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Journal acronym: RVST
Author(s): Anniina Hyttinen and Lena Näre
Article title: Symbolic and ritual enactments of nationalism –a visual study of Jobbik’s gatherings during
Hungarian national day commemorations
Article no: 1358104
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Symbolic and ritual enactments of nationalism – a visual study
of Jobbik’s gatherings during Hungarian national day
commemorations
ANNIINA HYTTINEN and LENA NA
¨RE
5This article analyses the symbolic and ritualistic
enactments of contemporary Hungarian nationalism
during national day commemorations organised by the
extreme right-wing party Jobbik. Drawing on three
ethnographic field trips to Budapest, Hungary,during
10 national day celebrations in 2013–2014 illustrated by
nine photos taken by the first author, the article analyses
the manifestations of nationalism through the use of
various visual symbols, slogans and ritualistic elements
such as marching and singing. Jobbik’s gatherings have a
15 rich repertoire of symbolic and ritualistic elements, which
primarily communicate Hungary’s mythical heroic past
and revisionism that is connected to xenophobic and anti-
Semitic mentality. The article argues that while these
modern rituals can be located somewhere between the
20 ‘banal’and ‘hot’nationalism, they maintain the ability to
mobilise people by evoking collective memory. Jobbik is
able to
utilise the strong emotional potential condensed in
the symbols through ritual enactment, which creates
Durkheimian solidarity among the participants and
25 emphasises oneness. However, such asense of solidarity is
based on exclusion and on the division into ‘us’and
‘them’, rather than inclusion. The discussion is supported
with photographic data from the gatherings.
INTRODUCTION
30 Past years have been characterised by the rise of
nationalism and populism across Europe and globally,
especially so in Eastern Europe. National days are key
events through which national identities and
nationalism are performed. They offer important
35 insights into understanding the current political climate
in Eastern Europe. In this article, we focus on
contemporary Hungary, a ‘small’East-Central European
nation with a population of just under 10 million
(World Bank 2017). In Hungary, there is not just one
40 collective way to celebrate national days; rather
celebrations take place in different communities
organised around political parties (Nyyssönen 2008;
Palonen 2009). We analyse national day celebrations
organised by the radical right-wing party Jobbik,
45 drawing on ethnographic data collected during three
field trips to Budapest in 2013–-2014.
While national days can be understood as a form of
national temporality (Edensor 2006) through which
nation-states govern the ceremonial time in a calendar
50year, the practices and ritual enactments through which
national days are celebrated vary. Since Billig (1995)
published his influential work on ‘banal nationalism’in
which he critiqued research on nationalism for
emphasising the extraordinary or ‘hot’nationalism and
55argued for an understanding of national identities that
become a ‘form of life which is daily lived in a world of
nation-states’(68), a great deal has been written on the
implicit, unspoken, underground, taken-for-granted and
unselfconscious forms of everyday nationalism (for a
60review of this literature see Fox 2017). However, we
would argue
that the explicit, outspoken, demonstrative
and celebratory forms of nationalism are alive and well,
and that analysing the visual and performative
enactment of national days is a key way to unravel the
65continuum between ‘banal nationalism’and the
extraordinary, ‘hot’forms of nationalism –as both
forms are present during national day celebrations.
We consider national day gatherings as rituals that
involve the audience in the act of commemoration on
70different levels and senses. Symbols present in these
events, such as flags, maps, coats of arms and
anthems,are used to express the connection between
the participants and a certain nation or group. Rituals
make possible the realisation of these symbolic
75attachments with visual means. In Jobbik’sgatherings,
it is not only the party elite that is responsible for the
production side of the events, the audience is also
actively creating these contents. This can be seen as an
echo from Jobbik’spastasasocialmovement.
80Politicians who permit a more active role for the
participants, and as argued by Giesen (2006,355),act
as authentic representatives of the people, blur the
limits between party elites and supporters, or ‘leaders’
and ‘followers’. In what follows, we first discuss the
85
rise of nationalism in Hungary and then the
theoretical concepts that have guided our analysis.
This is followed by the presentation of the methods
and the empirical analysis. We end with concluding
remarks.
Visual Studies, 2017
Vol. 00, No. 00, 1–15, https://doi.org/10.1080/1472586X.2017.1358104
© 2017 International Visual Sociology Association
C/e: VK C/e QA: SJ
90 HUNGARIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE RISE
OF NATIONALISM
In order to understand the construction of Hungarian
national identity, one needs to go back to 1920 and to
the Treaty of Trianon. In the aftermath of World War I
95 Hungary, which as part of Austria-Hungary was one of
the losers of the war, were given strict terms according
to which Hungary lost two thirds of its territory and its
population dropped from 18 to 8 million. Around 3
million ethnic Hungarians remained outside the
100 Hungarian borders in neighbouring countries, mainly
Romania and Czechoslovakia. In the Treaty, Hungary
lost Transylvania (Erdély), an ethnically and
linguistically diverse territory currently located in
western Romania. In the national narrative, the treaty
105 signified the end of the Hungarian empire and the end
of unity of Hungarian people (Pytlas 2016, 156). The
Treaty of Trianon caused overwhelming embitterment
in Hungarians and revision became the main aim of the
politics in the coming decades (Vehviläinen 2004, 204).
110 The inter-war years, the era of the national conservative
Regent Miklós Horthy, was characterised by racist right-
wing radicalism, anti-modernism, anti-liberalism and
anti-Semitism (Kovács 2016, 526). Even if none of the
current parties make openly revisionist claims, the
115 Treaty of Trianon remains central to the Hungarian
national identity, especially among conservative and
right-wing parties and their supporters.
The establishment of the socialist state, the Hungarian
People’s Republic in 1949 began a period during which
120 nationalism was downplayed in the socialist ideology.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in a
renewed emergence of nationalist ideology that
continues to this day. The national re-awakening meant
rehabilitating the old national traditions and
125 celebrations as well as abandoning the socialist ones.
In the beginning of the new millennium, Hungary was
considered a model example of a state which had
completed a successful transition from socialism to
parliamentary democracy and from a planned to a
130 market economy. This development was followed by
Hungary’s accession to NATO in 1999 and to the EU in
2004. However, in 2006 the Prime Minister of the
governing socialist party Ferenc Gyurcsány was caught
in a scandal over lying about the country’s economic
135 situation. The scandal combined with the effects of the
2008 economic crisis led to increasing distrust among
the electorate and street protests (Korkut 2012).
Consequently, and for lack of alternatives on the left,
parliamentary elections held in Hungary in April 2010
140 signalled a landslide victory for the conservative right-
wing party Fidesz. The decline of the left was further
emphasised by the rise of the radical nationalist right-
wing party Jobbik. Although in 2009 Jobbik had been
able to gain three seats in the European Parliament, their
145success in 2010 parliamentary elections was a surprise
for many. This success was enhanced in the elections of
April 2014 when Jobbik managed to increase its support
from 17 to 20 per cent.
Jobbik was originally founded as a Right-Wing Youth
150Association (Jobboldali Ifjúsági Közösség)in1999bya
group of university students. In 2003, the association
transformed into a political party which changed its
official name to Jobbik, The Movement for a Better
Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom) (Jobbik
1552010a).
1
Since 2006, it has been led by Gábor Vona, who
according to Pytlas (2013,170)is‘espousing an ideology
that is mixture of Hungarian political and economic
nativism, (with a particularly overt and extreme anti-
Roma element), conspiracy-like anti-Semitic, anti-
160Communist and anti-
globalisation rhetoric, and historical
revisionism’.The‘Roma issue’has been seen by many
scholars as the single most important factor behind the
success of Jobbik (e.g. Karácsony and Róna 2010;Kovács
2013). Nevertheless, it seems that the common anti-Roma
165attitudes among Hungarians, together with the
disappointment towards the political elite, could not alone
explain the success of radical right. What was needed in
addition to these negative sentiments was a political actor
that could meet the needs of the public, in other words, a
170party that brought the ‘Roma issue’to the political agenda
and appeared as an ‘order’bringing
organisation with the
help of its paramilitary wing the Hungarian Guard
(Magyar Gárda). Jobbik was able to present the party as
most competent to deal with the ‘Roma issue’and
175therefore gained issue-ownership over the matter
(Karácsony and Róna 2010,54–55).
There are other explanations to Jobbik’srisetoo.According
to Grajczjár and Tóth (2010)AQ1,themostsignificant factor
behind Jobbik’ssuccessandthehardenedattitudeswasthe
180economic crisis that hit Hungary badly in 2008. Together
with the scandals that led to thecollapseofsupportforthe
left-wing government, the impact of the crisis was
devastating. This caused feelings of insecurity, disorder and
fear that made attractive a party that offered radical
185solutions and change (87). Jeskó, Bakó, and Tóth (2012)
offer yet another perspective to the success of Jobbik. They
argue that the expansion of the Internet is a key explanatory
factor behind Jobbik’ssuccess.Beforetheelectionsof2009
and 2010 Jobbik was largely ignored by mainstream mass
190media and was therefore driven towards alternative
solutions of communication on the Internet. The sudden
growth of Jobbik’spopularitycanbetemporallylocatedwith
the general growth of Internet usage in Hungary. The age
2A. Hyttinen and L. Näre
structure of active Internet users is also similar to Jobbik’s
195 supporters’age structure. (83). For the first timethe Internet
was used in Hungary by a political party as the main channel
for reaching potential voters, but as Jeskó, Bakó, and Tóth
(2012)
emphasised,thevastnetworkofJobbik-relatedpages
is much wider than the number of clearly politics-related
200 pages. Therefore, we can talk about the emergence of an
entire online subculture, which covers all fields of life from
online shops of clothes, food and handcrafts to band
homepages and news portals.
Finally, the eastward expansion of the EU was expected to
205 weaken nationalism in the new member states, but the
development in Hungary has been quite the opposite (Fox
and Vermeersch 2010). For the ruling right wing party
Fidesz, EU has offered an agenda for its national interests.
Fidesz
defined itself as a representative of the Hungarian
210 nation defending all ethnic Hungarians irrespective where
they live. Hungary’sjoiningtheEUdidnotforFideszmean
abandoning its nationalist ambitions, but on the contrary,
offered it a new agenda (Fox and Vermeersch 2010)
Nationalism is central for both Fidesz and Jobbik and
215 growing the national pride of the Hungarian people has been
regularly on their agenda. On the other hand, EU has been
seen as an institution that interferes with sovereign state
business and is not able to understand the situation in
Hungary.
220 Publicly Fidesz condemns most of the proposals of Jobbik,
but has later on implemented some of them. For instance,
the first law amendment of Fidesz in 2010 was to provide
Hungarian citizenship to all ethnic Hungarians living in
neighbouring countries, sparking considerable debate. In
225 addition, Fidesz passed a law stating that the 4th of June, the
day when Treaty of Trianon was signed, is to be
commemorated as the Day of National Unity (Nemzeti
összetartozás napja)(Feischmidt2014;Pytlas2016). Both
amendments had been initiated by Jobbik, but Fidesz
230 implemented them according to its own agenda. Jobbik
considers the name of Trianon memorial day, ‘The Day of
National Unity’,anoutrage,becauseit
emphasises unity
instead of trauma and revision. According to Jobbik, the day
should be commemorated as ‘The National Day of
235 Mourning’(Nemzeti gyász napja)(Jobbik2014a). Thus,
national days are a central but contested terrain on which
nationalism is manifested in contemporary Hungary. Before
analysing the national day celebrations organised by Jobbik,
we outline the theoretical notions that have guided our
240 approach.
VISUAL AND EMBODIED NATIONALISM
In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life
(Durkheim [1912] 1964), Durkheim famously claimed
that rituals create solidarity. Neo-Durkheimian scholars
245of nationalism, in applying this idea to modern societies,
argue that nationalism is not something that exists, or is
achieved, but evolves through repetition, rituals and
articulation (Tsang and Woods 2014). Following this
line of thought, it can be argued that national days are
250key moments and events that enable the repetitive,
ritualistic and collective articulation of the nationhood.
During national days, collective memory is produced,
reproduced, and rearticulated in the present through
ritualistic enactment (Connerton 1989; Giesen 2006).
255Thus, in this article we depart from the classical
definition of nationalism as a theory of political
legitimacy requiring unity between ethnic and political
boundaries of state, as defined by Gellner (1983, 1) and
approach nationalism as a constructed ‘frame of vision,
260(. ..) cultural idiom, and a political claim’(Brubaker
et al. 2008, 358). Accordingly, nationalism appears in
multiple forms and is expressed through various
‘ethnopolitical claims, objectified in symbols, embedded
in institutional structures andorganisational routines,
265encoded in elite and popular discourses, embodied in
schemas and common-sense knowledge, and enacted in
public ceremonies and private interactions (358).
Following Brubaker et al. (2008) and Fox and Miller-
Idriss (2008), we are not interested in trying to define
270what nationalism means or is in Hungary, rather how it
is constructed and enacted through ritual performances.
Moreover, we take cue from Hobsbawm (1991, 10), who
has argued that nationalism needs to be understood and
analysed ‘from below, that is in terms of the
275assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of
ordinary people, which are not necessarily national and
still less nationalist’.
In discussing everyday constructions of nationalism, Fox
and Miller-Idriss (2008)offered different ways to analyse
280everyday nationalism: talking the nation, choosing the
nation, performing the nation, and consuming the
nation. ‘Talking the nation’refers to the discursive acts
through which nationhood and nation are constructed
in everyday interactions. Fox and Miller-Idriss
285distinguish between talking about the nation and talking
with nation referring to the taken for granted framework
that nation offers for everyday talk. They are also
interested in the moments when this talk occurs, in
other words, when the nation is. They claim such
290moments to be, for example, national catastrophes and
international sporting events (Fox and Miller-Idriss
2008). National day commemorations are clearly events
during which talking nation occurs. By choosing the
nation, Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008) refer to the often
295unconscious choices and institutions, such as the
Symbolic and ritual enactments of nationalism 3
education system and media, that are structured
according to a national logic. An example of ‘choosing
the nation’in the Hungarian context could be a private
taxi company which calls itself Nemzeti taxi –the
300 National taxi. Related to this, Fox and Miller-Idriss
(2008) also discuss ‘consuming the nation’, i.e., that
citizens have an active role as producers of nationhood
through the everyday choices of consumption.
Consumption and commodification of the nation is a
305 central aspect in Jobbik’s national day gatherings and in
the subculture that surrounds the party.
For this research ‘performing the nation’is the most
relevant dimension of constructing nationalism from
the below. According to Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008),
310 nationalistic ritual performances are part of everyday
life –not because of the banality of the events, but
because of the ordinary people that participate in
them. They also highlight the ways in which the elite
designed events’intended symbolic messages are often
315 mixed or even missed. They argue further, that the
venue of such performances has changed from
national commemorations to sporting events (Fox and
Miller-Idriss 2008). The Hungarian case as well as
examples from Finland (Paasi 2016) point to the
320 contrary, national day or Independence Day
celebrations continue to be a significant way through
which nationalism is done from below. When the first
author attended the commemorations in years
2013–2014, the eventsorganised by the ruling party
325 Fidesz, such as the ‘Peace march’(Békemenet)onthe
23
rd
of October had hundreds of thousands of
participants (according to some sources one million).
Even in Jobbik’s gatherings in October and March,
there were thousands of people (Origo 2013
AQ2 ).
330 Commemorating three different days in events divided
by the political lines tells that history is far from being
‘over’in Hungary (see McCrone and McPherson 2009,
3). Moreover, national day celebrations demonstrate
that performing nationalism does not only relate to
335 the banal, mundane and everyday –although these
might also be elements of the performances as we
later discuss- but that national day celebrations can
include spectacular and extraordinary elements. It can
be argued that national days have become a part of
340 the everyday, national order of things (Malkki 1995)
and as part of the ‘national temporalities’of the
calendar year (Edensor 2006), operate similarly to the
flags that hang in front of office buildings, yet have
the potential and elements of being activated towards
345 the spectacular and ‘hot’. As our research concerns
national day celebrations that already are spectacular
events, our analysis focuses on the ways in which
nationalism –rather than nation –is being performed
and enacted ritually as well as consumed in
350contemporary Hungary.
ANALYSING NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS
FROM A VISUAL PERSPECTIVE
Nationhood and national symbols have a strong visual
dimension in themselves (Jenkins 2008,2011; Spencer
3552011), as visual representations are indispensable in
expressing the unspeakable and unquantifiable (Pauwels
2010). What is characteristic for our visual material is
that the photos contain two visual levels: firstly, they
depict visual symbols that were present in the events and
360secondly, they are visual representations of the
surroundings, i.e., the immediate context in which the
symbol appears and how it is used. These visual levels
are then linked to the wider societal context, which
brings yet another level to the analysis. Visual symbols
365are difficult to analyse since they are inherently
multivocal, multivalent and their production and
perception inherently a multisensory process (Pink
2011). In the analysis, we do not even aim to uncover all
the private meanings, but instead approach symbols and
370their use through their current and historical contexts.
In recent years, visual methods have become
increasingly popular, but the methodological basis
supporting such research has remained rather weak
(Pauwels 2010). In order to remedy the situation
375Pauwels has developed a framework for visual social
research which we have found useful. Firstly, the visuals
we use are researcher-produced as opposed to using pre-
existing artefacts. The benefits of this approach are that
the researcher has more knowledge of the context and
380more control over the data gathering and, therefore,
better insights into their production (Pauwels 2010).
Secondly, the subject of the researchis national day
gatherings, i.e., human social behaviour with a clear
visual dimension. These gatherings can be seen as
385consisting of rituals that according to Pauwels (2010)
benefit from a visual approach since it has the capacity
to catch the richness and complexity inherent to such
events. Thirdly, the material has been collected with a
smart phone and consists of photographs. The collection
390method is close to what Pauwels (2010)called
explorative research and ‘opportunistic sampling’where
things that attract a researcher’s attention are recorded.
This process is guided by the thematic focus that draws
from the initial research questions and theoretical
395starting points. Lastly, Pauwels (2010)elaborated on the
degree of involvement, which can vary from zero-state
involvement to collaboration and joint-production with
the research participants. In this research, there was very
little involvement, although the camera use was fully
4A. Hyttinen and L. Näre
400 overt. It could be said that due to the nature of the event
(a mass gathering) the audience was probably mainly
unaware of the camera use, but generally aware of the
presence of cameras, since such events are recorded by
the press and audience to similar extents.
405 The empirical data consist of photos, videos and field
notes collected during the following national day
gatheringsorganised by Jobbik: 20 August 2013 (Saint
Stephen’s Day, Foundation of the Hungarian State), 23
October 2013 (Memorial Day of the 1956 Revolution),
410 and 15 March 2014 (Memorial Day of the 1848
Revolution). These were the last three national day
commemorationsorganised before the April 2014
parliamentary elections. The total field material consists
of 125 photos and 24 short videos, from which nine
415 photos were chosen for the purposes of this article.
PERFORMING NATIONALISM: VISUAL SYMBOLS
IN JOBBIK’S GATHERINGS
Visual symbols represented in various kinds of flags are
probably the first thing an observer notices in Jobbik’s
420 national day gatherings. Flags and symbols are
everywhere, carried by the audience and more
democratic than the speaker’s podium that gives voice to
only a selected few. Flags and other ritual symbols can
be understood as condensed symbols (Turner 1967).
425 This means that flags are able to contain various
meanings and emotions attached to them. While flags
can be used to convey attitudes and sentiments with
simple acts such as waving, they have emotional
potential that allows flags to be used as rallying points
430for political action (Firth 1973, 77). It is therefore not
surprising that flags play such a central role in the
national celebrations organised by Jobbik (see Figure 1).
In Figure 1,at least five different kinds of flags are
visible: the current flag of Hungary with three stripes
435(red, white, green); Jobbik party flags with text and cross
as symbols; the red and white Árpád flag and the blue
and golden flag of the Székely land. The red and white
Árpád flag consists of eight stripes used originally in the
flag of the Árpád dynasty that ruled Hungary from the
440
9th until the 13th century. Today the Árpád stripes are
used widely by the radical right and can be seen
everywhere in Jobbik’s gatherings in flags, coat of arms,
maps, scarfs, clothes and all kinds of accessories. The
flag of the Székely land is a newly invented flag
445representing a region in Romania with many ethnic
Hungarians. The flag has a light blue background, one
golden line in the middle and a golden star and a silver
moon.
The three flags are all connected to different nationalist
450projects. The official flag of Hungary represents the
current Hungarian state, whereas the Árpád stripes are
often linked to the historical Hungarian state and
revisionist thinking. The Székely flag, on the other hand,
can be seen also outside the scope of revisionism, as a
FIGURE 1. Flags held by the audience represent various nationalist and party-specific symbols.
Symbolic and ritual enactments of nationalism 5
455 quest for the recognition of a minority culture and
autonomy. When it comes to the origins of these flags,
they date back to different eras and flag traditions: the
Árpád flag is part of the pre-modern monarchical
imagery, the Hungarian tricolour originates from
460 modern age and the republican movement, whereas the
newly invented Székely flag can be placed in the more
recent flag tradition that, nevertheless, draws its
inspiration from the ancient past (see Elgenius 2011).
By carrying symbols such as the flags, the audience is
465 able to take part in the ritual of performing
nationhood through non-verbal means. While the
power of a symbol derives from the ritual usage of the
symbol over time (Jenkins 2011;Turner1967),
symbols are also (re)invented. The flag of the Székely
470 land is an example of a symbol that, albeit new,
utilises old symbols (see Figure 2). The sun and the
moon are traditional Székely symbols that can be
traced back to the Middle Ages and the blue
background with a stripe in the middle can be found
475 in old flags of the region (Takács 2013).
However, meanings related to symbols are not fixed, but
dynamic and flexible. As argued by Guibernau (1996,
81) ‘symbols not only stand for or represent something
else, they also allow those who employ them to supply
480 part of their meaning’. It is in the active use and re-
interpretations of the symbols that the participants enact
and perform the nation at Jobbik’s national day
celebrations. A common way to actively use and
reinterpret symbols at the National Day gatherings was
485 the mixing and tuning of symbols. These symbolic mixes
could be seen as demonstrating particular
interpretations of history. As an illustrative example of
this mixing is the self-made flag carried by a man at the
March 15
th
event (Figure 3).
490Figure 3 portrays a man carrying a self-made, invented
flag formed by a unique combination of the current
Hungarian flag and the Árpád flag. In the middle of the
flag is a self-drawn map of Greater Hungary with a small
text stating the names of the 64 historical pre-Trianon
495Hungarian counties. The map is circled with triangles
probably representing sun rays. The text reads: ‘It is the
holy right and duty of every Hungarian to take back the
stolen ancient Carpathian home’,(Minden magyar szent
joga, kötelessége visszavenni az elrabolt ősi Kárpáti hont).
500On the sides of the flag, names of two old religions are
written (mani–keizmus and bud–hizmus). Standing to
the right of the man, another man is wearing a
Hungarian flag around his shoulders and a similarly
themed scarf around his neck.
505During the national day gatherings, symbolism
connected to Greater Hungary seemed to be a
reoccurring theme. The Map of Greater Hungary (Nagy-
Magyarország), showing the borders before the 1920
Trianon peace treaty is a revisionist national symbol that
510was used commonly during the inter-war years (Zeidler
2002). This symbol has been reinvented in the past
10 to
15 years by Jobbik and other related extreme right-wing
organisations (see Feischmidt 2014). The situation of
ethnic Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries
515is central to Jobbik’s policies. In their 2010 Election
Manifesto, Jobbik declares that ‘our political horizons
are not defined by the borders of our country, but by the
borders of our nation’(Jobbik 2010b, 15). The party
emphasises that they do not think in terms of 10 million
520Hungarian citizens, but 15 million ethnic Hungarians
(15). The 2014 Election Programme expresses the same
line of thinking with the words ‘we are from the same
blood’and declares that the party feels responsible for
every Hungarian (Jobbik 2014b, 77).
525
The revival of the inter-war revisionist symbols at
Jobbik’sgatheringsgoeshandinhandwithanti-
Semitism and prejudices against ethnic minorities (cf.
Kovács 2016). Restoring old symbols also revives the
connected worldviews and therefore revisionist
530symbolism cannot be seen only as a ‘toolbox’as
Feischmidt (2014, 57) seems to suggest. We agree with
Feischmidt (2014)thatthereasonsforthere-
emergence of these symbols have to be searched located
within the present context, but her approach overlooks
535the process through which a certain ideological
‘package’is symbolically condensed during its use in
the past.
FIGURE 2. People holding a pale blue flag of Székely land.
A
Q3
6A. Hyttinen and L. Näre
CONSUMING NATIONALISM – JOBBIK’S ACTIVE
SUBCULTURE
540 Unlike the rigidly ordered national ceremonies
organised ‘from above’in which the public has only the
role of audience, ceremonies discussed, for instance, in
the edited volumes by Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983)
and Gillis (1994), the national day celebrations
545 organised by Jobbik are much more driven ‘from below’.
The public takes part in the collective ritual enactments
during Jobbik’s national day celebrations. The diversity
and nuances of the symbolic world that is being created
during the national day celebrations are created also by
550 Jobbik’s active supporters, who clearly put a lot of effort
in their appearance. It is apparent that for the
supporters, these gatherings and all the clothes and
accessories they bring along them, are important. They
form a distinct subculture. These symbols are not just
555 given from above but the supporters use them actively
and creatively to convey different kinds of messages. Old
and new visual symbols, as well as verbal symbols, are
used to communicate with fellow participants and to the
audience. Thus,while national day celebrations can be
560 perceived as manifestations of ‘hot’nationalism they also
have a mundane, banal dimension.
Many Jobbik supporters are consciously putting
emphasis on communicating their Hungarianness. Since
that is anyway assumed in Hungary, one can ask are
565 they actually communicating their identities as Jobbik
supporters, a truer and better Hungarian identity, or
alternatively their connections to Transylvania or other
lost territories. Brubaker and his colleagues (2008)
stressed that in addition to just emphasising or
570downplaying one’s membership, one can also make an
already known category membership relevant in a
certain context. This membership can be used, for
example, to justify certain opinions or actions, to claim
‘insider’or membership status, or to control the borders
575of a certain category (Brubaker et al. 2008, 224–225).
The subculture formed by Jobbik supporters is tightly
linked to distinct consumption choices. It is capable of
maintaining a separate network of shops and services
which profile their products as characteristically
580‘national’(nemzeti) (see Jeskó, Bakó, and Tóth 2012).
Figure 4 shows well how consumption has penetrated
the sphere of radical right nationalism and is clearly
visible also in national day gatherings.
This commercial production of symbols for
585nationalistically aware consumers seems to play a central
role in involving the supporters in Jobbik’s nationalist
project. The accessories that were on sale during the
gatherings included flags and T-shirts decorated with
various combination of nationalistic elements
590introduced as well as products made of leather such as
belts and bracelets. In addition, nationalist rock music
and related products such as CDs and DVDs were on
sale. Jobbik, together with the sellers of nationalist
FIGURE 3. Man holding a self-made flag and people wearing national symbols.
Symbolic and ritual enactments of nationalism 7
products, as well as nationalist rock and folk-rock bands,
595 seem to all benefit from this alliance. By bringing the
popular nationalist rock bands to perform at their
events, Jobbik canmobilise potential supporters who
would otherwise not be interested in listening to political
speeches whereas the bands and sellers are provided
600 several occasions to perform or sell merchandise.
Another example of how political preferences can lead to
divisions in the level of consumption is the taxi company
called ‘National taxi’(Nemzeti taxi) which directs its
services specifically for nationalistically-minded
605 customers.
Jobbik has been particularly skilful in creating and
nourishing a subculture to support its political goals (see
Jeskó, Bakó, and Tóth 2012). These products which vary
from music to merchandise related to expressing one’s
610 true Hungarian identity as well as individuality, appear
as a successful fusion of political and nationalistic
ideology with modern mass consumerism and
individualism. Such expressions of Jobbik’s consumerist
nationalism can be observed first hand in all their
615 diversity during national day gatherings, where the true
believers meet each other and ‘show their colours’. The
events are filled with nationalistic symbols which offer
the supporters the possibility to express simultaneously
their individuality, such as membership in a motorbike
620 club, combined with nationalism. These consumption
practices emphasise a shared sense of belonging and
solidarity. Although all Jobbik supporters are unlikely to
be deeply aware of the origins of the symbols and the
meanings attached to them, they still carry a certain
625‘historical weight’which is an essential part of the nature
of the events.
THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF NATIONALISM: A
CONTINUUM OF ‘HOT’ AND BANAL
In his study of the most elementary forms of the
630religious life, Durkheim ([1912] (1964)) researched
totemism among the Australian Aboriginals. His famous
revelation was that by worshipping a totem the
community actually worships itself, the totem then being
a symbol of the community. Neo-Durkheimian
635researchers such as Marvin and Ingle (1999)drew
analogies between national flags and totems and argued
that flags can be seen as totems for the community of a
nation. Thus rituals connected to nationalism can be
perceived as performances creating solidarity. Moreover,
640Breuilly (1994) argued that, while in other ideologies
such as religion or socialism, the object of worship is
external to the community (a transcendent God or a
future utopia), nationalism has a self-referential quality
in that nationalists worship themselves (Breuilly 1994,
64564). We can ask whether the strong self-referential
character of nationalism is the reason behind its
continuous success.
Besides the flags, examples of totemic visual symbols
present in Jobbik’s national day celebrations are the
FIGURE 4. Stand selling nationalist merchandise during the celebrations.
8A. Hyttinen and L. Näre
650 mythical Turul bird and the mythical warrior Árpád (see
Figure 5). Turul is considered a national totem animal
for Hungarians. According to legend, Turul impregnated
Emese, the Hungarian foremother, who then gave birth
to Álmos, who was Árpád’s father. The symbol first
655 appeared in the Transylvanian warrior group’sflag in
1321. It became again more popular at the end of the
19
th
century as part of the rise of nationalism and
interest towards the Hungarian origin myth.
After the Treaty of Trianon, Turul became an almost
660 inseparable element of Trianon memorials and thereafter it
has been closely linked to the ideology of the extreme right
(Ungváry 2005). Turul and the Hungarian myth of origin
are closely linked to the historical Árpád dynasty, which is
sometimes even called ‘the Turul dynasty’.Árpád,despite
665 being a historical figure, is also a mythical national symbol
surrounded by legends. In the gatherings, Árpád is often
depicted on horse back and carrying the red and white flag
of the dynasty (Figure 5). Sometimes the riding figures,
appearing mainly on T-shirts, are more anonymous,
670 representing an unidentifiable mythical warrior from the
era of conquest of Hungary.
Jobbik has been successful in mobilising and
monopolising various old symbols (flags and coats of
arms) to justify its own version of nationalism. It has
675managed to present the party’s ideology as
Hungarianness and something more: a better and a
prouder version of Hungarianness, a national identity
free of the often negative self-image common to
Hungarians whose history ischaracterised by failed
680revolutions and lost wars (cf. Feischmidt 2014).
According to Jobbik’s nationalist ideology, the current
situation is something shameful and national pride is
sought through references to a nostalgic past.
The visual symbols through which Jobbik’s nationalist
685ideology is expressed, such as the Árpád flag and the
Turul bird, can be understood as political tools that can
be used to harness the heroic past symbolically
condensed in them. The importance of these symbols
and rituals becomes apparent when one tries to imagine
690the events without the symbols. The gatherings create
Durkheimian solidarity among the participants and
emphasise oneness. This unity, however does not
indicate inclusion and consensus, but is based on
exclusionary mechanisms and strict divisions between
695‘us’and ‘them’(cf. Elgenius 2011; Mouffe2005).
Symbols are used in the gatherings to draw these
boundaries.
Modern performances during national day gatherings
often aim at reaching the audience emotionally through
700different ritual elements such as music, singing and
marching. These ‘moral dramas’seek to provide the
audience with an illusion of authenticity (see Giesen
2006). However, they rarely succeed in creating what
could be called in Durkheimian terms a ‘collective
705effervescence’among modern audiences (cf. Fox and
Miller-Idriss 2008; Skey 2006). But does this mean that
the rituals do not work? In Jobbik’s gatherings it
becomes apparent that the dichotomy between ‘banal’
and ‘hot’nationalism is in reality a continuum. Modern
710rituals are best understood somewhere between the
mundane, everyday nationalism and moments of truly
heated nationalism (see Billig 1995; Collins 2014; Skey
2006). As seen in Figures 3 and 4, Jobbik’s gatherings,
performing the nation did not consist of merely active
715flag-waving, but also wearing the national symbols and
dressing into the flags. Wearing the national symbols
emphasises the ‘banality’of nationalism (Billig 1995)
over sacredness.
However, heated expressions of nationalism remain a
720possibility during national day celebrations. Extreme
right-wing parties maintain the ability tomobilise
people if needed, and in this mobilisation references to
the historical past are central. This was seen in Hungary
in 2006 during the October 23 commemorations which
725escalated into street riots drawing their power from the
FIGURE 5. A flag with a Turul bird carrying a sword.
Symbolic and ritual enactments of nationalism 9
legacy of the Revolution of 1956. Themobilisation of
people would not have been possible if the meanings
related to this specific day had not been available for the
audience. This potential is something that can be
730 maintained through repetition.
Another example of an expression of ‘hot’nationalism is
the Hungarian Guard (see Figure 6). The original
Hungarian Guard movement and the related association
was founded by Jobbik’s leader Gábor Vona in June
735 2007 (Balogh 2012, 246). The guard was profiled as an
order bringingorganisation in rural areas, which
according to Jobbik’s propaganda were suffering from
high crime rates caused by Roma. This was identified as
a central problem of Hungary in Jobbik’s 2010 Election
740 Manifesto. The functioning of the guard was banned in
2009, because according to the court decision, their
activities increased ethnic tensions and violated others’
rights and freedom (Index 2009a). Banning the guard
meant also banning the uniform.
2
However, only nine
745 days later ‘The New Hungarian Guard’was founded by
acclamation in Budapest.
During the national day gatherings, the guard marched
in an intentionally slightlydisorganised way, and its
members wore uniforms, which were not unified. For
750example, the black jackets were not all exactly the same;
some wore bomber or leather jackets, some wore a
regular black cap instead of the ‘Bocskai cap’.In
addition, marching together with the rest of Jobbik
supporters was done in semi-
organised lines and the
755guard seemed to occasionally merge with the rest of the
marchers. This all appeared as an intentional move to
defy the court order, but at the same to give some leeway
against possible accusations.
The behaviour of the members of the New Hungarian
760Guard reveals the power that symbols carry. While the
court order perceived the uniform as threating to others,
for the guard members it signified pride and superiority.
Symbols are thus more ambiguous than words. The
message sent by boots, white shirts and black vests
765depends on the context, and therefore it is easy to feign
innocence. Jobbik’s leader Gábor Vona, who was also the
leader of the original Hungarian guard wrote in the
party magazine Bar!kád (2013) that the situation has
gone so far that it appears to be a crime to wear a white
770shirt and a black vest, but the observations at the
National Day celebrations reveal that this is not the case.
On 23 October, the police were observing at close range
the marching of guard members dressed in guard
uniform in a clearly defined unit without any
775interruption (see Figure 7). Although symbolism related
to the Guard is distinctive compared to the other visual
symbols present at the gatherings, it too draws
inspiration from inter-war years. As a living symbol, the
guard members embody and re-enact the idea of
780revisionist paramilitary movements such as the Levente
movement (see Connerton 1989).
Apart from the marching of the Guard, processions by
the supporters formed a central ritual element during
national day celebrations (see Figure 8). The procession
785of party supporters marked the end of the smaller warm-
up events and made moving together to the main event
more meaningful. The March 15 procession emphasised
the role of Jobbik politicians who were marching in the
front line carrying a big banner. Many people who
790participated in this procession were wearing a white
campaign jacket and almost everyone had in their hands
either a red, white or green balloon with the message
‘May Jobbik win!’(Győzzön a Jobbik!), or, since the
party’s name is a pun ‘May the better win!’. The idea was
795to have all in all 1848 balloons to commemorate the year
of the March 15 revolution. Huge flags at the front of the
crowd dominated the visual outlook of the procession
(Figure 8).
FIGURE 6. T-shirt with an image of Árpád on a horse carrying
the red and white flag of the dynasty.
A
Q4
10 A. Hyttinen and L. Näre
After the procession had reached its destination at Deák
800 square, one of the most visually impressive rituals,
releasing the balloons, was enacted (see Figure 9). People
were told to let the balloons free with the words: ‘We
will send on their way these national coloured air
balloons, and if it depends on us, and if on April 6 we
805will get the trust of the people, the nation and the
Hungariannes will rise like this, fly free, freed from the
24 and the earlier 44 year of colonialism. May Jobbik
win! May Hungary win!’The balloons were freed with
FIGURE 7. Hungarian Guard marching at the October 23 celebration.
FIGURE 8. Procession at the March 15 commemoration.
Symbolic and ritual enactments of nationalism 11
dramatic uplifting music rising with the balloons with a
810 clear aim to offer the people a strong collective
experience to which everyone could participate equally.
This symbolic act combined nationalistically framed
visual and auditory dimensions with a clear party-
political message. In the message Jobbik’s success as a
815 party was linked to the faith of the nation: Jobbik’s
victory is Hungary’s victory. Balloon release is an
illustrative example of a ritual, which creates solidarity
through shared participation (see Kertzer 1988;
Durkheim 1964
AQ5 ). It also involves the participants
820 without bringing to the surface possible ideological
disagreements.
CONCLUSIONS
We have analysed the diverse, multisensory but highly
visual universe of symbols and rituals through which
825 Jobbik and its supporters construct, articulate, enact, and
perform nationalism during Hungarian national day
gatherings. The symbols present in the events draw their
power and meanings from inter-war revisionism and
nostalgic dreams of Greater Hungary. They form a
830 distinct dimension open for varied expressions of
nationhood.
The symbols, such as the Árpád flag and the Map of
Greater Hungary, are by their nature dividing, since not
all Hungarians can identify with them. This division is
835 partly lessened by the use of generally accepted national
symbols such as the Flag of Hungary and the singing
together of the national anthem Himnusz. However, it is
the dividing symbols that make Jobbik’s gatherings stand
out from the more ‘mainstream’usage of nationalist
840 symbols. They also seem to function as means for
creating solidarity among Jobbik supporters. The
symbols are used to communicate to other participants a
Jobbikian version of ‘true Hungarianness’.
In Hungary, national days are moments of political
845contestations and therefore contestations of different
understandings of Hungarian nationhood. The fact that
national days are commemorated and celebrated in
politically fragmented units makes the processes through
which past meanings are fought in the political arena
850visible. Jobbik, which has become internationally known
for its paramilitary guard, is now trying to present itself
as a people’s party (néppárt) and is constantly playing
with blurred interpretations and meanings. It is
simultaneously trying to attract the interest of a larger
855public and meet the needs of its core supporters. The
actions and rhetoric of Jobbik’s politicians have, since
the beginning of the party’s existence, been a complex
game of what is accepted and what is not. It has been
argued that the rise of Jobbik has led to a significant
860change in what is considered to be polite and
permissible in Hungary (see Stewart 2012).
The visual symbolic expressions in Jobbik’s gatherings
appear more radical than the speeches of the party
leaders. Based on the observations, it seems that the
865visual sphere in general is more open to ambiguous
radical expressions: what cannot be said can still be
shown. Using clearly revisionist symbols in the present
context as well as supporting various paramilitary
activities can be seen as flirting with revisionism and
870expressing xenophobia and outright racism. These
connections can then be verbally denied if someone
from the outside questions them. This playing with two
cards (towards media and the supporters), allows Jobbik
FIGURE 9. The balloon release on 15 March
.
12 A. Hyttinen and L. Näre
to keep their activities open for various sub-groups and
875 their own agendas.
We have argued that in order to understand contemporary
forms of nationalism in small Central Eastern-European
nation-states such as Hungary, a dichotomy between ‘hot’
and ‘banal’is not useful. It does not fully capture the
880 characteristics of national day celebrations organised by
right-wing and populist parties such as Jobbik. Rather, we
should speak of a continuum between hot and banal
nationalism, which takes different forms from ritualistic
commemorations to banal consumerism. In both cases,
885 performing nationalism during Jobbik’snationalday
commemoration is a collective endeavour by the public, as
well as the party leaders, and in this, visual symbols and
totems are of central importance.
Finally, the discussion demonstrates that Jobbik and its
890 populist ideology has a broader influence on the
Hungarian public sphere and politics thanis acknowledged
outside of Hungary. Jobbik has been able to influence
Fidesz’political agenda. Jobbik has been allowed to express
their revisionist interpretations of history, and make
895 xenophobic and racial political claims based on a
primordial notion of ethnic Hungarianness. It is also clear
that attempts to limit its activities through legal measures,
such as banning the Hungarian guard, have not been
effective. Moreover, Hungary’s geographic position as a
900 gateway for people seeking asylum in Central and
Northern Europe in 2015 offered opportunities for the
right-wing parties to create images of new enemies.
Consequently, also the ruling Fidesz party moved in its
rhetoric and politics towards the extreme right and started
905 targeting asylum seekers and ‘terrorists’. What remains to
be seen is how far towards the extreme right the power play
between Jobbik and Fidesz will move Hungarian politics.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the
910 authors.
AQ6
NOTES
[1] The word ‘Jobbik’is actually a pun meaning both ‘better’
and ‘right’.
[2] After several long disputes, it was ruled in the so called Lex
915 Gárda that the ban of The Hungarian Guard meant that
also using the guard uniform is forbidden (Index 2009b).
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