given to the One Belt, One Road Strategy in China’s diplomacy.”
9
The actual shape of OBOR was articulated by Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli at an Asia-Europe Meeting in
Chongqing in 2015, when he announced six economic corridors, funded by the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund,
connecting Asia and Europe:
China-Mongolia-Russia
New Eurasian Land Bridge
China-Central and West Asia
China-Indochina Peninsula
China-Pakistan
China-Myanmar-Bangladesh-India
10
Each of these economic corridors serves a different geopolitical objective for China, and taken together
indicate an ambitious plan to increase China’s presence across a range of issues throughout Eurasia.
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
Of the six OBOR corridors, CPEC is currently the best developed. Andrew Small referred to CPEC as
“the flagship project for China’s Belt and Road initiative, essentially the only fully-developed section of the
entire scheme, and hence an important test case for Xi Jinping’s ambitious plans.”
11
Analyzing the features of
this corridor, it appears consistent with the aforementioned quote that OBOR can be seen as a new slogan for
“stuff they’ve wanted to do for a long time.” Indeed, CPEC actually predates the announcement of OBOR,
Proceedings of International Conference on Inter-Regional Connectivity: South Asia and Central Asia 2016
45
Department of Political Science / Centre of Excellence China Studies, GC University Lahore, Pakistan
having been formally proposed in May, 2013, six months before OBOR was articulated at the Third Plenary
Session.
12
CPEC has been represented with the formula of a 1+4 cooperation structure. 1 represents the economic
corridor and 4 represents the pillars that support it: the Gwadar port, energy, infrastructure, and industrial
collaboration.
13
Underwriting this formula is close political cooperation, security coordination, trade, and FDI.
In examining CPEC against the vision statement for OBOR, it is clear that the policy goals of OBOR are already
at an advanced stage in this corridor, especially relative to CCWAEC.
Policy Coordination
Sino-Pakistani relations have evolved over time from primarily a Cold War era response to external
threats to a relationship that also encompasses domestic stability for both states, emphasizing the importance of
the bilateral relationship. China’s importance has been described as “the cornerstone of Pakistan’s strategic
foreign policy.”
14
The resulting relationship has expanded to include extensive trade ties and geopolitical
considerations, as Pakistan also provides China with a bridge to the Middle East. The diplomatic relationship
has been useful for China over the years, as Pakistan was used as a diplomatic conduit for establishing ties with
the USA and Saudi Arabia, and today Pakistan has come to be regarded as “a central part of China’s transition
from a regional power to a global one.”
15
Diplomatic relations have intensified in the post-Cold War era. President Jiang Zemin made China’s
first state visit to Pakistan in 1996, and announced the establishment of an “all around cooperative partnership.”
The relationship deepened with a visit from Premier Wen Jiabao in 2005, when China and Pakistan signed the
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborly Relations, and announced the beginning of
negotiations for a free trade agreement. When President Xi Jinping made a state visit in April 2015, the first of
51 Memorandums of Understanding signed established the all-weather strategic partnership, which is generally
viewed as China’s highest level of bilateral relations, involving the “full pursuit of cooperation and
development.”
16
These existing high level bilateral relations provide opportunities to enhance policy
coordination within CPEC, as evidenced with the CPEC Summit held in Islamabad in August 2016.
In addition to bilateral relations, Sino-Pakistani policy coordination is facilitated by participation in
multilateral organizations, especially the SCO. Pakistan had observer state status since June 2005 and its request
for full membership passed in June 2016 at the SCO Heads of State Summit at Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Pakistan
is expected to become a full member by the next summit in Astana in June 2017.
17
While SCO policy
coordination involves security related issues rather than the economic and development coordination stressed
by OBOR, full membership status in the SCO will further promote intergovernmental cooperation, expand
shared interests, and enhance political trust.
Facilities Connectivity
This objective is central to CPEC. As noted above, the 1+4 cooperation structure is the basis of CPEC,
and requires dense levels of cooperation in terms of infrastructure development. Gwadar represents an end
point to this corridor, and China’s role in developing the port as well as the associated infrastructure
demonstrates a clear commitment to this goal, as well as political and economic interests for the Chinese
government in the continued development of CPEC. Currently there are several infrastructure projects
associated with CPEC, including the Peshawar-Lahore-Karachi railway, power plants in Tharparkar and Port
Qasim, the Gwadar-Nawabshah natural gas pipeline, the Karot hydropower project, the Jhimpir wind farm,
Gwadar airport, the Karachi-Thatta expressway, and the M-9 Hyderabad-Karachi motorway.
18
With $46 billion
promised in infrastructure development loans from China, facilities connectivity is a major component of CPEC.
Unimpeded Trade
During Premier Wen’s state visit in February 2005, China and Pakistan announced the beginning of
negotiations on a free trade agreement (FTA) that was signed when President Hu visited in 2006. Since then,
trade has intensified significantly. China has become Pakistan’s most important trade partner, with 8.8% of its
2015 exports directed to China, and 28.2% of its imports coming from China, representing a tremendous
increase from 9.8% in 2006.
19
According to IMF data, China has been Pakistan’s top source of imports every
year since 2006. (See Table-1)
An Analysis of Two Corridors Fulton
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Academic Session-2: Geopolitics of Corridors: Building Economic Linkages-I
Table 1: Value and Ranking of Pakistan’s Imports from/Exports to China (Millions of US $)
Year
Pakistani Imports from China
Pakistani Exports to China
2006
$4,664.81 (1)
$915.61 (4)
2007
$6,363.41 (1)
$1,004.78 (4)
2008
$6,590.55 (1)
$915.53 (5)
2009
$3,774.17 (1)
$973.82 (4)
2010
$7,629.26 (1)
$1,572.70 (4)
2011
$9,281.85 (1)
$1,929.88 (4)
2012
$10,206.93 (1)
$2,855.63 (2)
2013
$12,117.16 (1)
$2,915.51 (2)
2014
$14,573.27 (1)
$2,509.44 (2)
Source: (IMF, Direction of Trade by Country)
Table 2: Value and Ranking of China’s Exports to/Imports from Pakistan (Millions of US $)
Year
Chinese Exports to Pakistan
2006
$4,664.81 (34)
2007
$6,363.41 (35)
2008
$6,590.55 (40)
2009
$3,774.17 (34)
2010
$7,629.26 (36)
2011
$9,281.85 (37)
2012
$10,206.93 (37)
2013
$12,117.16 (35)
2014
$14,573.27 (33)
(IMF, Direction of Trade by Country)
As with many of China’s bilateral trade partners, the relationship is heavily one-sided. While China
ranks as Pakistan’s top import partner, Pakistan ranks as China’s 33rd largest source of imports. In terms of
export destinations, China is 2nd highest for Pakistan, while Pakistan is 67th for China.
20
The trade deficit is
significant, with the value of Pakistan’s imports from China consistently considerably larger than the value of
its exports to China. (See Tables 1 and 2) In terms of trade, China is much more important to Pakistan than
Pakistan is to China. However, Pakistan’s geopolitical significance gives it a weight incommensurate to its
trade volume.
Financial Integration
This OBOR policy goal also indicates a pre-existing cooperative relationship. Pakistan is a founding
member of the AIIB, and was the recipient of funding for one of its three initial projects, a 64 kilometer stretch
of highway connecting Khanewal to Shorkot.
21
The AIIB has also announced a $300 million loan for an
expansion at a hydropower project, co-financed by the World Bank.
22
Likewise, Pakistan was chosen as the
first investment for the Silk Road Fund, with a $1.65 billion investment to construct the Kohat dam on the
Jhelum River, a ‘priority project’ for CPEC.
23
China-Central Asia Economic Corridor
The size and scope of this corridor, as compared with CPEC, underscores the difficulty in realizing such
an ambitious and wide-reaching initiative. CCWAEC requires China to coordinate with actors in six states of
varying levels of development and political stability: Turkey, Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan. To emphasize the disparity among the states in this corridor, Turkey’s 2016 GDP forecast is three
times larger than the four Central Asian states combined.
24
While there are a number of shared interests between
Proceedings of International Conference on Inter-Regional Connectivity: South Asia and Central Asia 2016
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Department of Political Science / Centre of Excellence China Studies, GC University Lahore, Pakistan
China and the CCWAEC states, and several pre-existing cooperative initiatives, this corridor appears more
difficult to successfully coordinate than CPEC.
Policy Coordination
In terms of bilateral relationships, China has official diplomatic relations with each of the six states in
this corridor. It has comprehensive strategic partnerships with Iran (January 2016) and Uzbekistan (June 2016),
and strategic partnerships with Turkey (2010), Tajikistan (2013), and Kyrgyzstan (2013). In 2014 China and
Turkmenistan committed to developing their relationship to a strategic partnership by 2018. Given the resources
devoted to OBOR, it can be expected that each of the strategic partnerships will be upgraded to comprehensive
in the near future; partnership upgrades are used to emphasize the importance of diplomatic events and usually
take place during state visits.
25
As multilateral partners, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are all members of the SCO, and Iran
has observer state status while Turkey is a dialogue partner. Turkmenistan alone has no formal status within
the SCO, attending as a guest but committed to permanent neutrality since a declaration at the United Nations
in 1995, under which it does not participate in multilateral defense organizations.
One concern with policy coordination is the issue of political trust. While Sino-Iranian ties are well-
established, China and Turkey have little in the way of a shared cooperative history. Tensions with China’s
Uighur population in Xinjiang presents a potential stress point in its relations with Turkey. Central Asian states
also are reluctant to become overly reliant on relations with China, with the concern that the volume of Chinese
trade creates potential political influence, a concern for states that have a long history of being dominated by
larger neighbors. For China’s part, the Central Asian states are seen as vulnerable to terrorism and radical Islam,
and a base for Uighur separatists.
26
The recent embassy bombing in Bishkek emphasizes the Chinese concern
of security threats in the region.
Facilitates Connectivity
There is significant room for development with regards to this goal. Turkey has over $35 billion
invested in current infrastructure development projects, mostly in transportation and logistics, representing
opportunities for cooperation in emerging projects. Given China COSCO Holding Company’s recent purchase
of 67% of the Port of Piraeus in Greece, Turkey’s continued infrastructure development will be a priority for
China.
27
Iran also has significant infrastructure investment needs, and in the wake of the July 2015 Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran’s economy is expected to record 4.5% growth rates in 2016-2017, the
highest in the Middle East.
28
Chinese firms are currently involved in several Iranian transportation and energy
projects, including oil and gas fields, the Tehran-Mashhad railway, and a high speed rail connecting Tehran,
Qom and Isfahan.
29
The Central Asian states in CCWAEC are especially in need of infrastructure investment,
and Chinese companies are investing in energy and transportation projects, including the Central Asia-China
Gas Pipeline that runs through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the Kara-Balta oil refinery in Kyrgyzstan,
and highway construction projects.
30
At the same time, the nature of CCWAEC underscores the potential problems in coordinating projects
with a wide range of states. Turkey and Iran pose little in the way of infrastructure risk, whereas Central Asian
states have significant physical infrastructure needs that limit connectivity and availability of facilities required
for sourcing projects, and relatively higher legal and regulatory risk as well.
31
Unimpeded Trade
This OBOR policy goal is at a considerably less advanced stage than with CPEC. This can be attributed
to the difficulties inherent in managing relations across a group of six states rather than one. Whereas CPEC
meets this goal with a pre-existing FTA, China does not have an FTA with any state in the CCWAEC, and none
is currently under negotiation, or even under consideration.
That is not to say that there are not considerable trade relations between China and these states.
According to IMF data, the total volume of trade between China and CCWAEC states reached over $96 billion
in 2014, up from $3.7 billion in 2000. (See Table 3) Of course there is significant variation in trade among
CCWAEC states. On one end of the scale, Turkey had a GDP of $733.6 billion in 2015. On the other end are
the four Central Asian states, with a combined GDP of $115.826 billion. In between is Iran at $387.6 billion.
32
Taken as a whole, this represents a combined GDP of $1.237 trillion, more than four times greater than
An Analysis of Two Corridors Fulton
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Academic Session-2: Geopolitics of Corridors: Building Economic Linkages-I
Pakistan’s GDP of $270 billion in 2015. As a bloc, therefore, CCWAEC provides a larger potential source of
trade than CPEC, but the lack of free trade agreements means that the OBOR objective of unimpeded trade does
not yet exist within this corridor.
Table 3: China-Central West Asia Economic Corridor Volume of Trade
Year
Iran
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Tajikistan
Total
2014
51,739.32
27,779.27
9,700.18
4,393.28
2,759.46
96,371.51
2010
22,311.15
19,449.99
1,523.8
2,477
685.13
46,447.07
2005
8,588.86
7,417.62
116.75
663.25
98.2
16,884.68
2000
2,177.29
1,440.74
24
54.31
15.3
3,711.63
Source: (IMF, Direction of Trade by Country. Data for Kyrgyzstan is not available)
Financial Integration
In terms of financial integration, cooperation is at an early stage. All CCWAEC states but Turkmenistan
have joined the AIIB as founding members. Tajikistan has already been approved for funding in one of the
AIIB’s first projects, a joint project with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
Each bank has loaned $27.5 million for a project to upgrade a section of highway that connects Tajikistan’s
capital city of Dushanbe to Uzbekistan.
33
No other projects involving states in CCWAEC have been announced
by the AIIB.
With a relatively deep representation in the SCO, many opportunities exist to deepen financial
integration among its member states, with regular annual meetings for Ministers of Finance. The SCO
Development Bank is expected to facilitate this goal, although this institution is still at a nascent stage. Leaders
of SCO member states signed an agreement in 2011 to establish the Development Bank, with the expectation
that it would provide mechanisms to facilitate financing for the SCO’s strategic projects.
Conclusion
In analyzing these two economic corridors, the first conclusion to be drawn is that CPEC is already at
a more advanced stage of development. This can be attributed to three factors. First, it is a bilateral agreement
between two states with a long history of cooperation and shared interests, making the coordination of OBOR
policy objectives less complex than the multilateral CCWAEC. Second, much of the framework of CPEC was
in place when OBOR was announced, and was consistent with OBOR policy objectives, making it a relatively
easier corridor to develop. Third, that Gwadar Port is the end point of this corridor is important; China’s
economy is reliant upon Persian Gulf energy, a situation that is projected to increase. In providing a direct link
to the Strait of Hormuz, Gwadar will play an important role in China’s energy security.
The second conclusion to draw from this analysis is that CCWAEC can be expected to become a larger
focus of Chinese investment and development. This corridor has two end points: Iran, also in the Persian Gulf,
and also an important source of energy, and Turkey, providing land and maritime access to European markets.
The potential economic benefits of this corridor are significant, and it is in China’s interests to see a stable
political and economic environment in the four Central Asian states that link it to Turkey and Iran. As such,
more Chinese funding for OBOR projects in Central Asia should be anticipated.
References
1
“Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” National
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s
Republic of China, with State Council Authorization, March 28, 2015.
2
“Xi Suggests China, Central Asia Build Silk Road Economic Belt,” Xinhua, September 7, 2013.
3
“Speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Indonesian Parliament,” China Daily, October 2, 2013.
4
Ibid.
Proceedings of International Conference on Inter-Regional Connectivity: South Asia and Central Asia 2016
49
Department of Political Science / Centre of Excellence China Studies, GC University Lahore, Pakistan
5
Michael Swain, “Chinese Views and Commentary on the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative,China Leadership Monitor
47:2 (2015): 3.
6
Ibid: 3
7
Charles Clover and Lucy Hornby, “China’s Great Game: Road to a New Empire,” Financial Times, October 12, 2015.
8
Ibid
9
Swain, “Chinese Views and Commentary”: 4.
10
He Yini, “China to Invest $900b in Belt and Road Initiative,” China Daily, May 28, 2015.
11
Faseeh Mangi, “China’s New Silk Road Hinges on a Small Pakistan Port,” Bloomberg, September 30, 2016.
12
Daniel S. Markey and James West, “Behind China’s Gambit in Pakistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 12, 2016.
13
Jamal Afridi and Jayshree Bajoria, “China-Pakistan Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 6, 2010.
14
Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 118.
15
Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: 1.
16
“Quick Guide to China’s Diplomatic Levels,” South China Morning Post, January 20, 2016.
17
Peter Korzun, Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Story of Success and Expansion, Strategic Culture Foundation, June
29 2016.
18
“One Belt, One Road: An Economic Roadmap,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2016, 69.
19
CIA World Factbook: Pakistan.
20
IMF Direction of Trade, 2014.
21
Tom Mitchell and Jack Farchy, “China’s AIIB Seeks to Pave New Silk Road with First Projects,” Financial Times, April
19 2016.
22
Sue-Lin Wong, “China-led AIIB Approves $320mln in Loans to Pakistan, Myanmar Power Projects,” Reuters,
September 29 2016.
23
Ting Shi and Natalie Obiko Pearson, “China Picks Pakistan as First Stop on $40 Billion Silk Road,” Bloomberg, April
21, 2015.
24
“One Belt, One Road: An Economic Roadmap,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2016, 15.
25
Feng Zhongping and Huang Jing, “China’s Strategic Partnership Diplomacy: Engaging with a Changing World,”
European Strategic Partnerships Observatory, Working Paper 8, June 2014: 14.
26
Laura Zhou, “As China Takes Greater State in Central Asia, Rewards Bring Their Own Risk,” South China Morning
Post, September 23, 2016.
27
Nektaria Stamouli, “Greece Signs Deal to Sell Stake in Port of Piraeus to China’s COSCO,” Wall Street Journal, April
8, 2016.
28
The Economist Intelligence Unit: 50.
29
Emma Scott, “Defying Expectations: China’s Iran Trade and Investments,” Middle East Institute, April 6, 2016.
30
The Economist Intelligence Unit: 17.
31
Ibid: 20.
32
CIA World Factbook.
33
Svitlana Pyrkalo, “Road Project in Tajikistan Becomes First Joint EBRD-AIIB Investment,” European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development.
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Vector Autoregression (VAR) is a stochastic process that captures the linear interdependencies among multiple time series, and it has become a vital instrument in macroeconomics research. The trade partnership of China and Central Asia establishes a key geoeconomic transactional hub for the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI). As China presses on with its economic vision of the BRI, its immediate geographic neighbor faces a stagnant and somewhat spiraling economic behavior. This paper uses the analysis of the VAR to assess if the geoeconomic prognosis of Central Asia is significant for a plausible economic partnership with China. To establish the premise, the analysis looked at three economic indicators of the M2 money supply, government expenditure, and national exports as variables to determine the outcome of the geoeconomic prognosis. The findings were significant to show that the results were not in favour of Central Asia, despite efforts made to streamline with the vison of the BRI, but it does not deliver the level of economic confidence for a near term multilateral economic partnership.
... The Economic Corridor has the most coverage of the ancient Silk Road, which was a network of trade routes between the East and West. It consists of eight countries from different geographical zones including China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, and Turkey (Fulton, 2016). Taken together, there are more than 1.6 billion inhabitants in the area of more than 16 million square kilometers. ...
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China and Pakistan have been each other's only "all-weather friend" for decades, but the relationship remains little understood. This book recounts the history of the Sino-Pakistani axis, including details of its most sensitive aspects, such as China's dealings with the Taliban and its support for Pakistan's nuclear program. Today this relationship plays a central role in Asia's geopolitics, with ramifications for Afghanistan, India, Asia as a whole, and the West. Finally, the book discusses the dilemma China faces in maintaining its current relationship with Pakistan. It focuses on the collision between China's take-off as a great power and the rise of militant Islam - how Beijing's economic might and geostrategic ambitions are turning it into a jihadi target, and what that means not only for the West's relationship with China but also for Western policy in states such as Afghanistan, where Beijing is finally stepping up its role.
Central Asia Build Silk Road Economic Belt Speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Indonesian Parliament
  • China Xi Suggests
Xi Suggests China, Central Asia Build Silk Road Economic Belt, " Xinhua, September 7, 2013. 3 " Speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Indonesian Parliament, " China Daily, October 2, 2013.
Department of Political Science / Centre of Excellence China Studies
  • Ibid
Ibid. Department of Political Science / Centre of Excellence China Studies, GC University Lahore, Pakistan
Chinese Views and Commentary on the 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative
  • Michael Swain
Michael Swain, "Chinese Views and Commentary on the 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative," China Leadership Monitor 47:2 (2015): 3.
China's Great Game: Road to a New Empire
  • Charles Clover
  • Lucy Hornby
Charles Clover and Lucy Hornby, "China's Great Game: Road to a New Empire," Financial Times, October 12, 2015.
Chinese Views and Commentary
  • Swain
Swain, " Chinese Views and Commentary " : 4.
China to Invest $900b in Belt and Road Initiative
  • He Yini
He Yini, " China to Invest $900b in Belt and Road Initiative, " China Daily, May 28, 2015.
China's New Silk Road Hinges on a Small Pakistan Port
  • Faseeh Mangi
Faseeh Mangi, "China's New Silk Road Hinges on a Small Pakistan Port," Bloomberg, September 30, 2016.
Behind China's Gambit in Pakistan
  • S Daniel
  • James Markey
  • West
Daniel S. Markey and James West, "Behind China's Gambit in Pakistan," Council on Foreign Relations, May 12, 2016.