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Dignity in Context, and Out: Discussion of Lynne Jacobs’ “On Dignity, a Sense of Dignity, and Inspirational Shame”

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Dr. Lynne Jacobs’ “On Dignity, a Sense of Dignity, and Inspirational Shame” is an interdisciplinary integration of a priori ethics and a phenomenology of dignity. She contends that the human person’s engagement with other people—writ large in the therapeutic encounter—is inherently ethically situated. Moreover, she avers an inherent content to this ethics, namely, mutual respect for distinctively human value—dignity—between and among people. Her ethics of dignity informs her psychoanalytic exploration of experiences of dignity, indignity, and her notion of inspirational shame, among others. I join in Jacobs’ advocacy for therapeutic facilitation of a person’s sense of inherent worth, as well as her opposition to relational contexts of devaluation and degradation. However, the primordiality Jacobs grants to her ethics of dignity often obscures the constitutively cultural, familial, and personal contextuality of, first, her—and in my view, any—ethical conviction; second, what she describes as the experience of being human; third, the alleged indignity of human vulnerability; and finally, the claim that shame is the natural reaction to one’s failure to live up to personal ideals. In the end, and subject to certain clinical concerns, Jacobs’ article integrates into psychoanalysis primordial ethical duties that she and others claim inhere in us as human beings.

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Article
Perhaps more than most psychological concepts, the concept of recognition is central to the most fundamental question: What does it mean to be human? Recognition underscores one of our basic ideas about being human; namely, that our selfhoods emerge from, are maintained within, and contribute to the shaping of our community of other human beings. However, I think the concept of recognition can also serve to illuminate a more hidden aspect of what it means to be human, what philosopher Charles Taylor calls a desire “to be rightly placed in relation to the good.” Our relationships to ourselves and others are transformed when we are recognized as orienting towards a “good.” I use phenomenological description and case examples to illustrate my thesis.Quizá en mayor grado que la mayoría de conceptos psicológicos, el concepto de reconocimiento es central para la pregunta fundamental por excelencia: ¿qué significa ser humano? El reconocimiento subraya una de nuestras ideas básicas acerca de ser humano, a saber que nuestro sentimiento de sí emerge de la comunidad de los seres humanos, es mantenido en ella, y al mismo tiempo contribuye a la formación de la misma. Pero creo que el concepto de reconocimiento puede también servir para iluminar un aspecto más escondido de lo que significa ser humano, lo que el filósofo Charles Taylor denomina el deseo de “ser correctamente situado en relación al bien.” Nuestra relación con nosotros mismos y con los demás queda transformada cuando nos sentimos reconocidos como orientados hacia “el bien.” Utilizo una descripción fenomenológica y ejemplos clínicos para ilustrar mi tesis.Peut-être davantage que la plupart des concepts psychologiques, le concept de reconnaissance est central dans la question la plus fondamentale: que signifie être humain? La reconnaissance souligne l'une de nos idées fondamentale au sujet d'être humain, à savoir que le sens d'être soi émerge, est maintenu à l'intérieur, et contribue au façonnement de notre communauté des autres êtres humains. Mais je pense que le concept de reconnaissance sert aussi à éclairer un aspect plus caché de ce que veut dire être humain, ce que le philosophe Charles Taylor appelle un désir «d'être à juste titre placé en relation au bon.» Nos relations à nous-mêmes et aux autres sont transformées lorsque nous sommes reconnus comme nous orientant vers le «bon.» J'utilise une description phénoménologique et des exemples de cas en illustration de ma thèse.Mehr als die meisten psychologischen Konzepte ist das Konzept der Anerkennung zentral für die grundlegende Frage: Was bedeutet es ein Mensch zu sein? Anerkennung unterstreicht eine unserer grundlegenden Vorstellungen des Menschseins: Unser Selbst-Sein entwickelt sich, wird aufrecht erhalten und liefert seine Beitrag zur Formgebung unserer menschlichen Gemeinschaft. Ich denke aber, dass das Konzept der Anerkennung auch dazu dienen kann, einen mehr versteckten Aspekt dessen, was es heiβt Mensch zu sein, zu erhellen; der Philosoph Charles Taylor benennt die Sehnsucht, “gut platziert in der Beziehung zum Guten zu sein.” Unsere Beziehung zu uns selbst und zu anderen verändert sich, wenn wir als etwas anerkannt werden, was sich zum “Guten” hin wendet. Um diese These darzustellen, benutze ich eine phänomenologische Beschreibung und Fallbeispiele.Forse più della maggior parte dei concetti psicologici, il concetto di riconoscimento è centrale per la questione più fondamentale: cosa vuol dire essere umani? Il riconoscimento sottolinea una delle idee di base circa gli esseri umani, cioè che il nostro sé emerge da, è mantenuto in, e contribuisce a dar forma a, la comunità di altri esseri umani. Ma io credo che il concetto di riconoscimento possa servire anche a chiarire un aspetto più nascosto di cosa significa essere umani, quello che il filosofo Charles Taylor chiama desiderio: “di essere giustamente collocati sin relazione al bene”. La nostra relazione con noi stessi e con gli altri si trasforma quando siamo riconosciuti come orientati al “bene”. Utilizzo una descrizione fenomenologica e degli esempi clinici per illustrare la mia tesi.
Article
In memory of Heinz Kohut, this study relates his view of empathy as replacement for “tool-and-method pride” to the search for understanding in a fully dialogic psychoanalysis. Only when we embrace our intersubjective vulnerability, including the shame we clinicians bring to the encounter with the other in treatment, can we hope for the kind of healing Kohut envisaged. Attitudes toward the other and toward our work are crucial mediators of in the process of treatment; they may be authoritarian and reductive or humanistic and compassionate. Ideals like courage become embodied in the clinician's willingness to accompany the other and take on the suffering of the other.En homenaje a Heinz Kohut, este estudio relata su visión de la empatía como la substitución del “orgullo del instrumento-y-el-método” para alcanzar la comprensión en un psicoanálisis plenamente dialógico. Sólo cuando incluimos la vulnerabilidad intersubjetiva, incluyendo la vergüenza que nosotros los clínicos traemos al encuentro con el otro en el tratamiento, podemos esperar el tipo de cura que Kohut previó. Las actitudes hacia el otro y hacia nuestro trabajo son mediadores cruciales en el proceso del tratamiento; pueden ser autoritarias y reductivas, o humanistas y compasivas. Ideales como el coraje quedan corporizadas en la voluntad del clínico en acompañar al otro y en hacerse cargo del sufrimiento del paciente.Écrite à la mémoire de Heinz Kohut, cette étude relie sa vision de l'empathie remplaçant «la fierté de l'outil-et-méthode» à la recherche de compréhension dans une psychanalyse pleinement dialogique. Ce n'est que lorsque nous embrassons notre vulnérabilité intersubjective, y inclut la honte que nous, cliniciens, amenons dans notre rencontre avec l'autre en traitement, pouvons-nous espérer la sorte de guérison que Kohut envisageait. Les attitudes envers l'autre et envers notre travail sont les médiateurs cruciaux du processus de traitement; ces attitudes peuvent être autoritaires et réductrices ou humanistes et compatissantes. Des idéaux tel le courage deviennent incarnés dans la disponibilité du clinicien à accompagner l'autre et à se charger de la souffrance de l'autre.Diese Studie stellt, in Erinnerung an Heinz Kohut, seine Sichtweise der Empathie als Ersatz für die Sicherheit, die richtige analytische Methode und das richtige Handwerkszeug zu besitzen, der Bemühung um eine wirklich dialogisch verstandene Psychoanalyse gegenüber. Nur wenn wir unsere intersubjektive Verletzlichkeit annehmen, inklusive der Scham, die wir Kliniker in die Begegnung mit dem Anderen in der Behandlungssituation mitbringen, können wir auf jene Art der Heilung hoffen, die Kohut vorschwebte. Einstellungen uns selbst und unserer Arbeit gegenüber sind entscheidende Faktoren im Behandlungsprozess, sie mögen autoritär und den Anderen einengend oder wohlwollend und mitfühlend sein. Ideale, wie Mut etwa, sind in der Bereitschaft des Klinikers, den Anderen zu begleiten und sein Leiden mit zu tragen, eingeschlossen.
Article
Psychoanalyst, teacher, and scholar, Heinz Kohut was one of the twentieth century's most important intellectuals. A rebel according to many mainstream psychoanalysts, Kohut challenged Freudian orthodoxy and the medical control of psychoanalysis in America. In his highly influential book The Analysis of the Self, Kohut established the industry standard of the treatment of personality disorders for a generation of analysts. This volume, best known for its groundbreaking analysis of narcissism, is essential reading for scholars and practitioners seeking to understand human personality in its many incarnations. “Kohut has done for narcissism what the novelist Charles Dickens did for poverty in the nineteenth century. Everyone always knew that both existed and were a problem. . . . The undoubted originality is to have put it together in a form which carries appeal to action.”—International Journal of Psychoanalysis
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This article outlines my essential paradigm as it relates to self psychology, how I arrived at it, and how I would position my perspective in the context of the larger psychoanalytic and scientific community. My dialogic complexity systems model is most closely aligned with the intersubjective systems theory of Atwood and Stolorow and was shown to have acquired its defining shape in the context of an in-depth exploration of the connection between the latter theory and Kohut's self psychology. My paradigm is part of the wider relational turn in contemporary psychoanalysis. I have characterized the evolution of my perspective as my continuous preoccupation with the deepening and refinement of my understanding of the limits of psychoanalytic theory and practice and the cultivation of a clinical attitude that allows me to fully embrace those limits, an attitude that combines the caring ambience of genuine dialogue with the spiritual calmness of nondual awareness. My perspective can, therefore, be understood as my ongoing attempt at unifying my intellect, my heart, and my spirit into one experiential whole. A dialogic complexity systems model grounded in a post-Cartesian nondual philosophy constitutes the explanatory reduction of my theory and philosophy as lived in real time.
My psychoanalytic values in life contexts and action. Unpublished manuscript, presented at the 2017 Conference of the International Association of Relational Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy
  • P N Maduro
Attitudes in psychoanalytic complexity: An alternative to postmodernism in psychoanalysis
  • W J Coburn
Dialogue in gestalt theory and therapy
  • L Jacobs
Mistaken Identity: The Mind-Brain Problem Reconsidered
  • L Brothers
The inevitable intersubjectivity of selfhood
  • L Jacobs
The mineness of my thrownness-into-relationship: Extending intersubjective=systems theory perspectives on experiences of personal ownership and individuality. Unpublished manuscript
  • P N Maduro
Prisoners of Childhood
  • A Miller