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Russian Think Tanks and Soft Power

September 2017

Project: The Russia Porgramme at FOI

Authors:

Carolina Vendil Pallin

Swedish Defence Research Agency

Susanne Oxenstierna

Swedish Defence Research Agency

Russia has put increasing emphasis on public diplomacy and the use of "soft power" to achieve foreign policy objectives. The Foreign Policy Concept of 2016 specifically calls for Russian academics and experts to get involved in the country's public diplomacy efforts and to do so in dialogue with foreign specialists on international relations. This report investigates how Russia tries to influence expert communities and wider public opinion in the West with the help of think tanks and similar GONGOs. Nine Russian think tanks or GONGOs (government-organized non-governmental organizations) were selected for closer analysis in this study. They are all directly or indirectly dependent on the Russian state for financial support. Other important donors are Russian big business. All of the think tanks analysed are, moreover, closely linked to the Russian political executive. A finding of the study is that the think tanks that take on less of an advocacy role in their messaging tend to be the ones with the best relations with Western researchers. Their experts are sought after as speakers at conferences and roundtables around the world and their access to Russian government circles adds to their attraction as cooperation partners. The think tanks that are more propagandistic tend to end up creating networks with experts, organizations and institutes in the West that are less mainstream.

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Russian Think Tanks

and Soft Power

August 2017

FOI-R-4451-SE

ISSN1650-1942 www.foi.se

Carolina Vendil Pallin and Susanne Oxenstierna

Russian Think Tanks and Soft Power Carolina Vendil Pallin and Susanne Oxenstierna

Carolina Vendil Pallin

Susanne Oxenstierna

Russian Think Tanks

and Soft Power

Bild/Cover: ITAR-TASS, Valery Sharifulin

FOI-R--4451--SE

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Title

Russian Think Tanks and Soft Power

Titel

Ryska tankesmedjor och mjuk makt

Rapportnr/Report no

FOI-R-4451-SE

Månad/Month

August

Utgivningsår/Year

2017

Antal sidor/Pages

ISSN

1650-1942

Kund/Customer

MSB

Forskningsområde

8. Säkerhetspolitik

FoT-område

Projektnr/Project no

E13583

Godkänd av/Approved by

Lars Höstbeck

Ansvarig avdelning

Defence Analysis Division

Exportkontroll

FOI-R--4451--SE

Sammanfattning

Ryssland använder i allt högre utsträckning public diplomacy och ”mjuk makt” för

att uppnå utrikespolitiska mål. I det utrikespolitiska konceptet från 2014 uppmanas

ryska akademiker och experter att engagera sig i landets offentliga diplomati och

föra dialog med utländska specialister inom området internationella relationer.

Rapporten undersöker hur Ryssland använder public diplomacy och mjuk makt för

att påverka forskarsamhället och en vidare opinion i Väst.

Nio ryska tankesmedjor eller GONGOs (statligt styrda enskilda organisationer)

studeras närmare. Samtliga är direkt eller indirekt beroende av statlig finansiering.

Övrig finansiering kommer främst från ryska storföretag. Alla tankesmedjor som

analyseras har starka band till den verkställande makten i Rysslands politiska

system. Rapporten finner att tankesmedjor vars målsättning är att bidra till den

globala diskussionen i olika frågor och inte i första hand att främja Rysslands

intressen har väl utvecklade kontakter med utländska forskare. Deras experter är

eftersökta som talare vid olika evenemang världen över. Att de har tillgång till

ryska makthavare ses som en fördel och innebär att de kan lämna intressanta bidrag

i debatter och i olika internationella samarbeten. De tankesmedjor som framförallt

vill påverka opinionen utomlands genom att föra fram den ryska politiska

ledningen synpunkter tenderar däremot att bilda nätverk med experter och

organisationer som är mer marginella.

Nyckelord: Ryssland, tankesmedjor, mjuk makt

FOI-R--4451--SE

Summary

Russia has put increasing emphasis on public diplomacy and the use of “soft

power” to achieve foreign policy objectives. The Foreign Policy Concept of 2016

specifically calls for Russian academics and experts to get involved in the

country’s public diplomacy efforts and to do so in dialogue with foreign specialists

on international relations. This report investigates how Russia tries to influence

expert communities and wider public opinion in the West with the help of think

tanks and similar GONGOs. Nine Russian think tanks or GONGOs (government-

organized non-governmental organizations) were selected for closer analysis in

this study. They are all directly or indirectly dependent on the Russian state for

financial support. Other important donors are Russian big business. All of the think

tanks analysed are, moreover, closely linked to the Russian political executive.

A finding of the study is that the think tanks that take on less of an advocacy role

in their messaging tend to be the ones with the best relations with Western

researchers. Their experts are sought after as speakers at conferences and

roundtables around the world and their access to Russian government circles adds

to their attraction as cooperation partners. The think tanks that are more

propagandistic tend to end up creating networks with experts, organizations and

institutes in the West that are less mainstream.

Keywords: Russia, think tanks, soft power

FOI-R--4451--SE

Innehållsförteckning

Acronyms and abbreviations 7

1 Introduction 9

2 Projecting soft power 11

3 The financing of think tanks 17

4 Case studies 21

4.1 Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) .................................. 23

4.2 Valdai Club ...................................................................................... 24

4.3 Council for Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP) ............................ 26

4.4 Gorchakov Fund .............................................................................. 27

4.5 Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI) .................................. 28

4.6 Rethinking Russia ........................................................................... 31

4.7 Dialogue of Civilizations (DOC) ....................................................... 34

4.8 Institute of Democracy and Cooperation (IDC), Paris ..................... 36

4.9 Information Security Institute (IISI) .................................................. 37

5 Conclusions 41

References 43

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Acronyms and abbreviations

CIS

Commonwealth of Independent States

CFDP

Council for Foreign and Defence Policy

DOC

Dialogue of Civilizations

ECOSOC

United Nations Economic and Social Council

HSE

National Research University Higher School of

Economics

IDC

Institute of Democracy and Cooperation

GGTTI

Global Go to Think Tank Index

GONGO

government-organized non-government organization

IISI

Institut problem informatsionnoi bezopasnosti

Information Security Institute

IMEMO

Institut mirovoi ekonomiki i mezhdunarodnykh

otnoshenii

Institute of World Economy and International

Relations

ISEPR

Institute of Social-Economic and Political Research

MGIMO

Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi institut mezhdunarodnykh

otnoshenii

Moscow State Institute of International Relations

NGO

non-government organization

ONF

All-Russia People’s Front

RCMD

Rossiiskii sovet po mezhdunarodnym delam

(see RIAC)

Rossiiskaia gazeta

(government newspaper)

RIAC

Russian International Affairs Council

RISI

Rossiiskii institut strategicheskikh issledovanii

RISS

Russian Institute for Strategic Studies

(see RISI)

FOI-R--4451--SE

Rossotrudnichestvo

Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of the

Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and

International Humanitarian Cooperation

SVOP

Sovet po vneshnei i oboronnoi politike

(see also CFDP)

SVR

Foreign Intelligence Service

UDPRF

President’s Directorate for Administrative Questions

United Nations

UNESCO

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization

VPK

Voenno-promyshlennyi kurer (newspaper on military

affairs)

VTsIOM

Vserossiiskii tsentr izucheniia obshchestvennoga

mneniia

Russian Opinion Research Centre

WPF DoC

World Public Forum “Dialogue of Civilizations”

FOI-R--4451--SE

1 Introduction

There is a wide array of think tanks in Russia today. Most of them are geared

primarily towards a domestic audience and compete for attention from the

Presidential Administration and government. Good relations and commissions

from the highest political level mean better funding. This is not unique to Russia.

Many think tanks in the West fight for attention from the government machinery.

However, in Russian society independent political activity is severely limited and

there are simply few alternative sources of income for a think tank. These

conditions apply also for the Russian think tanks that are active on an international

arena and there is every reason to be aware of the very different domestic

circumstances in which these think tanks operate.

The think tanks examined below are all in varying degrees active in trying to

promote Russia’s view of international relations, the country’s policy positions

and its political system internationally. This is not a new practice for Russia and

we should bear in mind the history of, for example, the Institute for U.S. and

Canadian Studies, which was a foreign policy tool for the International Department

of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

The concept of soft power describes a country’s ability to attract and cooperate as

means of persuasion in foreign relations (Nye 2004). A defining feature of soft

power is that it is non-coercive. Instead the instruments of soft power are cultural

and political values and foreign policies. The original concept was modelled on

the US use of soft power in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War (Rutland &

Kazantsev 2016: 397). Later, the term has also been used to describe policies

attempting to influence social and public opinion through less transparent channels

and lobbying through powerful political and non-political organizations. Russia

started to refer to “soft power” in the early 2000s. Its objectives were primarily to

regain influence over other post-Soviet countries. The colour revolutions in

Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) as well as the EU’s expansion to the east

during the same period were perceived by Russia as threats to its interests in the

post-Soviet space (Čwiek-Karpowicz 2012: 6).

Russia uses both state organizations and so-called government-organized non-

governmental organizations, GONGOs, in its attempts to influence opinions in the

West. A special type of GONGO is think tanks that may be instrumental in helping

a government to reach specific foreign policy goals by building networks with

This department coordinated the Soviet Union’s active measures – overt and covert methods of

influence – abroad (Levchenko 1982). According to Katri Pynnöniemi (2016: 41) the Soviet open

propaganda effort was closely coordinated with the official foreign policy. It relied on “widely

appealing themes and slogans: peace, democracy, national self-determination, land reform and

racial equality”. She identifies front organizations such as the World Peace Council and the World

Federation of Teachers’ Unions as the open influence agents of the Soviet era (2016: 40).

FOI-R--4451--SE

international researchers and to influence their agendas as well as shaping media

reporting and public opinion in other countries. There are different definitions of

think tanks but in this study we refer to organizations that produce public-policy

research analyses or take part in public debate and the media by other means. Think

tanks often act as a bridge between the academic and policymaking communities

and between the state and civil society.

The main purpose of this study is to explore how Russia tries to influence expert

communities as well as wider public opinion in the West with the help of think

tanks and similar GONGOs. This means that organizations primarily addressing a

domestic audience or compatriots abroad are not discussed. The study also

examines how the Russian state influences the think tanks and GONGOs examined

– through direct and indirect control as well as through funding – and what

channels are used to disseminate ideas and narratives about Russia and the world.

As a starting point a number of GONGOs were identified as representing think

tanks and similar organizations that channel the voice of the Russian government

in varying degrees. An important criterion for the selection of think tanks has been

that they should be active in the English-language sphere rather than more or less

exclusively among the Russian-language community. The idea was to provide

representative examples rather than an exhaustive list. The think tanks selected for

our case studies are listed in Table 1 below. Representatives of a few of these

organizations were interviewed during a study visit to Moscow in January 2017

(see the list of interviews at the end). The interviews focused on the funding, the

activities of the organizations, the organizational structure, and links to partners in

the West. In addition, the organizations were studied from the point of view of

how they present themselves on their websites and in their publications, and from

that of previous Western analyses of Russian GONGOs. Of the think tanks

analysed, three are ranked in the Global Go to Think Tank Index (GGTTI)

developed by Pennsylvania University under James G. McGann (2017).

This report starts with a discussion of the concept of soft power, how it is reflected

in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept, how it is interpreted and applied in the

Russian case and how different GONGOs are used as vehicles for public

diplomacy. The third section looks more closely at how think tanks and GONGOs

are financed in Russia. The fourth section examines nine selected think tanks in

more detail regarding their objectives and activities. The final section applies the

concept of soft power as well as the findings on how GONGOs and think tanks are

funded to draw conclusions about how dependent they are on the Russian

government and which different aims and primary audiences the think tanks have.

FOI-R--4451--SE

2 Projecting soft power

Russia puts emphasis on public diplomacy and more specifically on the use of

“soft power” as one of the methods of achieving foreign policy objectives (Foreign

Policy Concept 2016: §9; see Persson 2014: 19). The foreign policy goals that the

Russian political leadership wants to attain using thinks tanks and GONGOs are

evident in Russian security documents. The National Security Strategy (2015)

states that among foreign powers there is a policy “to contain Russia” and that this

is done by applying various pressures, including informational pressures (§12; see

Hedenskog et al. 2016: 97ff). The Information Security Doctrine (2016) lists as

one of Russia’s national interests in the information sphere “providing the Russian

and international community with reliable information” on Russian policies (§8).

The section on “Information Support for Foreign Policy Activities” in the Foreign

Policy Concept merits quoting in full since it explicitly mentions the role of

Russian experts:

Delivery to the international community of unbiased information about Russia’s perspectives

on key international issues, its foreign policy initiatives and efforts, processes and plans of its

socioeconomic development and Russia’s cultural research achievements is an important

element of foreign policy activities of the Russian Federation.

Russia seeks to ensure that the world has an objective image of the country, develops its own

effective ways to influence foreign audiences, promotes Russian and Russian-language media

in the global information space, providing them with necessary government support, is

proactive in international information cooperation, and takes necessary steps to counter

threats to its information security. New information and communication technology is used

to this end. Russia is intent on promoting a set of legal and ethical forms regarding the safe

use of such technology. Russia asserts the right of every person to access unbiased

information about global developments and various points of view.

Greater participation of Russia’s academics and experts in the dialogue with foreign

specialists on global politics and international security is one of the areas of public diplomacy

development.

(Foreign Policy Concept 2016: §§46–48)

A couple of themes in this quotation stand out and need to be put in a wider context

of Russian thinking on security and information security. First, Russia considers

the global information community to be fundamentally skewed or biased in favour

of the West. This is why there is an insistence on the need to bring “unbiased

information” about global events and to provide an “objective image” of Russia.

In Russian thinking about the information space, the West dominates the

international media, including the internet. To a certain degree, this is a justified

claim. Many of the leading television networks with a global reach and certainly

the internet were created in the West and by companies that are firmly grounded

in a Western ideology, which is, among other things, pro-free speech (Garton Ash

2016: 21ff). This constitutes a challenge for the Russian authoritarian system

which wants to control its information space, and this challenge has become more

FOI-R--4451--SE

acute with the advent of information and communication technologies that are

difficult to confine within national borders.

This leads on to the second aspect in the quotation above that merits an

explanation. Russia has promoted the adoption of an international convention on

information security at the United Nations (UN). Thus, when Russia states that it

“is intent on promoting a set of legal and ethical forms regarding the safe use of

such technology”, this is in line with its promotion of a binding treaty that would

respect national borders and the concerns of states like Russia and China when it

comes to protecting their respective national information spaces. It is worth noting

that in the very same paragraph, Russia states that it uses “new information and

communication technology” in developing its own ways of influencing foreign

audiences. As will be evident below, the majority of the think tanks and GONGOs

below are active on Facebook, Twitter and other social media.

Finally, the Foreign Policy Concept states that Russia would like to see a greater

participation by its own “academics and experts in the dialogue with foreign

specialists on global politics and international security”. In other words, engaging

experts to promote Russian public diplomacy and Russia’s strategic narrative

externally is an explicit goal in the concept. This is part and parcel of a larger

strategy to use information as a way of influencing foreign countries (Hellman &

Wagnsson 2016: 3–5). The experts that are expected to promote a Russian strategic

narrative are attached to the leading think tanks on foreign policy in Russia. This

strategic narrative can be analysed on three levels. First, the narrative about how

the international system is structured and how it is evolving; second, a narrative

about what Russia is and which values it promotes as well as the goals it pursues;

and, finally, a narrative that explains the virtues of specific policies and the way

Russia pursues these (Roselle et al. 2014: 76).

Russia and soft power

When the American political scientist Joseph Nye defined soft power in the 1980s

the emphasis was on influence through attraction (Nye 2004; 2008: 95). The

concept quickly migrated from the academic world into the policy realm. As it did

so it often came to be reinterpreted, misunderstood or even misused by

governments that, for example, allowed public diplomacy to move into one-way

broadcasting or even propaganda, which was not the original meaning of the

concept. Among other things, Nye has underlined that soft power messaging from

a government must be in line with the concrete policies and actions pursued (Kearn

2011; Nye 2008: 103, 108).

When employing soft power, Russia does not primarily attract through lifestyle

and prosperity. Indeed, in Russian official rhetoric it often appears to mean the use

of just about all instruments and methods other than military to reach foreign

policy goals (Hedenskog et al. 2016: 108; Hudson 2015: 331). An important

component in Russia’s soft power strategy has been to use Russians and Russian-

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speakers abroad (Just 2015: 83; Meister & Puglierin 2015: 4–5; Persson 2014:

25ff). Many analyses have focused on the message that Russia is promoting

through channels such as Rossotrudnichestvo (Federal Agency for the

Commonwealth of the Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and

International Humanitarian Cooperation) and the Russkiy Mir Foundation (see

below) and reached the conclusion that Russian soft power, in the true sense of the

concept, has not been very effective. It has, for example, proved difficult for Russia

to increase its attraction outside an audience that is already Russia-friendly (Just

2015). Furthermore, there are internal contradictions in the narratives sent from

Russia and the lack of positive ideas and values gives the message less traction

(Hudson 2015: 334; Rutland & Kazantsev 2016: 403). Russia’s attempts to

influence other countries are furthermore state-centric and are managed from

above rather than attracting through prosperity and popular culture in Russian

society (Just 2015: 85; Lutsevych 2016: 3–5; van Herpen 2015: 27–29).

Russian GONGOs and public diplomacy

The government-managed think tanks are examples of GONGOs, since they are

managed by the state but presented as at least semi-independent. Any country can

create this type of organization to promote certain issues, but GONGOs are more

common in countries with authoritarian regimes where civil society is weak

(Moisés 2007; Steinberg 2001). Because the GONGOs are controlled by the

government they play a different role than civil society organizations in

democracies that channel the voice and opinions of different social groups on

various issues and thereby balance the views of the state (Oxenstierna 2014). In

other words, GONGOs are not a counterbalance to the state in Russia and their

ability to influence decision making is limited at best. Instead, Russia can use

GONGOs to interact with civil society organizations in democracies around the

world, since they represent a different platform to work from than formal state

structures. Credibility has become an important resource in projecting soft power

(Nye 2008: 100). Think tanks and GONGOs with experts who are well regarded

therefore become a strategic asset for a government that wants its public diplomacy

efforts to succeed.

The agency Rossotrudnichestvo, which comes under the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, was established by presidential decree (No. 1315, 6 September) in 2008.

It is responsible for promoting a positive image of Russia abroad, primarily among

Russians and Russian-speakers, but also in more general terms, for example, by

supporting Russian cultural initiatives abroad and proficiency in the Russian

language. There is a clear focus on the Commonwealth of Independent States

(CIS), where Rossotrudnichestvo has established Russian Science and Culture

Centres. According to the information on its website, Rossotrudnichestvo is

represented in 80 countries around the world and has representatives in 21 Russian

embassies. In line with the wording of the Foreign Policy Concept (2016) the

agency and its missions abroad are active in promoting “an objective image of

FOI-R--4451--SE

contemporary Russia” (Rossotrudnichestvo, “About”; “Public Diplomacy”; van

Herpen 2015: 35–7). One indication that Rossotrudnichestvo is directing its

activity primarily towards a Russian-speaking audience is the fact that the English

version of the agency’s website appears not to have been language-edited.

Another important organization is the Russkiy Mir Foundation, which aims to

promote the Russian language and culture abroad. It was created by presidential

decree in 2007 (No. 796, 21 June) and is funded through the federal budget,

voluntary contributions and “other sources in accordance with Russian

legislation”. Responsible ministries are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the

Ministry of Education and Science. One of the missions of the foundation is to

contribute to distributing objective information about Russia and Russian

compatriots as well as to forming a positive view of Russia among the public. Its

activities are, however, primarily geared towards a Russian-speaking community

(Russkiy Mir Foundation, “O fonde”; van Herpen 2015: 37–8).

Russian public diplomacy directed at an English-speaking audience through think

tanks and GONGOs has not been so thoroughly examined. Tomila Lankina and

Kinga Niemczyk (2015: 105) identify a number of toolkits to project soft power,

such as “vertically integrated propaganda networks”. These networks can include

state authorities, state-organized think tanks and research institutes. The aim is to

promote a positive image of Russia and its policies abroad as well as to counter

Western soft power.

The Iron Curtain that used to separate the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact

countries from Western Europe no longer exists. In other words, Russia can easily

reach a Russian-language community outside Russia as well (Pynnöniemi 2016:

47). However, to reach a wider audience internationally, it needs to publish and

organize events at least in English as well as to be active on social media using

English. Public diplomacy directed at an English-speaking audience is directed by

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and think tanks or GONGOs with strong links to it

as well as to the Presidential Administration. The think tanks and GONGOs

selected below are all funded by or dependent upon the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, the Presidential Administration or individuals close to these entities.

In addition there are academic research institutes like the MGIMO (Moskovskii

gosudarstvennyi institut mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii), which is Russia’s leading

institute for the study of international relations. Similar institutions for the study

of international politics exist at other institutes as well, for example at the National

Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) and the above-mentioned

Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies. In this overview, however, an analytical

choice has been made to focus on think tanks rather than on academic institutions,

and especially on the think tanks that are clearly geared towards an international

audience. However, it is important to note that there are links between individual

researchers at, for example, the MGIMO and the HSE, and different GONGOs.

Several of the think tanks below, not least the Russian International Affairs

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Council (RIAC) and the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP), include

experts from the MGIMO and the HSE and cooperate closely with the academic

world.

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3 The financing of think tanks

As with the situation internationally, the financing of think tanks and other forms

of GONGOs in Russia is usually mixed. Part comes from the government and the

rest from private actors and clients, usually big business. There is furthermore a

wide array of research foundations and grant operators – something that makes it

difficult to determine exactly how a particular think tank funds its activities. In

some cases it is absolutely clear that state funding accounts for the bulk of funding

or, in the case of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI), all of it. State

funding comes from the government, for example from the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, or from the president, channelled mainly through the President’s

Directorate for Administrative Questions (UDPRF). These funds in turn are often

operated through mediators. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds the work

of the Gorchakov Fund, which in turn grants funding to think tanks and GONGOs.

The UDPRF funds a number of research institutes, among them the RISI and the

HSE, but from April 2017 also channels money to the Fund for Presidential Grants

for the Development of Civil Society (Presidential Order No. 93).

Private funding may be in the form of grants and support from businesses and

individuals or in the form of paid assignments and commercial services that the

GONGO provides. For example, the RIAC has 50-50 per cent state-private

funding. Part of the money comes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

(Presidential Order No. 67, 22 February 2012). The structure of the funding of the

Valdai Club, created in 2004, is probably similar (van Herpen 2015: 59–62). The

think tank Dialogue of Civilizations (DOC) is managed by the former chairman of

Russian Railways, Vladimir Yakunin, who is probably key to the financing of this

think tank (see section 4.7 below for details).

It is, however, important to keep in mind that much of the funding that these

GONGOs receive from commercial entities would not happen if there were not a

clear understanding that these think tanks are closely connected to the political

leadership. Any funding of the activity of alternative think tanks to those favoured

by the political leadership could be considerable risk for any company. On the

other hand, we may assume that contributing to activities that do enjoy the trust

and patronage of the political leadership could give both enterprises and individual

businessmen advantages.

State funding takes the form of direct funding as well as grants that are

government-controlled, but some is disbursed through intermediate organizations

that are linked to the Kremlin (Vojtišková et al. 2016: 29–30). The problem of the

opacity of funding for think tank activities is in no way unique to Russia

On how these kinds of informal relationships and power networks between business and

government form an integral part of Russian governance, see Ledeneva 2013.

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(Transparify 2016) and it is difficult to obtain exact information on how much

funds different NGOs and GONGOs get from the state.

Similarly, Dialogue of Civilizations appears remarkably wealthy as think tanks go

judging from its wide-ranging activity, but the only information available on

funding leads to a foundation with a similar name in Switzerland.

The fact that a considerable share of the work of think tanks is funded through

sponsorship and grants from big business with strong links to the political

leadership suggests that the exact share of state funding is less important. In a

political system where economic and political activity are intrinsically linked, the

fact that business finances a think tank does not mean that it is therefore more

independent of the political leadership.

There are signs that the funding of entities such as the Russkiy Mir Foundation,

Rossotrudnichestvo and the Gorchakov Fund has increased. Rossotrudnichestvo’s

budget was around €24 million in 2013 and was set to increase to €113.8million

(0.1 per cent of Russia’s GDP) in 2020 (Vojtišková et al. 2016: 43). Hudson (2017:

30) reported that Rossotrudnichestvo receives $95.5 million per year, the Russkiy

Mir Foundation $15 million, and the Gorchakov Foundation for Public Diplomacy

$2 million. However, in comparison to what other countries spend on soft power

instruments the Russian numbers are still quite modest. In the budget year 2015–

2016 the British Council received €210 million from the government, and its total

income for those years was €1.2 billion. Likewise the Goethe Institute received

€213 million from the German Foreign Office in 2014–2015 (Vojtišková et al.

2016: 29).

Also important to keep in mind is the introduction of the 2012 law on “foreign

agents”,

referring to NGOs with foreign funding that have to register with the

Ministry of Justice. The law has severely restricted the activities and existence of

such NGOs. Generally after the law was enforced NGOs became more dependent

on domestic funding and the Presidential Administration increased its capacity to

distribute presidential grants. In 2016 nine grant operators distributed presidential

grants to a total of RUB 4.6 billion (Nagornykh 2017). In 2017, the overall sum

was set do decrease somewhat, to RUB 4.3 billion, at the same time as control over

In effect, there is probably a wider financial network behind Dialogue of Civilizations, with

Vladimir Yakunin in the centre. Apart from his international think tank, Yakunin is a key person in

two domestic think tanks with a Russian Orthodox and patriotic agenda, the Foundation of Saint

Andrew the First-Called (Fond Andreia Pervozvannogo) and the Centre for National Glory (Tsentr

natsionalnoi slavy), which are connected to the Millennium Bank, the banking licence of which

was revoked in February 2016 by the Bank of Russia (2016). Millennium Bank, in turn, was

closely connected to Russian Railways (Golunov & Galakshionova 2016).

“On Amendments to Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation regarding the Regulation of the

Activities of Non-profit Organisations Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent”, FZ-121, 20

July 2012.

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distribution was centralized in the Fund for Presidential Grants for the

Development of Civil Society. The NGOs to receive grants were to be confirmed

by the deputy head of the Presidential Administration, Sergei Kirienko

(Mukhametshina & Churakova 2017; TASS 2017). In addition to this, think tanks

promoting a political agenda that is in line with official policy can continue to

receive funding from abroad without ending up on the “foreign agents” list

(Kolezev 2015).

The overall trend in recent years has been for individual grants to become larger

and the grant operators to become more specialized. Human rights activists

complain about the lack of transparency in the distribution of grants (Nagornykh

2017) and patriotic organizations appear to have been given priority over

traditional NGOs focusing on, for example, human rights, democracy and the

environment (Mukhametshina 2015). Although presidential grants for civil society

are probably not the primary source for financing any of the think tanks studied

below, it is safe to assume that most think tanks with generous funding have been

forced to adapt to the current political climate in Russia.

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4 Case studies

This section now looks in greater detail into nine organizations that bear the

characteristics of think tanks or are organizations with similar qualities.

These are

listed in Table 1 and are discussed as case studies below. Most importantly these

organizations have activities that address experts, policymakers, or students in the

West. Three of the organizations chosen are ranked in the GGTTI: the Russian

International Affairs Council, Rethinking Russia and the Council for Foreign and

Defence Policy (McGann 2017). The GGTTI ranking can be criticized for the way

in which it categorizes some of the think tanks and the methodology does not

include an in-depth study of the quality of output. Nevertheless, it provides an

impression of how individual think tanks are rated by the Western expert

community.

The GGTTI also ranks some leading Russian research centres that are not

discussed in this study. These are the Moscow State Institute of International

Relations (MGIMO), the Institute of World Economy and International Relations

(IMEMO) and the National Research University Higher School of Economics

(HSE). We have made the analytical choice not to include these research centres

because these institutes and universities are academic and cover a multitude of

disciplines and topics rather than just focusing on international relations. In the

case of the MGIMO and the HSE they are also elite universities. Instead our focus

lies on smaller think tanks with a clearer focus on outreach to the international

audience. However, it may be noted that many experts at the MGIMO, IMEMO

and HSE contribute to the activities of the think tanks studied quite frequently and

are part of their pools of experts. Another important think tank that is missing

below is the Carnegie Moscow Center, which is one of the most influential today.

However, this think tank is part of the International Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace which is a global network of policy research centres and is

therefore not included in this study, which is devoted to Russian think tanks.

The weight of the different think tanks also depends on whether they are able to

influence decision making in their own country (Koshkin 2016; Krastev 2001).

When it comes to foreign policy, it seems that most Russian think tanks are not

involved in providing expert advice to the government or the president. This may

be because Russian decision making on foreign policy is a closed process relying

to a considerable degree on secret information (Koshkin 2016; Hedenskog,

Persson & Vendil Pallin 2016: 99–100). However, think tanks can be instrumental

in helping a government to reach specific foreign policy goals, to build networks

At the beginning of this study the organization Roscongress was also included among the

organizations selected, but it was later excluded since it is not a think tank but rather a professional

event organizer, mainly for business events.

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with international researchers and influence their agendas, as well as shaping

media reporting and public opinion in other countries.

Table 1. Selected think tanks

Think tank

Objectives/Target groups

Characteristics

4.1 Russian International

Affairs Council, RIAC

Rossiiskii sovet po mezh-

dunarodnym delam, RCMD

International experts and policy

environment

A think tank with a network of

foreign affairs and security policy

experts. Established by President

Medvedev.

4.2 Valdai Club

International experts and indirectly

also policy environment

Founded by SVOP, MGIMO and

HSE. Link to the President through

yearly Valdai conference.

4.3 Council for Foreign and

Defense Policy, CFDP

Sovet po vneshnei i oboronnoi

politike, SVOP

Influence experts and policy

makers

Founded 1992 by experts and

officials at power ministries and

journalists.

4.4 Gorchakov Fund

Fond Gorchakova

Public diplomacy towards civil

society

Founded by President Medvedev

2010. Closely linked to Russian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4.5 Russian Institute for

Strategic Studies, RISS

Rossiiskii institut strategich-

eskikh issledovanii, RISI

Internationally active, e.g. through

RISI centres abroad

Established by President Putin.

Linked to SVR, financed by the

President’s Directorate for

Administrative Questions.

4.6 Rethinking Russia

Influence experts and policy-

makers

Probably founded by the ISEPR

think tank. Described as

“International Analytical Center”.

Cooperation with VTsIOM.

4.7 Dialogue of Civilizations

(DOC)

Influence experts and policy-

makers

Founded by Vladimir Yakunin,

former chair of Russian Railways,

with close ties to President Putin

4.8 Institute of Democracy and

Cooperation (IDC)

Influence experts and policy

environment

Institutes in Paris and New York to

balance the EU’s promotion of

democracy and human rights in

Russia.

4.9 Information Security

Institute

Institut problem informats-

ionnoi bezopasnosti, IISI

Influence experts and policy

environment on information

security

Institute at Moscow State

University.

Generally, we have opted to use Russian acronyms throughout the report. Three exceptions have

been made. The Russian International Affairs Council is widely referred to as RIAC in the West.

The think tanks Dialogue of Civilizations (DOC) and Institute of Democracy and Cooperation

(IDC) do not really have activities in Russia and therefore there is little sense in using Russian

acronyms for these.

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4.1 Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC)

The Russian International Affairs Council is a non-profit academic and diplomatic

think tank that was established by the resolution of its founders pursuant to

Presidential Order No. 59, dated 2 February 2010, “On the Establishment of the

Non-profit Partnership ‘Russian International Affairs Council’”. It operates as a

link between the government, academia, business and civil society in an effort to

provide foreign policy proposals on complex problems. The RIAC’s mission is to

facilitate Russia’s peaceful integration into the global community, partly by

facilitating greater cooperation between Russian scientific institutions and foreign

analytical centres and scholars on the major issues of international relations

(RIAC, website).

About 50 per cent of the RIAC’s funding comes from the state and 50 per cent

from assignments from mainly big business and the regions. Judging from its

publications, the RIAC appears to be relatively independent when taking part in

public debate. The office employs about 35 staff but the organization relies on

hundreds of experts to cover different issues. The think tank forms “ad hoc groups”

that work and write together on different topics and they have cooperated with

different people in academia (interview). The link to the president and the

government implies certain restrictions when it comes to topics, but it also means

that the RIAC has access to the highest echelons of power. On the RIAC’s

presidium are to be found Igor Ivanov, who is president of the RIAC but also

former minister of foreign affairs; Andrei Kortunov, who is director general of the

RIAC; Fyodor Lukyanov, with leading positions in both the Valdai Club and

SVOP; Petr Aven, who is one of Russia’s most prominent representatives of big

business, especially Alfa Bank; Aleksei Meshkov, who is deputy minister of

foreign affairs; and Dmitrii Peskov, who is deputy head of the Presidential

Administration and Putin’s press secretary (RIAC, “Presidium”).

The fact that RIAC members have these close links to the Russian political

leadership is interesting to a Western audience – they promise something of

interest and unique insights to contribute to the discussions at seminars and

conferences. However, according to the RIAC, it does not take on an advocacy

role, i.e. it does not advocate on specific policy questions or positions. Instead it

contributes analyses in debates (interview).

RIAC staff and experts participated in Medvedev’s reform programme in 2009–

2010 and today they are participating in the developing of a new economic strategy

under Alexei Kudrin, a former minister of finance. The RIAC has ambitions to be

seen on the global scene and has projects with other countries e.g. Turkey, the UK

and Latvia (interview). Yet most of the partners listed on the RIAC’s website are

Russian. There are academic and educational organizations such as the HSE, but

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also Rossotrudnichestvo, the Gorchakov Fund and media outlets such as RIA

Novosti and RT

(RIAC, website).

The channels used by the RIAC to distribute its message are different kinds of

projects, publications and other activities. Projects include “Russia and the Euro-

Atlantic Community”, “Roadmap for International Cooperation in the Arctic” and

“Development of Russian-Chinese Relations”. The institute produces RIAC

reports, working papers and policy briefs. Publications are available in English on

the website. Most are written by Russian experts working at different institutes and

organizations that RIAC cooperates with. Other activities include meetings with

Russian and foreign politicians, world economy sessions, talks to ambassadors and

civil dialogue sessions (RIAC, website).

The RIAC is one of the think tanks that make it into the top sub-lists of the GGTTI,

for example, under “Top Foreign Policy and International Affairs Think Tanks”,

where in 2016 it was ranked 133 of 135. In the regional index for think tanks in

Central and Eastern Europe, the RIAC came in 82nd out of 90 think tanks (McGann

2017: 66, 86).

Although the RIAC claims it does not have an advocacy role, it is clear that certain

narratives are more prevalent than others. The very fact that it has access to active

and former politicians who are still considered to have a certain leverage in the

Russian political system is one reason why it is influential. Although the RIAC

certainly directs much of its activity at a domestic audience, its strong point when

it comes Russian soft power is its ability to attract the leading Russian experts on

international affairs as well as high-level political participation. This makes it an

attractive cooperation partner in the West.

4.2 Valdai Club

The Valdai Club was created in 2004 and is best known for the annual conference

that it organizes for the Russian president in October every year. The name is

derived from Lake Valdai, close to which the first conference was held in 2004.

The first conferences were more informal sessions than the well-directed media

event that the Valdai Conference had developed into by October 2016 (President

of Russia 2016).

In 2011, the Foundation for Development and Support of the Valdai Discussion

Club was created in order to expand activities to research and outreach work, and

regional and thematic programmes. In 2014, this foundation took over

management of the Valdai Club’s projects. The founders listed on the Valdai

RT is the main Russian English-language news channel which gives the Russian view on global

news.

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website include the RIAC, the HSE, the MGIMO and SVOP (Valdai Club,

“About”).

Apart from the annual conference in October, the Valdai Club organizes three

regional conferences, the Asian, Middle Eastern and Transatlantic dialogues. It

also regularly sets up a special Valdai Club session during the Saint Petersburg

Economic Forum each year. According to the Valdai Club it does not receive state

funding for these activities but relies on large companies for this (interview). The

website of the Valdai Club lists as partners two banks (Alfa-Bank and VTB) and

two metallurgical companies (Severstal and Metalloinvest) and the charity fund

Renova (Valdai Club, “About”).

The executive leadership team of the Valdai Club includes its director, Andrey

Bystritskiy, with a background overwhelmingly in the media; Nadezhda

Lavrentieva, who is executive director and has a background in media; Fyodor

Lukyanov, who is academic director and a journalist by training (see also his role

in SVOP and as editor of the journal Russia in Global Affairs below); and Leonid

Burmistrov, who is advisor to Lavrentieva and has a background in media,

especially in public relations (Valdai Club, “Executive Team”).

Fyodor Lukyanov acknowledges that the club used to publish information that was

more geared towards promoting a positive image of Russia (interview). On its

website, the Valdai Club describes this as having gone from a format where the

emphasis was on telling “the story of Russia to the world” to concentrating on the

practical work of setting the global agenda (Valdai Club, “About”). Lukyanov

underlines that the Valdai Club does not want to be compared to propaganda

organs such as the state-controlled television channel RT or the RISI (interview).

The aim of the regular work of the Valdai Club has thus evolved into functioning

as a platform for Russian as well as foreign academics, “to promote a dialogue

between the Russian and international intellectual elite and an objective scientific

analysis of the political, economic and social events in Russia and the world”

(Valdai Club, “About”). The emphasis on promoting an “objective” analysis of

Russia is similar to the wording in the Foreign Policy Concept, which stresses the

need to deliver “unbiased information” about Russia’s position on international

affairs as well as to ensure that the international community has an “objective

image” of Russia (Foreign Policy Concept 2016: §§46–48).

The publications of the Valdai Club are available in both English and Russian and

its Facebook page publishes news and links in English (Facebook “Valdai…”).

There are three Valdai publications series: Expert Opinions, Valdai Papers and

Reports. In addition, the chairman of the foundation, Andrey Bystritskiy, writes

All the banks and companies above are owned by so-called oligarchs, i.e. people with an

influential position in big business and close connections to the political leadership.

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“Messages from the Chairman” that are published on the website. All of these

publications are produced with high-quality layout and are language-edited.

Starting in 2017, the Valdai Club will make an award to Russian and international

experts who have made a significant contribution to thinking about world politics.

An academy of 30 experts of the Valdai Club has been specially created to

nominate candidates for the award (TASS 2016).

The Valdai Club is an example of how communities of experts overlap and are

dependent upon each other. SVOP, the RIAC, the MGIMO, IMEMO and the HSE

were all founding members of the Valdai Club in its present form (from 2014) and

Fyodor Lukyanov is an influential member of SVOP as well as academic director

of the Valdai Club. It does not engage in propaganda, but at the same time the

Valdai publications echo many of the views promoted by Russia internationally,

and the global agenda that Russia would like to promote. Although formally not a

government organization, the greatest asset for the Valdai Club is its annual

presidential conference. Its link to the president and the visibility that it brings are

important components in attracting leading experts to engage with the Valdai Club

and probably also attract funding from commercial companies. Another important

asset is the high quality of the layout and language-editing of its publications. In

spite of this, the Valdai Club is not mentioned in the GGTTI rating.

4.3 Council for Foreign and Defense Policy

(SVOP)

The Council for Foreign and Defence Policy was created in 1992 as a non-

government organization according to the council’s website. Its founding members

were a group of policymakers and businessmen as well as people from the so-

called power ministries (e.g. the Ministry of Defence and security and intelligence

services), the defence industry, the scientific community and the mass media

(SVOP, “About”). This council quickly acquired an influential role not least since

there were few similar organizations in Russia just after the dissolution of the

Soviet Union. It was active in proposing policies and strategic concepts in the

security policy sphere. As new competing institutions emerged with a similar

agenda, it lost some of its influence, but there is a considerable overlap in

membership between it and, for example, the RIAC. There is little or no

information on who funds its activities, but among its partners the council lists the

Valdai Club and the journal Russia in Global Affairs, the newspapers Voenno-

promyshlennyi kurer (VPK) and Rossiiskaia gazeta (RG) and the news agency

RIA Novosti (SVOP, “Partnery”). VPK is closely connected to the Russian

defence industry whereas RG and RIA Novosti are both government-controlled

news outlets. According to SVOP’s website, its work is financed through

sponsorship, grants and donations from individuals and NGOs (SVOP, “About”).

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At first sight, SVOP does not appear to direct its activity primarily towards a

Western audience. Its website and Facebook page are almost entirely in Russian

and its publications primarily in Russian. In other words, much of its activity is

geared towards a domestic audience and, more specifically, towards the Russian

expert community. What makes the council interesting in spite of this is that it

appears to remain an important network for Russian experts. Most importantly, its

former and current figureheads like Sergei Karaganov and Fyodor Lukyanov are

well known to an international audience and often participate in international

conferences and seminars. The journal Russia in Global Affairs, which is closely

affiliated with both SVOP and the RIAC, is published in both Russian and English.

Its editor-in-chief, Fyodor Lukyanov, is head of the presidium of SVOP. Russia in

Global Affairs is one of few Russian journals that reach an English-speaking

community. Its editorial board includes renowned international scholars as well as

former and current dignitaries from countries like the US, Germany, Finland and

Sweden. Also represented are Russian scholars and people from the Presidential

Administration, the minister of foreign affairs, Sergei Lavrov, and the former

minister of foreign affairs, Igor Ivanov. It is furthermore a journal in which

prominent international academics publish articles (Russia in Global Affairs).

Furthermore, in the GGTTI ranking of think tanks SVOP makes it into a number

of “sub-lists”. For example, it is ranked 41 out of 135 under “Top Foreign Policy

and International Affairs Think Tanks”; and it is ranked as 58th of 110 under “Top

Think Tank by Area Research” (McGann 2017: 72, 84). It is furthermore ranked

at 24 out of 75 “Best Government Affiliated Think Tanks” as well as 107 out of

150 “Best Independent Think Tanks (McGann 2017: 106, 144). This ranking

probably highlights two aspects of studying think tanks and their activities. First,

the international expert community is probably slow to pick up how the influence

of an individual think tank changes domestically. Second, categorizing think tanks

is difficult.

4.4 Gorchakov Fund

The Gorchakov Fund was established in 2010. The objective of the fund is to

engage in public diplomacy. Financing is mixed, coming from the state and

undefined sponsors. The work of the fund is disbursing grants to NGOs in Russia

and abroad. Projects are funded after an application procedure where projects

compete for grants. The fund runs about 260 projects in 20 thematic areas yearly

(interview). There are dialogue projects with different countries, regions and

topics, and there are academic and educational projects. There are also projects

facilitating mobility and travel of experts and students (Gorchakov Fund, website).

The fund supports what it calls NGOs in Russia and abroad; however, this category

also includes work with other groups such as parliamentarians. The Gorchakov

Fund works with young people of different ages and supports youth centres at

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universities (interview). Partners are the RIAC, Rossotrudnichestvo, the Russkiy

Mir Foundation and the MGIMO (Gorchakov Fund, website).

The Gorchakov Fund works with different countries and regions. For example, it

has cooperation with France, Finland, China, Iran, Central Asia and the Baltic

states. It has a cooperation scheme with German parliamentarians in the so-called

“Postdamskie vstrechi” where German and Russian members of Parliament meet

twice a year in Russia and Germany (interview). The fund has an Information

Centre in Kyiv and a Russian-Georgian/Georgian-Russian Public Centre in Tbilisi

which was founded in July 2013 (Gorchakov Fund, website). It does not have any

publication series of its own.

During the first three years of the fund’s existence, activities included about 300

participants from CIS and the Baltic countries and Eastern and Southern Europe

who became alumni of the fund’s research and educational programmes. Many of

them continue to maintain a close relationship with the fund, supporting its

cooperation with NGOs and universities. In 2013 a decision was made to create a

Club of Friends of the Gorchakov Fund and invite the most active young

participants of the research and educational programmes for cooperation. The club

takes part in roundtables, presentations and other events that are organized on

various Russian and foreign platforms (Gorchakov Fund, website).

The Gorchakov Fund appears to have a broad approach and there is no very strict

focus or mission. It targets youth organizations, which indicates that it wants to

build networks for years ahead, but it also engages with established actors like

parliamentarians. Public diplomacy may come in a variety of aspects but the

representatives the authors met in the interviews in 2017 gave few concrete

examples of with whom they actually work. This organization might work with

foreign political parties and their youth organizations or with foreign NGOs

attempting to influence public opinion or supporting activism in different fields;

however, this could not be proved during his study.

4.5 Russian Institute for Strategic Studies

(RISI)

The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies was founded by Presidential Decree No.

202 of 29 February 1992. From 1992 to 2009, the RISI was an institute under the

Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Even after the institute was tasked with

providing the Presidential Administration in particular with analyses, its directors

have had an SVR background. Leonid Reshetnikov attained the rank of lieutenant-

general within the SVR before going on to head the RISI from 2009 to 2016;

Mikhail Fradkov headed the SVR from 2007 to 2016 and took over as director of

the RISI in January 2017.

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The RISI is entirely state-funded and its director is appointed through presidential

decrees (RISI Statutes; UDPRF, “Perechen…”). Its funding is channelled through

the Office for Administrative Affairs of the President of the Russian Federation

and the RISI supplies the federal organs of power with analytical information for

strategic decisions on national security policy (UDPRF, “Federalnoe…”). It

appears to have become one of the main institutes for reviewing policy documents

(interview) and is the think tank that is most likely to influence Russian foreign

policymaking since its analyses are circulated within the Presidential

Administration, the Security Council and government.

According to a former senior researcher at the RISI, the think tank provided

analysis and advice on Ukraine that was very much in line with the Russian foreign

policy conducted. The former senior researcher, Aleksandr Sytin (2015), claims

that under Reshetnikov the institute changed its research direction and became

preoccupied with Russian imperial history as well as the Russian Orthodox

Church. Although Sytin can perhaps be argued to have an axe to grind with the

RISI after having left the institute, a quick browse through the publications on the

institute’s website suggests that his claim is at least partly true. Whether the RISI’s

research direction will change again under Fradkov remains to be seen.

According to the RISI statutes adopted in 2012, the institute is tasked by the

Presidential Administration and the themes in this tasking order are not open

information. The organization of the institute into a number of centres suggests

that focus themes are research on “the near abroad” (the CIS and the Baltic states),

economics, Euro-Atlantic and defence studies as well as Asia and the Middle East.

There is also a Centre for Research on Complex Problems, which appears to

concentrate on domestic problems as well as migration and demographics (RISI

2017b).

The tasks of the institute according to its statutes are:

 researching current international and military-political problems; the

military and military-industrial policy of the leading countries in the

world; the future development of bilateral relations between Russia and

other states; and the social-political situation in the “near abroad”;

 expertise in and evaluation of Russia’s security policy;

 studying the development of international economic relations, the

development of the world economy and the economic policy of Russia’s

main partners; and

 analysis and forecasting of developments in certain countries where crises

could erupt as well as developing proposals for how to handle such

situations.

In order to fulfil these tasks, the RISI conducts research, gathers information and

develops relations with institutions of higher education in Russia and other

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countries. It can also establish formal cooperation agreements with Russian and

foreign research centres (RISI Statutes).

On its Facebook page, the RISI comments mainly in Russian on international

affairs and informs about its own work (Facebook “RISI”) and its journal

Problemy natsionalnoi strategii (National Strategy Issues) is published in Russian

with a short description of its content in English. The journal invites authors from

Russia and from other countries, but with the caveat that: “The RISI team feel free

to express their patriotic positions and invite everyone for cooperation. Everyone

who is fond of Russia” (RISI, “Journal”). Its other publications, for example its

books series and reports, are mostly in Russian with only a few reports available

in English. All in all, this suggests that a Russian-speaking audience is the main

target for the RISI’s analytical activity.

The RISI is also active in different formats within the CIS and the BRICS countries

(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). For example, the RISI has run a

School for Young Political Scientists especially for participants from the CIS

countries since 2012 (RISI, “School”). There is furthermore a clear focus on the

former republics of the Soviet Union as well as on Eurasian integration. However,

the institute reaches out beyond the CIS not least through its representatives in

Turkey, Poland, France and the countries of Northern Europe. The RISI has a

representative office in Serbia, (RISI, “Contacts”; RISI, “Kapnist”). In addition, it

often receives visits from representatives of other countries in Moscow and there

are examples of RISI associates taking part in conferences abroad. For example,

Vladimir Kozin, who is presented as the main advisor to the RISI director,

delivered a talk at the conference “The North – a Zone of Peace” in Stockholm on

4 February 2017. His talk centred on the danger that the US and NATO posed to

the world (Kozin 2017).

A study from 2016 highlights that one of the things that set the RISI apart from

other institutions is its production of propaganda video material (Vojtíšková et al.

2016: 51). What is probably meant here is “RISI TV”, which produces YouTube

clips publicizing the RISI’s activities as well as its view on topical issues. Its motto

is “We know more” (RISITV, website). According to Mark Galeotti at the Institute

of International Relations Prague and the Centre for European Security, the RISI

remains the SVR’s PR arm. “From warning against Sweden and Finland joining

NATO to damning the ‘terrorists’ of Ukraine, its position is in step with official

policy and Foreign Intelligence Service analysis” (Galeotti 2016: 12).

In 2017, the RISI was furthermore accused of having advised the Presidential

Administration on how to interfere in the US elections. A Reuters article claimed

that a RISI document from June 2016 argued in favour of launching a campaign

through social media to promote presidential candidates believed to stand for a

softer approach towards Russia (Reuters 2017). A second analysis from October

2016 reportedly reached the conclusion that Hillary Clinton was likely to win and

that the best strategy therefore was to undermine the legitimacy of the US election

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and political system rather than focus on pro-Trump propaganda (Parker, Landay

& Walcott 2017). These allegations were ridiculed by Russian officials, including

Mikhail Fradkov in a statement on the institute’s website (RISI 2017a).

In early May 2017, Mikhail Fradkov launched a reorganization of the institute.

There were to be two main directions of its research. A regional direction was

divided into six centres for studying the US; Canada and Latin America; Europe;

Central Asia and Asia-Pacific; the Near East and Middle East; Africa; and the

countries of the “near abroad”. A functional direction was divided into a centre for

humanitarian, one for economic, and one for military-political research (RISI

2017b). Furthermore, during the reorganization a new scientific plan was to be

developed in order to “significantly raise the productivity and quality of the expert

work” (RISI 2017b). New directors often want to put their stamp on an

organization and point out a new direction, but the emphasis on raising quality and

productivity nevertheless suggests that there might have been a level

dissatisfaction with previous work in the RISI. This was underlined by the

comment of Mikhail Fradkov that accompanied the RISI announcement of the

reorganization. After stating that the institute had become the target of information

provocations he stated that there was a need to be “more professional” so that there

would be no need “to refute wild guesses” (RISI 2017b).

4.6 Rethinking Russia

Rethinking Russia has its roots in another think tank, the Institute of Social-

Economic and Political Research (ISEPR). When you sign up to receive

Rethinking Russia’s newsletter, you receive a thank-you in response from the

ISEPR. The ISEPR has been mainly involved in Russian domestic politics and is

closely connected to the All-Russia People’s Front (ONF)

and to the speaker of

the Duma, Viacheslav Volodin, who was behind the setting up of the ONF when

he was deputy head of the Presidential Administration and responsible for

monitoring Russian domestic politics.

The ISEPR was instrumental in creating Rethinking Russia, which directs part of

its efforts abroad. The ISEPR chairman, Dmitrii Badovskii, plays a more

influential role in Russian politics than his formal position suggests. He has been

directly involved in setting up political parties to dilute the vote for the opposition

in Russia (Vendil Pallin 2016). In 2013, Putin issued a presidential order (No. 115,

29 March) that made the ISEPR Foundation one of the recipients of the

“presidential grant”. In addition, a presidential executive order in January 2014

The RISI tried to establish a regional centre for Northern Europe with an office in Helsinki,

managed by the Finnish researcher Johan Bäckman. This idea appears to have been abandoned;

there is no information on such a centre on the RISI’s website.

The ONF was established in 2011 as an additional election vehicle for the re-election of Vladimir

Putin.

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entrusted the ISEPR (2015b) with distributing state support to NGOs “that

implement socially important projects and projects in the field of protection of the

rights and freedoms of man and citizen”.

In 2015, the ISEPR brought together a group of Russian and international

researchers, referred to as “Klub 21”, and presented a volume entitled

Democracies XXI: A Paradigm Shift (ISEPR 2015a). Volodin was among those

who attended the launch of the research volume. According to the initiators,

Rethinking Russia was created as an alternative to the Valdai Club. The intention

was to specialize in domestic politics based on scientific research and to bring to

a Russian and international audience a “more informed view” of how Russia’s

political system was evolving. There appeared to be an ambition to relaunch or

rebrand the idea of a Russian “sovereign democracy” as being equally valid as the

liberal democracy promoted by the West. Offices were reportedly opened in

Moscow and Brussels (Nagornykh 2015; Shevchuk 2015).

Its director in the years 2015–2017 was Yan Vaslavskii, who came from a position

at the MGIMO. The current director is Alexander Konkov who came to it from a

position as deputy head of the Department of Political Analysis of the Faculty of

Public Administration at Moscow State University. He had furthermore been an

advisor to the executive director of the Gorchakov Fund (Rethinking Russia 2017).

The English website of Rethinking Russia states that this international analytical

centre “takes as a premise” that there is (a) a strong interdependence between

domestic and foreign policies; (b) a need for dialogue between Russia and the West

“in a new format of relationship”; and (c) a “current crisis of Russian studies, lack

of profound expert support for decisions on Russia in the West” (Rethinking

Russia, “About”). The Facebook page of Rethinking Russia notes that there are

many analysts in the West who are sympathetic to Russia or objective, analysts

who have an interest in arriving at a conclusion as to what is “the true state of

affairs in Russia”. These analysts are, according to Rethinking Russia, often

hindered from making their analyses public and forced to adapt to the

“mainstream” (Facebook “Rethinking Russia”).

The same message is underlined in the study Think Tank Atlas: Russian Studies

Abroad, published by Rethinking Russia in 2016. The study lists over 600 think

tanks outside Russia that occasionally to frequently publish on Russia. They are a

motley crew – everything from government agencies to single-person institutes is

included and in the appendix some institutes appear to have been registered twice.

In addition to the database on think tanks, the study builds on interviews conducted

especially in the US, large European countries and Asia. The study concludes that

after the Cold War the countries in the West especially downsized their respective

Russia studies programmes. This has, according to the study, “led to the

disintegration of the expert community working on Russia and the gradually

declining quality of expertise on Russia”. In turn, the study concludes that this has

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had a negative effect on Russian public diplomacy and Russia’s image abroad

(Rethinking Russia 2016: 71).

As expert interviews show, the decision-makers in Europe are strongly influenced by the

media. However, it is important that foreign think tanks rely heavily on studies and comments

of their Russian colleagues. In this context it is valid for Russian “think tanks” to cover the

events in Russia for the international research community.

(Ibid: 72)

In other words, Rethinking Russia claims that it is a dearth of knowledge in the

West that is behind Russia’s poor image abroad rather than an informed analysis

of Russia’s policies and activities at home and abroad. This brings to mind the

emphasis in the Foreign Policy Concept on the need for Russia to project an

“objective” image (Foreign Policy Concept 2016: §§46–48).

In its publications as well as its communications through social media, it is obvious

that the core message is to relay Russia’s perspective on world affairs. It is

especially worth noting how much effort went into promoting the Russian

parliamentary elections in September 2016 as effective and democratic. Putin is

quoted extensively in publications and on social media, as is Viacheslav Volodin

on the website. Moreover, Rethinking Russia’s Facebook page was active in

distributing messages and analyses about how American democracy was seriously

flawed during the US election campaign (Facebook “Rethinking Russia”, 2 August

2016) and interpreted Donald Trump’s victory as evidence of the “deep systemic

crisis in American society” (Facebook “Rethinking Russia”, 14 November 2016).

The conclusions of the Dutch investigation into what brought down flight MH17

are dismissed as “no surprise considering the seething anti-Russia hysteria that has

gripped the Western imagination of late” (Facebook “Rethinking Russia”, 29

September 2016).

Rethinking Russia is geared towards both a domestic and an international

audience. This is indicated by the fact that its website, its Facebook page and its

journal, Rethinking Russia, are all published in both English and Russian. The

think tank has taken part in conferences abroad and seeks to engage with the

international research community. It has managed to attract international

researchers to write articles or chapters in its publications.

Rethinking Russia and the ISEPR publish a yearbook, Surprising Russia, together

with the opinion survey institute Russian Opinion Research Centre (VTsIOM) and

the coordination centre “Platform”. In Surprising Russia 2015, the head of

VTsIOM, Valerii Fedorov, starts by establishing that the sociology developed in

the West cannot be applied to Russia – that another approach is required (Firsov

et al. 2016: 3) and Dmitrii Badovskii ends his introduction to Surprising Russia

2015 by stating that the publication has “the potential to become a manual for

policymakers” by helping them to understand Russia (Firsov et al. 2016: 7).

Surprising Russia contains a number of opinion polls in selected years, but usually

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not entire time series that would show how polling results have fluctuated over

time. Instead the reader is presented with the marked difference in expressed

opinions in 2014–2015 compared to individual years, sometimes as far back as

1990. The book also contains expert opinions, sometimes commenting on the

findings in opinion polls, but often not. For example, the section on Ukraine

contains opinion polls among Russians on the war in Donbas, while expert

opinions conclude that Ukraine has “lost its sovereignty to outer forces” since

Washington and Brussels dictate Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy (Firsov et

al. 2016: 40) and that Euromaidan was the result of Western meddling (Firsov et

al. 2016: 36). This is very much in line with how the chain of events leading up to

the war in Ukraine is described in Russia’s National Security Strategy, where it is

stated that:

The support of United States and the European Union for an anti-constitutional coup d’état

in Ukraine resulted in a deep-going divide in Ukrainian society and that an armed conflict

began.

(National Security Strategy 2015: §17)

From the opinion polls that express increased trust in Vladimir Putin and

endorsement of the annexation of Crimea, expert opinion concludes, among other

things, that “Russia’s political system rests upon the principles of direct

democracy” and that “wholesale democratic transformations” had been initiated

by the Russian government after the demonstrations in 2011–2012 (Firsov et al.

2016: 72–73). This part of the report appears to have been written to boost the

legitimacy of the Russian political system as a whole, but perhaps more

specifically its democratic credentials.

In 2017, the GGTTI rating included Rethinking Russia as number 35 of 45 “Best

New Think Tanks 2016”, but its overall impact on the international academic

debate should probably not be overemphasized as yet. Rethinking Russia does

stand out as a think tank with a clear mission to promote Russia’s view of the

world. It is also very vague about its funding and management.

4.7 Dialogue of Civilizations (DOC)

The DOC Research Institute opened officially in Berlin in the summer of 2016

(Schult 2016). According to its website, the think tank was funded through an

endowment, the World Public Forum “Dialogue of Civilizations” (WPF DoC),

based in Switzerland, as well as through membership fees and sponsorship. The

endowment was registered in 2013 by Vladimir Yakunin, the former CEO of

Russian Railways (DofC, “WPF…”). However, it is obvious that the DOC

Research Institute builds on previous activities. The endowment from the WPF

DoC dates back to 2002 and in June 2017 the DOC Research Institute was set to

celebrate the fifteenth anniversary of its annual Rhodes Forum.

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Yakunin is regarded as belonging to an inner circle of the power network around

Vladimir Putin and became notorious in Russia for his opulent lifestyle, especially

when details of his mansion outside Moscow were published (Gel’man 2016: 457;

Schult 2016). His wife, Natalia Yakunina, is chairperson of the WPF DoC and the

foundation states that it focuses “on intercultural dialogue according to the

International Decade for the Rapprochement of Cultures programme of UNESCO,

as well as developing of alternative concepts of world order, such as Chinese

dream, Trans-Eurasian Belt Development and world order, based on dialogue and

historical traditions” (DofC, “WPF ‘Dialogue of Civilizations’ today”). The

foundation specifically refers to the resolution on a “Global Agenda for Dialogue

among Civilizations” adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2001 (UN 2001).

The foundation’s work is in line with Russia’s policy of trying to push the agenda

in different UN forums towards civilizational-diversity and traditional-values

agendas to challenge what have previously been regarded as universal liberal

democratic values (Cooley 2016: 121).

Apart from funding through the WPF DoC endowment, the research centre states

that it is funded through membership fees and sponsorship as well as proceeds

from publishing and activities arranged by the DOC (DOC, “Funding”). The aim

of the DOC is to “offer global policy makers and major multi-national corporations

practical advice and solutions” on six topics:

 East and West: Bridging the Postmodern Identity Gap;

 Life Space for Humanity: protecting the Humane in Human Beings;

 Policies, Institutions, and Progress for Global Inclusive Development;

 Civilizations Against the Threat of Social Barbarism;

 Infrastructure as the Backbone of Global Inclusive Development; and

 The Economics of Post-Modernity: When Conventional Models Fail

(DOC, “Mission”).

Apart from emphasizing diversity and civilizational agendas, the DOC’s

“paradigm” includes looking for alternative economic models. Thus, in a call for

papers under the headline “The Economics of Post-Modernity: When

Conventional Models Fail”, authors are instructed to consider “novel economic

models”, “new critiques of neo-liberalism” as well as “non-mainstream economic

models” (DOC 2017).

The WPF DoC underlines its connections, however tenuous, with the UN agenda

(UN 2001), but is vague on exactly how it cooperates with the UN. Yakunin served

in the Soviet diplomatic mission to the UN 1985–1991 and is thus probably well

versed in how the organization works. In spite of this, actual traces of cooperation

with the UN are not evident from the WPF DoC webpage and there are now

representatives of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),

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which it says it enjoys a consultative status in the management of the foundation.

The UN is generally well looked upon internationally and stating that an activity

or an aim is in accordance with a UN framework or resolution is a way of

legitimizing it.

In the first of a promised series of Yakunin speeches published by the DOC in May

2017, he provided a strong advocacy for the Eurasian Union. He stated that there

was “a serious shortfall among political scientists capable of adequately carrying

out research and providing recommendations to politicians and public officials”

when it comes to analysing the dissolution of the Soviet Union and developments

in the countries that became independent. To rectify this he announced that there

was now “an agreement for implementing a master’s degree program in English

entitled Post-Soviet Public Policy at the Moscow State University” (Yakunin

2017).

The Dialogue of Civilizations research centre appears to be well funded. Few think

tanks around the world invite authors to write papers with a specific angle – usually

GONGOs and think tanks spend a great deal of time hunting for commissions

instead. Funding of all the activities the DOC engages in is basically done through

the foundation WPF DoC, which in turn provides few details about how it was set

up financially, but in its origin it is intimately connected with Yakunin and his

agenda.

4.8 Institute of Democracy and Cooperation

(IDC), Paris

At the EU–Russia Summit in Lisbon in October 2007, President Putin officially

launched the Russian initiative to create a “Russian–European institute for

freedom and democracy”. The EU was active in supporting similar activity in

Russia, he stated, and now the time had come for Russia to do the same for the EU

by opening an institute in Brussels “or another of the European capitals”. Russia

was ready to devote the same kind of financial resources as the EU was devoting

to activity “on Russian territory” (President of Russia 2007). The Institute of

Democracy and Cooperation was founded in 2008 in Paris and the former Duma

deputy Natalia Narochnitskaya

became its director. An institute with an identical

name was created in New York almost simultaneously. Both were supported by

Russia’s political leadership and intended to serve as an instrument of influence in

Natalia Alekseevna Narotchnitskaya is a Russian politician, historian and diplomat. Between

1982 and 1989 she worked at the Secretariat-General of the UN in New York. She was elected to

the Russian State Duma as a representative of the Rodina bloc in 2003–2007 and served as vice-

chair of the International Affairs Committee in the State Duma. Narochnitskaya advocates that an

indispensable condition for the success of Russia’s foreign policy in the modern world is the

renewal and in-depth study of traditional (pre-Soviet) foundations of Russian diplomacy.

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the West. Both were probably set up with initial government funding, according

to an American diplomat. He concluded as much in 2008 based on information

from Anatolii Kucherena (information in a Wikileaks cable, quoted by Braw

2015). Kucherena headed the Moscow-based fund Institute for Democracy and

Cooperation, which in turn opened the offices in New York and Paris (the Paris

office was later branched off since French legislation did not allow it to be headed

from Moscow).

The New York institute, under the leadership of Andranik Migranyan,

was closed

down in December 2015, probably mainly because of problems with funding. At

the same time, Narochnitskaya admitted that the IDC in Paris was also finding it

difficult to attract funding. It seems that most of the funding had come from

Russian businesses and they were hit by sanctions and the fall in the oil price in

2014–2015. There were sources close to the political leadership that claimed that

the institutes were gradually being replaced by a younger generation of experts and

institutes, among them Rethinking Russia (Vinokurov et al. 2015).

The IDC in Paris appears to be a two-people operation. Apart from

Narochnitskaya, John Laughland

is director of studies. The institute does not

appear to publish reports and analyses itself. The aim of the institute at its

inception, to deliver analysis and research on the observance of human rights in

Europe (IDC 2008), appears to have been abandoned. Instead the institute’s main

activity seems to consist in Narochnitskaya and Laughland making statements,

addressing conferences or being interviewed on a variety of topics, where they are

presented as experts – between them they cover everything from Brexit and the

French elections to the war in Ukraine (IDC, website). Overall, the institute’s

activity appears to be grinding to a halt because of lack of funding and low or non-

existent output in terms of publications and research events.

4.9 Information Security Institute (IISI)

The Information Security Institute was founded in 2003 and is a separate

department of Moscow State University. Its focus is research and there are no

courses taught for students at the institute (IISI, “About us”). No details are

Andranik Migranyan is an Armenian-born Russian political scientist who is a professor at

the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. During the 1990s he was an advisor to Boris

Yeltsin. From 1993 till 2000 he was a Member of the Presidential Council of the Russian

Federation. In 1994 served as chief advisor to the Committee on CIS Problems in the Russian

Duma. From 2008 to 2015 he served as the director of the Institute for Democracy and

Cooperation, New York, founded in 2007.

John Laughland is a British eurosceptic academic and author who writes on international affairs

and political philosophy. He has a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Oxford. Until

2008 he was the European director of the European Foundation, a eurosceptic think tank. He has

been Director of Studies at the IDC in Paris since 2008.

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provided on funding, but there is a list of customers and partners, which indicate

that the institute works on commission mainly for the Presidential Administration,

ministries and government services and agencies, including the Russian General

Staff and the Federal Security Service, as well as Russian big business (IISI, “Our

Customers”; IISI, “Our Partners”). There is furthermore a strong link with the

apparatus of the Russian Security Council, which is part of the Presidential

Administration. Among directors and deputy directors of the IISI, three out of four

have worked for the Security Council apparatus (IISI, “Rukovodstvo”). The IISI

director, Vladislav Sherstiuk, has a background within the KGB and has served as

deputy secretary of the Security Council; the first deputy director, Valerii

Yashenko, served in the Soviet security service up to 1991 and has in his capacity

as advisor to the principal represented the Moscow State University in various

commissions of the Security Council; Deputy Director Anatolii Streltsov has a

background working for the Ministry of Defence and has also worked as head of

the department of the apparatus of the Security Council that was responsible for

information security (Streltsov 2013).

The IISI has been described as “one of the Russian Security Council’s channels

for exercising influence abroad” (Nocetti 2015: 119). It is clearly involved in

promoting Russia’s view on information security to an international audience.

Among other things, the IISI organizes an annual conference on information

security, usually in Garmisch-Partenkirchen in Germany. The fourteenth annual

conference was organized there in April 2017. From the programme and the

conference resolution issued by the IISI, it is obvious that the Russian agenda of

strengthening the sovereignty of states in the cyber arena is actively promoted for

discussion (IISI, “Odinnadtsatyi…”). The institute has also been engaged in

bilateral meetings “with European and Asian officials and experts, with the evident

aim of influencing them on ‘information security’ issues” (Nocetti 2015: 119). At

a conference arranged by Georgetown University, Anatolii Streltsov (2013)

recognized the work done within the framework for developing the Tallinn

Manual

as a first step, but underlined that international law needed amendment.

He went on to argue in favour of the draft convention on information security

presented by Russia at the UN.

The institute employs just over twenty researchers and its work is organized in

three sections and two centres:

 Mathematical Studies in Information Security Section;

The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare is an academic, non-

binding study on how international law applies to cyber conflicts and cyber warfare. Between 2009

and 2012, the Tallinn Manual was written at the invitation of the Tallinn-based NATO

Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence by an international group of experts. It was

published by Cambridge University Press in April 2013.

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 Information Security for the Computer Systems Section;

 Humanist Studies in Information Security Section;

 Qualification Documents Expertise and Approval Centre; and

 Centre of the International Collaboration in Security Studies and

Terrorism Counteracting. (IISI, “About Us”)

The institute is manned by specialists in information systems and security, but

there are relatively few publications listed on its website (IISI, “Trudy i

publikatsii”). Obviously the institute’s work consists more in providing services to

Russian government authorities and big business than in producing scholarly

work. Certainly, the institute has a key role in promoting Russia’s position on

information security to an international audience through its experts and is open

about this as well as the background of its director and deputy directors.

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5 Conclusions

The main purpose of this study was to explore how Russia uses soft power to

influence expert communities as well as a wider public opinion in the West with

the help of think tanks and similar GONGOs. In addition the study has attempted

to find out how the Russian state finances and controls the think tanks and

GONGOs examined and what channels are used to disseminate ideas and

narratives about Russia and the world.

The study discusses nine organizations of which three ‒ the RIAC, Rethinking

Russia and SVOP ‒ are listed as think tanks in the international GGTTI rating.

However, we would suggest that the Valdai Club also has the characteristics of a

think tank. The RISI is a state-owned organization that produces government

propaganda and the remaining four ‒ the Gorchakov Fund, the DOC, the IDC and

the IISI ‒ are GONGOs that channel their influence through grant schemes,

projects with NGOs and political organizations, and a presence in different policy

environments. All these organizations are dependent on the Russian state for

financial support. Other donors are as a rule Russian big business and private

persons. The experts of the think thanks often come from well-known research

institutes or the policy arena, are attractive to Western partners and often appear

as guests at expert events abroad. The fact that they have access to the Russian

government and president, in a way that few Westerners have, increases their

attraction and perceived relevance on these occasions.

Overall, the think tanks and GONGOs that have the widest interface with Western

researchers tend to be the ones that are the least propagandistic, that take on less

of an advocacy role in their messaging. The RIAC and to a certain extent the Valdai

Club and SVOP have good working relations with the Western academic and

expert community and their experts are highly sought after as speakers at

conferences and roundtables around the world.

The think tanks that are more obviously conveying the Russian official message

tend to end up creating networks with experts, organizations and institutes in the

West that are less mainstream – but not necessarily less influential since they may

work with extreme political groups or movements. This is certainly the case for

the RISI, but Rethinking Russia and the DOC have found it more difficult to

establish an influential voice in the international debate on foreign relations – but

then perhaps this is not the overall goal, but rather to reach marginal groups. The

Gorchakov Fund works with youth groups in other countries, which could indicate

that it takes a long-term perspective in its efforts to forge contacts and build

networks to carry Russian values and views in the future.

The study finds that for most of the think tanks there are close links to the

Presidential Administration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, when

cooperating and having dialogue with Russian think tanks there is every reason to

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be well aware of the conditions in which they operate as well as what agenda they

are likely to promote. There is also a need for more transparency when it comes to

exactly how such cooperation takes place and on what terms. There are already

codes of conduct for how to present research data and results (see for example

ALLEA 2011). Similar codes of conduct for transparency of funding and links to

government authorities or big business when conferences and workshops are

organized would be a good step on the way to becoming aware of links and

dependencies (see also Foxall 2015: 13).

One of the messages conveyed above by certain Russian think tanks is that

knowledge about Russia is lacking in the West, or perhaps more precisely the right

knowledge is lacking. Partly this is in line with the security policy documents that

call for “objective” or “unbiased” information on Russia and its policies. But there

is also a Russian proposition here that research and analysis in the West arrive at

negative conclusions about Russia and therefore must be of poor quality.

Finally, this study has not addressed the narratives promoted by individual Russian

think tanks in greater detail. However, the study shows that the think tanks follow

the intentions of the Foreign Policy Concept in that they engage Russian academics

and experts in the dialogue with foreign specialists on global politics and

international security. Thereby, think tanks promote Russian public diplomacy and

Russia’s strategic narratives externally, which is an explicit goal of the Concept.

The Concept may also be seen as a guideline for which narratives think tanks may

promote. Deeper investigation of how individual think tanks’ narratives develop

would be a good task for future research.

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List of interviews

Date 2017

Organization

13 January

Valdai Club

16 January

RIAC

16 January

17 March

Embassy of Sweden in Moscow (about RISI)

Press attaché of Embassy of Sweden

16 January

Gorchakov Fund

18 January

SVOP

18 January

Roscongress

Russian Think Tanks

and Soft Power

August 2017

FOI-R-4451-SE

ISSN1650-1942 www.foi.se

Carolina Vendil Pallin and Susanne Oxenstierna

Russian Think Tanks and Soft Power Carolina Vendil Pallin and Susanne Oxenstierna

Academic community and policy-making in Russia: : impact or detachment?

Article

Aug 2018
PROBL POST-COMMUNISM

Katarzyna Kaczmarska

This paper is concerned with the role of IR expertise and the academia-policy nexus in contemporary Russia. Drawing on interviews with Russia-based scholars, it posits that while there exist some formal channels of knowledge diffusion between academia and the state, there is no clear-cut relationship between knowledge produced in academia and the uses of this knowledge by the state. Two concurrent trends can be identified in the relationship between academic community and the policy-making world. On the one hand, authorities expect Russian universities to upgrade their position in international rankings and partake in global intellectual exchanges, the education and publishing market. On the other, the academic community perceives that professional expertise in international relations, and social sciences more broadly, is not valued by policy practitioners. Scholars? attitudes towards policy impact, while generally skeptical, span a broad spectrum. Some are convinced that achieving impact is impossible, some declare unwillingness to interact with the policy-making world, while others find providing expert advice difficult but possible under certain conditions. Since 2014, the state has also increased its efforts to maintain a monopoly on producing foreign policy narratives, which, together with stultifying bureaucracy, pushed some scholars towards even greater caution.

INSTRUMENTS OF RUSSIA’S HYBRID IMPACT: TO THE PROBLEM OF SYSTEMATIZATION

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2020

السیاسة الروسیة الجدیدة فى المنطقة العربیة : دراسة فى أدوات القوة الناعمة وفعالیتها

Article

Jul 2021

رضا هلال

A modern empire and its public diplomacy: On Russia’s communication with Estonia

Article

Full-text available

Aug 2021

Defining the Russian Federation as one of the four contemporary empires (Zielonka 2012), this article links the imperial paradigm (Parker 2010; Zielonka 2012, 2013, 2015; Colomer 2017), social constructs building (Wendt 1992), strategic narrative theory (Miskimmon et al. 2013), and soft power-associated public diplomacy instrumentarium (Melissen 2005; Nye 2008; Cull 2008, 2009; Cowan and Arsenault 2008) into a single conceptual framework to examine public diplomacy by the Russian Federation towards the Republic of Estonia. This analysis assumes that Russia understands Estonia as its own periphery in geo-strategic as well as imperial terms.

Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy

Book

Full-text available

Jan 2020

Making Global Knowledge in Local Contexts: The Politics of International Relations and Policy Advice in Russia

Book

Apr 2020

Katarzyna Kaczmarska

Sanktionerna mot Ryssland. Har de någon effekt?

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2018

Susanne Oxenstierna

Västs ekonomiska sanktioner mot Ryssland med anledning av den ryska aggressionen mot Ukraina 2014 har nu verkat i över fyra år. Målet med sanktionerna har varit att göra det kostsamt för Ryssland att fortsätta sin politik mot Ukraina och få Ryssland att lämna landet. Artikeln visar att sanktionerna har påverkat rysk BNP negativt men Rysslands politik mot Ukraina ligger fast. Ekonomiska sanktioner är ett instrument som används alltmer i internationella relationer för att signalera att ett land beter sig oacceptabelt eller bryter mot internationella konventioner. Men hur effektiva är sanktionerna?

GREAT EURASIA: COOPERATION FOR REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ADVANCEMENT

Presentation

Full-text available

Jan 2017

Vladimir Yakunin

Lecture at The Institute for Iran-Eurasia Studies (IRAS)

The Bear in Sheep's Clothing: Russia's Government-funded Organisations in the Eu

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2016

This paper sheds light on organisations operating in Europe that are funded by the Russian government, whether officially or unofficially. These include government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and think tanks. Their goal is to shift European public opinion towards a positive view of Russian politics and policies, and towards respect for its great power ambitions. In light of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine, the overt or covert support for these organisations must become a matter of concern to the EU. The EU’s politicians and citizens should look at the activities of the Russian GONGOs and think tanks as challenges that can help improve national and EU-level decision-making mechanisms, increase transparency in policymaking and deepen the involvement of citizens and civil society organisations in the democratic process. The paper recommends, among other measures, fostering the EU’s own narrative, which is based on human rights, freedom and equality; supporting pro-democratic civil society so that Europeans become more resistant to Russian propaganda; and increasing transparency requirements for NGOs and lobbyists by setting up a mandatory lobbying register at the EU level.

Can Russia Modernise?: Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2010

Alena Ledeneva

In this original, bottom-up account of the evolution of contemporary Russia, Alena Ledeneva seeks to reveal how informal power operates. Concentrating on Vladimir Putin's system of governance – referred to as sistema – she identifies four key types of networks: his inner circle, useful friends, core contacts and more diffuse ties and connections. These networks serve sistema but also serve themselves. Reliance on networks enables leaders to mobilise and to control, yet they also lock politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen into informal deals, mediated interests and personalised loyalty. This is the 'modernisation trap of informality': one cannot use the potential of informal networks without triggering their negative long-term consequences for institutional development. Ledeneva's perspective on informal power is based on in-depth interviews with sistema insiders and enhanced by evidence of its workings brought to light in court cases, enabling her to draw broad conclusions about the prospects for Russia's political institutions.

Russia's presidential domestic policy directorate: Hq for defeat-proofing Russian politics

Article

Jul 2017
Demokratizatsiya

Carolina Vendil Pallin

Russia's political leaders maintain power through their ability to tailor domestic institutions and manage mechanisms as new challenges arise. The Presidential Administration's Domestic Policy Directorate has become a headquarters for managing society and elites, not least in connection with elections. Instead of focusing on domestic policy, this directorate manages domestic politics. The main challenges facing the Kremlin are, first, overcoming the information deficit; second, keeping society in check and not allowing the emergence of a credible political alternative or criticism that could evolve into mass demonstrations; and, third, ensuring that elites do not build coalitions against the autocrat but instead participate in a power-sharing agreement. The focus and "curatorship" of domestic politics has changed with each person to hold the role of First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, and also with the need for constant adjustment of the defeat-proofing structures within the system as new challenges arise or old ones become more acute.

How can European states respond to Russian information warfare? An analytical framework

Article

Mar 2017
Eur Secur

How can European democratic states respond to Russian information warfare? This article aims to enable and spur systematic research of how democracies can respond to the spread of distorted information as part of information warfare. The article proposes four ideal-type models representing different strategies that democratic governments can employ; blocking, confronting, naturalising and ignoring. Each strategy is illustrated by ways of empirical examples of strategies applied by European states in view of what is regarded as an unwelcome Russian strategic narrative that is spread as part of information warfare. We problematise each strategy and explore reasons for why states choose one strategy over another. We then explore how different strategies might contribute to destabilise or stabilise the security environment and how they resonate with democratic values. Finally, we contribute to theorising on strategic narratives by highlighting that the choice of strategy will influence states in their formation of strategic narratives. We thus further theorising on strategic narratives by highlighting the link between strategies and narratives, thus identifying one central dynamic in how narratives are formed.

Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics

Article

Jan 2005
Int J

The limits of Russia’s ‘soft power’

Article

Sep 2016

Moscow came late to the soft power game, but made it an integral feature of the drive to restore Russia’s great power status. Russia has a proud cultural legacy and has invested heavily in trying to promote a positive image of the country abroad, for example through the Russia Today television channel. However, the leadership faced the challenge of dealing with the complex legacy of the Soviet past, and finding a viable development model for Russia: it is hard for a country facing economic stagnation to project a positive international image. Russia’s authoritarian turn since 2004, and its use of force in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, have reinforced negative stereotypes of Russia as a hard power. For these reasons Russian leaders have largely failed to develop soft power as an effective policy tool.

Free speech: Ten principles for a connected world

Book

Jan 2016

T. Garton Ash

Never in human history was there such a chance for freedom of expression. If we have Internet access, any one of us can publish almost anything we like and potentially reach an audience of millions. Never was there a time when the evils of unlimited speech flowed so easily across frontiers: violent intimidation, gross violations of privacy, tidal waves of abuse. A pastor burns a Koran in Florida and UN officials die in Afghanistan. Drawing on a lifetime of writing about dictatorships and dissidents, Timothy Garton Ash argues that in this connected world that he calls cosmopolis, the way to combine freedom and diversity is to have more but also better free speech. Across all cultural divides we must strive to agree on how we disagree. He draws on a thirteen-language global online project-freespeechdebate.com-conducted out of Oxford University and devoted to doing just that. With vivid examples, from his personal experience of China’s Orwellian censorship apparatus to the controversy around Charlie Hebdo to a very English court case involving food writer Nigella Lawson, he proposes a framework for civilized conflict in a world where we are all becoming neighbors.

Russia’s Foreign Policy and Soft Power

Chapter

Jan 2015

Much of the commentary on Russia’s recent interventions in the near abroad, most notably the March 2014 annexation of the Crimea, has focused on Russia’s hard power — its geopolitical designs in the post-Soviet neighbourhood, ostensible security vulnerabilities to NATO’s eastward expansion, strategic objectives and military capabilities. These questions are not moot and have a strong sense of urgency for leaders in Kyiv, Chisinau and even Astana nervously pondering Russia’s next moves. Yet an excessive focus on the hard aspects of Russia’s power risks obscuring the Kremlin’s attempts to develop its own brand of ‘soft power’ — a factor perhaps equally, if not more important in accounting for the swiftness of operation Crimea than the shady men in balaclavas appearing on the peninsula’s shores.

Promoting Russia abroad: Russia's post-Cold war national identity and public diplomacy

Article

Jan 2016

Thomas Just

As the Soviet Union fell, the ideological glue that was the source of national unity and identity was no longer present in post-Cold War Russia. Recently, however, Russia has made attempts to redefine itself in the post-Cold War world, establish a new national identity, and project it to the world. Russia's exercise of public diplomacy and soft power differ starkly from most Western countries, as the Russian approach is defined by a top-down, centralized nature that emphasizes a nationalist message to its target audiences. The Russian approach has been marked by a tendency to locate and mobilize sympathetic Russian diaspora populations, but an aversion to building networks among those who do not presently share Russia's foreign policy goals. This approach has led to significant limitations on Russia's ability to persuade foreign publics and build new partnerships. Such tendencies are especially evident through an examination of Russia's public diplomacy in Ukraine, where attempts are made to mobilize Russian diaspora communities, while other potential audiences are diminished. This paper argues that the inherent contradictions, limitations, and divisive nature of Russian public diplomacy are especially evident in the case of the Crimean annexation and inhibit Russia's ability to influence and persuade non-Russian audiences.

Russian Think Tanks and Soft Power

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