Content uploaded by Leon T Goldsmith
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Leon T Goldsmith on Aug 15, 2017
Content may be subject to copyright.
1
Abstract
In 1866 geographer A.F. Foster wrote of the Arabs that there are two types: “the
Bedoweens [sic], who wander about the deserts with their cattle, living in tents…and
the stationary Arabs, who live in towns and villages.”1 A century and a half later, is
our understanding of the sheer complexity of the Arab world significantly better? The
Levant region is highly diverse in both human and physical forms. Thus, political
geography should be a key method of analysing this region. Despite this there remains
a deficit of academic attention being paid to the communities of the Levant, relating
to their spatial, social and political setting.
The author has observed an inclination to consider the Syrian Arab Republic in
monolithic terms, and largely according to the characteristics of its ruling regime. For
example, prominent Middle Eastern expert Professor Barry Rubin stated in June 2007:
“to understand Syria – like other regional forces - one must examine the nature of the
regime…”2 This approach, while useful in terms of appraising short term foreign
policy, will not help scholars really understand Syria with its complex and
longstanding sectarian geopolitics.
This research seeks to draw out one element of the sectarian mosaic of Levant, the
Alawite community of Syria. The Alawites are widely accused of ‘hijacking’ the
Syrian State and maintaining the reins of power ruthlessly in spite of a significant
Sunni Arab majority, but who are the Alawites? Where do they come from? What do
they believe? And what is their spatial and social position in Syrian Society? This
dissertation analyses the past and current geopolitical situation of the Alawites and to
give a glimpse for their future.
1 Foster, A.F., (1866), A Popular Geography, Frederick Warne and Co., London, p.148.
2 Professor Barry Rubin, Interview with Michael J. Totten, June 6th 2007.
2
DECLARATION
I certify that this dissertation does not incorporate without acknowledgement any
material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that to
the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously
published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.
Signed: Date:
3
Table of Contents
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................... 1
DECLARATION ............................................................................................................................... 2
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................................................................... 4
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 5
CHAPTER SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................. 7
1. CONSTRUCTING THE ALAWITES ............................................................................................ 10
THE ‘ALAWI MOUNTAINS ................................................................................................................... 10
THE ORIGINS OF THE ALAWITE SECT. ............................................................................................... 14
THE FAITH OF THE ALAWITE SECT.................................................................................................... 17
ALAWITE CULTURAL TRAITS .............................................................................................................. 21
CHAPTER ONE OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................. 24
2. HOLDING OUT ABOVE THE CROSSROADS .......................................................................... 10
SUNNI REGIONAL DOMINATION. ........................................................................................................ 25
THE OTTOMANS IN THE LEVANT ........................................................................................................ 27
THE FRENCH MANDATE .................................................................................................................... 29
CHAPTER TWO OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................. 35
3. THE ALAWITES AND THE SYRIAN STATE ............................................................................ 37
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE ....................................................................................................... 38
THE ALAWITES IN THE MILITARY ...................................................................................................... 40
SUNNI FACTIONALISM ....................................................................................................................... 42
THE MILITARY COMMITTEE .............................................................................................................. 43
CHAPTER THREE OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................. 44
4. THE ALAWITES AND THE ASADS ............................................................................................ 45
AN ALAWITE IN DAMASCUS: THE ASAD SYSTEM ............................................................................... 45
MAINTAINING THE ASAD SYSTEM ...................................................................................................... 47
THE SPATIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC POSITION OF THE ALAWITES IN MODERN SYRIA ...................... 49
ANOTHER ALAWITE RULES DAMASCUS ............................................................................................. 53
CHAPTER FOUR OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................... 55
CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................... 57
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................. 59
4
Acknowledgments
This dissertation has been completed with the valued assistance of three of people. I
am grateful to my supervisor, Professor William Harris for his generosity with his
time, and his insightful knowledge of the subject matter. His enthusiasm for the
political geography of the Levant has inspired my own. In addition I would be remiss
in not thanking Sarah Byrne for patient support, not to mention her analytical and
technical advice, and my mother for her suggestions on logic and grammar.
5
Introduction
“It is not unreasonable to think that the mosaic will dissolve itself in bloodshed.”
-Xavier De Planhol, 19973
From the 1960s onwards, the real identity of the Alawite community of North-West
Syria has steadily receded from view. Already a historically reclusive and secretive
community, the policies of the Syrian regime in suppressing sectarian discourse make
defining the Alawite community quite inexplicable. It is under these circumstances
that we set ourselves the difficult task of ‘unearthing’ the Alawites. Aside from the
widely discussed Alawites in the Syrian regime, what is the geopolitical situation of
the broader Alawite community? By looking at the physical characteristics of their
mountain, their origins, religion, cultural traits, and their past geopolitical situation, it
is hoped to uncover an accurate assessment of their geopolitical situation today, and
make comment on their future prospects.
Albert Hourani wrote in 1946 of the indigenous Syrians aptitude for the “art of rapid
and superficial assimilation, and that of preserving, beneath new modes of behaviour
and in new forms, their old ways of living.”4 This pragmatic and chameleon like
social approach to preserving minorities has been aided in large part by physical
geography, and is especially true for the Alawite community. The identity of the
Alawites crystallised within a hostile social and physical environment has therefore
been imbued with a pragmatic sense of survival. The rise of Hafiz al-Asads regime
represents a disjuncture of the historic geopolitical outlook of the Alawite community.
Moreover, the behaviour of the current Asad regime in Damascus with its narrower
Alawite composition, compromises the geopolitical prospects of the Alawite
community as a whole.
3 De Planhol, Xavier, (1997) Minorités En Islam, Géographie Politique Et Sociale, Flamarrion, France,
p.409.
4 Hourani, A., (1946)Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay, Oxford University Press, London. cited in
Antoun, R.T., and Quataert, D., (eds), (1991), Syria, Society, Culture, and Polity, State University of
New York Press, Albany, pp.1-2.
6
To begin, a general theoretical discussion of the geography of Middle Eastern
sectarianism is required. Comprehending longstanding geopolitical cleavages in the
Middle East that cut across arbitrary state boundaries is important to shedding light on
causes of conflict in the region. Additionally, there is a need to consider topography,
and its relationship to the distribution and preservation of separate communities in the
region.
The Levant region consists of a diverse mixture of ethnic and religious minorities,
including Alawites, Druze, Jews, Ismaili’s, Shiites, Sunnis, Christians, Kurds,
Armenians and Circassians, to name but a few. This human mosaic coincides with an
equally diverse physical geography, that ranges across coastal mountains, fertile
plains and sandy deserts. The correlation between human diversity and physical
diversity is palpable. The existence of certain groups in certain locations can be
placed squarely at the feet of geography. In this vein, Xavier De Planhol formulated
his hypothesis of the Montagne refugee, whereby persecuted minorities seek refuge in
mountainous locations.5
Geopolitical analysis is vital to understanding the complex mosaic of communities
inhabiting the Levant because, as Fuad Khuri points out, “ethnicity in Arab-Islamic
culture takes the form of religious differentiation or national origin or both
combined…”6 These diverse ethnicities in the Levant comprise a “fractured mosaic”.7
However, they are also multi-layered. Over time the region has periodically been
overlayed with new cultural, ethnic, ideological and religious influences. When the
old is overlayed with the new, an imprint of the old often remains. Geographer
Corbett Held suggests that the Levant has seen a pattern of “successive cultures
…partially erasing and yet partially preserving patterns, creating by this long pattern,
a geographical palimpsest”8 A paradigm could therefore be introduced that views
sectarianism in the Levant as a ‘mosaic-palimpsest’. This paradigm allows us to
consider the nature of a particular sect or minority not only through analysis of its
5 De Planhol, Xavier, (1957) The World of Islam, Cornell University Press, London, p.
6 Khuri, Fuad, I., ‘The ‘Alawis of Syria: Religious Ideology and Organisation’; Antoun, R.T., and
Quataert, D., (eds), (1991), Syria, Society, Culture, and Polity, State University of New York Press,
Albany, p.49.
7 Harris, William., (2005) The Levant, A Fractured Mosaic, Markus Wiener, Princeton.
8 Held, Colbert, C., (2000), Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples, and Politics, Westview Press,
Boulder, Colorado,p.13.
7
geopolitical role as part of a mosaic of diverse communities, but also in terms of
remnant influences from preceding periods.
It is evident that where geography has intervened, the imprint of the old remains more
exposed than elsewhere, such as inaccessible mountain regions where the
homogenising effects of incoming dominant forces are somewhat inhibited. Although
regional influences can be resisted due to geography, when aspects of influences are
adopted by a geographically isolated minority, these characteristics become highly
resilient. This is particularly the case for the Alawites, where the geography of their
territorial base has meant that the sect has simultaneously withstood and retained
preceding influences. This explains the eclectic mix of belief systems which are
prevalent amongst the Alawites, for example, the Alawite faith retains elements of
ancient Harranian solar and lunar worship, combined with a belief in
metempsychosis, significant Persian elements, and numerous parallels with
Christianity, all overlayed with [relatively] recent extreme Shiite doctrine.
Another geographic factor incorporated into the analysis of sectarianism is the
comparison between compact minorities and diffuse minorities: compact minorities
being ethnic/religious minorities that occupy a “well defined geographical territory;”
and diffuse minorities being those that are permeated throughout the majority.9
Chapter Summary
This dissertation follows a chronological path from the roots of the Alawite sect up to
present day Syria, mapping the key indicators of Alawite identity and geopolitical
outlook on the way. The first chapter outlines who the Alawites are and where they
come from. This will be done by a description of the physical geography of the
‘Alawi Mountains followed by a historiography of the roots of the Alawite faith. This
chapter will give an appraisal of the ideology, beliefs and with their cultural traits.
of the Alawites.
9 Bengio, Ofra, & Ben –Dor, G. (eds) (1999), Minorities and the State in the Arab World, Lynne
Reiner Publishers, Boulder & London.
8
The second chapter explores how the Alawites have responded to successive waves of
regional domination. The chapter argues that the Alawites have retained a pragmatic
and Realpolitik approach to their external relations. This has been the case whether
resisting the orthodox Sunni Muslims, or coopting and exploiting the policies of the
colonial French. In either example, geography remained a key element in preserving
Alawite identity.
The third chapter traces the rise of certain Alawites in the Ba’th Party and the upper
echelons of the military in modern Syria. The chapter will discuss the rationale behind
the emergence of members of the Alawite community, from their mountain refuge to
the wider Syrian political stage. It will argue that a combination of factors existed that
made possible the unlikely rise of Alawite individuals in the Syrian political arena.
The fourth chapter portrays the rise of the Asads, and the cementing of the primacy of
Alawites in the top echelons of Syrian power. The contention that the Alawites in
Damascus do not represent the Alawite community as a whole is put forward.
The dissertation concludes that the Alawites have pursued a pragmatic geopolitical
approach to their external relations based on the ‘Alawi Mountains as a refuge for
their heterodox beliefs and their unique cultural traits.10 However, the Asad period
represents a disjuncture in this approach.
10 Nisan, Mordechai, (2002), Minorities in the Middle East, A History of Struggle and Self-Expression,
2nd Edition, Mcfarland & Company, Jefferson & London, p.117.
9
Methodology
With limited access to primary sources, and having no personal experience of the
region, the main research tool for this dissertation has been secondary sources.
Analysis of the Alawites through a ‘Mosaic-palimpsest’ paradigm, looking at the
contemporary mosaic but also the historical palimpsest, requires broad research
parameters. Geography, Religious Studies, History and Political Studies are all
surveyed. The works of Hanna Batatu and Eyal Zisser on contemporary Syria have
provided valuable insight into positioning the Alawites within the modern Syrian
state. Colbert Held’s comprehensive geography of the Middle East, Middle East
Patterns, has given information on the physical geography of the region along with
the ‘palimpsest’ concept. Likewise, Xavier De Planhol’s Minorités En Islam, (after
translation from French) has informed my analysis of the Alawite sects’ physical
environment. The historical accounts of Phillip Khoury, Peter Shambrook and Dick
Douwes along with the classic texts on Syria and Lebanon by Albert Hourani, have
informed much of the backgrounding of the Alawites. In terms of Religious Studies,
the most informative has been Matti Moosa and Fuad Khuri with their critical
appraisals of the origins and beliefs of the Nusayri (Alawite) sect.
The possibility of current events coinciding with the construction of this research
means that it is important to remain abreast of contemporary developments. In this
regard online news sources have been useful.
The challenge confronting researchers of geopolitics in the Levant is that a great part
of the literature is proffered by ‘interested’ parties, whether Sunni/Alawite,
Arab/Israeli or apologists/opponents of various political structures. It is therefore
important to constantly evaluate the boundaries between factual description, analysis
of processes and historical interpretation.11 In this I have proceeded to the best of my
ability.
11 Be’eri, E., (1969), Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, Praeger Publishers, New York, p.61.
10
1. Constructing the Alawites
The Alawites are a compact minority from the mountainous region in the northwest of
modern Syria (see map 1.).1 Alawite society is highly eclectic, and contains elements
from the various religions and cultures that have influenced the Levant. The
community is comprised of four main tribes; the Khayyatun, Haddadun, Matawira
and Kalbiyah,who have on the whole maintained a loose confederation.2 The first task
in unearthing the Alawite sect it is to define the physical characteristics of their
territorial base.
Map 1. The Sectarian Geography of The Levant. Source: Leverett, 2005
The ‘Alawi Mountains
The mountain range that has been the territorial base of the Alawite community for
over a thousand years stretches from Mount Lebanon in the south, to a point north of
the Orontes River and Antioch. The range has borne many names; the ancient Syrians
1 Although Leverett’s Map shows the Alawites as a sub-sect of the Shia branch of Islam, this is
contentious as will be discussed below.
2 Van Dam, Nikolaos, (1997), The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and
the Ba’th Party. New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, p.8.
11
called them the Ukomo (Black), the Romans referred to them as Bargylus, and the
Arabs, following from the ancient Syrians, referred to them as Jabal al-Lukam (Black
Mountains).3 From the tenth century AD, and the emergence of the Nusayri faith
among the local population, the range was called Jabal al- yya after the sect
who inhabited them. This was changed to the ‘Alawi Mountains when the Nusayri
sect changed their name around the beginning of the 20th century. Most recently, the
Syrian government has changed the official toponym to Jabal al-Sahiliyah (Coastal
Mountains).4 This most recent name change is synonymous with regime efforts to
downplay sectarian identities. For the purpose of this research, the range will be
referred to as the ‘Alawi Mountains.5
The ‘Alawi Mountains consist of uplifted Jurassic and Cretaceous limestone. Rising
to 1562m6 at their highest point, they are framed to the east by an “impressive fault
with both vertical displacement and a strike slip of some 20 kilometres. The fault is
also the west side of the Ghab graben, the northern end of the Levant rift system”.7
The eastward orientation of this most imposing aspect of the ‘Alawi Mountain range
has been important in terms of inhibiting the penetration of invading forces from the
east. In the North the Ammanus Mountains descend to the sea dramatically, impeding
the coastal passage from the Cilician plain. The main route from the north into Syria
has therefore historically been inland, bypassing the Alawi Mountains.8 To the south,
Alawite territory has been protected by the “complex mass”9 of Mount Lebanon. It is
understandable why Kamal Salibi comments that “this part of northern Syria …was
overshadowed in historical importance by the inland regions of Aleppo, Hama, and
Hims, which controlled important points along the main route north to south.”10
3 Moosa, Matti, (1988), Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects, Syracuse University Press, New York,
p.256.
4 Held, Colbert, C., (2000), Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples, and Politics,, p.242.
5 Note Map 2. labels the ‘Alawi mountains as al-Nusayriya.
6 Ibid, p.242.
7 Ibid, p.242.
8 Salibi, K., (1977), Syria under Islam, Empire on Trial, 634-1097, Caravan Books, Delmar, New
York, p.5.
9 Held, (2000), Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples, and Politics, Westview Press, Boulder,
Colorado, p.242.
10 Salibi, K., (1977), Syria under Islam, Empire on Trial, 634-1097, Caravan Books, Delmar, New
York, p.5.
12
Map 2. The Coastal Mountains of The Levant. Source: Harris, 2003.
To the west of the Alawi Mountains lies a stretch of fertile coastal plain
approximately 10 - 20 km wide. Unfortunately for the Alawites, this strip has
historically been controlled by Sunni landholders who dominated the main port of
Latakia. Those Alawites who did occupy the coastal plain were in most cases
indentured labour to the Sunni landholders. Alawite access to the Mediterranean has
therefore been inhibited by their historical lack of control of the coastal plain. Unlike
the Christian Maronites of Mount Lebanon, who controlled the section of coast
attached to their territorial base, the ‘Alawites territory has been described as an
isolated prison, “surrounded by hostile plainsmen without any possible outlet to the
sea”.11 Thus one could argue, that not only were the ‘Alawi Mountains a source of
protection, but also a physical constraint to their economic and agricultural advance.
The relative stagnation of the Alawites in comparison to the Lebanese Maronites is
partly attributable to the lesser fertility of the Alawite Mountains.12 The mean annual
rainfall for the west facing slopes of the ‘Alawi Mountains is 1400mm, in comparison
11 De Planhol, Xavier, (1957) The World of Islam, Cornell University Press, London, p.83.
12 De Planhol, Xavier, (1997) Minorités En Islam, Géographie Politique Et Sociale, Flamarrion,
France, p.84.
13
with up to 1525mm on Mt Lebanon, which also has extensive aquifers to aid
agriculture.13 Moreover, the calcic rock formations of the Alawi Mountains are highly
porous, meaning that groundwater is not retained.14 The main natural drawback for
the ‘Alawi though, has been lack of access to the sea.
Xavier De Planhol commented in 1957 on the ‘archaic economic’ state of the Alawite
people.15 This perpetual lower socio-economic status proved important after the
independence of the Syrian state in terms of ‘Alawi embracing political reformism.
Moreover, their landlocked position, with limited quality agricultural land and
resources was also a possible consideration in the calculations of the Alawite elite
when faced with the prospect of whether or not to join with the new Syrian State.
The ‘prison like’ nature of the ‘Alawi Mountain may also have contributed to the
compact geographical stature of the sect. 16 The fact that the Alawites were
constrained spatially by the physical characteristics of their mountain has most
definitely been a factor in their historic lack of diffusion throughout Syria. Of great
importance however, has been the perception of the Alawites as despised heretics by
the majority of the orthodox Sunnis occupying the interior and coastal regions.
In summary, the geomorphic features of the Alawi Mountains have provided some
protection from assimilationist and external control, however, the lack of arable soils
has inhibited economic development, while poor access to the sea has imprisoned the
Alawites, culminating in a generally impoverished compact minority.
Having analysed the physical characteristics of the Alawite territory, it is necessary to
uncover the roots of the sect, and the forces that propelled them to remain imprisoned
within this inhospitable mountain refuge.
13 Held, Colbert, C., (2000), Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples, and Politics, Westview Press,
Boulder, Colorado, p.244,268.
14 De Planhol, Xavier, (1997) Minorités En Islam, Géographie Politique Et Sociale, Flamarrion,
France, p.84
15 De Planhol, Xavier, (1957) The World of Islam, Cornell University Press, London, p.83.
16 Weulersse, Jacques, cited in De Planhol, Xavier, (1957) The World of Islam, Cornell University
Press, London, p.84.
14
The Origins of the Alawite Sect.
Pinpointing the origins of the Alawite religious sect is difficult and there is
considerable debate amongst both scholars of Islam and historians on this matter. It is
important to try and clarify this aspect, as the Alawites Islamic credentials, or lack of,
are pivotal to their geo-political legitimacy today. The first point to highlight is that
the sect should technically be referred to as the Nusayri . The name Alawite was
adopted by the sect in 1920 in order to water down their heterodox identity.17 The
term ‘Alawi is synonymous with “all Shiites who follow Ali and believe him to be the
heir and successor of the prophet in leading the Muslim community.”18 The name
therefore is inaccurate nomenclature for a heterodox sect, however, as it is the most
widely accepted and recognised name for the sect we shall persevere with the term.
The Alawite sect derived its original name from Ibn Nusayr,19 who is generally
attributed as the inspiration for the Alawite religion. He declared himself the bab
(“gateway to truth”) in A.D.859,20 and then set about proclaiming a set of doctrines
following on from the earlier ‘Sabbaiyya,’21 which posited Ali Ibn Talib, the son in
law and cousin of Mohammed, as divine. The individual widely accredited as the
actual founder of the Alawite faith is Abu Abd Allah al-Husayn Ibn-Hamdan al-
Khasibi (d.957), who formalized the teachings of Nusayr and “propagate[ed] the
Nusayri religion in all lands.”22Al-Khasibi by most accounts was an active missionary
for the Nusayri religion, and set up religious centres in both Baghdad and Aleppo.23
Khasibi was imprisoned in Baghdad sometime between A.D. 926 and 945 for his
heterodox views.24 Upon his release, Khasibi travelled to the Levant where he is
17 Daniel Pipes claims that the name change was imposed by the French, however this would seem to
conflict with the French policy of encouraging sectarian divisions therefore why would they take such a
step?
18 Moosa, Matti, (1988), Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects, Syracuse University Press, New York,
p.256.
19 Batatu, Hanna, (1999), Syria’s Peasantry, The Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their
Politics, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, p.18.
20 Pipes, Daniel, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford University Press.,
p.159.
21 Followers of Abd Allah Ibn Saba, see: Moosa, p.xvii.
22 Moosa, Matti, (1988), Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects, Syracuse University Press, New York,
p.263.
23 Ibid, p.262. and Batatu, p.18.
24 Friedman, Y., (2001)al-Husayn Ibn Hamdan al-Khasibi: A Historical Biography of the Nusayrî-
Alawite Sect, Studia Islamica, No.93.pp.100-101.
15
purported to have settled in the city of Harrân and established a religious community.
This community is most likely the earliest predecessor of the Alawites. Interestingly,
this community named itself Muwaahhidan (monotheists),25 which suggests that these
early members of the ghulat26 saw themselves as true Muslims, and not a heterodox
sect.27 .
Mahmud Faksh suggests that the modern Alawites are the descendants of ancient
Canaanite people, who lived in isolation in their mountain region and retained many
of their pagan beliefs. Their remote existence meant that the effects of Christianity
and Islam were diluted, and it was considerably later that they adopted the Arabic
language and the Nusayri version of Islam.28 This hypothesis seems credible, as there
is little evidence to suggest that there was an exodus of Nusayris from other regions at
any stage. The most likely explanation for the existence of the Nusayri faith among
the people inhabiting the mountain region of north east Syria, was that they were
converted from a rustic ‘folk’ version of Islam. Following the death of al-Khasibi in
Aleppo in A.D. 957 (or 969), his grandson al-Tabãrãni moved in A.D. 1032 to what
was Byzantine Laodikeia on the Northern Syrian coast. He then set about converting
the local population of the coastal mountains and the Cilician plains to Nusayrism.29
What ensued was an amalgamation of the rustic beliefs of the local isolated mountain
inhabitants, and the Nusayri teachings of al-Khasibi’s grandson al-Tabãrãni. This set
forth the progression of a distinct community, which became ever more reliant on its
geographically isolated location to maintain its identity and existence. Friedman
comments that “had al-Khasibi not fled Baghdad yya may very well not
have existed.” 30 In fact, they did cease to exist, vanishing from sight in Baghdad,
Aleppo, and even in Harran, only surviving amongst its few remaining acolytes and
25 Interestingly the original name of the Druze minority is also Muwaahhidan but for entirely different
reasons. See Batatu, (1999) p.16.
26 Ghâlî, pl.ghulât: exaggerator. The appellation of Shî ‘ite groups who were accused of exaggeration
(Ghuluww) in their adoration of the Imâm; the ghulat attributed superhuman abilities to him, to the
point of deification. (M.G.S. Hodgson, “Ghulat,” (1965), pp. 1093-1095).
27 Friedman, Y., (2001) al-Husayn Ibn Hamdan al-Khasibi: A Historical Biography of the Nusayrî-
Alawite Sect, Studia Islamica, No.93.p.93.
28 Faksh, M. A., (1984), The Alawi Community of Syria: A New Dominant Political Force. Middle
Eastern Studies, Vol.20, No.2, p.134.
29 Halm, Heinz, (2004), Shi’ism, 2nd edition, Columbia University Press, p.157.
30 Friedman, Y., (2001) al-Husayn Ibn Hamdan al-Khasibi: A Historical Biography of the Nusayrî-
Alawite Sect, Studia Islamica, No.93, p.110.
16
its new adherents on their isolated mountain. Around 1223, Prince Hasan al-Makzun
(d.1240) brought his tribe from Sinjar in northern Iraq, to help fight the Kurds.31 They
became the Matawira clan, and were most likely the last of the Alawites to arrive in
the ‘Alawi mountains. Al-Makzun was succeeded by Shaykh Hatim al-Tubani as
another great military leader against the Sunnite Kurds.
Map 3. The Early Geography of the Alawites. Source: Adapted from Harris, 2003.
31 Moosa, Matti, (1988), Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects, Syracuse University Press, New York.,
p.256.
17
The Faith of the Alawite Sect
At the end of 1936, representatives of the Alawite community, realising that their
aspirations for an autonomous Alawite state were lost, proclaimed that “the Alawis
are nothing more than partisans of the Imam Ali, and the Imam Ali is merely the
cousin, son-in-law and executor of the messenger.”32 They were attempting to portray
the sect as orthodox Shi’a Muslims. Only a few months before, the Alawite elite had
appealed to the French Mandate power that owing to irreconcilable religious
differences the Alawites should not be forced to join with the rest of Syria. This is
shown by a letter written by Alawite notables including Sulayman al-Asad (Hafiz al-
Asad’s father) to French Prime Minister Léon Blum in June 1936, which stated:
Alawis differ from Sunnis religiously and historically; Alawis refuse to be joined to
Syria, for it is a Sunni state and Sunnis consider them unbelievers (kaffirs); ending the
mandate would expose them to mortal danger.33
These two stances appear contradictory and are based upon geopolitical expedience,
in this case the possible unification of Alawite territory with wider Syria as the French
Mandate looked like ending. It seems therefore that politics and religion are not
widely separated in Alawite custom.
The Alawites are widely accused of being the most extreme of the Ghulat, in that they
are the most ardent in their deification of Ali Ibn Talib, the son in law and cousin of
the prophet Muhammad. Matti Moosa claims that:
s [Alawites] form the zenith of extreme Shiism. To them Ali is the
almighty God who takes the place of the God of the Bible and the Quran. Ali is
superior to Muhammad whom Ali created.34
The central accusation levelled at the ghulat Shiite sects’ doctrine is their belief in the
divinity of Ali. This belief is the main rupture between the orthodox branches of Islam
32 Batatu, Hanna,. (1999), Syria’s Peasantry, The Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their
Politics, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, p.20.
33 cited in Pipes, Daniel, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford University
Press, p.167.
34 Moosa, Matti, (1988), Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects, Syracuse University Press, New York,
p.xxii.
18
and the extremists, to lay divinity upon Ali is considered extreme by orthodox Shiites
and totally heretical by Sunnis.
The Ghulat dates back to the period following the death of Muhammad in 632.
According to Matti Moosa, Muslim heresiographers agree that Abd Allah Ibn Saba, a
Jew from Yaman who converted to Islam between 644-656AD, was the first to
attribute divinity to Ali.35 If this is accurate, then he was the pioneer of the ghulat.
Saba’s followers apparently approached Ali proclaiming him to be god, Ali allegedly
found this “abominable,”36 and had some of the men burnt on a bonfire. Upon seeing
this other supporters apparently claimed “now we believe you are God, because no
one tortures by fire but God.”37 This linking of fire and God could have possible roots
in Zoroastrian beliefs, which place fire as central in their religion. This indicates the
continuity of previous influences in the heterodox sects such as the Alawites. Matti
Moosa suggests that there i sm is of Persian origin,
and that the Nusayris believe that the Persians are superior to the Arabs”.38 It could
be suggested that two things have given Islamic Scholars ammunition to discredit the
Alawites, firstly the Jewish taint of Saba, and secondly, their apparent linkages to, and
preferences for the Persians.
The Alawite faith is highly esoteric, and therefore not well understood by many; it is
barely even understood by the majority of Alawites themselves. Only a select few are
initiated into the secrets of the Alawite creed. Most of what is known about the sect’s
beliefs comes from an exposé published in 1859 by Sulaymān al-Adhani, an Alawite
initiate who converted to Christianity.39 This work shed considerable light on the
Alawite creed, much to the displeasure of the Alawite shaykhs it would seem, as he
was assassinated not long after it was published.40 The power of the Alawite shaykhs
and their rigid stipulation for secrecy was demonstrated unequivocally in the 1960s.
When a non-Alawite colleague suggested to Alawite General Salah Jadid that he
35 Moosa, Matti, (1988), Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects, Syracuse University Press, New York,
p.xvii
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Batatu, Hanna, (1999), Syria’s Peasantry, The Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their
Politics, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, p.17.
40 Pipes, Daniel, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford University Press,
p.160.
19
ought to publish the sects secret books in order to deflate sectarian tensions, Jadid
responded with horror that were this done the “Shaykhs would crush us!”41 Salah
Jadid was at the peak of his powers at this stage, so for him to consider the secrecy of
the Alawite creed and the power of the Alawite religious leaders so reverently speaks
volumes for their influence.
A major feature of the Alawite faith is a belief in metempsychosis which involves the
eternal transmigration of souls from the dying to the living. This belief is illustrated in
the account of al-Adhani and the dire threat conveyed to him upon initiation by the
Alawite shaykhs:
Know my son, that the earth will not suffer you to be interred in it, should you
divulge this secret; and you will no longer enter into human forms- nay, rather when
you die, you will pass into degraded vestments, from which there will be no
deliverance for you forever.42
This extract reveals two things about the Alawite faith, firstly their predilection for
secrecy, and secondly that they believe in metempsychosis. Hanna Batatu makes an
interesting comparison with the religions of the ancient Britons, who believed in the
transmigration of souls and also practised their rites surreptitiously. Batatu comments,
“One cannot but wonder how the ancient Britons and the mountain peoples of Syria
came to share similar beliefs.”43 This correlation is certainly informative and
highlights the presence of ancient pagan beliefs upon which a veneer of (extreme)
Islam has been grafted. In a similar vein, Moosa argues that the Alawites hark back to
ancient Harranian pagan beliefs by their “worship of the sun and the moon and also in
their belief in the multiple manifestations of God.”44
The Alawite religious palimpsest is described by the Alawites themselves as being the
“synthesis of previous religious dogmas.”45
41 Ibid.
42 Batatu, Hanna, (1999), Syria’s Peasantry, The Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their
Politics, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, p.18.
43 Ibid.
44 Moosa, Matti, (1988), Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects, Syracuse University Press, New York,
pp.340-341.
45 Khuri, Fuad, I., (1990), Imams and Emirs: State, Religion and Sects in Islam, Saqi, London, p.134.
20
Alawite parallels with Christianity have largely been based around twin conceptions
of a holy trinity. According to al-Adhani, the Alawite trinity comprises Ali, who
corresponds to the Father, Muhammad to the son and Salman al-Farisi to the Holy
Spirit. As Moosa points out however, there is no evidence to suggest a specific
analogy between the Alawite and Christian trinities.46 The fact that al-Adhani was a
Christian convert may have made him more open to the idea of a correlation between
the two. Of more importance perhaps is the Christian holidays which are observed by
the Alawites, including Epiphany, Pentecost and Palm Sunday. Moreover, it has been
suggested that Al-Khasibi held Jesus in such high regard that this was why he chose
to come to Al-Sham (Greater Syria). Al-Khasibi preached that Jesus Christ embodied
the persons of every one of the prophets that came into the world.47 This is another
example of the Alawite belief in metempsychosis.
Despite the efforts of the Alawite religious and political elite to portray the sect as
simply a branch of Twelver Shiite Islam, even from this brief evaluation of the
Alawite faith it is clear that it is widely divergent from any branch of orthodox Islam,
including the Twelvers. The faith of the Alawites has been summed up by Matti
Moosa as “a syncretism of the astral pagan religious system of the Harranians,
Christianity, and extremist Shiism.”48 They differ from the Twelver Shiites according
to several factors, the most important of which is their extreme deification of Ali, but
also by the esoteric nature of their faith, their belief in major elements of the Christian
faith, and the strong remnant influences of pagan religions.
Historically, the geopolitical implications of the Alawite’s religion was that “such a
faith was best practiced in a remote and inaccessible place, and it was indeed in such
rugged surroundings that the ‘Alawis found refuge.”49
It was the physical characteristics of their refuge that allowed the Alawites to retain
their unique faith.
46 Moosa, Matti, (1988), Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects, Syracuse University Press, New York,
p.323.
47 Ibid, p.263.
48 Ibid, p.409.
49 Kramer, M., (ed) (1987), Shi’ism, Resistance, and Revolution, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado,
p.239.
21
The debate will continue over whether Alawites are really Muslims. Either way, their
questionable Islamic credentials have caused the Alawites problems that will no doubt
resurface if the Alawites currently holding the reins of power in Syria are unseated.
Alawite Cultural Traits
[The Alawis are] of a strange and singular character, …chameleon-like [sic] they put
on the colour of religion…no body was ever able to discover what shape or standard
their consciences are really of. - Observation of a British traveler in 1657 50
Aside from the unusual religious doctrines developed and nurtured in the Alawi
Mountains, the geography of the Alawites territory has created certain cultural
characteristics. Analyzing the nature of, and reasons for, these characteristics is
important in answering the question of how members of this ‘despised’ sect managed
to elevate themselves so dramatically, and is also useful in examining the geo-
political orientation of the sect.
As the Alawites were a persecuted and heretical sect it meant that they sought refuge
within the safe confines of their mountain. The fact that they were able to survive
there for a thousand years while retaining their cultural and religious heritage was due
to the physical nature of their environment, moreover, the harshness of their
environment combined with their repressed and impoverished state to produce certain
psychological traits.
Firstly, the Alawites refined the art of taqqiya (dissimulation), whereby one can
conceal ones faith by disguising it to outsiders. An interesting example of this
instrument is given in al-Adhani’s account: “if they [Alawites] enter a mosque with
Muslims, they do not recite any of the prayers; instead they lower and raise their
bodies like the Muslims, while cursing Abu Bakr, ‘Umar Uthman, and [other major
figures of the Sunni tradition]”.51 Assuming the validity of this account, and there
seems not to be any reason to doubt the reliability of it, it is entirely conceivable that
taqqiya could be applied to other aspects of importance to the Alawites. For instance,
50 Pipes, D. (1990), Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford University Press,
p.162.
51 Ibid.
22
Daniel Pipes claims that it is the concept of taqqiya that underpins the Alawites ability
to “blow with the wind” according to the prevailing political power structures: “when
France ruled, they [Alawites] portrayed themselves as lost Christians, when Pan-
Arabism was in favor they became fervent Arabs” .52 It seems the Alawites only
revealed their Alawite identity when the presidency of Hafiz al-Asad made it
politically beneficial to do so, and therefore the concept of taqqiya arguably
corresponds with a highly developed sense of pragmatism.
An important by-product of religious heterodoxy, as discussed earlier, is the
construction of an independent and cohesive identity. Ibn Khaldun’s concept of
asabiya is useful in understanding this phenomenon.53 Asabiya (meaning nerve),
signifies “internal cohesion often brought about by unity of blood and faith.”54
According to Khaldun, two criteria are required for an asabiya arrangement;
exclusiveness and a non-hierarchical structure in authority. The Alawite traditional
tribal structure was not hierarchical, it maintained a loose confederation without a
stratified vertical hierarchy. The Alawites perception of exclusiveness lies in their
belief that “they are the last to sign the divine covenant with God”.55 Add to this
belief the stipulation that one must be born an Alawite,56 and the end result is a sect
which is very cohesive and compact. Moreover, the physical geography of the
Alawite Mountain being inaccessible and of little appeal to other groups due to its
poor economic potential, has provided the ideal environment for an introverted
compact minority.
The development of strongly cohesive and compact demographic characteristics can
be related to the extent by which the Alawites have been persecuted by their Sunni
neighbours. Geographic compactness and isolation was made necessary by their
persecution, the fact they survived up until the present was made possible by the
nature of the landscape. The contempt in which the Alawites have historically been
held is illustrated by three Sunni fatwas (religious decisions); the first issued by Abu
52 Pipes, Daniel, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford University Press,
p.162.
53see Khuri, Fuad, I., (1990), Imams and Emirs: State, Religion and Sects in Islam, Saqi Books,
London, p.52.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid, p.53.
56 Batatu, Hanna, (1999), Syria’s Peasantry, The Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their
Politics, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, p.14.
23
Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111) stated that the Alawites “apostacize in matters of
blood, money, marriage and butchering, so it is a duty to kill them.”57 The second by
Ahmad Ibn Taymiya (1268-1328), concluded that “the Nusayris are more infidel than
Jews or Christians…they are always the worst enemies of the Muslims,” and therefore
“war and punishment in accordance with Islamic law against them are among the
greatest of pious deeds, and the most important obligations” for a Muslim.58 Later in
the nineteenth century, another Sunni Shaykh issued a fatwa that: “Muslims may
freely take Alawi property and lives”.59 These articles of Islamic jurisprudence show
the tenuous status of the Alawites. According to sources, some twenty thousand
Alawites were “massacred in 1317” and around ten thousand in 1516 by Sunni
Muslims.60
The circumstances under which the Alawites “silently entrenched themselves in their
mountains”61 are therefore clear. Daniel Pipes sums up the effect of this experience on
the Alawites: “centuries of hostility took their toll on the ‘Alawi psyche. In addition to
praying for the damnation of their Sunni enemies, ‘Alawis attacked outsiders. They
acquired a reputation as a fierce and unruly mountain people”.62 From this we also see
the emergence of an inclination towards the martial arts becoming embedded in
Alawite culture. What is important to establish by this analysis is that the relationship
of the Alawites vis-à-vis the Sunnis is one of mutual enmity. It is difficult to imagine
this legacy has been forgotten, despite the rhetoric of the present regime in Damascus,
it arguably lies very close to the surface in modern Syria.
Another important factor in the formation of Alawite cultural traits is the fixed
boundaries of their territorial base. Arguably this geographic confinement has led to a
predisposition to more socialist systems of government.
57 Pipes, Daniel, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford University Press,
pp.162-163.
58 Ibid, p.163.
59 Ibid, p.164.
60 Ibid, p.164.
61 Weulersse, Jacques, ‘Ley pays de Alaouites’, Tours: Arrault, Vol.1, 1940 p.59.
62 Pipes, Daniel, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford University Press,
p.164.
24
Fuad Khuri writes, “Confined to narrower and somehow unexpandable territories,
sects had to divide the pie more carefully”.63 Add to this the moral controls of
asabiya, and the “pressure on the haves to redistribute wealth is much stronger”.64
Other factors have played their part in socialist tendencies, such as socio-economic
retardation due to an unfavourable physical environment, combined with economic
repression by adjacent Sunni overseers, particularly during the Ottoman period. The
fact emerges that geography has been pivotal in forging an egalitarian inclination
within the Alawite minority.
Chapter One Overview
In short, geography contributed to producing the unique characteristics of the Alawite
faith and enabled its continued existence. The sect refined the concept of taqqiya as
an additional method of preserving their faith and unique attributes, but relied mostly
on maintaining a compact demographic base secure in their mountain stronghold. This
in turn produced a strong tendency toward the martial arts. Equally, the confined and
non-hierarchical character of the sect produced a propensity for social egalitarianism
within their own community.
63 Khuri, Fuad, I., (1990), Imams and Emirs: State, Religion and Sects in Islam, Saqi Books, London,
p.75.
64 Ibid.
25
2. Holding out above the Crossroads
The Alawi Mountains sit above the intersection of the Levant, Anatolia, and the
Eastern Mediterranean. For centuries invading armies have passed through en-route to
Asia Minor, the ‘Holy Land’, or penetrating into the Levant from the Mediterranean.
Despite powerful hostile forces in the regions directly adjacent to their territory, the
Alawites have remained intact for the last thousand years. Hostile forces included:
Sunni Seljuk and Mamluk rulers after the fall of the Hamdanid Shiite dynasties of
Aleppo, the Sunnite Ottoman Empire, and the French, who dominated the region for a
brief period after the fall of the Ottomans. Syria fell briefly under Sunni Arab control
with the end of the French mandate. Throughout these periods, the Alawites have
maintained relative political autonomy, their religion and their cultural identity.
Rather than assuming a subservient role in the newly created Syrian state members of
the Alawite sect have, for better or worse, taken the leading role. This resilience has
been possible due not only to the physical geography of the Alawi Mountains, but
also because of the ruthlessly pragmatic approach of the Alawites to each challenge
which has confronted them.
Sunni Regional domination.
The arrival of the Seljuk Turks in Syria from the 11th century meant that Sunni
Muslims were the regional hegemons. This necessitated the rapid spatial retreat of the
Nusayris into secluded isolation. The demise of the Shiite Hamdanis from Aleppo
made the situation for the Nusayris in the interior untenable and, as discussed earlier,
al-Tabãrãni was forced to move his headquarters to Latakia around AD 1031-1032.
1 Later, in 1258, the Nusayri centre in Baghdad was destroyed by the invading
Mongols, putting an end to the Nusayri confession outside of North West Syria.2
Fuad Khuri explains that the “Sunni came to concentrate in countries with rich open
fertile plains such as Egypt, Syria, and Morocco, and simultaneously to dominate in
the most fertile lands.”3 The spatial distribution which has resulted in the Levant is
one whereby the Sunnis have perpetually constituted the elite controlling the core,
1Moosa, Matti, (1988), Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects, Syracuse University Press, New York,
p.267.
2 Ibid.
3 Khuri, Fuad, I., (1990), Imams and Emirs: State, Religion and Sects in Islam, Saqi, London.,p.58.
26
Damascus and Aleppo, and the minorities, including the Alawites, the impoverished
and marginalised periphery, however, while the Alawites struggled economically
throughout this period of Sunni (and briefly Mongol) regional domination, they did
maintain in large part their political autonomy in their isolated mountain, up until the
Ottomans under Selim I defeated the Mamluks, who had ruled the region since the
mid 13th century, at Aleppo in 1516.4
Map 4. The Levant before 1516. Source: Harris, 2003.
The Alawites maintained their autonomy through this period because of the
defensibility of their geographic base, and but also by utilising strategically pragmatic
alliances. The advent of the Crusades from 1097 is important in showing the geo-
political orientation of the Alawites early in their history. This era gives us our first
insight into how the Alawites have manipulated regional conflicts to their advantage,
or at least to ensure their continued survival. According to Syrian writer Bar Hebraeus
(d.1286); the Crusaders initially killed a great number of Nusayris, however on
4 Moosa, Matti, (1988), Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects, Syracuse University Press, New York,
p.273.
27
learning that they were not a “truly Muslim sect, they became tolerant toward them”.5
This research proposes that the Alawites would very likely have emphasised the
Christian aspects of their faith to the Crusaders. Moreover, the Alawites actually sided
with the Crusaders against the “forces of Sunni Islam”.6 This shows us two things;
firstly that the Alawites were readily willing to present themselves in whatever
fashion would best suit their present geopolitical needs, and secondly, that they
viewed the Sunnis as their major regional adversary. Munar al-Sharif claims that the
Alawites “transmit from generation to generation the stories of the Sunnites
persecution of their people”.7 It appears that the rift between the Alawites and the
Sunnis has been longstanding.
One aspect of the Alawite mosaic-palimpsest is therefore revealed: a spatial,
ideological and socio-economic cleavage with Sunni Muslims, even to the extent that
the Alawites would side with an alien invader. What this also illustrates clearly is a
pragmatism based in either necessity or design, but not in ideology, in fact one could
argue that if the Alawites have an ideology it is in fact pragmatism itself.
The Ottomans in the Levant
The emergence of the Ottoman Empire in the Levant in 1516 brought yet another
hostile Sunnite power to the region. Moosa contends that “Ottoman occupation of
Syria brought misfortune to the Nusayris, who had to face oppression by a powerful
Sunnite enemy”8 The Ottomans were well known for their toleration of minorities
within the empire under the Millet system whereby minorities retained some
autonomy subject to conditions, however, the Ottoman tolerance did not extend to the
‘heretical’ Alawites. Partly as a result of the Ottoman-Persian conflict, Sultan Selim I
harboured a severe mistrust for the extreme Shi’a tendencies of the Alawite apostates.
He set about destroying the sect; but “their mountain refuge
prevented Selim I from decimating the Nusayris” 9 Selim therefore tried a different
5 Moosa, Matti, (1988), Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects, Syracuse University Press, New York,
p.269.
6 Momen, M., (1985), An Introduction to Shi’I Islam, Yale University press, London and New Haven,
p.93.
7 Moosa, Matti, (1988), Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects, Syracuse University Press, New York,
p.269.
8 Ibid, p274.
9 Moosa, Matti, (1988), Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects, Syracuse University Press, New York,
28
strategy. This involved relocating ethnic Turks into the region in order to absorb the
Alawites. This strategy proved effective on the coast and lowlands, Latakia was
overrun and its Alawite inhabitants vanquished or were driven into the
Mediterranean.10 In the ‘Alawi Mountains, however, the strategy failed. In fact, those
Turks who were settled in the mountains rather than overwhelming the Alawites were
themselves absorbed into the Alawite tribes.11 Moosa gives the example of the
Qaratila tribe, who hail from ethnic Turkish roots but are now commonly accepted as
an Alawite tribe.
The early Ottoman experience illustrates two things, firstly that geography made
possible the continued existence of the sect, and secondly the pragmatism of the
Mountain Alawites which propelled them to absorb the intruding Turkish settlers,
rather than attempt to expel them. After the early attempts to eliminate the Alawite
sect, the remainder of the Ottoman-Alawite relationship seems to be characterised by
a grudging toleration. The martial prowess of the [Mountain] Alawites continued
throughout the Ottoman period. Dick Douwes comments that “some Nusayri
Muqaddams12 could mobilise quite formidable forces”.13 Due to this the main method
of oppression utilised by the Ottoman rulers was [where possible] to impose crippling
taxation measures against the Alawites. Douwes explains that the “Nusayris
[Alawites] were subjected to a discriminatory capital tax”.14 Ottoman efforts to
domesticate the Alawites included building mosques in the Alawite villages, however,
as soon as the Ottoman a officials left the Alawite villagers made good use of the new
structures as shelter for their livestock. 15 The Alawites had no use for these mosques
of orthodox Islam.
For the Alawites, the Ottoman period was a continuation of Sunni oppression. The
differing fates of the lowland and the Mountain Alawites early in the Ottoman period
illustrate clearly the role that geography played in preserving the sect throughout this
p.275.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Local strongmen.
13 Douwes, Dick, (2000). The Ottomans in Syria: A History of Justice and Oppression. United
Kingdom: I.B. Tauris Publishers, p.70.
14 Ibid, p.142.
15 Rubin, Barry, (2007), The Truth About Syria, Palgrave Macmillan. New York, p.49.
29
period. Moreover, the Alawites were prepared to adopt the trappings of orthodox
Islam while the Sunnite Ottomans were amongst them, but never changed their real
beliefs. For the Alawites, the combined effects of oppression, geographical compact
isolation, and tribal asabiya instilled a far greater sense of enmity toward Ottoman
domination. This recalcitrance toward the Ottoman state is divergent from the Sunni
Arabs, who considered themselves fellow citizens of the Ottoman state.16
The French Mandate
The demise of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 was a crucial juncture in terms of the
geopolitical aspirations of the Alawite community. French interest in the region
stemmed from a “longstanding French vocation to a position of power in the
Mediterranean”.17 Alawite interest lay in securing their position and autonomy within
their territory. These twin ambitions were to be compatible.
To begin with there was conflict between the Alawites and the French (similar to the
earlier Crusader period). The Alawites under Shaykh Ahmad Salih al-Ali18 resisted
French intrusion into Alawite territory from 1918 till 1921. The Alawite revolt was,
according to Phillip Khoury a reaction to French attempts to impose hegemony over
their territory, to which the Alawites put up staunch resistance.19 The Alawites were
willing to compromise somewhat for the purpose of pragmatism, but they would not
accept foreign hegemony. When it became apparent that the French could improve the
Alawites geopolitical position vis-à-vis the Sunni Arabs however, the Alawites ceased
resistance and embraced French patronage. Both Moosa and Pipes argue that the
Alawite resistance was not a revolt against French imperialism, but rather a side effect
of Alawite – Ismaili conflict. The Ismailis are a smaller sect, historically known as the
Assassins who reside to the south of the Alawite territory. French support for the
Ismailis meant they confronted the Alawites.20 This was perhaps more a case of the
16 Van Dam, Nikolaos, (1997), The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and
the Ba’th Party. New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, p.2.
17 Burke III, Edmund, (1973), A Comparative View of French Native Policy in Morocco and Syria,
1912-1925, Middle East Studies, Vol.9, No.1. p.175.
18 Moosa, Matti, (1988), Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects, Syracuse University Press, New York,
p.284.
19 Khoury, Phillip, S., (1987), Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920-
1945, I.B. Taurus Books, London, pp.99-102.
20 Ibid, p.284; see also Pipes, D., (1990), Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York:
Oxford University Press, p.166.
30
French not understanding local tribal dynamics adequately. In any case, al-Ali’s revolt
certainly was not indicative of Alawite solidarity with the Sunni Hashemite Prince
Faysal’s claims on Damascus.21 Alawite concern, as mentioned above, was for
maintaining their autonomy in the face of absorption by a broader Sunni state. This
point is underscored by the Alawite acceptance of French patronage immediately
upon the French granting the Alawites semi-autonomy in their territory in 1922, and
further emphasised by their non-participation in the Arab revolt against French rule in
1925-26.22 In fact, the Alawites became a valuable tool for the French in maintaining
their position.
Map 5. The Levant 1920-1947. Source: Harris, 2003.
21 As has been claimed by the current Syrian regime in its attempts at achieving wider Arab legitimacy.
22 Moosa, Matti, (1988), Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects, Syracuse University Press, New York,
p.284; see also Khoury, Phillip, S., (1987), Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab
Nationalism 1920-1945, I.B. Taurus Books, London, pp.205-206.
31
The French acquired a League of Nations mandate over the Syrian Levant in 1920
after the reduction of the Ottomans in the Levant (see Map 5.). French tutelage in the
Levant made possible Alawite aspirations for their own autonomous state. These
aspirations were realised in 1922, when the Alawites were given semi-autonomy
within their own territory. The ‘Alawite State’ was changed in 1930 to the less
controversial name the ‘Government of Latakia.’23 The French had Franco-friendly
states along the Eastern Mediterranean seaboard, Lebanon and the Government of
Latakia.24 The Alawites finally had a regional presence after centuries of economic,
religious and political persecution and isolation. The French reasons for dividing off
the Alawite territory were as part of a strategy of divide and rule to splinter Arab
resistance to French rule. In addition the French had demanded the Alawite area as
well as Mount Lebanon, in the Sykes-Picot agreement of February 1916. This was
partly was out of historic concern for the Christians of the Levant. Hourani explained
that it was this traditional concern that “led to part of the northern Syrian coastlands
being excluded from the scope …of Arab independence”.25
The Sunni Arab nationalists were less pleased with arrangements, and their feelings
were of complete betrayal. The urban bourgeois nationalists of interior Syria believed
that Sir Henry McMahon had promised them “a large new territory…with no mention
of British or French zones,”26 let alone a semi-independent state for the Alawites. For
them, the permanent separation of the coastal region around Latakia from the rump of
Syria was unacceptable. Despite what the nationalists believed, the text of the
McMahon-Hussein correspondence was explicit about coastal Syria, stating: “portions
to the west of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab,
and should be excluded”.27
The Alawites were not passive objects of the French-Syrian relationship. It is possible
that the difficulty the French had in pacifying al-Ali was a factor in their decision to
23 Khoury, Phillip, S., (1987), Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920-
1945, I.B. Taurus Books, London, 59.
24 Ibid, p.138.
25 Hourani, Albert, (1946), Syria and Lebanon, A Political Essay, Oxford University Press, London,
p.150.
26 Catherwood, C., (2006), A Brief History of the Middle East, Robinson, London, p.170.
27 Hourani, Albert, (1946), Syria and Lebanon, A Political Essay, Oxford University Press, London,
p.43.
32
appease Alawite interests. Moreover, the Alawites actively manipulated the cleavage
between Syrian Nationalists and the French to promote their own interests, which lay
in securing autonomy within their own territory. The French knew that they could
never hope to gain the affections of the Sunni Arab population of the interior;
therefore they sought to secure their position on the coast.28 The Alawites exploited
this opportunity by offering themselves as willing allies for the French in maintaining
control over the rebellious Sunni Arabs. Alawites formed about half the battalions of
the Troupe Speciales du Levant,29 the military and intelligence units that were
instrumental in suppressing dissent to French rule. The willing Alawite assistance to
the French in putting down nationalist movements in the Syrian interior demonstrates
a continuity of geopolitical orientation with the Crusader period. Given the
opportunity, the sect actively worked against its historical Sunni oppressors, devoid of
any conceptions of Arab fellowship. The Alawites “feared the Sunnite wolf”30 far
more than they feared the French.
On the surface, it would seem that the relationship between the French and the
Alawites was one of mutual expedience, however, Keith Watenpaugh suggests that
the French treated the Alawites, despite their usefulness, as inferior beings. According
to his account, Zaki al-Azurzi witnessed a French teacher scolding a Christian
student: “are you an Alawite?...Are you a dumb beast?” The teacher then wrote on the
board “Alawites are on the same level as dumb beasts”.31 Jacques Weulersse explains
that French education policy was premised on the view that “Alawites are Arabs, and
therefore if they became cultured they would join their voice to the voice of the sons
of their race, the Arabs”.32 It is therefore apparent that the French were happy to
utilise the Alawites in the military, but did not want them exposed to an education that
may narrow the religious schism with the Sunnis and/or forge a common nationalist
ideology. The French actively worked to promote a cleavage between the Alawite
community and the majority of the population who were Sunni Arabs. For a time this
28 Khoury, Phillip, S., (1987), Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920-
1945, I.B. Taurus Books, London, p.138.
29 Pipes, Daniel, (1990), Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford University
Press, p.166.
30 Moosa, p285.
31 Watenpaugh, K.,D., (1996), “Creating Phantoms”: Zaki Al-Azurzi, The Alexandretta Crisis, And the
Formation of Modern Arab Nationalism in Syria, Int. J. Middle East Studies, Vol. 28, p.367.
32 Ibid.
33
strategy seemed to be working as the Alawites embraced their new found political
independence, albeit under French tutelage.
Throughout the 1930’s, agitation by the Syrian nationalists for independence
increased, along with international pressure for the French to reduce their paternal
role in the Levant Mandate states. In response, the French pointed to the sectarian
divisions within Syria as an excuse for their continued presence, even though it was
they who had actively promoted these divisions.33 Nevertheless, they were forced to
begin looking to withdraw. The Syrian Nationalists in Damascus, in negotiations with
the French, refused to accept the partition of ‘Greater Syria’ including the Alawite
state. The destiny and identity of the Alawites was in the balance, the prospect of the
French withdrawing from the region required a crucial geopolitical decision.34
The period leading up to 1936 was a watershed for the Alawite community. The
perceived choice was between unity with Syria, or continued semi-independence
under French patronage, either option was likely to bring major challenges.
Independence meant continued isolation and economic challenges, due to both a lack
of resources and the poor productivity of their indigenous territory. Unity meant
placing themselves at the mercy of a Syrian state dominated by their longstanding
oppressors the orthodox Sunnis. A seldom mentioned third option was touted to the
French by the president of the Alawite representative council, Ibrahim al-Kinj on the
24th June 1936. This third option was an Alawite union with Lebanon, which would
guarantee them autonomy under French protection and create the largest country of
minorities in the Middle East.35 This suggestion was met with a stony silence by both
the Lebanese and the French, and therefore never gathered any momentum.
As negotiations between the Syrians and the French began to look more likely to
preclude, the retention of a separate Alawite state leaders fiercely debated the best
course of action. Peter Shambrook describes the mood of the Alawites at the time:
33 Shambrook, Peter A., (1998), French Imperialism in Syria: 1927 – 1936. United Kingdom: Ithaca
Press, p.6.
34 Yaffe-Schatzmann, Gitta, (Jan, 1995), Alawi Separtatists and Unionists: The Events of 25 February
1936, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.31, No.1, Frank Cass, London,p.36.
35 Moosa, Matti, (1988), Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects, Syracuse University Press, New York,
pp.290-291; see also, Archives du Ministère, E. 412.2, file393, 8 and file 493, 7; and al-Din, al-
Nusayriyya, 94.
34
The Alawite Mountain had resisted the Sunnite Muslim domination for thirteen
centuries. To appease the Syrians the French had now sacrificed them…if the
mandate could not be continued in Latakia, …the Alawites would face the Sunnites
by themselves, and ‘let the Sunnites try and take their mountain if they can’36.
Shambrook correctly points out that the Alawites did not fear Sunni military force,
they feared far more the prospect of losing the equality of rights that they had enjoyed
under French rule for the last fifteen years.37 The view of the Alawites in 1936 shows
us firstly that they were confident that the geography of their mountains would, as it
had for centuries, protect them from annihilation. More importantly however, having
had a taste of equality and relative economic and social improvement, the Alawites
were loath to return to an isolated and impoverished condition.
Although most historical accounts point to rigid opposition within the Alawite
community to reattachment to Damascus and Syria, there is evidence to suggest that a
pragmatic compromise aimed at securing the unique attributes of the sect was
constructed in the event of reattachment. A convention of Alawite chiefs occurred in
February 1936 at Tartus to discuss the reattachment of Alawite territory to Syria.
Munir al-Abbas’ lobbied for unity, and Ibrahim al_Kinj and M.S. al-Ahmed agitated
for Alawite Independence under the French.38 Gitta Yaffe-Schatzmann points out that
it was unclear which of these factions claimed the majority of support of Alawites, in
the end it mattered little as the Alawite Shaykhs acted, putting an end to any rift in the
community. Fifteen Alawite Shaykhs met in May 1936 and formulated a decree, the
crux of which proclaimed:
Every Alawi was a Muslim and that every Alawi who denied being a Muslim and
who did not admit that the holy Qur’an was his holy scripture, and that Mohammad
was his prophet, was not considered an Alawi in the legal sense by the Shari’a39
36 Shambrook, Peter A., (1998), French Imperialism in Syria: 1927 – 1936. United Kingdom: Ithaca
Press, p.223.
37 Ibid.
38 Yaffe-Schatzmann, Gitta, (Jan, 1995), Alawi Separtatists and Unionists: The Events of 25 February
1936, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.31, No.1, pp.28-38, Frank Cass, London, p.36.
39 Ibid.
35
While this manifesto was written in religious terminology, its purpose was implicitly
political. Thereafter, all Alawites were compelled to accept the union, or risk losing
their status in the Alawite community. The final sentence of the manifesto: “‘wa-i
‘tasamu billahi huwa mawlakum fa-ni‘am al-mawla wa-ni‘ am-Nusair’” however,
betrayed the underlying message for Alawites. 40 This sentence translated “emphasises
anew, Alawite adherence to the Imam Ali”41 and the founder of the sect Ibn al-
Nusayr. Taking into account the concept of taqqiya discussed in Chapter One, the
Alawites shaykhs were outwardly denying their heterodox beliefs but inwardly
affirming them so as to pave a possible path for Alawite acceptance into Syrian
society.
This compromise was reached by a purely pragmatic decision making process, based
on the following deductions; The French were wavering in their commitment to
ensuring Alawite independence, the Alawite territory was lacking in the resources and
infrastructure to sustain a viable independent state, they had been rebuffed by their
fellow compact minorities in Lebanon, and most of all, although they were confident
of defending by force a separate Alawite State, the sect had no wish to return to their
isolated and impoverished existence. The only pragmatic decision was unity with
Syria, to be conducted in conjunction with a campaign to actively assert their Islamic
credentials. Subsequently, the “Mufti of Palestine, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, issued a
fatwa, certifying that ‘those’ Alawis were indeed Muslims, and ought to be accepted
wholeheartedly by every Muslim”. 42 The emphasis on ‘those’ Muslims shows
implicitly that this acceptance was extended only to those Alawites that adopted the
Syrian “mainstream”.43
Chapter Two Overview
In summary, the Alawites maintained a compact minority in the mountains above the
crossroads of the Levant, Asia Minor and the Eastern Mediterranean. The defensive
advantages of topography had secured their initial existence against Sunni rulers,
thwarted both Ottoman attempts to eliminate them, and French attempts to impose
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ash-Sha‘b, Damascus, 31 Tammuz 1936; Munir ash-Sharif, p.59.
43 Yaffe-Schatzmann, Gitta, (Jan, 1995), Alawi Separtatists and Unionists: The Events of 25 February
1936, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.31, No.1, Frank Cass, London, pp.36-37.
36
outright hegemony over their territory. In addition, it is evident that pragmatic
geopolitical alliances and manipulations were critical to Alawite survival. The most
important of which was their ability to merge with the Syrian state from the mid-
1930’s relatively peacefully, and with (conditional) Islamic credibility. This was
achieved even though they had fought against the Sunni Arabs alongside the
Crusaders, remained recalcitrant throughout the Ottoman period, and had been
complicit with the French Mandate power in crushing Arab nationalist movements by
their involvement in the Troupe Speciales.
The advent of the Second World War was to postpone the effective independence of
Syria till 1946, however, if we accept the arrival of Al-Tabãrãni in Latakia in 1032 as
the birth of the Alawite sect, the events of 1936 ended over nine hundred years for the
Alawites as a Montagne Refuge community.44 From this point onward, the Alawite
sect was to engage with a wider spatial and political perspective. As will be seen, the
emergence of members of the Alawite sect onto the wider Syrian political stage was
to have far reaching consequences for Syria.
44 De Planhol, Xavier, (1957) The World of Islam, Cornell University Press, London.
37
3. The Alawites and the Syrian State
“How miserable you are, oh Syria! The Mongols invaded you, followed by the
French, killing, devastating and spoliating [sic]. Then a worse disaster befell you: the
Alawites infiltrated the [Ba’th] regime and started to shed blood, seize property, and
violate taboos. Paralysed by stupefaction, the Nations power of resistance was
sapped; little by little the Syrians resigned themselves to the new state of affairs, the
oppressors sat firmly in the saddle, treating the population arbitrarily”
-Bayan al-Thawra; al-Nadhir, December 5, 1979.1
Syria gained full independence from French rule shortly after the Second World War.
For the Sunni Arabs, this was a chance to finally re-establish their majoritarian
sovereignty over Syria, although it was a significantly reduced territory to the one
Sunni Arabs felt that they were entitled. The Balfour Declaration had stripped away
Palestine and Transjordan. The French had gifted Alexandretta to the Turks, and
separated off Greater Lebanon. The prospect of sectarian divisions within what was
left of Syria was unpalatable for the Syrian nationalists in Damascus. Jamil Mardam,
a veteran nationalist, warned of the perils of minorities. In December 1939 he wrote:
“For centuries this problem [minorities] has done nothing but …sow the seeds of
revolutions…and has weighed heavily on the future of nations.”2 Interestingly,
Mardam suggested that it “was always the minorities who pay,”3 for Syria, however,
this was to prove quite the reverse. It was the majority who paid the price of sectarian
divisions.
There was a brief attempt to reassert Alawite autonomy by the followers of cult
figure, Sulayman Murshid (d.1946) in 1946. The revolt was, however, quickly put
down and al-Murshid was executed by the government in Damascus.4 Although this
effectively ended Alawite autonomy in their territory history, shows that members of
the Alawite community came to dominate positions of power in Syria from the early
1960s. The irony of this turnaround for Alawites in Syrian society has been pointed
1 Quoted in Sivan, Emmanuel, (1985), Radical Islam, Yale University Press, New Haven & London,
p.42.
2 Mardam-Bey, S., (1994), Syria’s Quest for Independence 1939-1945, Ithaca Press, Beirut, p.xxiv.
3 Ibid, p.xxiv.
4 Moosa, Matti, (1988), Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects, Syracuse University Press, New York,
p.290.
38
out by several commentators.5 This view is understandable in light of the historically
repressed and despised status of the sect. It was indeed ironic, like an “untouchable
ruling India or a Jew becoming Tsar in Russia”.6
Unequivocal explanations of how this may have occurred are rare. Analyses of the
rise in the geopolitical fortunes of the Alawites have failed to give a clear answer to
this question. It is evident however, that a combination of factors combined to create
an environment in Syria whereby a role reversal between the Sunni Arab bourgeoisie
and certain Alawites could occur. These factors include social upheaval, a
disproportionate representation of Alawites in the armed forces, factionalism within
the Sunni civilian and military elite, Alawite traits that enabled unified political
manoeuvring and the emergence of the Ba’th party. These factors combined to allow
Alawite individuals into powerful positions within the military and the state.
Social and Political Change
The departure of the French from Syria was followed by a period of political
openness not seen in Syria for generations. This freedom of expression manifested
into political opposition against the traditional elite of Syria. The ruling elite were
seen as complicit in the dismemberment of Syria, and representative of the traditional
landowning urban bourgeoisie. The Alawites, being almost uniform in their
membership of the lowest socio-economic rural segment of society, had much to gain
by an upheaval of Syrian society.
A key figure in this period was a Sunni from Hama named Akram al-Hawrani.7 Al-
Hawrani is largely credited with the mobilisation of rural society in Syria during the
late 1940’s and early 1950’s. Alawites who descended the mountain in search of
income saw Al-Hawrani as a political focal point.8 Al-Hawrani stood for a revolution
of the ‘country’ over the ‘town’. This was to become a reality within the next two
decades under an Alawite by the name of Hafiz al-Asad, who was cutting his
5For example see: Held, C., (2000), p.247 and Kramer, M., cited in Pipes, D., (1990). Greater Syria:
The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford University Press, p.175.
6 Pipes, Daniel, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford University Press, p.175.
7 Seale, P., (1988), Asad of Syria, The Struggle for the Middle East, I.B. Taurus, London, p.41.
8 Ibid.
39
ideological teeth during this time.9
Hafiz al-Asad was a product of educational opportunities that French patronage had
opened up for the Alawites. In addition, Asad was representative of young Alawites
who exhibited the “natural rebelliousness and independent spirit of mountain boys,
[and] the class grievances of rural have-nots”.10 Asad came from Qurdaha, a
provincial town on the western side of the ‘Alawi Mountains, and was educated in
Latakia during the latter half of the 1940’s. Seale explains that “Alawi mountain boys
like Asad studied hard because getting into secondary school was a struggle, and they
had no thought of throwing away the chance to better themselves”.11 Asad was elected
in 1951 as the president of the Syrian Union of Students, an unprecedented
accomplishment for an Alawite.12 Hafiz al-Asad was to later play a major role in
Syrian Politics.
In the last years of the Mandate, a political movement known as the Ba’th (Arabic for
resurrection) began under a Christian Arab Michel Aflaq and a Sunni Arab Salah al-
Din al-Bitar. Ba’th ideology was built on socialism, secularism and pan-Arabism.
Following independence the Ba’th Party held promise for Alawite aspirations of
geopolitical emancipation within the Syrian state. While the pan-Arab doctrines may
not have run strictly according to Alawite ideas of particularistic autonomy, the
pragmatic reality was that this option was long dead. Due to this the socialist and
secular aspects of the Ba’th were a sound option for Alawites. Raymond Hinnebusch
explains the Alawites attraction to the Ba’th Party:
The educated sons of minority mountain peasants – Alawis, Druze – saw the Ba’ths
secular nationalism and agrarian populism as a way to both challenge the chiefly
Sunni landlord–merchant elite and integrate their communities into the wider
nation…having the least stake in the old regime they were to form the ‘vanguard’ of
the Ba’th movement.13
9 Seale, P., (1988), Asad of Syria, The Struggle for the Middle East, I.B. Taurus, London, p.41.
10 Ibid, p.34.
11 Ibid, p.25.
12 Ibid, p.37.
13 Hinnebusch, Raymond A, (1989) Peasant and Bureaucracy in Ba’thist Syria: The Political Economy
of Rural Development. London: Westview Press, p.18.
40
Hinnebusch is correct in asserting that the Alawites, along with the Druze, saw in the
Ba’th Party an opportunity to improve their geopolitical and social condition vis-à-vis
the Syrian state. It is misleading however, to suggest that the Alawites formed the
‘vanguard’ of the Ba’th Party. There was only one Alawite on the Ba’th executive
Bureau from 1945 till 1954, a physician from Latakia Wahib al-Ghanem.14 Another
Alawite, Zaki al-Arsuzi was involved in the early days of the Ba’th, however it is
unclear how much substantive effect he had in the party formation. In later years, he
would be trolleyed out by the Asad regime as an Alawite with “unassailable Arab
nationalist credentials”, thus adding legitimacy for the regime.15
There was no premeditated sectarian conspiracy to capture the state as the extract at
the beginning of this chapter would suggest. The socio-economic condition of the
Alawites caused them to gravitate toward reformist parties such as the Ba’th. The
close knit nature of the Alawite community was to benefit the political aspirations of
individuals from amongst its ranks, providing them a reliable support base.
The Alawites in the Military
The overrepresentation of minorities in the armed forces has perhaps been the most
crucial factor in the geopolitical emancipation of the Alawites within the Syrian State.
Phillip Khoury suggests that “because [the] Alawites were the largest and perhaps the
poorest minority community, they were the most overrepresented in the military”.16 It
is almost certainly a misconception that French bias toward the minorities in its
military and security apparatus, the Troupe Speciales, was the decisive ingredient in
the Alawites coming to dominate the military. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that
the sectarian imbalance in the Syrian military has its roots in the Ottoman period and
stems from a Sunni aversion to military service rather than a minority propensity for
it.
During the 1830’s the Egyptian General Muhammad Ali Pasha fought with the
Ottoman Sultan for control of Syria. Historian Dick Douwes explains how the
14 Batatu, Hanna,. (1999), Syria’s Peasantry, The Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their
Politics, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, p.138.
15 Watenpaugh, K.,D., (1996), “Creating Phantoms”: Zaki Al-Azurzi, The Alexandretta Crisis, And the
Formation of Modern Arab Nationalism in Syria, Int. J. Middle East Studies, Vol. 28, p.382
16 Khoury, Phillip, S., (1987), Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920-
1945, I.B. Taurus Books, London, p.630.
41
Egyptians attempted to impose conscription upon the local populace who “resorted to
almost any means to escape from it; many offered bribes…others even resorted to self
mutilation”.17 In any case, military service was avoided at all costs by the majority of
Sunni Arabs. It is possible that the Sunni distaste for the military as a career option
was carried forward from the Ottoman period into independence; it certainly did not
dissipate during the Mandate period.
During the mandate years the French undoubtedly preferred to recruit from the
compact minorities, as they were seen to be removed from the ideologies of Arab
nationalism. As for whether French recruitment policy laid the basis for Alawite
military preponderance in the post-independence Syrian Army, it is doubtful. It is
apparent that there were only a few hundred Alawite ex members of the Troupe
Speciales in 1946, and these individuals were largely shunned due to the taint of
French “collaboration”.18
There is no solid data to show that Alawites mobilised into “the greatly expanded
national army”19 in any greater proportions than previously, however, if they retained
their disproportionate representation of twenty percent,20 then their numbers would
have grown correspondingly to the size of the army. The Syrian army grew from 5000
at the end of 1945 to 12,000 by the time of the Palestine war in 1948.21
Evidence that the Alawites sought to capture the Syrian State through the military is
lacking. In the decade and a half following independence, Alawites saw the military
academies as an opportunity for a stable income, and as a way of integrating
themselves into the Syrian state.22 Moreover, Sunnis on the whole continued to fill the
top echelons of the officer class of the Syrian military with the minorities, including
the Alawites, filling the rank and file.
17 Douwes, Dick, (2000) The Ottomans in Syria: A History of Justice and Oppression. United
Kingdom, I.B. Tauris Publishers, p.197.
18 Seale, P., (1988), Asad of Syria, The Struggle for the Middle East, I.B. Taurus, London, p.38.
19 Khoury, Phillip, S., (1987), Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920-
1945, I.B. Taurus Books, London, pp.81-82.
20 Nisan, Mordechai, (2002), Minorities in the Middle East, A History of Struggle and Self-Expression,
2nd Edition, Mcfarland & Company, Jefferson & London, p.120.
21 Be’eri, E., (1969), Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, Praeger Publishers, New York, p.335.
22 Be’eri, Eliezer, (1969), Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, Praeger Publishers, New York,
p.336. see also Batatu, Hanna,. (1999), Syria’s Peasantry, The Descendants of its Lesser Rural
Notables, and Their Politics, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, p.158.
42
The process that brought Alawites into influential posts in the military is difficult to
define. There is scant information on the activities of Alawites in the Army for the
period 1945 to 1963. Patrick Seale’s Struggle for Syria considered an exhaustive
appraisal of the first dozen years of Syrian independence, yet it barely mentions
Alawites at all.23 It may be reasonable to assume that Alawites were applying their
cultural traits of pragmatism and taqqiya at this time and so maintained a low profile.
An account by Eliezer Be’eri on the role of officers in Arab politics written in the late
sixties is interesting, in that Be’eri fails to recognise the major roles played by
Alawite officers in that period. He writes that Sunni officer Amin Hafiz was “making
use of Alawi and Druze Ba’thist officers”.24 Through hindsight, we know that the
relationship was quite the reverse and that Salah Jadid and Hafiz al-Asad were in fact
pulling the levers of power.25 This is revealing in that it shows the invisibility of the
Alawites as events were unfolding. It is likely that if Sunnis foresaw a takeover of the
state by members of the heretical Alawite sect they would have moved to forestall it.
Sunni Factionalism
According to Michael Van Dusen: “from 1946 to 1963, Syria witnessed the gradual
erosion of the national and eventually sub national political power of the traditional
elite, not so much through the emergence of new and especially dynamic elites, but
rather by internal conflict”.26 Thus Alawites came into influential positions not so
much by design but through the opportunity presented by a lack of unity within Sunni
elite ranks. Rampant factionalism within the ranks of the Sunni Political and Military
elite resulted in numerous coups, each followed by a major purge of the officer ranks.
This process culminated in the 1963 coup by the Ba’th party, after which seven
hundred, mainly Sunni officers were purged. More than half of these vacancies were
filled by Alawites.27
23 Seale, Patrick, (1965), The Struggle for Syria, Oxford University Press, London.
24 Be’eri, Eliezer, (1969), Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, Praeger Publishers, New York,
p.160.
25 Drysdale, Alisdair, ‘The Syrian Political Elite, 1966-76: A Spatial and Social Analysis, Middle
Eastern Studies, Vol.17, No.1, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, London, pp.4 & 12. see also Batatu, (1999)
p.159.
26 Cited in Pipes, Daniel, (1990) Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford
University Press, p.174.
27 Pipes, Daniel, (1990) Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford University
Press, p.170.
43
The disunity of the Sunni officers compared to the cohesiveness of the Alawites,
could be explained by the existence of broader Sunni identities that ranged across the
Sunni Arab world. The Sunnis were more susceptible to division by external
influences, whether from Egyptian Nasserites, Hashemite monarchists, Syrian Arab
nationalists, or Muslim Brotherhood Islamists. Conversely, the Alawites, tribal
affiliations notwithstanding, were bound by common ties of religion, asabiya, socio-
economic status and geography.
The Military Committee
In 1959, during the ill-fated union of Syria and Egypt (the United Arab Republic of
1958 to 1961), a group of officers stationed in Egypt began meeting to discuss the
future of Syria. All Alawites, the key members included Lieutenant-Colonel
Muhammad Umran, Major Salah Jadid, and Captain Hafiz al-Asad. The formation of
the Military committee in 1959 is flagged by some as the first step in a premeditated
Alawite takeover of the State. Annie Laurant argues that, “the Alawi[tes] put into
effect a strategy of setting up cells in the army, and this won them power in
Damascus”, while Matti Moosa suggests that these officers were acting purely
according to “ 28 The thesis of this research is that these men were
not acting as Alawites, but as ambitious energetic individuals. They were undoubtedly
devoted Ba’thists who appreciated the socialist and secular policies that held so much
promise for “their own continued ascent, and that of their minority sect,”29 however,
they did not seek Alawite communal hegemony over Syria.
The Military committee was to play a pivotal role in the 1963 Ba’thist coup, which
would topple the traditional elite of Syria once and for all. Hafiz al-Asad and Salah
Jadid, believing that the support of their coreligionists was the most reliable, looked to
bolster the position of Alawites in sensitive military positions. On the morning of
March the 8th 1963 following the Ba’th coup, “Salah Jadid bicycled into the city
[Damascus] to take over the crucial Bureau of Officers Affairs, which controlled
transfers and promotions throughout the armed forces.”30 Thereafter it is evident that
28 Ibid, p.174.
29 Seale, P., (1988), Asad of Syria, The Struggle for the Middle East, I.B. Taurus, London, p.64.
30 Ibid, p.77.
44
Alawites, and initially Druze and Ismailis, garrisoned the bases closest to Damascus,
while Sunnis were posted to locations safely distant from the capital.31
Chapter Three Overview
The period from 1946 to 1963 saw the gradual emergence of an environment whereby
a small group of Alawites, with the support of their coreligionists could begin to steer
the political trajectory of the Syrian state. The collective Alawite community did not
deliberately engineer this turnaround of power relations in Syria.
In 1966 the Military wing of the Ba’th disposed of the civilian wing in another coup,
and in 1970 after a power struggle with Salah Jadid for ultimate control of the
country, Hafiz al-Asad with his ‘corrective movement’ emerged as the President of
Syria. One of the oppressed Alawites was now, as al-Nadhir laments above, the
‘oppressor sitting firmly the in saddle’ of Syria. The position of the Alawite
community was dangerously predicated on the tenuous legitimacy of Asad’s
presidency. His “search for legitimacy” was to last for the next thirty years. 32
31 Pipes, Daniel, (1990) Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford University
Press, p.170.
32See: Kedar, M., (2005) Asad in search of Legitimacy: Message and Rhetoric in the Syrian Press
under Hāfiz and Bashār. United Kingdom: Sussex Academic Press.
45
4. The Alawites and the Asads
It is a necessary to distinguish between the regime and “the great body of Alawi [tes]
who had no role in establishing it and are part of the silent majority of the people who
resist its crimes, at least with their hearts”.
- Extract from an article by Salah al-Din al-Bitar shortly before his assassination.1
The geopolitical orientation of the Alawite community from 1970 was influenced
more than anything else by one individual, Hafiz-al-Asad. Following Asad’s death in
2000, his second son Bashar has assumed the presidency, setting a dynastic precedent
that perpetuates the Asad reign in Syria, and ensures a continuation of Alawite
identification with the regime. Hafiz al-Asad’s, ultimately failed, efforts in seeking
legitimacy along with iron-fisted repression in maintaining his regime mean that
Alawites may very well sit within the cross hairs of any backlash should the regime
falter. The performance of Bashar in reconciling the minoritarian nature of his regime
with a restless majority and a volatile regional arena has therefore become crucial to
the geopolitical prospects of the Alawite community.
An Alawite in Damascus: The Asad System
Figure1. 2
Hafiz al-Asad was officially sworn in as
president in February 1971. This was a
major event, for although Alawites had
occupied key posts through much of the
1960s, a Sunni façade had always been
maintained. Hafiz al-Asad felt confident
enough to openly take power.3
Although Hafiz al-Asad seized power in
1 Batatu, H., (1999), Syria’s Peasantry, The Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their
Politics, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, p.229.
2 Cartoon depicting the Asad regime drawn by Syrian cartoonist Ali Farzat, published in: Wedeen,
Lisa, (1999), Ambiguities of Domination, University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, p.134.
3 Pipes, D., Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford University Press. (1990),
p.176.
46
Damascus, this did not mean automatic leadership of the Alawite community. Asad
needed Alawite support on which to base his ‘correctionist’ movement, therefore he
looked to raise his status in the Alawite community by means of politically expedient
marriages and appointments.4 Once Asad had secured the support of the bulk of the
Alawite community, he “turned it into the main prop of the regime”.5 The “pecking
order”6 beneath Asad assumed a graduated nepotistic character; Alawites of other
tribes held positions in the military command, members of Asad’s own tribe the
Kalbiyya assumed higher roles in the intelligence and security apparatus, and direct
relatives filled the most “sensitive and powerful offices of state”.7
Rather than the Alawite community making use of Hafiz al-Asad’s presidency to
improve their position in the Syrian state, Asad used them to secure his regimes
position. Barry Rubin uses the analogy of the Corleone family of ‘Godfather’ fame to
describe the structure of Hafiz al-Asad’s regime. This analogy, while seemingly
outlandish, is remarkably accurate in some respects.8 Asad, similar to ‘Don Vito’ built
up a network based on loyal kinsmen, favour and individuals who owed their position
and future to Asad. He passed the mantle to his ‘unlikely’ second son after the elder
son died unexpectedly. As explained, Hafiz al-Asad did not seek power for the
Alawite community, rather the Alawite community provided a stable platform for his
regime, “having an entire community identified with the regime on a life and death
basis was a tremendous advantage”.9
The regime erected by Hafiz al-Asad was built on a sectarian bias that was not overtly
recognisable. Asad had to simultaneously balance the interests of the Alawite
community, whose unquestioned loyalty was his lifeline, with the Sunni community
who were coming to the alarming realisation that they were being ruled by a secular,
heretical Alawite. This necessitated the mobilising of provincial Sunnis who had an
interest in the social reforms that the Ba’th party brought. Important individuals from
4 Zisser, E., The ‘Alawis, Lords of Syria: From Ethnic Minority to Ruling Sect; Bengio, Ofra, & Ben –
Dor, G. (eds) (1999), Minorities and the State in the Arab World, Lynne Reiner Publishers, Boulder &
London, p.130, pp.135-136.
5 Ibid, p.136.
6 Pipes, Daniel, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford University Press.
(1990), p.176.
7 Ibid, p.176.
8 Ibid, p.127.
9 Rubin, Barry, (2007), The Truth About Syria, Palgrave - Macmillan. New York, p.51
47
among these ranks included vice president Abd al-Halim Khaddam10 from Banyas,
Prime Minister Mahmud al-Zu‘bi from Dar‘a and foreign minister Mustafa Tlas from
Rustan near Homs.11 These personalities gave Asad orthodox cover, and played an
important role in preserving the regime.
Hafiz al-Asads rule was also buttressed by a persistent propaganda campaign which
glorified himself and his family. Everywhere in Syria are statues and placards
depicting the Asad family in poses designed to portray Islamic piety, Arab
nationalistic fervour, or staunch resistance to Zionist and Western regional designs.
This was accompanied by blanket rhetoric through the state controlled media.12 In this
Asad has been quite successful in attaining broad acquiescence to his rule, however,
Lisa Wedeen raises an interesting point, that in Syria “identification with and love of
Asad need not be felt, but only simulated”.13 Syrians may have learnt to show the
trappings of obedience in order to have a peaceful life, safe from regime repression by
its security apparatus the Mukharabat.14
Maintaining the Asad System
Hafiz al-Asad has most likely accrued significant respect in the broader Alawite
community as a ‘great leader’. Fuad Khuri suggests that Hafiz al-Asad may be
elevated in Alawite folklore, alongside figures such as Prince Hassan al-Mukzun
(1240), Shaykh Hatim al-Tubani (1375), Shaykh Ali Salih, and Sulayman al-Murshid,
all of whom fought ‘heroically’ for Alawite causes.15 The real legacy of Hafiz al-Asad
and his son Bashar may be, according to Rubin, that having “given [the Alawites]
everything” they could in the final analysis “cost them everything.”16 While this
10 Khaddams friendship with Asad extends back to the 1940s when they were members of the National
Students Union, of which Asad was the head. See Zisser, E., Decision Making in Asads Syria, Policy
Focus, Washington Institute, Feb. 1998, no.35, p.25.
11 Tlas and Asad were long time colleagues from the Military Academy.
12 For an exhaustive study of Rhetoric under the Asad regime see: Kedar, M., Asad in search of
Legitimacy: Message and Rhetoric in the Syrian Press under Hāfiz and Bashār. United Kingdom:
Sussex Academic Press. (2005).
13 Wedeen, Lisa, (1999), Ambiguities of Domination, University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London,
p.65.
14 The Mukharabaat is the secret police erected under Hafiz al-Asad; it is largely staffed with Alawites.
for a good summary of this see, Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human
Rights by the Asad Regime. United States of America: Yale University Press. (1991), pp.38-54.
15 Khuri, Fuad, I., (1990), Imams and Emirs: State, Religion and Sects in Islam, Saqi Books, London,
p.201.
16 Rubin, Barry, (2007), The Truth About Syria, Palgrave - Macmillan. New York, p.49.
48
contention of Rubin’s is valid in view of the present material position of some
Alawites, it contains two weaknesses. Firstly, considering the economic and social
poverty of the sect over the previous nine hundred years, the majority of Alawites
actually had nothing to begin with, so what is there to lose? Secondly, as will be
discussed, the benefits of the Asad regime have not accrued evenly to the wider
Alawite community, so it would be more accurate to say that the Asad’s have given
‘some’ Alawites everything. In the event of a power reversal, whether or not a
revanchist Sunni population will differentiate is unclear.
Eyal Zisser quite rightly suggests that “the average Sunni still harbours feelings of
condescension and contempt” for Alawites.17 What physical evidence is there to
suggest that the historic Alawite-Sunni enmity remained intact? Underground
newspapers of the early 1980s described the “Infidel Nusayris, who were outside
Islam” and who had “made Islam their traditional enemy”.18 More illustrative was the
Muslim Brotherhood backed uprising from 1976 to 1982, that demonstrated Sunni
“fury against both the regime and the Alawi community”.19 In June 1979, the Muslim
Brothers massacred more than sixty, mainly Alawite, cadets at a military school in
Aleppo, a clear indication of sectarian animosity. This was followed in July 1980 by
an assassination attempt on Hafiz al-Asad that was narrowly averted. 20 Asads
response was retaliation, astonishing in its ferocity. Membership of the Brethren
became a capital offence, and when rebels captured and held the city of Hama in early
1982, Asad dispatched 12,000 troops, (mostly Alawites) field artillery, attack
helicopters and tanks.21 The city was reduced to virtual rubble. Estimates of the
casualties vary from 10,000 up to 30,000.22
The demolition of Hama in 1982 destroyed the Brethren and virtually all effective
opposition, it showed the extent to which the regime would go to defend its position.
17 Zisser, E., The ‘Alawis, Lords of Syria: From Ethnic Minority to Ruling Sect; Bengio, Ofra, & Ben –
Dor, G. (eds) (1999), Minorities and the State in the Arab World, Lynne Reiner Publishers, Boulder &
London, p.137.
18 Drysdale, Alasdair & Hinnebusch, R.A., (1991), Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, Council
of Foreign Relations Press, New York, p.34.
19 Ibid, p.138.
20 Pipes, Daniel, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford University Press.
(1990), p.182.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
49
Although Hafiz al-Asad succeeded in silencing dissident voices within Syria, it is
difficult to imagine that there are not strongly dissenting elements of Syrian society
that harbour vivid memories of Hama and the humiliation of thirty seven years of
Alawite rule.
The spatial and socio-economic position of the Alawites in modern Syria
As is apparent from the aforementioned paragraphs, it is difficult to separate an
objective appraisal of the Alawite community in the post 1970 period independently
of the Asad regime. Not only does Hafiz al-Asad, and now his son, dominate the
literature, but a paucity of demographic and socio-economic data, (no doubt owing to
the regimes efforts to submerge sectarian discourse) constrain attempts at evaluating
the Alawite condition. In fact, Onn Winckler has written an entire book on
contemporary Syrian demography and has mentioned Alawites only once23.
Map 6. The Contemporary Levant. Source: Harris, 2003.
23 Winckler, O., (1999) Demographic Developments and Population Policies in Ba’thist Syria, Sussex
Academic Press, Brighton & Portland.
50
Yahya Sadowski concedes that there are no official statistics on the communal
breakdown of the Syrian State, however, he cites scholarly estimates that the Alawite
population sits around 15 percent of the population.24 If we take 15 percent of the
mid-year 2007 Syrian population of 19,315,000,25 then the present Alawite population
stands at around 2.9 million. By extrapolating historical census figures, Sadowski
claims 43.2 percent of Alawites are now living in cities,26 and therefore, while this
represents a significant urban Alawite population, it also leaves a substantial rural
population of around 1.6 million.
It is apparent that Alawites moved in some numbers to the cities of the interior. The
combined Alawite population of Damascus and Aleppo is estimated at over a quarter
of a million.27 According to Eyal Zisser, the urban Alawites comprise the “political
and economic elite of the ‘Alawi community, although the ‘Alawi mountains remain
their centre of gravity and source of communal power”.28 That the ‘Alawi Mountains
remain the epicentre for Alawite geopolitical concern suggests that the urban Alawites
still view their territorial homeland as important. An analysis of the tribal affiliation of
the urban Alawite population and the socio-economic status of their home villages
would be an interesting subject for further research, as this would give an insight into
exactly which Alawites comprise this urban elite, and if indeed there is a significant
bias. One could only speculate, however, it is likely that the Asads, Kalbiyya tribe
may comprise the greater part of the Alawite urban elite in Damascus.
Overall it appears that the majority of the Alawite population of an estimated 2.9
million continue to reside in the wider Latakia province; in the ‘Alawi mountains and
the coastal region around Latakia, Tartus and Banyas, and also in the rural peripheries
24 Sadowski, Y., The Evolution of Political Identity in Syria; Telhami, S. & Barnett, M., (eds), (2002),
Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, pp.144-
145.
25 US Census Bureau, 2007, www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country/syportal.html. accessed
11/09/2007.
26 Sadowski, Y., The Evolution of Political Identity in Syria; Telhami, S. & Barnett, M., (eds), (2002),
Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, pp.144-
145.
27 Zisser, E., The ‘Alawis, Lords of Syria: From Ethnic Minority to Ruling Sect;Bengio, Ofra, & Ben –
Dor, G. (eds) (1999), Minorities and the State in the Arab World, Lynne Reiner Publishers, Boulder &
London, p.137
28 Ibid.
51
of the cities of Hama and Homs.29 Moreover, there has seemingly been a more acute
urbanisation of Alawites within the Latakia Province itself. According to Sadowski
the Alawite population of the city of Latakia, increased from a ten percent minority in
the 1960s to an estimated fifty five percent majority in 1994.30
Whether or not Alawites as a community have benefited materially from the Asad
rule is a difficult question. It appears there has been an uneven distribution of benefits.
The order of patronage follows a hierarchical framework with the Asad family at the
top, followed by the wider Kalbiyya clan and then other affiliated Alawites. There is
plenty of visual evidence to suggest that many Alawites still live in underdeveloped
poverty. Leverett observed that “villages in the traditional rural ‘Alawi
heartland…remain underdeveloped in comparison with some other rural areas in
Syria”.31 One could argue that considering the poor state of the Syrian economy, this
is not an uncommon occurrence for many Syrians. It does dispel assertions however
that the Alawites as a whole are a privileged elite sitting astride the Syrian state.
Daniel Pipes points out that government spending has been concentrated on the
province of Latakia and on such projects as “roads, railroads, ports, an airport,
industrial plants and irrigation works”.32 This seeming government bias has led to a
view that the regime is preparing a secessionist backup plan if things go wrong in the
interior.33 The fact is that the Latakia province, and especially the ‘Alawi mountains,
were for most of Syria’s history the poorest and most underdeveloped. Perhaps this
region may have needed extra funding to bring it up to the standards of the rest of the
country? Also being Syria’s only section of coast and a major conduit of trade, where
else would you build a port and infrastructure? The regime has also spent
considerable money developing the Jazirah region in the north-east, which was
previously underdeveloped. While benefits have most definitely accrued for
29 Zisser, E., The ‘Alawis, Lords of Syria: From Ethnic Minority to Ruling Sect;Bengio, Ofra, & Ben –
Dor, G. (eds) (1999), Minorities and the State in the Arab World, Lynne Reiner Publishers, Boulder &
London,, p.130.
30 Sadowski, Y., The Evolution of Political Identity in Syria; Telhami, S. & Barnett, M., (eds), (2002),
Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, p.144.
31 Leverett, Flynt, Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial by Fire. Washington: Brookings Institution Press,
(2005), p.229.
32 Pipes, Daniel, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford University Press.
(1990), pp.176-177.
33 See Annie Laurant cited in Ibid, p.180.
52
segments of the Alawite community that have close connections with the regime,
there has not been a disproportionate bias toward enriching the Alawite community as
a whole.
What is the nature of Alawite identity under the Asad regime? Has nearly four
decades of concealing Alawite identity had a watering down effect on the Alawite
identity? Sadowski points to the “slow death of Alawism as a faith”,34 however the
evidence for this does not follow, and moreover as is apparent from the preceding
chapters, the Alawite community engenders more than just a faith, they “have
implicitly seen themselves as a coherent ethnic community”.35 An interview that
Patrick Seale conducted with the Mayor of Qardaha (the Asad family home town) in
the late 1980’s is informative. When Seale questioned the Mayor on local identity the
Mayor replied with: “we have neither tribes nor families, for we are all members of
the Ba‘th family,” however, he was coaxed to concede the existence of strong Alawite
and more specifically Kalbiyya tribal affiliations in the city.36 This interchange gives
an important insight into Alawite identity, most importantly that the Mayors initial
impulse was to apply taqqiya and deny the local population’s real identity. The need
to deny Alawite identity actually serves to reinforce its existence. This concept can be
expanded to apply to the policies of the regime. Why would the Asad regime go to
such lengths to conceal Alawite proclivities if Alawites were merely fellow Arab
“members of the Ba‘th family” with nothing to hide?37
Another aspect to consider concerning Alawite identity is how others perceive it, for
example, Hafiz al-Asad sought to perpetuate a view that he “turned his back on his
Alawite origins when he was quite young,”38 however, even if this was true, it made
little difference to the view of many urban Sunnis “who insist[ed] that Asad was
‘really’ an Alawi” despite what he may have said.39 Once again, considering the
34 Sadowski, Y., The Evolution of Political Identity in Syria; Telhami, S. & Barnett, M., (eds), (2002),
Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, p.146.
35 Rubin, Barry, (2007), The Truth About Syria, Palgrave - Macmillan. New York, p.50.
36 Zisser, E., The ‘Alawis, Lords of Syria: From Ethnic Minority to Ruling Sect;Bengio, Ofra, & Ben –
Dor, G. (eds) (1999), Minorities and the State in the Arab World, Lynne Reiner Publishers, Boulder &
London, pp.141-142.
37 Ibid.
38 Sadowski, Y., The Evolution of Political Identity in Syria; Telhami, S. & Barnett, M., (eds), (2002),
Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, p.138.
39 Sadowski, Y., The Evolution of Political Identity in Syria; Telhami, S. & Barnett, M., (eds), (2002),
53
tradition of taqqiya, Alawites can deny their religion and communal heritage without
offending either, and therefore their own history seems to condemn Alawites to their
identity regardless. This has had a consolidating effect on Alawites who, far from
integrating with the population, seem to stick together more than ever. Rubin claims
that “it is very rare to find an Alawite in the liberal opposition…”40 Nonetheless, the
task of defining the continuing identity of the Alawite Sect remains elusive. William
Harris asks the pertinent question, “What has been happening among the Alawite
clans and army officers since 2000?” to which there seems no ready answer.41 Overall
it remains difficult to define Alawite identity as it is remains a taboo, and even illegal,
subject for researchers within Syria.
Another Alawite Rules Damascus
Having argued that the Alawite community is linked to the prospects of the current
Asad regime, an appraisal of the prospects for Bashar al-Asad is necessary. Bashar
has been promoted in some quarters as a thwarted reformer who is held back by the
‘old guard’ in the regime.42 Barry Rubin dispels this myth convincingly. He argues
that the very nature of the regime and its past misdeeds precludes any move toward
democracy or reform of any kind. This is based upon the well conceived prediction
that any fair electoral ballot in Syria would return at least a Sunni, if not an Islamist
government.43 It can be argued therefore that, “the Alawites may well be massacred
by the Sunni majority; [and] the elite [will] end up in prison or facing a firing
squad”.44 Rubin is quite right, however, he leaves out that although they are the
minority by five to one, the Alawites control the military in Syria. A state breakdown
could well have explosive effects and although Zisser assumes that, “all sides would
wish to avoid escalation…in time of crisis…all boundaries might be crossed”.45 Thus
Bashar is quite understandably focused on maintaining the status quo at all costs. In
this respect, where his father was very adept at “swimming strenuously and skilfully
Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, p.138.
40 Rubin, Barry, (2007), The Truth About Syria, Palgrave - Macmillan. New York, p.50.
41 Harris, W., Review Article: Syria, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, August 2007, vol.34
(2), p.220.
42 See Leverett, Flynt, Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial by Fire. Washington: Brookings Institution
Press. (2005), p.58.
43 Rubin, Barry, (2007), The Truth About Syria, Palgrave - Macmillan. New York, pp.236-237.
44 Ibid, p.189.
45 Zisser, E., The ‘Alawis, Lords of Syria: From Ethnic Minority to Ruling Sect;Bengio, Ofra, & Ben –
Dor, G. (eds) (1999), Minorities and the State in the Arab World, Lynne Reiner Publishers, Boulder &
London, p.142.
54
to tread water,”46 Bashar may have gone over his head.
Since 2000, Bashar al-Asad has not only continued the sectarian bias of the regime, he
has in fact increased it, removing some of the last vestiges of orthodox Sunni
legitimacy. Bashar alienated his fathers long time ally Abd al-Halim Khaddam and
has surrounded himself with his Alawite contemporaries, the sons of the elite. The
leadership of the pivotal intelligence and security agencies have passed to two young
Alawite officers “considered close to Bashar, known as Brigadier General Bahjat
Sulayman and Brigadier General Ayyad Mahmud”.47 Bashar’s brother in law Asif
Shawkat48 has risen quickly to be effectively in control of Military Intelligence.49 In
addition the role of the family of Hafiz al-Asads wife, the Makhlufs have become
more pronounced.50 The Makhlufs commercial empire is estimated to be worth $3
billion, the dominant personalities are Bashar’s uncle and cousin, Muhummad and
Rami.51 The leverage this family has within the regime is renowned. Meanwhile, Abd
al-Halim Khaddam has gone into exile, engaged with the existing opposition forces,
and he has “blown the whistle” on some of Bashar’s foreign policy ‘measures’,52
namely the murder of Lebanon’s most popular politician, Rafiq al-Hariri.
The Hariri murder has brought serious repercussions for Bashar al-Asad. Hariri was
immensely popular in Lebanon, thus leading to large scale demonstrations against
Syria’s interference in Lebanon . Moreover, Hariri had powerful friends in Europe,
most notably the French President Jacques Chirac. Subsequently, an International
Tribunal to investigate the murder of Hariri has been set in motion. It is set down for
early 2008 at The Hague in the Netherlands, and has the backing of the UN Security
Council under Resolution 1757.53 Whether Bashar will be directly implicated in the
murder is yet to be seen, however, considering the close knit nature of the regime, it
will be difficult for him not to be implicated if Syrian involvement is proven. It is
46 Rubin, Barry, (2007), The Truth About Syria, Palgrave - Macmillan. New York, p.126.
47 Leverett, Flynt, (2005), Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial by Fire. Washington: Brookings Institution
Press, pp.62-63.
48 Asif Shawkat is the husband to Bashar’s sister Bushra.
49 Leverett, Flynt, (2005), Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial by Fire. Washington: Brookings Institution
Press, p.63.
50 Ibid, p.84
51 Ibid.
52 Rubin, Barry, (2007), The Truth About Syria, Palgrave - Macmillan. New York, p.211.
53 For a thorough and up to date appraisal of the Hariri Investigation see: Harris, William, ‘Crisis in the
Levant: Lebanon at Risk’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 2007, Vol.18, pp37-60.
55
noteworthy that a senior Alawite outside the regime inner core, interior minister
Ghazi Kana’an, who would likely have had knowledge of the Hariri assassination,
conveniently committed suicide following the announcement of the investigation.
Interestingly, Kana’an was reported to have advocated a freer press in Syria, claiming
that the papers were “unreadable”.54
The implications of indictments of senior Syrian personnel in the Hariri affair can
only be damaging for the prospects of Bashar al-Asad as he attempts to present
himself as a regional peacemaker, whilst at the same time sponsoring destabilising
forces in Lebanon, the occupied Palestinian territories and Iraq. Moreover, Bashar
continues to face legitimacy issues domestically as an Alawite dictator, that would
surely be exacerbated by international murder indictments.
Presently there seems to be momentum building to get the tribunal underway. The
assassination of Lebanese anti-Syrian legislator Antoine Ghanem and the
postponement of Lebanese presidential elections, have inflamed the situation. The
United States has stressed the need to push the process forward and have already
contributed five million dollars to the tribunal with an attached message that there
should be “no impunity for political assassinations”.55 Lebanese politician Saad al-
Hariri, son of Rafiq al-Hariri, in late September, called for “getting rid…of the regime
of Bashar”.56 On the 2nd of October 2007 Bashar announced a one off bonus of 50%
of their fixed salaries for “civilian and military state workers…”57 This is clearly an
attempt to draw his support base around him as international pressure builds on his
regime. To what lengths Bashar will go to maintain his regime remains to be seen.
Chapter Four Overview
The period of 1970 up until the present day has seen the geopolitical orientation of the
Alawite community steered largely according to the requirements of the Syrian
regime. The Asad regimes have co-opted sections of the Alawite community to
54 Akhbar al Sharq, November 24, 2004. Cited in Leverett, Flynt, (2005), Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s
Trial by Fire. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, p.257.
55 BBC News, 28th September 2007, ‘US pledges funds for Hariri court’, http://news.bbc.co.uk
accessed 3/10/2007.
56 Naharnet, Beirut, 25th September 2007, ‘Hariri for finishing off the Asad Regime’,
http://www.naharnet.com accessed 27/09/2007.
57 SANA, Local News 2nd October 2007, ‘Cabinet hails decree issued by President al-Assad on the
salary grant’, http://www.sana.org accessed 3/10/2007.
56
buttress their position; internal dissent has been brutally repressed, generating cause
for even further resentment; some Alawites have moved into the interior cities, but
most remain concentrated around the Latakia region near their communal heartland,
the ‘Alawi Mountains. Although benefits of the Asad regime have not accrued evenly
to Alawites, it is likely that the repercussions will.
Hafiz al-Asad was proficient at skilful and cautious manoeuvring somewhat
reminiscent of Alawite pragmatism. He managed to maintain a broader coalition of
support for his regime compared to the current version. Hafiz al-Asads pragmatism
was directed at regime prerogatives, not his community. The system that he created
could mean disaster for the Alawites. This has necessitated a delicate balancing act to
maintain the status quo in Syria. This is the task that Bashar has inherited
The period of Asad rule in Syria represents a major disjuncture for the geopolitical
orientation of the Alawite community away from a pragmatic and Realpolitik
approach to its external relation. It appears that the Alawites have, to borrow from
Zisser “crossed the Rubicon”.58
58 Zisser, E., The ‘Alawis, Lords of Syria: From Ethnic Minority to Ruling Sect;Bengio, Ofra, & Ben –
Dor, G. (eds) (1999), Minorities and the State in the Arab World, Lynne Reiner Publishers, Boulder &
London, p.142.
57
Conclusions
This study has focused on one part of the mosaic-palimpsest of the Levant. It is clear
that this study has only brushed the surface of the intricate web of political and
geographical interrelationships that construct the dynamics of this region. Having,
unearthed the spatial setting, origins, religion, cultural traits, and past geopolitical
strategies of the Alawite community, we have a clearer picture of this community’s
geopolitical situation in the Levant.
The Alawites clearly do not belong to any branch of orthodox Islam. This has
necessitated a cautious, pragmatic and Realpolitik approach to community survival.
The Alawite community historically presented themselves according to the incumbent
regional power structures. They displayed flexibility in external relations, yet never
over extended themselves, always retaining the insurance of the defensive qualities of
their mountain. Their religious leaders skilfully integrated the Alawite community
peacefully into the modern Syrian state from the 1930s.
From the 1960s, broad social upheaval, an Alawite overrepresentation in the military
and the failure of Sunni Arabs to coalesce an effective government in Syria, allowed
talented Alawites such as Hafiz al-Asad to seize power. Asads undoubted political
‘genius’ nonetheless placed his community in a perilously vulnerable position from
the 1970s. The system that Asad created utilised sectors of the Alawite community as
a support base. Although the Alawites did not benefit as a whole, it will be a matter of
perception whether Sunnis differentiate between the regime and the Alawites in
general. It may be, as Salah al-Din al-Bitar attempted to communicate before his
assassination, that the broader Alawite community should not jointly be held
accountable for the actions of the Asad regimes. Considering the lack of affinity
between the two communities across nearly a thousand years however, it is doubtful.
Could the Alawites have risen in Syrian society outside of their mountain without a
regime such as Hafiz al-Asads? In view of the period 1946-1963, where there was
very little evidence of sectarian conflict, it is possible that Alawites may have
eventually become fully emancipated in a Syrian national identity along the lines of
the original Bath’ist ideology, without needing to seize the state.
58
As it stands, the Alawite community’s geopolitical situation is beyond comparison.
There are no clear examples of a similar situation. The example of the Kurds in
contemporary Iraq could be given, although the Kurds have the option of retreat to
their northern autonomous territory, whereas the Alawites have overextended
themselves. The Alawites are a non-Muslim minority ruling over an unreceptive and
possibly vengeful Sunni majority. They have few options but to cling to the regime of
the far less talented Bashar al-Asad, as he tries to balance the status quo his father so
skilfully maintained.
The international community continues to bear down on Bashar’s regime for its role
in the political crisis in Lebanon. It is looking likely that Bashar’s regime will sooner,
rather than later, be held accountable. The eclipse of Bashar’s regime could very
likely result in a state implosion, which may well manifest into the ‘bloodshed’ that
Xavier De Planhol spoke of in 1997.
Looking forward, the geopolitical reality for the great majority of the Alawite
community is that they will most likely, “entrench themselves silently in their
mountain” once again, and await their moment of truth.1
1 Weulersse, Jacques, ‘Ley pays de Alaouites’, Tours: Arrault, Vol.1, 1940 p.59.
59
Bibliography
Antoun, R.T., and Quataert, D., (eds), (1991), Syria, Society, Culture, and Polity,
State University of New York Press, Albany.
Ash-Sha‘b, Munir ash-Sharif, Damascus, 31 Tammuz 1936.
Batatu, Hanna,. (1999), Syria’s Peasantry, The Descendants of its Lesser Rural
Notables, and Their Politics, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
Bengio, Ofra, & Ben–Dor, G. (eds) (1999), Minorities and the State in the Arab
World, Lynne Reiner Publishers, Boulder & London.
Be’eri, Eliezer, (1969), Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, Praeger
Publishers, New York.
Burke III, Edmund, (1973), A Comparative View of French Native Policy in Morocco
and Syria, 1912-1925, Middle East Studies, Vol. 9, No.1. pp.175-186.
Catherwood, C., (2006), A Brief History of the Middle East, Robinson, London
De Planhol, Xavier, (1957), The World of Islam, Cornell University Press, London
------ (1997), Minorités En Islam, Géographie Politique Et Sociale, Flamarrion,
France.
Douwes, Dick, (2000), The Ottomans in Syria: A History of Justice and Oppression.
United Kingdom: I.B. Tauris Publishers.
Drysdale, Alisdair, ‘The Syrian Political Elite, 1966-76: A Spatial and Social
Analysis, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.17, No.1, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, London, pp.3-
31.
------ & Blake, G.H., (1985), The Middle East and North Africa: A Political
Geography. New York: Oxford University Press.
------ & Hinnebusch, Raymond, A.,(1991), Syria and the Middle East Peace Process,
60
Council of Foreign Relations Press, New York.
Faksh, Mahmud, A., The Alawi Community of Syria: A New Dominant Political
Force. Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.20, No.2, 1984.
Fuller, Graham,E., and Francke, R.R., (1999), The Arab Shi’a: The Forgotten
Muslims, Macmillan Press, London.
Friedman, Yaron., (2001) al-Husayn Ibn Hamdan al-Khasibi: A Historical Biography
of the Nusayri-Alawite Sect, Studia Islamica, No.93.
George, Alan, (2003), Syria, Neither Bread Nor Freedom, Zed Books, London &
New York.
Ginat, Rami, (2005), Syria and the Doctrine of Arab Neutralism: From Independence
to Dependence. United Kingdom: Sussex Academic Press..
Halm, Heinz, (2004), Shi’ism, 2nd edition, Columbia University Press.
Harris, William., (2003) The Levant, A Fractured Mosaic, Markus Wiener Publishers,
Princeton.
------ Review Article: Syria, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol.34, No. 2,
August 2007, Routledge.
------ ‘Crisis in the Levant: Lebanon at Risk’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 2007, Vol.18,
pp37-60.
Held, Colbert, C.,(2000), Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples, and Politics,
Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.
Hinnebusch, Raymond, A., (1989), Peasant and Bureaucracy in Ba’thist Syria: The
Political Economy of Rural Development. London: Westview Press.
Hourani, Albert, (1946), Syria and Lebanon, A Political Essay, Oxford University
Press, London.
Kedar, Mordechai, (2005), Asad in search of Legitimacy: Message and Rhetoric in
61
the Syrian Press under Hāfiz and Bashār. United Kingdom: Sussex Academic Press.
Khoury, Phillip, S., (1987), Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab
Nationalism 1920-1945, I.B. Taurus Books, London.
Khuri, Fuad, I., (1990), Imams and Emirs: State, Religion and Sects in Islam, Saqi
Books, London.
Kramer, Martin, (ed) (1987), Shi’ism, Resistance, and Revolution, Westview Press,
Boulder, Colorado,
Lawson, Fred, H., (2006), Constructing International Relations in the Arab World,
Stanford University Press, Stanford, California.
Leverett, Flynt, (2005), Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial by Fire. Washington:
Brookings Institution Press..
Ma’oz, Moshe and Yaniv, A., (eds), (1986)Syria under Assad: Domestic Constraints
and Regional Risks. United Kingdom: Croom Helm..
Mardam-Bey, Salma, (1994), Syria’s Quest for Independence 1939-1945, Ithaca
Press, Beirut
Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the Asad
Regime. United States of America: Yale University Press. (1991).
Momen, Moojan, (1985), An Introduction to Shî’ i Islam, The History and Docrines of
Twelver Shi’ism, Yale University Press, New Haven & London.
Moosa, Matti, (1988), Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects, Syracuse University Press,
New York.
Nisan, Mordechai, (2002), Minorities in the Middle East, A History of Struggle and
Self-Expression, 2nd Edition, Mcfarland & Company, Jefferson & London.
Pipes, Daniel, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. New York: Oxford
University Press. (1990).
62
Quilliam, Neil, (1999), Syria and the New World Order. United Kingdom: Ithaca.
Rubin, Barry, (2007), The Truth About Syria, Palgrave - Macmillan. New York.
Salibi, Kamal, (1977), Syria under Islam, Empire on Trial 634-1097, Caravan Books,
Delmar, NewYork.
------ (1988), A House of Many Mansions; The History of Lebanon Reconsidered, I.B.
Taurus & Co, London.
Seale, Patrick, (1965), The Struggle for Syria, Oxford University Press, London.
------ (1988), Asad of Syria, The Struggle for the Middle East, I.B. Taurus, London.
Sivan, Emmanuel, (1985), Radical Islam, Yale University Press, New Haven &
London.
Shambrook, Peter A., French Imperialism in Syria: 1927 – 1936. United Kingdom:
Ithaca Press. (1998).
Telhami, S. & Barnett, M., (eds), (2002), Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle
East, Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London.
Thomas, Martin, C. ‘French Intelliegence-Gathering in the Syrian Mandate, 1920-40,
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.38, No.1, January 2002. pp.1-32.
Van Dam, Nikolaos, (1997), The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society
under Asad and the Ba’th Party. New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers.
Watenpaugh, Keith.,D., (1996), “Creating Phantoms”: Zaki Al-Azurzi, The
Alexandretta Crisis, And the Formation of Modern Arab Nationalism in Syria, Int. J.
Middle East Studies, Vol. 28.
Wedeen, Lisa, (1999), Ambiguities of Domination, University of Chicago Press,
Chicago & London.
Weulersse, Jacques, ‘Ley pays de Alaouites’, Tours: Arrault, Vol.1, 1940.
63
Yaffe-Schatzmann, Gitta, Alawi Separtatists and Unionists: The Events of 25
February 1936, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.31, No.1, pp.28-38, Jan, 1995, Frank
Cass, London.
Winckler, Onn., (1999), Demographic Developments and Population Policies in
Ba‘thist Syria, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton & Portland.
Zisser, Eyal, (2007).Commanding Syria: Bashar Al-Asad and the First Years in
Power.: I.B. Tauris and Co LTD, New York
Zisser, E., ‘Decision Making in Asads Syria,’ Policy Focus, Washington Institute,
no.35, Feb. 1998.
Internet Sources
BBC News, 28th September 2007, ‘US pledges funds for Hariri court’,
http://news.bbc.co.uk accessed 3/10/2007.
http://www.michaeltotten.com/archives/001458.html accessed 22/08/2007
Naharnet, Beirut, 25th September 2007, ‘Hariri for finishing off the Asad Regime’,
http://www.naharnet.com accessed 27/09/2007.
SANA, Local News 2nd October 2007, ‘Cabinet hails decree issued by President al-
Assad on the salary grant’, http://www.sana.org accessed 3/10/2007.
US Census Bureau, 2007, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country/syportal.html.
accessed, 11/09/2007.