Content uploaded by Daphna Oyserman
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Daphna Oyserman on Oct 27, 2018
Content may be subject to copyright.
Research Dialogue
Conservatism as a situated identity: Implications for consumer behavior
Daphna Oyserman ⁎, Norbert Schwarz
University of Southern California, United States
Accepted by Sharon Shavitt, Area Editor
Received 14 August 2017; received in revised form 16 August 2017; accepted 16 August 2017
Available online 24 August 2017
Abstract
Insufficient attention to political ideology as an organizing axis reduces predictive power. Jost (2017 –this issue) makes a significant
contribution by outlining and documenting a set of relationships among personality factors, attitudes, values, and conservatism. The value of this
approach is highlighting the possibility that ideology sticks when it fits features of the individual and hence has an enduring quality. This approach
needs to be balanced by consideration of the power of the immediate situation to define what an identity means and the potential universality of
many features associated with conservatism. We discuss both issues using identity-based motivation theory as our organizing framework.
© 2017 Society for Consumer Psychology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
“A Jeep driver is one who doesn't give up when faced with
adversity”(Shanghai husband explaining why he bought his
wife a Jeep Grand Cherokee; from Barnett, 2016).
“Love, hope, happiness. Whatever your destination, there're a
million ways to get there”(“Recalculating”advertisement for
Jeep https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2dnmCmTI90).
“Yes you can go back, you just have to look in the right place.”
“It is not about hugging trees. It is not about being wasteful
either. Find that balance, when taking care of yourself takes
care of more than just yourself. That is the sweet spot.”(Texan
actor Mathew McConaughey, promoting Ford Lincoln cars, in
a series of sleekly shot commercials https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=8QEAA94FjHc).
Introduction
Are Jeeps for tough tenacious people who value personal
happiness, self-direction and new experiences? Are Lincolns for
quirky people who are rooted in their past, value family and
personal happiness, and are benevolent and want to avoid harm?
How did the Jeep and Lincoln people choose these particular
descriptors? According to John Jost's (2017 –this issue) timely
and stimulating target article these descriptors are associated with
political ideology. The Jeep ‘recalculating’and the Lincoln
McConaughey advertisements mix some descriptors resonating
more with conservatives with other descriptors resonating more
with liberals. Associates of conservatism are tough-mindedness,
individualism, respect and deference to tradition and authority.
Associates of liberalism are tolerance, compassion, flexibility, and
openness to new experiences. The advertisements cleverly link
consumption with all of these attributes (which might variously be
defined as attitudes, traits, values, or moral bases; Oyserman,
2015a, 2015b). For example, in the Jeep ‘recalculating’spot, the
theme music comes from Frank Zaruba's country western tune,
providing a link to that identity, while the images and words in the
‘recalculate’advertisement emphasize self-directed ways to get to
a traditional lifestyle. “Go straight to a steady job, recalculating;
DOI of original article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcps.2017.07.003.
⁎Corresponding author at: Department of Psychology, University of Southern
California, 3620 S. McClintock Ave, Los Angeles, CA 90089-1061, United
States.
E-mail address: oyserman@usc.edu (D. Oyserman).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcps.2017.08.003
1057-7408/© 2017 Society for Consumer Psychology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
ScienceDirect
Journal of Consumer Psychology 27, 4 (2017) 532 –536
tow the company line, recalculating; stay single until you are 34,
recalculating (with an image of a diamond ring); be a vegan,
recalculating (with an image of a person viscerally enjoying a
large steak).”In the Lincoln advertisements, McConaughey, in a
subtle southern Texan twang, talks to his dogs about dinner plans
but tells them he is the boss, tells a bull in his path that he will
show respect, lets the bull have the road, while he himself backs
up and takes the long way around. If liberals and conservatives
notice identity-relevant cues and fail to notice or process irrelevant
ones, advertisements like these can feel equally compelling to both
audiences.
Jost's timely target article asks whether there is a profile of
conservatism and liberalism that is relevant to understanding
consumer choice and behavior, which consumer behavior theories
and marketing strategies should take into account. One implication
of these advertising examples is that ads target the sorts of values,
attitudes, and traits that Jost (2017 –this issue) proposes are
associated with political ideology, understood through the lens of
a conservatism-liberalism continuum. A second implication is that
advertising does so, it seems, by mixing and matching ideologies,
perhaps assuming that consumers will only notice and process
identity-relevant information, making sense of the whole by
focusing on identity-relevant parts. Jost reviews the literature on
associative relationships between political attitudes, personality
variables, and family background, arriving at three key conclu-
sions (see also Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009).
First, certain kinds of people hold certain political ideologies
because these ideologies are good matches with their traits and
characteristics. Political ideologies stick because they resonate
with personal needs and motivations. Conservatives emphasize
tough-mindedness and tenacity, personal happiness, family
security, economic prosperity, hierarchy, obedience to authority,
and individualism. These values stick more with people who
have the personality trait of conscientiousness and have a low
need for cognition and high need for cognitive closure. Liberals
emphasize self-direction and flexibility. These values stick more
with people who have the personality trait of openness to new
experience, have a high need for cognition and low need for
cognitive closure. Second, political ideologies come from the
larger society and express themselves at the individual level in
distinctive ways of thinking, kinds of motivation, and even brain
structures. Third, all of this might matter for consumer choice and
behavior.
A situated approach
Jost's message is appealing, not the least because it dovetails
with people's general preference for dispositional ‘at person’
explanations over situational ‘at context’ones (Nisbett & Ross,
1991). People believe that they know who they are and that who
they are matters for what they do; that their own and other peoples'
choices and actions reflect who they are and who they might
become–their current and possible future identities (Oyserman,
Elmore, & Smith, 2012). People believe that in core and essential
ways, they are the same across time and space; their friends
usually share this belief about themselves. This essentialist belief
is useful for several reasons. First, it allows people to make
predictions about their own and others' future behavior given what
they believe to be true of them now. Second, if “future me”and
“me now”are essentially the same “me”it is less painful to refrain
from smaller current rewards to accrue future larger ones. This
makes long-term strategies, such as saving for one's retirement,
more palatable (Lewis & Oyserman, 2015). Third, if “future me”
and “me now”are essentially the same “me,”people should be
more willing to take a “no pain, no gain”approach, investing more
effort when they experience difficulty working toward their goals
(Smith & Oyserman, 2015).
However, the appealing message of essential dispositions
comes with an important caveat that matters for those interested
in shaping and predicting consumer choice and behavior. As with
all dispositional accounts of attitudes and behavior, Jost's (2017 –
this issue) emphasis on dispositional variables needs to be balanced
by a consideration of immediate contextual variables influencing
motivation, identities, attitudes, and behaviors. As with all
dispositional accounts, this also requires a realistic assessment of
the likely amount of variance that political ideologies expressed in
one context can explain in behaviors measured in another context
or across contexts over time (e.g., effects of political ideology on
charitable giving, Kemmelmeier et al., 2002; and performance,
Kemmelmeier et al., 2006). Even though identities feel stable,
identities and the content of these identities change as a function of
context (for a review, see Oyserman et al., 2012). Rather than being
invariant, which identities come to mind and what ‘on-the-mind’
identities seem to mean is sensitively attuned to momentary and
chronic features of context. That people are sensitive to the
implications of their immediate situation is a design feature, not a
design flaw. This sensitivity allows people to make inferences
about what people like themselves likely do, which strategies work
for them, and what inferences to draw when their current activity
progresses smoothly or when they run into difficulties (for reviews
Fisher & Oyserman, 2017; Oyserman, 2015a, 2015b; Oyserman
et al., 2017).
Identity as situated
Our organizing framework here is identity-based motiva-
tion theory, a situated social cognition theory of motivation
and goal pursuit —with special focus on when and how
self-regulation works (Oyserman, 2007; Oyserman et al., 2017).
Identity-based motivation theory starts with the disjuncture
between decontextualized belief and contextualized reality.
People experience their own and others' identities as fixed and
always on the mind so that they can predict tomorrow's tastes and
desires from those of today. People prefer to act (action-readiness)
and make sense of their experiences (procedural-readiness) in
identity-congruent ways. However, contexts influence more than
which identities are on the mind; people actively construct what
their identities are and imply given contextual cues (dynamic
construction). ‘On-the-mind’identities influence the strategies
people are willing to use and the meaning they make of their
subjective experiences, especially their experiences of ease and
difficulty in considering or trying to work on their self-goals.
People make culturally tuned inferences about what these
experiences imply for who they are or could become and what
533D. Oyserman, N. Schwarz / Journal of Consumer Psychology 27, 4 (2017) 532–536
todoaboutit(Oyserman, 2007; Oyserman et al., 2017).
Although typically considered as differing across groups, some
aspects of human culture are likely universal because human
culture developed from the survival necessity of connecting
with others and adapting to group living (Boyd & Richerson,
1988; Cohen, 2001; Haidle et al., 2015; Oyserman, 2017;
Schwartz, 1992). Living together requires that people coordi-
nate and organize their relationships, clarify group boundaries,
and notice and reward innovation that can be imitated or
exploited (Boyd, Richerson, & Levinson, 2005; Kurzban &
Neuberg, 2015; Oyserman, 2011; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001).
The implication is that many of the attributes and values
currently described as conservative may be quite universal and
hence available and identity-congruent, though not necessarily
accessible or on the mind, and not necessarily considered as
part of a conservative identity. If so, then features of situations,
including advertisements, which cue elements of honor,
collectivistic mindsets, or individualistic mindsets, should be
experienced as meaningful even to people who do not identify
clusters of these attributes as conservatism.
Conservative identity
That said; some people do have conservative identities or
identities as conservatives rather than liberals (or the reverse). As
summarized in Jost (2017 –this issue) and highlighted by our
opening examples of car advertisements, the values and attitudes
associated with conservatism such as individual initiative, family
orientation, and a desire for personal happiness, can be associated
with branding and marketing strategies. At the same time, these
values and attitudes can be considered aspects of conservative
identity. If so, then on the one hand, when on the mind,
conservatism should evoke action- and procedural-readiness, a
readiness to act and make sense of experience in light of this
identity. And, on the other hand, what a conservative (or liberal)
identity implies should be, in important ways, dynamically
constructed as a function of features of the immediate context.
As Jost (2017 –this issue) outlines, a number of features of
what a conservative identity might contain have been
documented. For example, conservatism is associated with
experiencing the world as a just place (Jost, 2017 –this issue).
Conservatives believe in free will and a just world, and this
implies that one deserves what one gets. Indeed, conservatism
is associated with fewer consumer complaints and less dispute
of the resolution of the complaints that one lodges (Jung,
Garbarino, Briley, & Wynhausen, 2017).
Conservatism is also associated with beliefs about what is
moral and what is not (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt &
Graham, 2007). Higher endorsement of moral values associ-
ated with conservatism (loyalty, deference to authority, purity)
is associated with more moralizing of self-control successes
(e.g., sticking to a diet, saving instead of spending) and failures
(e.g., succumbing to temptations, drinking or eating to excess,
being unfaithful; Mooijman et al., 2017). This is not the case for
higher endorsement of the moral values associated with liberalism
(fairness, caring, harm avoidance), which are not associated with
whether self-control is moralized (Mooijman et al., 2017). The
implication is that moral values associated with conservatism
change self-control from a personal choice or personal skill to a
moral imperative: people should be self-controlled and self-
restrained and should be punished if they are not. This, in turn, has
implications for action- and procedural-readiness, as a few
examples may illustrate.
If conservatism is associated with experiencing self-control
as a moral imperative, conservatives should work harder at
controlling themselves and should believe that people could
control themselves if they only wanted to. Indeed, conserva-
tism is related to higher self-control (Clarkson et al., 2015;
Jost, 2017 –this issue; Kemmelmeier, 2008). For example,
Clarkson et al. (2015) found that conservatives perform better
than liberals at a color Stroop task, a measure of attentional
control in which respondents have to read color words while
ignoring the color of letters that form the word (e.g. the word ‘red’
written in blue letters). They also showed that the relationship
between conservatism and self-control was due, in part, to
conservatives' higher belief in free will (Clarkson et al., 2015).
As noted, conservatism is associated with belief in free will, that
people deserve what they get and get what they deserve (Jost,
2017 –this issue). These beliefs are congruent with other
conservative values such as acceptance of the status quo.
Conservatism might influence what kinds of consumption are
deemed morally good or right. “Sin”taxes reflect moralization of
decisions of this kind and impose a disincentive on classes of
consumption that are considered inappropriate (alcohol, ciga-
rettes), unwise (gas guzzling cars) or unnecessary (luxury goods).
The same is true for liberalism. Consider graduated costs of
license plate renewal. If newer models or more expensive cars are
charged more, it is not because the plate is more costly to make or
the paperwork is more costly to process, but because of a decision
that people who have more can pay more. Conservative and
liberal political ideology may be behind each of these policy
decisions, both result in taxes but for seemingly opposite reasons.
Conservative moralization of self-control leads some purchases
to be taxed since they seem to require punishment and liberal
belief in equity leads other purchases to be taxed since they seem
to imply that one has more than enough. Indeed, in a recent set of
experiments involving hypothetical and real giving, Olson,
McFerran, Morales, and Dahl (2016) show that Americans find
buying organic food and making greener car choices a marker of
morality for people who spend money they earned, but a marker
of immorality for people who spend money they received from
government assistance programs. Americans also act on these
perceptions. Olson et al.' (2016) participants donated over 50%
more to a community charity that aimed to feed the hungry than
to an otherwise identical community charity that aimed to feed
the hungry with organic food.
On the other hand, the size of the relationships between
conservatism and values, and between values and patterns of
consumption is small in absolute size. From an identity-based
motivation perspective, one reason that the associations are small is
that the dispositional approach misses the implications of dynamic
construction and how this then influences what actions and
meanings come to mind when conservative identity is cued in
context. Three examples may illustrate this issue by highlighting
534 D. Oyserman, N. Schwarz / Journal of Consumer Psychology 27, 4 (2017) 532–536
the variable impact of political ideology on the moralization of
self-control, the role of free will, and consumers' preferences for
stability versus change.
Evidence for dynamic construction of conservative identity
Identity-based motivation theory predicts that what a conser-
vative identity implies for what do to and how to make sense of
one's experience is in part a dynamic function of context. For
example, is conservatism always linked to self-control or does it
depend on what self-control seems to imply in context? Can
anyone be induced to take on a conservative approach to morality
and does this lead to more moralizing of self-control? Supporting
our situated prediction, Clarkson et al. (2015) started with the
finding described earlier, that the conservative-liberal difference
in self-control is mediated by conservatives' higher endorsement
of the idea of free will. It is as if conservatives conclude that if
you can choose your fate, then you better get going to make sure
it is a good one. Clark and colleagues wondered if belief in the
role of free will could be manipulated. They manipulated
participants' theories about the value of freewill for effective
self-control. They randomly assigned liberals and conservatives
to two conditions. In one condition, participants got the message
that the authors assumed conservatives tend to endorse —that
people can control themselves because they have the free will to
do so and this is energizing. In the other condition, participants
got the alternative message —that trying to control yourself is
taxing and really not possible because people do not have free
will. Performance shifted depending on the match between the
message and identity.
Mooijman et al. (2017) started with liberal and conservative
differences in endorsement of moral values (Haidt & Graham,
2007), with liberals endorsing more individuating values of caring
and fairness and avoiding harm and conservatives endorsing more
binding values of loyalty, deference to authority, and purity. They
documented that participants randomized to consider morality
through a liberal individuating lens were less likely to moralize
self-control successes and failures than participants randomized to
consider morality through a conservative binding lens. Important-
ly, participants randomized to consider morality through a liberal
lens were no different in their tendency to moralize self-control
than participants not led to use either lens, whereas participants led
to use a conservative lens were more likely to moralize self-control
successes than participants in either of the other groups were. One
implication is that a conservative lens matters when it is
accessible. A second implication is that elements of conservatism
are available to be made accessible, as would be predicted if these
elements are universally part of human culture. A third implication
is that identity content is dynamically constructed —not all
participants randomized to this group would otherwise describe
themselves as conservative, yet readiness to make sense of the
world in a conservative way is easily evoked.
Other experiments examined the relationships between con-
servatism and preference for products that represent stability vs.
change (Duhachek, Han, & Tormala, 2014; Farmer, Kidwell, &
Hardesty, 2014). These studies used experimental methods to
guide momentary procedural readiness and showed that
conservatives' proclivity for products that represent stability can
easily be changed. Next, consider how the situation may shape the
relationship between conservatism and readiness to act in
environmentally friendly ways. Gromet, Kunreuther, and Larrick
(2013) found that consumers who identified themselves as
conservatives compared to liberals placed less value on making
choices that would reduce carbon emissions when carbon
emissions were described as linked to climate change; but the
groups did not differ when carbon emissions were described as
linked to energy independence. When given money and the option
to buy light bulbs, conservatives purchased energy-efficient
compact fluorescent light (CFL) bulbs over equivalently bright
incandescent bulbs if the bulbs were the same price and even if
the CFL costs more, as long as they were not labeled as envi-
ronmentally friendly. Once a “protect the environment”sticker
was added, conservatives' willingness to buy CFL bulbs declined.
This is consequential because, according to Dietz, Leshko, and
McCright (2013), 38% of overall United States greenhouse gas
emissions stem from household direct energy consumption.
The common theme across these studies is that, like any
identity, conservative identity is more likely to influence action
and meaning-making when it is on the mind, that it is relatively
easily brought to mind, and that what it implies once on the
mind is a function of context. Marketing campaigns seem to be
aware of this and try to link consumption with values, attitudes,
and beliefs related to both conservative and liberal identity,
perhaps in the hope that consumers will experience the product
only through the lens that is identity-congruent for them. Jost's
(2017 –this issue) target article provides a service by
reminding consumer researchers that this is a rich topic with
many open venues for research and application. One such
venue, as we outlined here, is to consider conservative identity
as a situated identity, dynamically constructed in context, with
implications for meaning making and action.
Though the examples provided in Jost's (2017 –this issue)
target article and our commentary focus on the U.S., this does
not imply that the topic is limited only to the U.S. or to the West
generally. Indeed, as Zhao and Belk (2008) articulate, Chinese
and Indian advertisements actively frame consumption of
luxury products as congruent with political ideology. We can
imagine a situated cultural psychology of political identities
and consumption building on Jost's stage setting work.
References
Barnett, C. E. (2016). Consumption as postmodern ideology in China. Inquiries
Journal,8(11) (Retrieved from http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=1497).
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1988). Culture and the evolutionary process.
University of Chicago Press.
Boyd, R., Richerson, P., & Levinson, S. (2005). Solving the puzzle of human
cooperation. Evolution and culture (pp. 105–132). MIT Press.
Clarkson, J. J., Chambers, J. R., Hirt, E. R., Otto, A. S., Kardes, F. R., & Leone,
C. (2015). The self-control consequences of political ideology. PNAS,
112(27), 8250–8253.
Cohen, D. (2001). Cultural variation: Considerations and implications.
Psychological Bulletin,127, 451–471.
Dietz, T., Leshko, C., & McCright, A. M. (2013). Politics shapes individual
choices about energy efficiency. PNAS,110(23), 9191–9192.
535D. Oyserman, N. Schwarz / Journal of Consumer Psychology 27, 4 (2017) 532–536
Duhachek, A., Han, D., & Tormala, Z. L. (2014). Stability vs. change: The
effect of political ideology on product preference. In J. Cotte, & S. Wood
(Eds.), Advances in consumer research,Vol. 42. (pp. 59–64). Duluth, MN:
Association for Consumer Research.
Farmer, A., Kidwell, B., & Hardesty, D. (2014). Political ideology and consumer
decision making. In J. Cotte, & S. Wood (Eds.), Advances in consumer
research,Vol. 42.(pp.59–64). Duluth, MN: Association for Consumer
Research.
Fisher, O., & Oyserman, D. (2017). Assessing interpretations of experienced
ease and difficulty as motivational constructs. Motivational Science,3(2),
133–163. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/mot0000055.
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on
different sets of moral foundations. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology,96, 1029–1046.
Gromet, D. M., Kunreuther, H., & Larrick, R. P. (2013). Political ideology
affects energy-efficiency attitudes and choices. PNAS,110(23), 9314–9319.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1218453110.
Haidle, M.N., Bolus, M., Collard, M., Conard, N. J., Garofoli, D., Lombard, M., ...
Whiten, A. (2015). The nature of culture: An eight-grade model for the
evolution and expansion of cultural capacities in hominins and other animals.
Journal of Anthropological Sciences,93,43–70.
Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007). When morality opposes justice: Conservatives
have moral intuitions that liberals may not recognize. Social Justice Research,
20,98–116.
Jost, J. (2017e). The marketplace of ideology: “Elective affinities”in political
psychology and their implications for consumer behavior. Journal of
Consumer Psychology,27, 502–520 (this issue).
Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure,
functions, and elective affinities. Annual Review of Psychology,60(1), 307–337.
Jung, K., Garbarino, J., Briley, D., & Wynhausen, J. (2017). Blue and red
voices: Effects of political ideology on consumers' complaining and
disputing behavior. Journal of Consumer Research, ucx037. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1093/jcr/ucx037.
Kemmelmeier, M. (2008). Is there a relationship between political orientation
and cognitive ability? A test of three hypotheses in two studies. Personality
and Individual Differences,45(8), 767–772.
Kemmelmeier, M., Jambor, E. E., & Letner, J. (2006). Individualism and good
works: Cultural variation in giving and volunteering across the United
States. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,37(3), 327–344.
Kemmelmeier, M., Krol, G., & Kim, Y. H. (2002). Values, economics, and
proenvironmental attitudes in 22 societies. Cross-Cultural Research,36(3),
256–285.
Kurzban,R., & Neuberg, S. (2015).Managing ingroup andoutgroup relationships.
In D. M. Buss (Ed.), The handbook of evolutionary psychology.Hoboken,NJ:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Lewis, N. A., Jr., & Oyserman, D. (2015). When does the future begin? Time
metrics matter, connecting present and future selves. Psychological Science,
26(6), 816–825. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797615572231.
Mooijman, M., Meindl, P., Oyserman, D., Monterosso, J., Dehghani, M., Doris,
J. M., & Graham, J. (2017). Resisting temptation for the good of the group:
Binding moral values and the moralization of self-control. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology.http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000149
(Advance online publication).
Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. (1991). The person and the situation: Essential
contributions of social psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Olson, J. G., McFerran, B., Morales, A. C., & Dahl, D. W. (2016). Wealth and
welfare: Divergent moral reactions to ethical consumer choices. Journal of
Consumer Research,42(6), 879–896.
Oyserman, D. (2007). Social identity and self-regulation. In A. Kruglanski, &
T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (pp. 432–453) (2nd ed.).
New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Oyserman, D. (2011). Culture as situated cognition: Cultural mindsets, cultural
fluency, and meaning making. European Review of Social Psychology,22,
164–214.
Oyserman, D. (2015a). Pathways to success through identity-based motivation.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Oyserman, D., 2015b. Values, Psychology of. In: James D. Wright (editor-in-
chief), International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Vol.
25, 2nd ed. (pp. 36–40). NY: Oxford Elsevier Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.24030-0.
Oyserman, D. (2017). Culture three ways: Culture and subcultures within
countries. Annual Review of Psychology,68, 435–463.
Oyserman, D., Elmore, K., & Smith, G. (2012). Self, self-concept and identity. In
M. Leary, & J. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (pp. 69–104)
(2nd ed.). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Oyserman, D., Lewis, N. A., Jr., Yan, V. X., Fisher, O., O'Donnell, S. C., &
Horowitz, E. (2017). An identity-based motivation framework for self-
regulation. Psychological Inquiry,28(2-3), 139–147.
Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values:
Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology,25,1–65.
Schwartz, S. H., & Bardi, A. (2001). Value hierarchies across cultures: Taking a
similarities perspective. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,32,268–290.
Smith, G. C., & Oyserman, D. (2015). Just not worth my time? Experienced
difficulty and time investment. Social Cognition,33,85–103.
Zhao, X., & Belk, R. W. (2008). Politicizing consumer culture: Advertising's
appropriation of political ideology in China's social transition. Journal of
Consumer Research,35(2), 231–244.
536 D. Oyserman, N. Schwarz / Journal of Consumer Psychology 27, 4 (2017) 532–536
