Conference PaperPDF Available

The Politics of Large-scale CCS Deployment


Abstract and Figures

Since the early 2000's, there has been growing recognition of the important role that CCS can play as part of a least-cost, global solution to climate change. Modelling by the International Energy Agency (IEA) has consistently highlighted a significant role for CCS in achieving a 2 o C target, and recognition of the role of CCS has also increasingly been a feature of reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). However, this growing appreciation of the value of CCS has not been accompanied by commensurate growth in political and policy support for the technology. In fact, support for CCS has been inconsistent and at times tumultuous, and has been closely intertwined with progress in global climate negotiations and wider economic conditions. CCS will not advance without significant public investment and the required support policies will not be put in place without political support – hence the politics of CCS play a major role in this respect. This paper looks at the politics of deploying large-scale CCS projects, including the drivers for CCS support, the opposing political forces and the practical challenges of deploying CCS. It will examine what factors could help to de-politicise CCS, and consider whether the Paris Agreement could provide a turning point.
Content may be subject to copyright.
1876-6102 © 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of GHGT-13.
doi: 10.1016/j.egypro.2017.03.1890
Energy Procedia 114 ( 2017 ) 7581 7595
13th International Conference on Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies, GHGT-13, 14-18
November 2016, Lausanne, Switzerland
The politics of large-scale CCS deployment
Juho Lipponena
, Samantha McCullocha, Simon Keelinga, Tristan Stanleya,
Niels Berghouta, Thomas Berlya
aInternational Energy Agency, 31-35 rue de la Féderation’, 75739 Paris, France
Since the early 2000’s, there has been growing recognition of the important role that CCS can play as part of a least-
cost, global solution to climate change. Modelling by the International Energy Agency (IEA) has consistently
highlighted a significant role for CCS in achieving a 2oC target, and recognition of the role of CCS has also
increasingly been a feature of reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
However, this growing appreciation of the value of CCS has not been accompanied by commensurate growth in
political and policy support for the technology. In fact, support for CCS has been inconsistent and at times
tumultuous, and has been closely intertwined with progress in global climate negotiations and wider economic
conditions. CCS will not advance without significant public investment and the required support policies will not be
put in place without political support hence the politics of CCS play a major role in this respect. This paper looks
at the politics of deploying large-scale CCS projects, including the drivers for CCS support, the opposing political
forces and the practical challenges of deploying CCS. It will examine what factors could help to de-politicise CCS,
and consider whether the Paris Agreement could provide a turning point.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of GHGT-13.
Keywords: Climate change; CCS; energy policy; politics; Paris Agreement
* Corresponding author. Tel.: + 33 1 40 57 66 80
E-mail address:
Available online at
© 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of GHGT-13.
7582 Juho Lipponen et al. / Energy Procedia 114 ( 2017 ) 7581 – 7595
1. Introduction
International experience demonstrates that strong political commitment and leadership is essential for the
successful deployment of large-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects. These projects can take up to a
decade to develop where suitable geological storage sites need to be identified and assessed. They are also capital-
intensive, involving investments of up to several billion dollars, while being considerably more complex than other
low emission technology solutions. As a result, the development phase of a first-of-a-kind CCS project has the
potential to outlast governments and will often traverse multiple budget cycles. These factors have tested political
commitment over the past decade, with significant fluctuations in the availability of policy and financial support for
CCS projects.
The lack of consistent and adequate support for CCS has contributed to the relatively slow pace of project
deployment to date. The global portfolio of large-scale projects has expanded from 8 in 2010 to 15 today, with 22
expected to be operating by 2020 [
]. The portfolio has also become more diverse, and importantly now includes
CCS applied to coal-fired power generation. However, the progress achieved falls well short of expectations and of
the potential contribution of CCS to achieving global climate objectives. The International Energy Agency (IEA)
2013 CCS Roadmap, which set out a vision for CCS deployment consistent with a 2oC target, included a goal of
having at least 30 large-scale projects operating by 2020, capturing around 50 MtCO2 each year. By 2030, this level
of CO2 capture under the Roadmap would need to be increased to 2 000 Mt [
]. However, the global project pipeline
has actually been shrinking, from 77 projects in 2010 to around 45 today, and the maximum cumulative capture rate
of all projects under consideration would be less than 80 MtCO2 per year [
Following the success of the Paris Agreement, the need to accelerate deployment of CCS has become more urgent
and critical. It is therefore essential that political support for the technology is reignited. This paper will examine the
factors that have underpinned political support for CCS, or alternatively which have impeded political support,
across a number of OECD economies. It will also consider the role of “arms-length” institutions in delivering CCS
projects in select countries.
2. Policy and political support for CCS has fluctuated
Since the early 2000’s, there has been growing recognition of the important role that CCS can play as part of a
least-cost, global solution to climate change. Indeed, the turn of the century has been identified by some as the “birth
of a global vision” for CCS [
]. Modelling by the IEA has consistently highlighted a significant role for CCS in
achieving a 2oC target, with CCS contributing as much as 12% of the emissions reductions needed to 2050 [
]. This
is the third largest contribution of the basket of technology options considered by the IEA, behind deployment of
renewable energy and energy efficiency.
Recognition of the role of CCS has also been underpinned by global climate scientists and particularly the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The 2005 IPCC Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture
and Storage (SRCCS) was a major turning point in terms of confirming and communicating the potential of CCS as
a climate solution. More recent IPCC reports, including the Firth Assessment Report (AR5) found that CCS may
indeed be critical to achieving more ambitious climate targets:many models could not achieve atmospheric
concentration levels of about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100…under limited availability of key technologies, such as
bioenergy, CCS, and their combination” [
]. The IPCC also found that, without CCS, the median cost of achieving
atmospheric concentrations in the range of 430-480 ppm would be 138% higher.
However, this growing appreciation of the value of CCS has not been accompanied by commensurate growth in
political and policy support for the technology. In fact, support for CCS has been inconsistent and at times
tumultuous, and has been closely intertwined with progress in global climate negotiations and wider economic
conditions (see Fig. 1).
Juho Lipponen et al. / Energy Procedia 114 ( 2017 ) 7581 – 7595 7583
Fig. 1: The fluctuating support for CCS.
Source: [10], modified from [
In the lead-up to the COP15 climate negotiations in Copenhagen, and three years after the IPCC SRCC, political
support for CCS was at its highest levels. This included a strong focus on deploying large-scale projects, with the G8
leaders pledging in 2008 to launch 20 large-scale CCS projects globally by 2010. This was with a goal to beginning
broad deployment by 2020. That same year, Australia’s Prime Minister Kevin Rudd established the Global CCS
Institute (GCCSI), which was formally launched in July 2009 at the meeting of the Major Economies Forum in
L’Aquila, Italy. At this global launch, Prime Minister Rudd was joined by US President Barack Obama and Italy’s
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi on stage to support the GCCSI objective to “play a significant role in delivering the
G8’s goal of developing at least 20 fully integrated industrial-scale CCS demonstration projects around the world by
2020” [
]. Both Prime Minister Rudd and President Obama referenced the need to address the practical challenge of
coal in their remarks. Later in 2009, the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum Ministerial (CSLF) emphasised
that these projects were “vital” and recognised that developing countries may need assistance to achieve the level of
CCS required to fight climate change.
This political support was accompanied by significant financial commitments. Between 2007 and 2010, major
funding programmes for large-scale projects had been announced in Australia, Canada, Europe, the United Kingdom
and the United States. By 2010, the total of announced global support for CCS projects had exceeded USD 31 billion
]. This funding was designed to support as many as 35 large-scale projects [
However, the level of political commitment and financial support were ultimately not sustained. Of the USD 31
billion pledged, less than USD 3 billion was actually invested in projects in the period 2009 to 2014, with only seven
successfully deployed having received support from these programmes [10]. All of these projects are in
Canada and the United States. Funding programmes in Australia and most recently the United Kingdom have been
scaled back or cancelled. The G8 pledge to have launched 20 new projects by 2010 for operation before 2020 is now
not expected to be fulfilled, with only 14 projects commissioned or likely to be commissioned within this decade.
There are a great many factors which have contributed to the tapering-off in support for CCS since the highs of
2008-2009. These include the failure of Copenhagen to deliver a global climate agreement, which removed
significant political impetus for climate change measures, and the lingering effects of the global financial crisis
which put pressure on government budgets
. Significant penetration and cost reductions achieved in alternative low
Projects operating or currently under construction and expected to commence operatio n within the next 12 -18 months.
Although in the United States, significant funding for CCS was linked to stimulus measures in response to the global financia l crisis. This
included under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.
7584 Juho Lipponen et al. / Energy Procedia 114 ( 2017 ) 7581 – 7595
emission solutions this decade, including renewables and energy efficiency, have arguably also impacted political
support for CCS and fuelled a perception that CCS is expensive, not required, or will only be needed in the long-
term. Furthermore, deploying large-scale CCS projects has proven to be more challenging, expensive, and time
consuming than many had expected. Some of these challenges are discussed further below. It is notable that, outside
of CSLF Ministerial meetings, there has been little in the way of global, collective political leadership on CCS. CCS
has not featured in G8 discussions since 2009, and the interest towards CCS has also fluctuated within the Clean
Energy Ministerial process.
Recent developments give cause for optimism that there could be a revival in political support for CCS. The most
significant of these is the historic success of the Paris Agreement, with global political leaders agreeing to limit
future temperature increases to “well below 2oC” and to pursue efforts towards 1.5oC. Achieving these targets will
almost certainly require CCS something that the IPCC is anticipated to confirm in its 2018 special report on the
impacts of global warming of 1.5oC and related emission pathways. The inclusion of CCS as a key area of
technology focus in the Mission Innovation initiative may also assist with rebuilding a global political consensus on
the need to accelerate CCS deployment.
3. What drives political support for CCS?
In examining the role of political support in deploying large-scale CCS projects, it is useful to identify key drivers
for political “backing” of CCS. This inherently depends on national circumstances and will differ between countries
and regions. However, four key areas of political justification for CCS investment can be identified.
First of all, most government programmes and statements of support for CCS are based on a recognition of its
contribution to achieving long-term climate goals (see e.g. [
]). This is unsurprising, with limited rational for CCS
deployment beyond climate change objectives. Unlike renewables or nuclear, CCS is not an energy generation
technology on the contrary, its application to power or industrial facilities actually consumes significant additional
energy and adds to the cost of production. Its value is in significantly reducing CO2 emissions from the use of fossil
fuels (or delivering “negative emissions” in combination with bioenergy), which is almost exclusively linked to
climate change. Several governments, including in the United Kingdom, have acknowledged that CCS can provide a
cost-effective solution to national climate targets in the future, even if the first projects would be expensive to
undertake (for example, see [
Second, CCS has been identified as a strategically important technology for countries with an economic or energy
security-related interest in the continued use of fossil fuels. Resource-rich countries such as Australia and Canada
derive significant income from exports of coal and natural gas and hence have had a strategic interest in pursuing the
deployment of CCS to support future sustainable use of fossil fuels in these export markets. CCS can also enable the
continued domestic use of fossil fuel resources in these countries, with coal and gas often relied upon for secure and
relatively affordable energy supply, including baseload power. In addition, fossil fuel industries tend to be major
employers, particularly in regional areas, which adds to the political impetus to ensure a sustainable future for the
sector. For countries with limited natural resources, such as Japan and Korea, ensuring a diversity of the energy mix
which includes fossil fuels is seen to be important from an energy security perspective. In all cases, the development
and deployment of CCS technology both domestically and globally would allow these economic and energy security
objectives to be maintained in a manner that is also consistent with climate objectives. This has been highlighted by
the Premier of the Canadian province of Saskatchewan, Brad Wall, who has been a strong and active supporter of the
development of the Boundary Dam CCS Project:
We have been mining coal in Saskatchewan since the 1850s, making it one of the earliest resources to be
mined in the province. Although it may not be as well known to those outside of Saskatchewan, it’s just as
valuable to those of us who live here. In the southeast corner of Saskatchewan…sits a 300-year supply of
lignite coal that is affordable, abundant, and accessible, and has been fueling power plants in Saskatchewan
for nearly a century. Today, it’s the baseload fuel of choice for SaskPower, our government-owned power
utility, and currently accounts for about 50% of our total power production. It’s also the reason
Saskatchewan is the largest per capita emitter of greenhouses gases in Canada. [
Juho Lipponen et al. / Energy Procedia 114 ( 2017 ) 7581 – 7595 7585
Technology leadership is a third key driver of political support for CCS. As the world transitions to a low carbon
economy, new markets will emerge with potential for significant global export opportunities. For example, Chinese
investment in new technologies has seen it become the world’s largest exporter of low-cost solar PV panels. Japan is
supporting the development of capture technologies by Japanese companies, including through Japan Bank for
International Cooperation (JBIC) and Mizuho Bank financing of the Petra Nova CCS project in the United States,
which uses technology developed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.
Finally, local economic factors have been a driver of political support for CCS, particularly from politicians
representing industrial regions. The industrial region of Teesside in the United Kingdom is a case in point. Teesside
is home to 5 of the top 25 CO2-emitting sites in the UK, including Europe’s second largest blast furnace, and
accounts for 5.6% of industrial emissions in the UK [
]. The Teesside Collective is proposing the development of a
CCS hub, positioning itself as the go-to location for future clean industrial development [14]. Lord Bourne, the
former Minister of Energy and Climate Change noted his support for the project “What Teesside Collective is doing
goes hand in hand with this Government’s ambition to upskill the workforce and support thousands of jobs in the
North” [14]. Trade unions have also emerged as supporters of CCS given its potential to preserve emissions
intensive industries in carbon constrained economies such as the UK.
4. What is challenging political support for CCS?
Although there are compelling economic and environmental drivers which have underpinned political support for
CCS, there are also multiple factors which challenge this support particularly in relation to large-scale project
4.1 General opposition to CCS
Many of the aforementioned factors relate to general opposition to CCS, including those views driven either by
ideology or concerns about the integrity of CO2 storage. While in practice there are many factors influencing
political leaders, in the following we use a simplified typology to highlight those that have been identified as the
most prominent.
4.1.1 Public opposition
Local public opposition to projects has eroded or reversed government support for CCS in some countries.
Public opposition has often been based on arguments on long-term risks and the perceived unproven nature of CO2
storage, leading ultimately to claims that CO2 storage is not safe for the wider population. Such opposition has
understandably found more support in densely populated areas and in countries with little or no experience with on-
shore hydrocarbon extraction. Several highly publicised cases of public opposition have had a very strong impact on
politics and government policy on CCS: public opposition in Germany resulted in the option of CCS being virtually
removed from the climate policy agenda (see case study below). Similarly, the case of the Barendrecht project in the
Netherlands, which was strongly opposed by the local community, contributed to the government effectively
banning onshore storage of CO2 (while off-shore is still possible).
4.1.2 Lack of support from non-government organisations (NGO’s), driven by opposition to continued use of fossil
Another key challenge has been the perception that CCS prevents a transition away from fossil fuels or is acting
as a technological greenwash for fossil fuel producers, to justify business-as-usual with a promise of a technological
cure sometime in the future. Opposition to CCS on this basis has been particularly focused amongst environmental
NGOs, which have consequently given limited, or in some cases no support for CCS. NGO groups have played a
key role in shaping the climate discussion in many countries, often exercising significant influence in legislation, or
during project-level permitting processes. NGOs are rather heterogeneous in their position on CCS including those
opposed to the technology, but many also taking a more realistic view, accepting the fact that CCS is needed to
abate emissions in the foreseeable future (see for example [
At the more favourable end are the groups who participate in the ENGO Network on CCS: altogether eleven
7586 Juho Lipponen et al. / Energy Procedia 114 ( 2017 ) 7581 – 7595
have come together since 2011 to advocate for safe and effective deployment of CCS [
]. While clearly not
arguing in favour of continued use of fossil fuels, the NGOs in the ENGO Network have taken a rather “realpolitik”
view and agreed with the need for CCS.
Several other NGOs have traditionally been much more sceptical about, if not outright against, the use of CCS.
WWF has seen CCS as a “necessary evil”, accepting its use in certain applications such as industrial CCS or in
conjunction with sustainable biomass [
]. Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace on the other hand have consistently
opposed CCS. Friends of the Earth have held the view that CCS is part of “false solutions” merely only perpetuating
the reliance on fossil fuels [
]. Greenpeace opposes CCS on the grounds of it being costly, unproven and ultimately
a distraction from renewable energy investment [
4.1.3 Perceived competition with renewable technologies
The perceived competition with renewable energy has been a key factor contributing to limiting political
support for CCS. The perceived competition is built on the assumption that CCS and renewables are competing for
the same public and private investment dollars. Renewable energy has been politically easier to support over the
years. Almost all major economies have a renewable energy programme in place, with targets and support policies,
often stressing the reduction of energy imports and the creation of a domestic technology and service industry.
Critically, the comparatively lower technical and commercial complexity of renewables has led to a much greater
project success rate and uptake of offered government support. Government support programmes for CCS have
generally been underspent as projects have failed to progress for various reasons, while renewable feed-in-tariffs, for
example, have often been hugely oversubscribed, forcing policy changes.
4.2 Project-specific challenges
From the perspective of deploying large-scale CCS projects, there are some significant challenges which have
directly or indirectly led to the withdrawal or erosion of political and often with it, financial support.
4.2.1 Timeframes for project development
CCS projects can take up to a decade to move from conception to operation, particularly if CO2 storage sites or
EOR opportunities are not already available. This means that public funding commitments for these projects will in
practice traverse multiple budget and even political cycles. For example, the Quest CCS project in Canada,
which commenced operations in 2015, secured funding from the Alberta CCS Fund and the Canadian Clean Energy
Fund in 2009. The Kemper County IGCC, Petra Nova and ADM Illinois CCS plants all secured government funding
through the US Clean Coal Power Initiative in 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively, and all are expected to come
online in 2016-17 [10]. Further, the greatest value of these early projects is arguably in their contribution to future
CCS deployment: reducing costs, refining technologies and improving practical know-how. The investments being
made by today’s political leaders will bear fruit in future decades, requiring long-term vision and commitment
within a context of short-term political imperatives.
This isn’t insurmountable, but has been well characterised by the former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair: “Long
term, everyone accepts that the needs of economy and environment are in partnership. Short term, there is a clear
tension. And we live in the short term” [
4.2.2 High capital and operating costs
First-of-a-kind CCS projects can be complex and expensive, particularly when capital investment in new CO2
transport and storage infrastructure is required, and significant public support will be critical. The ZeroGen
Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) project in Australia, which had received strong political support
The Bellona Foundation, Clean Air Task Force, The Climate Institute, E3G, Environmental Defense Fund, Green Alliance, Natural Resources
Defense Council, The Pembina Institute, Sandbag, World Resources Institute, Zero Emission Resource Organisation
Juho Lipponen et al. / Energy Procedia 114 ( 2017 ) 7581 – 7595 7587
from the Premier of the State of Queensland
, was cancelled after cost estimates escalated by 46%, to AUD 6.9
. This was a result of several factors, including the choice of technology, exchange rate impact, domestic
productivity factors and access to suitable storage [
]. In the United Kingdom, one reason for the cancellation of
the GBR 1 billion CCS Commercialisation Programme was the perceived lack of value for money” of the CCS
projects in question. However, this assessment failed to consider the long-term role of CCS in achieving the UK’s
climate goals (National audit office) as well as their contribution to supporting the transport and storage needs of
future projects. In particular, the National Grid Corporation estimated that the transport and storage unit costs of
future projects would have dropped by 60-80% using infrastructure put in place by the White Rose project [
Early CCS projects will also have higher operating costs that may need to be addressed through ongoing direct
or indirect support if the project is to be commercially viable. For projects in the power sector, this can have political
implications insofar as electricity prices are affected. For example, the Kemper County IGCC Plant which is not
yet operating has been partly subsidised by increases in electricity rates, with strong local community and political
opposition including claims that the University of Southern Mississippi raised annual tuition by USD 236 per
student, partly to offset higher electricity costs [
]. While the Kemper case is not considered typical in terms of
overall projects costs (approaching USD 7 billion) or in the nature of the subsidies provided it highlights the
potential political sensitivities associated with electricity price increases.
4.2.3 High project “failure” rates
The number of large-scale CCS projects globally which have been proposed but have failed to progress to
operation outnumbers the successful projects by a factor of two to one [10]. The reasons for this range from
inadequate financial or policy support or lack of access to suitable CO2 storage sites to local community opposition
[6]. This “drop-out” rate is not necessarily unexpected given the nature of the technology, the requirement for
suitable CO2 storage and the fact that many projects may not ever have been developed beyond the initial concept
stage. However, there are clear political implications where projects have received significant public funding prior
to a decision not to progress even where the decision is widely considered to be sound (for example, in the
ZeroGen case described above).
5. Politics in practice: Country case studies
The challenges described above have tested, and will continue to test, political commitment to CCS globally. To
better understand how this has impacted CCS deployment in practice, and what factors have been conducive to
sustained political support, we will examine a selection of country case studies.
5.1 Norway: Pioneering CCS globally
Norway has been one of the early pioneers of CCS technology, with forward-looking policy, research and
investment in world-first large-scale CO2 storage projects. The Sleipner project was brought on line in 1996, after
the introduction of an off-shore carbon dioxide tax (in the order of EUR 45 per tonne) back in 1991. Snøhvit
followed in 2008. The government-funded Technology Centre Mongstad was inaugurated in 2012, and provides a
test-bed for new CO2 capture technologies.
Political support for CCS in Norway has been relatively stable for over twenty years and this has been the case
across all main political parties. Addressing climate change and a related “moral imperative” have been key
components in Norwegian CCS policy from early days: it has often been emphasised that as Norway gets significant
revenue and wealth from selling oil and gas that will have a CO2 impact elsewhere, the country should be at the
forefront in developing CCS technologies [
]. The fact that Norway has been such an important fossil fuel producer
and exporter, and that it has been very progressive as regards climate policy has placed CCS in a rather central
position in Norway’s energy discussions. It is also noteworthy that in Norway the CCS discussions have not only
In 2007, Premier Beattie proposed an increase in coal royalty rates unless the industry increased its voluntary AUD 300 milli on commitment to
CCS technologies, including to invest in the ZeroGen project.
7588 Juho Lipponen et al. / Energy Procedia 114 ( 2017 ) 7581 – 7595
been retained on the level of expert and technical communities, but have reached government departments, the
energy minister and even the Prime Minister.
While politics have in general been favourable for CCS in Norway, they have also had their more dramatic side.
In fact, Norway is likely to be the only country where a government has fallen, at least partly, linked to a question on
CCS. Norway’s then Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik resigned in year 2000 as he lost a vote of confidence
over a question on whether to permit gas-fired power stations without CO2 capture technology [
]. This may well
be the only CCS-related high-level political casualty to date.
Despite the earlier challenges, Norway’s political support for CCS continues to be strong today. The government
has a CCS strategy in place, and is in the process of investigating the opportunity to invest a significant amount of
public funding to a third large-scale project [
5.2 Canada: Reducing emissions from coal-fired power generation and oil sands
Canada has been at the forefront of CCS developments in recent years. On federal level, the Conservative
government announced its CAD 1 billion Clean Energy Fund in 2009, including a strong share for CCS projects.
The Fund has supported two projects in the Province of Alberta: the Shell Quest project, as well as the Alberta
Trunk-line project. The Federal Government also supported SaskPower’s Boundary Dam project in Saskatchewan,
with the CAD 240 million committed in 2008, before the establishment of the Clean Energy Fund.
In 2011 the Canadian federal government announced regulations to reduce CO2 emissions from coal-fired
generation of electricity. The final regulations were published by Environment Canada in 2012, setting an emissions
performance standard of 420g CO2/kWh to all new coal-fired power units, as well as to units that have reached the
end of their useful life [
Much of Canada’s activity on CCS is however on Provincial level, due to the fact that Provinces largely govern
the use of natural resources and can enact support for CCS deployment. On provincial level, the province of
Saskatchewan has championed the Boundary Dam CCS project through its crown-owned power utility SaskPower.
SaskPower is controlled by the Province of Saskatchewan, which has been governed by the conservative
Saskatchewan Party since 2007, currently occupying 50 out of 61 seats in the province’s legislature. The politics of
CCS remained relatively stable until the start-up of the CCS facility in 2014, but took a different turn quickly
afterwards. Political issues were raised especially during 2015, as the new capture unit did not perform as expected.
While the political support by the ruling party for the Boundary Dam 3 project remained stable, the opposition New
Democratic Party used issues with the lower than expected performance of the CO2 capture unit to call into question
the Government’s competence. The unit captured 426 000 tonnes of CO2 from January through December 2015 [
The New Democratic Party also took issue with the penalty payments that SaskPower issued to a private corporation
(Cenovus Energy) during 2015, linked to the lower than agreed volumes of CO2 delivered to its CO2-EOR
operations [
Another particular element of Saskatchewan politics is the question on carbon tax, which in most cases could be
an instrument that could favour CCS investment. While the opposition New Democratic Party supports a carbon tax,
the ruling Saskatchewan Party opposes it. Despite the arguments by the opposition, Saskatchewan’s CCS politics
have nevertheless not posed serious threats to the Boundary Dam CCS project.
In the neighbouring Alberta, home to two large-scale CCS projects (the Shell Quest project and the Alberta
Trunkline project), there has however been an explicit change in politics, at least in the rhetoric. Alberta’s long-time
ruling party, the Progressive Conservatives, put significant emphasis on CCS as a key technology to deliver emission
reductions in the oil-rich province, and committed CAD 2 billion for CCS projects in 2008. However, it
subsequently changed its position back in 2014, as then-Premier Jim Prentice announced that the party would
support the existing large-scale CCS funding programme, but would not commit any new funds for CCS projects
]. Such change came about shortly after the cancellation of a third large-scale project in Alberta, the TransAlta
Project Pioneer, in 2012, despite a commitment of CAD 795 million to the project by the government [
Campaigning for the 2015, Alberta’s New Democratic Party (NDP) vowed to scrap Alberta’s CCS programme
altogether. NDP subsequently won the provincial elections by a landslide, but has since toned down its anti-CCS
stance. The government has instead stated that it will honour the existing funding and contracts [
Juho Lipponen et al. / Energy Procedia 114 ( 2017 ) 7581 – 7595 7589
5.3 Australia: Ambitions of global leadership have faltered
As a major producer, user and exporter of coal and natural gas, Australia has a strong economic and strategic
interest in the success of CCS technology. Recognition of this underpinned Australia’s efforts to position itself as a
“world-leader” in the development of CCS in the 2000’s. The 2004 Energy White Paper: Securing Australia’s
Energy Future, acknowledged carbon capture as part of a suite of technologies that could significantly reduce the
greenhouse signature of energy production and use (EWP) [36]. Australia’s approach to CCS development was
evaluated as being in the “market leader” category, or more simply, “it was considered to be in Australia’s interest to
take a lead role in international efforts to develop and implement CCS” [
]. The EWP provided AUD 500 million
in funding towards low emissions technologies, which ultimately included AUD 60 million for the Gorgon CO 2
injection project. Gorgon will be the world’s largest CO2 storage project when it commences operations in 2017,
storing between 3-4 Mtpa.
By 2007, climate change was high on the political agenda, with the country in a prolonged drought, and the issue
was a major factor in Kevin Rudd’s election as Prime Minister. One of Prime Minister Rudd’s first official acts was
to sign the Kyoto Protocol, and in 2008 his government published a final White Paper on the introduction of an
emissions trading scheme (the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme), with the intention that it would take effect in
July 2010. The Rudd Government also established an AUD 500 million National Low Emissions Coal Fund, to
support the development and demonstration of CCS. In May 2009, a further AUD 1.9 billion for a CCS Flagships
Programme was announced, to support 2-4 large-scale, integrated CCS projects. These projects were to be
Australia’s contribution to the G8 pledge to have 20 projects operating by 2020. One of the programme criteria was
that projects needed to commence operation by 2015, an ambitious timeframe when there was limited confidence in
CO2 storage options.
Australia’s political and financial support for CCS was expanded internationally and at the highest levels in
July 2009, with the launch of the Global CCS Institute at the G20 meeting in L’Aquila, Italy. Prime Minister Rudd
was joined by US President Barak Obama to announce the establishment of the Institute, which was to receive
funding of AUD 100 million per year. The original aim of the Institute was to contribute to accelerated deployment
of an international portfolio of industrial-scale CCS projects globally [
However, this period of unprecedented support for CCS did not last, and closely paralleled the loss of momentum
in climate policy. Kevin Rudd’s CPRS had been twice rejected by the Senate, any prospect of bipartisan support for
the scheme was lost with a change of leadership in the Coalition Opposition party, and Copenhagen’s COP15 failed
to deliver a global climate agreement. Prime Minister Rudd ultimately deferred plans for the CPRS in April 2010.
Progress with the CCS Flagships Programme also faced challenges. Four projects had been shortlisted for initial
funding in December 2009, including the high-profile ZeroGen IGCC project in the state of Queensland. This
project was cancelled a year later, with project costs estimated to be around AUD 6.9 billion well beyond the
funding that was likely to be available [22]. Between 2010 and 2014, the remaining Flagship projects were all
significantly scaled-back, with a focus on CO2 storage development rather than integrated projects. The AUD 1.9
billion in Flagship funding was reduced by successive governments, to now total around AUD 300 million.
The 2015 Australian Energy White Paper acknowledged a role for CCS but positions Australia as an early
adopter of capture technology while focusing investment in storage capacity development [
]. CCS was not
mentioned in Australia’s Independent Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) in the lead-up to the COP21
climate negotiations, nor its Mission Innovation pledge. Funding for CCS R&D was announced in 2016 around
AUD 26 million but there remain no plans for large-scale project deployment beyond the Gorgon CO2 injection
project, which will commence operation in 2017. The 2015 Australian federal election also highlighted that neither
of the major political parties have a strong commitment to CCS, with no mention of CCS in either party’s pre-
election policies. Australia’s political aspirations to be a world leader in CCS now appear to be all but abandoned.
5.4 United Kingdom: Strong support for CCS succumbed to budget pressure
There has been broad political consensus in the United Kingdom on the role of CCS in meeting ambitious
domestic emissions reduction targets, which has underpinned the development of a comprehensive CCS policy
7590 Juho Lipponen et al. / Energy Procedia 114 ( 2017 ) 7581 – 7595
framework. However, ultimately there was insufficient political capital in CCS to prevent the GBP 1 billion CCS
Commercialisation Programme funding from being cut given the competing budgetary priorities.
The UK has attempted to bring about several CCS projects over the past 10 years, with a low success rate. In
2007, BP pulled out of the first attempt to construct a CCS project at Peterhead in Scotland, after the UK
government announced that funding would be awarded based on a competition. BP considered that a new process
would take too long for the company to take advantage of its declining Miller oil field as storage site.
In 2007, the Government subsequently launched a procurement process to support the UK’s first commercial
scale CCS demonstration project. In October 2010, up to GBP 1 billion was made available to contribute to the
capital costs of this first project, and the UK CCS Demonstration Programme was launched to deliver the next two to
four projects. Demonstrating the cross party support for CCS in the UK, the 2007 procurement process was launched
by a Labour Government, while the appropriation of GBP 1 billion was a commitment in the coalition agreement
between the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties following the 2010 election.
The competition came to an end in 2011 after the only project left standing, Scottish Power’s Longannet project
in Scotland, failed to reach agreement with the government. However, the coalition Government further showed its
commitment to CCS in 2011, when the Prime Minister confirmed in Parliament [
] that the funding for CCS would
be safeguarded for use on future projects following the collapse of Longannet. The “ringfencing” of the GBP 1
billion was particularly significant given the Government was dramatically cutting public spending at the time
following the global financial crisis.
Starting in 2012, the third phase was entitled “UK CCS Commercialisation Programme”. Among four bidders,
two (Peterhead and White Rose) were selected for detailed engineering studies with the initial aim of reaching final
investment decision by 2015. As well as keeping the GBP 1 billion of capital support available for CCS projects, the
Coalition Government now also introduced a mechanism to support the operation of CCS on power projects through
the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) in 2012. Amongst a number of measures to support low carbon electricity
generation, the EMR included a feed-in-tariff with a contract-for-difference (CfD) mechanism for power produced
with CCS. However, in November 2015 the UK government announced that the GBR 1 billion ringfenced capital
budget for the CCS project(s) would no longer be available, effectively ending the Commercialisation Programme.
In hindsight, it would appear that the support for CCS from the Coalition Government was largely due to pressure
from the Liberal Democrats given that the funding was withdrawn shortly after the Conservatives won the 2015
election in their own right. The Conservatives acknowledged rhetorically the importance of CCS, however amongst
competing budgetary priorities, preferred to withdraw funding from CCS in favour of other more politically sensitive
Following the withdrawal of the funding, support for CCS has still been politically driven, coming largely from
Members of Parliament with strong industrial constituencies. There is also growing support from trade unions and
regional industry associations who recognise that CCS can offer a lifeline to high emissions industries in a carbon
constrained future.
In contrast to the Australian general election in 2015, almost all major political Parties in the United Kingdom
mentioned CCS in their pre-election policies [37]. The Conservatives highlighted that investment in CCS was a key
part of their climate response [
], while the Labour Party focused on the potential of CCS to secure the future of the
offshore oil and gas industry [
]. Both Parties had released papers setting out their vision for CCS development in
Yet despite this bipartisan support, the cancellation of the CCS Commercialisation Programme, with no prior
notice, was met with a relatively muted response. Lisa Nandy, Labour’s shadow energy secretary, said: “CCS offers
huge economic opportunities for Britain. Year after year the prime minister has personally promised to support CCS,
so this is a huge betrayal.” [
] The industry and shortlisted projects responded with understandable surprise and
disappointment, but there was almost no political fallout from such an unexpected and significant decision. This
underscores the challenges of building sustained political commitment to CCS in the absence of strong community
or NGO support.
Juho Lipponen et al. / Energy Procedia 114 ( 2017 ) 7581 – 7595 7591
5.5 Germany: Public opposition takes CCS out of the mix
CCS has proven a particularly controversial technology proposition in Germany, raising high emotions amongst
politicians, NGOs and civil society groups. Against the backdrop of an energy transition strategy strongly based on
renewable energy and the phase-out of nuclear power, attempts at building CCS projects, and passing CCS-related
legislation, have been met with strong resistance and complicated politics in Germany.
A political clash on CCS was particularly apparent during the period 2009-2012, when the German Federal
Government was implementing the EU Directive on Geological Storage of CO2. With the cross-party support of the
then Christian Democrat and Socialist Party coalition government, a first draft bill transposing the Directive was
presented to the Parliament in April 2009, but the process ground to a halt ahead of federal elections in September,
as the coalition withdrew the bill. After the election, a new much watered-down version of the bill was presented and
subsequently passed, limiting the law to a mere demonstration law. The law sets a limit to the volumes of CO2 that
could be stored underground to 1.3 MtCO2 per project per year and 4 MtCO2 in total in Germany per year.
The politics around the passing of the German CCS legislation showed sharp divisions between the Federal and
the State level, with several of the Bundesländer highly sceptical of CO2 storage in their territories. The States
represented by the Bundesrat played a critical role in limiting the scope of the law, also including a strong opt-out
clause for the Bundesländer from CO2 storage activity.
Politics were at play more widely during this time, as the media reported extensively on the progress with the
legislative process, and on CCS as a technology more generally. Media coverage did not help the case of CCS, as
much of it has been deemed rather negative [
Since the passing of the much watered-down CCS law, the prospects of deploying carbon capture and storage in
Germany have all but disappeared. While Germany continues a level of efforts in research and development and in
international collaboration, the earlier idea of Germany being one of the early CCS developers and users has been
6. Taking the politics out of CCS: A role for “arms-length” institutions?
Developing large-scale CCS projects, including CO2 transport and storage infrastructure, in the short to medium
term will require significant investment of public funds potentially hundreds of millions of dollars. This investment
is also closely aligned with climate policy approaches. It is therefore impossible to imagine that the development of
these projects could occur in political vacuum. However, global experience, and particularly the case studies
identified above, suggests that certain conditions can help to foster long-term political support for CCS project
The first of these is strong and consistent bipartisan or multi-party support. This is arguably the most important
factor for ensuring the sustained political support required by CCS projects being developed over relatively long
timeframes. This has been a salient feature of the Norwegian experience. Second, a national strategy for climate
mitigation that includes a) strong climate targets and b) a clear articulation of the role of CCS in meeting these
targets. This is important for communicating the role, and future value, of CCS over the medium and longer term.
Third, support from proactive and engaged environmental NGOs can provide a trusted and influential voice in public
dialogue. In Norway, Bellona has had a particularly positive impact on promoting policies necessary to support CCS.
Finally, global leadership through key international bodies has acted as a catalyst for CCS policy commitments at a
national level, including the original (but ultimately unsuccessful) G8 pledge for 20 projects to be operating by 2020.
Organisations such as the CSLF and now Mission Innovation could play an important future role in supporting CCS
project investment.
In addition to these key factors, alternative institutional frameworks could help to “de-politicise” the deployment
of CCS projects and allow political support to be maintained from a more “arms-length” perspective. This includes
the creation of government agencies to progress CCS deployment objectives or the establishment of private
consortiums tasked with similar objectives.
In Norway, Gassnova has been established since 2005 as a state enterprise with three key areas of focus:
7592 Juho Lipponen et al. / Energy Procedia 114 ( 2017 ) 7581 – 7595
1) Technology development, including the CLIMIT research and development programme and the CO2
Technology Centre Mongstad, which allows suppliers can demonstrate and refine CO2 capture technologies
before they are commercialised;
2) Full-scale CCS deployment, including studying the possibility for full-scale CCS in Norway, at existing
and potential CO2 emissions sources, with a goal of having a full-scale CCS demonstration facility in place
by 2020.
3) Advice, acting as a technical advisor and export for Norwegian authorities and climate policymakers.
Gassnova has been the project coordinator of Norway’s program to identify a least one technic ally feasible CCS
chain with corresponding cost estimates. Three feasibility studies have been completed at industrial sites, and all will
now move to more detailed engineering with the announcement of NOK 360 million (approximately EUR 40
million) in funding in Norway’s 2017 Budget
. Gassnova enjoys a reputation as an effective, expert advisor on the
development of these CCS projects in Norway.
In Japan, Japan CCS Co. Ltd was established in May 2008 by a group of 24 major companies with expertise in
CCS-related fields, including electric power, petroleum, oil development, and plant engineering [
]. The
organisation has been commissioned by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) to undertake
a significant proportion of the country’s CCS programme, including investigations of potential CO2 storage sites and
the management of the Tomakomai CCS demonstration project.
The UK Parliamentary Advisory Group on CCS has recently recommended the establishment of a CCS Delivery
Company (CCSDC), which would initially be government-owned but could eventually be privatised. The company
will have the responsibility of managing “full-chain” risk and will be responsible for the progressive development of
infrastructure focused on industrial hubs to which power stations and other emitters could deliver CO2 which, for a
fee, will be pumped to appropriate storage [
In addition, the IEA has proposed that a storage-driven approach to CCS development, led by a government-
backed Public Storage Agency (PSA) could be an effective way of driving investment in CCS with a view to
widespread deployment [10]. While not specifically considered from a political perspective, such an approach could
also help to ensure that the long-term decisions around CO2 storage development can be made in an environment
that is somewhat insulated from the shorter-term political and budget cycles. The approach also recognises that
significant government involvement in early CO2 storage development will be required, and this is arguably best
managed on a day-to-day by a dedicated and expert organisation with strong government backing.
Looking beyond national approaches, there may also be potential for an analogous approach to CCS development
on a global scale. This would be particularly the case for CO2 storage development, with a global agency promoting
consistent methodologies for the identification and characterisation of CO2 storage resources, advancing global
understanding of CO2 storage potential and ultimately accelerating development. If CCS deployment is to be
expanded to a scale contemplated in 2oC climate scenarios with as much as 6 GtCO2 being captured and stored by
2050 [5] new approaches and global coordination may need to be considered in global climate forums.
The establishment of “arms-length” organisations to deliver CCS would not replace the need for strong political
commitment and support indeed, political support will be required to establish their initial mandate and to ensure
continued, adequate funding. However, this approach may assist with ameliorating some of the more acute political
challenges associated with deployment of large-scale projects, including by providing concentrated expertise and
greater flexibility for the management of project development over longer time periods.
7. Could Paris shift the political landscape for CCS?
The success of the Paris Agreement in 2015 could represent a major turning point for CCS and provide the
impetus needed to reignite high-level political support for investment in large-scale projects. The Agreement
includes strengthened climate targets, including a target of “well below 2oC”, and provides a framework for climate
action that looks beyond 2050, including a goal of achieving a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources
and removals by sinks” in the second half of this centur y. The Agreement also invites Parties to communicate, by
2020, “mid-century, long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies” [
Within this context of ambitious temperature targets and longer-term timeframes, the role of CCS will become
harder for governments to ignore. Successful implementation of the Paris Agreement will require national climate
Juho Lipponen et al. / Energy Procedia 114 ( 2017 ) 7581 – 7595 7593
strategies to be strengthened and expanded, and in particular will require a policy response that goes beyond the
current emphasis on renewable energy and energy efficiency. The challenge of reducing emissions industry, which
account for 26% of global CO2 emissions, will need to be addressed and CCS is one of the few options available.
Emissions from existing fossil fuel assets must also be considered. There is currently 1 950 GW of coal-fired power
generation globally, with a further 250 GW under construction. Around 500 GW was added since 2010 [5].
Premature closure of much this coal fleet necessary to achieve a 2oC target may prove even more politically
challenging than deploying CCS. Furthermore, gas is expected to provide crucial flexibility for renewable dominated
grids in the future, however the emissions from gas-power will also need to be addressed.
Implementation of the Paris Agreement could therefore increasingly see CCS emerge as a key part of the global
climate response, and indeed even as a key barometer of a country’s commitment to a well below 2oC target.
However, it must be acknowledged that there is still a significant gap between the ambitions of the Paris Agreement
and today’s climate response. The INDCs submitted in the lead-up to COP21 were consistent with future
temperature increases of 2.7oC, and only 10 out of 162 identified a role for CCS. Without a significant strengthening
of climate policy action not just ambition policy and political support for CCS may remain inconsistent.
8. Conclusion
The “politics” of CCS will ultimately determine whether it reaches its potential as a key part of the global climate
response. Widespread deployment of CCS will require a strengthened climate response, targeted policy support and
government leadership it is clear that markets alone will not be able to drive CCS deployment at the pace and scale
needed to meet climate targets. An examination of political support for CCS in different countries can therefore be
useful in understanding what factors are aiding, or alternatively challenging, the politics of CCS project deployment.
Support for CCS has fluctuated in the past, with high-profile funding announcements, raised expectations and
ambitious programme goals followed by declining interest and support as the challenges of first-of-a-kind CCS
projects became more apparent; and as global climate negotiations faltered. Despite recent momentum in project
deployment, the limited number of large-scale projects in operation falls short of what is required to support rapid
“learning by doing” technology cost reductions. This has created somewhat of a vicious circle, with slow progress in
CCS contributing to declining political interest in supporting the technology, notwithstanding the continued
emphasis on the importance of CCS in achieving climate targets by the IEA, IPCC and others. The Paris Agreement
may provide a “circuit-breaker” for this vicious circle, by obliging Parties to set out long-term visions for their
energy transformation, as well as tangible policies to drive change. This will almost certainly require a re-focusing
on CCS by global political leaders.
7594 Juho Lipponen et al. / Energy Procedia 114 ( 2017 ) 7581 – 7595
] Global CCS Institute, 2016, “Large scale project database”, Melbourne (Australia).
projects (accessed on 14-10-2016),
] International Energy Agency, 2013. Technology Roadmap: Carbon capture and storage, OECD/IEA, Paris (France).
] Global CCS Institute, 2015. The Global Status of CCS: 2015, Summary Report, Melbourne (Australia).
] Von Hirschhausen, C., Herold, J., Oei, P, 2012. How a “Low Carbon” Innovation Can Fail Tales from a “Lost Decade” for Carbon Capture,
Transport and Sequestration. TU Berlin, Berlin (Germany).
] International Energy Agency, 2016. Energy Technology Perspectives 2016, Paris (France).
] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014. Climate Change 2014. Synthesis Report. Geneva (France).
] SBC Institute, 2016. Low Carbon Energy Technologies Factbook Update. Carbon Capture and Storage at a crossroads, The Hague (the
] Advance, 2009. Global Carbon and Capture Institute Launched, Media Release 10 July 2009.
capture-and-storage-institute-launched/ (accessed on 17-10-2016)
] Global CCS Institute, 2010. The Global Status of CCS 2010, Canberra (Australia).
] International Energy Agency, 2016. 20 years of Carbon Capture and Storage. Accelerating Future Deployment. Paris (France).
] Ishii, A., Langhelle O., 2011. Toward policy integration: Assessing carbon capture and storage policies in Japan and Norway. Global
Environmental Change 21, 358-367.
] UK National Audit Office, 2016. Briefing for the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, Sustainability in the spending
review, July 2016, London (United Kingdom).
] Wall, B., 2015. Keeping coal alive on the Canadian Prairies: Carbon capture and storage at work in Saskatchewan, Cornerstone. ing-coal-alive-on-the-canadian-prairies-carbon-capture-and-stora ge-at-work-in-saskatchewan/ (accessed on
] Teeside, 2016. Teesside Collective: A new industrial future for CCS, website, (accessed 17 October
] Anderson, J., Chiavari, J. 2009. Understanding and improving NGO position on CCS. Energy Procedia (1), 4811-4817.
] ENGO Network on CCS, 2015. “Closing the gap on climate Why CCS is a vital part of the solution.”
] World Wildlife Fund, 2013. “WWF reaction to the European Commission’s ‘Consultative Communication on The Future of Carbon Capture
and Storage in Europe’”.
] Friends of the Earth, 2012. “False solutions for 2030”.
] Greenpeace International, 2016. “Carbon capture and storage a costly, risky distraction”
] Blair, T., 2008. “Tony Blair speaks on Breaking The Climate Deadlock”,
on-breaking-the-climate-deadlock/ (accessed 17 October 2016).
] Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) (2007), “No incentive for voluntary clean coal: Analyst”, Transcript of The World Today, 10
May 2007, (Accessed 18-10-2016).
] Garnett, A.J, C.R Grei g, and M. Oettin ger (2012). ZeroGen IGC C with CCS: A Case History. University of Queensland, Brisbane, (accessed 17 October 2016)
] Carbon Capture and Storage Association, 2016. Lessons and evidence derived from the UK CCS Programmes, 2008 2015, London (United
] Urbina, I., 2016. “Piles of dirty secrets behind a modern ‘clean coal’ project”, New York Times, 5 July 2016. (accessed 17-10-2016)
] Røkke, N. “What happened to CCS in Norway”, presentation by Niels Røkke / SINTEF at Technoport Conference, 2012.
] BBC, 2000. “Norway moves to form new coalition”.
] Government of Norway, 2014. “The Government’s carbon capture and storage strategy”
(accessed on 17-10-2016)
] Government of Canada, 2013. Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Electricity Generation fact sheet., Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2013. (accessed on 17-10-2016)
] SaskPower Annual Report 2015-2016, 2016. SaskPower, Regina (Canada).
] New Democratic Party, 2015. NDP calls for Crowns committee to meet on carbon capture; Sask. Party refuses, insists on secrecy.
] Financial Post, 2014. “Jim Prentice says to wind down carbon capture fund in Alberta, new projects ‘on hold’”. National Post, Toronto
] Financial Post, 2012. “TransAlta abandons Alberta’s $1.4B carbon-capture plant”, National Post, Toronto (Canada).
] Edmonton Journal 23 July 2015, “NDP gov’t honours Alberta carbon capture projects despite election vow to scrap funding”.
] Australian Government, 2007. Australian Government Submission to the House of Representatives Inquiry on Geosequestration.
(Accessed 17-10-2016)
] Australian Government, 2008. “Presentation Global Carbon Capture and Storage”. Presentation given at IEF-IFP Symposium. Role of
Technology in the Petroleum Sector in Enhancing Global Energy Security,
Juho Lipponen et al. / Energy Procedia 114 ( 2017 ) 7581 – 7595 7595
] Australian Government Department of Industry and Science, 2016. Energy White Paper 2015, Canberra (Australie).
] Carbon Capture and Storage Association, 2011. For Immediate Release CCS Industry Responds to Longannet Decision. Press Release 19
October 2011.
] Conservatives, 2015. The conservative party manifesto 2015: Strong leadership - a clear economic plan - a brighter, more secure future. (accessed on 17-10-2016)
] CarbonBrief, 2015. Election 2015: What the manifestos say on climate and energy.
manifestos-say-on-climate-and-energy (accessed on 17-10-2016)
] Carrington, D., 2015. “UK cancels pioneering £1bn carbon capture and storage competition”, The Guardian, 25 November 2015, (accessed on
] Katja Piezner, André Schwartz, Elisbeth Duetschke, Diana Schumann, 2014. Media coverage of four carbon capture and storage (CCS)
projects in Germany: analysis of 1115 regional newspaper articles. Energy Procedia (63), 7141-7148.
] Gassnova, 2016. “Crucial climate commitment in the 2017 budget”.
budget (accessed 17-10-2016).
] Japan CCS Co Ltd, 2016. “Japan CCS Co. Ltd: History”. (accessed 17-10-2016).
] Parliamentary Advisary Group on CCS, 2016. Lowest cost decarbonisation of for the UK: The critical role of CCS, Report to the Secretary
of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy from the Parliamentary Advisory Group on Carbon Capture and Storage, September
] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015. Conference of the Parties, Fifteenth Session, Adoption of the Paris
Agreement, Part III, paragraph 36, December 2015, Paris (France).
... On the other hand, SSP5 includes large amounts of mitigation from nuclear power and from new and complex branching measures, including H2 in demand sectors, CCS in industry and the power sector, and electrification of air transport. So far, CCS programmes have produced poor results: 'CCS will not advance without significant public investment and the required support policies will not be put in place without political support' (Lipponen et al 2017). Furthermore, new nuclear power and gas with CCS in the power sector are expected to have double the levelised cost of variable renewables in 2050 (CCC 2021). ...
Full-text available
The potential for using findings from socio-technical energy transition (STET) models in Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) has been proposed by several authors. A STET simulation model called TEMPEST, which includes the influence of societal and political factors in the UK’s energy transition, is used to model three of the global shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs) at the national level. The SSP narratives are interpreted as inputs to TEMPEST, which drive scenario simulations to reflect varying societal preferences for mitigation measures, the level of political support for energy transition, and future economic and population trends. SSP1 and SSP2 come close to meeting net zero targets in 2050 but SSP5 does not reach net zero by 2080. An estimate of the total societal, political, and economic cost of scenarios indicates that while SSP1 achieves the best emissions reductions it also has the highest total cost, and SSP2 achieves the best ratio between rate of emissions reductions and total cost. Feasibility appears to be highest for SSP2 since it is the least different to historical precedent. Current UK government energy strategy is closer to the narrative in SSP5, however, which has the highest total cost and exceeds an estimated carbon budget by 32%. Recommendations for using TEMPEST findings in IAMs include: (i) the uncertainty in emissions savings from variable political and societal support for energy transition, (ii) the influence of societal pushback to policies in achievement of expected policy outcomes, and (iii) introducing additional drivers for future patterns of energy services demand.
... The post-combustion carbon dioxide capture technology of chemical absorption based on alcohol amine absorbents is currently the most mature carbon capture technology. Large-scale commercial operations were achieved in the United States and Canada in 2014 and 2017 (Lipponen et al., 2017). In addition, MTR (Membrane Technology and Research) successfully developed for the first time a polymer membrane (Polaris Membrane) that can be used in commercial applications to separate carbon dioxide from syngas (Kniep et al., 2017). ...
Full-text available
Due to the intensification of the greenhouse effect and the emphasis on the utilization of CO 2 resources, the enrichment and separation of CO 2 have become a current research focus in the environment and energy. Compared with other technologies, pressure swing adsorption has the advantages of low cost and high efficiency and has been widely used. The design and preparation of high-efficiency adsorbents is the core of the pressure swing adsorption technology. Therefore, high-performance porous CO 2 adsorption materials have attracted increasing attention. Porous adsorption materials with high specific surface area, high CO 2 adsorption capacity, low regeneration energy, good cycle performance, and moisture resistance have been focused on. This article summarizes the optimization of CO 2 adsorption by porous adsorption materials and then applies them to the field of CO 2 adsorption. The internal laws between the pore structure, surface chemistry, and CO 2 adsorption performance of porous adsorbent materials are discussed. Further development requirements and research focus on porous adsorbent materials for CO 2 treatment in industrial waste gas are prospected. The structural design of porous carbon adsorption materials is still the current research focus. With the requirements of applications and environmental conditions, the integrity, mechanical strength and water resistance of high-performance materials need to be met.
... Although technically feasible, according to the Global CCS Institute (Global CCS Institute, 2021) only 9 countries (United States, Canada, Brazil, Norway, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, China and Australia) have operational commercial CCS facilities installed in the whole world. The aforementioned barriers result from the problems related to the complexity of the deployment of this expense and energy-intensive technology (Lipponen et al., 2017). It could be reasonable to conclude that RES deployment becomes a more appealing way to fight climate change. ...
Mexico is expected to become the 6th largest economy in 2050. According to EDGAR database, in 2019 it was the largest polluting country in Latin America and the 13th in the world, regarding Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. Lately, the new Administration has shifted its energy strategy from a renewable path into the reinforcement of conventional energy sources. In this context, new policies have to be deployed to meet the Paris Agreement goals. In such scenario, carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology may contribute reducing CO2 emissions as a way to transform Mexico into a low-carbon economy in the long term. However, the construction and operation and maintenance phases will embody environmental impacts that should be considered. This paper assesses the carbon capture investments required for the expected increasing capacity of natural gas power plants up to 2050 and their impact on production, value added, employment, climate change, acidification, water consumption and human health effects. An environmentally extended multi-regional the input-output analysis (EMRIO) is used to address Mexican policies for the period 2020–2050. Results show that the investment in capture technologies in Mexico allows a net reduction of the carbon emissions in Mexico that is pursued at a low cost (33 EUR/tCO2). This mitigation policy has important additional co-benefits in terms of domestic value added and employment creation of medium and high qualification. As for the environmental impacts, most of them are produced in the power plant due to the burning of the natural gas consumed.
... The IEA estimates that meeting the predicted CCS requirement to reduce carbon emissions by 9.5 Gt CO2 in 2050, or 19 percent of the total, would require 100 CCS projects by 2020, storing 255 Mtpa [157] (p. 5755) [158]. Research also documents how global targets set for CCS capability by the IEA, the IPCC, the G8, the Australian Government, the Australian Coal Association, and the Council of the European Union, to meet these needs have not been realized [159]. ...
Full-text available
Hydrogen is fast becoming a new international “super fuel” to accelerate global climate change ambitions. This paper has two inter-weaving themes. Contextually, it focuses on the potential impact of the EU’s new Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) on fossil fuel-generated as opposed to green hydrogen imports. The CBAM, as a transnational carbon adjustment mechanism, has the potential to impact international trade in energy. It seeks both a level playing field between imports and EU internal markets (subject to ambitious EU climate change policies), and to encourage emissions reduction laggards through its “carbon diplomacy”. Countries without a price on carbon will be charged for embodied carbon in their supply chains when they export to the EU. Empirically, we focus on two hydrogen export/import case studies: Australia as a non-EU state with ambitions to export hydrogen, and Germany as an EU Member State reliant on energy imports. Energy security is central to energy trade debates but needs to be conceptualized beyond supply and demand economics to include geopolitics, just transitions and the impacts of border carbon taxes and EU carbon diplomacy. Accordingly, we apply and further develop a seven-dimension energy security-justice framework to the examples of brown, blue and green hydrogen export/import hydrogen operations, with varying carbon-intensity supply chains, in Australia and Germany. Applying the framework, we identify potential impact—risks and opportunities—associated with identified brown, blue and green hydrogen export/import projects in the two countries. This research contributes to the emerging fields of international hydrogen trade, supply chains, and international carbon diplomacy and develops a potentially useful seven-dimension energy security-justice framework for energy researchers and policy analysts.
... 3. We find that theoretical frameworks are generally lacking in the studies. As noted in previous reviews, there are "infrequent" references to theoretical frameworks [24]: some studies are based on the theory of planned behaviour or other social psychological theories 15 [see 19], while very few offer "analytical frameworks" to assess the state of outreach processes [43]. A few studies use technoeconomic concepts such as "social license to operate" [23], but theories from political science or sociology are rarely referenced. ...
Full-text available
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is discussed as a technology for mitigating climate change. With social scientific research on CCS having increased considerably over the last decade, this paper offers a first comprehensive review and evaluation of studies that investigate the way CCS projects are communicated to (local) stakeholders and the general public. We conduct a systematic review of 115 papers for a state-of-the-art assessment of research on communication practices in CCS projects. Based on this review we compile an extensive list of the recommendations provided for CCS outreach activities and scrutinize it for limitations. This enables us to show that "best practices" in communication need to be applied in context sensitive approaches and to highlight factors in communication (such as social media) which have been underutilized up to now. Furthermore, we identify two conceptual shortcomings that limit the scope of CCS communication research: first, the majority of the literature refers to CCS as applied to the fossil fuel-based energy sector and thereby narrows the debate. Second, while the social scientific debate has moved on from the mere study of acceptance of CCS to practices of communication, we find that the theoretical lens applied to communication is still largely focused on convincing people to accept CCS. We argue that future research should tackle these shortcomings by paying more attention to CCS projects that go beyond coal or natural gas power plants. Additionally, it is advised to theoretically reframe communication efforts by emphasizing long-term alliance building through participation and joint goals instead of focussing on short-term persuasion and simple strategies of raising acceptance.
The construction industry is one of the largest CO2 emitters worldwide. This review outlines all existing CO2 capture technologies in the construction-related industry which are mainly found in the cement, steel, iron and construction material production industry. This review found that carbon capture and utilization (CCU) is the preferred alternative for carbon capture in the construction-related industry due to its ability to produce value-added products. Among the CCU pathways, alternatives that capture CO2 via carbon mineralization have received the most attention due to their capabilities to valorize industrial waste to produce carbonate products. Unlike the production of liquid CO2, hydrogen, purified CO2 and biofuels from the majority of the carbon capture system (excluding hydroxide absorption and accelerated carbonation system), carbonate products can be directly utilized for construction application, reducing costs associated with product transportation. Although CCU technologies have potential sustainable carbon-capturing processes, outlined barriers such as high operating cost, low CO2 capture capabilities and low maturity hinder their commercialization. To overcome these limitations, continuous development is crucial. Recommendations for the development of CCU technologies such as the creation of standards for carbonate products, incorporation of promoters or hybrid mixing, integration of IR 4.0’ principles and process intensification into existing CCU technologies are deliberately discussed.
With the Danish government's goals of decreasing 70% of CO2 emissions by 2030 and reaching a fully decarbonised society in the years after, this paper aims to identify the role of sustainable bioenergy in achieving this goal. The methodology and approach presented are relevant for other countries heading in the same direction. The focus is on strategies to further develop the sustainable biomass resources and conversion technologies within energy and transport paired with CCUS (carbon capture utilisation and storage) to coordinate with other sectors and achieve a fully decarbonised society. By using hourly energy system modelling and a Smart Energy Systems approach, it is possible to create a robust multiple technology strategy and keep the sustainable bioenergy levels. The results are presented as principles and guidelines on how to include the use of sustainable biomass in the individual country as an integrated part of global decarbonisation.
As a result of the increase in carbon emissions and climate change, it is imperative to innovate and implement new sustainable solutions across industries, including construction. The current study explores how an early upstream supplier (EUS) can influence actors in its innovation ecosystem and the degree to which the effect of green public procurement (GPP) can be increased. An increased degree of GPP is sought as an enabler for the EUS to succeed with its green business process innovation. Using a holistic case study methodology, comprising literature review, semi-structured interviews, and document analysis, we examined the direct and indirect paths the EUS could utilize to influence public actors' degree of GPP. The case study is based on a Norwegian cement producer currently developing low-carbon cement with carbon capture and storage technology. Our findings show that public buyers actively influence GPP and that it is possible to effect change in the ecosystem from the supplier side. There is a high potential for an EUS in the construction industry to influence (downstream) public purchasers’ current practice. The study demonstrates the opportunities for an EUS to directly and indirectly influence the degree of GPP. It also highlights the challenges related to GPP and innovation in the construction industry.
Carbon capture technologies have been recognized as a potential alternative to alleviate global warming. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is preferred over carbon conversion and utilization (CCU) due to its lower operating costs and higher CO2 reduction capability. Nevertheless, CO2 utilization has the potential to be more economical if value‐added products are produced. This highlights the importance of assessing CO2 utilization routes and alternatives in carbon management. This review paper aims to evaluate the carbon utilization potential of major CO2‐capturing absorbents including amine, hydroxide, ionic liquid, amino acids and carbonate absorbents. All absorbents show potential application for CO2 utilization except for ionic liquids (ILs) due to their unclear CO2 capture mechanisms. Absorbents that require a desorption process for CO2 utilization include MEA, MDEA, K2CO3 and Na2CO3 due to their high absorption capacity. Industries have utilized the desorbed CO2 as chemical feedstocks, enhanced oil recovery (EOR) and mineral carbonation. For hydroxide absorbents and CaCO3, desorption of CO2 is unnecessary as the absorbed CO2 can be directly utilized to produce construction materials. Apart from that, the incorporation of advanced technologies and business models introduced by the fourth industrial revolution are plausible considerations to accelerate the development of carbon capture technologies. © 2022 Society of Chemical Industry and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Grand hopes exist that carbon capture and storage can have a major decarbonization role at global, regional and sectoral scales. Those hopes rest on the narrative that an abundance of geological storage opportunity is available to meet all needs. In this Perspective, we present the contrasting view that deep uncertainty over the sustainable injection rate at any given location will constrain the pace and scale of carbon capture and storage deployment. Although such constraints will probably have implications in most world regions, they may be particularly relevant in major developing Asian economies. To minimize the risk that these constraints pose to the decarbonization imperative, we discuss steps that are urgently needed to evaluate, plan for and reduce the uncertainty over CO2 storage prospects.
Conference Paper
Full-text available
The results presented in this article illustrate how the local public was informed on specific Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) projects by regional newspapers in Germany. The analyzed articles were published in four daily newspapers within the German regions where four CO 2 onshore storage projects took place or have been planned. The articles were published between 2007 and 2011. In total, 1,115 newspaper articles about the four CO 2 onshore storage projects were gathered and analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively. Our results showed that the regional media coverage of CCS projects in Germany reached peaks in 2009 and 2010. The main topics changed within the media coverage and it is worth mentioning to what extent the media coverage of CCS disregarded topics with regard to economic, technical, ecological or scientific aspects on CCS. The overall evaluation of CCS within the articles is negative. While commercial CCS projects received more negative evaluation across newspaper articles; opinions about the research and industry project Ketzin were more neutral.
Full-text available
See full text at
Full-text available
This paper analyzes the discrepancy between the high hopes placed in Carbon Capture, Transport, and Storage (CCTS) and the meager results that have been observed in reality, and advances several explanations for what we call a "lost decade" for CCTS. We trace the origins of the high hopes placed in this technology by industry and policymakers alike, and show how the large number of demonstration projects required for a breakthrough did not follow. We then identify possible explanations for the "lost decade", such as incumbent resistance to structural change, wrong technology choices, over-optimistic cost estimates, a premature focus on energy projects instead of industry, and the underestimation of transport and storage issues. We conclude it is likely that we have to live for quite some time with a cognitive dissonance in which top-down models continue to place hope in the CCTS-technology by reducing its expected fixed and variable costs, and bottom-up researchers continue to count failed pilot projects.
Full-text available
The importance of public acceptance of CCS has been highlighted by developers and policy makers, with all emphasising that it is a fundamental factor in the future success of CCS. However, little research has been done so far on NGO positioning on CCS. The current debate in Europe, with discussion beginning to result in both real projects on the ground and in real policies, has put NGOs more and more into a position of making open stands. This has resulted in a diversity of viewpoints, and the controv ersy has polarized opinions. In this paper we review our own research on NGO opinions on CCS, to spell out their most important concerns. We discuss NGO positioning vis-à-vis the ongoing negotiations of a legislative proposal to regulate CCS in Europe. Finally, we consider whether it is possible to come to more coherent approaches and agreements in a way that maximizes their effectiveness both as a counterweight to, and partner of, other stakeholders and governments.
The objective of this paper is to develop independent and systematic criteria for assessing CCS policy in terms of its level of policy integration. We believe that we should assess CCS policy in terms of the distance to an ideal integrated CCS policy in order to keep track of its trajectory toward sustainable development. After reviewing the existing literature of environmental policy integration, an assessment framework for integrated CCS policy is developed based on Arild Underdal's notion of ‘integrated policy’ then, its usefulness is demonstrated by applying it to CCS policies in Japan and Norway. In the final part, we summarize the findings of the cases and conclude with some observations regarding explanatory factors of the difference in terms of the achieved level of policy integration between Japan and Norway's CCS policies, and some policy implications derived from the analysis based on the framework.Highlights► We developed a framework for assessing the achieved level of integrated CCS policies. ► Its usefulness is demonstrated by applying it to CCS policies in Japan and Norway. ► Norway has overall achieved higher level of integrated CCS policy than Japan. ► More stringent climate policy may stimulate vertical integration of CCS policy.
Large scale project database
  • Ccs Global
  • Institute
Global CCS Institute, 2016, "Large scale project database", Melbourne (Australia). (accessed on 14-10-2016),
  • Ccs Global
  • Institute
Global CCS Institute, 2015. The Global Status of CCS: 2015, Summary Report, Melbourne (Australia).
Low Carbon Energy Technologies – Factbook Update. Carbon Capture and Storage at a crossroads The Hague (the Netherlands)
  • Sbc Institute
SBC Institute, 2016. Low Carbon Energy Technologies – Factbook Update. Carbon Capture and Storage at a crossroads, The Hague (the Netherlands).
Global Carbon and Capture Institute Launched, Media Release
  • Advance
Advance, 2009. Global Carbon and Capture Institute Launched, Media Release 10 July 2009. (accessed on 17-10-2016)
The Global Status of CCS
  • Ccs Global
  • Institute
Global CCS Institute, 2010. The Global Status of CCS 2010, Canberra (Australia).