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The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Edited by Hugh LaFollette.
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2016 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/9781405186414.wbiee829
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“Patience is a virtue,” or so a familiar saying goes. Still, we might wonder: is it a
moral virtue (see ), or merely prudential? And is it even really a virtue at all?
To address such questions, we must delve more deeply into the nature of patience.
For the Stoics, patience is a fundamental virtue – one that arises from, yet also
sustains, the reasoned detachment crucial to Stoic ethics (see ). Through
patient study we gain an understanding of the world and come to see there is only
one genuine good: virtue. This knowledge allows us to calmly accept burdens and
delays that would frustrate most people because we realize that wealth, pleasure, and
other commonly pursued objects are only indifferents, and not in fact real goods. A
proper understanding of the world enables us to avoid the passions that undermine
our virtue and selfcontrol (Harned 2015 [1997]; Pianalto 2014).
Early writers in the Christian tradition, including Tertullian and Augustine, also
treat patience as a central moral virtue (Harned 2015 [1997]: Chs. 3–4). For them,
patience involves turning ourselves over to God’s will, and accepting our own
weakness. In enduring burdens calmly and demonstrating forbearance with others,
we accept God’s will, and imitate God’s own patience and forbearance with us. These
writers would reject a Stoic understanding of patience, with its emphasis on
detachment from the external world and selfmastery. For them, this would reflect
both a rejection of God’s creation, and a problematic pride. This early Christian
approach to patience is echoed in later Christian thought (see, e.g., Kierkegaard
1990; Hauerwasand Pinches 1996).
Contemporary Accounts of Patience
Joseph Kupfer treats patience as the “disposition to [calmly] accept delays in the
gratification of our desires – delays that are warranted by the circumstances or the
desires themselves” (2007: 165). Thus an artist might patiently prepare a raw canvas
prior to painting in order to achieve her best results. Or we might wait patiently as
we are stuck in gridlocked traffic, even as we desire to arrive home. Many social
scientists have operationalized patience in terms of waiting or deferred gratification.
For example, Fowler and Kam (2006) found that patient individuals – ones who
were less prone to significant futurediscounting – were more likely to vote. Such
individuals were more willing to accept the shortterm costs of becoming informed
and voting for the sake of potential longerterm benefits.
While illuminating for some purposes, patience cannot be characterized solely in
terms of calm waiting or (merely) deferring gratification. With respect to the latter,
Patience
Jason Kawall
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our attitudes while waiting matter. A person who is terribly frustrated and constantly
complaining while she defers gratification may demonstrate a certain continence,
but is not yet patient. And even if she were to refrain from outward complaint, her
inner frustration and agitation would be incompatible with genuine patience.
More generally, there are instances where patience is manifested, but not in wait-
ing for the satisfaction of some desire. Eamonn Callan gives the example of a man
who loses his sight and requires patience to cope with the changes and burdens he
faces, rather than giving in to resignation or anger (1993: 525–6). We can manifest
patience in enduring chronic pains, in calmly forbearing from reacting to belligerent
neighbors, and in other situations where we are not waiting for the satisfaction of
some desire.
Nic Bommarito suggests that patience “requires some suffering or frustration”
(2014: 271). After all, without such negative states, it might seem there is no need for
patience. However, his claim needs to be modified – presumably a truly patient indi-
vidual might not feel any frustration in the face of delays or timeconsuming work.
Such equanimity is often a mark of patience.
Matthew Pianalto can be seen as addressing this worry. He characterizes patience
as “the virtue of bearing one’s unavoidable or wisely assumed burdens with equa-
nimity,” where burdens should be understood broadly as “obstacles, delays, or other
forms of adversity that may give rise to undue anger or despair – to which one can
respond, or fail to respond with patience” (2014: 91, 92). Some of our burdens are
unavoidable, such as the suffering associated with losing a loved one, while other
burdens we choose – devoting ourselves to a program of physical exercise, or help-
ing to look after an ill relative. Crucially, Pianalto does not require patient agents to
actually feel anger or frustration in the face of delay or adversity; rather, patience is
exercised in situations that may give rise to such reactions.
Still, to further refine Pianalto’s account, it seems that patient individuals bear
reasonably borne burdens with equanimity rather than “wisely assumed burdens.” As
Pianalto himself suggests (2014: 92–3), what matters for patience is that a burden is
still appropriately borne. A burden that was wisely assumed might no longer be
appropriate given changing circumstances. And even if a burden was unwisely
assumed, it may now be reasonably borne. Claire may have been foolish to adopt a
puppy on a spontaneous whim. But now that the commitment has been made, it is
appropriate for her to bear the burdens, and she can be virtuously patient in doing so.
A second, rather minor concern is that it seems strained to speak of many ordi-
nary burdens as being wisely assumed. For example, while such hobbies as collecting
stamps or playing video games may be fine pastimes, and the burdens associated
with them reasonably or appropriately borne, it may be too generous to characterize
them as wisely borne. To say that the burdens attached to such hobbies are wisely
borne suggests a certain praiseworthiness and importance that seem unwarranted;
they instead seem to be simply permissible and unobjectionable.
Finally, some form of epistemic or awareness requirement may be needed in char-
acterizing patience. For example, if Emmeline merely forgets about something she
has been waiting for (where this is not part of a strategy on her part to avoid thinking
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about the desired event, etc.), and this forgetting explains why she is not agitated, it
is not clear that she is being patient – it does not seem to reflect any particular virtue
on her part.
Perspective and Detachment
Many philosophers have suggested that there are particular understandings of the
world that make patience possible – making us capable of calmly waiting, enduring
various burdens, knowing when to act, and so on (see ). Pianalto expresses
sympathy for a broadly Stoic detachment from the external world as a source of an
apt patience. He writes:
[D]etachment is intended to foster a state of mind in which loss can be borne without
rage, resentment, or despair, and thus enables one to make sound decisions and com-
mitments … [W]e step back from our impulses, desires, and ambitions, and consider
both their merits as well as our own capacity for satisfying them. (2014: 101)
On the other hand, Bommarito points to an underlying perspective on the world
as fundamental to patience. While hard to define, Bommarito has in mind the sense
of perspective at stake when we say such things as “That accident really helped me
to gain some perspective.” Bommarito discusses four aspects of such perspective:
1 Perspective concerning our desires and values – an understanding of what really
matters to us, allowing us to avoid frustration when trivial desires are left unsat-
isfied, etc.
2 Perspective on ourselves as members of a community or species – an under-
standing that other humans face similar burdens and sufferings, and that many
are experiencing far worse than us.
3 Perspective in understanding causes and laws of nature – we may be more patient
when we understand why our boss is being irritable (perhaps he is experiencing
a family crisis), and so on (see ).
4 Perspective in seeing burdens and obstacles as an opportunity for growth and
improvement – a delayed flight can be seen as a chance to exercise patience and
other virtues.
Drawing on Pianalto’s discussion of detachment, we might add:
5 Perspective concerning our abilities – recognizing when achieving a goal will be
long and difficult given our flawed temperament and limited abilities can reduce
frustration; in some cases certain goals will not be realistically achievable by us.
As Bommarito notes (2014: 274), perspective is not simply a matter of knowledge; it
is a way of experiencing the world. We might add that it is a morally laden understand-
ing: patience is grounded in a forgiving, tolerant perspective on the world – one that
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correctly assesses the value of things, including the triviality of so much that often
frustrates us.
Such a perspective seems a more attractive grounding for patience than a Stoic detach-
ment. Detachment rests on the belief that many of the apparent goods in the world –
including health, pleasure, and life itself – are not genuine goods. Though it is typically
natural and appropriate for us, as humans, to select them when given the opportunity, in
the end these things do not truly matter. On the other hand, having perspective allows
us to treat such goods as genuine, and their absence as a genuine harm or evil. With
perspective we understand which such goods are most valuable, which are trivial, and
recognize the burdens that must often be overcome in securing such goods.
Patience as a Virtue
A strong case can be made for treating patience as a moral, not merely prudential,
virtue. First, many will accept broadly theistic positions where in seeing and acting
patiently we see the world aright, give ourselves over to God, and – in a small way –
imitate God in His endurance and forbearance. Second, even for those who do not
embrace such a theistic worldview, it seems that the perspective underlying patience is
constituted by a morally laden, forgiving, and humble understanding of the world –
one that correctly recognizes genuine goods and harms.
Beyond this, patience plays a crucial role in developing and manifesting other
moral virtues. For example, consider a volunteer with a chronically underfunded
communitybased, nonprofit organization. For her to act benevolently in such cir-
cumstances will require her to endure significant burdens and frustrations. More
generally, patience allows us to pursue our goals and desires effectively. It also makes
our life more pleasant – “Being disturbed or irritable is not a desirable way to perform
tasks” (Kupfer 2007: 273). Finally, patience allows us to avoid the frustrations and
errors that accompany impatience or, on the other hand, an excessive torpor and
inaction.
We can consider two major objections to the status of patience as a moral virtue.
First, some worry that patience is not a virtue as it will allow or even require a pas-
sive acceptance and endurance of injustices. We might imagine a woman in an abu-
sive marriage who “patiently” endures the situation. But Callan provides a clear
response: “It is only a puerile, coarsegrained patience that could motivate a blanket
impassivity towards evils that are fit objects of indignant resistance” (1993: 538). A
genuine patience is a mean between impatience and a vice of lassitude or enduring
burdens that are not reasonably borne. Patience does not require suffering endlessly
without complaint when a problem could instead be addressed.
A second objection draws attention to individuals who are apparently patient but
otherwise largely vicious – consider a supposedly patient con artist; his patience
makes him more dangerous. Such cases may suggest to some that patience is merely
a prudential, and not a moral, virtue. Still, a range of responses is available. First, it
could be that patience is a moral virtue even if there can be occasional cases where
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possessing the trait makes a particular individual worse. A trait can be generally
positive and valuable even if there are some circumstances where it becomes prob-
lematic. Compare a drug that is an effective, good medication – this can be so even
if there are some individuals who are allergic to it.
A second response would hold that not only is patience a moral virtue, it remains
a moral virtue even in the grifter. It is true that he has worse impacts on others
because of his patience. But while his character is clearly morally flawed, on this
second response there is at least one moral flaw that he does not possess: a lack of
patience. Or, put otherwise, while the grifter must improve his moral character, his
patience is a good trait that may help him when he tries to change, and he also
requires less improvement than someone with a similar character, but who lacks
patience. His patience brings him closer to having a morally good character.
Finally, a third response would instead hold that the grifter who takes the required
time for his schemes to develop is not actually patient. He possesses a character trait
that might develop into genuine patience – but this will require acquiring greater
moral perspective and other virtues. To justify this claim, compare a putatively
benevolent person who happily assists neoNazis as they vandalize a synagogue
(perhaps she helps them to carry their heavy, awkward bags); despite a superficial
appearance of being benevolent, her moral understanding is flawed, and she does
not genuinely possess the virtue. Or consider a putatively courageous person who
encounters a Kodiak bear while hiking, and decides to wrestle it (see ).
This is vicious foolhardiness and not genuine courage. Similarly, then, we might
hold that the apparent patience of the grifter is in fact vicious. It could be that the
grifter is simply trying to become rich while being unwilling to take the time to
make money through morally acceptable means. The grifter may also lack perspec-
tive on the value of money, and its importance relative to various moral goods – just
as our superficially courageous and benevolent individuals lack the requisite under-
standing and perspective in order to truly possess these virtues.
Patience and Other Virtues
There is interesting work to be done in further considering the relationship of
patience to other virtues. For example, consider the perspective underlying patience.
Is this a more fundamental virtue, one that finds expression in derivative virtues
such as patience, humility, and forgivingness? Or might each of these virtues instead
simply include a certain perspective as a component?
We might also consider whether we ought to distinguish more finegrained forms
of patience. For example, compare being patient in working diligently and carefully
(perseverance), with being patient with a yapping dog or overtired child (forbear-
ance), or with being patient in enduring a chronic illness or the loss of a loved one
(endurance or fortitude). Are these expressions of a single core virtue of patience or,
instead, several distinct virtues? And if these are distinct virtues, is any one of them
more fundamental than the others? Answering such questions will further clarify
the nature of patience, and its relationship to other virtues.
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See also: ; ; ; ;
REFERENCES
Bommarito, Nicolas 2014. “Patience and Perspective,” Philosophy East and West, vol. 64, pp.
269–86.
Callan, Eamonn 1993. “Patience and Courage,” Philosophy, vol. 68, pp. 523–39.
Fowler, James H., and Cindy D. Kam 2006. “Patience as a Political Virtue: Delayed Gratification
and Turnout,” Political Behavior, vol. 28, pp. 113–28.
Harned, David Baily 2015 [1997]. Patience: How We Wait upon the World. Eugene, OR:
Wipf& Stock.
Hauerwas, Stanley, and C. Pinches 1996. “Practicing Patience: How Christians Should Be
Sick,” Christian Bioethics, vol. 2, pp. 202–21.
Kierkegaard, Søren 1990. Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. and trans. Howard Hong and
Edna Hong. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kupfer, Joseph H. 2007. “When Waiting Is Weightless: The Virtue of Patience,” Journal of
Value Inquiry, vol. 41, pp. 265–80.
Pianalto, Matthew 2014. “In Defense of Patience,” in Dane R. Gordon and David B. Suits
(eds.), Epictetus: His Continuing Influence and Contemporary Relevance. Rochester, NY:
Rochester Institute of Technology Press, pp. 89–104.
FURTHER READINGS
Augustine 2004. “On Patience,” in Philip Schaff (ed.), St. Augustin on the Holy Trinity,
Doctrinal Treatises, and Moral Treatises. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger, pp. 527–36.
Curry, Oliver, Michael E. Price, and Jade G. Price 2008. “Patience Is a Virtue: Cooperative
People Have Lower Discount Rates,” Personality and Individual Differences, vol. 44, pp.
778–83.
Pianalto, Matthew (forthcoming). “Nietzschean Patience,” Journal of Value Inquiry.
Rudd, Anthony 2008. “Kierkegaard on Patience and the Temporality of the Self: The Virtues
of a Being in Time,” Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 36, pp. 491–509.
Scarre, Geoffrey 2010. On Courage. New York: Routledge.
Schnitker, Sarah A. 2012. “An Examination of Patience and WellBeing,” Journal of Positive
Psychology, vol. 7, pp. 263–80.
Tertullian 2004. On Patience, trans. Sydney Thelwell. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger.
Wong, David B. 2006. “The Meaning of Detachment in Daoism, Buddhism, and Stoicism,”
Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, vol. 5, pp. 207–19.
