Conference PaperPDF Available

Identifying a Connection between Transparent Lobbying and Quality of Democracy

Authors:

Abstract

Considering the core of democratic principles – freedom, equality, and control, one of the relevant dimensions of quality of democracy is participation. Creating opportunities for individuals and groups to talk to policy and decision makers and legislators is a part of the democratic process by which policy is formulated, implemented and tested. But some of these influences might have greater access to policy makers due to their bigger economic power. Some groups or individuals try to act/lobby behind closed doors and in secret. The problem of lack of transparent lobbying – lobbying by the rules – is closely related to decreased equality of access by voices representative of a wide range of interests to public decision-making. Similarly, formal institutions in the form of rules as well as the balance of political forces in society are considered to be endogenous, because they are chosen within the society. When selecting them, conflict of interests between different groups and individuals can be expected. Thus, there is a danger that institutions can develop to the benefit of stronger groups at the expense of others. A transparent environment where groups negotiate and transparency in the promotion of diverse interests – transparent lobbying – can significantly reduce this risk. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the connection between transparent lobbying and quality of democracy, in other words to investigate the influence of transparent lobbying on the process of democratization.
Šárka Laboutková
1
Technical University of Liberec, Faculty of Economic, Department of Economic
Studentská 1402/2, 461 17 Liberec 1, Czech Republic
email: sarka.laboutkova@tul.cz
Identifying a Connection between Transparent Lobbying
and Quality of Democracy
Abstract
Considering the core of democratic principles freedom, equality, and control, one of the
relevant dimensions of quality of democracy is participation. Creating opportunities for
individuals and groups to talk to policy and decision makers and legislators is a part of
the democratic process by which policy is formulated, implemented and tested. But some
of these influences might have greater access to policy makers due to their bigger
economic power. Some groups or individuals try to act/lobby behind closed doors and in
secret. The problem of lack of transparent lobbying lobbying by the rules is closely
related to decreased equality of access by voices representative of a wide range of
interests to public decision-making. Similarly, formal institutions in the form of rules as
well as the balance of political forces in society are considered to be endogenous, because
they are chosen within the society. When selecting them, conflict of interests between
different groups and individuals can be expected. Thus, there is a danger that institutions
can develop to the benefit of stronger groups at the expense of others. A transparent
environment where groups negotiate and transparency in the promotion of diverse
interests transparent lobbying can significantly reduce this risk. Therefore, it is
necessary to identify the connection between transparent lobbying and quality of
democracy, in other words to investigate the influence of transparent lobbying on the
process of democratization.
Key Words
Lobbying, transparency, quality of democracy, participation, decision-making
JEL Classification: P16, D72
Introduction
Free and open access to government is necessary for a functioning democracy. But some
individuals or organizations have greater access to policy makers due to their bigger
economic power. The power of private actors and the balance between individual interests
1
Suggested citation: Laboutková, Š. Identifying a Connection between Transparent Lobbying and Quality of
Democracy. In: Kocourek,A. (ed.) Proceedings of the 13th Liberec Economic Forum 2017. Liberec: Technical
University of Liberec, 2017, pp. 439-446. ISBN 978-80-7494-349-2.
and the public good is a central question of democratic theory. Since Dahl (1971)
suggested his minimalist concept of quality of democracy contestation and participation,
there have been identified more of relevant dimensions to measure the quality of
democracy, e.g. Collier and Levitesky (1997) expanded the root concept of quality-of-
democracy-indices for the link between citizens and their representatives; Diamond and
Morlino (2004) pointed out eight categories: rule of law, vertical and horizontal
accountability, participation, competition, responsiveness, freedom and equality; Pickel,
Stark and Breustedt (2015) added the public sphere, mutual constraints of constitutional
powers, governmental capability, transparency, and representation, which further specify
the core dimensions. Bühlmann et al. (2012) and Marshall et al. (2014) have suggested a
wider range of procedures and structures that drive elite decision-making between
elections like actions of interest and civil society groups. Lauth (2016) pointed out three
core dimensions of democracy freedom, equality and control in which citizens/civil
society groups play a crucial role, although the conceptualization of the citizen component
of democratic quality is severely underdeveloped in existing research (Mayne and Geissel,
2016: 635). The dimension of freedom means both to demonstrate individual preferences
in free and fair elections and the opportunity for continuing political participation (Lauth,
2016), which is based on free competition of different interests. From the political equality
point of view Lauth (2016: 608) stresses, that “…it enables all citizens to participate in a fair
and effective way in all formal institutions needed for the democratic process”. According to
him fairness means the equal and effective exercise of civil and political rights regardless
of social status, gender, or ethnicity”; it is necessary to add regardless of economic power.
And he asks: Do all citizens have the same opportunity to exercise their rights?” To be able
to answer the question, it is important to fulfil the third core dimension of democracy
control, which integrates both vertical and horizontal accountability. Transparency is an
important prerequisite for implementing political accountability (e.g., Halachmi and
Greiling, 2013). Similarly, it is possible to reach the same conclusion about the necessity of
transparency for strengthening quality of democracy through acting of citizens/civil
society groups/interest groups in the political process. One of the legitimate activities to
promote interests is lobbying. The problem of lack of transparent lobbying is closely
related to increased inequality of access by voices representative of a wide range of
interests to public decision-making. Equality of access as one of the dimensions of quality
of democracy is important in enabling decision makers to act and take decisions
impartially, fairly and without discrimination. Inclusive participation, representation, and
transparency are required to reach political equality (Bühlmann et al., 2012: 521).
However, transparency is a rarely mentioned category in the research literature on
measuring the quality of democracy. The aim of this article is to identify the connection
between transparent lobbying and quality of democracy, find the common elements and
stress the importance of influence of transparency in lobbying on already existing
measures of quality of democracy.
1. Material and Methods
First, after the defining of basic terms, I will identify the relations between transparent
lobbying and dimensions of quality of democracy. The explanatory method deduction
will be used for this purpose. Then I will briefly introduce the most common measures of
quality of democracy and analyze its indicators in terms of transparency requirements. I
will conclude with implications and suggestions of the research results for the study of the
importance transparent lobbying for the democratization process.
Generally, the transparency in the public sector is defined as a mechanism that reduces
information asymmetry and therefore adverse selection. The term of transparency reflects
the level of disclosure and clarity of information (e.g., Madhavan, Porter and Weaver, 2005)
on one side, and accuracy, quality and political relevance on the other side (e.g., Granados,
Gupta, and Kauffman, 2006).
Lobbying means any direct or indirect communication with a public official that is made,
managed or directed with the purpose of influencing public decision-making and is
understood as a legitimate way of interest representation in a pluralistic conception of
liberal democracies. The Transparency International (TI 2015) focuses on three critical and
inter-related elements of lobbying performance: transparency whether interactions
between lobbyists and public officials are made transparent and open to public scrutiny;
integrity whether there are clear and enforceable rules on ethical conduct for both
lobbyists and public officials; and equality of access how open is public decision-making
to a plurality of voices representative of a wide range of interests. Lobbying is often
understood as a two-way exchange of information: while lobbyists present the opinions
and arguments of their clients recipients of lobbying public officials present the
opinions of their offices or their superiors, which also express the status of their knowledge
about the problem and induce a willingness to accept the possibility of a solution. This two-
way exchange of information should be carried out in a transparent manner. According to
Stiglitz (1999) information gathered by public officials at public expense is owned by the
public. He adds that there are two traditional arguments for transparency: opacity
provides first some insulation against being accused of making a mistake and/or of acting
in an interest other than public interest, and second the opportunity for special interests to
act in their own favour with greater influence (in return for any remuneration like the
funding of political parties etc.). “But if these actions in support of special interest groups are
subject to public scrutiny, the scope for favouritism is greatly circumscribed. and he
concludes that Secrecy is the bedrock of this persistent form of corruption, which undermines
confidence in democratic governments in so much of the world.” (Stiglitz, 1999: 11). Thus
lobbying transparency is needed in order to level the playing field for the framework
design of fair lobbying, and moreover also in respect of a broader scope of a level playing
field of the decision-making process and equal access. A high level of transparency in the
political process is required (Lauth, 2016: 610).
Based on these assumptions, it is possible to deduce that transparency of lobbying, i.e.
transparency of interactions between decision-makers (public body) and interests
(lobbyists) is linked to the core dimensions of quality of democracy, particularly equality
and control. Freedom is connected rather with the activities carried out within the
framework of constitutional guarantees. From this perspective, it is necessary to
distinguish the lobbying activities from other legitimate activities in liberal democracies as
expression of opinion, the right of petition, the right to campaign for political change, a
change in legislation, policies or practices within legitimate political activities, whether it is
done individually or collectively.
Measuring the quality of consolidated democracies is a young yet very dynamic field of
research, with the number of indices growing considerably (Geissel, Kneuer and Lauth,
2016: 571). The most used measures and their dimensions are listed and described in
Table 1.
Tab. 1: Measures of quality of democracy
Name of the
Indicator
Author
Dimensions/Principles
Transparency of decision making process-
related sub indicators
Freedom in
the World
(FH)
Freedom
House
Political Rights
Civil Liberties
Functioning of Government
Associational and Organizational Rights
Rule of Law
Democracy
Index (EIU)
Economic
Intelligent Unit
Electoral Process and
Pluralism
Civil Liberties
The Functioning of
Government
Political
Participation
Political Culture
Transparency in the process of financing
political parties
Exercise of significant political power of
special economic, religious or other
powerful domestic groups
Sufficient mechanism and institutions in
place for ensuring government
accountability
Open and transparent functioning of
government with sufficient public access
to information
Citizens’ engagement with politics
Democracy
Barometer
(DB)
Bühlmann et
al.
Freedom
Control
Equality
Willingness for transparent
communication
Government decisions are effectively
implemented.
Existence of provision for disclosure of
income by political parties.
Existence of provision for public
disclosure of expenditure by political
parties.
Restriction of freedom of information /
barriers for access to official information.
Effectiveness of Freedom of Information
laws.
Equality of participation
Varieties of
Democracy
Project (V-
Dem)
Coppedge et al.
Electoral
Liberal
Participatory
Majoritarian
Consensual
Deliberative
Egalitarian
Civil society participation index
Equal protection index
Political equality comments
WJP Open
Government
World Justice
Project
Publicized Laws and
Government Data
Publicized laws and government data
Information requests quality;
Index (WJP)
Right to Information
Civic Participation
Complaint
Mechanism
timeliness; affordability and trust;
general accessibility of information
Right to petition and civic engagement
Complaint mechanisms
Sustainable
Governance
Indicators
(SGI)
Schraad-
Tischler et al.
Policy Performance
Quality of Democracy
Executive Capacity
Executive
Accountability
Party financing
Popular decision-making
Access to government information
Legal Certainty
Judicial Review
Corruption prevention
Scholarly advice
Quality of RIA Process
Negotiating Public Support
Policy knowledge
Associations competence
Source: Bühlmann et al. (2012), Economic Intelligent Unit (2017), Freedom House (2017), Coppedge. et al.
(2016), World Justice Project. (2015), Schraad-Tischler et al. (2016).
2. Results of the Research
As can be seen, the sub indicators are set varyingly widely. Those that are set more
generally are usually concretized in determining queries. For example, the indicator
Freedom in the World specifies its sub indicator Functioning of Government by the main
question: Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it
operate with openness and transparency?’. This main question is complemented by six
queries targeted to a specific phenomenon: ‘Are civil society groups, interest groups,
journalists, and other citizens able to comment on and influence pending policies or
legislation?’ ‘Do citizens have the legal right and practical ability to obtain information
about government operations and the means to petition government agencies for it?’ ‘Is the
budget-making process subject to meaningful legislative review and public scrutiny?’ ‘Does
the government publish detailed accounting expenditures in a timely fashion?’ ‘Does the
state ensure transparency and effective competition in the awarding of government
contracts?’ ‘Are the asset declarations of government officials open to public and media
scrutiny and verification?’ Sub indicator Associational and Organizational Rights is
determined using these following questions: ‘Is there freedom for non-governmental
organizations (civic organizations, interest groups, foundations, etc.)?’ ‘Are there free trade
unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective
bargaining?’ ‘Are there free professional and other private organizations?’ (Freedom
House, 2017). While the first mentioned sub indicator is pointing towards a requirement of
transparency and is linked with the core dimension of quality of democracy control, the
second one deals mainly with free acting of nongovernmental organizations (the core
dimension of quality of democracy freedom), it does not focus on e.g. fair and equal access
to public bodies or equality of participation.
With all of the listed indicators, the sub indicators and its questions pointing towards
acting of interest groups (citizen related indicators) focus on the existence or non-
existence of the phenomena like capability of society/interest groups to comment on and
influence pending policies/legislation in the case of Freedom in the World or routine
consultations of policy makers with civil organizations in the case of V-Dem, but they are
not concerned with the form. However, there are exceptions emphasizing the degree of
equality rights and freedoms within the framework of groups, such as e.g. Equal Protection
Index measured by V-Dem: Equal protection means that the state grants and protects rights
and freedoms evenly across social groups. To achieve equal protection of rights and freedoms,
the state itself must not interfere in the ability of groups to participate and it must also take
action to ensure that rights and freedoms of one social group are not threatened by the
actions of another group or individual.” (Coppedge, 2016) The authors of this index use the
term social groups or just groups. In their presented methodology, the definition of a
broader view of the meaning of the term group occurs in connection with the Civil Society
Participation index or Core Civil Society Index. The broader meaning comes from definition
of the sphere of civil society which lies in the public space between the private sphere and
the state. Here, citizens are organized in groups to pursue their collective interests and
ideals and the authors call these groups civil society organizations (CSOs). CSOs include
interest groups, labour unions, spiritual organizations (if they are engaged in civic or
political activities), social movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-
governmental organizations. Then it is possible to assume that the Equal Protection Index
could cover all types of the above mentioned groups, not only social groups.
Only two indicators directly focus on transparent communication:
1) Willingness for transparent communication (DB) assesses the transparency of
government policy measured on a scale ranging from The government does not often
communicate its intentions successfully to The government is transparent towards
citizens.
2) Scholarly advice (SGI) indicates effective and legitimate consultation with non-
governmental academic experts which should take place during the early stages of a
decision-making process, that is, when outcomes can still be altered and this consultation
should be transparent to the public. It is ranging from The government does not consult
with non-governmental academic experts, or existing consultations lack transparency
entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma to In almost all cases, the government
transparently consults with a panel of non-governmental academic experts at an early
stage of government decision-making’.
3. Discussion
The measures of quality of democracy, however, contain other indicators that determine
the circumstances of the transparency of the decision-making process. Most of them refer
to the so-called sunlight principles as one of the four categories of The lobbying
transparency catalogue created by Laboutková and Vymětal (2017) like
participation/equality of participation; access to government information open
government data; financing disclosure of political parties, obligation of public bodies to
consult with citizens and other stakeholders before a decision is made; online platform for
civic participation; systematic monitoring of access to information; data sources relevant
for policy analysis; proactive publication of information; equal access to information and
documents for all.
Liaison points in examining the quality of democracy and transparent lobbying are citizen-
related indicators and information related indicators. Basic models of modern democracies
Liberal-Pluralism and Participatory-Deliberative share a common broad account of
citizens, who act, engage, share and contribute. They can do this individually, in groups or
by proxy. The right to information is one of the most important elements of the relationship
between citizens and public authorities. For the purposes of assessing the quality of
democracy, the information is examined especially in terms of its availability free access
to information, while the level of disclosure, clarity and accuracy of information is mainly
monitored in terms of transparency. If lobbying is perceived as a communication tool based
on the exchange of information, this requirement of transparency also applies to lobbying.
The manner of interaction between citizens, civil/interest groups and professional
lobbyists shapes the democratic political culture and hence the quality of democracy.
Conclusion
Quality of democracy and transparent lobbying have common elements. A high level of
transparency in the political process is required, as well as a willingness on the part of the
citizens to obtain information. To measure transparent lobbying is a current challenge and it is
the next step of this particular research on lobbying. So far, the process of explicit direct
measuring of the transparency of lobbying remains unresolvable until lobbying is regulated.
Variables that were already identified in the mentioned catalogue of transparent lobbying above
need to be operationalized/operationally defined to be measurable, detectable and observable.
Already existing indicators measuring the quality of democracy, which share some similar
characteristics with lobbying transparency requirements, might be an important aid in finding
measurable or categorical variables of proposed transparent lobbying measures.
Acknowledgment
This research was supported by the Czech Science Foundation, project No. 16-08786S
“Impact of Transparency of Lobbying on Democratization and Its Consequences”.
References
BÜHLMANN, M., W. MERKEL, L. MÜLLER and B. WESSELS. (2012). The Democracy
Barometer: A New Instrument to Measure the Quality of Democracy and its Potential
for Comparative Research. European Political Science, 2012, 11(1): 519536.
COLLIER, D. and S. LEVITSKY (1997). Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual innovation in
comparative research. World Politics, 1997, 49(3): 430-451.
COPPEDGE, M. et al. (2016). V-Dem Codebook v6. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)
Project. [cit. 2017-03-15]. Available at: https://www.v-
dem.net/media/filer_public/d1/24/d124efd5-7ff5-4175-a1ed-f294984084d0/v-
dem_codebook_v6.pdf.
DAHL, R. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT; London: Yale
University Press, 1971.
DAIMOND, L. J. and L. MORLINO. (2004). The Quality of Democracy. An overview. Journal
of Democracy, 2004, 15(4): 20-31.
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENT UNIT. (2017). Democracy Index 2016. [cit. 2017-03-08]. Available
at: http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-Index-
2016.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex2016
FREEDOM HOUSE. (2017). Freedom of the World 2017. [cit. 2017-03-25]. Available at:
https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2017.
GEISSEL, B, M. KNEUER and H. J. LAUTH. (2016). Measuring the quality of democracy:
Introduction. International Political Science Review. 2016, 37(5): 571-579.
DOI:10.1177/019251216669141.
GRANADOS, N., A. GUPTA and R. KAUFFMAN. (2006). The impact of IT on market
information and transparency: a unified theoretical framework. Journal of the
Association for Information Systems, 2006, 7(3): 148178.
HALACHMI, A. and D. GRELLING. (2013). Transparency, E-government, and accountability.
Public Performance & Management Review. 2013, 36(4): 562584.
LABOUTKOVÁ, Š. and P. VYMĚTAL. (2017). Measures of Transparent Lobbying: How to
Approach It and Evaluate It: A Preliminary Stage. In: Matějová, L. (ed.) Proceedings of
the 21st International Conference Current Trends in Public Sector Research 2017. Brno:
Masaryk University, pp. 50-57.
LAUTH, H. J. (2016). The internal relationship of the dimension of democracy: The
relevance of trade-offs for measuring the quality of democracy. International Political
Science Review. 2016, 37(5): 606-6017. DOI: 10.1177/0199512116667630.
MADHAVAN, A., D. PORTER and D. Weaver. (2005). Should securities markets be
transparent? Journal of Financial Markets, 2005, 8(3): 265287.
MARSHALL, M. G. et al. ((2014). Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and
Transitions, 1800 2013. Data User´s Manual. 2014. [cit. 2017-04-06]. Available at:
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
MAYNE, Q. and B. GEISSEL. (2016). Putting the demos back into the concept of democratic
quality. International Political Science Review. 2016, 37(5): 634-644. DOI:
10.1177/0199512115616269.
PICKEL, S., T. STARK and W. BREUSTED. (2015). Assessing the quality of quality measures
of democracy: a theoretical framework and its empirical application. European Political
Science. 2015, 14(4): 496-520. DOI: 10.1057/eps.2015.61
SCHRAAD-TISCHLER, D. et al. (2016). Sustainable Government Indicator. [cit. 2017-03-15].
Available at: http://www.sgi-network.org/2016/Questionnaire.
STIGLITZ, J. E. (1999). On liberty, the right to know, and public discourse: The role of
transparency in public life. Oxford, UK: Oxford Amnesty Lecture, January 27. [cit. 2017-
04-08]. Available at:
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.594.93&rep=rep1&type=p
df.
TI. (2015). Lobbying in Europe: hidden influence, privilege access. Berlin: Transaprency
International, 2015. [cit. 2016-09-30]. Available at:
http://files.transparency.org/content/dowland/1909/12646/file/2015_LobbyingInEu
rope_EN.pdf.
WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT. (2015). WJP Open Government Index. [cit. 2017-03-15].
Available at:
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/ogi_methodology_0.pdf.
... Second, we introduce the results of our existing research (Laboutková 2017;Laboutková and Vymětal 2017) which focuses on individual measures and subprocesses of transparent lobbying. In that research, we argue that a complex approach combining lobbying rules and other supportive legal measures is needed in order to set up a transparent mechanism of decision-making. ...
... If lobbying means any direct or indirect communication with a public official that is made, managed or directed with the purpose of influencing public decision-making than it is part of this concept and lobbying rules are instruments of deliberative democracy (Chari, Hogan, and Murphy 2010). Laboutková (2017) developed this notion when she investigated links between the most wide-spread indices of quality of democracy and transparent lobbying. She focused on citizen-related indicators and information-related indicators in the indices of quality of democracy and argued that it is possible to deduce that transparency of lobbying, i.e. transparency of interactions between decision-makers (public body) and interests (lobbyists) is linked to the core dimensions of quality of democracy, particularly equality and control. ...
... • Existence of opportunity to take binding political decisions by citizens Source: Compiled by authors. Laboutková (2017), however, also shows that the measures of quality of democracy contain other sub-indicators that determine the circumstances of the transparency of the decision-making process in the broader context and identifies in total 20 such subindicators (Table 1). In the present study, we take these 20 sub-indicators identified as related to the transparency of communication in decision-making and assess the strength of their relationship to transparency and the impact they have on the quality of democratic governance. ...
Article
In this paper, we discuss the link between democracy and transparent lobbying indices. We assume that a deeper understanding of attributes of the transparency of lobbying help to develop more complex tools of measurement of quality of democracy. We briefly introduce five common indices of quality of democracy and analyze its indicators in terms of transparency requirements. Second, we present a catalog of all pro-lobbying transparency measures with four categories involving lobbyists, targets of lobbying, sunshine rules, and monitoring and sanctioning rules. Third, we carry out a statistical analysis of the democracy indices and lobbying indices. Fourth, we identify sub-indicators in the introduced indices and assign a value to each individual indicator in the indices to determine whether measures of transparent lobbying have relevance with respect to these indicators. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of the links found between indicators of the quality of democracy and transparent lobbying.
... Second, we introduce the results of our existing research (Laboutková 2017; Laboutková and Vymětal, 2017) which focuses on individual measures and sub-processes of transparent lobbying. In that research, we argue that a complex approach combining lobbying rules and other supportive legal measures is needed in order to set up a transparent mechanism of decision-making. ...
... If lobbying means any direct or indirect communication with a public official that is made, managed or directed with the purpose of influencing public decision-making than it is part of this concept and lobbying rules are instruments of deliberative democracy (Chari et al., 2010). Laboutková (2017) developed this notion when she investigated common denominators in research on the quality of democracy and transparent lobbying. She focused on citizen-related indicators and information-related indicators in indices of quality of democracy. ...
Conference Paper
Full-text available
Although the topic of lobbying attracts many scholars and activists, the evaluation of its quality is underdeveloped. The paper's aim is to propose a comprehensive catalogue of key measures of transparent lobbying that offers the space for later evaluation of the transparency of lobbying regulation and activities for discussion. The authors employed the qualitative analysis of existing approaches, namely the evaluation of " hard " lobbying regulation by the Centre for Public Integrity and recommendations of " transparency " measures by various international organisations, and finally propose their own set (catalogue) of measures that employs both the hard direct rules on lobbying, but also the indirect rules linked to lobbying, and informal rules and voluntary activities are also included.
Article
Full-text available
Measuring characteristics of democracy is not an easy task, but anyone who does empirical research on democracy needs good measures. In this article, we present the Democracy Barometer, a new measure that overcomes the conceptual and methodological shortcomings of previous indices. It allows for a description and comparison of the quality of thirty established democracies in the timespan between 1995 and 2005. The article examines its descriptive purposes and demonstrates the potential of this new instrument for future comparative analyses.
Article
Full-text available
The recent trend toward democratization in countries across the globe has challenged scholars to pursue two potentially contradictory goals. On the one hand, they seek to increase analytic differentiation in order to capture the diverse forms of democracy that have emerged. On the other hand, they are concerned with conceptual validity. Specifically, they seek to avoid the problem of conceptual stretching that arises when the concept of democracy is applied to cases for which, by relevant scholarly standards, it is not appropriate. This article argues that the pursuit of these two goals has led to a proliferation of conceptual innovations, including numerous subtypes of democracy – that is to say, democracy "with adjectives." The articles explores the strengths and weaknesses of alternative strategies of conceptual innovation that have emerged: descending and climbing Sartori's ladder of generality, generating "diminished" subtypes of democracy, "precising" the definition of democracy by adding defining attributes, and shifting the overarching concept with which democracy is associated. The goal of the analysis is to make more comprehensible the complex structure of these strategies, as well as to explore trade-offs among the strategies. Even when scholars proceed intuitively, rather than self-consciously, they tend to operate within this structure. Yet it is far more desirable for them to do so self-consciously, with a full awareness of these trade-offs.
Article
Full-text available
With the advent of the Internet, we have seen existing markets transform and new ones emerge. We contribute to the understanding of this phenomenon by developing a unified theory about the role that IT plays in affecting market information, transparency and market structure. In particular, we introduce a new theoretical framework which uncovers the process and the forces that, together with IT, facilitate or inhibit the emerging dominance of transparent electronic markets. Transparent electronic markets offer unbiased, complete, and accurate market information. Our effort to develop a unified theoretical framework begins with a thorough assessment of the prior literature. It also uses an inductive approach involving the case study method, in which we contrast and compare the forces that have led the air travel and financial securities markets to become increasingly transparent. Building on the electronic markets and electronic hierarchies research of Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987), our findings suggest that IT alone does not explain a move to transparent electronic markets. Instead, we argue that enhanced electronic representation of products, and competitive and institutional forces have also played an important role in the process by which most sellers have come to favor transparent markets. 1 Sirkka Jarvenpaa was the accepting senior editor. This paper was submitted on March 16, 2005, and went through three revisions. Ranjan Dutta and Fred Collopy were reviewers for this paper.
Article
Greater use of information and communications technology and e-government can increase governmental transparency. This, in turn, may invite citizen participation, foster e-governance, and facilitate e-democracy. However, beyond a certain point, more government openness may be dysfunctional if it reduces operational capacity. This article claims that in the real world, where the proverbial question is "Why can't government be like business?," many public managers are challenged by the need to perform a balancing act between the pursuit of greater openness and private-sector efficiency. The article concludes that there is a need to develop theories, models, and trainings to assist managers in addressing this balancing challenge.
Article
Over recent decades, comparative political scientists have developed new measures at a rate of knots that evaluate the quality of democratic regimes. These indices have been broadly applied to assess the quality of democracy cross-nationally and to test the generalisability of theories regarding its causes and effects. However, the validity of these inferences is jeopardised by the fact that the quality of democracy is an abstract and contested concept. In order to address this eventuality, researchers constructing indices measuring the quality of democracy as well as researchers applying these indices should critically examine the quality of the indices. Owing to the absence of a standardised framework that is both suitable for the evaluation of contested concepts and that includes explicit coding rules so as to be directly applicable, this article seeks to fill this gap. The application of our framework is demonstrated by an evaluation of the Sustainable Governance Indicators, the Global Democracy Ranking and the Democracy Barometer. As indicated by our evaluation, the framework is a practical tool that helps to assess the conceptual foundation, validity, reliability and replicability of indices. In addition, it can be used to study the quality of indices in a comparable manner.
Article
Market transparency lies at the heart of debate about floor versus automated trading systems, the informational advantages of market makers, and inter-market competition between trading systems. Since changes in transparency regimes are rare, analysis of each event becomes more crucial in our ability to evaluate prevailing theory accurately. We examine the natural experiment affected by the Toronto Stock Exchange when it publicly disseminated the limit order book on both the traditional floor and on its automated trading system. This change in transparency regime allows us to isolate the effects of increased transparency while controlling for stock-specific factors and for type (floor or automated) of trading system. We find that the increase in transparency reduces liquidity. In particular, execution costs and volatility increase after the limit order book is publicly displayed. We also show that the reduction in liquidity is associated with significant declines in stock prices.
The Quality of Democracy. An overview
  • L J Daimond
  • L Morlino
DAIMOND, L. J. and L. MORLINO. (2004). The Quality of Democracy. An overview. Journal of Democracy, 2004, 15(4): 20-31.