Enhancing public project implementation in Botswana during the NDP 11 period

Abstract

Successful project implementation is critical in development planning. If there is poor project implementation, economic development will be stalled. Generally, public project implementation has a chequered history. This is particularly true in developing countries which are characterised by low levels of project management maturity. The objective of this article is to review public project implementation in Botswana and recommend improvements for the National Development Plan (NDP) 11 period (2017/2018-2022/2023). The article used the survey strategy and adopted the descriptive approach. Data collection sources were mixed, that is, primary and secondary sources. It concluded that public projects are either poorly implemented (i.e. not implemented in accordance with the ‘Project Management Triple Constraint’ of cost, time and scope) or not implemented at all. Given a constrained revenue envelope post 2008, there is a need for improved project implementation. Amongst others, this calls for professional public project implementation so that NDPs become a reality.

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Africa’s Public Service Delivery and Performance Review
ISSN: (Online) 2310-2152, (Print) 2310-2195
Page 1 of 9 Original Research
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Author:
Emmanuel Botlhale1
Aliaon:
1Department of Polical and
Administrave Studies,
University of Botswana,
Botswana
Corresponding author:
Emmanuel Botlhale,
botlhale@mopipi.ub.bw
Dates:
Received: 25 Apr. 2017
Accepted: 26 June 2017
Published: 11 Aug. 2017
How to cite this arcle:
Botlhale, E., 2017, ‘Enhancing
public project
implementaon in Botswana
during the NDP 11 period’,
Africa’s Public Service
Delivery and Performance
Review 5(1), a163. hps://
doi.org/10.4102/apsdpr.
v5i1.163
Copyright:
© 2017. The Authors.
Licensee: AOSIS. This work
is licensed under the
Creave Commons
Aribuon License.
Introducon
Humans have three basic needs to ensure survival, namely food, shelter and clothing (see e.g.
Denton 1990). However, the wants of humans are innumerable, so satisfying the wants on the one
hand and the needs on the other presents difficulties for governments, given resource scarcity.
Scarcity is the inability of resources, whether land, labour, capital and so on, to satisfy human
needs and unlimited wants. Because of scarcity, economic agents, be they individuals, households,
firms or governments, have to rank their needs and wants in order of preference. Through the
scale of preference, pressing (or priority) needs and wants are positioned at the top of the scale so
that they are satisfied first subject to the availability of resources. Unlike Moses in the bible (see
Exodus 16:35) who had the luxury of summoning manna from heaven when he was on a
pilgrimage to the Promised Land, economic agents such as governments do not have such a
luxury. Therefore, amongst others, planning is imperative. Planning is a mechanism that allows
governments to rank their preferences and design work packages such as projects to implement
them. In Botswana, national development planning is actualised through National Development
Plans (NDPs). NDPs are mere intentions that can only have a meaning if they are translated into
goods and services, for example schools, to improve citizens’ lives. To this end, in a foreword to
the third NDP, 1970–75, then President Seretse Khama emphasised the centrality of national
development planning when he said:
Our commitment to planning springs from the recognition that our resources are limited, and must
therefore be carefully allocated. We are in a critical stage in our development. Decisions taken in the
current plan period affect the quality of life in Botswana for generations. We must therefore be sure that
we understand the choices before us and make the right decisions. (Ministry of Finance and Development
Planning 1975:1)
Since attaining independence in September 1966, Botswana has been unremittingly committed to
national development planning through the production of NDPs. Starting with Botswana’s
Transitional Plan for Social and Economic Development prepared in 1965, NDPs have been
unfailingly produced. NDPs are national macroeconomic blueprints that contain government
strategies planned to be undertaken over the Plan period. To deliver the NDPs, programmes and
projects are designed and implemented. The most recent plan was NDP 10, the tenth in a series of
NDPs. NDP 11, the draft of which was approved by parliament in December 2016 (Mathambo 2017),
commenced operations on 01 April 2017. NDPs are mere intentions that can only have a meaning if
they are translated into goods and services, for example schools, hospitals, roads, bridges and so on,
to improve the lives of the Batswana. For this to happen, programme and projects implementation
is key. Unfortunately, Botswana has a chequered history of project implementation (see e.g. Lucas
2008; Maruapula 2008; Mathambo 2014, 2015; Phatshwe 2014). Then President Ketumile Masire
Successful project implementation is critical in development planning. If there is poor
project implementation, economic development will be stalled. Generally, public project
implementation has a chequered history. This is particularly true in developing countries
which are characterised by low levels of project management maturity. The objective of this
article is to review public project implementation in Botswana and recommend improvements
for the National Development Plan (NDP) 11 period (2017/2018-2022/2023). The article used
the survey strategy and adopted the descriptive approach. Data collection sources were mixed,
that is, primary and secondary sources. It concluded that public projects are either poorly
implemented (i.e. not implemented in accordance with the ‘Project Management Triple
Constraint’ of cost, time and scope) or not implemented at all. Given a constrained revenue
envelope post 2008, there is a need for improved project implementation. Amongst others, this
calls for professional public project implementation so that NDPs become a reality.
Enhancing public project implementaon in Botswana
during the NDP 11 period
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publically raised the issue in mid-1995, when he stated that
‘there is a growing gap between the establishment of policy
and its implementation’ and that ‘the rapid growth in the
formulation of policies have [sic] not been matched by the pace
of implementation’ (Lucas 2008:10). Masire’s successor, Festus
Mogae (1998–2008), similarly worried about the issue. This
actuated him to recall then Vice President Ian Khama from a
12-month sabbatical leave in August 2000 to oversee public
project implementation. He put it concretely saying that he
recalled his vice ‘so that he could direct and coordinate
ministries to ensure efficiency and expeditious implementation
of government projects and programmes’(Botswana Press
Agency [BOPA] 2000:1). In regard to the recent Plan, NDP 10,
a midterm review conducted in 2012 showed that public
project implementation is still problematic. As the country is
currently implementing NDP 11 and given fiscal strictures
post 2008, it is vital that issues of improved public project
implementation be brought to the fore of public discourse.
This is what this article primarily intends to do.
The article is organised as follows: firstly, it reviews the
literature on project implementation. Secondly, it discusses
the research methodology. Thirdly, it discusses the institutional
framework of public project implementation in Botswana.
Fourthly, it discusses project implementation issues in
Botswana (field stories). Fifthly, it makes suggestions to
improve the regime of public project implementation in
Botswana during the NDP 11 period (2017/2018–2022/2023).
Finally, it concludes with summarising thoughts.
Literature review on project
implementaon
There are five phases in the life of a project: (1) initiation, (2)
planning, (3) implementation (sometimes called execution),
(4) monitoring and controlling and (5) commissioning
and close-out (e.g. see Project Management Institute 2013).
For expositional clarity, it is very important to define key
operational terms such as implementation. Implementation is
defined as a specified set of activities designed to put into
practice an activity or programme of known dimensions
(National Implementation Research Network 2014). In a
related vein, implementation is defined ‘as a specified set
of activities designed to put into practice an activity or
programme of known dimensions’ (Fixsen et al. 2005:5).
Employing Fixsen et al.’s definition, ‘implementation
processes are purposeful and are described in sufficient
detail such that independent observers can detect the
presence and strength of the “specific set of activities”
related to implementation’ (Fixsen et al. 2005:5). Developing
the definition of implementation further, Fixsen et al. argue
that regard must be paid to two sets of activities: (1)
intervention-level activity and (2) implementation-level
activity, and two sets of outcomes: (1) intervention outcomes
and (2) implementation outcomes. In this regard,
intervention-level activities and implementation-level
activities are very highly and positively related in that
effective intervention outcomes will necessarily lead to
effective implementation outcomes. That is, the right
interventions, correctly applied, must lead to the desired
implementation outcomes.
Implementation is the most important phase of the project
cycle (Association for Project Management 2006; Hoare 1973;
Maruapula 2008; Meredith & Mantel 2012). Successful project
implementation will result in a successful project. However,
successful project implementation is complex and difficult
(Slevin & Pinto 1987). However, this is not to say that
successful project implementation is an impossible feat or a
quest for the Holy Grail. The challenge, therefore, is to deploy
all efforts to ensure successful implementation, and hence a
successful project. Vitally, what is a successful project? Put
another way, what are the success criteria for successful
project implementation? This subject has excited debate in
the project management literature and also spawned a
cornucopia of writings on the subject (e.g. see Baker, Murphy
& Fisher 1983; Cleland & King 1983; Locke 1984; Martin 1976;
Sayles & Chandler 1971). Slevin and Pinto (1987:34) have
developed 10 successful project implementation factors as:
• Project mission: initial clarity of goals and general direction.
• Top management support: willingness of top management
to provide the necessary resources and authority or
power required for project implementation.
• Project schedules and plans: detailed specification of the
individual action steps required for project implementation.
• Client consultation: communication and consultation, and
active listening, to all affected parties.
• Personnel: recruitment, selection and training of the
necessary personnel for the project team.
• Technical tasks: availability of the required technology and
expertise to accomplish the specific action steps.
• Client acceptance: the act of ‘selling’ the final product to its
intended users.
• Monitoring and feedback: timely provision of comprehensive
control information at each stage in the implementation
process.
• Trouble shooting: ability to handle unexpected crises and
deviations from the plan.
All things being equal, successful project implementation
would ensure project success. At a minimum, a successful
project must be implemented as per the Project Management
Triangle (also known as Triple Constraint or the Iron Triangle)
of ‘scope’ (quality), ‘time’ and ‘cost/budget’. The Project
Management Triangle constitutes key performance indicators
(KPIs). However, it is vital to note that although KPIs
constitute necessary conditions for project success, they
do not constitute sufficient conditions for project success.
Therefore, a project manager must cast his or her eyes beyond
KPIs. He or she must also consider key success factors (KSFs)
(e.g. see Kerzner 2006 on KSFs). Examples of KSFs are scope,
schedule, budget, risk, resources and quality (Kerzner 2006).
It has been a well-recognised axiom in project management
research that the project implementation process can be
greatly facilitated by addressing a variety of project critical
success factors (Pinto & Prescott 1990:305). Pinto and

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Prescott argue that critical factors often fall into two
distinct subgroups: (1) those related to initial project
planning and (2) those concerned with subsequent tactical
operationalisation. Despite guidance in terms of successful
project implementation factors, the literature is replete
with instances of unsuccessful project implementation in
both developed and developing countries. In the main,
this results in time and budget (cost) overruns and poor
quality products. It is notable that causes of poor project
implementation are multifaceted, multidimensional and
happen at different levels. These are as follows: (1) the
project, (2) project manager and team members, (3) factors
related to the organisation and (4) factors related to the
external environment. Therefore, it is vital to look at these
various aspects of poor project implementation.
Botswana, similarly, suffers from the malaise of poor
project implementation. This has been documented in
works by, amongst others, Maruapula (2008), Phatshwe
(2014), Kaboyakgosi and Sengwaketse (2003), Kaboyakgosi
and Marata (2013), Khama (2012) and Mathambo (2014,
2015), midterm reviews of NDPs, consultancy reports and
newspaper reports (e.g. BOPA 2000, 2012, 2013, 2015; Lucas
2008; Segaetsho & Mpuang 2015; Sunday Standard Reporter
2015). Memorably, when delivering the opening address
at the 12th National Business Council on 14 October 2012,
President Ian Khama (2012) said:
Our policy framework is good, but implementation continues to
be a challenge on account of the regulatory framework and
rigorous processes. This, I believe, calls for Government to
review the existing processes in order to expedite service
delivery if we are to succeed in our economic diversification
efforts. (Khama 2012:12)
Although there is a universal agreement in Botswana
that the country suffers from the malaise of poor project
implementation, the Botswana-specific literature is yet to
definitively pronounce on the causes. Nonetheless, there
have been efforts to document causes of poor project
implementation, for example declining public accountability,
lack of commitment to reforming the public sector, decline
in commitment by state authorities (Kaboyakgosi & Marata
2013:316) and lack of a culture of professional project
management in Botswana (Maruapula 2008). In conclusion,
the cumulative effects of poor project implementation are as
follows: (1) time and budget (cost overruns) and (2) shoddy
projects. Moving forward, there is a demonstrated case for
improved public project implementation. This is particularly
pertinent in an era characterised by fiscal stress during the
NDP 11 period (2017/2018–2022/2023).
Research methodology
This article is grounded in the intrepretivist research
philosophy and used the survey strategy. It adopted the
descriptive approach because it primarily sought to observe
and describe the state of affairs, the state of public project
implementation in Botswana. In terms of data collection,
the article used methodological triangulation by using both
primary and secondary data collection sources. Primary data
collection was in the form of an interview with one senior
officer at the Government Implementation Coordination
Office (GICO). Very vital to note, ‘qualitative research methods
differ from quantitative approaches in many important
respects, not the least of which is the latter’s emphasis on
numbers’ (Baker & Edwards 2012:8); therefore, the author
chose to conduct one in-depth interview with a senior officer
at the GICO. Secondary data sources were multiple and
varied: published works (e.g. Kaboyakgosi & Marata 2013;
Kaboyakgosi & Sengwaketse 2003; Khama 2012; Maruapula
2008; Mathambo 2014, 2015; Phatshwe 2014), midterm reviews
of NDPs, consultancy reports and newspaper reports (e.g.
BOPA 2000, 2012, 2013, 2015; Lucas 2008; Segaetsho & Mpuang
2015; Sunday Standard Reporter 2015). Finally, data analysis
was in the form of interview (for primary data) and document
analyses (for secondary data). The analysis was also used as
the basis for policy recommendations.
Instuonal framework of public
project implementaon in
Botswana
Although the formulation of the NDPs predates
independence, the first being Transitional National
Development produced in 1965 (a year before independence
in September 1966), there were no formal arrangements to
coordinate project implementation. Even at the time that
Botswana was inaugurating a series of public sector reforms
such as the Work Improvement Teams movement in 1992,
followed by the Performance-based Management System in
the late 1990s and cognate tools such as Business Process
Reengineering and Balanced Score Card, public project
implementation was not accorded the prominence it deserved
despite the fact that successful project delivery is critical to
the translation of national goals into reality. At the same time,
there was concern over poor public project implementation
as sufficiently instanced by then President Ketumile Masire,
lamenting in mid-1995 that ‘there is a growing gap between
the establishment of policy and its implementation’ and that
‘the rapid growth in the formulation of policies have [sic] not
been matched by the pace of implementation’ (Lucas 2008:10).
However, these lamentations were not matched by any
policy action through the establishment of public project
implementation tools save ad hoc ones that oversaw
implementation in a disjointed fashion. With the departure of
Masire, Festus Mogae took over on 01 April 2008 during the
tail end of NDP 9. He too worried over the issue of poor
public project implementation. This actuated him to recall his
then vice president, Ian Khama, from an unprecedented
sabbatical in early August 2000 so that he could oversee
public project implementation. Mogae reasoned that the
recall was so that he (Khama) ‘could direct and
coordinate ministries to ensure efficiency and expeditious
implementation of government projects and programmes’
(BOPA 2000:1). Mogae also did something unprecedented;
he divested the vice president of his ministerial duties
(then, he was the Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public

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Administration) so that he could only concentrate on the
overseeing of public project implementation. With no
performance targets established, there was no tool to judge
the performance of the public project implementation czar.
However, with the benefit of hindsight, it can be believably
argued that nothing significantly changed regarding public
project implementation. That is, public project implementation
was still very problematic.
At the same time, there were moves to improve the
institutional architecture of public project implementation as
instanced by reforms that saw the merging of then Department
of Architecture and Building Services (DABS) and Department
of Electrical and Mechanical Services (DEMS). The merging
resulted in the creation of the Department of Engineering and
Building Services (DBES) on 11 August 2003. DBES has the
portfolio responsibility for government building development
projects, their associated infrastructure, engineering services
and the maintenance of government building, and electrical
and mechanical stock (Government of Botswana 2011).
Amongst its many divisions is the Project Implementation
Division (PID). The division is comprised of 10 units, with
each unit assigned a specific portfolio of projects or ministries
that it is responsible for. Each unit coordinates a project team
made up of consultants and contractors engaged to deliver
projects for the relevant government ministry (Government
of Botswana 2011). Ever since the creation of the DBES,
Botswana experienced a phenomenal growth in the gross
domestic product with a corresponding increase in activities
including construction projects (Government of Botswana
2011). The growth in the construction industry was largely
driven by government projects initiated by ministries even
though their implementation was the responsibility of the
DBES. Post 2008, there was a slowdown in construction
activity. However, the DBES was equally involved in finishing
ongoing projects. To enhance operational efficiency, the DBES
was structured to meet the systemic problems that were
inherent in the former DABS and DEMS (Government of
Botswana 2011). The focus has, therefore, been on creating a
viable and vibrant Department that is modernised and
streamlined to be efficient in service delivery (Government of
Botswana 2011). Although no studies have been conducted to
assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the DBES in regard
to its mandate of project implementation, anecdotal evidence
seems to suggest that there have been issues with public
project implementation. Epic failures such as National
Stadium in Gaborone, Sir Seretse Khama International Airport
in Gaborone, Francistown Stadium in the City of Francistown
and Morupule B Power Plant in Palapye speak volumes on
the public project implementation record of the DBES. Even
though the poor record of public project implementation
cannot be solely laid at the door of the DBES, the Department
must take a disproportionate share of the blame because it is
the project manager. To this end, in project management, the
project manager must shoulder a disproportionate share of
project failures.
In view of the above-mentioned problems that were
faced by the DBES and in a bid to coordinate public project
implementation, the government established the GICO in
May 2007. By late 2008, the government had kick-started the
operationalisation of the GICO. When speaking at the signing
of a management contract between GICO and Accenture,
then director general of the GICO, Moses Lekaukau, stated
that setting up the GICO was a ‘tall order’ (BOPA 2008a:2).
Specifically, he said that ‘it has been a tall order because the
office had to be set up from scratch including the selection
and recruitment of professional and support staff’ (BOPA
2008a:2). GICO replaced prior arrangements in which project
implementation coordination was carried out through the
Standing Committee on Projects Implementation (SCOPI)
and bilateral meetings between DBES and Government
Implementing Agency. Underscoring the central role played
by the GICO in public project implementation and budget
effectiveness, Lekaukau said that ‘it is now imperative that
government policies are implemented through programmes
and projects to benefit the society’ and that ‘the ideal goal of
any country is to spend 100 per cent of its annual development
budget, and it is GICO’s mandate to aid the nation to achieve
the ideal’ (BOPA 2008a:2). GICO was dissolved and subsumed
into the National Strategy Office (NSO) in May 2009. As part
of further public sector reforms, the Government
Implementation Coordination Unit (GISU) was created
within the NSO to further improve project implementation in
May 2014. Upon further reflection, the government decided
to separate strategy and public project implementation
functions. The thinking was that ‘NSO had to focus on
strategy issues and GICO to focus on the monitoring of the
implementation of government projects’ (Interview, 16
November 2016). This resulted in the decoupling of the GICO
from the NSO such that the two are stand-alone entities. The
reconstituted GICO has the same mandate that was given to
it when it was first established in May 2007. However, it has
introduced innovations such as the project management
dashboard (PMD) that is shown in Figure 1.
As is deducible from Figure 1, GICO has developed and uses
PMDs. It is notable that GICO did not reinvent the wheel
because its tool is based on PMDs that are readily available
from the Project Management literature (see e.g. Kerzner
2013). A PMD is the central component of project tracking
systems and, amongst others, it provides project managers
with an overview of a project’s progress. It captures data
about achievement of milestones and displays the
information in a simple format. It has project metrics that are
measurable and actionable. It is notable that the PMD in
Figure 1 allows GICO to track project management KPIs.
These are as follows: (1) Planned Value project KPI (this is the
budgeted cost of work scheduled), (2) Actual Cost project
KPI (this is the actual cost of work performed) and (3) Earned
Value project KPI (this is the budgeted cost of work
performed).
GICO has also developed service score cards. To provide a
brief explanation, ‘the Community Score Card (CSC) is a two-
way and ongoing participatory tool for assessment, planning,
monitoring and evaluation of services’ (CARE [Malawi]
2013:5). The CSC brings together the demand side (‘service

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user’) and the supply side (‘service provider ’) of a particular
service or programme to jointly analyse issues underlying
service delivery problems and find a common and shared
way of addressing those issues (CARE [Malawi] 2013:5).
Amongst others, the score card enhances participation,
accountability and transparency between service users,
providers and decision-makers (CARE [Malawi] 2013:5).
Through the tool, the community scores the implementation
of services and projects (see Table 1).
The scores are displayed in bar charts as shown in Figure 2,
and the information is shared with service providers so that
they can take corrective action.
Finally, key service providers, being ministries, are rated
on their performance on the following core mandate
areas: implementation of policies, programmes and
projects, Business and Economic Advisory Council1 action
items, performance of parastatals, committee of supply,
maintenance of facilities, service delivery, 10-point
agenda2, youth empowerment and dipitso.3 The ministries are
ranked on a three-point scale of ‘Very Good or Good’ (colour-
coded green), ‘Satisfactory’ (colour-coded yellow) and
‘Unsatisfactory’ (colour-coded red) as shown in Table 2.
1.The Business and Economic Advisory Council (BEAC) was established in August 2005
to address the challenge of lack of economic diversicaon in Botswana.
2.The 10-point agenda was introduced as a government service pledge with clearly
laid out service standards that were developed to improve the quality of service and
producvity level within the public service.
3.These are public opinion–gathering events.
Currently, there are 18 ministries, some examples being (1)
Presidential Affairs, Governance and Public Administration,
(2) Defence, Justice and Security, (3) Agricultural Development
and Food Security, (4) Infrastructure and Housing Development,
(5) Ministry of Basic Education, (6) Environment, Natural
Resources Conservation and Tourism and (7) Finance and
Economic Development, which are appraised. These annual
appraisals are conducted by the GICO and remitted to the
Office of the President for dialogue with the ministries.
In addition to the establishment of the GICO, the Khama
administration (01 April 2008–present) came up with other
public project implementation-enhancing initiatives. Chief
among them was the 5th D (Delivery). To provide a context,
President Ian Khama on 01 April 2008 introduced 4 Ds as
Democracy, Dignity, Discipline and Development (Khama
2008). Over time, and informed by his interaction with the
nation through kgotla meetings (public meetings), it became
apparent to Khama that public service delivery was
problematic. This actuated to him to introduce the 5th D
(Delivery) to his 4-D roadmap. Immediately after the
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) won the general election
in 2009, he introduced the 5th D on 18 October 18, saying:
I have already started my job as the President. I am adding
another ‘D’ to the Four Ds I introduced when I took over last
year. I am introducing the Fifth ‘D’ for Delivery. You are going to
see us deliver, you shall be the witnesses. (Gaotlhobogwe 2009:1)
Admittedly, not enough empirical work has been conducted
to assess the efficacy of various initiatives such as the GICO
and 5th D. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that,
overall, public project implementation is problematic. Next,
the article discusses stories from the field that confirm that
there are challenges in public project implementation.
Stories from the eld on public
project implementaon
Apart from documented work by Maruapula (2008),
Phatshwe (2014), Kaboyakgosi and Sengwaketse (2003)
and Kaboyakgosi and Marata (2013), amongst others, on
problems of public project implementation, stories from
Budget Timelines Progress
(%
completed)
Reasons if
progress below
target
Recommendaons
and proposed
acons
Project name
Locaon of the
project
Execung
enty/contractor
Implemenng
Ministry/Dept.
Sub-project
name
Planned
Actual
expenditure
Scheduled start
date
Scheduled finish
date
Actual start
date
Actual finish
date
Days behind
schedule
Target
Actual
Source: GICO oce 2016
FIGURE 1: GICO’s project management dashboard.
TABLE 1: Sample combined service score card.
ServiceaScoring (0%–100%)b
Adequacy and condion of classrooms 50
Availability of electricity 60
Vehicle registraon 70
Issuance of drivers’ licence 55
Land allocaon 78
Transport availability 75
Refuse collecon 20
aThis is a sample of services. Typically, the number is larger than 7; it can go up to 30.
bThe scores are the author ’s subjecve scoring to demonstrate the use of the service score
card.
Source: GICO oce 2016

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the field provide an insight into the problem as is illustrated
next. The issue was thrust to national prominence during
the 12th National Business Conference (NBC) that was
held in Francistown from 14 to 17 October 2012. The
overarching objective of the 12th NBC was to discuss the
issue of implementation as sufficiently deducible from the
theme Interrogating Implementation – why is it a challenge?
Leaders and visionaries from the government and private
sector shared and exchanged ideas on a variety of themes.
These included some of the following: Infrastructure
Development, Education and Skills Development, Land
Use for Business, Privatisation, Economic Diversification,
Youth Unemployment and Diamond Trading Company
International’s relocation from London to Botswana. The
NBC was attended by President Ian Khama, amongst
others. President Khama talked of the need to enhance
project implementation when officially opening the 12th
NBC. To illustrate, he said that despite a good policy
framework, project implementation continued to be a
challenge because of the regulatory framework and
rigorous processes (BOPA 2012:1). Very importantly, he
told the participants that the problem of problematic
project implementation demanded interventions from all
stakeholders. He thus said:
it is a hallmark of my administration to listen to a range of views,
whether conventional or unconventional, from within the
government, from the private sector, from civil society and from
outside the country. (BOPA 2012:1)
He also implored the private sector to improve its work ethic
so that it successfully delivered government projects like it
did with respect to private sector projects. Finally, he assured
the participants that input from fora such as the NBC was
being factored into the public policymaking process. In a
confirmatory vein, he stated that resolutions emanating
from the previous NBCs had been implemented, thereby
‘making Botswana much better’ (BOPA 2012:1).
Politicians, eschewing partisan politics, often express
misgivings about poor public project implementation. To
illustrate, when debating the 2013/2014 Budget Speech in
Parliament, the then Member of Parliament for the Nkange
constituency, Edwin Batshu, warned government to act
swiftly to remedy the problem of slow implementation of
projects facing the public sector (BOPA 2013). He expressed
the concern that delays were costly and thus delayed
developments. Batshu gave the example of the Morupule
B power project ‘as one of the major disappointments
concerning implementation of government projects’ (BOPA
2013). He lamented that the construction of the power station,
which was envisaged to increase production of electricity
in Botswana, did not meet the planned completion time
(BOPA 2013).4 In a related vein, cabinet ministers have also
expressed worry on poor public project implementation.
4.Even though the project was nished some years beyond schedule, it is fraught with
problems such that the government took a decision to sell the loss-making power
plant to an independent power producer.
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Adequacy and
condion of
classrooms
Availability
of electricity
Vehicle
registraon
Issuance of
drivers’
licence
Land
allocaon
Transport
availability
Refuse
collecon
20
75
78
55
70
60
50
Source: GICO Oce (2016)
Figure 2: Sample combined service score card.
TABLE 2: Performance on core mandate areas.
Review area Very good or good Sasfactory Unsasfactory
Implementaon of policies
Business and Economic
Advisory Council acon items
Performance of parastatals
Commiee of supply
Maintenance of facilies
Service delivery
10-point agenda
Youth empowerment
Dipitso
Source: GICO oce 2016

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In this regard, an excerpt from then Minister of Finance
and Development Planning, Kenneth Mathambo, when
delivering the 2015/2016 Budget Speech on 02 February 2015,
is enlightening and very sobering. Addressing issues of poor
public project implementation, he said:
Madam Speaker, project implementation remains one of the
challenges facing the Government. During NDP 10, the
development budget has been underspent by an average of 17.3
percent for the years 2011/2012 through 2013/2014, due to
delayed project implementation. Even where projects are finally
delivered, they are usually characterised by cost overruns and
questionable quality. (Mathambo 2015:6)
It is deducible from the above-mentioned selected field
stories that there are serious challenges surrounding
public project implementation in Botswana. In a related
vein, assessments by third parties (i.e. those external to the
government) are not very encouraging for they echo the
same message. To illustrate, in late January 2015, Innolead
Consulting co-hosted a seminar with Oracle Primavera at the
Gaborone International Convention Centre. What came out
during the discussions strongly suggests that governmental
operational processes and systems are not well primed for
project management (Sunday Standard Reporter 2015). It is
notable that although the government spends huge sums of
money on project management training, the outcome is not
bearing any fruit. For instance, it was stated that ‘the current
situation doesn’t allow people to use skills they have learnt’
and that ‘some of the engineers who receive project
management … are not given responsibilities in line with this
training but resume their normal duties when they get back
to the office’ (Sunday Standard Reporter 2015).
It can be concluded from the preceding brief survey that
efforts to enhance public project implementation have not
borne commendable fruit. Therefore, as stated by then
Minister of Finance and Development Planning when he
delivered the 2015/2016 Budget Speech on 02 February 2015.
‘during NDP 10, the development budget has been
underspent by an average of 17.3 percent for the years
2011/2012 through 2013/2014, due to delayed project
implementation’ (Mathambo 2015:6); this is a cause for worry.
In a related vein, a midterm review of NDP 10 (Ministry of
Finance and Development Planning 2012) shows that there
are public project implementation challenges. In specific
reference to the public buildings sector, the report alluded
that ‘poor project management due to insufficient planning
and skills capacity deficiency reduce efficiency of project
delivery’ (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
2012:37). The results were the following: project cost overruns,
frequent scope changes, conflicts on sites and late completion
of projects (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
2012:37). In addition, some projects that were lined up for
implementation during the NDP 10 period were not
implemented. The result is that these projects, if still needed,
will be rolled over to NDP 11 which commenced operations
on 01 April 2017. It is notable that the NDP 11 period,
2017/2018–2022/2023, presents serious challenges, the most
being a constrained fiscal envelope. The 2017/2018 Budget
Strategy Paper, the precursor to the 2017/2018 budget,
forecasts budget deficits for the 2016/2017, 2017/2018,
2018/2019 and 2019/2020 financial years mainly because of
declining diamond revenues (Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning 2016). This, ineluctably, means that
there will be limited revenues to fund NDP 11 development
projects. In summary, it means that there is a need to revamp
the architecture of public project implementation in Botswana.
Suggesons for improving public
project implementaon during
NDP 11
Admittedly, enhancing the architecture of public
project implementation in Botswana needs a multifaceted,
multilayered and multistakeholder approach. That is, the
enterprise must be approached from many and varied
angles as briefly recommended below.
Professional Project Management: as variously documented in
the literature (e.g. see Association for Project Management
2006; Hoare 1973; Maruapula 2008; Meredith & Mantel 2012),
implementation is the most important phase of the project
cycle. Therefore, utmost attention must be paid to the
implementation phase of the project cycle as counselled by
Thato Raphaka, then Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of
Local Government, when launching the draft NDP 10 in
October 2008. He counselled:
Let me caution you that we may have good policies, programmes
and strategies but if our capacity to implement them, both within
government and in the economy as a whole is wanting, then we
may not easily reach our noble intentions. (BOPA 2008b:1)
Amongst others, successful public project implementation is
predicated on the application of the science of professional
project management, complete with trained (career) project
managers. Two problems are evident in the public sector: (1)
lack of an approach to professional project management and
(2) preponderant use of accidental project managers. Project
management is not accidental; it is something that is
purposeful. Therefore, there is a need to cultivate a culture of
professional project management in the public sector. That is,
the government cannot practise project management by
accident. In a related vein, there is a tendency to appoint non-
project managers as project managers. In summary, these are
engineers and senior public servants who just happen to be
occupying a certain managerial (or senior) position.
Without detracting from the professional training of either
engineers or senior public servants, this cadre of personnel is
trained in its respective field of either engineering or public
management. So, on a balance of probabilities, they could be
seasoned engineers or public managers. However, this is as
far as their professional competency goes; they cannot be
project managers (unless as accidental project managers). In
fact, in a field trip undertaken by the author with his Project
Management class in September 2015, one of the project
officers decried the practice of appointing non-project

Page 8 of 9 Original Research
hp://www.apsdpr.org Open Access
managers as project managers. He told the author that ‘the
trouble is that some of us are not trained as project managers
but we are deployed as project managers’ (Interview, 15
September 2015). This practice must stop.
Increased responsibility for performance: in the era of New Public
Management, public managers are, on the one hand, given a
wide berth of discretion to run their departments like
entrepreneurial entities, amongst others. On the other hand,
they are expected to account more for their performance (i.e.
results or non-results). While the law, for example, Public
Finance Management Act (2011), provides for sanctions for
incidents in which the government needlessly loses money
through the actions of public officials, this is done in the
breach than in the observance. In the end, the government
loses billions of Pula5 because of, amongst others, negligence,
but only a few are held to account for these losses. Hence, the
time is nigh for public officials to be held accountable for
their performance with respect to project implementation.
Resourcing and capacitating of DBES: as the department
responsible for public project implementation, it is vital that
the DBES is adequately resourced and capacitated despite
challenges of fiscal strictures post 2008. It became apparent
from discussions with some DBES staff during a field trip
undertaken by the author with his Project Management class
in September 2015 that the DBES is beset with resource and
capacity constraints (particularly, financial resources and
trained project managers and project officers).
Transformation of GICO into a delivery unit: it is apparent
that GICO has a very extensive mandate – to coordinate
the implementation of programmes and projects across
government to ensure efficient service delivery. To do so, it
must be adequately resourced and capacitated. Post 2008,
like other government departments, GICO has had to
contend with resource and capacity problems (Interview, 16
November 2016). Beyond resourcing and capacitating GICO,
there is a need to widen the mandate of GICO and transform
it into a Public Service Delivery Unit. In this regard, several
governments around the world have established Public
Service Delivery Units. Examples are UK (Prime Minister
Tony Blair created the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit in
June 2001 – this was abolished in 2010), India (the Cabinet
Secretariat for Performance Management), Indonesia
(Presidential Unit), Malaysia (Performance Management
Delivery Unit) and South Africa (Delivery Unit). These units
are ‘generally tasked with the mandate to drive performance
improvements in critical service delivery areas’ and may be
in addition required to implement ‘broader reforms to
improve performance, such as restructuring civil service
terms, performance-based contracts or delegation of financial
management’ (World Bank 2010:2). Thus, Botswana can peer-
learn and benchmark from these said case studies. It does not
need to apply the lessons wholesale; it can customise them by
paying heed to Botswana-specific circumstances.
5.At the me of wring this arcle (6 July 2017), one Botswana Pula (BWP) = 0.096 US
Dollar.
Conclusion
The government has an obligation to provide goods that
the market either cannot produce (e.g. national defence)
or produces in insufficient quantities (e.g. education and
health services). Unfortunately, governments have to deal
with everlasting issues of resource scarcity. In addition,
as custodians of national resources, governments must
unremittingly pursue prudent financial management. To
address the twin issues of resource scarcity and prudent
financial management, particularly the former, the
government of Botswana engages in national development
planning. Planning is actualised through NDPs that are
produced every six years. The NDPs are mere intentions
that can only have a meaning if they are translated into
goods and services, such as schools and hospitals,
to improve the lives of the Batswana. Therefore, project
implementation is key to this success. However, Botswana
has a chequered history of project implementation as
documented in the literature. A review of the NDPs,
particularly NDP 10, shows that public project
implementation is very problematic. NDP 10 came to an
end on 31 March 2017 and parliament approved a draft of
NDP 11, the implementation of which began on 01 April
2017. Given a constrained revenue envelope post 2008, it is
imperative that things should be done differently. Thus, the
case for improved public project implementation should be
apparent to all. Amongst others, this calls for the adoption
of professional public project implementation and increased
responsibility for results and non-results by public
managers. Doing so will ensure that NDPs are actualised
and, therefore, translated into tangibles such as goods and
services.
Acknowledgements
Compeng interests
The author declares that he has no financial or personal
relationships which may have inappropriately influenced
him in writing this article.
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