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The Characteristics of Directive Future Experiences and Directive Memories
Abstract
People can mentally travel to the future to "prelive" events they might experience. This ability to mentally prelive future events is closely related to the ability to mentally relive past events. People report traveling back in time to relive experiences that happened in their past in order to direct their behavior in the present, so people may imagine future experiences for similar reasons. If people use imagined future experiences to direct their behavior, how do the characteristics of these directive future experiences compare with those of directive memories? To address that question, we asked subjects to describe either an imagined future event or a remembered event that had helped them when they thought of it. We then asked each subject to rate phenomenological and memorial characteristics of his or her event, including how vivid and emotionally evocative it was, how often he or she rehearsed it, and its emotional valence. We also classified each event according to its relationship with the cultural life script (CLS). Across two experiments, we found that directive future experiences were more evocative, more frequently rehearsed, more positive, and more often drawn from the CLS than directive memories. These results suggest that, although imagined future experiences may, like memories of past experiences, serve a directive function, the characteristics of these two classes of experience are distinct. We also found that many directive memories were negative, suggesting a special role for these memories in guiding behavior. The consequences of mental time travel on behavior warrant further study. (PsycINFO Database Record
... Beyond these philosophical speculations, recent interest in the impact of time perspective on human wellbeing has been rekindled by empirical investigations motivated by the recognition that subjective wellbeing and positive affect are related to one's relationship to the temporal features of one's own life (Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999;Boniwell et al., 2010;Zhang et al., 2013a;Stolarski, 2016;Cordonnier et al., 2018;Salgado and Berntsen, 2018;Sanson et al., 2018;Jankowski et al., 2020). For instance, "mental time travel" can be used to prospectively "pre-live" events based on templates from past experiences, and in fact such future-focused mental time travel has been found to be generally more positive and evocative than mentally visiting past events to direct behavior (Sanson et al., 2018). ...
... Beyond these philosophical speculations, recent interest in the impact of time perspective on human wellbeing has been rekindled by empirical investigations motivated by the recognition that subjective wellbeing and positive affect are related to one's relationship to the temporal features of one's own life (Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999;Boniwell et al., 2010;Zhang et al., 2013a;Stolarski, 2016;Cordonnier et al., 2018;Salgado and Berntsen, 2018;Sanson et al., 2018;Jankowski et al., 2020). For instance, "mental time travel" can be used to prospectively "pre-live" events based on templates from past experiences, and in fact such future-focused mental time travel has been found to be generally more positive and evocative than mentally visiting past events to direct behavior (Sanson et al., 2018). This could be due to a positivity bias when it comes to nearterm future prospection (Salgado and Berntsen, 2018), which may arise because memories of actual events constrain our rerepresentations of the past, but not the future (Cordonnier et al., 2018). ...
Individuals with a balanced time perspective, which includes good thoughts about the past, awareness of present constraints and adaptive planning for a positive future, are more likely to report optimal wellbeing. However, people who have had traumas such as adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) are likely to have less balanced time perspectives and lower overall wellbeing when compared to those with fewer or no ACEs. Time perspective can be improved via time-travel narratives that support people in feeling connected to a wise and loving future version of themselves, an approach that has until now only been provided in counseling contexts. Our team used an iterative inclusive design process to shape a scalable time-travel narrative tool – a responsive and progressive web application called Time Machine. Among other functionalities, Time Machine allowed people to record and listen to messages as if they were from and to their past and future selves. Using pre-planned as well as post-hoc analyses, we analyzed quantitative and qualitative data from 96 paid design partners (participants) who were taken through a 26-day pilot study of the technology. Among other effects, the results revealed: (1) high engagement throughout the design process, (2) improvements in self-reported time perspective and overall wellbeing scores that were greater for those using Time Machine during an optional-use period, (3) twice as much improvement in overall wellbeing scores for design partners with high ACEs (16%) versus low ACEs (8%), and (4) feelings of unconditional love apparently mediating the relationship between scores on time perspective and overall wellbeing measures. We discuss the limitations of these results as well as implications for the future role of spiritually informed scalable time-travel narrative technologies in healthcare and wellness.
... For one thing, when people imagine events that might happen in the future, they clearly do not believe those events have happened. Yet future thoughts have profound effects on thinking and behavior (Daniel et al., 2013;Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; see also Sanson et al., 2018). Perhaps, then, the vivid phenomenological characteristics of these thoughts help drive them to serve functions. ...
People can come to “remember” experiences they never had, and these false memories—much like memories for real experiences—can serve a variety of helpful and harmful functions. Sometimes, though, people realize one of their memories is false, and retract their belief in it. These “retracted memories” continue to have many of the same phenomenological characteristics as their believed memories. But can they also continue to serve functions? Across four experiments, we asked subjects to rate the extent to which their retracted memories serve helpful and harmful functions and compared these functions with those served by “genuine” autobiographical memories. People rated their retracted memories as serving both helpful and harmful functions, much like their genuine memories. In addition, we found only weak relationships between people’s belief in their memories and the extent to which those memories served perceived functions. These results suggest memories can serve functions even in the absence of belief and highlight the potential for false memories to affect people’s thinking and behavior even after people have retracted them.
Passwords might unlock more than our computer accounts. A New York Times Magazine described anecdotes of people who infused their passwords with autobiographical information [Urbina, I. (2014, November 20). The Secret Life of Passwords. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/magazine/the-secret-life-of-passwords.html]. We suspected people infused their passwords with autobiographical information so they could privately remember that information. Across two studies we took a systematic approach to address the extent to which people infused passwords with autobiographical information and the functions that information served. We also examined the self-reported consequences of people infusing their passwords with autobiographical information. Across both studies, 41.6–71.1% of people infused their passwords with autobiographical memories; in Study 2, 9.3% of people infused their passwords with episodic future thoughts. People who infused their password with autobiographical information reported that information served identity, social, and directive functions, and they created their password to remember that information. These studies show that people do not simply use passwords to unlock their computer accounts. Some people might use passwords as mementos to cue autobiographical information.
This is an introduction to the special issue “Prospection Studies: Exploring Future-Oriented Perspectives on Consciousness.”
This article contains the argument that the human ability to travel mentally in time constitutes a discontinuity between ourselves and other animals. Mental time travel comprises the mental reconstruction of personal events from the past (episodic memory) and the mental construction of possible events in the future. It is not an isolated module, but depends on the sophistication of other cognitive capacities, including self-awareness, meta-representation, mental attribution, understanding the perception-knowledge relationship, and the ability to dissociate imagined mental states from one's present mental state. These capacities are also important aspects of so-called theory of mind, and they appear to mature in children at around age 4. Furthermore, mental time travel is generative, involving the combination and recombination of familiar elements, and in this respect may have been a precursor to language. Current evidence, although indirect or based on anecdote rather than on systematic study, suggests that nonhuman animals, including the great apes, are confined to a "present" that is limited by their current drive states. In contrast, mental time travel by humans is relatively unconstrained and allows a more rapid and flexible adaptation to complex, changing environments than is afforded by instincts or conventional learning. Past and future events loom large in much of human thinking, giving rise to cultural, religious, and scientific concepts about origins, destiny, and time itself.
Research on future thinking has emphasized how episodic details from memories are combined to create future thoughts, but has not yet examined the role of semantic scripts. In this study, participants recalled how they planned a past camping trip in Australia (past planning task) and imagined how they would plan a future camping trip (future planning task), set either in a familiar (Australia) or unfamiliar (Antarctica) context. Transcripts were segmented into information units that were coded according to semantic category (e.g., where, when, transport, material, actions). Results revealed a strong interaction between tasks and their presentation order. Starting with the past planning task constrained the future planning task when the context was familiar. Participants generated no new information when the future camping trip was set in Australia and completed second (after the past planning task). Conversely, starting with the future planning task facilitated the past planning task. Participants recalled more information units of their past plan when the past planning task was completed second (after the future planning task). These results shed new light on the role of scripts in past and future thinking and on how past and future thinking processes interact.
Although our ability to remember future simulations conveys an adaptive advantage, enabling us to better prepare for upcoming events, the factors influencing the memorability of future simulations are not clear. In this study, participants generated future simulations that combined specific people, places and objects from memory, and for each trial, made a series of phenomenological ratings about the event components and the simulation as a whole. Memory for simulations was later assessed using a cued-recall test. We used multilevel modelling to determine whether the phenomenological qualities of event components (familiarity, emotionality and significance) and simulations (detail, plausibility) were predictive of whether the simulation was successfully encoded and later accessible. Our results demonstrate that person familiarity, detail and plausibility were significant predictors of whether a given future simulation was encoded into memory and later accessible. These findings suggest that scaffolding future simulations with pre-existing episodic memories is the path to a memorable future.
The ability to mentally simulate hypothetical scenarios is a rapidly growing area of research in both psychology and neuroscience. Episodic future thought, or the ability to simulate specific personal episodes that may potentially occur in the future, represents one facet of this general capacity that continues to garner a considerable amount of interest. The purpose of this article is to elucidate current knowledge and identify a number of unresolved issues regarding this specific mental ability. In particular, this article focuses on recent research findings from neuroimaging, neuropsychology, and clinical psychology that have demonstrated a close relation between episodic future thought and the ability to remember personal episodes from one's past. On the other hand, considerations of the role of abstracted (semantic) representations in episodic future thought have been noticeably absent in the literature. The final section of this article proposes that both episodic and semantic memory play an important role in the construction of episodic future thoughts and that their interaction in this process may be determined by the relative accessibility of information in memory.
© The Author(s) 2010.
Theories hold that autobiographical memory serves several broad functions (directive, self, and social). In the current study, items were derived from the theoretical literature to create the Thinking About Life Experiences (TALE) questionnaire to empirically assess these three functions. Participants (N = 167) completed the TALE. To examine convergent validity, they also rated their overall tendency to think about and to talk about the past and completed the Reminiscence Functions Scale (Webster, 1997). The results lend support to the existence of these theoretical functions, but also offer room for refinements in future thinking about both the breadth and specificity of the functions that autobiographical memory serves.
The persuasive power of brain images has captivated scholars in many disciplines. Like others, we too were intrigued by the finding that a brain image makes accompanying information more credible (McCabe & Castel in Cognition 107:343-352, 2008). But when our attempts to build on this effect failed, we instead ran a series of systematic replications of the original study-comprising 10 experiments and nearly 2,000 subjects. When we combined the original data with ours in a meta-analysis, we arrived at a more precise estimate of the effect, determining that a brain image exerted little to no influence. The persistent meme of the influential brain image should be viewed with a critical eye.
Mental time travel (MTT) is the ability to mentally project oneself backward or forward in time in order to remember an event from one's personal past or to imagine a possible event in one's personal future. Past and future MTT share many similarities, and there is evidence to suggest that the two temporal directions rely on a shared neural network and similar cognitive structures. At the same time, one major difference between past and future MTT is that future as compared to past events generally are more emotionally positive and idyllic, suggesting that the two types of event representations may also serve different functions for emotion, self, and behavioral regulation. Here, we asked 158 participants to remember one positive and one negative event from their personal past as well as to imagine one positive and one negative event from their potential personal future and to rate the events on phenomenological characteristics. We replicated previous work regarding similarities between past and future MTT. We also found that positive events were more phenomenologically vivid than negative events. However, across most variables, we consistently found an increased effect of emotional valence for future as compared to past MTT, showing that the differences between positive and negative events were larger for future than for past events. Our findings support the idea that future MTT is biased by uncorrected positive illusions, whereas past MTT is constrained by the reality of things that have actually happened.
Despite the growing interest in future-oriented cognition in various areas of psychology, there is still little empirical data regarding the occurrence and nature of future-oriented thoughts in daily life. In this study, participants recorded future-oriented thoughts occurring in natural settings and rated their characteristics and functions. The results show that future-oriented thoughts occur frequently in daily life and can take different representational formats (more or less abstract), embrace various thematic contents (e.g. work, relationships) and serve a range of functions (e.g. action planning, decision making). The functions and characteristics of thoughts differed according to their temporal distance, with thoughts referring to the near future being more specific and serving action planning to a greater extent than thoughts concerning the far future. The characteristics of future thoughts were also related to affective content, with positive thoughts being more frequent, more specific, and associated with more visual images than negative thoughts. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Reviews evidence which suggests that there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. Ss are sometimes (a) unaware of the existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response, (b) unaware of the existence of the response, and (c) unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. It is proposed that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do so on the basis of any true introspection. Instead, their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgments about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response. This suggests that though people may not be able to observe directly their cognitive processes, they will sometimes be able to report accurately about them. Accurate reports will occur when influential stimuli are salient and are plausible causes of the responses they produce, and will not occur when stimuli are not salient or are not plausible causes. (86 ref)
People's recollections of the past are often positively biased. This bias has 2 causes. The 1st cause lies in people's perceptions of events. The authors review the results of several studies and present several new comparative analyses of these studies, all of which indicate that people perceive events in their lives to more often be pleasant than unpleasant. A 2nd cause is the fading affect bias: The affect associated with unpleasant events fades faster than the affect associated with pleasant events. The authors review the results of several studies documenting this bias and present evidence indicating that dysphoria (mild depression) disrupts such bias. Taken together, this evidence suggests that autobiographical memory represents an important exception to the theoretical claim that bad is stronger than good.
Recent neuroimaging work has demonstrated that the hippocampus is engaged when imagining the future, in some cases more than when remembering the past. It is possible that this hippocampal activation reflects recombining details into coherent scenarios and/or the encoding of these scenarios into memory for later use. However, inconsistent findings have emerged from recent studies of future simulation in patients with memory loss and hippocampal damage. Thus, it remains an open question as to whether the hippocampus is necessary for future simulation. In this review, we consider the findings from patient studies and the neuroimaging literature with respect to a new framework that highlights three component processes of simulation: accessing episodic details, recombining details, and encoding simulations. We attempt to reconcile these discrepancies between neuroimaging and patient studies by suggesting that different component processes of future simulation may be differentially affected by hippocampal damage.
Mental simulations of future experiences are often concerned with emotionally arousing events. Although it is widely believed that mental simulations enhance future behavior, virtually nothing is known about how memory for these simulations changes over time or whether simulations of emotional experiences are especially well remembered. We used a novel paradigm that combined recently developed methods for generating simulations of future events and well-established procedures for testing memory to examine the retention of positive, negative, and neutral simulations over delays of 10 min and 1 day. We found that at the longer delay, details associated with negative simulations were more difficult to remember than details associated with positive or neutral simulations. We suggest that these effects reflect the influence of the fading-affect bias, whereby negative reactions fade more quickly than positive reactions, and that this influence results in a tendency to remember a rosy simulated future. We discuss implications of our findings for individuals with affective disorders, such as depression and anxiety.
The ability to mentally simulate possible futures (episodic future thinking) is of fundamental importance for various aspects of human cognition and behavior, but precisely how humans construct mental representations of future events is still essentially unknown. We suggest that episodic future thoughts consist of transitory patterns of activation over knowledge structures at different levels of specificity, with general knowledge about the personal future (i.e., personal semantic information and anticipated general events) providing a context or frame for retrieving, integrating, and interpreting episodic details. In line with this hypothesis, Study 1 showed that the construction of episodic future thoughts is frequently a protracted generative process in which general personal knowledge is accessed before episodic details. We then explored in more detail the nature of this general personal knowledge and tested the hypothesis that it is mainly organized in terms of personal goals. Study 2 showed that cuing participants with knowledge about personal goals increased the ease of future event production during a fluency task. Study 3 further demonstrated that cuing participants with their personal goals facilitated access to episodic details during the imagination of future events. Taken together, these findings indicate that general personal knowledge and, in particular, knowledge about personal goals plays an important role in the construction of episodic future thoughts.
Differences between positive and negative autobiographical memories are often explained with reference to hypothesized evolutionary functions. Generally, it has been proposed that autobiographical memory serves directive, self-, and social functions. However, the relationship between emotional valence and the three functions has never been studied. In Study 1, participants generated memories that mapped onto each of the three functions. Directive memories were dominated by negative emotion, whereas self- and social memories were dominated by positive emotion. In Study 2, participants generated their most positive and most negative memories, as well as their most frequent involuntary and most vivid flashbulb memories, and the three functions were measured through rating-scale questions. The directive function had the lowest ratings across all memory classes, but, consistent with the results of Study 1, positive memories were rated higher on the self- and social functions, whereas negative memories were rated higher on the directive function.
Life scripts are culturally shared expectations about the order and timing of life events in a prototypical life course. American and Danish undergraduates produced life story events and life scripts by listing the seven most important events in their own lives and in the lives of hypothetical people living ordinary lives. They also rated their events on several scales and completed measures of depression, PTSD symptoms, and centrality of a negative event to their lives. The Danish life script replicated earlier work; the American life script showed minor differences from the Danish life script, apparently reflecting genuine differences in shared events as well as less homogeneity in the American sample. Both consisted of mostly positive events that came disproportionately from ages 15 to 30. Valence of life story events correlated with life script valence, depression, PTSD symptoms, and identity. In the Danish undergraduates, measures of life story deviation from the life script correlated with measures of depression and PTSD symptoms.
One hundred fifteen undergraduates rated 15 word-cued memories and their 3 most negatively stressful, 3 most positive, and 7 most important events and completed tests of personality and depression. Eighty-nine also recorded involuntary memories online for 1 week. In the first 3-way comparisons needed to test existing theories, comparisons were made of memories of stressful events versus control events and involuntary versus voluntary memories in people high versus low in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptom severity. For all participants, stressful memories had more emotional intensity, more frequent voluntary and involuntary retrieval, but not more fragmentation. For all memories, participants with greater PTSD symptom severity showed the same differences. Involuntary memories had more emotional intensity and less centrality to the life story than voluntary memories. Meeting the diagnostic criteria for traumatic events had no effect, but the emotional responses to events did. In 533 undergraduates, correlations among measures were replicated and the Negative Intensity factor of the Affect Intensity Measure correlated with PTSD symptom severity. No special trauma mechanisms were needed to account for the results, which are summarized by the autobiographical memory theory of PTSD.
Two studies explored potential bases for reality monitoring (Johnson & Raye, 1981) of naturally occurring autobiographical events. In Study 1, subjects rated phenomenal characteristics of recent and childhood memories. Compared with imagined events, perceived events were given higher ratings on several characteristics, including perceptual information, contextual information, and supporting memories. This was especially true for recent memories. In Study 2, subjects described how they knew autobiographical events had (or had not) happened. For perceived events, subjects were likely to mention perceptual and contextual details of the memory and to refer to other supporting memories. For imagined events, subjects were likely to engage in reasoning based on prior knowledge. The results are consistent with the idea that reality monitoring draws on differences in qualitative characteristics of memories for perceived and imagined events (Johnson & Raye, 1981) and augment findings from more controlled laboratory studies of complex events (Johnson & Suengas, in press; Suengas & Johnson, 1988).
The authors provide an overview of the literature on the ability of response expectancies to elicit automatic responses in the form of self-fulfilling prophecies and link it to the broader psychological investigation of automatic processes. The authors review 3 areas of research in which response expectancies have been shown to affect experience, behavior, and physiology: placebo effects, the effects of false biofeedback on sexual arousal, and the alteration of perceptual and cognitive functions by hypnotic and nonhypnotic suggestion. Also reviewed are data suggesting that all behavior, including novel and intentional behavior, is initiated automatically. Following this review, the authors summarize some of the ways in which knowledge of response expectancy effects and other automatic processes that influence experience and behavior can enhance clinical practice.
In three experiments, undergraduates rated autobiographical memories on scales derived from existing theories of memory. In multiple regression analyses, ratings of the degree to which subjects recollected (i.e., relived) their memories were predicted by visual imagery, auditory imagery, and emotions, whereas ratings of belief in the accuracy of their memories were predicted by knowledge of the setting. Recollection was predicted equally well in between- and within-subjects analyses, but belief consistently had smaller correlations and multiple regression predictions between subjects; individual differences in the cognitive scales that we measured could not account well for individual differences in belief. In contrast, measures of mood (Beck Depression Index) and dissociation (Dissociative Experience Scale) added predictive value for belief, but not for recollection. We also found that highly relived memories almost always had strong visual images and that remember/know judgments made on autobiographical memories were more closely related to belief than to recollection.
Three classes of evidence demonstrate the existence of life scripts, or culturally shared representations of the timing of major transitional life events. First, a reanalysis of earlier studies on age norms shows an increase in the number of transitional events between the ages of 15 and 30 years, and these events are associated with narrower age ranges and more positive emotion than events outside this period. Second, 1,485 Danes estimated how old hypothetical centenarians were when they had been happiest, saddest, most afraid, most in love, and had their most important and most traumatic experiences. Only the number of positive events showed an increase between the ages of 15 and 30 years. Third, undergraduates generated seven important events that were likely to occur in the life of a newborn. Pleasantness and whether events were expected to occur between the ages of 15 and 30 years predicted how frequently events were recorded. Life scripts provide an alternative explanation of the reminiscence bump. Emphasis is on culture, not individuals.
The field of autobiographical memory has made dramatic advances since the first collection of papers in the area was published in 1986. Now, over 25 years on, this book reviews and integrates the many theories, perspectives, and approaches that have evolved over the last decades. A truly eminent collection of editors and contributors appraise the basic neural systems of autobiographical memory; its underlying cognitive structures and retrieval processes; how it develops in infancy and childhood, and then breaks down in aging; its social and cultural aspects; and its relation to personality and the self. Autobiographical memory has demonstrated a strong ability to establish clear empirical generalizations, and has shown its practical relevance by deepening our understanding of several clinical disorders - as well as the induction of false memories in the legal system. It has also become an important topic for brain studies, and helped to enlarge our general understanding of the brain.
Episodic memory refers to a complex and multifaceted process which enables the retrieval of richly detailed evocative memories from the past. In contrast, semantic memory is conceptualized as the retrieval of general conceptual knowledge divested of a specific spa-tiotemporal context. The neural substrates of the episodic and semantic memory systems have been dissociated in healthy individuals during functional imaging studies, and in clinical cohorts, leading to the prevailing view that episodic and semantic memory represent functionally distinct systems subtended by discrete neurobiological substrates. Importantly, however, converging evidence focusing on widespread neural networks now points to significant overlap between those regions essential for retrieval of autobiographical memories, episodic learning, and semantic processing. Here we review recent advances in episodic memory research focusing on neurodegenerative populations which has proved revelatory for our understanding of the complex interplay between episodic and semantic memory. Whereas episodic memory research has traditionally focused on retrieval of autobiographical events from the past, we also include evidence from the recent paradigm shift in which episodic memory is viewed as an adaptive and constructive process which facilitates the imagining of possible events in the future. We examine the available evidence which converges to highlight the pivotal role of semantic memory in providing schemas and meaning whether one is engaged in autobiographical retrieval for the past, or indeed, is endeavoring to construct a plausible scenario of an event in the future. It therefore seems plausible to contend that semantic processing may underlie most, if not all, forms of episodic memory, irrespective of temporal condition.
This is the first book to introduce the new statistics—effect sizes, confidence intervals, and meta-analysis-in an accessible way. It is chock full of practical examples and tips on how to analyze and report research results using these techniques. The book is invaluable to readers interested in meeting the new APA Publication Manual guidelines by adopting the new statistics—which are more informative than null hypothesis significance testing, and becoming widely used in many disciplines. This highly accessible book is intended as the core text for any course that emphasizes the new statistics, or as a supplementary text for graduate and/or advanced undergraduate courses in statistics and research methods in departments of psychology, education, human development, nursing, and natural, social, and life sciences. Researchers and practitioners interested in understanding the new statistics, and future published research, will also appreciate this book. A basic familiarity with introductory statistics
Prospection-the ability to represent what might happen in the future-is a broad concept that has been used to characterize a wide variety of future-oriented cognitions, including affective forecasting, prospective memory, temporal discounting, episodic simulation, and autobiographical planning. In this article, we propose a taxonomy of prospection to initiate the important and necessary process of teasing apart the various forms of future thinking that constitute the landscape of prospective cognition. The organizational framework that we propose delineates episodic and semantic forms of four modes of future thinking: simulation, prediction, intention, and planning. We show how this framework can be used to draw attention to the ways in which various modes of future thinking interact with one another, generate new questions about prospective cognition, and illuminate our understanding of disorders of future thinking. We conclude by considering basic cognitive processes that give rise to prospective cognitions, cognitive operations and emotional/motivational states relevant to future-oriented cognition, and the possible role of procedural or motor systems in future-oriented behavior.
College students who do not have parents with 4-year degrees (first-generation students) earn lower grades and encounter more obstacles to success than do students who have at least one parent with a 4-year degree (continuing-generation students). In the study reported here, we tested a novel intervention designed to reduce this social-class achievement gap with a randomized controlled trial (N = 168). Using senior college students' real-life stories, we conducted a difference-education intervention with incoming students about how their diverse backgrounds can shape what they experience in college. Compared with a standard intervention that provided similar stories of college adjustment without highlighting students' different backgrounds, the difference-education intervention eliminated the social-class achievement gap by increasing first-generation students' tendency to seek out college resources (e.g., meeting with professors) and, in turn, improving their end-of-year grade point averages. The difference-education intervention also improved the college transition for all students on numerous psychosocial outcomes (e.g., mental health and engagement).
Research on future episodic thought has produced compelling theories and results in cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and clinical psychology. In experiments aimed to integrate these with basic concepts and methods from autobiographical memory research, 76 undergraduates remembered past and imagined future positive and negative events that had or would have a major impact on them. Correlations of the online ratings of visual and auditory imagery, emotion, and other measures demonstrated that individuals used the same processes to the same extent to remember past and construct future events. These measures predicted the theoretically important metacognitive judgment of past reliving and future "preliving" in similar ways. On standardized tests of reactions to traumatic events, scores for future negative events were much higher than scores for past negative events. The scores for future negative events were in the range that would qualify for a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD); the test was replicated (n = 52) to check for order effects. Consistent with earlier work, future events had less sensory vividness. Thus, the imagined symptoms of future events were unlikely to be caused by sensory vividness. In a second experiment, to confirm this, 63 undergraduates produced numerous added details between 2 constructions of the same negative future events; deficits in rated vividness were removed with no increase in the standardized tests of reactions to traumatic events. Neuroticism predicted individuals' reactions to negative past events but did not predict imagined reactions to future events. This set of novel methods and findings is interpreted in the contexts of the literatures of episodic future thought, autobiographical memory, PTSD, and classic schema theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved).
Describes laboratory and clinical attempts to relate different memory systems (procedural, semantic, and episodic) to corresponding varieties of consciousness (anoetic, noetic, and autonoetic). The case of a young adult male amnesic patient is described. The S suffered a closed head injury that left him without autonoetic consciousness. This deficit is manifested in his amnesia for personal events and his impaired awareness of subjective time. Two simple experiments investigated recall and recognition by a total of 89 normal undergraduates to further examine autonoetic consciousness as the necessary correlate of episodic memory. Results show that the distinction between knowing and remembering previous occurrences of events is meaningful to people, that people can make corresponding judgments about their memory performance, and that these judgments vary systematically with the conditions under which retrieved information takes place. (French abstract) (71 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Memories of specific life episodes, termed
personal event memories, have only recently become a focus of systematic research. In this article, memories of momentous events are analyzed from a functional perspective. First, personal event memory is defined. Second, research on the temporal organization of specific memories across the life span is described. Third, psychological functions served by remembering momentous events are illustrated. Fourth, variations in the structure and content of autobiographical memory are identified. Finally, potential connections to clinical and educational practice are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Twenty years after Baddeley admonished memory researchers to examine the real-world relevance of their findings, research has informed a wide range of practical issues and it is increasingly guided by analyses of memory functions. Although broadly defined social, self and directive functional categories have provided an initial organizational framework for autobiographical memory research, the functional agenda will benefit from conceptual and methodological refinements and innovations. An especially valuable research strategy targets specific functions in carefully defined experimental and practical contexts. Promising research directions include comparing functions served by positive versus negative memories, tracking the early development of memory functions, and exploring individual and group differences. Although reconstructive memory processes contribute to inaccuracies in reproducing the past, functional analysis instead highlights the adaptive value of a flexible and constructive memory system. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
False memories, or memories for events that never occurred, have been documented in the real world and in the laboratory. In the real world, false memories involving trauma and abuse have resulted in real-life consequences. In the laboratory, researchers have just begun to study the consequences of false memories. We review this laboratory-based work and show how false memories for food-related experiences (e.g., becoming ill after eating egg salad) can lead to attitudinal and behavioral consequences (e.g., lowered self-reported preference for and decreased consumption of egg salad).
© 2009 Association for Psychological Science.
Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is a relatively new website that contains the major elements required to conduct research: an integrated participant compensation system; a large participant pool; and a streamlined process of study design, participant recruitment, and data collection. In this article, we describe and evaluate the potential contributions of MTurk to psychology and other social sciences. Findings indicate that (a) MTurk participants are slightly more demographically diverse than are standard Internet samples and are significantly more diverse than typical American college samples; (b) participation is affected by compensation rate and task length, but participants can still be recruited rapidly and inexpensively; (c) realistic compensation rates do not affect data quality; and (d) the data obtained are at least as reliable as those obtained via traditional methods. Overall, MTurk can be used to obtain high-quality data inexpensively and rapidly.
© The Author(s) 2011.
Research has demonstrated that imagination can be used to affect behaviour and also to distort memory, yet few studies have examined whether the effects of imagination on behavioural estimates and memory are related. In two experiments, the effects of imagination on self-reported behaviour and subsequent memory for that behaviour were investigated. A comparison of behavioural estimates collected before and after imagination demonstrated that reported estimates of behaviour changed after imagination. In addition, memory for the original estimates of behaviour was also affected, suggesting that imagination may impair one's ability to remember originally reported behaviour. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the observed changes in reported behaviour were accompanied by the largest errors in memory for originally reported behaviour when participants generate images based on self-relevant scenarios. On the other hand, memory distortion was minimized when participants read but did not imagine self-relevant scenarios. These results have direct application to clinicians and researchers who employ imagination techniques as behavioural modifiers, and suggest that techniques that are self-relevant but do not include imagery may be a useful alternative to imagination. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Memory for the emotions evoked by past events guides people's ongoing behaviour and future plans. Evidence indicates that emotions are represented in at least two forms in memory with different properties. Explicit memories of emotion can be retrieved deliberately, in a flexible manner, across situations. Implicit memories of emotion Lire brought to mind automatically by cues resembling the context in which an emotional event occurred. One property they share, however, is that both types of memory are Subject to forgetting and bias over time as people's goals and appraisals of past emotional events change. This article reviews the cognitive and motivational mechanisms that underlie stability and change in memory for emotion. We also address functions that remembering and misremembering emotion may serve for individuals and groups. Although memory bias is typically viewed as problematic, changes in representations of emotional experience often promote goal-directed behaviour and facilitate coping with challenging situations. Copyright (C) 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Participants are not always as diligent in reading and following instructions as experimenters would like them to be. When participants fail to follow instructions, this increases noise and decreases the validity of their data. This paper presents and validates a new tool for detecting participants who are not following instructions – the Instructional manipulation check (IMC). We demonstrate how the inclusion of an IMC can increase statistical power and reliability of a dataset.
The role of the hippocampus in imagining the future has been of considerable interest. Preferential right hippocampal engagement is observed for imagined future events relative to remembered past events, and patients with hippocampal damage are impaired when imagining detailed future events. However, some patients with hippocampal damage are not impaired at imagining, suggesting that there are conditions in which the hippocampus may not be necessary for episodic simulation. Given the known hippocampal role in memory encoding, the hippocampal activity associated with imagining may reflect the encoding of simulations rather than event construction per se. The present functional (f)MRI study investigated this possibility. Participants imagined future events in response to person, place, and object cues. A postscan cued-recall test probing memory for detail sets classified future events as either successfully encoded or not. A contrast of successfully versus unsuccessfully encoded events revealed anterior and posterior right hippocampal clusters. When imagined events were successfully encoded, both anterior and posterior hippocampus showed common functional connectivity to a network including parahippocampal gyrus, medial parietal and cingulate cortex, and medial prefrontal cortex. However, when encoding was unsuccessful, only the anterior hippocampus, and not the posterior, exhibited this pattern of connectivity. These findings demonstrate that right hippocampal activity observed during future simulation may reflect the encoding of the simulations into memory. This function is not essential for constructing coherent scenarios and may explain why some patients with hippocampal damage are still able to imagine the future.
Mental simulation provides a window on the future by enabling people to envision possibilities and develop plans for bringing those possibilities about. In moving oneself from a current situation toward an envisioned future one, the anticipation and management of emotions and the initiation and maintenance of problem-solving activities are fundamental tasks. In the program of research described in this article, mental simulation of the process for reaching a goal or of the dynamics of an unfolding stressful event produced progress in achieving those goals or resolving those events. Envisioning successful completion of a goal or resolution of a stressor--recommendations derived from the self-help literature--did not. Discussion centers on the characteristics of effective and ineffective mental simulations and their relation to self-regulatory processes.
The reminiscence bump-the reporting of more memories from young adulthood than from other stages of life-is considered a hallmark of autobiographical memory research. The most prevalent explanations for this effect assume that events in young adulthood are favored because of the way they are encoded and maintained in long-term memory. Here we show that a similar increase of events in early adulthood is found when children narrate their personal futures. In Study 1, children wrote their future life stories. The events in these life stories were mostly life-script events, and their distribution showed a clear bump in young adulthood. In Study 2, children were prompted by word cues to write down events from their future lives. The events generated consisted mostly of non-life-script events, and those events did not show a bump in young adulthood. Our findings challenge prevailing explanations of the reminiscence bump and suggest that the cultural life script forms an overarching organizational principle for autobiographical memories and future representations across the life span.
Episodic future thinking is a projection of the self into the future to mentally preexperience an event. Previous work has shown striking similarities between autobiographical memory and episodic future thinking in response to various experimental manipulations. This has nurtured the idea of a shared neurocognitive system underlying both processes. Here, undergraduates generated autobiographical memories and future event representations in response to cue words and requests for important events and rated their characteristics. Important and word-cued events differed markedly on almost all measures. Past, as compared with future, events were rated as more sensorially vivid and less relevant to life story and identity. However, in contrast to previous work, these main effects were qualified by a number of interactions, suggesting important functional differences between the two temporal directions. For both temporal directions, sensory imagery dropped, whereas self-narrative importance and reference to normative cultural life script events increased with increasing temporal distance.
The classical tripartite concept of time divided into past/present/future components, has been applied to the analysis of the functional cerebral substrate of conscious awareness. Attempts have been made to localize and to separate the neuronal machineries which are responsible for the experience of a past, a present, and a future. One's experience of a past is obviously related to one's memories. Memory mechanisms (in the conventional sense) have a well known functional relation to superficial and deep parts of the temporal lobe. Some such mechanisms presumably have a more widespread distribution. The experience of a present or a "Now-situation" is mediated by the sensory input. This input also exerts a role for conscious awareness of an inner Now-situation, independent of current afferent impulses, as shown by numerous observations on sensory deprivation. The main discussion is devoted to the experience of a future. Evidence is summarized that the frontal/prefrontal cortex handles the temporal organization of behaviour and cognition, and that the same structures house the action programs or plans for future behaviour and cognition. As these programs can be retained and recalled, they might be termed "memories of the future". It is suggested that they form the basis for anticipation and expectation as well as for the short and long-term planning of a goal-directed behavioural and cognitive repertoire. This repertoire for future use is based upon experiences of past events and the awareness of a Now-situation, and it is continuously rehearsed and optimized. Lesions or dysfunctions of the frontal/prefrontal cortex give rise to states characterized by a "loss of future", with consequent indifference, inactivity, lack of ambition, and inability to foresee the consequences of one's future behaviour. It is concluded that the prefrontal cortex is responsible for the temporal organization of behaviour and cognition due to its seemingly specific capacity to handle serial information and to extract causal relations from such information. Possibly the serial action programs which are stored in the prefrontal cortex are also used by the brain as templates for extracting meaningful (serial) information from the enormous, mainly non-serial, random, sensory noise to which the brain is constantly exposed. Without a "memory of the future" such an extraction cannot take place.
Loss of memory for the characteristics of stimuli (i.e., forgetting of stimulus attributes) can lead to increases in behavior, a consequence quite different from the impairments associated with the forgetting of responses. Evidence from animal and human research for the forgetting of stimuli as a distinct memory principle is presented, and the methodological and conceptual implications of this pervasive type of memory loss are considered. Malleability of eyewitness memory, cognitive confusions, sleeper and familiarity effects, and temporal distortions in inferences and attributions are among the varied behavioral phenomena that can be accounted for in terms of forgetting of stimulus attributes.
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▪ Abstract Episodic memory is a neurocognitive (brain/mind) system, uniquely different from other memory systems, that enables human beings to remember past experiences. The notion of episodic memory was first proposed some 30 years ago. At that time it was defined in terms of materials and tasks. It was subsequently refined and elaborated in terms of ideas such as self, subjective time, and autonoetic consciousness. This chapter provides a brief history of the concept of episodic memory, describes how it has changed (indeed greatly changed) since its inception, considers criticisms of it, and then discusses supporting evidence provided by (a) neuropsychological studies of patterns of memory impairment caused by brain damage, and (b) functional neuroimaging studies of patterns of brain activity of normal subjects engaged in various memory tasks. I also suggest that episodic memory is a true, even if as yet generally unappreciated, marvel of nature.
Classical conditioning is included as a component in the response expectancy model of placebo responding. Though introspectable when attention is drawn to them, expectancies need not be in awareness while guiding behavior. Most placebo effects are linked to expectancies, and classical conditioning is one factor (but not the only factor) by which these expectancies can be produced and altered. Conditioned placebo effects without expectancies exist but are relatively rare in humans. The adaptive advantage of cognition is increased response flexibility. For it to convey that benefit, however, it must be capable of overriding the influence of simpler automatic processes. Thus, the higher up the phylogenetic scale, the smaller the role of nonconscious conditioning processes and the larger the role of cognition.
People can consciously re-experience past events and pre-experience possible future events. This fMRI study examined the neural regions mediating the construction and elaboration of past and future events. Participants were cued with a noun for 20s and instructed to construct a past or future event within a specified time period (week, year, 5-20 years). Once participants had the event in mind, they made a button press and for the remainder of the 20s elaborated on the event. Importantly, all events generated were episodic and did not differ on a number of phenomenological qualities (detail, emotionality, personal significance, field/observer perspective). Conjunction analyses indicated the left hippocampus was commonly engaged by past and future event construction, along with posterior visuospatial regions, but considerable neural differentiation was also observed during the construction phase. Future events recruited regions involved in prospective thinking and generation processes, specifically right frontopolar cortex and left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, respectively. Furthermore, future event construction uniquely engaged the right hippocampus, possibly as a response to the novelty of these events. In contrast to the construction phase, elaboration was characterized by remarkable overlap in regions comprising the autobiographical memory retrieval network, attributable to the common processes engaged during elaboration, including self-referential processing, contextual and episodic imagery. This striking neural overlap is consistent with findings that amnesic patients exhibit deficits in both past and future thinking, and confirms that the episodic system contributes importantly to imagining the future.
It has recently been observed that the brain network supporting recall of episodic memories shares much in common with other cognitive functions such as episodic future thinking, navigation and theory of mind. It has been speculated that 'self-projection' is the key common process. However, in this Opinion article, we note that other functions (e.g. imagining fictitious experiences) not explicitly connected to either the self or a subjective sense of time, activate a similar brain network. Hence, we argue that the process of 'scene construction' is better able to account for the commonalities in the brain areas engaged by an extended range of disparate functions. In light of this, we re-evaluate our understanding of episodic memory, the processes underpinning it and other related cognitive functions.
In a dynamic world, mechanisms allowing prediction of future situations can provide a selective advantage. We suggest that memory systems differ in the degree of flexibility they offer for anticipatory behavior and put forward a corresponding taxonomy of prospection. The adaptive advantage of any memory system can only lie in what it contributes for future survival. The most flexible is episodic memory, which we suggest is part of a more general faculty of mental time travel that allows us not only to go back in time, but also to foresee, plan, and shape virtually any specific future event. We review comparative studies and find that, in spite of increased research in the area, there is as yet no convincing evidence for mental time travel in nonhuman animals. We submit that mental time travel is not an encapsulated cognitive system, but instead comprises several subsidiary mechanisms. A theater metaphor serves as an analogy for the kind of mechanisms required for effective mental time travel. We propose that future research should consider these mechanisms in addition to direct evidence of future-directed action. We maintain that the emergence of mental time travel in evolution was a crucial step towards our current success.
Episodic future thinking
- C M Atance
- D K Neill
Atance, C.M., & O'Neill, D.K. (2001). Episodic future thinking. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5,
533-539. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01804-0