Impact of Cronyism in Mexican Multinationals

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Abstract
Therefore, within the findings of the present investigation it is considered that the one part of the performance of the company is associated with the relations that have the director general with other members of the council, which contradicts the theory of the agency, which Mentions that the agent (director of the company) must be an independent person so that it can be monitored by the members of the board, the previous thing can be logical if one takes into account that the majority of the companies studied are of familiar origin and is Something common that arise this type of relations.
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Technology Innovation,
Finance and crm: Repercussions
on Competitiveness
Technology Innovation,
Finance and
CRM
: Repercussions
on Competitiveness
JOSÉ SÁNCHEZ GUTIÉRREZ
TANIA ELENA GONZÁLEZ ALVARADO
(Coordinators)
Primera edición, 2017
© D.R. 2017, Los autores
© D.R. 2017, Red Internacional de Investigadores en Competitividad
© D.R. 2017, Fondo Editorial Universitario
© D.R. 2017, Universidad de Guadalajara
Centro Universitario de Ciencias Económico Administrativas
Av. Periférico Norte 799, Edificio G-306
Núcleo Los Belenes
45100 Zapopan, Jalisco, México
ISBN 978-84-17075-56-9
Impreso y hecho en México
Printed and made in Mexico
Technology Innovation, Finance and CRM: Repercussions on
Competitiveness
Universidad de Guadalajara
Sánchez-Gutiérrez, José; González-Alvarado, Tania Elena (coordinators)
This work is a product of the members of RIICO (Red Internacional de Inves-
tigadores en Competitividad) with external contributions. The findings, inter-
pretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect
the views of Universidad de Guadalajara and RIICO.
All the photos on this book were taken from Unsplash. Unsplash is a photo
discovery platform for free to use, high-definition photos. Unsplash, Inc., a
Canadian corporation) operates the Unsplash website at unsplash.com (the
“Site”) and all related websites, software, mobile apps, and other services that
they provide (together, the “Service”) with the goal of celebrating and enabling
contributors and fostering creativity in their community.
7
Chapter 3
Impact of Cronyism in Mexican
Multinationals
By Jorge Pelayo-Maciel, Manuel Alfredo Ortiz-Barrera and
Tania Elena González-Alvarado
Impact of Cronyism in Mexican Multinationals
Jorge Pelayo-Maciel
Manuel Alfredo Ortiz-Barrera
Tania Elena González-Alvarado
Universidad de Guadalajara, México
INTRODUCTION
This work seeks to analyze how the
cronyism, even known as friendship networks,
can affect the Mexican multinationals. This is
because the importance of having partner
networks to develop a synergy to consolidate
resulting businesses from such networks. The term
has its origin in “social exchange, whose main
analysis are relations between the actors” that can be defined as
well like a “reciprocal exchange transaction, where agent “A” shows a
favorable action to agent “B”, based on shared membership in a social
network at expense of agent “C”; where a valuable resource is claimed
(Khatri, Tsang & Begley, 2006).
Authors explains that cronyism must exist if “there are a reciprocal
exchange where agent “A” gives some value to “B”, and this agent will
give something to his partner in the future. In second place, exchange
could be tangible or intangible, and third, members in group are based in
kinship, friendship, ethnicity, religion, school, workplace, mutual interest,
among others; all these forms are basic in favoritism”. To contextualize, a
social network is a perspective where agents, seen as individuals, groups
and organizations, form a set of interconnected relationships where the
behavior of their members is established (Granovetter, 1985; Adler &
Kwon, 2002; Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Brass el at., 2004; Inkpen & Tsang,
2005; Begley, Khatri & Tsang, 2010); also the concept can be defined as
a “set of agents with one or more relations between them. These actors
can be any kind of meaningful social unit, including individuals, collective
entities, companies, organizations, [...] such relationships can be formal,
Impact of Cronyism in Mexican Multinationals
Pelayo-Maciel, J.; Ortiz-Barrera, M.; González-Alvarado, T.
55
affective (friendship or respect), social interactions, workflows, As not
commercial materials and alliances" (Contractor, Wasserman & Faust,
2006).
A business group is therefore a social network (Goto, 1982; Keister,
1998; Yiu, Bruton & Lu, 2005; Chacar & Vissa, 2005; Carney et al.,
2011) where it can generate a cronyism (Mathews, 1998; Claessens &
Fan, 2002; Chang & Shin, 2006; Carney, 2008; Keles, Özkan & Bezirci,
2011; Chen & Miller, 2011; Barnett, Yandle & Naufal, 2013), since this
term as "a set of companies that are controlled by a small group of
majority shareholders, usually members of a family or a group of
associates with Social or ethnic nexuses “(Chavarin, 2011: 194). The
family having ownership or possession of capital of the enterprise implies
having the authority or the control to establish the policies of the
organization (Cheffins & Bank, 2009). There is no precise data in Mexico
when family business groups began, but it can be mentioned that this
type of organization began with the industrial revolution in the late
nineteenth century (Chavarin, 2011).
1. MEXICAN CONTEXT.
In Mexico the context can be understood as a vast majority of family
owned corporations with structures known as business groups; these can
be identified as a strategy that comes from 19th century, which consist in
develop a business group through an structured known as market
concentration (Chavarín, 2012; Shleifer et al., 2000).
Moreover, this is something common
in the world; since 19% of the listed
companies in different stock exchanges
are controlled by familiar business
groups, which seek to obtain the profits
of the subsidiaries and in turn to have a
control without need of capital
contribution (La Porta et al., 1999).
Although there may theoretically be
disadvantages in family ownership, there are studies that argue that when
such structures exist, managers will seek long - term strategies to ensure
the wealth of their family (Leff, 1978; Granovetter, 2010; Miller et al.,
2008; Minichilli, Corbetta & MacMillan, 2010).
Technology Innovation, Finance and CRM: Repercussions on Competitiveness
56
Sánchez-Gutiérrez, J.; González-Alvarado, T. (coord.)
Table 1. The thirteen largest Mexican multinationals in 2015.
Source: Forbes (2015).
It can also be mentioned that family property exists because there is a
conflict between the one who controls the company and the shareholder
(Castillo Ponce, 2007). When analyzing business groups in emerging
economies, the family establishes a pyramid-owned structure to control
its multiple affiliated companies (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006; Claessens
et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999, 2002). In other words, they have a
certain percentage of ownership sufficient to exercise control over them,
in addition to which business groups are the structure that prevails at the
global level (Masulis, Pham & Zein, 2011). Within this scope, it is
estimated that by 2015 in Mexico there were thirteen of the 2,000
multinationals with the highest income and market value in the world
(Global 2000, cited by Forbes, 2015), of which are part of Mexican
family-owned business groups are: América Móvil, Inbursa Group and
Carso Group (Slim family); FEMSA (Fernández family); Grupo México (the
Mota-Velasco family); Grupo Televisa (Azcárraga family); Alfa (Fernández
Garza family); Grupo Bimbo (Servitje family); Liverpool (Suberville family);
Grupo Elektra (Salinas family) and Arca Continental (Barragán family), the
economic importance for Mexico is high, as can be seen in Table 1, these
thirteen companies generated global sales of US $ 181,800 billion, which
is equivalent To 22% of Mexican GDP generated in the fourth quarter of
2015.
Ranking
Companies
Sales (mdd)
Earnings
(mdd)
Assets (mdd)
Market Value
(mdd)
125
América Móvil
63,700
3,500
85,200
74,500
379
FEMSA
20,900
1,300
25,500
33,800
519
Banorte
8,100
1,100
74,500
16,900
556
Grupo México
9,300
1,800
20,600
23,700
794
Grupo Inbursa
4,000
1,400
26,200
17,700
846
Cemex
15,800
-510
34,900
12,400
1,003
Grupo Televisa
6,000
405
15,800
20,400
1,036
Alfa
17,200
-170
15,800
11,000
1,068
Grupo Bimbo
14,200
287
12,000
14,000
1,163
Liverpool
6,100
583
7,100
16,200
1,419
Grupo Elektra
5,600
551
13,300
6,500
1,446
Grupo Carso
6,200
427
6,200
10,100
1,557
Arca Continental
4,700
489
5,400
10,300
Impact of Cronyism in Mexican Multinationals
Pelayo-Maciel, J.; Ortiz-Barrera, M.; González-Alvarado, T.
57
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.
Multinational companies are those that generate direct investments
abroad, which, control activities of generation of value in these
international markets, these corporations have been object of study in
different parts of the world, which they have analyzed from industries of
commodities like are The industrialization of the oil sector in Chile and
steel in India (Bucheli, 2010; Ganguli, 2007), to high technology
industries such as TATA (Gaur, 2010); Have also generated studies
analyzing their success in countries such as China and India (Carney &
Dieleman, 2001); As well as the creation of strategies to diversify its
business portfolio to the global level, to take advantage of market failures
in emerging countries (Carrera, Mesquita & Perkins Vassolo, 2003; Gaur,
2009; Kumar, Gaur & Pattnalk, 2012). It also deals with this issue from
the perspective of transaction costs, strategic management, institutional
theory and resource-based theory (Göksen & Üsdiken, 2001; Li,
Ramaswamy, & Pettit, 2006). Has served to understand the different
strategies that multinational companies have sought in their international
expansion, it has also been seen that Latin American multinational
companies develop a type of organization called business groups (Sargent
& Ghaddar, 2001), and it has also been seen how this faces to market
imperfections (Yiu, 2010), but to date, little has been studied of the
business and friendship networks generated by such companies.
For the development of the present study it is taken as the basic
theories of agency and institutional, the first one analyzes the
motivations and behaviors of the agent and the main one (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976), this seen as a contract by which one or more people
(The principal), designates another person (the agent) to perform some
service on his behalf, which involves delegating to the agent some
authority for decision making. While the second, it can be seen simply as
the rules of the game, which include institutional changes over time which
may be formal or informal, which, on the one hand, are laws and
standards planned humanely and on the other, are moral norms and
culture, of which in both cases determines the behavior of both
individuals and companies (North, 1993). For this research is taken as an
informal institution the behavior that follow the directors and advisers
when creating links with other people from different organizations and
different industries.
Technology Innovation, Finance and CRM: Repercussions on Competitiveness
58
Sánchez-Gutiérrez, J.; González-Alvarado, T. (coord.)
With this, we seek to support the behavior of the agent consistent with
the generation of wealth of the principal. It is believed that changes in the
structure or process of having a board of directors independent of the
control or management of the organization leads to greater efficiency in
monitoring and therefore leads to the interests of the principal
(Anderson, Melanson & Maly 2007). However the empirical findings show
mixed results (Kang, Zardkoohi, 2005), in fact it has been argued that
the closeness between the board of directors and the management of the
company can enhance the financial benefits, or in other words, the duality
between Ownership and control leads to better financial performance
(Anderson et al., 2007).
Based on the above, we study an investigation made with information
from the Taiwan Stock Exchange (Chung & Luo, 2008), where it finds
that business groups are created to reduce agency costs and that in
addition these are taken for granted Institutional context. Based on a
study done in Canada, however, (Chung & Luo, 2008) mention that when
generating such structures there are agency costs for small shareholders
and the benefits exist for the controlling family, Financial performance
than companies that are totally independent.
In another study by Kuhnen (2009), he mentions that business groups
can mitigate agency conflicts by facilitating the transfer of information
efficiently, suggesting that the effects of a pyramid structure give better
oversight of the board of directors and Increase the possibility of
collusion of the same, but does not find relevant that this can improve
the results for shareholders.
In emerging economies, external monitoring institutions aimed at the
supervision of management are only beginning to be created, this is
usually solved with the concentration of ownership and direct
management of the company, especially through controlling families
(Khanna & Palepu, 1999). Another reason why firms concentrate
ownership is for cultural reasons of a society, understanding this as the
set of shared beliefs that condition the behavior of individuals (Smircich,
1983). These cultural elements are socially created and, therefore, it
cannot be assumed that the corporate governance structure is entirely a
product of rationality and the explicit design of individuals. For the above,
different studies were analyzed where the term cronyism or cronyism was
studied in the corporative as well as its relation with the performance of
the company.
Impact of Cronyism in Mexican Multinationals
Pelayo-Maciel, J.; Ortiz-Barrera, M.; González-Alvarado, T.
59
It begins by saying that the studies have focused on the crisis that
occurred in that continent in the late 1990s, where Dieleman and Sachs
(2008), where they analyze business groups in emerging economies,
particularly in Indonesia, where Institutional context analyzes the increase
in the resources and capacities of a family business group for the
friendships generated during the regime of President Suharto, to achieve
this, the company was studied for 20 years
through the information available from the
Jakarta Stock Exchange and Where 56
interviews were made. On the other hand, in
Malaysia, Gul (2006) verified by means of a
linear regression and with information from the
Worldscope database that during 1996 to 1998
the fees paid to audit firms increased more in
the companies with political ties of the Which
did not have, in addition that in 1998 imposed
capital controls that in the end turned out to be
a financial subsidy that favored the companies
with political ties with which the risks derived
from the crisis were reduced.
This represented a gain of five billion dollars in
the stock market (Johson & Milton, 2001). In this same line of research,
but in China, Allen and Li (2011) analyzed the long-term impact of the
recovery on the compensation of managers in the banking sector in China,
where through a linear regression they find evidence that The existence
of political cronyism in the main four Chinese banks, find the existence of
preferential loans, the same happened in Romania where during crisis the
companies of nationality of that country had access to preferential loans
unlike foreign investors, resulting in low Levels of indebtedness of the
former (Valsan, 2005).
This theme of cronyism, not only covers issues of political ties with
companies, has also been studied through organizational relationships (,
such as Begley and Khatri (2010), who analyze these networks in a
context of change Social, where two types of networks identify comrades
(clique) and business networks, in addition to two forms of competition,
inter and intra net, in each of them it is shown that network competition
increases the cronyism that is something natural In family ties, among
friends, business partners, but in any case must be analyzed to avoid acts
Technology Innovation, Finance and CRM: Repercussions on Competitiveness
60
Sánchez-Gutiérrez, J.; González-Alvarado, T. (coord.)
of corruption, which have caused financial crises such as those in Asia and
the United States (Khatri & Tsang, 2006). Also from the business
perspective, it can be mentioned that they work in networks and that in
this 21st century are quite sophisticated, based on friendship, family ties
or business networks (Contractor, Wasserman & Faust, 2006). Similarly,
organizational cronyism reflects the reciprocal exchange and is found to
be the most important factor for the generation of confidence on the
part of the managers.
As a result, it is clear that this issue is broad and can be exploited
further, previous research has focused on issues of political friendship
(Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Gul, 2006; Johson & Milton 2001; Khatri &
Tsang, 2006; Contractor, Wasserman & Faust, 2006), but not only
cronyism occurs in these spheres is also held in the business or
organizational domain. Therefore, the present research aims to increase
the knowledge of this subject in a greater extent in the business
networks, it is analyzed the general managers and the chairmen of council
of the business groups in Mexico the following hypotheses are proposed:
H1a: The level of existing relations of the CEO with members of the
board of directors is positively related to the performance of the
company.
H1b: The level of existing relations of the CEO with other organizations
is positively related to the performance of the company.
H1c: The level of the CEO's existing relationships with other industries is
positively related to the company's performance.
H2a: The level of existing relations of the chairman of the board of
directors with members of the board itself is positively related to the
performance of the company.
H2b: The level of existing relations of the chairman of the board of
directors with other organizations is positively related to the
performance of the company.
H2c: The level of existing relations of the chairman of the board of
directors with other industries is positively related to the performance
of the company.
3. METHODOLOGY.
To test the hypotheses, we used information from the 143 companies
listed on the Mexico Stock Exchange, completing the information with the
ISI Emerging Markets and Bloomberg database, of the companies with
Impact of Cronyism in Mexican Multinationals
Pelayo-Maciel, J.; Ortiz-Barrera, M.; González-Alvarado, T.
61
information available only 87, since the remaining 56, did not have
complete information. The present research is developed with an analysis
of variance (ANOVA), this tool seeks to analyze the differences between
means of different groups in this case investigates if there are differences
between both the directors and the presidents of the companies In the
relationships they have with members of the board, with other companies
and with companies from other industries.
3.1 Variables Measurement.
To measure the dependent variable, as already mentioned, secondary
databases were taken, "relations of the director general with board
members, with other organizations and other industries" was developed
as a continuum and what Bloomberg published as the number of Identified
connections exist with board members, connections with different
organizations and connections with different industries. In the same way
the relations of the chairman of the board of directors were analyzed.
The independent variables were developed through financial indicators
such as return on assets (ROA), which is obtained by dividing net profits
over total assets; The return on shareholders' equity (ROE), which is
obtained by dividing post-tax earnings on the total capital of the
shareholders; The net return on sales, which is calculated by dividing
earnings after tax on income; The gross profit margin (UOB) is obtained
by dividing the income minus the cost of the goods between the income
and finally the net profit margin (OU) which is calculated by dividing the
profit after tax between the income.
4. RESULTS.
This section analyzes the relations of both the CEO and the CEO of the
company and in the first case analyzes the results generated between the
CEO and the board members generates a good performance of the
company by throwing the information that Of advice shedding the
indicators return on assets (ROA), return on equity of the shareholders
(ROE); Which can not be significant with the F statistic; (ROS) results in
a .10 level of significance, while the gross profit margin (UOB) and net
profit margin (UO) indicators result in a significance level of .01, In
addition it can be seen that the return on sales is the one that has the
most impact by the sum of squares of inter-groups (Table 2), in this case
you can see the ties in the intra or intra-organizational relationships can
generate A better performance of the company (Begley & Khatri, 2010).
Technology Innovation, Finance and CRM: Repercussions on Competitiveness
62
Sánchez-Gutiérrez, J.; González-Alvarado, T. (coord.)
Table 2. One way ANOVA of the relations of the CEO with members
of the board
Table 3.
One way ANOVA of the relations of the CEO with other
organizations
gl
F
Sig.
ROA
Inter-grupos
44
.267
1.000
Intra-grupos
41
Total
85
ROE
Inter-grupos
44
1.446
.116
Intra-grupos
42
Total
86
ROS
Inter-grupos
44
1.976
.015
Intra-grupos
41
Total
85
UOB
Inter-grupos
44
9.323
.000
Intra-grupos
42
Total
86
UO
Inter-grupos
44
48.564
.000
Intra-grupos
42
quadratic
mean
.107
.401
.039
.027
1.788
.905
.744
.080
1.593
.033
Total
Squere
sum
4.711
16.445
21.156
1.720
1.136
2.856
78.669
37.101
115.769
32.741
3.352
36.093
70.110
1.378
71.488
86
gl
Quadratic
F
Sig.
ROA
Inter-grupos
9
.168
.997
Intra-grupos
76
Total
85
ROE
Inter-grupos
9
.211
.992
Intra-grupos
77
Total
86
ROS
Inter-grupos
9
.318
.967
Intra-grupos
76
Total
85
UOB
Inter-grupos
9
.247
.986
Intra-grupos
77
Total
86
UO
Inter-grupos
9
.203
.993
Intra-grupos
77
mean
.046
.273
.008
.036
.466
1.468
.112
.456
.184
.907
Total
Squere
sum
0.413
20.743
21.156
.069
2.787
2.856
4.198
111.571
115.769
1.011
35.082
36.093
1.655
69.832
71.488
86
Impact of Cronyism in Mexican Multinationals
Pelayo-Maciel, J.; Ortiz-Barrera, M.; González-Alvarado, T.
63
Source: self made
Source: self made
When analyzing the relations of the director general with other
organizations and other industries, ie the interorganizational part, you can
see that the return on sales has a greater impact on the performance of
the company, cannot be said to exist a relationship Significant, since in
Tables 3 and 4 a very low value can be seen in the F statistic, so it can be
said that there is no relation between the company's performance and
the relations that the CEO has with other organizations as with others
Industries.
Tabla 4. One way ANOVA of the relations of the CEO with other
The following analysis was made of the chairman's relationship with
other directors, other companies, and other industries, it is appreciated
that there is no level of significance to say that there is an impact on the
chairperson's relations with other counselors in the Generating a good
financial performance of the company (Table 5). However, observing the
levels of significance of the board chairman's relationships with other
companies and other industries identifies that the financial indicator called
return on assets has a significance level of 0.05 and .010 respectively,
but not the same In the other dependent variables, where we can see
that there is no relation to the independent variables, with the above it
F
Sig.
ROA
Inter-grupos
.432
.914
Intra-grupos
Total
ROE
Inter-grupos
.942
.494
Intra-grupos
Total
ROS
Inter-grupos
.929
.505
Intra-grupos
Total
UOB
Inter-grupos
.536
.844
Intra-grupos
Total
UO
Inter-grupos
.731
.679
Intra-grupos
Quadratic
mean
.114
.265
.031
.033
1.275
1.372
.236
.441
.626
.855
Total
Squere
sum
1.030
20.126
21.156
.283
2.573
2.856
11.477
104.292
115.769
2.128
33.965
36.093
5.630
65.858
71.488
industries
gl
9
76
85
9
77
86
9
76
85
9
77
86
9
77
86
Technology Innovation, Finance and CRM: Repercussions on Competitiveness
64
Sánchez-Gutiérrez, J.; González-Alvarado, T. (coord.)
Source: self made
can be said that relations based on friendship or business networks are
quite sophisticated for this first analysis and a study is needed where
Reflects the reciprocal exchange that may exist both inside and outside
the company (Contractor, Wasserman, Faust, 2006).
Table 5. One way ANOVA of the relations of the president of the board with
other counselors
Table 6. One Way ANOVA of the relations of the president of
the board with other companies
gl
F
Sig.
ROA
Inter-grupos
45
.847
.707
Intra-grupos
40
Total
85
ROE
Inter-grupos
45
1.201
.277
Intra-grupos
41
Total
86
ROS
Inter-grupos
45
.302
1.000
Intra-grupos
40
Total
85
UOB
Inter-grupos
45
.312
1.000
Intra-grupos
41
Total
86
UO
Inter-grupos
45
.255
1.000
Intra-grupos
41
Quadratic
mean
.229
.271
.036
.030
.653
2.159
.204
.656
.348
1.362
Total
Squere
sum
10.322
10.834
21.156
1.624
1.232
2.856
29.393
86.376
115.769
9.199
26.894
36.093
15.656
55.832
71.488
86
gl
F
Sig.
ROA
Inter-grupos
11
3.220
.001
Intra-grupos
74
Total
85
ROE
Inter-grupos
11
.640
.789
Intra-grupos
75
Total
86
ROS
Inter-grupos
11
.767
.672
Intra-grupos
74
Total
85
UOB
Inter-grupos
11
.341
.974
Intra-grupos
75
Total
86
UO
Inter-grupos
11
.245
.993
Intra-grupos
75
quadratic
mean
.623
.193
.022
.035
1.077
1.404
.156
.458
.225
.920
Total
Squere
sum
6.849
14.307
21.156
.245
2.611
2.856
11.842
103.927
115.769
1.717
34.377
36.093
2.477
69.011
71.488
86
Impact of Cronyism in Mexican Multinationals
Pelayo-Maciel, J.; Ortiz-Barrera, M.; González-Alvarado, T.
65
Source: self made
Source: self made
Tabla 7. One Way ANOVA of a factor of relations of the president of the
board of other industries
The results show a contribution to understand the behavior of networks
of friendship generated by managers of business groups in Mexico and it
can be seen that organizational relationships in the form of friendship is a
way to generate greater entrepreneurial skills that benefits them to
generate a Positive effect on performance (Begley & Khatri, 2010;
Contractor, Wasserman & Faust, 2006).
CONCLUSIONS
Therefore, within the findings of the present investigation it is
considered that the one part of the performance of the company is
associated with the relations that have the director general with other
members of the council, which contradicts the theory of the agency,
which Mentions that the agent (director of the company) must be an
independent person so that it can be monitored by the members of the
board, the previous thing can be logical if one takes into account that the
majority of the companies studied are of familiar origin and is Something
common that arise this type of relations.
gl
F
Sig.
ROA
Inter-grupos
15
2.272
.011
Intra-grupos
70
Total
85
ROE
Inter-grupos
15
1.065
.404
Intra-grupos
71
Total
86
ROS
Inter-grupos
15
.532
.914
Intra-grupos
70
Total
85
UOB
Inter-grupos
15
.581
.880
Intra-grupos
71
Total
86
UO
Inter-grupos
15
.337
.989
Intra-grupos
71
Quadratic
mean
.462
.203
.035
.033
.790
1.484
.263
.453
.317
.940
Total
Squere
sum
6.928
14.228
21.156
.524
2.331
2.856
11.855
103.914
115.769
3.947
32.146
36.093
4.752
66.736
71.488
86
Technology Innovation, Finance and CRM: Repercussions on Competitiveness
66
Sánchez-Gutiérrez, J.; González-Alvarado, T. (coord.)
Source: self made
So you can check the hypothesis 1a, but not the 1b and 1c. With
respect to hypothesis 2a, 2b and 2c, it can be tested only partially
because it only seems to have relations with the performance of the
assets, which can be logical when analyzing that one of the most
important functions of the president of the council is to help To establish
the investment objectives of the company and to see how the
performance generated by the amount of relationships that such person
achieves is an interesting finding in this research.
One of the limitations of the present investigation is that it would be
necessary to complete the sample with all the companies of the Mexican
Stock Exchange to analyze the behavior of the companies that are not
part of business groups. Issue in terms of investment decisions in
different countries where managers have generated friendly relations and
can also be analyzed in different institutional contexts and longitudinally
over time.
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