Intellectual humility and openness to the opposing view

Abstract

Strong disagreements have stymied today’s political discourse. We investigate intellectual humility – recognizing the limits of one’s knowledge and appreciating others’ intellectual strengths – as one factor that can make disagreements more constructive. In Studies 1 and 2, participants with higher intellectual humility were more open to learning about the opposition’s views during imagined disagreements. In Study 3, those with higher intellectual humility exposed themselves to a greater proportion of opposing political perspectives. In Study 4, making salient a growth mindset of intelligence boosted intellectual humility, and, in turn, openness to opposing views. Results suggest that intellectual humility is associated with openness during disagreement, and that a growth mindset of intelligence may increase intellectual humility. Implications for current political polarization are discussed.

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Self and Identity
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Intellectual humility and openness to the opposing
view
Tenelle Porter & Karina Schumann
To cite this article: Tenelle Porter & Karina Schumann (2018) Intellectual humility and openness to
the opposing view, Self and Identity, 17:2, 139-162, DOI: 10.1080/15298868.2017.1361861
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2017.1361861
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SELF AND IDENTITY, 2018
VOL. 17, NO. 2, 139162
https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2017.1361861
Intellectual humility and openness to the opposing view
TenellePortera§ and KarinaSchumannb
aDepartment of Human Ecology, University of California, Davis, CA, USA; bDepartment of Psychology, University
of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
ABSTRACT
Strong disagreements have stymied today’s political discourse. We
investigate intellectual humility – recognizing the limits of one’s
knowledge and appreciating others’ intellectual strengths – as one
factor that can make disagreements more constructive. In Studies
1 and 2, participants with higher intellectual humility were more
open to learning about the opposition’s views during imagined
disagreements. In Study 3, those with higher intellectual humility
exposed themselves to a greater proportion of opposing political
perspectives. In Study 4, making salient a growth mindset of
intelligence boosted intellectual humility, and, in turn, openness to
opposing views. Results suggest that intellectual humility is associated
with openness during disagreement, and that a growth mindset of
intelligence may increase intellectual humility. Implications for current
political polarization are discussed.
I confess that there are several parts of this Constitution which I do not at present approve, but
… I cannot help expressing a wish that every member of the Convention who may still have
objections to it, would with me, on this occasion doubt a little of his own infallibility – and, to
make manifest our unanimity, put his name to this instrument.
– Benjamin Franklin
In 1787, with the eyes of the world upon them, delegates gathered in Philadelphia to reach
consensus on a United States Constitution. There were many issues that deeply divided them,
but Benjamin Franklin, in the speech cited above, asked his fellow delegates to accept the falli-
bility of their own opinions, to trust the collective wisdom in the room, and to reach an agreement
for the greater good (Webb, 2012). Today’s political discourse is characterized by similarly strong
disagreements, but too often lacks the self-scrutiny and respect for other positions that Franklin
sought to foster. Indeed, congressional gridlock has stymied productivity and cut in half the
number of substantive bills passed by Congress (Desilver, 2014). Much of the electorate seems
similarly unwilling to grant any validity to opposing views (Pew Research Center, 2016a).
However, disagreements can also play a constructive role. They can optimize deci-
sion-making by minimizing “groupthink” – the process by which people reach a premature
and misguided consensus (Janis, 1982). Resolving them can sometimes even increase
© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
KEYWORDS
Humility; open-mindedness;
growth mindset; politics;
disagreement
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 8 June 2017
Accepted24 July 2017
Published online9 August
2017
CONTACT Tenelle Porter tjporter@ucdavis.edu
§Department of Human Ecology, University of California, Davis, CA, USA.
The supplemental data for this article is available online at https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2017.1361861.

140 T. PORTER AND K. SCHUMANN
feelings of closeness between conicting parties (McCullough et al., 1998; Overall, Sibley, &
Travaglia, 2010). When might this happen? Research suggests that disagreements are most
fruitful when each person tries to understand the other’s position (de Wied, Branje, & Meeus,
2007; Kahn & Lawhorne, 2003; McCullough et al., 1998). Indeed, experts in conict resolution
often instruct people to do this very thing by asking questions and listening to the other
side (Stone, Patton, & Heen, 2010).
Here we ask: What determines whether people will be open to learning about the oppos-
ing view? We propose a key role for intellectual humility and dene it as a willingness to
recognize the limits of one’s knowledge and appreciate others’ intellectual strengths. Past
work suggests that people are particularly closed-minded to contrary perspectives when
they feel defensive about their competence (Tjosvold, Johnson, & Fabrey, 1980), or are highly
motivated to perceive themselves as “right” or superior in their knowledge (Vaknin, 2001).
People high in intellectual humility might feel less motivated to defend their correctness
and intellectual superiority because they are more comfortable acknowledging their intel-
lectual fallibility. We therefore predict that intellectual humility will be associated with open-
ness to learning about opposing perspectives, even during disagreements about highly
charged topics.
Conceptualizing intellectual humility
Several conceptualizations of intellectual humility have recently emerged in the research
literature. Intellectual humility has been described as the “disinclination to regard a belief
as true just because it’s one’s own” (Gregg & Mahadevan, 2014, p. 8), as having “insights about
the limits of one’s knowledge” (McElroy et al., 2014), as “a nonthreatening awareness of one’s
intellectual fallibility” (Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016, p. 2), as “the degree to which people
recognize their beliefs might be wrong” (Leary et al., 2017, p. 1), and as “a virtuous mean
lying somewhere between the vice[s] of intellectual arrogance … and intellectual didence”
(Samuelson et al., 2014, p. 1). In general, these denitions agree that intellectual humility
involves being aware of one’s intellectual fallibility.
Our conceptualization of intellectual humility includes this awareness, and adds a will-
ingness to appreciate others’ intellectual strengths. Without this other-directed compo-
nent, acknowledging the limitations of one’s knowledge still has the potential to manifest
in a form of intellectual superiority. For example, a person might recognize that her under-
standing of an issue is limited and conclude that this means that no one has the capacity
to understand it. Likewise, someone may think that because he does not know something,
others must not know it either. What is needed for intellectual humility, then, is both an
acknowledgement of one’s partial understanding and an appreciation for the knowledge
that others can possess.1 In support of this conceptualization, a rich theoretical literature
suggests that general humility includes both an accurate awareness of self and an appre-
ciation of others (Davis & Hook, 2014; Emmons, 1999; Owens, Johnson, & Mitchell, 2013;
Tangney, 2000; Wright, Nadelhoer, Ross, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2017), and many humility
measures include an interpersonal component (see Davis & Hook, 2014 for a review).
Regarding its place in a nomological network of humility constructs, many scholars con-
sider intellectual humility to be a sub-domain of General Humility2 (Davis & Hook, 2014;
Davis et al., 2016; Gregg & Mahadevan, 2014; Hopkin, Hoyle, & Toner, 2014). Although general
humility involves having an accurate awareness of self and others across multiple contexts,

SELF AND IDENTITY 141
intellectual humility is a specic type of humility focused on the intellectual domain. In
support of this view, intellectual humility is more predictive than general humility of need
for cognition, openness to experience, and objectivism, all dispositions that primarily concern
intellectual activities (Davis et al., 2016).
Intellectual humility and barriers to openness during disagreements
During many of our daily encounters, we are exposed to perspectives that are in direct
opposition to our own and therefore result in intellectual disagreement. When confronted
with an intellectual disagreement, people are motivated to see themselves as knowledgeable
and their point of view as “the right one” (Ross & Ward, 1996; Taber & Lodge, 2006). This
motivation can lead people to attribute disagreements to a dissenter’s stupidity or misun-
derstanding, rather than to the potential legitimacy of their opposing views (Ross & Ward,
1996). Unfortunately, this undermines the value of opposing perspectives and closes people
o to learning about them. For example, people who feel a strong need to defend their
intellectual competence or superiority derogate opposing perspectives (and the people
holding them) and exhibit greater closed-mindedness to these contrasting views (Tjosvold
et al., 1980; Vaknin, 2001).
We propose that people who are high in intellectual humility might be less closed o to
opposing perspectives because they are more willing to admit their intellectual fallibility
and see intellectual merit in others’ ideas. Compared to those who are low in intellectual
humility, we anticipate that those higher in intellectual humility will make more respectful
attributions for why someone holds opposing views (e.g., because the issues being discussed
are complex), and will be more open to learning about the perspectives of others, even if
those perspectives are in direct opposition to their own.
Empirical research on intellectual humility is just emerging, but past work suggests that
it might be associated with openness to learning in school and on the job (MacPherson,
2015; Owens et al., 2013; Wineburg, 2001). However, learning an academic subject or a new
skill is quite dierent than being willing to learn about the opposing view during a disagree-
ment. Disagreements, especially when they involve near and dear sociopolitical issues, can
arouse strong emotions and defenses, making people more motivated to conrm their own
opinions than to learn about the other side (Taber & Lodge, 2006). Although wise reasoning
– a composite of researcher-coded intellectual humility and dialectical thinking – was asso-
ciated with partisan undergraduates’ interest in joining a bipartisan political group (Kross &
Grossmann, 2012), and although those with higher intellectual humility may be more accept-
ing of those with dierent religious beliefs, and of politicians who change their views –
sometimes called “ip-opping” (Leary et al., 2017), we know of no research that directly
examines the relation between intellectual humility and openness to opposing views. We
therefore designed the current research to investigate this possible link.
Fostering intellectual humility
Most extant research on intellectual humility conceptualizes it as a characteristic that ought
to be relatively stable, and promote similar behaviors across contexts. Some research sup-
ports this conceptualization. For example, Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse (2016) found 1 and
3 month stabilities of intellectual humility to be .75 and .70, respectively. However, even the

142 T. PORTER AND K. SCHUMANN
most well-established traits exhibit both continuity and change (Roberts & Mroczek, 2008;
Roberts, Wood, & Smith, 2005), and do not always produce the same behavior across situa-
tions (Fleeson, 2004). Accordingly, manifestations of intellectual humility can dier with
respect to specic beliefs and attitudes (Hoyle, Davisson, Diebels, & Leary, 2016), and with
respect to how personally relevant the information being evaluated is (Leary et al., 2017).
Wise reasoning, one facet of which is intellectual humility, is also variable across contexts
(Grossmann, 2017; Grossmann, Gerlach, & Denissen, 2016). Moreover, characteristics that
are similar to intellectual humility and considered relatively stable, such as openness to
experience, can be fostered with interventions (e.g., see Jackson, Hill, Payne, Roberts & Stine-
Morrow, 2012).
We therefore expect that although intellectual humility exhibits some degree of stability
within individuals, it may also be shaped by external and internal factors. We anticipate that
one way of enhancing intellectual humility is to reduce people’s motivation to defend their
intellectual correctness and superiority. One possible way of reducing this motivation is to
make salient the belief that people can develop their intelligence (a Growth Mindset of
Intelligence; Dweck, 2000). We reason that acknowledging your intellectual limitations and
listening to opposing perspectives should be less threatening, and the motivation against
doing so less strong, if you believe that you can improve your intelligence by developing
your knowledge. By contrast, acknowledging your intellectual limitations should be more
dicult, and the motivation against doing so stronger, if you believe that doing so may label
you as someone with low xed intelligence. If these predictions are correct, this would
identify a growth mindset of intelligence as one psychological lever for fostering greater
intellectual humility and corresponding adaptive responses. We test this possibility in the
current research.
Overview of studies
We conducted four studies to test our hypothesis that intellectual humility is associated with
greater openness to opposing perspectives. In Study 1, we examined whether intellectual
humility was positively associated with college students’ openness to learning about an
opposing view during imagined classroom disagreements. In Study 2, we tested whether
intellectual humility was positively associated with openness during imagined disagree-
ments about personally important sociopolitical issues. In Study 3, we examined whether
intellectual humility was positively associated with openness to reading about the opposing
sociopolitical position. Finally, in Study 4, we tested whether we could experimentally boost
intellectual humility by making salient a growth mindset of intelligence, which promotes a
non-defensive orientation toward one’s intellectual abilities. We also tested whether this
nudge in intellectual humility would, in turn, predict greater openness to the opposing view.
That is, we tested a mediation model where fostering a growth mindset of intelligence would
indirectly increase openness to the opposing perspective via intellectual humility.
Study 1
In Study 1 we asked: Do those who report having more intellectual humility show more
interest in learning about the opposing view during imagined classroom disagreements?
We also included a number of other personality measures to test whether intellectual

SELF AND IDENTITY 143
humility predicted openness to opposing perspectives over and above a variety of theoret-
ically related constructs.
Method
Participants
We recruited 181 students attending a community college in Northern California (Mage = 23.67,
SD = 7.71, range = 18 to 59; 130 women, 49 men, 2 unspecied).
Materials and procedure
Intellectual humility (IH)
To assess intellectual humility, we developed a 9-item self-report scale that included six
positively-worded (e.g., “I am willing to admit it if I don’t know something”) and three neg-
atively-worded (e.g., “I feel uncomfortable when someone points out one of my intellectual
shortcomings”) items (see Table 1 for full scale). The IH scale had a 1 factor structure when
we modeled method eects of the negatively worded items (see the exploratory and con-
rmatory factor analyses in the Supplementary Materials for results). Thus, we averaged the
9 items in the IH scale (reverse-scoring the three negatively-worded items) to create a uni-
dimensional scale of IH (α = .67). Across all four studies the scale yielded an acceptable
average internal consistency of α = .74. Please refer to Supplementary Materials for all infor-
mation regarding the development of this IH scale, including its relation to socially desirable
responding.
Personality measures
Participants also completed measures that we suspect are empirically related to IH to exam-
ine whether IH predicted responses to disagreement over and above these other constructs.
A White Paper identied these measures (e.g., Need for Cognition; Narcissism) as probable
correlates of IH (Samuelson, Church, Jarvinen, & Paulus, 2012), and other researchers have
assessed similar constructs when exploring intellectual humility’s place in a nomological
network of constructs (e.g., see Leary et al., 2017). These measures, sample items, alphas,
number of items, predicted associations with IH, and key conceptual dierences from IH are
summarized in Table 2.
To investigate the possibility that the IH scale might be erroneously tapping a low view
of oneself or one’s intellectual abilities, we also assessed Self-Esteem, 1-item; (Robins, Hendin,
Table 1.Intellectual humility scale items.
Note: All items rated from 1–7, 1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree.
1 I am willing to admit it if I don’t know something
2 I like to compliment others on their intellectual strengths
3 I try to reflect on my weaknesses in order to develop my intelligence
4 I actively seek feedback on my ideas, even if it is critical
5 I acknowledge when someone knows more than me about a certain subject
6 If someone doesn’t understand my idea, it’s probably because they aren’t smart enough to get it (R)
7 I sometimes marvel at the intellectual abilities of other people
8 I feel uncomfortable when someone points out one of my intellectual shortcomings (R)
9 I don’t like it when someone points out an intellectual mistake that I made (R)

144 T. PORTER AND K. SCHUMANN
Table 2.Intellectual Humility in relation to validation constructs.
*For Study 1, we adapted Ames, Rose, and Anderson (2006) forced-choice measure into a Likert response scale. Research suggests that Likert response adaptations of valid narcissism scales are
themselves valid, and are highly correlated with forced-choice scales (r=.97; Barelds & Dijkstra, 2010).
Constructs Denition & sample item Range
Number of
items & alpha
Predicted
relation
to IH Key dierences from IH
Need for closure A person’s desire for a firm answer to questions and an
aversion toward ambiguity
1–7 15 items Positively
related
Although a person’s need for cognitive closure may sabotage IH,
absence of need for closure does not necessarily lead to presence
of IH“I dislike questions that could be answered in many
different ways”
Study 1 α =
.85 Study 2 α
= .85Webster and Kruglanski (1994)
Narcissism Having a grandiose view of self, sense of superiority,
self-absorption and sense of entitlement
1–7 16 items Negatively
related
IH is not merely the lack of self-absorption or superiority that we
would expect from someone low in narcissism. IH also captures
recognition of intellectual limitations and appreciation of others“I can make anybody believe anything I want them to” Study 1 α = .80
Ames, Rose, and Anderson (2006)* Study 2 α = .77
Openness to
experience
A tendency to be a curious, imaginative, and independ-
ent thinker who is amenable to new ideas, appreciates
art, novelty and adventure
1–7 4 items Positively
related
Openness to experience emphasizes one’s preference for novelty. As
such, it does not capture the defining components of IH
“I am curious about many different things” Study 1 α = .61
John, Donahue, and Kentle (1991) Study 2 α = .77
Need for
cognition
The tendency to enjoy and engage in thinking 1–7 18 items Negatively
related
A person high in IH would likely exhibit a high need for cognition,
but the latter does not capture the core elements of IH of
acknowledging one’s knowledge limitations and others’
intellectual strengths
“Thinking is not my idea of fun” (R) Study 1 α = .91
Cacioppo and Petty (1982) Study 2 α = .93
Modesty Letting one’s accomplishments speak for themselves, not
seeking the spotlight; not regarding oneself as more
special than one is
1–7 10 items Positively
related
Modesty differs from IH in its focus on social awareness and not
drawing too much attention to oneself. The central features of IH
concern how one thinks about their own and others’ knowledge
and intelligence“I don’t brag about my accomplishments” Study 2 α = .79
Park, Peterson, and Seligman (2004)
General humility Having an accurate view of one’s abilities and limitations,
appreciation of others’ abilities, sense of personal
finiteness
1–7 25 items Positively
related
General humility is a broader humility construct than IH. It involves
having an accurate view of one’s abilities and limitations and a
general sense of personal finiteness. By contrast, IH is focused only
on the intellectual domain“In the broader scheme of things, what I will accomplish
in the world is small”
Study 1 α = .68
Bollinger (2010)
Epistemic
curiosity
The drive to know 1–7 10 items Positively
related
Epistemic curiosity does not necessarily indicate that one
acknowledges the limits of his or her knowledge, or value others’
intellectual strengths
“I am interested in discovering how things work” Study 1 α = .89
Litman and Spielberger (2003)
Growth mindset
of intelligence
Tending to believe that intelligence is malleable and can
be developed
1–7 8 items Positively
related
Believing that intelligence is malleable is not the same as acknowl-
edging the limits of one’s knowledge, or valuing the intellectual
strengths of others“No matter who you are, you can significantly change
your intelligence level”
Study 1 α = .94
Dweck (2000) Study 2 α = .92

SELF AND IDENTITY 145
& Trzesniewski, 2001), and Condence in One’s Intelligence, 1 item. We did not assess any
additional constructs in this study beyond what is reported here.
Responses to disagreement
Participants then read three scenarios of classroom disagreements (see Appendix of Study
Materials in the Supplementary Materials for all measures). For each scenario, participants
rated attributions for why their classmate would disagree with them, two of which were
respectful (e.g., “because the essay topic is complex and warrants dierent opinions about
it”), and three of which were disrespectful (e.g., “because they are not as intelligent as I am”);
1 = not at all the reason to 7 = denitely the reason. The disrespectful attributions were reverse-
scored and averaged with the respectful attributions to create an index of respectful attri-
butions for disagreement, α = .90.
Next, participants imagined that the dissenter engaged them in a discussion about the
disagreement outside of class. Participants rated how likely they would be to respond with
openness on 9 items (e.g., “I would try to understand their perspective about the reading,”
“Listen to their reasoning for why they hold their opinion”; 1 = extremely unlikely to
7 = extremely likely). Items were averaged to create an openness composite, α = .89.
Participants then answered a demographics questionnaire.
Results
IH was related to the personality measures largely as expected (see Table 3 for all correlations,
means, and standard deviations). Specically, IH was positively associated with Need for
Cognition, Openness to Experience, and Epistemic Curiosity, suggesting that it taps an open
orientation toward thinking and learning. IH was also positively associated with a Growth
Mindset of Intelligence, a nding that supports our prediction that fostering a growth mind-
set might increase IH (see Study 4). Although in the predicted direction, IH was not signi-
cantly related to Need for Cognitive Closure or Narcissism. IH was not associated with
Self-Esteem or Condence in Intelligence and thus was not tapping a low self-concept or a
lack of intellectual condence.
To examine our hypothesis that those who reported having higher IH would respond
with greater openness to learning about the opposing view, we rst tested the bivariate
correlations. We saw strong positive associations between IH and respectful attributions for
disagreement, r = .40, p < .01, and open-minded responses, r = .48, p < .01. Those with higher
IH were more likely to attribute disagreements to the complexity of the issues being dis-
cussed, and were more open to learning about the opposing view. These dependent varia-
bles were also associated with many of the personality variables that we assessed. Thus, we
conducted a regression analysis controlling for the personality measures to examine whether
intellectual humility could explain unique variance in these outcomes when controlling for
the constellation of related characteristics. Over and above the variance predicted by these
other factors, IH still predicted respectful attributions, B = .23, SE = .10, t(166) = 2.33, p = .021,
95% CI [.04, .43], and openness, B = .23, SE = .07, t(166) = 3.15, p = .002, 95% CI [.09, .37].
Discussion
When faced with disagreement scenarios, participants who were higher in intellectual humil-
ity were more respectful of and more interested in trying to learn about opposing

146 T. PORTER AND K. SCHUMANN
Table 3.Study 1 correlations, means and standard deviations.
*p<.05; **p<.01.
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Intellectual
humility
1
2 Growth
mindset
.233** 1
3 Narcissism −.03 −.02 1
4 General
humility
.419** .260** −.14 1
5 Agreeableness .347** .288** −.06 .314** 1
6 Conscientious-
ness
.304** .222** .173* .290** .353** 1
7 Openness to
experience
.262** .256** .172* .333** .177* .281** 1
8 Extraversion .10 .13 .426** .08 .214** .170* .03 1
9 Emotional
stability
.161* −.06 −.10 −.155* −.212** −.297** .07 −.278** 1
10 Need for
cognition
.260** .177* .00 .358** .05 .260** .441** .157* −.201** 1
11 Need for
closure
−.05 −.12 .376** −.151* −.267** .12 .04 −.07 .337** −.11 1
12 Self esteem .10 .06 .480** .07 .08 .355** .174* .360** −.395** .158* .11 1
13 Confidence .14 .155* .431** .214** .11 .327** .232** .281** −.369** .320** .03 .670** 1
14 Respectful
attributions
.401** .378** −.226** .318** .461** .275** .331** −.10 −.01 .161* −.04 −.04 .00 1
15 Openness in
disagree-
ment
.481** .304** −.243** .445** .411** .309** .358** −.14 .00 .317** −.08 −.04 .07 .744** 1
M (SD) 4.88
(.71)
5.14
(1.30)
4.30
(.84)
4.67
(.55)
5.24
(.97)
5.31
(.98)
5.36
(1.00)
4.22
(1.38)
4.08
(1.31)
4.31
(.96)
4.43
(.89)
4.34
(1.64)
4.73
(1.44)
5.24
(1.03)
4.85
(.79)

SELF AND IDENTITY 147
perspectives. Notably, these associations could not be explained by many related constructs,
even general humility. The specicity of intellectual humility as a construct, in contrast to
the more general personality measures that we assessed, may account for its unique pre-
dictive power when explaining openness during intellectual disagreements.
Although the results of Study 1 provided initial support for our hypothesis, the nature of
the classroom scenarios might have prevented participants from feeling emotionally invested
in these disagreements. In Study 2, we took a step toward addressing this limitation by
having participants imagine a disagreement about a personally important sociopolitical
issue, for which they would have a stronger motivation to assert their correctness by dero-
gating and being closed o to the opposing view.
Study 2
It is not uncommon to discover in conversation that a relative, colleague, or even romantic
partner has a view that is opposite to ours on an important issue. How do we respond in this
situation? Do we listen to this person and try to learn about their perspective? Or do we
ignore, ridicule, or attack them? Here, participants selected a sociopolitical topic they were
passionate about and then indicated how they would respond to a person who disagreed
with them on this issue. We predicted that intellectual humility would be associated with
openness to learning about the opposition’s perspective, even here when the disagreement
was over an important, emotionally evocative topic.
Method
Participants
We recruited 188 American adults (M
age
= 32.84, SD = 11.65, range = 18–69; 109 women and
78 men, 1 unspecied) from the online panel Amazon Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang,
& Gosling, 2011; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). Participants received a small monetary com-
pensation for participating.
Materials and procedure
IH and personality measures
In one online session, participants completed measures of IH (α = .74), additional personality
constructs (see Table 2), and questionnaires assessing Self-Esteem (10 items; α = .91;
Rosenberg, 1965), and Condence in Intelligence (3 items; α = .77; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong,
1995).
Responses to disagreement
Next, participants read about ve contentious issues (e.g., gun control; same-sex marriage)
and indicated their position on the issue (pro or anti). After choosing a position on each
issue, they rated four attributions for why someone might disagree with them about that
issue (e.g., because the issue is complex and warrants dierent opinions). Attributions across
issues were combined to create a respectful attribution composite, α = .81. Participants also
rated how personally important each issue was to them (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely).

148 T. PORTER AND K. SCHUMANN
Participants then chose the one issue out of the ve provided that was most important to
them. They were asked to imagine discussing this issue with a person who endorsed the opposite
view, and rated 8 items similar to those used in Study 1 about how likely they would be to respond
to this person with openness, α = .64. Finally, participants answered demographic questions.
Results
As expected, IH was again positively associated with personality measures tapping an open-
ness to thinking and learning, including Need for Cognition, and Openness to Experience,
and negatively associated with Need for Closure and Narcissism (see Table 4). This study also
replicated the association between a Growth Mindset of Intelligence and IH, providing addi-
tional support for the prediction we will test in Study 4. IH was positively associated with
Modesty and Self-Esteem, but was not signicantly related to Condence in Intelligence,
demonstrating again that the IH scale did not assess a low self-concept.
Participants rated their most important issue as being very important to them, M = 5.98,
SD = 1.27. Yet, although these issues were of great importance, IH was still associated with
more respectful attributions for the disagreement, r = .34, p < .01, and greater openness to
learning about the opposing perspective, r = .33, p < .01. As in Study 1, responses to disa-
greement were also associated with some of the personality constructs that we assessed.
Thus, we repeated the regression analyses done in Study 1 to test whether IH explained
variance in the dependent variables over and above the other factors. Controlling for all of
the personality measures weakened the association between IH and respectful attributions,
B = .13, SE = .08, t(174) = 1.67, p = .097, 95% CI [−.02, .29], but this association remained
signicant when controlling for each personality construct independently, all ps < .05 (see
Table 5 in the Supplementary Materials for partial correlations). As in Study 1, IH predicted
openness over and above all of the validation variables, B = .21, SE = .09, t(173) = 2.29,
p = .023, 95% CI [.03, .39].
Discussion
Study 2 provides another glimpse into how those higher in intellectual humility might react
to a disagreement, this time about a personally important issue. Far from being defensive,
dismissive, or derogatory, those higher in intellectual humility reported being more inter-
ested in learning about the other side’s perspective. These ndings were robust, remaining
signicant when controlling for a number of related personality constructs, again suggesting
the unique value of intellectual humility in predicting individuals’ responses to intellectual
disagreements. These ndings are also notable given how important the issues addressed
in this study were to participants.
Given the results from Studies 1 and 2, we wondered whether the behavior of those high
in intellectual humility would mirror their questionnaire responses. Thus, in Study 3 we exam-
ined participants’ actual behavior when they were given the opportunity to learn about
opposing opinions.
Study 3
The internet, television, and social media have made a multitude of perspectives accessible.
Greater access oers an opportunity to think more critically about our own views by allowing

SELF AND IDENTITY 149
Table 4.Study 2 correlations, means and standard deviations.
*p<.05; **p<.01.
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Intellectual
humility
1
2 Growth
mindset
.358** 1
3 Narcissism −.197** −.191** 1
4 Agreeable-
ness
.406** .322** −.334** 1
5 Conscien-
tiousness
.253** .192** −.137 .416** 1
6 Openness to
experience
.404** .339** −.009 .165* .097 1
7 Extraversion .184* .027 .374** .161* .110 .127 1
8 Emotional
stability
.311** .190** .178* .247** .411** .163* .380** 1
9 Need for
cognition
.406** .334** .034 .148* .156* .632** .123 .249** 1
10 Need for
closure
−.176* −.236** −.028 −.089 .140 −.244** −.141 −.276** −.375** 1
11 Modesty .310** .164* −.557** .467** .361** .114 −.257** .065 .102 .096 1
12 Self esteem .228** .228** .114 .344** .469** .103 .321** .549** .203** −.138 .160* 1
13 Confidence .111 .041 .240** .018 .175* .179* .158* .373** .312** −.036 −.089 .404** 1
14 Respectful
attributions
.339** .315** −.348** .248** .100 .342** −.099 .056 .254** −.217** .332** .127 −.065 1
15 Openness in
disagree-
ment
.327** .180* −.231** .280** .126 .104 .054 .104 .148* −.108 .346** .179* −.064 .388** 1
M (SD) 4.79
(.86)
4.90
(1.40)
1.28
(.21)
5.14
(1.06)
5.22
(1.04)
5.52
(1.11)
3.67
(1.43)
4.31
(1.33)
4.72
(1.07)
4.36
(.94)
4.95
(.94)
5.01
(1.21)
1.80
(.32)
4.84
(.85)
4.36
(.91)

150 T. PORTER AND K. SCHUMANN
Table 5.Study 3 correlations, means and standard deviations.
*p<.05; **p<.01.
 12345678910
1 Intellectual humility 1
2 Growth mindset .420** 1
3 Learning goals .439** .318** 1
4 Political ideology −.025 −.018 −.060 1
5 Issue knowledge .307** .046 .205** .015 1
6 Issue attitude strength .120 .064 .091 −.044 .269** 1
7 Political engagement .260** .193* .314** −.124 .344** .196* 1
8 Raw opposing reasons .060 .049 .111 −.074 −.025 .080 .118 1
9 Proportion of opposing reasons read .288** .190 .143 −.004 .020 .086 .110 .385** 1
10 Opposing minus matching reasons
read
.164* .068 .072 −.011 −.043 .133 .044 .479** .733** 1
M (SD) 5.07 (.81) 4.84 (1.59) 5.80 (1.14) 3.67 (1.70) 60.72
(23.33)
81.31
(20.61)
4.53 (1.51) 1.46 (2.30) .52 (.30) .22 (1.54)

SELF AND IDENTITY 151
us, if we choose, to learn about the views of those who disagree with us. In Study 3, we tested
whether those higher in intellectual humility would take greater advantage of an opportunity
to learn about the opposing perspective. We gave participants a chance to read other peo-
ple’s reasons for holding a position that was the same as or opposite to their own on a
sociopolitical issue. We predicted that those higher in intellectual humility would seek infor-
mation about the opposing view to a greater extent than those lower in intellectual
humility.
Method
Participants
We recruited 169 American adults from Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mage = 33.14, SD = 11.71,
Range 18–72; 74 women, 88 men, 7 unspecied). Participants were compensated a small
monetary amount for participating.
Materials and procedure
IH and other predictor measures
Participants completed measures of IH, α = .74, Growth Mindset of Intelligence (4 items;
α = .92; (Dweck, 2000), and Learning Goals (3 items; α = .91; (Grant & Dweck, 2003).
Behavioral measure of openness to learning about opposing view
Participants then read reasons about either gun control or capital punishment. We counter-
balanced assignment to issues to ensure that results were not driven by a specic issue
(Hoyle et al., 2016).
Participants indicated a pro or anti stance on the issue. Par ticipants then rated how much
they favored capital punishment [or more gun control] (0 = completely oppose to 100 = com-
pletely favor); this item was recoded so that higher values indicated stronger attitudes.
Participants also reported how much they knew about the issue (0 = nothing to
100 = everything).
Next, participants were given an opportunity to read reasons supporting their own view
and the opposing view that had ostensibly been written by a sample of participants who
were US citizens. Participants were told they could read as many reasons as they wanted,
and that each link would lead to a unique reason. Links to various reasons were presented
on one webpage, counterbalanced so that half of the participants saw the 7 “pro” links on
top, followed by the 7 “anti” links, and the other half of participants saw the reverse order.
When a link was clicked, participants saw a reason for a particular position. Reasons were
written by us and were matched for length (see Appendix in the Supplementary Materials
for all reasons). Throughout, participants could either advance to the next part of the study
or read more reasons. Participants were only advanced to the next part of the study when
they chose to move on or when all 14 reasons had been read.
Next, participants rated their interest in learning more about the issue. They also rated
their attitude strength, and their issue knowledge a second time. At the end of the study,
participants reported their level of political engagement, political ideology, and answered
demographic questions.

152 T. PORTER AND K. SCHUMANN
Results
As in Studies 1 and 2, IH was positively associated with having more of a growth mindset of
intelligence, r = .42, p < .01. Consistent with their general propensity for thinking and learn-
ing, IH was also associated with having stronger learning goals, r = .44, p < .01 (see Table 5).
Political issues
There were no signicant dierences between the issues in attitude strength, t(163) = 1.80,
p = .074, or issue knowledge, t(164) = 1.04, p = .30. Thus, we combined responses across
issues for the remaining analyses. On average, participants held strong opinions about gun
control and capital punishment, M = 81.31, SD = 20.61, and had a moderate amount of base-
line knowledge about the issues, M = 60.72, SD = 23.33.
IH and reasons read
Although participants read a similar number of opposing reasons (reasons that were opposite
their own view) (M = 1.46, SD = 2.30) and matching ones (reasons that matched their own
view) (M = 1.23, SD = 2.06), nearly half of participants (n = 81) read no reasons. Because we
did not know why these participants chose not to read any reasons (e.g., eciency; not
interested), we conducted analyses both including and excluding the non-readers.
To test whether those higher in IH took greater advantage of an opportunity to learn
about the opposing view, we calculated the proportion of opposing reasons read for each
participant by dividing the number of opposing reasons read by the total number of reasons
read:
opposing reasons
opposing reasons
+
matching reasons
. This proportion has been used in past research to assess bias
in information-seeking (Taber & Lodge, 2006), and allows us to control for variability in each
participant’s willingness to spend time reading both types of reasons. By using this propor-
tion, we are capturing a preference for spending more of one’s time learning about the
opposing view.
IH was signicantly associated with a greater proportion of opposing reasons read, r = .29,
p = .007, indicating that those higher in IH read a larger share of opposing than matching
reasons relative to those lower in IH. We reasoned that individuals’ baseline attitude strength,
issue knowledge, political ideology and level of political engagement might have shaped their
willingness to read reasons. Thus, we controlled for these covariates in a regression analysis.
Controlling for these measures did not eliminate the association between IH and the propor-
tion of opposing reasons read, B = .11, SE = .05, t(79) = 2.16, p = .034, 95% CI [.01, .20].
Because we were not able to include those who read no reasons using the proportion
score (as it is impossible to divide by zero), we also calculated a more conservative openness
index that allowed us to include the non-readers in analyses. For this index we subtracted
the number of matching reasons read from the number of opposing reasons read. A higher
score indicated exposing oneself to more opposing than matching positions. Again, IH was
signicantly associated with this openness index when including those who read no reasons,
r = .16, p = .033, and when excluding them, r = .25, p = .017. These associations remained
signicant when controlling for the aforementioned measures both when including
non-readers, B = .33, SE = .16, t(157) = 2.07, p = .041, 95% CI = [.02, .65], and when excluding
them, B = .77, SE = .34, t(806) = 2.29, p = .025, 95% CI [.10, 1.44].
When we examined the bivariate correlation between IH and reasons, IH was not associ-
ated with total opposing reasons read when including non-readers, r = .06, p = .44, or exclud-
ing them from analyses, r = .11, p = .29. Thus, the eects of IH on openness only emerged

SELF AND IDENTITY 153
when we used measures that controlled for participants’ overall willingness to spend time
reading reasons, be they opposing or matching.
Additional analyses
On average, attitude strength and issue knowledge did not signicantly change during the
study and the amount of change was not related to IH, all ps > .30. However, participants
higher in IH were more interested in learning more about the issues at the end of the study,
r = .19, p = .017.
Discussion
In Study 3 the results clearly showed that those higher in intellectual humility read a greater
proportion (and higher number) of opposing vs. matching reasons than those lower in
intellectual humility. This eect only emerged when we controlled for participants’ willing-
ness to spend time reading reasons by calculating proportion and dierence score measures,
suggesting that the relation between IH and willingness to seek-out the opposing perspec-
tive may be moderated by attentional factors.
A possible alternative explanation for our primary nding is that participants higher in
intellectual humility read more opposing than matching reasons to mentally derogate the
opposition’s perspective. Although we cannot rule out this possibility, we consider it unlikely
given the ndings from Studies 1 and 2 where intellectual humility was correlated with
greater interested in learning about the opposing view. Moreover, if participants were lam-
basting the opposition while reading, the high IH individuals might have developed even
stronger attitudes about their own position after exposure to the opposite view, as combat-
ting the opposition has had this eect in past research (Taber & Lodge, 2006). We did not
nd this eect in the current study. In fact, those higher in IH had greater interest in learning
more about the issues relative to those lower in IH, which supports the notion that intellectual
humility undergirds a persistent motivation to learn.
Given the ndings from Studies 1–3 suggesting that those higher in intellectual humility
are more open to learning about the opposing view, we wondered how intellectual humility
might be fostered. In Study 4, we tested whether we could enhance intellectual humility by
making salient a growth mindset of intelligence.
Study 4
If intellectual humility can promote openness to opposing views, are there ways to increase
it? Considerable research suggests that people’s mindsets of intelligence might be a likely
candidate for promoting intellectual humility. A growth mindset of intelligence – the belief
that one can change and develop one’s intelligence – fosters many qualities thought to be
associated with intellectual humility, including greater motivation to learn (Blackwell,
Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007), less defensiveness (Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008), and a more
accurate awareness of one’s knowledge and abilities (Ehrlinger, Mitchum, & Dweck, 2016).
By contrast, a xed mindset of intelligence – the belief that intelligence is unchangeable
– might sabotage intellectual humility by increasing self-focus and defensiveness (Mueller
& Dweck, 1998; Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008). We therefore predicted that activating a growth
mindset would promote a non-defensive orientation toward one’s intellectual abilities and

154 T. PORTER AND K. SCHUMANN
reduce motivation to view one’s self as undeniably correct, thereby allowing one to admit
greater intellectual fallibility and appreciate others’ intellectual strengths in the form of
intellectual humility. We predicted that this boost in intellectual humility would, in turn,
boost participants’ openness in response to disagreements, a mediation model that we
test in the current study. Notably, although we anticipated that activating a growth mindset
would promote a non-defensiveness that would result in higher intellectual humility scores,
we did not believe that participants’ levels of intellectual humility would be permanently
changed by this growth mindset manipulation. Rather, we expected the growth mindset
manipulation to temporarily foster a humble orientation toward one’s own and others’
intelligence, which would suggest a potential psychological lever for longer-lasting
changes.
Method
Participants
We recruited 104 community college students. Three participants were excluded from anal-
yses: One because of suspicion about the experimental manipulation, and two because they
submitted identical survey responses.3 This left 101 participants (41 women, 48 men, 12
unspecied).
Materials and procedure
Growth and xed mindset conditions
In one online session, participants were randomly assigned to read an article with evidence
for either a growth or xed view of intelligence. The growth and xed articles were ostensibly
published in a well-known magazine, were matched for length and content, and were
adapted from articles used in past studies (e.g., Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008). The key message
of the growth article was that intelligence can be developed and that of the xed article was
that intelligence is a static trait. As an attention check, we asked participants to report the
article’s main idea.
Success and failure conditions
We also experimentally varied experiences of success and failure to explore how the rela-
tionship between mindsets of intelligence and intellectual humility might change when
people encounter an intellectual success or failure, the latter being a highly threatening
situation for a person with a xed mindset. After completing questions about the article,
participants began a seemingly separate study on spatial reasoning and attitudes. Participants
completed seven dicult spatial reasoning problems selected from practice dental school
admissions tests. Past research shows it is dicult to know whether one has answered these
problems correctly or incorrectly, making both success and failure feedback equally plausible
(Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008). Once participants submitted answers, the computer provided
either predetermined success (86th percentile) or failure feedback (46th percentile).
The success and failure conditions did not aect IH, t(99) = .70, p = .49, or responses to
disagreement, ps > .16, and no interactions between intelligence mindset and feedback
conditions emerged, all ps > .60. Because experiencing success or failure did not aect the
outcomes, we focus on reporting the eect of mindsets of intelligence on intellectual

SELF AND IDENTITY 155
humility across feedback conditions for all analyses, though we include the success and
failure condition as an independent variable in all analyses reported below.
IH and other measures
Next, participants completed measures of IH (α = .79), self-esteem (α = .86, Rosenberg, 1965),
condence in intelligence, (α = .69, Dweck et al., 1995), and the same responses to classroom
disagreement used in Study 1, including respectful attributions (α = .88) and openness to
the opposing view (α = .89). Participants were then fully debriefed about the study, and
received course credit for participating.
Results
All participants except four correctly reported the main idea of the article. Results did not
change whether including or excluding these participants. To be conservative, we include
these participants in the analyses.
As predicted, participants in the growth mindset condition had signicantly higher IH,
M = 5.09, SD = .71, 95% CI [4.95, 5.23], than those in the xed mindset condition, M = 4.77,
SD = .75, 95% CI [4.62, 4.92], t(98) = 2.16, p = .028, d = .44. Participants in the growth mindset
condition also made signicantly more respectful attributions for a disagreement, M = 5.65,
SD = .87, 95% CI [5.48, 5.82] than did those in the xed mindset condition, M = 5.30, SD = .86,
95% CI [5.13, 5.47], t(98) = 1.97, p = .04, d = .40, and were marginally more open to learning
from the opposing view, M = 5.13, SD = .73, 95% CI [4.97, 5.27], than those in the xed mindset
condition, M = 4.84, SD = .69, 95% CI [4.70, 4.98], t(98) = 1.96, p = .053, d = .41(see Figure 1).
We next examined whether IH mediated the eect of mindsets of intelligence on
responses to disagreement (see Figure 2). We ran two separate tests of mediation: One for
respectful attributions, and one for open-minded responses. Although the eect of mindset
condition on openness was only marginally signicant, we tested indirect eects on both
respectful attributions and openness because signicance of individual paths from X to Y
(in our case, mindset condition to openness) is not needed to determine whether there is a
signicant indirect eect of X on Y via a specied mediator (Hayes & Rockwood, in press).
Bias-corrected bootstrap mediation models with 5000 bootstrap re-samples supported the
role of IH in mediating the eect of mindset of intelligence condition on both respectful
attributions (indirect eect = .17, SE = .09, 95% CI [.02, .38]) and openness (indirect eect = .16,
SE = .08, 95% CI [.02, .35]).
Discussion
Study 4 provides some evidence that making salient dierent mindsets of intelligence has
the potential to shape participants’ intellectual humility and their corresponding responses
to disagreement. This study suggests that intellectual humility can be at least temporarily
enhanced, and points to a growth mindset as a set of beliefs that seems capable of doing
so. Although the mindset induction only marginally increased openness to learning about
the opposing view, it is possible that we failed to detect a signicant eect because this
study was slightly underpowered (d = .50, α = .05, 1 – β = .71; one-tailed 1 – β = .80, power
analysis conducted in G*Power, Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Additional research
is needed to examine these eects with a larger sample. However, the associations between

156 T. PORTER AND K. SCHUMANN
intellectual humility and openness to learning about the opposing view were robust, repli-
cating the ndings from Studies 1–3. In accordance with our theory, there was also a signif-
icant indirect eect of mindsets of intelligence on openness and respectful attributions,
mediated by intellectual humility. Overall, these results suggest that with a growth mindset
of intelligence, people can feel comfortable acknowledging what they don’t yet understand
and appreciating others’ intellectual strengths.
3
4
5
6
7
Intellectual Humility Respectful attributions Openness
Fixed Growth
*
*
†
Figure 1.Effect of mindset condition (fixed vs. growth) on intellectual humility, respectful attributions,
and openness in Study 4.
Notes: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. *p < .05, †p < .10.
B=.55**
B= .32*
Mindset of
intelligence
Intellectual
Humility
B= .17 (B= .35*) Respectful
attributions
Intellectual
Humility
Openness during a
disagreement
B= .11(B= .28†)
B= .52**
B= .32*
Figure 2.Indirect effects of mindsets of intelligence on respectful attributions and openness during a
disagreement through intellectual humility.
Notes: Fixed mindset coded as 0; growth mindset coded as 1. Unstandardized coefficients are reported. The parenthetical
numbers indicate coefficients before including the mediator. **p <.01; *p <.05; †p < .10.

SELF AND IDENTITY 157
General discussion
Many political disagreements seem intractable and destructive. Research suggests that these
disagreements could become more constructive if disagreeing parties would hear out those
from the opposing side (Kahn & Lawhorne, 2003; McCullough et al., 1998; de Wied et al.,
2007). But listening to the opposition is not easy to do. Across four studies, we found that
intellectual humility was consistently linked with greater respect for and openness to the
opposing view.
We consider two alternative explanations for the ndings we observed. One possibility
is that the connection between intellectual humility and openness was driven by people’s
reluctance to hold strong opinions about issues. This explanation is not supported by the
data. Those higher in intellectual humility did not dier from others in the strength of their
political views. A second possibility is that low self-esteem or low condence in one’s intel-
ligence were responsible for the observed associations. Again, we nd no evidence of this.
Despite being aware of the limits to their knowledge, those higher in intellectual humility
did not have less condence or lower self-esteem relative to less intellectually humble
participants.
On the whole, our research expands understanding of the consequences of intellectual
humility and contributes to a growing literature documenting the benets of humility in its
many forms, including increased tolerance (Hopkin et al., 2014), forgiveness (Lavelock et al.,
2014), generosity (Exline & Hill, 2012), physical health (Krause, 2010), helpfulness (LaBou,
Rowatt, Johnson, Tsang, & Willerton, 2012), academic achievement (Rowatt et al., 2006), and
eective leadership (McElroy et al., 2014; Ou et al., 2014; Owens et al., 2013). This work also
identies a potential source of intellectual humility. In Studies 1–3, we found consistent
correlational evidence that those higher in intellectual humility had more of a growth mind-
set of intelligence, and Study 4 suggested a potential causal link between mindset of intel-
ligence and intellectual humility. These ndings shed light on how we might foster intellectual
humility and its behavioral consequences.
Limitations
The current research also has limitations. First, we assessed participants’ responses to disa-
greement through self-report in several studies. Self-report ratings, though often predictive
of actual behavior, are vulnerable to reporting biases (Duckworth & Yeager, 2015). Because
all forms of measurement have deciencies (see Duckworth & Yeager, 2015 for a discussion),
it is best to assess outcomes in more than one way and test for replication across comple-
mentary methods. Accordingly, we used a (non-self-report) behavioral measure in Study 3,
obtaining the same substantive results as the studies that used the self-report measures,
adding some robustness to the results. Because there are other important considerations
with regard to measuring intellectual humility, we provide a thorough discussion of how
we assess intellectual humility and the strengths and limitations of our approach in the
supplementary materials.
Another limitation is that we sample exclusively from the United States, and our samples
are not nationally representative. Thus, we do not know if these results would replicate in
dierent cultural and political contexts, or with a fully representative sample of Americans.
We also only examined two disagreement contexts (school and socio-political issues) and,
thus, do not know if these ndings would hold in alternative contexts.

158 T. PORTER AND K. SCHUMANN
We did not assess every possible correlate or moderating factor in this research. For exam-
ple, we did not assess overlap between intellectual humility and wisdom or wise reasoning,
a construct that by many accounts includes intellectual humility and other components
(Grossmann, 2017; Grossmann & Kross, 2014). Future research should therefore test overlap
with this likely correlate. We also did not measure or evoke political party identication. We
note, however, that controlling for political ideology (degree of conservatism vs. liberalism)
did not change our substantive ndings. Also, the socio-political issues used in Studies 2
and 3 were strongly partisan (e.g., same-sex marriage, global warming, gun control, capital
punishment), suggesting that intellectual humility may have benets even despite strong
inter-party animus. Future research should investigate this matter more directly.
Implications for political polarization
Despite these limitations, research on intellectual humility is highly relevant and warrants
further study given the current political climate in the United States. Some evidence suggests
that Americans are increasingly politically polarized, as the issue positions of Democrats and
Republicans have become more consistently liberal and conservative, respectively, than they
were about a decade ago (Gentzkow, 2016; Pew Research Center, 2014). Thus, members of
the opposing parties have fewer issue positions in common, making disagreements all the
more likely. Although we do not know much about how these disagreements play out in
everyday interactions, one study found that 59% of those who discussed political disagree-
ments on Facebook thought the experiences were “stressful and frustrating” (Pew Research
Center, 2016b). Further, partisanship seems to be increasingly hostile and hard to bridge.
Partisanship elicits negative implicit and explicit evaluations, and low trust towards the oppos-
ing party (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). This partisan hostility has consequences that extend
beyond politics. For example, political aliation is a strong predictor of online dating deci-
sions, marriage across party lines is extremely rare in the US, and parents have become more
disapproving of their children marrying someone from the opposite political party (Huber &
Malhotra, 2017; Iyengar, Gaurav, & Yphtach, 2012; Rosenfeld, Thomas, & Falcon, 2011).
If we hope to have cross-cutting dialogue, tools for managing these increasingly inevitable
and hostile disagreements in a constructive way are urgently needed. Based on the current
research, intellectual humility shows promise in making such disagreements more productive.
Our ndings suggest that intellectual humility increases the possibility of more engagement,
respectfulness, and possibly even satisfaction and learning during such interactions.
Future directions
Our work also generates a number of intriguing questions for future investigation on intel-
lectual humility. One important avenue is to further explore how individuals become intel-
lectually humble. Our research takes an initial step towards addressing this question, though
our studies took place over a short period of time and only looked at one possible antecedent.
Future studies should therefore identify and test other possible antecedents, and collect
longitudinal data. Future research should also pinpoint the psychological mechanisms
through which intellectual humility operates. One possibility is that intellectual humility
boosts openness by shaping emotional processes such as down-regulation of emotion
(Gross, 2015), or dierentiated emotion (Grossmann et al., 2016). Future research could test

SELF AND IDENTITY 159
these possibilities. Finally, the current ndings call for more research on intellectual humility
in contexts where people are apt to disagree, such as the workplace. Intellectual humility
may even be especially valuable for successful work collaborations, as people are more likely
to work in mixed-gender and mixed-ethnicity environments (Burns, Barton, & Kerby, 2012),
making the likelihood of encountering dierent views more probable.
Conclusion
Intellectual disagreements are inevitable, but entering into such disagreements with an openness
to learning about the other side promises to make them more productive. Although research
documents people’s tendency to eschew the opposing view (Taber & Lodge, 2006), our ndings
suggest that some people respond dierently. Rather than shutting out the other side, those
with higher intellectual humility seem to open themselves up to learning about contrasting
perspectives. Promoting intellectual humility may thus oer one path to making disagreements
more constructive, and our research suggests that teaching people a malleable view of intelli-
gence may be one promising way to foster intellectual humility and its associated benets.
Notes
1. We believe there are strong conceptual reasons to include both the self- and other-directed items
in intellectual humility. Yet, we also investigated this matter empirically, separating the self- and
other-directed items of our scale and re-running analyses to examine whether one component
or the other was driving the eects. The general pattern of results remained the same when using
only the self-directed items or only the other-directed items (e.g., both subscales signicantly
correlate with openness during disagreements in Studies 1–4), but the results were strongest
when the full scale was used. This suggests that neither the self- nor other- directed items alone
were responsible for our eects, but that they produced the strongest results together. We also
note that the self- and other-directed items positively loaded on the same factor in exploratory
and conrmatory factor analyses (see the Supplementary Materials), suggesting that they go
together empirically. Full results from these analyses are available upon request.
2. General Humility is distinct from the personality dimension Honesty-Humility, which
encompasses a person’s tendency to avoid fraud or corruption and greed, and to display
modesty and sincerity (Ashton, Lee, & de Vries, 2014).
3. The eect of the experimental manipulation on intellectual humility remains statistically
signicant when these participants are included in analyses, p=.04.
Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from the Fuller Theological
Seminary/Thrive Center in concert with the John Templeton Foundation [grant number IH 101]. The
opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reect the views
of the Fuller Thrive Center or the John Templeton Foundation.
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