INTRODUCTION A certain metaphysical thesis about meaning that we'll call Informational Role Semantics (IRS) is accepted practically universally in linguistics, philosophy and the cognitive sciences: the meaning (or content, or sense') of a linguistic expression 1 is constituted, at least in part, by at least some of its inferential relations. This idea is hard to state precisely, both because
... [Show full abstract] notions like metaphysical constitution are moot and, more importantly, because different versions of IRS take different views on whether there are constituents of meaning other than inferential role, and on which of the inferences an expression occurs in are meaning constitutive. Some of these issues will presently concern us; but for now it will do just to gesture towards such familiar claims as that: it's part and parcel of dog meaning dog 2 that the inference from x is a dog to x is an animal is valid; it's part and parcel of boil meaning boil that the infere