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Two Peoples – Two Stories:
Anti-Immigrant Attitudes
in Post-Socialist Russia
Anastasia Gorodzeisky
1
and Anya Glikman
2
1
Tel Aviv University,
2
Kibbutzim College, Israel
ABSTRACT
This article investigates mechanisms underlying anti-immigrant sentiment in post-socialist
Russia in particular, and in societies undergoing a search for new national identity borders in
general. We argue that when the borders of national identity are drawn and redefined, the
forces that drive anti-immigrant attitudes differ meaningfully for members of the ethnic ma-
jority group and for members of the minority population. Our empirical analysis utilizes data
obtained from a representative sample of the Russian population by the European Social
Survey (2006-2012). Descriptive data reveal that the level of anti-immigrant attitudes among
ethnic Russians (the majority population) is higher than among non-ethnic Russians (ethnic
minority group), reflecting the fact that the crisis of national identity in post-socialist Russia
has undermined, primarily, a sense of group position of ethnic majority. Our main findings
demonstrate that in post-socialist Russia, as a society undergoing the critical period of the re-
consideration of national identity, the anti-immigrant attitudes of the ethnic majority group
rely mostly on perceptions of collective (state) vulnerability, while the anti-immigrant atti-
tudes of ethnic minority groups rely to a greater degree on individuals’ vulnerable socioeco-
nomic position, and conservative views and ideologies (i.e., self-interests).
KEYWORDS: anti-immigrant attitudes; immigration; group position theory; Russia; prejudice.
A significant body of research conducted across Western societies (Western Europe, the United
States, Canada) has consistently observed that individual-level attributes, especially socioeconomic
vulnerability and conservative views and ideologies, are likely to increase hostility and antagonism to-
ward immigrant populations (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996;Fetzer 2000;Raijman and
Semyonov 2004;Schlueter, Schmidt, and Wagner 2008;Strabac and Listhaug 2008). Surprisingly,
findings from post-socialist Russia differ considerably from those observed in Western societies.
Results of recent studies (Bessudnov 2016;Gorodzeisky, Glikman, and Maskileyson 2015) revealed
that in post-socialist Russia, the socioeconomic position of individuals—as well as conservative views
and ideologies—are not effective in predicting anti-foreigner attitudes.
1
This is so despite the very
high level of xenophobia and negative sentiments toward immigrants in Russia.
Direct correspondence to: Anastasia Gorodzeisky, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Tel Aviv
University, Haim Levanon Street, 30, Tel Aviv, 6997801, Israel. E-mail: anastasiag@post.tau.ac.il.
1 Results from an additional recent study (Bahry 2016) also demonstrate that an individual’s socioeconomic position together with
demographic characteristics only explains a tiny part (between 2 and 3 percent) of the variance in anti-immigrant attitudes. Bahry
V
CThe Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for the Study of Social Problems.
All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
1
Social Problems, 2017, 0, 1–21
doi: 10.1093/socpro/spx023
Article
The high level of anti-foreigner attitudes in Russia is usually understood in the context of the dra-
matic geo-political and socioeconomic changes experienced by Russian society following the collapse
of the former Soviet Union, a collapse that led to a deep crisis of national identity, and a rising need
for the reconsideration of national self (Gudkov 2006;Malinova 2010;Pain 2007;Shlapentokh 2007;
Warhola and Lehning 2007). Anastasia Gorodzeisky, Anya Glikman, and Dina Maskileyson (2015)
suggest that the social climate of Russia in the first decade of twenty-first century, as a society in
search of new national identity borders, has diluted socioeconomic and ideological divergences
among native citizens with regard to attitudes towards immigrants. That is, in contrast to Western
societies characterized by stable political and welfare regimes, in post-socialist Russia negative atti-
tudes toward immigrants are likely to emerge regardless of natives’ socioeconomic status or conserva-
tive ideology. If this is correct, what can explain anti-immigrant attitudes in post-socialist Russia in
particular, and in societies passing through the critical period of the reconsideration of national iden-
tity in general? The present study aims to answer these questions.
We argue here that when the borders of national identity are drawn and redefined, the forces that
drive anti-immigrant attitudes differ for members of the ethnic majority group and for members of
the ethnic minority populations. In what follows, we contend that while anti-immigrant attitudes of
the ethnic majority group rely mostly on perceptions of collective (state) vulnerability, the anti-
immigrant attitudes of ethnic minority groups rely to a greater degree on individuals’ socioeconomic
vulnerability and conservative views and ideologies (i.e., self-interests). At the beginning of the
twenty-first century, the historically multi-ethnic Russian society consisted of a majority ethnic
Russian population (80 percent); the remaining 20 percent represents more than 150 different ethnic
groups (i.e., minority groups). Thus, Russian context provides us with a unique opportunity to de-
velop and empirically test our argument.
In what follows, we first outline the theoretical framework that will guide us; second, discuss the
social context of contemporary Russia, and develop a series of specific hypotheses; third, present an
overview of immigration trends in post-socialist Russia; fourth, present empirical analysis and find-
ings; and finally, conclude and discuss the findings in light of the theoretical framework. By so doing,
we will be in a better position to evaluate the sources of anti-immigrant attitudes among minority
and majority group members in societies undergoing social change and the quest for a redefinition of
national identity.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: SELF-INTERESTS, CONSERVATIVE VIEWS, AND
GROUP POSITION THEORY OF PREJUDICE
There are two established and repeatedly proven—in the context of Western societies—micro-level
sociological explanations for anti-immigrant sentiment. Both refer to individual sociodemographic
characteristics, and are viewed as rather complementary. The first highlights the role of individual
socioeconomic attributes and self-interests, mostly but not exclusively in the economic arena.
According to this explanation, socially and economically vulnerable individuals (the unemployed,
low-income earners, those employed in blue-collar occupations) are more likely to express anti-
immigrant sentiment, because they face higher competition (real or perceived) with out-group mem-
bers for scarce social and economic resources (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996;Esses et al. 2001;
Olzak 1992;Raijman and Semyonov 2004). The second explanation focuses on the role played by
conservative ideologies and views. This explanation argues that the presence of out-group populations
may constitute a threat to the cultural and national homogeneity of the society. Thus, persons who
hold more conservative views and ideologies (e.g., older people, religiously observant individuals, and
those of a right-wing political orientation) tend to embrace stronger negative attitudes toward
(2016) suggests that “social conservativism” tends to increase anti-immigrant attitudes in Russia. Note that “social conservatism”
in the study is measured as attitudes towards gay and lesbian rights; in other words, as attitudes towards another minority group.
At the same time, Bahry (2016) reported that when measured by “conservation” values (following Schwartz’s [1999] theory of
cultural values), conservatism has no impact on attitudes towards immigrants.
2Gorodzeisky and Glikman
immigrants, because they are concerned to a greater degree with the impact that foreigners may exert
on the cultural homogeneity and collective identity of the state (Castles and Miller 2003;Fetzer
2000;Raijman and Semyonov 2004;Schnapper 1994).
Another prominent sociological perspective for understanding the sources of anti-immigrant atti-
tudes is drawn from Herbert Blumer’s (1958) group position theory. This theory emphasizes the col-
lective interests of the dominant group and structural conditions, rather than self-interests and
individuals’ sociodemographic attributes. The approach posits intergroup competition, which leads to
anti-immigrant attitudes, as a zero-sum scenario: them against us (Blumer 1958;Bobo 1999).
Accordingly, majority group members can be expected to express higher levels of prejudice towards
out-group populations when the interests and conditions of their collective are undermined or threat-
ened. A substantial number of studies that depart from Blumer’s group position theory have exam-
ined the effect of objective measures of country-level characteristics (as indicators of structural
threat) on anti-immigrant prejudice, from a cross-country comparative or longitudinal perspectives
(for example, Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009;Quillian 1995;Schlueter and Davidov 2013;
Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006). Results related to the role of these structural conditions
are not as consistent as the results related to the effect of individual-level attributes (described ear-
lier); however, general tendency suggests that the increased size of the out-group population, poor
economic conditions, and the popularity of extreme-right political parties in countries all tend to be
associated with high levels of anti-immigrant attitudes.
According to Lawrence D. Bobo (1999), one of the limitations of this type of studies is that of
reducing Blumer’s group position theory to structural-level objective threat, while the theory under-
scores perceptions of threat. A few studies, which have focused on the majority’s perceptions of struc-
tural conditions regarding a state’s economic, social, and political conditions (as indicators of
collective vulnerability), find a substantial effect of these perceptions on attitudes toward migrants
and ethnic minorities.
2
For example, Moshe Semyonov, Rebeca Raijman, and Gorodzeisky (2008)
showed that the perceived (much more than the actual) size of out-group populations tends to
prompt anti-immigrant attitudes in European countries; Jack Citrin and colleagues (1997) found that
in the United States, anti-immigrant attitudes tend to rise in conjunction with pessimism about the
current state of the national economy; and Geoffrey Evans and Ariana Need (2002) demonstrated
that insecurity related to the political efficiency of the state tends to reduce support toward granting
rights to minority populations in Eastern Europe.
An additional significant feature of Blumer’s group position theory (one that has not received
enough attention in the recent research literature) is its emphasis on the importance of specific social
context and historical processes in shaping groups’ collective identities, assessment of interests, and
prejudice (Bobo 1999;Bobo and Hutching 1996). The theory highlights that the sense of group pos-
ition is a product of socially constructed meanings (Bobo 1999); this sense is formed by a running
process in which the dominant group “defines and redefines the ... subordinate group and relations
between them” (Blumer 1958:5), based on major related issues in the public arena.
2 Another line of research, also departing from Blumer’s group position theory, directly examines majority members’ perceptions
of the threat posed by immigrants to the interests of their collective in different spheres (job availability, welfare services, national
identity, etc.) on attitudes toward immigration policy and granting rights to immigrants (Jackson et al. 2001;McLaren 2003;
Raijman and Semynov 2004;Rosenstein 2008;Semyonov, Raijman, and Yom-Tov 2002). However, this research literature is be-
yond the scope of the present study, since the goal of the present research is the investigation of the factors that explain anti-
immigrant attitudes (as a general concept) in the unstable social and political context of societies in search of new national iden-
tity borders, rather than an examination of the complex relationship between different types of such attitudes, namely perceived
threat posed by immigrants and objection to allocation rights to immigrants or attitudes toward immigration policy. At the same
time, it should be noted that one of these studies (Semyonov et al. 2002) suggested that different mechanisms underlie support
for economic discrimination against labor migrants among ethnic minority (Arabs) and ethnic majority (Jews) in Israel. The
study suggested that the endorsement of economic discrimination of labor migrants among ethnic minority can be explained by
the perceived threat immigrants pose to individual’s labor market interests, while among the ethnic majority group, this endorse-
ment seemed to be motivated partially by such threats, but also by degree of national identification and ethnocentric sentiments.
Two Peoples – Two Stories 3
If a threat has a perceived nature, and the sense of group position is dependent on major societal
issues related to the dominant group’s definition of subordinate groups, it is reasonable to suggest
that collective threat (and as a result also individual self-interests) may play divergent roles in shaping
negative attitudes towards “outsiders” among the ethnic majority group as compared to the attitudes
of ethnic minorities (who can also, in turn, be defined by the majority as subordinate “outsiders”).
Indeed, specific social contexts, such as a period of national identity redefinition, may differently af-
fect the importance of perceived collective vulnerabilities and the state’s socioeconomic and political
conditions in the emergence of anti-foreigner attitudes among majority, as compared to minority,
groups. The context of contemporary Russia is especially interesting and relevant for testing this argu-
ment. Thus, in the next section, describing the social context of post-socialist Russia and departing
from the theory of group position, we develop our specific hypotheses for explaining anti-immigrant
attitudes in a society in search of new national identity borders.
CRISIS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND EXPLANATIONS OF ANTI-IMMIGRANT
SENTIMENT
At the beginning of the twenty-first century (a decade after the collapse of Soviet Union), Russia
faced a deep crisis of national identity, one that occurred in the context of tremendous political, eco-
nomic, and state-structural changes. The crisis of national identity and cultural self-determination was
prompted by the need for the reconsideration of the national self, given new geo-political and social
borders (Blakkisrud 2016;Gudkov 2005,2006;Kolsto 2016;Malinova 2010;Pain 2007). The re-
search literature views this social context as fertile ground for the diffusion of anti-foreigner senti-
ment, since in times of crisis and disorganization everyone who does not belong to majority group,
members of religious or ethnic minority groups or immigrants are viewed as a threat to a now precar-
ious social order (Wimmer 1997). A turn in the Kremlin’s rhetoric toward ressentiment—
“nationalism driven by pervasive and strong sense of grievance” (Breslauer 2009:370)—at the second
half of the first decade of the twenty-first century (Breslauer 2009;Richter and Hatch 2013;Smith
2012) intensified the importance of national identity idea and of national solidarity (Blakkisrud
2016). According to Andreas Wimmer (1997), the search for a collective identity, generally, revives
historical myths and beliefs that help to reassert the national self and its boundaries. In Russia, the
search for a new national self led to the restoration of a sense of pride in the Soviet Union’s accom-
plishments, and the re-writing of the Soviet Union’s history in a positive light (Leykin 2015;
Mendelson and Gerber 2008). This process has contributed to the intolerance of “others” in general,
and to hostility towards immigrants—whom have continued to arrive in increasing numbers—in par-
ticular. At the same time, the 2008 economic crisis threatened the sense of economic stability that
some strata of the Russian population had felt during the first years of the twenty-first century. Thus,
negative attitudes towards immigrants in Russia at the turn of the first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury should be understood in light of the critical process of national identity redefinition, accompa-
nied by periods of economic instability and the Kremlin’s nationalistic ressentiment rhetoric.
Departing from Blumer’s group position theory, we suggest that natives’ perceptions of the state’s
economic, political, and social conditions (as indicators of perceived sociopolitical and economic vul-
nerability of the collective) should play a crucial role in explaining anti-immigrant sentiment during
the critical period of national identity formation and extreme importance of national solidarity. If
prejudice is a defensive reaction to a perceived threat to the collective position, then, at the period of
national identity formation, collective interests and vulnerability will become even more important in
shaping natives’ attitudes toward “others.” At the same time, as suggested by Gorodzeisky and col-
leagues (2015), the social climate framing the extreme importance of national solidarity—in which
advocates for foreigners are seen as traitors to such solidarity—may dilute the role of natives’ socioe-
conomic and ideological attributes in shaping their attitudes toward “others.” To sum, a search for
new national identity borders might strengthen the role of perceived collective interests (and/or
4Gorodzeisky and Glikman
threat), but may also weaken the role of self-interests in shaping attitudes toward immigrants in post-
socialist Russia.
However, we claim that the argument formulated above is relevant only for the ethnic majority
group in Russia. The role played by concerns over the state’s economic, social and political position
in prompting anti-immigrant sentiment among ethnic minority populations in Russia seems to be ra-
ther minor. It appears that in Russia in the beginning of twenty-first century, only ethnic Russians, as
a majority ethnic group, were “allowed” to take part in the process of re-building the national identity,
while actually excluding ethnic minorities (native-born population) from the new borders of the col-
lective. Thus, during the first decade of the twenty-first century, despite the multi-ethnic character of
the society, the idea of “Russia for Russians (ethnic Russians
3
)” was supported, in one way or an-
other, by more than half of the native Russian population (Blakkisrud 2016;Gudkov 2006;Pain
2007;Tipaldou and Uba 2014). Moreover, scholars argue that in the recent decades, national identity
in Russia has undergone a fundamental shift from a mainly statist to a mainly ethno-nationalist nature
(Blakkisrud 2016;Kolsto 2016). More specifically, “the national self [has been] redefined from a
predominantly civic understanding based on citizenship and identification with the state to a more
ethnic one, based on Russian language and culture, one in which ethnic Russians take a center stage”
(Blakkisrud 2016:250). In these circumstances, it is reasonable to suggest that collective (state) inter-
ests and vulnerabilities should rather play a secondary role in shaping ethnic minorities’ attitudes to-
ward immigrants. Since ethnic minorities are barely involved in the process of the reconsideration of
the national self, their self-interests and personal socioeconomic vulnerabilities should play a more
important role in explaining anti-immigrant attitudes than their perceptions of collective position and
vulnerability (in terms of state interests).
In sum, we expect that the anti-immigrant attitudes of members of the ethnic majority group
would rely mostly on their perceptions of the state’s economic, welfare, and political insecurity (col-
lective vulnerability), and hardly on their own socioeconomic position and conservative ideologies
(self-interests). By way of contrast, anti-immigrant attitudes of members of ethnic minority groups
would rely on their own socioeconomic position and ideologies (self-interests) to a greater extent
than on their perceptions of the state’s economic, welfare, and political insecurity (collective vulner-
ability). In addition, we expect that the level of anti-immigrant attitudes among the ethnic majority
population would be higher than that among ethnic minorities, since the crisis of national identity
has undermined, primarily, a sense of group position among the ethnic majority (ethnic Russians).
IMMIGRATION TRENDS IN POST-SOCIALIST RUSSIA
Russia has experienced not just massive emigration but also massive immigration since the collapse
of Soviet Union. Consequently, by 2010 the immigrant population as a proportion of the country’s
total population reached 7.8 percent (United Nations 2015).
4
The immigration flow to post-socialist
Russia should be understood in light of the country’s geographical location in the center of Eurasian
space; labor market size and wage levels, which are higher than those of other countries in the area;
and the negative population trends that makes Russia dependent on labor migrant inflow (Iontsev,
Ivakhnyuk, and Soboleva 2009).
While the immigration flow to Russia immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union (between
1991 and 1996) was mostly comprised of ethnic Russian repatriates from former Soviet Union
(FSU) republics, subsequent 1990s immigration flows were characterized by the growth of labor mi-
gration—both documented and undocumented. During the 1997-2000 period, due to a relatively
laissez-faire migration policy and a flourishing domestic economy, Russia became a regional
3 There are two distinct words in the Russian language for “Russians”: one of them, Russkie, refers to Russians as an ethnic group;
and the other, Rossiiane, refers to Russians as citizens of Russia. The slogan “Russia for Russians” (Rossiia dlia Russkikh) explicitly
refers to Russians as ethnic group.
4 This number also includes ethnic Russians who arrived in Russia from the former Soviet Republics.
Two Peoples – Two Stories 5
“migration magnet.” Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova were the main source countries, but labor
migrants also arrived from Central Asia and the Caucasus FSU Republics, as well as from Turkey,
China, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Somalia, and North Korea. The estimated number of immigrants who
had entered Russia by 2000 was 13 million at most (Heleniak 2002;Molodikova 2007;Supyan
2000).
The first years of the twenty-first century, with Vladimir Putin as Russian president, were charac-
terized by a radical turn to a strict migration policy and tight migration control, intended to deal with
illegal immigration and to protect national security. A series of measures, including laws regulating
labor migrant activities, were implemented in order to demonstrate the tough anti-immigration line
of the regime (Molodikova 2007). About 800,000 immigrants arrived in Russia between 2001 and
2005, a third of them from three Central Asian countries: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan
(Chudinovskikh et al. 2010). A rapid decrease of migration flows, from about 2.5 million between
1996-2000 to 800,000 between 2001-2005 (Chudinovskikh et al. 2010), alongside a demographic cri-
sis, led to a dramatic shortfall in the labor force of the country. As a result, in the following years the
Russian government again shifted its migration policy, this time from prohibition and control to legal-
ization and liberalization of access to the labor market for migrants from the Commonwealth of
Independent States (Chudinovskikh et al. 2010;Molodikova 2007). More than a million immigrants
arrived in Russia during the 2006-2009 period. The share of labor migrants from Central Asian coun-
tries (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) in the total inflow increased, and by 2010 exceeded 50
percent. The main source country beyond the Commonwealth of Independent States was China; the
share of labor migrants from China in the total inflow by the end of the first decade of the twenty-
first century was 12 percent (Chudinovskich et al. 2010).
In general, the share of unskilled migrant workers to Russia had increased throughout the first dec-
ade of the century. Most labor migrants in Russia work in low-skilled manual jobs in the fields of con-
struction, industry, transport, and agriculture, as well as in the retail and domestic service sectors
(Vishnevskiy 2011). It has been estimated that about two-thirds of labor migrants are employed in
the “twilight” economy, and that their average hourly wage is about 40 percent lower than that of the
natives (Lebedeva and Tatarko 2013;Tipaldou and Uba 2014).
Previous studies have shown that public attitudes toward immigrants in Russia are far from wel-
coming (Malinkin 2013;Pain 2007) and significantly more negative than in most other European
countries (Gorodzeisky et al. 2015;Gudkov 2006). While the level of anti-foreigner sentiment is
quite high among the general population, ethnic Russians and Muscovites are consistently more hos-
tile and less tolerant toward immigrants than non-ethnic Russians and residents of other parts of the
country (Alexseev 2010;Bessudnov 2016;Gerber 2014).
DATA, VARIABLES, AND DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW
Data for the present study were obtained from four rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS
2006,2008,2010,2012), which Russia participated in. The data were collected via face-to-face inter-
views from a nationally representative samples (age 15 and above). The analysis reported here was
restricted to respondents who were born in Russia and who held Russian citizenship. The total sam-
ple includes 9,390 respondents: 1,305 belong to ethnic minority groups, and 8,085 are members of
the ethnic majority group (e.g., ethnic Russians). This division of ethnic minority and ethnic majority
groups is based on respondents’ self-definition. The respondents were asked whether they belonged
to a minority ethnic group in Russia. We believe that self-definition is the most suitable operationali-
zation of ethnic minority/majority variable for the purpose of the present research. Appendix Table
A1 includes descriptive statistics for all the variables included in the study for the pooled sample
(four rounds altogether) for ethnic majority and ethnic minorities separately.
The dependent variable anti-immigrant sentiment index was constructed as a mean score of the
responses to three questions regarding respondents’ views on the impact that immigrants exert on
6Gorodzeisky and Glikman
society. The questions were: “Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or
enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?”; “Would you say it is generally bad or
good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?”; and “Is [coun-
try] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?”
Responses were coded according to an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 (most positive impact) to 10
(most negative impact). In the present data, Cronbach’s alphas were .872 for the majority group and
.877 for the minority group.
The descriptive results demonstrate that, in general, members of the majority group, ethnic
Russians, viewed foreigners’ impact on Russia in more negative terms (mean ¼6.45) than members
of ethnic minority groups, non-ethnic Russians (mean ¼5.96). This difference was statistically sig-
nificant (t¼7.99, p¼.00).
The results related to the perceived impact that immigrants exert on each aspect (culture, econ-
omy, and country in general) in each year and for the pooled sample are displayed in Figure 1. The
level of anti-immigrant attitudes in Russia during the period under study was quite high; it decreased
slightly between 2006 and 2008-2010, but had returned to 2006’s level by 2012.
5
As expected, mem-
bers of ethnic majority group consistently expressed negative perceptions of the impact immigrants
exert in each sphere of life—culture, economy, and country in general—and in higher proportions
than ethnic minority members. The difference in the level of anti-immigrant attitudes was especially
pronounced in the cultural realm.
According to the pooled data (2006-2012), members of the ethnic majority group perceived the
impact of foreigners on the cultural realm in more negative terms than their impact on the economic
sphere: 62 percent of ethnic Russians reported that immigrants undermined the cultural life of the
country to some degree, while about 56 percent claimed that immigration was bad for the economy
of the country. In comparison, 50 percent of non-ethnic Russians reported that foreigners
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Ethnic minority Ethnic majority
Figure 1. Anti-immigrant Attitudes: Percent of Respondents Who View Immigrants’ Impact in Negative Terms
(percent of responses from 6 to 10) by Year and in Polled Data Set
Note: The mean differences between ethnic minority and majority groups were found to be statistically signifi-
cant (p<.05) in all items in each year and in pooled data, except perceived impact on economy in 2010.
5 It is interesting to note that according to the Racism and Xenophobia Report, published by the SOVA center in October 2012:
“the main achievement of previous reduction of racist- and neo-Nazi-motivated violence is clearly lost in 2012.” The number of
victims by such violence during summer 2012 was higher than during summer 2011 (Yudlina and Alperovich 2012).
Two Peoples – Two Stories 7
undermined cultural life of Russia and viewed the impact of immigrants on the economy in negative
terms. Both ethnic majority and ethnic minority members expressed the most negative opinions on
immigrants when asked about their general impact on the country (as compared to the impact in spe-
cific spheres): 65 percent of the ethnic majority group, and 56 percent of ethnic minority respond-
ents evaluated the impact of immigrants on Russia in general as negative.
Perceived collective (state) vulnerability was measured by four indicators: the respondent’s level of
dissatisfaction with the (1) country’s present state of economy, (2) way that national government is
doing its job, (3) country’s education system, and (4) country’s health services. Responses were
measured according to an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (highest level of satisfaction) to 10 (highest
level of dissatisfaction). Each one of the four items refers, in a straightforward manner, to respond-
ents’ evaluation of the state’s position in various realms, or in other words, to perceptions of collect-
ive/state vulnerability. Ben-Nun Bloom and colleagues (2015) used the same items (related to
economic situation and health services) as predictors of attitudes toward immigrants in Europe, while
Citrin and colleagues (1997) used respondent’s assessments of the state’s economic condition as a
predictor of anti-immigrant attitudes in the United States. To test whether the four indicators cap-
tured one latent construct, we performed a confirmatory factor analysis on the pooled sample, based
on the moment structural AMOS procedure (Arbuckle 2008). The results are presented in Appendix
Figure A1. The analysis provided sufficient—although not very strong—support for the possibility
that the four indicators belong to one concept. Since bivariate correlations between the indicators
were found to be not very high (between .419 to .667), in the multivariate analysis we applied two
strategies: first, we included in the models each indicator of perceived state vulnerability separately,
and second, we included in the models the perceived state vulnerability index constructed as a mean
value of the four indicators.
The descriptive results (presented in Figure 2) show the level of perceived collective vulnerability
for both ethnic majority and ethnic minority groups is quite similar. There were no statistically signifi-
cant differences between groups in most of the indicators across all four years, and existing differen-
ces did not reveal any trends. The absence of such trends was reflected in the very similar levels of
perceived state’s vulnerability among both the ethnic minority and majority groups in the pooled
data (2006-2012). In general, then, the results demonstrated that dissatisfaction with the condition of
the state in a range of realms was quite widespread among both ethnic Russians and non-ethnic
Russians. Both groups expressed the highest level of dissatisfaction in connection with the country’s
economy situation, and its health services: 62 percent and 65 percent respectively among majority
group members, and 63 percent and 62 percent among minority group members, were dissatisfied,
to some extent, with the country’s condition in these realms. 52 percent of members of both groups
were dissatisfied with the present state of the country’s educational system. By comparison, the level
of dissatisfaction with the national government was lower: 47 percent of both the ethnic minority
and ethnic majority respondents perceived the way government carried out its functions in negative
terms to some degree.
Two main sets of the sociodemographic characteristics of individuals, referring to self-interests and
traditionally used in the research literature as predictors of anti-immigrant attitudes, are included in
the multivariate analysis.
The first set pertains to individuals’ socioeconomic position: education (in years), subjective income
(insufficient versus sufficient), and a series of dummy variables representing labor force position (pro-
fessionals, technicians and managers; clerks and sales; blue-collar; unemployed; not in the labor force,
students).
The second set pertains to individuals’ conservative views and ideologies: level of religiosity (on an
11-point scale), a series of dummy variables representing membership in a religious denomination
(Eastern Orthodox as titular religion, Islam, other religions, and those who do not belong to any reli-
gious confession), and political orientation as a series of dummy variables representing a “particular
political party [the respondent] feels closer to than all the other parties” (United Russia – the ruling
8Gorodzeisky and Glikman
party; CPRF – Communist Party of Russian Federation; LDPR – Liberal Democratic Party of
Russia; Rodina/Motherland or Fair Russia; other parties; and no party). It is worth noting that
Eastern Orthodox identity in post-socialist Russia is a sign of cultural rather than religious identity, as
“Eastern Orthodox” does not necessarily hold a theological meaning (Warhola and Lehning 2007). It
was suggested earlier that in the context of religious resurgence and the collective identification crisis,
deliberate self-identification with a titular religious denomination in post-socialist Russia may reflect
conservative views related to national identity and culture (Gorodzeisky et al. 2015). As to the meas-
ure of political orientation, the division of political orientation into “right” and “left,” as used in re-
search in Western countries to capture conservative ideologies, cannot be applied in the Russian
context. Initially, in post-socialist Russia, the idea of Russian nationalism was less widespread among
Russian defenders of the liberal economy associated with the political right. Furthermore, previous re-
search has demonstrated that the traditional divisions of political “right” and “left” had lost its mean-
ing in Russia by the beginning of the twenty-first century (Gorodzeisky et al. 2015;Pain 2007). Due
to the above-mentioned reasons, we used “a party respondent feels closer” instead of “right-left” scale
to capture conservative political ideologies related to nationalism. The LDPR, Rodina/Motherland,
and Fair Russia are parties that express such nationalist (what is called in Western countries “far
right”) ideologies.
Additionally, the models include the following sociodemographic variables (referring to self-
interests): age, gender, rural versus urban place of residence, and perception of neighborhood safety.
In the immigration research literature, older age and rural residence are usually associated with more
conservative views, and, thus, higher level of anti-immigrant attitudes. Perception of neighborhood
safety allowed for taking into account the criminal threat often associated with the presence of immi-
grants (Ceobanu 2011;Ivleva 2009) as an additional source of anti-immigrant attitudes.
The descriptive statistics results (presented in Appendix Table A1) demonstrate some differences
in sociodemographic composition of ethnic minority and ethnic majority groups, mostly related to
residential patterns and religiosity. Specifically, a much higher percentage of ethnic minority members
(43.7 percent) lived in rural areas, as compared to ethnic majority members (21.4 percent). Forty-six
percent of ethnic majority group members, as compared to 33.8 percent of ethnic minority members,
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Ethnic minority Ethnic majority
Figure 2. Perceived Collective Vulnerability: Percent of Respondents Who are Dissatisfied With ... (percent of
responses from 6 to 10) by Year and in Polled Data Set
Note: The mean differences between ethnic minority and majority groups were found to be statistically signifi-
cant only for economy in 2006, education in 2010, health in 2010 and 2012, and pooled data.
Two Peoples – Two Stories 9
did not belong to any religious denomination. Almost half of ethnic majority group, and a fifth of the
ethnic minority group members, considered themselves as Eastern Orthodox, while 41.6 percent of
ethnic minority group members belonged to Islam as compared to one-half of one percent of ethnic
majority members. Regardless of religious denomination, the ethnic minority population tended to
be more religious than the ethnic majority population. A somewhat higher share of the ethnic minor-
ity population (61.5 percent) reported insufficient household income, as compared to 56.7 percent of
the ethnic majority population. In terms of level of educational achievement, labor market position,
and political orientation, ethnic Russians and non-ethnic Russians were quite similar. In the multivari-
ate analysis that follows, we examine whether the above-mentioned differences in sociodemographic
composition may explain the differences in the level of anti-immigrant attitudes between the ethnic
minority and majority populations.
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
In order to examine whether, and to what extent, self-interests and perceived collective vulnerability
affect anti-immigrant attitudes among ethnic majority versus ethnic minority populations, we esti-
mated three series of linear regression models: first, for ethnic majority; second, for ethnic minority;
and third, for the total population. All models presented in Table 1 and 2are estimated on the pooled
data and include year of survey for control purposes. Model 1 (for ethnic majority and for ethnic mi-
nority groups) includes sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender, rural versus urban residential
area, and perception of neighborhood safety), indicators of socioeconomic position, and conservative
views and ideologies (as proxies of self-interests). Model 1 for the total population also includes an
ethnic minority status dummy variable. To Models 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d (for ethnic majority and for ethnic
minority groups), we added an indicator of perceived collective (state) vulnerability in the areas of
economy, government functioning, educational system and health services, respectively. In order to
test whether the size of perceived vulnerability effect varies between ethnic majority and ethnic minor-
ity population, Models 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d for the total population also include interaction terms between
respective indicator of perceived vulnerability and ethnic minority status (as well as minority status it-
self). In Model 2 (for ethnic majority, for ethnic minority, and for the total population), an indicator
of collective vulnerability in one realm is replaced with perceived collective vulnerability index.
This strategy allowed us to estimate whether self-interests and perceived collective vulnerability
exerted a net effect on anti-immigrant attitudes, to compare the explanatory power of the two sources,
and the effect size of perceived collective vulnerability between majority (ethnic Russian) and minority
(non-ethnic Russian) populations. We did so, examining perceived collective vulnerability, first, in each
realm separately, and second as general concept. To streamline the presentation of plenteous results
and for the sake of brevity, in Table 1 we present all regression coefficients from Model 1 and Model 2;
in Table 2 we display only the coefficients for “ethnic minority,” an indicator of “perceived vulnerability”
in the respective realms and an interaction term between them from Models 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d.
We first discuss results related to the explanatory power of the models, and then proceed to inter-
pretations of the regression coefficients. The results presented in Table 1 (Model 1) and Table 2
(Models 2a-2d) reveal that each indicator of the perceived state’s vulnerability explained a bigger
share of the variance in anti-immigrant attitudes among ethnic Russians than the entire set of charac-
teristics related to self-interests included in the study (as implied by Rsquare and changes in R
square). Specifically, the explanatory power of each indicator of collective vulnerability was almost
twice as high as the explanatory power of socioeconomic position, conservative views and sociodemo-
graphic characteristics altogether. For example, 7.6 percent, 6.6 percent, 6.6 percent and 5.6 percent
of the variance of ethnic majority anti-immigrant attitudes were explained by a perceived vulnerability
related to economic conditions, government work, education system, and health services, respect-
ively, as compared to the 3.6 percent variance that was explained by all indicators of socioeconomic
position, conservative views and sociodemographic characteristics. The results related to the
10 Gorodzeisky and Glikman
Table 1. Regression Coefficients (S.E) for Predicting Anti-immigrant Attitudes Among Ethnic Majority, Ethnic Minority, and Total Population
in Russia
Model 1 Model 2
Majority Minority Total Majority Minority Total
Constant 6.56* (.21) 6.65* (.46) 6.62* (.19) 4.78* (.20) 5.95* (.46) 4.86* (.19)
Men .01 (.06) .38* (.13) .06 (.05) .02 (.05) .34* (.13) .08 (.05)
Age .00 (.00) .01* (.00) .01* (.00) .00 (.00) .01* (.00) .00 (.00)
Rural residence .10 (.06) .05 (.13) .10 (.06) .03 (.06) .11 (.13) .05 (.05)
Unsafe neighborhood .21* (.05) .24 (.13) .22* (.05) .16* (.05) .22 (.13) .17* (.05)
Education .03* (.01) .03 (.02) .03* (.01) .05* (.01) .06* (.02) .05* (.01)
Insufficient income .33* (.05) .23 (.13) .31* (.05) .10* (.05) .02 (.13) .08 (.05)
Labor force position
(reference category: blue color occupations)
Professionals, technicians, and managers .17* (.09) .15 (.21) .17* (.08) .09 (.08) .06 (.21) .08 (.08)
Clerks, sales and services workers .02 (.09) .10 (.23) .04 (.09) .07 (.09) .14 (.22) .09 (.08)
Unemployed .05 (.14) .28 (.29) .01 (.12) .06 (.13) .25 (.29) .00 (.12)
Not in the labor force .04 (.09) .47* (.20) .12 (.08) .09 (.08) .39* (.19) .00 (.08)
Students .44* (.11) .31 (.25) .41* (.10) .15 (.10) .20 (.24) .16 (.09)
Religious denomination
(reference category: no denomination)
Eastern Orthodox .20* (.06) .21 (.19) .21* (.06) .17* (.06) .21 (.18) .18* (.06)
Islam .66 (.37) .09 (.17) .23 (.12) .91* (.34) .14 (.17) .37* (.11)
Other religion .52 (.27) .31 (.39) .25 (.22) .26 (.25) .31 (.38) .08 (.21)
Level of religiosity .07* (.01) .12* (.03) .08* (.10) .04* (.01) .11* (.03) .05* (.01)
Party respondent feels closer to
(reference category: United Russia)
CPRF .28* (.11) .36 (.20) .17 (.10) .11 (.10) .63* (.24) .20* (.09)
LDPR .85* (.13) .13 (.35) .73* (.12) .50* (.12) .25 (.34) .42* (.12)
Rodina/Fair Russia .56* (.20) .08 (.47) .44* (.18) .20 (.19) .11 (.46) .10 (.17)
No party .20* (.06) .08 (.14) .18* (.06) .03 (.06) .07 (.14) .03 (.05)
(continued)
Two Peoples – Two Stories 11
Table 1. Regression Coefficients (S.E) for Predicting Anti-immigrant Attitudes Among Ethnic Majority, Ethnic Minority, and Total Population
in Russia (continued)
Model 1 Model 2
Majority Minority Total Majority Minority Total
Minority ——.23* (.08) — — .85* (.19)
Perceived state’s vulnerability index — — — .39* (.01) .23* (.03) .39* (.01)
Minority* perceived state’s vulnerability index — ————.17* (.03)
Rsquare change .036 .054 — .102 .032 —
Rsquare .041 .056 .045 .143 .088 .134
Notes: All models include a series of dummy variables representing years of survey, as well as dummy variable for missing cases in “belonging to religious denomination” variable and for “other parties or no response” category in
“party feels closer to” variable (the coefficients are not presented). Rsquare change in Model 1 refers to the model that includes only year controls, Rsquare change in Models 2 refer to Model 1.
*p<.05 (two-tailed tests)
12 Gorodzeisky and Glikman
Table 2. Regression Coefficients (S.E) for Predicting Anti-immigrant Attitudes Among Ethnic Majority, Ethnic Minority, and Total Population in
Russia
Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c Model 2d
Majority Minority Total Majority Minority Total Majority Minority Total Majority Minority Total
Constant 5.17* (.21) 5.81* (.47) 5.19* (.19) 5.56* (.20) 6.20* (.46) 5.62* (.19) 5.56* (.20) 6.43* (.47) 5.56* (.19) 5.39* (.21) 6.29* (.46) 5.47* (.19)
Minority – – .46* (.18) – – .35* (.15) – – .87* (.16) – – .48* (.17)
Perceived state’s
vulnerability regarding
Economic
conditions
.28* (.01) .21* (.03) .29* (.01) – – – – – – – – –
Government work – – – .24* (.01) .15* (.02) .24* (.01) – – – – – –
Educational system – – – – – – .24* (.01) .08* (.02) .24* (.01) – – –
Health services – – – – – – – – – .23* (.01) .14* (.03) .23* (.01)
Minority*economic
conditions
––.11* (.03) – – – – – – – – –
Minority*government
work
–––––.11* (.02) – – – – – –
Minority*educational
system
––––––––.19* (.02) – – –
Minority* health
services
–––––––––––.11*(.02)
Rsquare change .076 .037 – .066 .026 —.066 .007 – .056 .018 –
Rsquare .117 .093 .115 .107 .082 .104 .107 .063 .102 .097 .074 .094
Notes: All models include sociodemographic characteristics, indicators of socioeconomic position, and conservative views and ideologies (same variables that are included in Model 1), and a series of dummy variables repre-
senting years of survey (the coefficients are not presented). Rsquare change in all models refers to Model 1.
*p<.05 (two-tailed tests)
Two Peoples – Two Stories 13
explanatory power of the models among the ethnic minority group mirrored the results among the
majority group. The share of the variance in ethnic minority anti-immigrant attitudes explained by set
of the variables related to self-interests (5.4 percent) was substantially higher than that explained by
each indicator of the perceived state’s vulnerability (3.7 percent, 2.6 percent, .7 percent and 1.8 per-
cent by perceived vulnerability related to economic conditions, government work, educational sys-
tem, and health services, respectively).
The differences in the explanatory power of the indicators of self-interests and perceived collective
vulnerability between ethnic minority and ethnic majority populations were very consistent and sub-
stantially bigger in models estimated for each year separately (presented in Appendix Table A2). In
each year, the explanatory power of self-interest indicators was found to be higher in the models for
ethnic minorities (ranging between 10.8 to 18.4 percent) than for ethnic majority (ranging between
3.8 to 7.8 percent), while the explanatory power of perceived collective threat indicators was much
higher in the models for the ethnic majority than for ethnic minorities.
Returning to the pooled data, the results of Model 2 in Table 1 demonstrated that the index of
perceived state vulnerability (calculated as a mean value of four indicators) added 10.2 percent to the
explained variance of anti-immigrant attitudes among the ethnic majority population as compared to
only 3.2 percent among the ethnic minority population.
Altogether, these results are in line with our theoretical expectations, suggesting that in contem-
porary Russia perceptions of collective vulnerability play a more important role in explaining anti-
immigrant attitudes among the ethnic majority group than among the ethnic minority groups. At the
same time, self-interests are more influential in explaining anti-immigrant attitudes among the ethnic
minority groups than among the majority group.
6
We now turn to the discussion of the regression coefficients (presented in Table 1). The results
presented in Model 1 reveal that higher educated ethnic Russians tended to perceive immigrants in
slightly less negative terms, as implied by a negative and statistically significant coefficient of years of
education (b¼.03). However, the size of the effect was extremely small. In terms of standardized
coefficient, a change in years of education by one standard deviation tended to be associated with an
average change in the level of anti-immigrant attitudes by only a .04 standard deviation. The effect of
subjective income was also in the expected direction, with ethnic Russians reporting insufficient in-
come expressing higher levels of anti-immigrant attitudes. Likewise, respondents employed in white-
collar occupations and students expressed views that were more tolerant than those employed in
blue-collar jobs. The results also revealed that negative perceptions of foreigners were more pro-
nounced among respondents who belonged to the Eastern Orthodox confession (titular religion in
Russia), in comparison to those who did not see themselves as belonging to any religious denomin-
ation (b¼.20). The degree of religiosity exerted a statistically significant effect, negative but marginal
in size, on anti-immigrant sentiment. With regard to the effect of political orientation (reflected by
“party respondent feels closer to”), the results obtained in Model 1 revealed that ethnic Russians who
felt closer to the United Russia (the ruling centrist party) expressed less negative views than all
others. The results regarding the effects of socioeconomic position and conservative views should be
6 An anonymous reviewer suggested that to make our results more convincing, we should present the same analysis but in connec-
tion with a country not undergoing a process of reconsideration of national identity. Unfortunately, we could not replicate the
same analysis with a Western European country using ESS data, because the number of respondents who defined themselves as
ethnic minority but who were not immigrants, or the sons or daughters of immigrants, in these countries’ samples was quite
small. However, we estimated comparable models for the ethnic majority population in four Western European countries and
Russia, using pooled data for four years. The first model in this analysis includes sociodemographic characteristics and socioeco-
nomic position (we did not include either the religiosity or the party closeness indicators, to make the models strictly comparable
across countries). To the second model, we add perceived state vulnerability index (mean values of four indicators). In Russia,
among the ethnic majority population, sociodemographic characteristics together with socioeconomic position explained a much
lower proportion of anti-immigrant attitudes’ variance than perceived collective vulnerability; however, in the four Western coun-
tries we examined, the picture was opposite. The explanatory power of sociodemographic characteristics, together with socioeco-
nomic position was much higher than that of perceived state’s vulnerability. For results, see Table A3 in the Appendix.
14 Gorodzeisky and Glikman
interpreted in the light of the very low explanatory power of these indicators in predicting anti-
immigrant attitudes among ethnic Russians.
Model 1 for the ethnic minority population reveals that non-ethnic Russian men tended to express
less negative views toward immigrants than women. As expected, the level of anti-immigrant senti-
ments was more likely to rise with age (b¼.01). At the same time, education did not exert any statis-
tically significant effect on anti-immigrant attitudes among non-ethnic Russians in Model 1, but it did
exert an effect, statistically significant and consistent in size, in all other models. The results also dem-
onstrated that ethnic minority members who were not in the labor force expressed less negative views
than those employed in blue-collar occupations. Controlling for religious denomination, the level of
religiosity exerted a statistically significant effect, negative and quite substantial in size (b¼.12),
on anti-immigrant attitudes among non-ethnic Russians. The higher the level of religiosity among
non-ethnic Russians, the lower their level of negative attitudes towards immigrants.
As evident from the results presented in Model 1 for the total population, ethnic minority status
exerted a negative effect on the level of anti-immigrant attitudes. Taking into account differences in
the sociodemographic characteristics, socioeconomic position, and conservative views, members of
ethnic minority groups were still less likely to express anti-immigrant attitudes than members of the
ethnic majority group (as implied by statistically significant coefficient b¼.23).
The results of Models 2a through 2d (presented in Table 2) reveal that perceived state vulnerabil-
ity in every realm (i.e., economy situation, government functioning, educational system, and health
services) tended to increase the level of anti-immigrant attitudes among ethnic Russians, as implied
by the statistically significant and positive coefficients for each indicator. The higher the level of dis-
satisfaction with the present economy situation (Model 2a), government functioning (Model 2b),
educational system (Model 2c), and health services (Model 2d) among majority group members, the
higher their level of anti-immigrant attitudes (b¼.28, b¼.24, b¼.24, and b¼.23, respectively).
The perceived state vulnerability in each one of the four realms tended to increase the level of anti-
immigrant attitudes also among non-ethnic Russians (minority population); however, it did so to a
lower extent (as implied by the smaller size of the respective coefficients in Models 2a-2d for ethnic
minority: b¼.21, b¼.15, b¼.08, and b¼.14). The negative and statistically significant interaction
terms between ethnic minority status and each indicator of perceived collective vulnerability (in
Models 2a-2d for the total population) demonstrate that the perceived state vulnerability in each
sphere, indeed, affected ethnic majority anti-immigrant attitudes to a greater degree than ethnic mi-
nority anti-immigrant attitudes. Consequently, in Model 2 (Table 1) the effect of the perceived col-
lective (state) vulnerability index was found to be bigger on anti-immigrant attitudes among ethnic
Russians (b¼.39) than on such attitudes among non-ethnic Russians (b¼.23). Statistically signifi-
cant and negative interaction term between ethnic minority status and the index of perceived collect-
ive (state) vulnerability (b¼.17) in Model 2 (for the total population) affirms the expectation that
the perceived collective vulnerability exerts a stronger impact on the anti-immigrant attitudes of eth-
nic majority members than on the anti-immigrant attitudes of the ethnic minority population.
Moreover, comparison of the results of Models 1 and 2 (for the ethnic majority population) dem-
onstrate that perceived collective (state) vulnerability meaningfully intertwines into the relationship
between self-interests (as captured by socioeconomic position) and anti-immigrant attitudes among
the ethnic majority population (ethnic Russians). Once the perceived collective vulnerability of ethnic
Russians is taken into account, the differences in anti-immigrant attitudes between persons with suffi-
cient and insufficient income became much smaller (the coefficients decreased by a factor of three),
while the difference between white-collar workers and blue-collar workers and between students and
blue-collar workers became statistically insignificant.
The inclusion of the perceived state vulnerability index in the model for the ethnic majority group
also changed the coefficients related to the effect of political orientation (Table 1). Once the level of
the perceived state’s vulnerability is included, most differences in the level of anti-immigrant views be-
tween ethnic Russians who felt closer to United Russia (the ruling party) and those who felt closer to
Two Peoples – Two Stories 15
other parties, or had no party which they felt close to, disappeared. However, ethnic Russians who
felt closer to LDPR (rather nationalist party) still expressed higher level of anti-immigrant attitudes
than those who felt closer to the ruling party, although the size of the effect decreased.
In contrast, among ethnic minority members, the inclusion of the perceived state’s vulnerability
index into the model uncovered differences between those who felt closer to the Communist party
and those who felt closer to United Russia (these differences had not been evident in the model with-
out perceived state’s vulnerability). It would seem that among ethnic minority members with the
same level of perceived state vulnerability, those who felt closer to the Communist party tended to
be more tolerant toward immigrants than those who felt closer to United Russia (the ruling party).
The inclusion of perceived vulnerability index has not lead to any other meaningful changes in the
coefficients of the models for ethnic minority population.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we contend that in societies undergoing a search for new national identity borders, the
forces that drive anti-immigrant attitudes differ meaningfully for members of the ethnic majority group
and for members of the ethnic minority population. Specifically, we argue that in the critical period of
national identity redefinition, the anti-immigrant attitudes of ethnic majority group rely mostly on per-
ceptions of collective (state) vulnerability, while the anti-immigrant attitudes of ethnic minority groups
rely to a greater degree on individuals’ vulnerable socioeconomic position, and on their conservative
views and ideologies (i.e., self-interests). We tested this theoretical argument empirically in the context
of the historically multi-ethnic society of Russia at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
Descriptive data reveal that the level of anti-immigrant attitudes among the majority population
(ethnic Russians) is higher than among ethnic minorities (non-ethnic Russians). Previous research in
Russia (Alexseev 2010) found comparable differences in anti-immigrant attitudes between ethnic and
non-ethnic Russians. Our findings also demonstrate that differences in the level of anti-immigrant
attitudes among majority and minority populations are especially pronounced with regard to percep-
tions of the impact of immigrants on the cultural realm. These results are in line with theoretical
expectations because the crisis of national identity in post-socialist Russia has undermined, primarily,
a sense of group position of ethnic majority.
The multivariate analysis demonstrates that in post-socialist Russia, sociodemographic characteristics,
socioeconomic position and conservative views explain a lower share of the variance in anti-immigrant atti-
tudes among ethnic majority population than among ethnic minority population. At the same time, and
strongly in line with our theoretical argument, the results demonstrate that in contemporary Russian soci-
ety, perceptions of state/collective vulnerability play a more important role in explaining anti-immigrant
attitudes among the ethnic majority than among ethnic minority. Dissatisfaction with the state’s conditions
in each one of four realms—economy, government functioning, educational system, and health services—
and as mutual concept tends to increase anti-immigrant attitudes among ethnic Russians to a larger degree
than among non-ethnic Russians. Moreover, perceived state/collective vulnerability possesses a substan-
tially higher explanatory power for predicting anti-immigrant attitudes among the ethnic majority than
among ethnic minority populations.
The present study highlights the importance of two focal features of Blumer’s group position
theory—the perceived nature of group threat, and the importance of specific historical context. The lat-
ter has received little attention in recent research. The results of our study demonstrate that these fea-
tures cannot be ignored, especially while testing Blumer’s theory in relatively “new” and understudied
social contexts. Since group position—and as a consequence, group threat—can be perceived and
defined differently by ethnic majority and minority populations, dependent on specific societal and
historical processes, attitudes toward foreigners among majority and minority groups may be driven
by different mechanisms. Indeed, our study suggests that when the borders of national identity are
redefined and nationalistic ressentiment rhetoric is sounded, perceived collective/state threat
16 Gorodzeisky and Glikman
becomes a more prominent source of anti-foreigner sentiment than individual self-interests (e.g., soci-
oeconomic position, conservative ideologies) among the ethnic majority population; self-interests,
however, still plays a more important role in prompting anti-foreign attitudes among ethnic minor-
ities, whom are rarely “included” in the process of the re-building of national identity.
As a future line of research, it would be interesting to test our theoretical argument in other soci-
eties with certain degrees of similarity in social context, namely societies negotiating the critical
period of national identity redefinition, accompanied (to some extent) by nationalistic rhetoric.
Serbia, for example, matches this context.
7
The processes of reasserting of the national self (after the
break-up of the former Yugoslavia along national lines) via nationalist mobilization and the rhetoric
of ressentiment are quite pronounced in this country (e.g., Subotic 2011;Todosijevic 2008).
APPENDIX
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics, Mean/Percent (weighted)
Ethnic Majority Ethnic Minority
Men (%) 41.4 41.6
Age 44.22 42.11
Rural residence (%) 21.4 43.7
Feeling unsafe in the neighborhood (%) 42.6 32.5
Years of education (%) 12.48 12.41
Insufficient income (%) 56.7 61.5
Labor force position
Professions, technicians, managers (%) 22.2 19.7
Clerks, sales, and services workers (%) 13.2 13.4
Blue color workers (%) 19.4 17.2
Unemployed (%) 4.1 5.5
Not in the labor force (%) 30.4 32.5
Students (%) 10.7 11.7
Religious denomination
Eastern Orthodox (%) 49.8 20.1
Islam (%) .5 41.6
Other religion (%) .9 2.6
No denomination (%) 46.1 33.8
No answer (%) 2.7 1.9
Level of religiosity (0-10) 4.29 5.18
Party respondent feels close to ...
United Russia (ruling party) (%) 24.6 25.6
CPRF (Communist Party of Russian Federation) (%) 7.6 7.9
LDPR (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) (%) 4.5 3.4
Rodina/Motherland or Fair Russia (%) 1.8 1.7
No party (%) 59.2 59.3
Other party or missing (%) 2.3 2.1
Perceived collective/state vulnerability index 6.04 5.93
Anti-immigrant sentiment index 6.45 5.96
N8,085 1,305
7 Unfortunately, Serbia has not taken part in the European Social Survey to date.
Two Peoples – Two Stories 17
Table A2. Models Summary for Predicting Anti-immigrant Attitudes Among Ethnic Majority and Ethnic Minority in Russia by Year
Ethnic Majority Ethnic Minority
R
2
R
2
Change Sig. F Change R
2
R
2
Change Sig. F Change
2006
Model 1: socioeconomic position, conservative views, and sociodemographic characteristics .078 ––.140 ––
Models 2: Model 1 þperceived state’s vulnerability regarding
Model 2a: Model 1 þeconomic conditions .124 .046 .00 .143 .003 .29
Model 2b: Model 1 þgovernment work .120 .041 .00 .141 .001 .49
Model 2c: Model 1 þeducational system .130 .052 .00 .145 .005 .17
Model 2d: Model 1 þhealth services .126 .048 .00 .142 .002 .41
2008
Model 1: socioeconomic position, conservative views, and sociodemographic characteristics .038 ––.108 ––
Models 2: Model 1 þperceived state’s vulnerability regarding
Model 2a: Model 1 þeconomic conditions .111 .073 .00 .141 .033 .00
Model 2b: Model 1 þgovernment work .103 .065 .00 .150 .042 .00
Model 2c: Model 1 þeducational system .090 .052 .00 .110 .002 .36
Model 2d: Model 1 þhealth services .080 .041 .00 .110 .002 .35
2010
Model 1: socioeconomic position, conservative views, and sociodemographic characteristics .040 ––.131 ––
Models 2: Model 1 þperceived state’s vulnerability regarding
Model 2a: Model 1 þeconomic conditions .127 .087 .00 .228 .097 .00
Model 2b: Model 1 þgovernment work .117 .077 .00 .164 .033 .00
Model 2c: Model 1 þeducational system .110 .070 .00 .174 .043 .00
Model 2d: Model 1 þhealth services .103 .064 .00 .189 .058 .00
2012
Model 1: socioeconomic position, conservative views, sociodemographic characteristics .057 ––.184 ––
Models 2: Model 1 þperceived state’s vulnerability regarding
Model 2a: Model 1 þeconomic conditions .158 .101 .00 .230 .046 .00
Model 2b: Model 1 þgovernment work .141 .084 .00 .236 .052 .00
Model 2c: Model 1 þeducational system .144 .087 .00 .233 .049 .00
Model 2d: Model 1 þhealth services .130 .073 .00 .239 .054 .00
18 Gorodzeisky and Glikman
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Table A3. Models Summary for Predicting Anti-immigrant Attitudes Among Ethnic
Majority by Country
R Square Model 1
a
R Square Model 2
b
R Square Change
Germany .179 .221 .041
France .196 .222 .026
Netherlands .118 .175 .057
Sweden .166 .195 .030
Russia .028 .137 .110
a
Model 1: socioeconomic position and sociodemographic characteristics
b
Model 2: Model 1 þperceived state’s vulnerability index
Figure A1: Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Perceived State Vulnerability
Note: To fit the model, correlation between e1 and e2 was allowed.
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