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The NLD-Military Coalition in Myanmar: Military Guardianship and Its Economic Foundations

January 2017

In book: Khaki Capital. The Political Economy of the Military in Southeast Asia (pp.93-130)
Publisher: NIAS Press
Editors: Paul Chambers and Napisa Waitoolkiat

Authors:

Marco Bünte

Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nürnberg

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CHAPTER 3

The NLfMilitary Coalition in Myanmar

Military Guardianship and lts Economic

Fou ndations

Marco Biinte

Not so long ago, Myanmar's military regime was widcly rcg.rrtletl .rs .rrr

cxception.r Whereas military regimes worlclwide wcrc givinl{ w.ry t()

nrulti-party democracies in the 1980s ancl 1990s, tlre rrrilit.rly legrrrrr.

in Myanmar, ruling directly since 1988, withstoo.l tlrat trt'rrtl. Altlrorrglr

1.rr from being considered legitimate internllly or irrtcrrr.rt ion.rlly, the

rnilitary iunta remained unusually stable. Myannrar-'.s rrrrrctl lirlccs

(Tatmadaw) were often described as a'statc within l statc' (Steinberg

2OOlt 74) or as a 'garrison state' following Harold Lirswells concept of

rnilitaries as'masters ofviolence' usurping state power (Laswell l94i).

Some scholars went even further and portrayed Myanmars military

.rs lhe state, given its deep penetration of the regime, the economy and

the society (Steinberg 2007). Steinberg once suggested that Myanmar

might even be 'the most militarized society in the contemporary

world' (ibid.: t 27). The presence of men in uniform in the regime's top

decision-making positions, and the military as an economic actor with

.r huge share in the national economy (including companies, factories,

land titles and investments), with ownership of monasteries, schools

.rnd charities - all this illustrates the deep permeation of the military

into fundamental aspects ofthe state and the society. The many Western

observers who sec the rnilitary's deep penetration as an anomaly fail to

.rcknowledge th.rt this sitrrltion rnight be the result of decades of anti-

er>loniirlstrugglcs.rrtrl t'lliuls.rl rr.rtitrn [.ruilcling struggles th;rt often led

l. l}tllnr.r w.rs rr.rr.rrr,.,l rn lrlx') l l ' i , , l r , t l ' t r ' r rrsr.s lir11rr.r'lo r'elir to lhe rountry

beli)re I()89, /!ly,rrrrrr.u Ilr, r,',rlt, r

Khaki Capital

to an interventionist military, ifwe thinkfor instance oflndonesia before

1998, Pakistan, Thailand or Myanmar (Chambers 2013; Koonings &

Kruijt 2002; Riiland, Manea & Born2O72; Mietzner 2012).

Yet, since 2011 we have also witnessed astonishing reforms in

Myanmar. After 22years of direct militaryrule, the junta (the State Peace

and Development Council) formally handed over power to a 'civilian

government in March 2011. To the surprise of many, President Thein

Sein (previously a high-ranking member of the former military iunta)

introduced a far- reaching liberalization ofthe political system, political

prisoners were released, censorship was abolished and new political

freedoms were established. These reforms culminated in the free and

fair elections of 8 November 2015, in which the oppositional National

League for Democracy (NLD) under the leadership ofAung San Suu

Kyi won a landslide. Though some of these reforms were planned well

before, to facilitate an exit for long-term strongman Senior General

Than Shwe and to ease the competition in the upper echelons ofthe

military (Biinte 2014), the extent of these reforms surprised many. The

International Crisis Group already speculated that the military'C reform

path might lead to its'return to the barracks' (ICG 2014).

How real are these changes and how far do they go? How could the

military become so entrenched in politics, the economy and society?

How can we characterize civil-military relations today, six years after

the introduction of reforms? What are the economic foundations of

military rule and to what extent have these been reformed? I argue that

the military has established a guardianship over the political systenl

shielding and protecting its political power. Although the military is

not ruling directly and has withdrawn from certain segments of the

government and administration, it is guarding the political system from

a position ofstrength. Still a vital part ofthe political game, it is provid-

ing checks on civilian politicians and has shored up its position in the

economy. During the past two decades, the military has been able to

dominate the political system and, in so doingr has generated valuable

income for both military modernization and personal enrichment of

senior military officers. This coercion-intensive period has not only

allowed the military to build up institutions that provide it with tools to

monitor and influence elected politicians, but also k) stiRc the growth

of countcrwcight fcrrccs in civil society. Additiolrrrlly, lhc rrrilitrrry hrrs

The NLD-Militory Coalitiofl in Myannar

consolidated its dominant position in the economyto meet its corPorate

needs and, thus, potentially profit from the current economic opening.

This study follows Siddiqa's understanding ofguardianship as a form

of military capital that is used for military benefit. Accordingly, the

military has 'carved out a permanent role for itself in governance and

politics' (Siddiqa 2008: 69). The studyis organized into fourparts: First,

it outlines the evolution of military rule and its economic foundations

throughout the country's most important critical iunctures. Second, it

gives an overview over the changes that happened since the transition

to civilian rule since 2011, in order to characterize the current state of

civil-military relations and discuss whether these reforms represent

a new critical juncture. Third, it looks into the formal and informal

sources of'khaki capital'before and after the transition to civilian rule

in 2011, in order to show how the military institutionalized its control

of the Myanmar economy and reformed it since then. Finally, the chap-

ter concludes by discussing several scenarios on the future of military

guardianship.

The path towards military control in Burma/Myanmar

The traiectory of civil-military relations in Burma/Myanmar has

been shaped by several critical junctures which have not only brought

an overall dominance of the military in politics and the economy, but

also affected the military's mindset and willingness to share power and

resources with civilians. These critical iunctures help also to explain

why and how the military institutionalized its control of Myanmar's

economy. Three critical iunctures, defined as 'short, time-defined pe-

riods, where antecedent conditions allow contingent choices that set a

specific traiectory ofinstitutional modificationthat is difficult to reverse'

(Page 2006: 8)., have shaped the countryt institutional development:

the formation of the modern Tatmadaw (Burmese army) and the fight

for national independence from the British, the outbreak ofregionalist

rebellions in the early post-indcpcrrtlcnce period, and the breakdown of

the civil-militrry collitiort le,rtling to (icncral Ne Win's coup in 1962.

The period that firllowctl willt lht' r'ist' .rntl f'all of Ne Win'.s socialist

ntilitary rcginrc (1961, ltlt ) rLrrs rrrl rt.[rcsr.,nt .) criticol iur]cture but a

continuing involv(,nrr,nl ol llrr, rr r llll,u y rrr l,olitir ,rl .rflirirs, llbcit rrncler ir

difforcnt institutiorr,ll t ttvllrtllItr,ttl ,rttrl ('r otrorrrir lirrrtttl,r( ion. 'l'hc pr:-

Khtki Capital

riod between 1962 and l9lltl also witnessed the deepening of civii war

between the military and the ethnic rebel armies and the nationalization

and isolation ofthe Burmese economy. After the 1988 student demon-

strations, the regirne evolved into a military oligarchy. The period ftom

1988-2011 was characterized by a deepening ofthe military's role in the

political and economic spheres. At the same time, the military was able

to come to an agreement with some of the ethnic armed organizations.

Before we start to discuss, whether the changes 2011 represent another

critical juncture, let us take a closer look at these critical periods and

how they have affeaed the military as an institution as well as how they

have shaped civil-military relations.

The birth of the modern army, rebellion and the demise oJ the first civil-

military coalition

The first critical juncture can be seen in the struggle for national

independence, which laid the groundwork for a political and military

role ofthe army. Aung San and a group ofyoung nationalists founded

the army in 1941. Originally trained and supported by the Japanese,

the Burmese Independence Army (BIA) was involved in the Japanese

invasion of Burma in 1942, but turned their back against its sponsors

later and fought a guerrilla war against Tokyo (Callahan 2001). After the

return of the Britisll the BlAwas integrated into the BurmaArmyunder

British control. Although offered a senior position in the army, Aung

San declined in favour of becoming the president of the Anti-Fascist

Peoplet Freedom League (a-Flfl), an umbrella organization ofdiverse

nationalist groups and parties, and the military leader of the People's

Volunteer Organisation. He was able to control a huge number ofloyal

soldiers and armed volunteers and to maintain pressure on the British

colonial administratiory which finally retreated and granted Burma in-

dependence in 1948. As the formation ofthe Burmese Army preceded

the existence of an independent state and the offfcer corps was politi-

cized as a liberating force during the struggle for national independence,

the army could retroactively claim the role ofa guardian ofthe Burmese

state and bulwark of national independence (Callahan 2001; 2003).

The overlap of politics and military affairs continued during the im-

mediate post-independence period, since many officcrs wcre affiliated

with thc AFPFL. Others were closely attached to thc (lorrlruunist Part,

which also hrrl a mixcd civilian-military leadcrship.'l'lrc rctrcllions of

The NLD-Militorl Coalition in l$anmat

the Arakanese Muiahidin, the Karen and the communist group after the

departure of the British hit the young army unprepared. Being organ-

ised along ethnic lines, the armed forces lost a huge number oftroops

and much ofits territory beyond Rangoon. Both army and state nearly

collapsed. The outbreak of these insurgencies had devastating conse-

quences and triggered the institutional modernization of the armed

forces, imbued soldiers with a praetorian ethos and led to an increasing

centralization of political power and capital in military realms (Taylor

I985; Callahan 2001; 2003). However, the union government gradually

expanded its territorial control beyond Rangoon and strengthened its

command structure under the leadership of General Ne Win. Although

the weak state became dependent on the army., the military accepted the

supremacy of the U Nu government and the 1947 constitution, which

enshrined civilian control over military expenditures, security policies

and senior promotions (Callahan 2001: 414). However, unlike its Thai

or lndonesian counterparts, the.Burmese army did not develop its own

business network at this point in time (Taylor 1985: 28).

ln the early 1950s, the external threat posed by Kuomintang trooPs

intruding from China triggered the modernization and further strength-

ening of the army. Also, democratic civilian control gave way to what

Janowitz calls a civil-military coalition. The military increasingly took

oyer administrative and civilian functions and claimed one-third to

one-halfofthe national budget for internal security. New organs such as

the Military Planning Staff, the Defence Sersice Institute (DSI) and the

Psychological Warfare Directorate were created. These organizational

reforms brought about improvements in military doctrine, traininS,

logistics and welfare (Callahan 2003: 159). The Defence Service

Institute was established to provide consumer goods to members ofthe

armed forces. This business slowly extended to include a range ofother

economic activities such as banking, shipping, trading, publishing and

retail businesses, leading Aung Myoe to conclude that the DSI became

'the largest commercial enterprise in Myanmar' as early as the end of the

1950s (Myoe 2009: 174). The income generated from these businesses

was utilized for thc wclfirc ofsoltlicrs lnd their families.

The political rolc of tht' nrilit.rry widcncd gndullly until 1958, when

the civil-n.rilitirly co litlotl ht'ttlte tlttwtt. lrtcrcnsirrg fitctionrlisrr within

the ruling AIrl'tll, L,rl kr u ripllt ltr.lwt'crt lltt'ttew'(llcrrn A['l)trl,'Iecl by

Khaki Capital

Prime Minister U Nu and the 'Stable A-FPFL faction led by Ba Swe and

Kyaw Nein. Both factions launched fierce campaigns to rally supporters

and local militias behind them. This split also led to growing parliamen-

tary instability, U Nu barely survived a no-confidence motion in the

Constituent Assembly in June 1958. When polarization increased and

spilled over into the army, General Ne Win urged the civilian govern-

ment ofPrime Minister U Nu to transfer power temporadly to the armed

forces. Although the Ne Win's 'Caretaker Government' returned power

back to civilians in February 1960, the General staged a coup in March

1962, which brought armyleaders back into power and tliminated their

civilian counterparts once and for all' (Callahan 2001 z 422). According

to the ofiicial army rhetoric, U Nu's decision to make Buddhism the

state religion, along with the calls by ethnic groups for greater autonomy

and secession from the union prepared the groundwork for the 7962

military intervention. During this period, the officer corps developed a

praetorian ethos, groundedinthe beliefthat itwas more effective than its

civilian counterparts, The deeply rooted beliefs that civilian politicians

are untrustworthy and the military is above disruptive 'party politics'

have been among ofthe most important and recurrent narratives ofthe

military leadership to this day.

The rise and fall oJ Ne Win's military-socialist regime

ln 1962, General Ne Win formed a l7-man Revolutionary Council of

senior military offfcers, which ruled the country by fiat until 1974. It

abolished the 7947 Constitution, dissolved Parliament, banned all

political parties and barred civil organisations (with the exception

of religious organisations), Under the banner of the 'Burmese Way to

Socialism] the military nationalized the economy and expropriated

private industries and businesses. It set up its own Leninist party, the

Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), which ran the country

unchallenged for over 25 years. The military became the backbone of

the socialist one-party state (t974-88). It permeated both party and

civil bureaucrary: all save one of the members of the BSPP Central

Executive Committee from 1971 to 1985 were active or retired military

officers (Nakanashi 20f 3: 167). Ne Win was both party chairman and

president. Based on his personal influence in the army arrd the party, he

kept his subordinates divided and controlled all potential rivals through

regular purges, Formally, the party controlled the rnlllt.rry institution.

The NLD-MilitdrJ Coalition i1 Mlonmar

However, through informal channels Ne Win controlled both party

and the military by providing retiring military officers with positions

in the BSPP or civilian ministries. Party and civilian bureaucracy in this

way extended the career paths of retired military offtcers, thus easing

generational pressures within the army and laying the foundation for its

extraordinary stability (Nakanashi 2013).

ln the socialist era, the militarywas required to reftain from commer-

cial activities. It nonetheless continued on a very small scalg in order

to address the welfare needs of soldiers and their families. Individual

units engaged in the production of basic commodities. For instance,

battalions grew rice and vegetables and raised poultry and fish, and ran

cottage industries (Myoe 2OO9: 175). However, it was only after the

military's takeover of the state in September 1988 that its commercial

interests were revived on a larger scale.

The harsh economic and political measures introduced by the Ne

Win regime in the 1960s further exacerbated ethnic conflicts. While the

Tatmadaw was able to reassert some control over the heartland, com-

munist and ethnic insurgencies spread rapidly in the rest ofthe country.

The army fought relentless counterinsurgencycampaigns, often brutally

effective, and drove ethnic rebel groups closer to the border regions

(Smith t999: 261). In the I970s and 1980s, much ofthe borderlands

continued to be controlled by ethnic armies, since these terrains often

proved to be inaccessible for the Tatmadaw. The army's offensive ar-

rived at a deadlock and, as a consequence, combat fighters developed

the perception that the army was left with insufficient resources to fight

these insurgencies. Moreover, for its part, the 186,000-strong national

army was regarded as insufficiently equipped trained and poorlyfunded

(Cdlahan zooa, zro).

Ne Win's military-backed, socialist one-party regime crumbled from

within during 1987-88, when the cciuntrywas facing a severe economic

crisis. In order to stop inflation and put an end to blackmarket activities,

the government decided overnight to devalue the country's 25, 35 and

75 kyat currency notes in September 1987. Ne Win introduced 45 and

90 kyat notes, which were multiples of 9, which was his luclry number

and which was astrologically assured to enable him to live up to 90. The

devaluation came witlrout wllnirrg or compensation and rendered more

than 70 percent of thc country ls currcncy worthless. Further economic

Khoki Capital

mismanagement led to mnstiivc student demonstrations in 1988, which

forced General Ne Win to resign as party chairman in July of that year.

The protests es€alated into o broad-based countrywide moyement

that continued untll September 1988, when the military reorganized

itself, staged a coup and brutally cracked down on the moyement,

killing thousands of demonstrators (Steinberg 2001: 3-12.; Lintner

1990). The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SlOnC) coup

re-established direct military rule on 18 September 1988. Under the

leadership of Saw Maung, the military revoked, the 7974 Constitution,

dissolved parliament and concentrated all executive, legislative and )udi-

cial powers in the hands of the SLORC. When seizing power, the iunta

promised to hand over control after holding fresh multiparty elections.

Although elections were called for May 1990, the military council failed

to acknowledge the results, which had ended in a landslide victory for

the oppositional NLD. Acting in the manner of a caretaker government,

the military argued that the country iacked a constitution for transfer-

ring power to a new government. The junta, led, after 1992 by a new

strongman, Senior Generai Than Shwe and renamed State Peace and

Development Council (SPDC) in 1997, stayed in power until March

2011.

Militarization of the state and economy: military oligarchy 1988-2011

SLORC'S coup was followed by direct military rule for more than two

decades. It continued Ne Win's military government without the civilian

and socialist veneer (Prager Nyein 20722 26), SLORC's ffrst announce-

ment in September 1988laid out its long-term yision to stage multi-party

elections 'after peace, order and the economy had been restored' (SLORC

1988). However, the junta leadership saw the Tatmadaw as ill equipped to

achieve these goals. Feeling threatened by an urban democracy movement

that might collaborate with ethnic insurgent groups and foreign powers,

the junta felt a strong need to modemize the armed forces, or, as Selth has

stated, 'to take whatever measures were required to recover and consoli-

date its grip on govemment' (Selth 2002: 33). h other words, the )unta's

strategy in the 1990s was guided by its corporate interest in securing its

future predominance. Although the policies of the military regime were

often shrouded in secrecy and used opaque language, wc can identify five

broad reforms to achieve the self-proclaimed goals ofiron-rlisirrtcgration

The NLD-Milltary Coalition in lulyanmar

of the union', hon-integration of national-solidarity' and 'perpetuation of

national sovereignry' (SLORC 1988). These policies included:

. the modernization of the armed forces,

. the deepening of the militaryt involvement in the economy,

. the signing ofceasefires with 17 ethnic-armed organizations, and

. the attempt to establish a political order, which allowed for a future

political role for the armed forces.

These 'policies'were not formalized and were often influenced byper-

sonal interests of members of the military regime. They also were highly

interrelated, opaque and often implemented at a glacial pace. They led to

an increasing militarization ofthe state, a huge degree ofcoercion and the

increasing dominance ofthe military over the economy, which aggravated

economic malaise and starvation. At the same time, the limiting and polic-

ing of social spaces deprived actors of any room for independent action

(Btinte forthcoming).

> Modernization of the armed Jorces

After 1990, the military embarked on a massive state-building pro-

gramme, which has concentrated on modernizing the country's weak

infrastructure (construction of roads, bridges, hospitals, etc.). As in

the early 1950s, the modernization ofthe coercive apparatus was at the

heart of this state-building programme. This entailed an expansion of

the armed forces from 186,000 to more than 370,000 soldiers (Callahan

2003; Selth 2002). The military subsequently enhanced its territorial

representation in the country and increased its surveillance capacities.

The reasons for this have to be seen in the militaryt unique threat per-

ception: its fear of armed dissidents and insurgents within ihe country

as well as foreign forces outside the country. Moreover, the impression

prevailed that the counteroffensives of the 1970s and 1980s had not

been successful because the military had lacked strength. Consequently,

the military allocated huge sums for defence expenditures throughout

the 1990s: the junta spent more than one billion US dollars on 150 new

combat aircraft, 30 new naval vessels, 170 tanks and 2,500 armoured

personnel carriers, as wcll ts rocketlaunching systems, infantry

weapons and othc'r hrrrlw c (tl.rllthan 2OOl: 424).It also stirred up

nationalism in rlrtlcr to lclrlt vc l r.rlly-rrrountl.thc-flag cffect; moreover,

Khaki Capital

it continuously pointed out its historical role as builder of nation and

state (Steinberg 2007: 102-10; Taylor 2009).

> Thc drcpcnhgoJthe militarlt s role in the economy

To frrnd the expansion of the military the SLORC/SPDC opened up

tlrc cconomy and started to build up its business empire. It discarded

tlrc sociirlist economy of the Ne Win era and adopted a market economy.

'l'lris sct the context for a transition from state-socialism to state-mediated

(.rpit.rlisnr (Joncs 2014b). The military managed to build up an effective

rronolroly irr ccorromic rffairs. It dominated the economy through a large

t orrrple x ol irrvcstrncnt rulcs and economic initiatives., which gave military

( oDrl[n ies .r ( entril Position.r The 1990s also saw the creation and expan-

riorr ol .r nrrrnbcr of conrpirnies or conglomerates with direct links to the

nlilit.lry juntil. n ncw firrm of 'crony capitalisrn evolved that was based on

wc.rl(hy lrrrsirrcssnrcn'.s ircccss to patrons in the military regime.

l)rrc to wc.rk ccononric conditions and a lack offinances to develop a

propcr tlcfcncc industry, the military started to build up the most impor-

talrt conglomerates in the country in the 1990s: the Union of Myanmar

Economic Holdings Limited (UMEH) and the Myanmar Economic

Corporation (UfC). fney were giyen licences in diverse businesses

such as construction, hotels, tourism, transport, gem and iade extraction

and agriculture. UMEH, founded in 1990, is a military-managed busi-

ness engaged in small and medium-sized commercial enterprises and

industries. Its main obiective was to support welfare organizations ofthe

regime, veteran organizations and retired military personnel. As a pen-

sion tool for retired officers it provides a yearly return normal retirement

schemes can only dream of MEC was founded in 1997 to give the mili-

2. Liberalization remained rather limited, partly as a consequence of Western sanc'

tions and the US investmentban, andpartlydue to a lackofaccess to capitalthrough

the banking sector for the foundation or expansion ofbusiness. Additionally, con-

servative genenls, ministers and officials blocked liberalizatioq fearing the loss ol

revenues, rents and control over employment decisions. The consequence ofthese

developments was manifold: First, a new form oftrony capitalism' evolved around

the top military generals and their families. To take advantage ofthe state s operrint

the private sector requircd iccess to the military lcadership. ()trnst'rlucntly, only a

few'cronies' oftop nrilit.rry generals were able to sccrrrc rnonrrpolics .lrr(l aontrilats

to expnnrl thcir wc.rlth (lirtl r'l al. 2016; Joncs 20l4b). Scr orr,l, li,rrrl stltc nro

nopolies wt'rc r'ctirinc(l in nr.lny scak)rs. Son)c st,( l(rrs, srr( ll rs rl( lirr( (' irr(ltrstrics,

wr.r'c eorrplclcly trrrrtlolletl by llol restriLterl lr]l tlrl st.rtr'

The NLD-Milil.i y (:onlilion in Myaflrnot

tary access to supplies of irnportant mrtcrial, ir.r order to build up healy

industry. By 2009, it had an insurancc monopoly as well as 2l factories,

including four steel plants, a bank, a cement plant. MEC is operated un-

der the Ministry of Defence's Directorate of Defence Procurement and

all ofits private shares are owned by active-duty military personnel. The

corporation's capital was established through revenue generated from

the public auctioning ofstate-owned enterprises in the I990s (Ford ef

al.2016: 26; Aung Myoe 2009: 201). Through joint ventures with for-

eign companies and mergers with smaller companies, MEC has become

one of Myanmar's largest companies. MEC is widely seen as generating

most of the military's operating revenue, together with UMEH. The

most lucrative sectors in the economy, such as rice trading and imports

of vehicles, refined petroleum and edible oils, continue to be reserved

for the latter (ICG 2014: 9).

Apart from these activities, the military engages in a wide range of

decentralized commercial inte(ests and enterprises. Economic opportu-

nities opened particularly at the local level due to the evolving ceasefire

economies (see below). Consequently, many regional officers who

engaged in these businesses became unusually rich. Such extra-legal

actiyities and abuses ofpower damaged the reputation ofthc military;

people began to see the commercial activities as being above the law

(Prager-Nyein 20I2: 40).

> CcascJircs u,ith tltc ctlnic Ltrnrctl groults

During the 1990s, a series ofceasefires negotiated between the military

ar.rd ethnic insurgent groups significantly reduced the internal armed

tl.rreat the Tatmadaw faced. General Khin Ny.unt, SPDC secretary- I and

head of military intelligence, signed ceasefires with 17 armed groups,

in order to avoid a collusion between the ceasefire groups and the

pro-democracy movement (Callahan 2007; Zaw Oo & Win Min 2007;

Srnith 2007). The ethnic armed groups were permitted to retain their

weapons and excrcisc control over their territories. This included the

right to trade, oftcrr b.rlterirrg fol illicit commodities such as weapons

irncl narcotics (t).rll.rlr.rrr 2007;Srrrith lt)t)t); Srrrith 2007; Z;rwOo&Win

Min 20t)7).' Wootls lr.rs r rlllrlly poirrtr.'rl out th.rt thc milit.rry cngaged

l. (l.rll.rh.trt t.rlls llrrr r.vllvtrrll 11,\r'rr.rr, rlrrr lrr.,r'nrr)s,r( wrllr v.rlyirrg tlcglces

ol'.url()rortry r.rnlilrli ll trr ,1, \,,lrrll,,r l',lrrll ,rrrt,rrr,rrrry

ti ltak i: C.apital

in private-milit,uy l)nrtnu'shrl)s with ethnic elites and traditional busi-

nessmen antl managcrl lo,relricvc significant progress in state-building.

The ceasefircs lllowcrl ,rn inclc.rsirrg military territorialization in some

parts ofthe country, in whieh rnilitlry commanders and relevant state

agencies gave out liccnscs to cxthct the region's natural resources.

Ethnic leaders oftcn actctl ls rnitltllcrlen or brokers to Chinese investors

(Woods 2011; Lee 2014b).

The ceasefires were not forrlirl; they were gentlemen's agreements'

between Khin Nyunt and lcatlcrs ofthe ethnic groups, which had differ-

ent reasons for accepting this form ofceasefire, even ifit precluded their

long-term goal offederalism or grcatcr autonomy. Some groups suffered

from a general war fatigue; others faced pressure from their grassroots

communities, the drying up of financial support from China and

Thailand, or new business opportunities and prospects for economic

development under a ceasefire (Zaw Oo & Win Min 2007; Callahan

2007). Altogether, these ceasefires were integral to co-optation of the

armed ethnic groups, as t}rey gave political actors in the regions some

breathing room, which they used for local economic development

(Jones 2014a: 792). Apart from rent-seeking opportunities, ceasefires

gave the military regime the chance to fight specifically those groups

which continued their active resistance, such as the Karen National

Liberation Army and the Shan State Army South.

> Thc crcation oJ'd new poltticdl order under ntilitary guardianship

The military ended direct rule in March 2011 only after it had managed

to design a political system that institutionalized the formalpolitical role

ofthe military. Consequently, it is fair to say that the reforms after March

20I I do not represent another critical )uncture and the military retained

its capaciry to control large parts of the economy, despite a consider-

able transfer of formal power to a civilian goyernment. The transition

to quasi-civilian rule was introduced from a position of strength: hav-

ing consolidated its position internally and weakened the opposition

movement severely, the military regime started to entrench its political

prerogatives. The most important phases of formal institution-building

were the drafting of a new Constitution by National Conventions

(Dql-q|;2003 07), thc hokling of thc rcfcrcnrlrrrl about the new

Constitrrti()n (200t|), thc crc.rtion of tlrc regirrrt'sl)()nsr)re(l Uniolr

The NL,l) Milito! (.oL ition in Myanmar

Solidarity and Developnrent l,.rrty (USDP) and the conducting of

(heavily scripted) elections in Novembcr 2010 - won by the USDP in

a landslide.

The praetorian strirtegy fronr 1988 to 20ll did not represent any

form ofliberalization or a genuinc democratic transition, since the mili-

tary controlled every step, political spaces were restricted to a minimum

and state repression was at its tightest (Pederson 20l l; Prager-Nyein

2009). To achieve the first three of the four stated objectives (see p.

101), the SLORC/SPDC military oligarchy ruled with an iron fist and

exercised a high degree ofrepression, manifested in the taking ofa high

number ofpolitical prisoners and the continuous neglect ofbasic free-

doms and political liberties. According to Amnesty International and

other human rights groups, there were more than 1500 political prison-

ers during the 1990s, and Myanmar was constantly ranked among the

lowest countries in democracy by organisations such as Freedom House

and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index. Anti-goyernment protests

were cracked down on vehemently, including the student demonstra-

tions in 1988 and 1996, and the peaceful protest of Budclhist monks

in September 2007. Opposition politicians suffered undcr severe stiltc

repression: NLD leaderAung San Suu Kyi famously spent more thln l6

years under house arrest. The high level ofrepression and huge nunber

of human rights abuses sparked not only a wave of internirtional criti-

cism but also a number of punitive economic sanctions, such as travel

bans against senior members ofthe regime, export and investment bans

(Pederson 2008).

Arguably, these measures impaired the economic opening and

also aggravated the security concerns of the ruling junta. In the wake

of Cyclone Nargis in 2008, when the inability of the military junta to

provide aid effectively became very clear, the international community

even loosely discussed an external intervention under the banner ofthe

United Nations' 'responsibility to protect' (BiiLnte 2008; Haacke 2009;

Selth 2008). Although ir US invasion was never a real prospect, the

l.rostility shown towartls tlrc S | ,() llC .rnd the SI)DC by Western powers

bctweer.r l9|ll .lr)(l l0 | I ( it,or.gc W. Ilrrslr'.s inclusion of llurma as an

'oLrtpost ol'tyr.lt)try'lr.ll vr.r'y lllr1..rl('t1ir)ll, irrtlccrl cncourlgecl nrilitirry

lcadcrs kr belit.vr. llr.rt My,rrlrr.rr l,rrr.rl,rrr lrislr.rrli.rl llrr.c.rt (Sclth 20l.5:

9). 'l lre lt.girrrr.w,rs only I r I , , . r , r I r . , , . r I . r I I r . r I'rr.srrL.rrt 'l lrt,irr St,in.rsstrrrrc.l

tilttb Cqital

office in Mrrclr 20 I I : lrc llt't'rl politicll prisoners, ended press censor-

ship and opcrrcrl up lxrlitic.rl sp,rccs for opposition and civil society.

Thus began ;r'prolritclcr,l lr'.lnsili()n' that culminated in the free and fair

elections of Novcmbcr 20l5 (ltiirrtc 2016b).

Military guardianship: 'l'he civil-military coalition since 2011

When the military iuntn trlnsfirrctl power to the quasi-civilian govern-

ment of President Thcin Scin rnrl clissolved the SPDC in March 201I,

Myanmar's military oligarchy transforrned itself into an electoral-author-

itarian regime ruled by a civil-military coalition under the leadership

of the military proxy party USD[) (Janowitz 1964; 1988:81). After the

2015 elections and election victory ofthe NLD, Myanmar can be classi

fied as a tutelary democracy with fragile civil liberties and political rights

(Atnte ZOt6b). Myanmar's political history is consistent with Siddiqa's

'parent-guardian military type', since the military has taken over the role

of a guardian, institutionally secured a number of veto positions and

further deepened its involvement in the economy. The whole political

system is infused with military checks on civilian politicians. This section

looks at the legal foundations of military guardianship and describes the

first six years of the civil-military coalition, while the following section

looks at the economic foundations of military guardianship.

The military as guardians: legal Joundations

The Tatmadaw has secured its political influence and veto position

through a number oflegal safeguards. Section 6(f) ofthe 2008 constitu-

tion gives the military a role in'the national leadership ofthe state' and

Section 20 makes it the principal safeguarding force for the constitu-

tion. Section I7(a) and (b) specify that the military is given a role in

both the executive and legislative affairs at Union and at regional levels.

According to Article 232(li) of the 2008 constitution, the Minister

of Defence, the Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of Border

Affairs are appointed from serving officers by the Commander in Chicf.

The Ministry of Home Affairs is particularly important: the Head of the

General Administration Department for a region orstate, who ultimate ly

reports to the Minister of Homc Affairs, is dcenrcd to bc sccretary ofthc

region or statc govcrnrncnt (scction 260). As ir resrrlt, lhe Mirristcr of

Homc Af[rirs,;rrrd tlrrough lrinr thc nrilit.rry, pl.rys.r silirrilit.nl rolc in

The NLI) Mililnry (:onlilion in Myaflnat

state and regional goverrrrncnt ltlnrinistration in addition to the powers

granted to appoint statc lnd rcgiorr ministers (sections Z6Z(a)(ti), (n)

(ii;, zzola)1ii.1.1.

Moreover, six out of I I scnts on the powerful National Defence and

Security Council are fillecl with serving military officers. The body

meets weekly to discuss security issues and has the authority to decide

about amnesties, the appointment ofthe commander-in-chief and states

of emergency.+Additionally, the militaryhas a 25 per cent representation

in all national parliaments (Upper House, Lower House and regional

parliaments). These representatives are appointed by the Commander

in Chiefofthe Armed Forces (as laid down in articles 109(b), l4l(b)

and 161(b)). Since a quorum of75 per cent in the legislature is needed

to change the constitution (Article 436), the military has a de facto veto

power over any future constitutional changes. A1l these provisions are

basically guarantees that core military functions will not be touched by

the civilian government (ICG 2014: l0).

What is even more important is that the military has cornplete

autonomy in regard to security-related issues. Article 20 of thc 200tt

constitution giyes the commander-in-chief autonomy over the managc-

ment of intra-military affairs. Article 20(b) guarantees 'the Dcf-encc

Services the right to independently administer and adjudicate all aflrirs

of the armed forcesl Guardianship becomes fully visible in the case of

an emergency. According to Chapter XI of the 2008 constitution, the

President and the National Defence and Security Council have the pow-

ers to impose martial law, disband parliament and rule directly, if the

president declares a state of emergency. This provides a legal channel

for the military to reimpose direct military rule. We consequently see

tl.rat the militaryhas created a'praetorian constitution' (Egreteau 2017a:

124) to influence the political process, safeguard its own interests and

guard civilian politicians (Egreteau 2016; Kamerling & Croissant

2013). If the military leadership sees a failure of civilian politicians,

evidenced for exlnrplc by incrersccl separatism, ethnic violence or any

nlcasurcs that put t lrc 'l,rt rrr.rrl.rw'.s corp()ritc interests irt stake, then the

+. 'l hc N.rtiorr.rl I )r.L,rrL r ,rrrr I \e, rrr rt! L ' ( rl ( r) \i\l\ ()l lhe plr.sirlcnl, thc two vicc

prcsi(l(rrts, llr(, rl'r..rl,r.r..,'l tl'r'lll,l',,r,rrr,lrlrIl.,rwcrllorrst,,tlrr.tor|rnrarrclcr.rn

tlriel .rntl lris,l,.;'r1ty,,,,,,1t1rr rrrrrrr'.t,rl,I lt,.lr.'r,,., ll rrrc All.rlt.r, lton[,r.All.rir,i

.trrrl lirrcrgr All.rrr.r

til&ki CdPitql

civilian-military coalitiotr rrright break down again and the military

might reverse thc rcfitrtrts. 'lir lrc sure, the threshold is low, given the

countryt history of'civil wirr rtnd thc military's unique threat percePtion

and deep involvement in thc cconomy. The military is also much more

than a nlrmal guarclian (tliintc 2014) or arbitrator (Egreteau 2015: 30)'

Let us take a closer look nt ltow thc military has interpreted its role dur-

ing the first years ofquaslcivilian mle

Military guardianship in practice: thc Jirst six years oJ the civil-military

coalition

The military is still deeply entrenched in the politicai arena, although

it has made room for civilian politicians to debate and decide in certain

policy arenas. As Selth rightly points out, the military has never seen

itself as having separate political and military roles (Selth 2015: 12)'

Seeing itseff atove Politics, the military imagines itself to be guiding

civiliJn politicians and taretaking democratization (Egreteau 2017b)'

This gives the military a deeply political role, which it has used to block

further constitutional changes, restrain liberal freedoms, comment on

the political role ofpoliticians and negotiate the nation-state' The mili-

tary is also protecting its own corPorate interest and trying to delineate

the contours ofthe evolving disciplined democracy'- a political system

with an elected government but with restricted liberal freedoms and

limited room to criticize the government.

During the first years of quasi-civilian rule the military attemPted to

keep a loiv pro6le, in keeping with the 2008 constitution, as it worked

with elected politicians and participated in the leadership of the state'

Moreover, even the t4 regional commanders (who held extensive

mllitary and administrative Powers in their respective regions duringthe

SPDC era) tended to exercise their authority only on military matters

(Selth ZOts, 12). There were hardly any open and disruptive conflicts

between the quasi-civilian government ofPresident Thein Sein and the

military leadership. This is hardly surprising, since President Thein Sein

has been a high-ranking member of the former military junta and is one

of the key "r.hit".t. of the transition to disciplined democracy - the

Burmese version of a tutelary democracy.s Moreover, parliaments were

The NLI) Mililnr! Oo,tlitioa in Mlanmat

dominated by the USDI), .r proxy party of the military that was packed

not only with former militrrry oflice rs but also with cronies of the former

military ,unta. Most militrrry irppointees in parliaments were of lower

rank, mere place holders who wcre regularly rotated. This was obvi-

ously a deliberate move to ensure that the military remained cohesive

and under the strict control ofthe commander-in-chief, Senior General

Min Aung Hlaing. Only after 2012 did he appoint more senior repre-

sentatives (Egreteau 20I5: 24). After the election victory ofthe NLD in

November 2015, relations between the military bloc in Parliament and

the government became more conflictive, despite military commander

Min Aung Hlaingt promise to work under the president. Military

representatives aimed to provide some checks and balances in order to

equilibrate the predominance of the NLD in Parliament. To date, Aung

San Suu Kyi has refrained from showing any open confrontation with

the military, and she does not intend to push the military out ofpolitics

(interview with NLD speaker. Nyan Win, December 2015). Knowing

that any perceived challenges to Myanmart unity, internal stability and

sovereignty, or to the Tatmadawt self-appointed national role might

delay or even reverse the transition process, she approached the military

cautiously and worked in cooperation with the military during her first

year.

According to Egreteaut landmark study of military parliamentarians

in the early years ofthe transition, the military guard has taken over the

role of 'moderators'and hrbitrators'in parliament (Egreteau 2015: 31;

Egreteau 2017). While exercising oversight over civilian politicians, the

military is trying to stand above'party politicsl Army chief Min Aung

Hlaing has repeatedly stressed the need for the army to play a political

role. On the 7lst Armed Forces Day in March2016, he reiterated that

the army had to assume the role of shepherding the democratization

process until a stable multlparty system and the rule of law evolved

(Pyae Thet Phyo 2016). In an interview with the Washington Post,he

indicated that the military rnight be willing to turn more authority over

to the civilian govcrnmcnt, but that'it would depend on the stability

of our country irntl pcople rrnrlclst.rrrrling the practice of democracy

(Weymouth 2() l5). Argrr,rhly, lhis se e rrrs to inclicate that the military

intcncls to rctirin ils rrrlr',rs 11rr,rrrli.rrr. Alle,rtly irr.func 2014, nrilitlry

rcplcscn t ilt ivt' s lrlrxkr'tl rrrttsltlttlirrn,tl rlt.ttt11's llr,tl worrltl lowcl thr:

5. A ttrtcl,rly rlcrnoctrtcy is x rcSimc with fornrilly rlerrrrrtt'tlit irrslilrrliL)rls' brrt thc

itrrrrr'tltirltesr'tl.rirltl)r(rIx.ilyl()illl('rvcnclt)(r)rrcrlrrlrlt'sir'rlrlcsl'ttt'srrl rllirir's

lihLrh ('apital

75 per cent thlcslxrltl lirl r orrsl itrrtional change to 70 per cent, which

would havc rctluccrl the vt'lo lxrwt'r of the military. This is a clear sign

that it wants to rctilin its role .rs gLrrrrrlian of the 2008 constitution, and

of the political ortlcr rrrorc gcrrcrally. Moreover, the military bloc also

prevented changing Articlc .59(l'), which bars Aung San Suu Kyi from

the presidency. The rnilitary rlocs not seem to trust civilian politicians

at this point in timc, t'spccially olrc with such huge popularity as Aung

San Suu Kyi (Selth20l.5: l3). Whcn the NLD changed the institutional

setup ofthe administration to introcluce the powerful position ofState

counsellor for Aung San Suu Kyi in April 2016, the military representa-

tives staged a boycott to demonstrrtc their dissatisfaction with the deci-

sion. One ofthe military legislators stated: 'as the Hluttaw Ilegislature]

did not consider our proposed amendments, we refused to vote on the

bill (NLM 2016: 3). At the end ofthe session, the bloc stood in silent

protest and subsequently denounced the passage of the bill as 'demo-

cratic bullying'by the majority. Since the NLD appointed all members

of the Constitutional Tribunal, the military likely felt a formal legal

challenge would be unsuccessful and risked further demonstrating its

legislative impotence. Instead, the military appointed Myint Swe, a wel[-

known hardliner and close confident of former general Than Shwe, as

vice president. All of this underlines the military's discomfort in work-

ing with civilian politicians at such an early stage of the civil-military

coalition.

The military has not only devised the new political order, it is also

actively guarding and restraining the extent of democratization. To the

surprise of many, military representatiyes have supported President

Thein Sein's liberalization. The military did not block the release of

political prisoners, the liberalization of the press or the relaxation of

the freedoms to protest (eiinte ZOt6a). It also allowed the elections

in November 2015 to run freely, fairly and smoothly (Biinte 2016b).

However, at the same time, the military is actively engaged in restrain-

ing some of the new democratic freedoms. The press is not allowed to

criticize the military as an institution or write negatively about military

projects. If sorne press outlets cross the line, thcy are approached by thc

military antl told to watch their rcporting (pcrson.rl itrtcrvicw with an

eclitor o['1'lt M,yrr tun,tr 'l itrcs,l)ccr. nr ber 20 I .5 ). 'l'lre rrr ilil.rly is llso not

conrlirrt.rblc willr llre lisirrg wavc ()l [)r()tcsts sin(t' ,1.(lI I. 'l'lrt'sc protcsts

The NLI) Militn,..v ( ottlition in Mloflrndr

are often triggered by Iand-gralrbirrg or military development projects.

The USDP government draftcrl .r ncw restrictive Assembly law to stifle

some ofthese protests. Once clcctetl into office, the NLD has continued

to use these laws to stifle criticisln irs wcll (Biinte 2016a, Biinte forthcom-

ing). Similarly, dlrect military represcntatives in parliamentyoted against

the repeal ofvarious repressive hws on the grounds ofnational security.

For instance, when the NLD repealed the Emergency Provisions Act in

October 2016, military representatives tried to block it. Since they form

a minority in the newly elected parliament, they could not prevent this

legislation to sail through. Yet, the military representatives sent a strong

signal to elected politicians that a far-reaching liberalization is too early

at this point. In a similar vein, military representatives in Parliament

staged a protest in February 20I6, when a NLD MP openly criticized

alleged misconduct by local authorities involved in the Letpadaung cop-

per mine proiect - a controversial enterprise with heaty involvement

of a military conglomerate. Thls symbolic and theatrical behaviour by

military representatives bluntly shows that the military disapproves of

being criticized for its involvement in commercial activities, inclutling

land grabbing and natural resource-related proiects. Any future Nl,I)

moves against the military's business interests might lead to open con-

flict between the NLD government and the military.

The military has also played an important, though not uncontrover-

sial, role in the peace process. Here, it is a veto-player par excellence. The

commander-in-chiefl Aung Min Hlaing, supported President Thein

Seint peace initiative, and military generals actively participated in

peace negotiations with rebel groups since 2011. Their aim was to end

60 years ofcivil war through ceasefires followed by a political dialogue.

Of the 15 groups included in the peace process, eight groups signed

the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) on l5 October 2015; seven

refused to do so, including the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the

Kachin Independencc Army (ICA). Togetherwith a number of smaller

ethnic armed groups, these seven continue to pose a challenge to the

central governmcrrl.

The pe'lcc ploccss rlilt.r lly irrvolvcs tlrc nr ilitlry, which is in a position

to providc scerrlily grr,rr',rrrlcr.s.rltl nursl .lgree or) wh.rtcvcr future politi-

cll ortlcr erttetgt.s Iiorrr I I r , . , I r . r I , ' f' r r r , . I lililr [.vel rrrilil,rry lcpresentltivcs

hlve.rclivt'ly l),ulr( rl'.rli''l nr ,rll l.rll.:l;rr l.rr. Allltorrglr rrrilil.rry gcrrcrals

Khdki CaPital

and rebel group leoders cycd cach otherwith suspicion duringthe initial

rorrnds in 2OIi and each side blamed the other for past hostilities, the

general atmosphere improved significantly during subsequent rounds'

ihe mllltary generally was well prepared and actively participated in

the discussions (personal interviews at the Myanmar Peace Centre,

November 2014 and December 2015). At the same time, the military

continues to insist that only those ethnic groups that have signed the

NCA should be allowed to ParticiPate in the upcoming political dia-

Iogue. This is a maior obstacle for a solution ofthe protracted conflict'

Yet, the military seems to have agreed on some sort of federalism,

although it shuns this specific word. A few years ago, the military vehe-

m"ntf oppo."d any move towards federalism, which it saw as an initial

step towards the break-up of the country' The military seems willing to

talk with some rebel groups about a future political order and is now

wiliing to enter into a dialogue with civilian Politicians and ethnic group

leaders to achieve this end (personal interviews at the Myanmar Peace

Centre, Novemb er 2ol4). The military leadership, however, will not

allowAung San Suu Kyi to take the lead on federalism and the establish-

-ent of a i"w political order (Min Zin2O16: 128). on the other hand,

the Tatmadaw leadership hopes that Aung San Suu Kyi can bring the

non-signatory, armed ethnic organizations into the peace process' The

most promising example has been the peace talks with the oldest in-

surgent group, the Karen National Union. After agreeing to enter Peace

talks, both sides have further agreed on an early warning mechanism,

and both sides are having monthly meetings at the highest level with

both the President and the Commander in Chiefto debate critical issues

ofthe peace process (personal interviews at the Myanmar Peace Centre'

December 2015)'

Whereas the military seemed supportive of this process in some

parts ofthe country its conduct on the ground in other parts.Save rise

io scepticism about its real commitment to Peace, especially during

the reiurgence of conflicts in Kachin State and Shan State' Although

President Thein Sein issued an order in 20ll that the Burmese army

should cease all offensive campaigns against the KIA, the Burmese

Army continued to move in trooPs into Kachin State and the war

has escalated since then (for a background, see Saclan 2015)' The

Tatmaclaw claimcd that it was only acting to Prott'ct its strpply lines at

The NLD-Militory Coalitiofl in Wanmar

a time when the KIA ambushes were increasing (Personal interviews

at the Myanmar Peace Centre, November 2014). Despite the rhetoric

of a new peace process, the military continues to be involved heav-

iiy in fighting the KIA. The NLD government of Aung San Suu Kyi

revived the peace process in 2016, but fighting in northern Myanmar

continues, In October 2016, thousands of Kachin State residents held

protests calling for an end to the militaryt offensives against the KJA.

They also criticized the NLD government for being siient on the

renewed military offensives (Nyein 2016). The militaryt rhetoric of

commitment seems to contradict its behaviour on the ground, and the

new NLD government seems unable to control the military. Arguably,

the war is driven by illicit enterprises such as the lucrative jade busi-

ness. According to research reports by Global Witness, both sides

are profiting immensely from this business (Global Witness 2015a).

Consequently, some authors argue that renewed fighting was driven by

regional commanders with interests in rent seeking, who might have

acted on their own in order to derail the peace process (Jones 2014a).

The situation in Shan State is similar: maior fighting resumed between

the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance (MNDAA) troops and

the army in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone since February 20I5.

Elsewhere, in Shan State, we have seen sporadic clashes between the

army and the Tahng National Liberation Army (TNLA). In 20t6 these

groups ioined forces with the KIA and formed the Northern Alliance,

which launched ioint military operations against the Myanmar army.

The group maintained that the attacks were an inevitable response

from constant military pressure from the Tatmadaw.

All in all, we can say that during the first five years of quasi-civilian

rule, the military provided guardianship over what it hopes will become

a disciplined democracy. It is actively involved in all national affairs.,

while trying to protect its interests and shield the political order. It also

has attempted to restrain democratization of the country. Its involve-

ment in the peace process is ambivalent. On the one hand, it supported

the negotiations with various rebel organizations. On the other, it acts

as veto-actor over tlrc path k) political clialogue and increased its of-

fensives against tlrosc gt'ottps wlrich h.rvc rcjccted the NCA. The next

section turns tn thc r.eortorttic l'rrrrrttl,ttiorr of thc rnilitary, which has

becn largely untouclrctl rlttt'lttg lltc lr,ltlsit i(,tr to rlisciplint'tl clernocracy.

Kh'tki Cdpitol

Milit;rry clpitll in the semi-democratic era

Military guardiarrship is not linritcil to the political system. It is backed

by formal and infornr.rl control of the countryt economic capital.

For more than two tlccarlcs, thc military was responsible for both the

formulation and the implcrrcntation of economic policy (Steinberg

2005: 60). Military-owncd conglomcrates dominated the economy. As

a consequence, the military managed to obtain a huge volume ofeco-

nomic rent, and a 'crony capitalism' evolved that favoured the military's

business interests. Moreover, some retired high-ranking generals have

been able to siphon offenormous wealth during this period. The transi

tion to quasi-military rule is gradually transforming the military's role in

the economy. It is affecting not only formal defence spending but also

the military's conglomerates and its land holdings. This section focuses

on military-economic developments from 201I to 2016 and concludes

with prospects for the NLDled government to change the militariza-

tion ofthe economy.

Defence spending

Andrew Selth, an astute observer ofthe security sector in Myanmar, has

repeatedly warned us of the intricacies of estimating Myanmar's annual

defence spending (Selth zooz' 130, 2009). Neither the government nor

the military has defined defence spending', nor is it really clear what

calculations are taken into account. Since budgets were not published

at all for many years, it is not clear what share the military received.

Even now, data from 2006 to 20I I is not available and data from 20II

onwards is not comparable with earlier figures. This should caution us

in our analysis. The analysis that follows is based on secondary-source

estimates until 2005; data from 2011 onwards are taken from budgets as

disclosed by the military.

Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

(SIPRI) indicate that Myanmar's defence spendinghas seen a steadyrise

from the early 1990s to the late 2000s. While these figures are difficult

to verify given the weakness of Myanmar's currency and high inflation

rates, the relation of defence spending to the GDP reveals a slightly

different pattern: we see a slow increase in defencc spcncling from 2.1

per cent of GDP in l98U to a pcak o[3.7 in 199.5, xftcr which tlefencc

spcnding clt'crcirsctl to .r low of I .6 pcr ccnt of ( ;l) l) irr 2005. 'l'hc figurcs

The Nl,l) Militnty ('.oalition in Myanmar

Table 3.1: Military spcnrling in Myanmrr

Spending by Spending (in

calendar year (in conctant [2014]

Year billion kyats) USD millions

1988 1.6 242

1989 3.7 430

1990 5.2 51 1

1991 5.9 443

1,992 8.4 s14

1993 t2.7 591

t994 16.7 628

1995 22.3 668

1996 27.7 713

t997 29.8 593

1998 37.7 489

1999 43.7 484

2000 58.8 653

2001 63.9 585

2002 73.1 426

2003 148 634

2004 173 708

2005 192 716

20r r 973 NA

2012 r,902 2969

2013 2,210 3269

2014 2,336 3276

2015 2,549 3187

% ofGDP

z.),

3.0

3.4

3.2

3.4

3.5

3.7

3.5

2.7

2.3

2.O

2.3

1.8

1.3

1.9

t.9

t.6

2.6

4.6

4.7

4.3

3.9

% share of

goYernment

spending

9.7

9.2

10.7

9.6

8.9

13.9

11.8

9.6

18.0

t7 .6

16.3

12.9

13.3

Nofe; The figures lbr My.rnrnar (llurnr.r) .rrc plesented in kyat owing to thc

extrerrle variiltiol ol'trrrstult.rl t,xclungr r,ttus [retwecn the kyrr ;rrrd the US

rloll;rr. Stated cxch.rrrgr.r',rtt.s v.rr y liorrr (r.076 kr 9(r0 kyrt/US$ (2003). The

figulcs for 20l l. I l.rlr. llrrrrr tlr(.i'lli( i,rl st.rtt. lrrrdget,lrrtl nrry not be directly

courlrlrltrlt'willr t.,rrltr.r lt;irr,,,,, wlrr, lr,rrl liorrr st.corrrl,rry sour.ccs.

Sorrrcr': S I l'll,I .l(ll(r.

The Nl,l, Nlilil,u'.\' ('oitlition in Mlanmar

The NLD's refusal to cut thc rnilit.rryls buclget in 2017/ 18 supports this

interpretation.

The military's economic holLlings

The military conglomcratcs, thc Union of Myanmar Economic Holding

Limited (UMEH) and thc Myrnmar Economic Corporation (MEC),

provide the backbone oI military clominance in the economy. Although

some observers see a'significantly diminished role'for these enterprises

due to a loss of government monopolies and licensing practices (ICG

2012: 6i 2015: I0), there is strong evidence that the military companies

have been left unharmed so far and that the military can still extract

significant rents from these businesses. Admittedly, the military has

lost its dominant role in policy formulation, and consequently military

conglomerates are facing growing competition from wealthy business-

men (cronies of former generals) and their companies. A1so, there is

enhanced control and oversight through governmental consultation and

increased cooperation with international organizations such as the IMF

and the World Bank (ICG 2015). Yet, during the last six years, military

conglomerates benefitted immensely from diverse rounds of privatiza-

tion, and they continue to make significant footprint on Myanmar'.s

economy. Military companies also have started to modernize in order to

being able to compete in the modern era.

Under direct military rule ( I988-201 I ), military businesses profited

from the decisions by the Trade Council, which was responsible for issu-

ing import and export licenses and was chaired by an army commander.

In the past, decisions on government contracts were made in secrecy and

without outside control. Often, the main beneficiaries were the military

conglomerates, MEC and UMEH. Founded in 1997 to establish profit-

able heavy industries to give the military access to supplies of important

materials such as cement and rubber, MEC's operations were shrouded

in secrecy. In 2009, MEC owned 21 factories, including 4 steel plants, a

bank, a cement plant irncl rn insurance monopoly. It is operated under

the Ministry of Dcfcnccls l)ire ctonrtc of Dcfcnce Procurement, with its

private shares cxelusively ownrrl by.rctivc-tlLrty military persouncl. Tlrc

corporationls e.rpil.rl w.rs r'sl.rlrlislrt'tl llrrorrgh lcvcrrrrcs gcncratctl frorl

the public .trrt t ior) irt[', ( 'l sl.rll o!vnr'(l( rl('rl)r'i\('s itr tlrc cntl ol the 1990s

(Foltl ,:l ,r/.201o: .l(r).'llrr,,rr;ilr lorrl vlnlor(s witlr lirleigr (()r)lll.lri('\

.rrrtl rrrcrgers willt sttt,rlllt r or|||r,IrIrr'',, l\lll( lt.rs lrltortrt' ilst'll rttte ol'

lilttki ('nPital

together rcflcct tlre ttt.tssivt' tttotlcrniz-ation of the armed forces from

the 1990s to thc cirrly 2,(X)()s.'l'hough SIPRI lists the military's share

of governmcnt cxpcttrlilttlcs .ts bctween 9 and l8 Per cent, it is a well-

known fact thtt gcrtcr.rlly .10 40 pcr cent ofthe national budgets were

spent on the militxry until 2() I I (Sclth 2002: 134), and even more after

extra-budgetary sourccs ilre inclrttictl.

The military tricd to itrstrla[c itst'lffronr budgetary uncertainties and

scarcities by developing its owtr Inilitlry enterprises. These ensured

cheap and constant supplics of b.rsic commodities such as steel, cement

and vehicle tyres. After the trltrsition to a civilian-military coalition, of-

ficial spending remained high. According to data from SIPRI, Myanmar

spent 4.6 per cent and 4.7 per cent of its GDP on defence in 20l2 and

2013. With civilian oversight over the budget being a mere faqade or

meaningless ritual, there is no corlective against high military spending

During a discussion on the annual defence budget in March 2013, some

military appointees approached their civilian colleagues behind closed

doors to convince them not to vote against the budget prepared by the

Ministry of Defence. They maintained that the budget for the armed

forces was one of the lowest in Southeast Asia and a drastic reduction

would hurt the country's 'national security' (Egreteau 2015: 39)' While

this is certainly true, this line of argumentation refers to the official

state budget only. Much ofthe income is not derived from official state

sources. Moreover, a special funds law (enacted in March 201 1) permits

the Tatmadaw to access additional funds without parliamentary over-

sight (Selth 20t5: 11).

In 2014, overall spending increased to 2,336 billion L7at. Due to a

much higher budget, this was only 13 per cent of the overall budget'

In 2015, the spending increased to 2,549 billion kyat. The Defence

Minister was quoted in the press as saying that halfofthe budget was for

salaries and allowances, while 29 per cent ofthe budget was earmarked

for a further modernization of the army, including hearyweapons (Htoo

Thant 201,S). This trend has continued under the NLD government,

which also earmarked 13 percent of its overall budget to the Ministry

ofDefence (lrrawaddy 2017). Consequently, the budget allocations ftrr'

the military were hirrtlly reduccd after thc transitiotl to the clctrrocratic

erir. Such high nrilitary spcttclittg cirn lrc itttcrpretctl .ts 'r p'ryoff tor rrrili-

tirry ollici.rls stcl'PirrR b.tcli lrrrtrr tl.ry'to tl.ry prtlitits (Scltlr l'{)15: ll)

Khaki Capitdl

Myanmart largest companies. MEC is widely seen as generating most

of the militaryt operating revenue - together with UMEH. The most

lucrative sectors in the economywere reserved for the latter, such as rice

trading and imports ofvehicles, refined petroleum and edible oils (ICG

2014: 9). Accordingly, it is believed that UMEH controls 70 per cent of

all major businesses in the country.

After 2011, the Trade Council was abolished. Military enterprises

have lost some of their monopolies and their status as tax free bod-

ies. Consequently, it is questionable whether these companies will

be profftable in the future or remain a drain on the military's budget.

There is now greater competition and disclosure, although e.g. UMEHT

monopolyin the gems sector is unbroken. Some observers have come to

the conclusion that the role of military conglomerates has been reduced

and the military has lost its gatekeeper function in the economy (ICG

2Ol4: 9). Although the conglomerates have lost their exclusive access

to preferential contracts with foreign ffrms, they are still profiting from

ongoing monopolies and contacts in the bureaucracy. In the most re-

cent rounds of privatization, military companies were again among the

main beneficiaries (Ford, et al.2016 31). Most ofthe heavy industries

owned by the Ministry of lndustry have been transferred to the MEC

via a privatization scheme (Min/Ku do 2Ol4 154). Even shortly before

the handover ofpower to the NLD government at the end of February

2016, another round ofprivatization spurred the anger ofthe NLD par-

liamentarians. The NLD openly criticized the govemmentt handling

of new projects (such as dams and new hospitals) and the militaryt

involvement in resource extraction, which led to the militaryt show of

open defiance in parliament (see above, Htoo Thant 2016).

However, Ford ef al. also point to the political salience and increasing

autonomy of wealthy domestic businessmen with connections to mili-

tary patrons. These 'nascent oligarchs' started to appear on the scene in

the 1990s, have shown increasing signs ofautonomy since the transition

period, and are increasingly challenging military businesses (Ford et

al, 2016: 33). Some of these cronies even met with Aung San Suu Kyi

in 2015 in order to get her ideas about future economic development'

Despite facing much more competition from these cronies, military

businesses remain powerful and deeply entrenched in thc ovcrall econ-

omy. UMEH, for instancc, has 5l subsidiarics throrrghout thc country.

The NLD-Military Coalition in Myatmar

It is active in mining, banking, livestock and 6sheries, trading and trans-

portation, food and beverages, steel, and pharmaceuticals. Moreover,

UMEH and the military elite control the prime real estate in Yangon

and can extract millions from the capitalt propertyboom. InJune 2016,

UMEH announced in a military-nrn newspaper that it will become a

public company and is preparing an initial public offering (Mahtanl

2016). This maior turnaround underscores the military conglomeratet

efforts to be attractive to foreign partners. The loss of its tax-exempt

status has put pressure on the conglomerate and their subsidiaries to

modernize and be more competitive. The reforms of the conglomerate

are also a pre-emptive measure to survive in the future, since the NLD

won the election based on the promise to create a transparent economy

and modernize ailing state enterprises (Vatsui ZOt6). Despite these

reform steps, the military remains in control of the company. As a re-

tirement scheme for soldiers and their families, the conglomerate plays

an important role for the military. The other conglomerate, MEC, has

3l subsidiaries in the country and is active in fields such as transporta-

tiory hotels and tourism, constructiory tradition, banking and resource

extraction (gas, gems and metals), steel and coal, and manufacturing

(Ford et al.2016:36). Both companies not only provide lucrative career

channels for retired army personnel but active members of the military

can also extract significant rents from these businesses.

The jade industry may serve as a good illustration of the military's

involvement in one of the most profitable parts of Myanmart economy.

Jade production is primarily centred in Kachin State. Driven by the

demand from China, the iade industry has boomed since the late

1990s. It is estimated that Myanmar provides more than 70 per cent

of the world's supply of high quality iadeite (Egreteau 2012: 93) with

an estimated annual production value of between 12 and 3l billion

US dollars, and companies from the military are among the main ben-

eficiaries (Global Witness 2015a).6 According to official sales records,

army companies made a profit of US$180 million in 2014 and US$100

million in 2013 (ibid.; 1I). UMEH and MEC share their profits from

this industrywith families of senior generals of the former militaryiunta

or families of senior USDP party officials, cronies and drug lords, who

6. Twelvc billion US tlolllrr in l ligurc rlcrivcd liorrr Chincse import data, whereas

(llobllWihrrss inclrrrlcr llgrrror liolrr thc (lotl('Nti. n)nrkct and the lrlack mlr.ket.

r.l

Khaki Copitol

are notorious for their local involvement in this business (ibid.). The

new NlD-government has announced plans to reform the jade sector

and has stopped giving out new licences to operate in Kachin State. We

can conclude that the military companies retain a signilicant portion of

Myanmar's economy, which provides important off-budget finances for

military projects and income for retired military officers. The current

economic opening is putting economic conglomerates under pressure

to modernize and remain competitive. Of particular importance is the

militaryt ongoing involvement in a number ofresource-related projects,

such as the countryt jade or copper mines, which has started to trig-

ger resistance on the ground, often due to its seizure of farmland and

environmental problems caused by extraction and processing.

The military and tand grabbing

The foundation of military power also rests on its seizure of farmland.

In a country with a long history of 'nationalized' land, followed by a

military-directed state and, recently, transition to quasicivilian rule, the

issues ofland seizure and ongoing ethnic conflict raise important ques-

tions regarding rent-seeking and the role ofthe army (Ferguson 2014).

In the 1990s, land grabbing became a common and largely uncontested

practice. Military units seized large tracts of farmland, usually without

paying compensation. While some of the land was used for the expan-

sion of militarybases, new government offices or infrastructure proiects

much of it was utilized either by militaryunits for their own commercial

purposes or sold to private companies (McCartan 2013). Burmese

agribusinesses with close affiliations to the military government could

access land with hardly any costs. Land confiscations peaked in 2006

under the veneer ofa countrywide privatization programme. According

to a study cited in the Global Witness report, by 2013 approximately

5.3 million acres - 35 times the size of Yangon - had been awarded to

domestic companies with close connections to the government and

military of{icials, predominantly for agriculture. As much as 1.5 million

acres ofthis land was earmarked for rubber plantations, as in neighbour-

ing Cambodia or Laos (Global Witness 20I5a: 8). The appropriation

of land builds one of the economic foundations of the political power

ofthe military. The symbiotic relationship between serving and retired

military officers and private businessmen that flourishcd under the

previous military regime remains largcly urrch,tngerl trtrlcr tlrc scmi-

The NLD-Military Coalition in Myanmar

civilian administration. In 20 12, parliament set up the Farnland

Investigation Commission to investigate the problem. In May 2013,

this commission submitted its first report, which reveals that between

late July 2012 and January 2013, the Commission had received more

than 585 complaints alleging that the military had confi scated 247,077

acres (-100,000 hectares) of land. The report outlines six reasons for

the con{iscation of farmland: the expansion ofurban areas, the expan-

sion of industrial zones, the expansion of army battalions and military

units, the construction ofstate-owned factories, the implementation of

state-run agricultural projects and land allocation to private business-

men linked to the military. The Commission recommended that land

which had not yet been developed by the military be returned to the

farmers. Where land had already been put to use, the military should

pay adequate compensation to affected farmers (Htet and Aye 2015).

ln February 2014 the military announced a commitment to return

154,116 acres of confiscated land to its original owners (ICG 2014;

Global Witness 2015b), which gives some indication of the vast scale

of its previous land seizures. Following this announcement, national

media reported that land is slowly being returned to landowners. At the

same time., however, a new wave of land grabs was on the way. Whereas

land grabs during previous periods were predominately conducted

directly by military-state and non-state armed actors for their benefit

alone., trony companies'with extreme wealth and political leverage have

become the new driver of land grabs in different parts of the country,

often financially backed by foreign investors. The semlcivilian USDP-

government was working hand-in-hand with former military-favoured

businessmen and their companies, enabling them to get legal access to

one of the countryt biggest and most promising assets: it has actively

encouraged more investment in agriculture by promoting the countryt

former role as the rice bowl of Asia and highlighting its potential for

commercial infrastructure (Woods 2014).

The NLD has avoided direct confrontation with the military and

crony companies and shied away from placing any civilian control oyer

military busincss irntl thcil tctivitic's in land grabbing. Nevertheless, it

has promisetl tlrc lctLrlrr ol liurrl rrrrtl conrpcnsttion of farmers and made

this onc of its pliolitie s. ll lr,rs lolrrrr,l.l x ne w c()r)r rnittee in May 2016 to

ovcrscc tlrc ptocess,uttl lr,n plorrist,rl lo lt,solve irlllirrrtl rlisptrtcs in otrc

-'f hc Nl,lt Miltto.v ( nnlition in Mlahna.f

It has neither encroirchcrl on rrrilit.rlyls businesses, nor reformed its

grip on land or resoulcc cxtr'.lcli()n. Since the establishment ofa civil-

military coalition budgct .rlloc.rtions fbr the military have hardly been

reduced. According kr oflicial d,tta, btrdget allocations to the military

have increased dramatically. High rrilitary spending is a payoff for its

withdrawal from day-to-day politics. Over the past two decades, the

military has also deepenccl its involvement in the economy, visible in

the actiyities of the two military conglomerates, UMEH and MEC, and

their involvement in land-grabbing, resource extraction and illegal trade.

A crony capitalist economy is emerging, in which the military plays the

role of gatekeeper. Several conglomerates with deep connections to

the military rulers could get extremely rich. Since the military regime

transformed into a civil-military coalition, military companies have

retained control ofa significant portion of Myanmar's economy, which

provides important off-budget finances for military proiects as well as

income for retired military officers. At the same time, the economic

opening is putting conglomerates under pressure to modernize and

remain competitive. Of particular importance is the military's ongoing

involvement in a number of resource-related projects, such as jade alrd

copper mines. Since some of these projects are located in territories of

ethnic minorities, the issue of their control is deeply connected to the

overall peace process.

What is a realistic scenario for civil-military relations in Myanmar?

Is the military withdrawing in the long term? Senior General Min Aung

Hlaing has indicated his willingness to withdraw from politics in the fu-

ture, subiect to positive developments in peace, national reconciliation

and democratic deepening. Consequently, Aung San Suu Kyi's ability to

negotiate a long-term peace deal with all ethnic groups becomes impera-

tive (see Jones 20I4a). A positive scenario relies on lasting peace and

increased gains in state building under the new NLD-led government.

Critical questions, such as the involvement of the military in resource

extraction and land grabbing, must be resolved in a way that suits both

the civilian govcrnnrent (rntl thc'people it represcnts) and the military.

For this sccnirrio to bceorrre .r lc.rlity, thc militirry Ieirdership would

havc to lcarn tllilt il ( ,r r llrrst t iv ili,r rr lrrlil ieiirns. l]ront l firundation built

()ntrust,thcNLl)govr,rrrrrrlrl rrrrl',lrl lrr.,rlrlr. lo tle rrrilitalizc politics lr.rd

cstir[rlish civili,trt rortlrrl ovlt llrc rrrrlrt.rry in tlrt.rrretlitrrrr to lorrg-terrr.

Khnki (\tPitdl

year, which woultl pttl Stttt Kyi on n collision course with the generals

and threaten Myitnrnarls Iritgilc tlirrlsition to democracy'

Conclusion and outlook: Military guardianship in Myanmar

Ruling directly or indircctly fitr more tl.ran four decades, Myanmar's

".-"J fo.... have bccn lllowctl to Pcrmeate all ofthe countryt main

state institutions, the economy lntl the society After governing the

country directly between 1988 arrd 201 l, the military has given way to

a civil-military coalition in which the military has taken over the role of

guardian ofthe Political order. It continues to protect its interests from a

;osition of strengthwhile it secures tlle country's constitution and mod-

-erates civilian politicians. In a number of policy fields, such as defence

and security, it still rules directly, without civilian oversight' During the

first five years of guardianship, 2011-15, the military shared national

Ieadership with elected civilians, although it still distrusts civiiian Politi-

cians. It actively prevented meaningful constitutional change, in order

to safeguard miliiary Primacy under the constitutional order devised by

General Than Shwe's military regime a decade earlier'

In 2011, President Thein Sein embarked on a far reaching Political

liberalization that culminated in the historic November 2015 elections'

Despite presiding over this liberalization, the military has continued to

limii some of the new democratic freedoms. The press is not allowed to

criticize the military as an institution or write negatively about military

projects. If some press outlets cross the line, they are approached by the

militaryto adiust their rePorting. Press coYerage of military behaviour in

the field is stiil considered a taboo. The military is also not comfortable

with the rising wave ofProtests since 2011' These protests have often

been triggered byland-grabbing or military development projects Since

2011, the quasi-civilian government (along with the USDP maiority in

parliament 2Ol2-20I5) has used the provisions in the new restrictive

issembly Law to stifle these Protests. This policy is closely connected to

the militaryt formal and informal predominance in the economy, which

still allows the military to extract a huge volume of rents

The real tcst flor the military's willingness to initifltc rcal rcforms of

its economic ancl politicll powcr is still out' So firr, thc NLD govcrn-

ment untlcr tle filcto lt'ltler Atrng San Sutr l(yi h'ts 'tvoitlctl 'ttry opcn

cortft otttrttiott ltntl .rttcnrptctl ll(tt to htlrt tllc tuilil'tt y's gt'ttttittt'itttcrcsts'

Klr:.ki Capital

At the samc titlc, tlte ('(1)rlr)rrl i( intcrests of the military would have to

be safeguardcd [i'orr lny irtt t trsivc civilian supremacy' The negative sce-

nario, which revolvcs lrorrrtrl incrcrsed fighting, the failure ofthe peace

process and a growing pol.triziltiotr arnong political Parties, might lead

the military back to the hcLn ofthc government and oust the civilian

leadership once again. Yct since thc rnilitary seems genuinely to be inter-

ested in reforms and an intcrnational opening, this scenario is unlikely.

What we might actually sec in the near to medium future is a scenario

ofpositive and negative steps, increasing collaboration between civilian

and military actors, but also ongoing struggles and skirmishes, ongoing

dissent between civilian politicians and military actors in a number of

economic and political realms.

List of AcronYms

AIPFL Anti-Fascist Peoplet Freedom League

BSSP Burmese Socialist Programme Party

Thc Nl,l, Nlilttn, y ( oililton in Myanmar

Biinte, Marco (2009) 'My.rrrrrr.rr un(l (lrc llr.rge tler externen Intervention:

Von der Responsibility to l)rol('.1 zrrrn hum.rnitiren Dialog' fExternal

Interyention in My.rnrnur: li oDr l{espr',nsibility to Protect to Humanitarian

Dialogue], Dic Fricdcrr.ruarlt, 84( I ): 125-41.

(2014) 'Burmals'f'r'rnsition to qu.rsi-Military Rule: From Rulers to

Guardians] Anrerl Frrccs tnd Socitly 4O(4),742 64.

(2016a) 'Myanrnirr'.s Protrtcted Transitionr Arenas, Actors, and

Outcomesl Asior Survey 56(2): 369-91.

(2016b) 'The Encl ol Military-Guided Electoral Authoritarianism:

The 2015 Elections in MyanmarlWorking Paper, No. 176, Southeast Asia

Research Centre, City University ofHong Kong.

(forthcoming) 'Pollcing Politics: Myanmrrt Military Regime and

Protest Spaces in Transition] in E. Hansson and M. Weiss (eds) Political

Participation in Asia: DeJining & Deploying Political Space. Lordon:

Routledge.

Callahan, Mary (2OOI) Bu.-r, Soldiers as State Builders; in M. AJagappa

(ed.) Coercion and Gowrnctnce. The Declining Political Role of the Military in

Asia. Stanford: Stanford Uniyersity Press: 413-33.

................_ (2003) Making Enemies. War and State Building in Burma.Ithaca and

London: Cornell University Press.

(2O07) Political Authority in Burma's Ethnic Minority States: Devolution,

Occupation and Coexisferce. Washington D.C.: East-West Center.

Chambers, Paul (2013) Knights oJ the Realm. Thailand.'s Military ond Police :

Then and Now.Bangkok: White Lotus.

Croissant, Aurel and Jill Kamerling (2013) 'Why Do Military Regimes

Institutionalize? Constitution-makins and Elections as Polirical Survival

Strategy in Myanm ar', Asian lournal oj Political Science 2l(2 ): 105-25.

Egreteau, Renaud (2012)'The Burmese Jade Trail: Transnational Networks,

China and the (Relative) lmpact of Sanctions on Myanmar's Gems] in

N. Cheesman, M. Skidkmore and T. Wilson (eds) Myanmar's Transition.

Openings, Obstacles and Opportunities. Singapore: lnstitute of Southeast

Asian Studies: 89-l19.

(2015) 'Soldiers as Lawmakers? Assessing the New Legislative Role of

the Burmese Armed Forces (2010 2015);in R. Egreteau and F. Robinne

(eds) Metamorpho.sis. Stldies in Social and Political Change in Myanmar.

Singapore: NUS l)ress: t 5-43.

(20 l7i) 'Emlrc(l(lirg l\'ictorianisrn. Sokliers, Stirtes and Constitutions

in Myannr.rr", irr M. lliintc .rnd Il. l)r't'sse'l (e ds) I,o/iticr arrd Constitutions in

Sorrlltrrsl ,4sirr. l,orrrLrrr, llortlt.rlgc: I l7 19.

(20171)) (il,r'l,rlrr! ltt,rttt ttttt. ttttr ,. Lrrrrriorr: l lrrst.

Ii'rgrrsor, .J.t r rr, M. (.'(ll\) 'I lr, ., r,rrrrl,lc li,r llr(, W,r\l(. l^rltls: 'li.rcLrrr6..,-

DPP

DSI

KIO

Ministry of Defence Procurement

Defence Service Institute

Kachin Independence Organization

MEC Myanmar Economic CooPeration

NLD National League for DemocracY

SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council

SPDC State Peace and Development Council

UMEH Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited

USDP Union Solidarity and Development Party

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Myanmar: Civil-Military Relations in a Tutelary Regime

Preprint

Full-text available

Jun 2021

Marco Bünte

Myanmar has had one of the longest-ruling military regimes in the world. Ruling directly or indirectly for more than five decades, Myanmar’s armed forces have been able to permeate the country’s main political institutions, its economy and society. This article examines the trajectory of civil-military relations over the last seven decades and identifies the push and pull factors behind the military’s intervention. It highlights the fact that Myanmar’s retreat from direct military rule was only initiated after the military managed to set up a tutelary regime in 2011. This regime gave the Tatmadaw a leading position in the government. Although policymaking in the economic, financial and social arenas was transferred to the civilian government, the military remained in control of internal and external security and continued to be completely autonomous in the management of its own affairs. As a veto power, the military was also able to protect its prerogatives from a position of strength. Despite this dominant position in the government, civil-military relations were a marriage of inconvenience and led to the coup in February 2021. The article identifies the personal and corporate interests of the military as push factors behind the coup. At the same time, it argues, the military felt humiliated and threatened as civilian politicians destroyed the guardrails it had put in place to protect its core interests within the tutelary regime.

Indonesia

Chapter

Oct 2022

Andreas Ufen

Myanmar: Hybrid presidentialism and democratic breakdown

Chapter

Full-text available

Oct 2022

Marco Bünte

This chapter discusses the institutional foundations of democratic erosion and breakdown in Myanmar. The military coup of February 2021 ended a decade of power-sharing between the military and the National League for Democracy (NLD). This chapter argues that Myanmar´s special form of hybrid presidentialism, which was created by the 2008 constitution, conditioned the transition to civilian rule but also provided the basis for later military dissatisfaction, ultimately leading to a military coup. Since the constitution was never carried by an overarching elite compromise and key actors could not agree on the rules of the political game, power-sharing between the military and the civilian arms of the government became increasingly precarious after 2015. Perilous not in the Linzean sense of an increasing polarization between executive and legislature, and not as increased conflict between political parties, but as growing antagonism between the civilian and military arms of the government. Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD increasingly used informal mechanisms to govern, which not only eroded the constitutional framework imposed by the 2008 constitution, but also led to growing dissatisfaction on the part of the military.

The impact of democratic transition in 2011 on Myanmar's ongoing Rohingya crisis

Preprint

Full-text available

Jul 2024

Mohmmad Fahim Afsan Chowdhury

Myanmar (formerly known as 'Burma') is a country that experienced a long past of colonialism by foreign powers at different times. After becoming independent in 1948, the country experienced the spirit of democracy only for fourteen years before being wiped out by the military dictatorship in 1962. Based on the successful struggle, the country began to shift towards the path of democracy in 2011. Rohingya, one of the ethnic minority groups living in Rakhine state, is being subjected to state-sponsored discrimination and terrorism for a long time that led them to flee neighbouring Bangladesh more often. The year 2017 was marked as one of the darkest periods of human history when state-sponsored systematic genocide was initiated against the Rohingya population in Myanmar. Interestingly, this event occurred during the reign of the current democratically elected government, not under the military regime, and the country was then going through a series of democratic reforms to ensure freedom of speech, freedom of the press, institutional strengthening, and protection of ethnic minorities, etc. Therefore, the paper aims to analyze the context of the Rohingya crisis and its relation to the recent democratic transformation in Myanmar. This paper also will explore several aspects of the current democratic transformation based on several research articles, news, and reports.

When Coups Occur: Erosion of Democracy in Thailand and Myanmar

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2023

Junsu Seo

It is generally accepted that attempts at coup d'état have decreased since the end of the Cold War. But this does not mean that coup attempts will not occur in the future. With the recent two military coups in Thailand and Myanmar, all the continental states in Southeast Asia have entered authoritarian rules. This article explores when coups possibly occurred in the cases of Thailand in 2014 and Myanmar in 2021 that experienced overthrowing the civilian governments and the rise of the military in power. The Early Warning Signals (EWS) recently endorsed to investigation of the likelihood of military coups and qualitative analysis of collected data on factors affecting such incidents were combined to better explain the situations. From this approach, this article found that Group Grievance and Security Apparatus indicators in the Fragile States Index are important factors leading to the occurrence of military coups in the two countries. Also, from the qualitative analysis, a political culture relying on on iconic political leaders in the two countries has been a negative influence that deludes democratization and challenges civilian rule.

The rise of military capital in Pakistan: Military neoliberalism, authoritarianism and urbanization

Article

Nov 2023
GEOFORUM

Ateeb Ahmed

Fracturing the Monolith: Could Military Defections End the Dictatorship in Myanmar?

Chapter

Apr 2023

Past episodes of mass uprising and successful transitions from dictatorial rule in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa offer several important lessons for Myanmar. Following weeks and months of popular demonstrations, the fall of presidents Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, Suharto in 1998 and Hosni Mubarak during 2011 Arab Spring, came only after the defection of senior military officers to the people’s cause. The chapter discusses a new political possibility which could be caused by emerging cleavages within and defection of the security forces. As the economic and political fractures in the monolith of Myanmar’s military worsen, the resistance movement is more likely to succeed if it is able to win-over junta softliners who may be open to a different way forward. A chance of an off-ramp depends on whether the democracy movement can offer segments of the security apparatus and current junta collaborators an agreement capable of securing defection.KeywordsMilitary defectionHardliners and softlinersInternal divisionNew political possibility

Local Conflicts in Post-reform Myanmar

Chapter

Mar 2022

Yukiko Nishikawa

Myanmar has experienced significant changes since the 2010s. It ended long military rule and undertook reforms under the quasi-civilian government as a result of the 2010 general elections. Although the military's seizure of power in 2021 set back the positive image that the country has obtained since 2010, if we understand the nature of the state, Myanmar, the event in early 2021 was not astonishing. This chapter reveals the nature of the state, Myanmar, and examines the effect of globalization in post-reform Myanmar. ‘Disciplined’ democracy is a symbolic term to represent the reforms. Nevertheless, the country suffers from more nationalist movements and extremism under democratization movements, thereby generating increased violence and local conflicts, particularly in the borderlands. While such international norms as democracy and the rule of law have been embedded in the country's reforms, careful investigations reveal that the pretense of democracy and the rule of law enhances marginalization, discrimination and exclusion vis-à-vis hegemonic state-building. A new dynamism of political economy developed since 2011 has significantly changed power relations of the state, military, entrepreneurs, foreign investors and local people.KeywordsMyanmarDemocracyReformsPolitical economyState-building

International Norms and Local Politics in Myanmar

Book

Jan 2022

Yukiko Nishikawa

Why veterans lose: the decline of retired military officers in Myanmar’s post-junta elections

Article

Sep 2021

Renaud Egreteau

Retired military officers often continue to wield significant influence in regimes built after the end of junta rule, sometimes helping to bridge enduring civil–military divides. Myanmar’s recent legislative elections offers a counterintuitive case. There has been a rapidly decreasing influence of military retirees in the electoral landscape shaped in the 2010s. I reveal this decline using data on the sociological background of candidates for the 2015 and 2020 elections. Then, building on field interviews with retired officers who ran for office, I offer five explanatory propositions: (1) the depletion of moral capital held by soldiers; (2) military socialisation and the difficulties for veterans to transition to political life, with rivals from other sectors emerging as better equipped; (3) the existence of worthier avenues for power, influence and wealth acquisition; (4) the failure of the authoritarian successor party to manipulate votes and be voted back into office; and (5) the lingering authority and political sway of serving officers. The findings illuminate the persistent insulation from Myanmar society of its active military – even before the 2021 coup – and challenge the claim that veterans can help close the widening gap in Myanmar’s civil–military relations.

Why Do Military Regimes Institutionalize? Constitution-making and Elections as Political Survival Strategy in Myanmar

Article

Full-text available

Aug 2013

In recent years Myanmar underwent drastic political changes. While many see these changes as first tentative steps towards democratization, we argue that the current political transformation is not a deliberate process of liberalization, but a survival strategy of the military regime. Using arguments of the ‘new institutionalism’ as a theoretical foundation, this article explores the hypothesis that the high degree of professionalization of the Burmese military creates the incentive to institutionalize power-sharing among the ruling elite. Our empirical analysis finds evidence for both a highly professionalized military and institutions that by securing the military's continuing dominance serve the purpose of institutionalizing military power- sharing. These results imply that further democratization is unlikely as it must be initiated from within the still dominating military itself.

Military's Economic Role and Beyond

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2007

Ayesha Siddiqa

Ceasefire Capitalism: Military–Private Partnerships, Resource Concessions and Military–State Building in the Burma–China Borderlands

Article

Full-text available

Oct 2011

Kevin Woods

Since ceasefire agreements were signed between the Burmese military government and ethnic political groups in the Burma–China borderlands in the early 1990s, violent waves of counterinsurgency development have replaced warfare to target politically-suspect, resource-rich, ethnic populated borderlands. The Burmese regime allocates land concessions in ceasefire zones as an explicit postwar military strategy to govern land and populations to produce regulated, legible, militarized territory. Tracing the relationship of military–state formation, land control andsecuritization, and primitive accumulation in the Burma–China borderlands uncovers the forces of what I am calling ‘ceasefire capitalism’. This study examines these processes of Burmese military–state building over the past decade in resource-rich ethnic ceasefire zones along the Yunnan, China border. I will illustrate this contemporary and violent military–state formation process with two case studies focusing on northern Burma: logging and redirected timber trade flows, and Chinese rubber plantations as part of China's opium substitution program.

The New Configuration of Power

Article

Apr 2016
J DEMOCR

Min Zin

Even though Burma’s military seems to have accepted the NLD’s stunning election victory, it can still use an array of constitutional provisions to hamstring the incoming NLD government. © 2016 National Endowment for Democracy and Johns Hopkins University Press.

Revised-Path Dependence

Article

Mar 2012

In this article, we define a class of revised path—dependent processes and characterize their basic properties. A process exhibits revised-path dependence if the current outcome can revise the value of a past outcome. A revision could be a change to that outcome or a reinterpretation. We first define a revised path—dependent process called the accumulation process: in each period, a randomly chosen past outcome is changed to match the current outcome and show that it converges to identical outcomes. We then construct a general class of models that includes the Bernoulli process, the Polya process, and the accumulation process as special cases. For this general class, we show that, apart from knife-edge cases, all processes converge either to homogeneous equilibria or to an equal probability distribution over types. We also show that if random draws advantage one outcome over the other, then the process has a unique equilibrium.

Expanding Military, Shrinking Citizenry and the New Constitution in Burma

Article

Nov 2009

Susanne Prager Nyein

Known Knowns and Known Unknowns: Measuring Myanmar’s Military Capabilities

Article

Jan 2009

Andrew Selth

Yes Yes

My.rrrrrr.rr un(l (lrc llr.rge tler externen Intervention: Von der Responsibility to l)rol('.1 zrrrn hum.rnitiren Dialog' fExternal Interyention in My.rnrnur: li oDr l{espr

Jan 2009
125-166

Marco Biinte

Biinte, Marco (2009) 'My.rrrrrr.rr un(l (lrc llr.rge tler externen Intervention: Von der Responsibility to l)rol('.1 zrrrn hum.rnitiren Dialog' fExternal Interyention in My.rnrnur: li oDr l{espr',nsibility to Protect to Humanitarian Dialogue], Dic Fricdcrr.ruarlt, 84( I ): 125-41. (2014) 'Burmals'f'r'rnsition to qu.rsi-Military Rule: From Rulers to

Myanrnirr'.s Protrtcted Transitionr Arenas

Jan 2016

Anrerl Frrccs tnd Socitly 4O(4),742 64.(2016a) 'Myanrnirr'.s Protrtcted Transitionr Arenas, Actors, and

The Encl ol Military-Guided Electoral Authoritarianism: The 2015 Elections in MyanmarlWorking Paper

Jan 2016
369-91

Outcomesl Asior Survey 56(2): 369-91.(2016b) 'The Encl ol Military-Guided Electoral Authoritarianism: The 2015 Elections in MyanmarlWorking Paper, No. 176, Southeast Asia Research Centre, City University ofHong Kong.(forthcoming) 'Pollcing Politics: Myanmrrt Military Regime and Protest Spaces in Transition] in E. Hansson and M. Weiss (eds) Political Participation in Asia: DeJining & Deploying Political Space. Lordon: Routledge.

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