Polycentric Systems of Governance: A Theoretical Model for the Commons

Abstract

Polycentricity is a fundamental concept in commons scholarship that connotes a complex form of governance with multiple centers of semiautonomous decision making. If the decision‐making centers take each other into account in competitive and cooperative relationships and have recourse to conflict resolution mechanisms, they may be regarded as a polycentric governance system. In the context of natural resource governance, commons scholars have ascribed a number of advantages to polycentric governance systems, most notably enhanced adaptive capacity, provision of good institutional fit for natural resource systems, and mitigation of risk on account of redundant governance actors and institutions. Despite the popularity of the concept, systematic development of polycentricity, including its posited advantages, is lacking in the commons literature. To build greater clarity and specificity around the concept, we develop a theoretical model of a polycentric governance system with a focus on the features necessary or conducive for achieving the functioning predicted by commons scholars. The model is comprised of attributes, which constitute the definitional elements, and enabling conditions, which specify additional institutional features for achieving functionality in the commons. The model we propose takes the concept a step further toward specificity without sacrificing the generality necessary for contextual application and further development.

Full text

Polycentric Systems of Governance: A Theoretical
Model for the Commons
Keith Carlisle and Rebecca L. Gruby
Polycentricity is a fundamental concept in commons scholarship that connotes a complex form of
governance with multiple centers of semiautonomous decision making. If the decision-making centers
take each other into account in competitive and cooperative relationships and have recourse to conflict
resolution mechanisms, they may be regarded as a polycentric governance system. In the context of
natural resource governance, commons scholars have ascribed a number of advantages to polycentric
governance systems, most notably enhanced adaptive capacity, provision of good institutional fit for
natural resource systems, and mitigation of risk on account of redundant governance actors and
institutions. Despite the popularity of the concept, systematic development of polycentricity,
including its posited advantages, is lacking in the commons literature. To build greater clarity and
specificity around the concept, we develop a theoretical model of a polycentric governance system with
a focus on the features necessary or conducive for achieving the functioning predicted by commons
scholars. The model is comprised of attributes, which constitute the definitional elements, and
enabling conditions, which specify additional institutional features for achieving functionality in the
commons. The model we propose takes the concept a step further toward specificity without
sacrificing the generality necessary for contextual application and further development.
KEY WORDS: polycentricity, natural resources governance, commons
多中心是公共资源学说的一个基本概念。它指的是一个有着多个半自主决策中心的复杂治
理模式。如果这些决策中心将彼此考虑成竞争与合作的关系,并且有资源去争取不同的解决方
案,他们可被认作是一个多中心的治理体系。在自然资源管理这一具体环境中,公共资源学者
们总结了一系列有关多中心治理体系的优点。其中,最主要的是,提高适应能力、提供与自然
资源体系相符的制度,以及通过多样化的行为者和治理制度来降低风险。尽管这一概念十分流
行,在公共资源的文献中,包括其所声称的优势在内的有关多中心治理的系统发展却是个缺
失。为了使该概念更加明晰且具体,我们提出了一个有关多中心治理体系的理论模型。这一模
型重点关注那些必要的或有助于实现公共资源学者们所预测的多中心治理功能的特征。这一模
型包含了特征,即那些明确的元素,和实现条件,即多中心在公共资源中实现其功能性的其它制
度特征。我们提出的这一模型,在不牺牲该概念使用和发展的普遍性的基础上,将其进一步的具
体化。
doi: 10.1111/psj.12212
V
C2017 The Authors. Policy Studies Journal published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Policy Studies Organization
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits
use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or
adaptations are made.
[The copyright line for this article was changed on 5 April 2018 after original online publication]
bs_bs_banner
Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 47, No. 4, 2019
927

1. Introduction
Polycentricity is a fundamental concept in the work of Vincent and Elinor
Ostrom. The term connotes a complex form of governance with multiple centers of
decision making, each of which operates with some degree of autonomy (E. Ostrom,
2005; V. Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961). The decision-making units in a polycen-
tric governance arrangement are often described as overlapping because they are
nested at multiple jurisdictional levels (e.g., local, state, and national) and also
include special-purpose governance units that cut across jurisdictions (McGinnis &
Ostrom, 2011; E. Ostrom, 2005). This multilevel configuration means that governance
arrangements exhibiting polycentric characteristics may be capable of striking a bal-
ance between centralized and fully decentralized or community-based governance
(Imperial, 1999). While the existence of multiple, semiautonomous decision-making
centers may be sufficient to characterize a governance arrangement as polycentric, it
does not guarantee that there will be sufficient coordination among the decision cen-
ters such that the arrangement functions as a polycentric governance system (Mar-
shall, 2015; Pahl-Wostl & Knieper, 2014). A polycentric governance system, the focus
of this article, may exist if the decision-making centers take each other into account
in competitive and cooperative relationships and are capable of resolving conflicts
(Marshall, 2015; V. Ostrom et al., 1961).
Polycentric governance systems have been explored in a number of interdisci-
plinary contexts, most notably in studies of public administration and in commons
scholarship concerning the governance of natural resources.
1
Despite the popularity
of the concept, there has been limited systematic development of polycentricity in
the commons literature (Brie, 2014). While some progress has been made in recent
years (e.g., Newig & Fritsch, 2009; Pahl-Wostl & Knieper, 2014), these empirical stud-
ies have employed definitions of polycentricity that are not entirely consistent with
one another and/or do not capture the full import of the concept as conceived by V.
Ostrom et al. (1961), thereby impeding systematic theoretical development. Com-
mons scholars have also attributed a number of theoretical advantages to polycentric
governance systems, ranging from the promotion of learning, trust, and adaptation
to the mitigation of risk of resource collapse or failure (Marshall, 2009). However,
there has been comparatively little study of the contexts and institutional features
likely to yield such advantages.
Developing greater clarity around the concept of polycentric governance and the
conditions under which it may lead to desired outcomes is an overdue endeavor
that may help to advance our understanding of more complex natural resource gov-
ernance. Much of the early commons scholarship focused on small-scale, commu-
nity-based resource systems, in part, because governance processes are easier to
observe in less complex systems (Berkes, 2006; E. Ostrom, 1990). Relatively simple,
isolated systems are the exception rather than the rule, however. Most cases of natu-
ral resource governance are complex and cross-level in character (Berkes, 2006), and
most human–environment interactions concerning natural resources take place at
multiple scales (Blomquist, 2009). Moreover, human activities are increasingly inter-
connected at the national and global level on account of technological advancements,
2Policy Studies Journal, 47:4
928

changes in governance systems, and the growth of capital markets (Folke, Hahn,
Olsson, & Norberg, 2005). Given that polycentricity is a pervasive condition in much
of the world, scholarly work that advances general understanding of the concept
and helps practitioners enable and leverage the potential benefits of a polycentric
governance system should be a priority.
This article builds greater clarity around the concept of polycentricity by propos-
ing a theoretical model of a functional polycentric governance system for the com-
mons.
2
By “functional,” we refer to the capacity of the governance system to comport
with the following three claims, explored in section 4, commonly made by scholars of
natural resource governance: (i) polycentric governance systems are better able to
adapt when faced with social and environmental change; (ii) they provide good insti-
tutional fit for complex natural resource systems; and (iii) they mitigate the risk of
institutional failure and resource losses on account of their redundant teams of deci-
sion makers employing diverse or redundant institutions. The model builds upon a
definition of a polycentric governance system that is not specific to natural resource
systems, but rather is drawn directly from the public administration literature in
which the concept was conceived. In the language of the model, the universal defini-
tional elements are “attributes.” Importantly, polycentric governance systems do not
necessarily perform well or better than other forms of governance (Marshall, 2015; V.
Ostrom et al., 1961). There are a number of potential pitfalls associated with their
complexity. For example, the transaction costs associated with coordination can be
quite high, particularly in larger or geographically dispersed systems (Huitema et al.,
2009; Wyborn, 2015). Additionally, the dispersion of responsibilities in a polycentric
governance system can make it challenging to hold decision makers accountable for
their performance (Huitema et al., 2009; Lieberman, 2011). We therefore specify addi-
tional institutional features in the model that may not be integral to the core concept
but are associated with achieving the functionality predicted by commons scholars.
These additional features are termed “enabling conditions.”
3
We distilled the attrib-
utes and enabling conditions through a review and synthesis of the commons litera-
ture and the public administration literature on metropolitan-area governance, as
well as related literatures that address the form and function of polycentric gover-
nance systems. In formulating enabling conditions, we also drew from findings in
related bodies of literature, such as work on social-ecological systems, where relevant.
Before we embark on this task, we clarify our position and the scope of this
undertaking. First, it is not our position that all polycentric governance systems are
capable of achieving the advantages examined in this article or of otherwise perform-
ing as well as or better than other forms of governance. Among other things, the
effectiveness of a governance system depends upon its objectives (e.g., efficiency or
equity) and the historical and cultural context in which the governance system is
embedded. This raises a second point: the governance model we propose does not
address the myriad contextual factors that may impact the functioning of a gover-
nance system. Our focus here is on the institutional features that theoretically
enhance the functionality of polycentric governance systems in the commons. To be
clear, we use the term “institution” to refer to the formal and informal rules, norms,
and strategies that structure human interactions (E. Ostrom, 2005).
Carlisle/Gruby: Polycentric Systems of Governance in the Commons 3
929

In section 2, we briefly trace the history of the concept of polycentricity. In sec-
tion 3, we introduce the attributes that form the definitional core of the theoretical
model, and in so doing, we clarify ambiguities and highlight open questions in the
definition we adopt. In section 4, we describe the aforementioned theoretical advan-
tages of polycentric governance systems, and we introduce enabling conditions that
specify features that may be necessary or conducive for realizing the advantages. We
present the model at the conclusion of section 4, bringing together the attributes and
enabling conditions discussed in sections 3 and 4 and correlating them with the
advantages they support. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications
of the model and the challenges that lie ahead for further development and opera-
tionalization of polycentricity.
2. History and Development of the Concept
The term polycentricity was first used in essays Michael Polanyi published as The
Logic of Liberty (1951) to describe a method of social organization in which individuals
are free to pursue their objectives within a general system of rules (Polanyi, 1951; see
also V. Ostrom, 1999a). A decade after the publication of The Logic of Liberty,V.
Ostrom et al. (1961) adopted the term polycentricity to describe a form of organization
in metropolitan-area governance characterized by a multiplicity of overlapping politi-
cal units. V. Ostrom et al. (1961) argued that this seemingly inefficient configuration
of political units could achieve greater efficiency in the production and provision of
public goods and services than a centralized government if certain market-like charac-
teristics were present. They theorized that political units could operate in a coherent
manner with predictable patterns—that is, as a system—to the extent they “take each
other into account in competitive relationships, enter into various contractual and
cooperative undertakings or have recourse to central mechanisms to resolve conflicts”
(V. Ostrom et al., 1961, p. 831). The theoretical claims concerning polycentricity in
metropolitan areas benefited from strong empirical support in the 1970s showing that
the provision of police services in polycentric metropolitan areas regularly outper-
formed more centralized systems in terms of efficiency and certain measures of effec-
tiveness, such as responsiveness (E. Ostrom & Parks, 1987).
In the 1980s, Elinor Ostrom turned her focus to the study of the commons where
she sought to understand how humans achieve and maintain self-governance in the
context of complex and dynamic social and physical environments. One of Ostrom’s
most influential contributions to commons theory was her formulation of eight insti-
tutional design principles that she found to be associated with robust institutions for
maintaining common-pool resources (E. Ostrom, 1990). The eighth design principle,
which relates to larger-scale, more complex systems of common-pool resources, pro-
vides that the various governance activities associated with robust institutions “are
organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises” (E. Ostrom, 1990, p. 101). In sub-
sequent work, Ostrom and others have sometimes used the term “polycentric” inter-
changeably with, or in reference to, the “nested” requirement of the eighth design
principle (e.g., Huntjens et al., 2012; E. Ostrom, 2005), though polycentricity implies
more than nestedness (Gruby & Basurto, 2013).
4Policy Studies Journal, 47:4
930

Since Ostrom’s publication of the design principles in 1990, a growing interest in
polycentricity on the part of commons scholars is evident in the number of papers
and books that consider the advantages of polycentric governance for sustaining nat-
ural resources (e.g., Andersson & Ostrom, 2008; Bixler, 2014; Blomquist & Schlager,
2005; da Silveira & Richards, 2013; Galaz, Olsson, Hahn, Folke, & Svedin, 2008; Mar-
shall, 2005, 2009, 2015; Nagendra & Ostrom, 2014; Newig & Fritsch, 2009; Pahl-Wostl
& Knieper, 2014; Pahl-Wostl, Lebel, Knieper, & Nikitina, 2012). In this literature, the
arguments for polycentric governance have evolved beyond improved efficiency, a
major objective in public administration. Blomquist (2009) observes that the rationale
of commons scholars who advocate polycentric governance includes themes such as:
“1) the recognition of scale diversity; 2) the desire to reduce error-proneness and pro-
mote learning; 3) the recognition of limitations on human information processing
capabilities; 4) the presence of multiple goals for resource management; and 5) the
recognition of the diversity of human interests and values associated with most com-
plex natural resource systems” (p. 115). Indeed, these themes feature explicitly in the
theoretical advantages of polycentric governance that emerge from recent commons
scholarship. Marshall (2009) notes that polycentricity has been associated with
advantages such as better access to local knowledge, closer matching of policy to
context, reduction of the risk that a resource will fail for an entire region on account
of multiple avenues for policy experimentation, improved information transmission
due to overlap, and enhanced capacity for adaptive management. The advantages
enumerated by Marshall (2009) generally figure into three broad claims concerning
polycentric governance that emerge from the commons literature: (i) polycentric gov-
ernance systems have a greater capacity to adapt to social and environmental
change, (ii) polycentric governance systems provide good “institutional fit” for com-
plex natural resource systems, and (iii) redundancy inherent in polycentric gover-
nance systems mitigates risk. These claims are examined in section 4. First, we
introduce the attributes of a polycentric governance system, which comprise the
foundation of the theoretical model.
3. Attributes
The attributes in the theoretical model represent the essential defining character-
istics of a polycentric governance system based on V. Ostrom et al. (1961). Reflecting
on the seminal 1961 paper, Vincent Ostrom later wrote:
As formulated by [V. Ostrom et al. (1961)], a polycentric political system
would be composed of: (1) many autonomous units formally independent
of one another, (2) choosing to act in ways that take account of others, (3)
through processes of cooperation, competition, conflict, and conflict resolu-
tion. (V. Ostrom, 1991, p. 225)
We adopt and adapt this three-pronged distillation of the concept in formulating
the attributes in the model. Our rationale for doing so is that we believe it important
Carlisle/Gruby: Polycentric Systems of Governance in the Commons 5
931

that the attributes be loyal to the original 1961 conceptualization to ensure we do not
imagine a substantively different concept. While there have been multiple formula-
tions of the concept by Vincent Ostrom and others over the years, this particular for-
mulation is a clear and concise articulation of the concept as it was originally
conceived. Additionally, we note that even as polycentric governance has been
explored in diverse literatures, many scholars continue to use definitions of the con-
cept based on the original 1961 conceptualization. In devising the attributes, we
make minor modifications to the first prong (discussed in subsection 3.1), and we
consolidate the second and third prongs. Thus, we propose the following two attrib-
utes of a polycentric governance system: (i) multiple, overlapping decision-making
centers with some degree of autonomy; (ii) choosing to act in ways that take account
of others through processes of cooperation, competition, conflict, and conflict resolu-
tion. In the following subsections, we describe and expand upon the attributes.
3.1. Multiple, Overlapping Decision-Making Centers with Some Degree of Autonomy
The first attribute is comprised of a number of distinct but related elements and
conditions, the meanings of which are not entirely self-evident. We substitute the
term “decision-making center” for the word “unit” in V. Ostrom’s (1991) formulation
because it better captures the active role that governance units assume in making
and enforcing institutions in a particular domain. In fact, V. Ostrom et al. (1961) use
the term “centers of decision making” to describe the units, although they do not
clearly define it. McGinnis and Ostrom (2011) are instructive in this regard:
Polycentric governance requires a complex combination of multiple levels
and diverse types of organizations drawn from the public, private, and
voluntary sectors that have overlapping realms of responsibility and
functional capacities. ... In addition, private corporations, voluntary associ-
ations, and community-based organizations play critical supporting roles
in a polycentric system of governance, even if they have not been assigned
public roles in an official manner. (p. 15)
Thus, the decision-making centers in a polycentric governance system are not
restricted to formal governmental bodies.
Not every organization or individual with an interest in a particular governance
domain constitutes a decision-making center, however. Only those that exercise
“considerable independence to make norms and rules within a specific domain” are
decision-making centers (E. Ostrom, 1999, p. 552). Legislatures, administrative agen-
cies, and other public bodies are clearly candidates for decision-making center status,
as are communities of resource users like the self-organized “harbor gangs” of the
Maine lobster fishery who make and enforce unwritten norms and rules (see Low,
Ostrom, Simon, & Wilson, 2003). But what about organizations or individuals—state
or nonstate—that lack authority to make rules in a particular governance domain but
strongly influence policies or provide critical technical or financial support? We
6Policy Studies Journal, 47:4
932

suggest that they fall in the category of “critical supporting role” (see McGinnis &
Ostrom, 2011). That is, the effective functioning of a polycentric governance system
often depends upon actors who can lend technical expertise or produce a good or
service more efficiently or effectively (see V. Ostrom et al., 1961). They may at times
collaborate with or join a decision-making center, although they are not, in their indi-
vidual capacities, decision-making centers. We therefore propose that the best way
to envision a polycentric governance system is not as a tidy and static network of dis-
crete, connected decision-making centers. Rather, it is a dense and evolving web of
decision-making centers—some transitory and others relatively fixed—and support-
ing actors from diverse sectors and domains.
We also inserted the word “overlapping” in this attribute to describe the jurisdic-
tion or domain of decision-making centers, which is integral to any polycentric gov-
ernance system. Overlap may result from the layering of decision-making centers
operating at multiple levels or jurisdictions when they share certain functional capac-
ities or areas of responsibility (see McGinnis & Ostrom, 2011). A critical function of
overlap is to facilitate the flow of information among decision-making centers,
enabling them to learn which institutions employed by others have been successful
(Marshall, 2008; E. Ostrom, 1999).
A reasonable question concerning polycentric governance systems is: how many
decision-making centers are required? Typically, open-ended qualifiers like “many”
(e.g., V. Ostrom et al., 1961), or “a multiplicity” (e.g., Aligica & Tarko, 2012) are used
to describe the population of decision-making centers because the answer is context
specific. As McGinnis (1999) observes: “[t]he key point is not the number of jurisdic-
tions but rather the concurrence of multiple opportunities by which participants can
forge or dissolve links among different collective entities” (p. 6). We would add that
achieving balance and representation in decision making is also likely more impor-
tant than the number of decision-making centers.
Finally, autonomy or independence in decision making is also a fundamental
characteristic of polycentric governance systems. Autonomy implies that the
decision-making centers act on their own behalf, without centralized coordination
(see V. Ostrom et al., 1961). But how much autonomy is necessary (Gruby & Basurto,
2013)? Scholars commonly write that decision-making centers in polycentric gover-
nance systems exercise “considerable” autonomy or independence (e.g., Marshall,
2009, 2015; E. Ostrom, 1999, 2010) or that they are “semiautonomous” (e.g., Koma-
kech & van der Zaag, 2013). Andersson and Ostrom (2008) use the phrase “some
degree of autonomy,” a phrase we adopt because it highlights the uncertain and
context-specific nature of the necessary or appropriate degree of autonomy.
As Marshall (2015) argues, it is de facto rather than formal autonomy that mat-
ters most given the focus in institutional analysis on rules-in-use rather than rules-in-
form. A grant of formal independence to decision-making centers does not guarantee
them considerable de facto autonomy; while central governments may devolve cer-
tain responsibilities to local governance organizations, they may nevertheless exert
substantial control over outcomes through, for example, financial incentives and the
imposition of burdensome reporting and compliance requirements (Gruby &
Basurto, 2013; Marshall, 2015). The degree of autonomy required to reap the
Carlisle/Gruby: Polycentric Systems of Governance in the Commons 7
933

theoretical benefits of polycentric governance systems is an open and fundamental
question for which there is little practical guidance in the literature.
3.2. Choosing to Act in Ways that Take Account of Others through Processes of
Cooperation, Competition, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution
In formulating the second attribute, we consolidated the second and third
prongs of Vincent Ostrom’s (1991) formulation because together, they describe how
an assemblage of decision-making centers operating with some degree of autonomy
may be capable of functioning as a coherent system: choosing to act in ways that
take account of others through processes of cooperation, competition, conflict, and
conflict resolution. Broadly, this means that decision-making centers, even if formally
independent of one another, base their decisions partly on the actions, inactions, or
experiences of other members of the system. In taking one another into account, deci-
sion-making centers and other supporting actors in the governance system interact
in processes of cooperation, competition, conflict, and conflict resolution (V. Ostrom
et al., 1961). These processes can lead to self-organizing tendencies to the extent deci-
sion-making centers have “incentives to create or institute appropriate patterns of
ordered relationships” (V. Ostrom, 1999a, p. 59). Governance systems that are self-
organizing are able to persist and adapt without requiring central or outside plan-
ning or direction (see Lebel et al., 2006).
Turning to the four integral processes identified by V. Ostrom et al. (1961), we
understand cooperation as a broad category involving voluntary joint action that is
inclusive of processes such as collaboration and contractual undertakings. Coopera-
tion is critical to a governance system’s functionality, as individual decision-making
centers may be incapable of effectively or efficiently producing certain goods and
services or addressing particular problems independently. Through cooperative pro-
cesses, however, they may be able to enhance their collective capacity or to outsource
functions to more capable decision-making centers or supporting actors. This point
was fundamental to the claim in V. Ostrom et al. (1961) that polycentric governance
systems may be capable of performing as well or better than monocentric systems.
Their argument was premised on the notion that the entity that provides a public
good or service to consumers need not be the same entity that produces it—particu-
larly if it would be more efficient to outsource production to another entity. This
important distinction between production and provision seldom figures into later
commons scholarship concerning polycentricity although it remains relevant. For
example, a decision-making center that lacks the resources or capability to produce
knowledge needed to make effective decisions concerning a natural resource can
outsource its production to more capable or efficient producers, such as a higher
level of government, research scientists, or local resource users. As characterized by
McGinnis (1999), “polycentricity allows considerable mixing and matching of con-
sumption, provision, and production units operating at different scales of
aggregation” (p. 4).
8Policy Studies Journal, 47:4
934

Withrespecttocompetition,V.Ostrometal.(1961)assertthatitcangenerate
self-organizing tendencies in metropolitan areas as municipalities are forced to com-
pete for residents through their mix of public goods and services on offer, and as
producers of public goods and services compete for the business of municipalities.
In the context of natural resource governance, similar forms of competition may sup-
port self-organization. For example, municipalities may compete for residents
through the provision of cleaner water or more green spaces. Additionally, NGOs
may have to compete against one another for the right to lead or influence an envi-
ronmental initiative undertaken by a political jurisdiction. A competition of ideas
and methods employed by decision-making centers may also drive the self-
organizing tendencies of polycentric governance systems, enabling them to better
address emerging challenges and goals without central direction (see Imperial, 1999;
Olsson, Folke, Galaz, Hahn, & Schultz, 2007). V. Ostrom et al. (1961) note that condi-
tions fostering competition emerge when decision-making centers are located near
one another and when they have access to information about one another’s
performance.
While competitive processes can lead to beneficial self-organizing tendencies,
intense competition over distributional issues can undermine cooperation and
impede a governance system’s capacity for self-organization (Poteete & Ostrom,
2004). In this regard, da Silveira and Richards (2013) evaluate the functioning of a
polycentric governance system for the Pearl River basin in China. They found that it
lacked incentives for cooperation and was characterized by intense competition for
resources among its members that undermined its effectiveness and ability to adapt.
This highlights the importance of designing institutions to manage or minimize com-
petition over resources, and it suggests the need for effective conflict-resolution
mechanisms.
Differencesinpowerandvaluesamongpartieswithaninterestinashared
resource make conflict nearly inevitable when decisions concerning allocation and
use are made (Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 2003). So long as conflicts do not escalate to a
point where the governance system becomes dysfunctional, they can bring about
learning and change as different interests, philosophies, and perspectives are aired
in the process of deliberation and conflict resolution (Dietz et al., 2003). V. Ostrom
and Ostrom (1977) point out that conflict is an important indicator of potential losses
and that the resolution of conflict can result in a net improvement of economic wel-
fare. However, widely divergent or incompatible views of the preferred state or use
of a natural resource could lead to potentially intractable conflict that could stymie
self-organization. Maintaining the capability to resolve conflict is critical, however,
and as Dietz et al. (2003) note, conflict resolution may be as important a reason for
designing resource governance institutions as concern over a resource.
4. Theoretical Advantages of Polycentric Governance Systems
Having laid out the core attributes of a polycentric governance system, we turn
to the three broad claims concerning the advantages of polycentricity in the gover-
nance of natural resource systems. In describing the logic of these claims, we
Carlisle/Gruby: Polycentric Systems of Governance in the Commons 9
935

introduce the enabling conditions in the model, which specify institutional and
design features of each attribute that may be necessary or conducive to achieving
these advantages. We note that whether an enabling condition is necessary or merely
helpful likely depends upon context, and the literature is not sufficiently developed
for us to make those distinctions. We also acknowledge that the three advantages are
closely related and mutually reinforcing in the sense that realization of one advan-
tage likely contributes to realization of the others. For example, if a governance sys-
tem produces institutions that are a good fit for natural resource systems and
mitigates risk through incorporation of redundancy, its capacity to adapt to change
is likely thereby enhanced. As this suggests, there is substantial overlap among
attributes and enabling conditions that support each of the three posited advantages,
and one could reasonably argue that all the attributes and enabling conditions are at
least helpful, if not necessary, in achieving each of the advantages. However, we link
the enabling conditions to the advantages they most directly support based on the
development of the claims in the literature. Finally, while it is important to maintain
some degree of flexibility within enabling conditions to account for context-specific
application, we expect the enabling conditions to be further refined as the research
agenda on polycentricity develops.
4.1. Adaptive Capacity
Perhaps the most commonly cited theoretical advantage of polycentric gover-
nance systems in the commons literature is that they may be capable of adapting to
actual or anticipated social and ecological change better than more centralized forms
of governance (e.g., Bixler, 2014; da Silveira & Richards, 2013; Folke et al., 2005; Mar-
shall, 2015; Pahl-Wostl, 2009). This ability to adapt is often termed “adaptive capaci-
ty,” which Pahl-Wostl (2009) defines as “the ability of a resource governance system
to first alter processes and if required convert structural elements as response to
experienced or expected changes in the societal or natural environment” (p. 355).
This includes adaptation through the design of new institutions (see E. Ostrom,
1999). With accumulating evidence signaling an increasing likelihood of nonlinear
and abrupt changes in ecosystems (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005), there
is considerable interest in designing institutions that allow for adaptation (e.g., Bixler,
2014; da Silveira & Richards, 2013; Dietz et al., 2003; Galaz et al., 2008; Pahl-Wostl,
2009; Pahl-Wostl & Knieper, 2014; Sovacool, 2011; Wyborn, 2015). Theoretical sup-
port for the proposition that polycentric governance systems exhibit greater adaptive
capacity can be found in complex-adaptive systems theory, which provides that self-
organizing complex-adaptive systems have the ability to adapt by changing their
rules and behavior as they gain experience (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012). Polycentric gov-
ernance systems have been characterized as complex-adaptive systems (Andersson
& Ostrom, 2008), and their capacity for adaption has been linked to the notion that
they facilitate parallel efforts to experiment with different ideas and rule combina-
tions which, when combined with information transmission and learning, can lead
to institutional innovation to cope with change (Imperial, 1999; E. Ostrom, 1999). In
Policy Studies Journal, 47:4
936

recent years, commons scholars have also begun to develop empirical support for
the proposition that polycentric governance systems exhibit enhanced adaptive
capacity (e.g., da Silveira & Richards, 2013; Pahl-Wostl & Knieper, 2014; Sovacool,
2011).
This potential advantage of polycentric governance systems stems first from
their most basic attribute: multiple, overlapping decision-making centers operating
with some degree of autonomy. If decision-making centers are actively engaged in
semiautonomous efforts to govern a resource, they may produce a diversity of insti-
tutions. While the probability that a particular institution will fail is likely high (E.
Ostrom, 1999), some institutions may well achieve a degree of success. If decision-
making centers take into account the successes and failures of others, and learn from
them, they may be capable of devising and continually adapting ever more effective
institutions(seeOlsson,Folke,&Berkes,2004;E.Ostrom,1999).Astheforegoing
suggests, this claim also implicates the second attribute in the model, as it requires
that decision-making centers take one another into account, including through pro-
cesses of cooperation and competition (e.g., of ideas or methods), and that they
resolve conflicts that could undermine cooperation and stymie adaptation. Many
other factors bear directly on the realization of adaptive capacity, and in the follow-
ing subsections we describe the institutional features we identify as being most inte-
gral to the claim. These features constitute “enabling conditions” in the theoretical
model of a functional polycentric governance system for the commons.
4.1.1. Decision-Making Centers Employ Diverse Institutions. This enabling condition
makes explicit a common presumption concerning polycentric governance systems:
namely, that a diversity of rules, norms, and strategies necessarily flow from a multi-
plicity of decision-making centers. We note that while institutional diversity is a logi-
cal outcome given a diversity of semiautonomous governance actors, there is nothing
inherent in polycentricity that prevents decision-making centers from coalescing
around a common policy or approach. Were this to happen, some of the advantages
ascribed to polycentric governance systems in the commons may not be achieved.
One of these is their enhanced adaptive capacity, for it rests upon the notion that deci-
sion-making centers will continually experiment with different resource institutions
and adopt (and adapt) the more successful ones. Given the improbability that any
governance system will ever stumble onto the optimal combination of rules (E.
Ostrom, 1999), and given that natural resource systems are dynamic and changing,
we should never expect the actors in a functional polycentric governance system to
settle upon a single policy or approach. Instead, we should expect ongoing experi-
mentation in an effort to continually improve and adapt institutions.
4.1.2. Generally Applicable Rules and Norms Structure Actions and Behaviors within
the System. The capacity of governance systems to adapt to change depends in part
on the existence of incentives for productive activity, including public or civic entre-
preneurship, and agreed or accepted limits on the range of possible responses by
governance actors. As Vincent Ostrom observes, “social organization occurs when
the potential variety of human behavior is constrained soastoexcludesomepossibili-
ties and permit other possibilities” (V. Ostrom, 1999a, p. 55, emphasis in original). In
Carlisle/Gruby: Polycentric Systems of Governance in the Commons 11
937

a polycentric governance system, this condition is made possible by the existence of
rules and norms generally applicable to actors in the system (see Aligica & Tarko,
2012; V. Ostrom, 1999a; Pahl-Wostl & Knieper, 2014). Generally applicable rules and
norms bound the universe of possible policies and management strategies, and they
ideally provide sufficient incentives for experimentation and creative problem
solving. To facilitate adaptation, it is also critical that the rules and norms allow the
entry of new actors and enable new institutional pathways when existing gover-
nance actors cannot meet the needs and objectives of the governance system (see E.
Ostrom, 1999). The possibility of entry allows for the influx of fresh ideas and meth-
ods, the creation of new partnerships and synergies, and the introduction of addi-
tional capacity. This may be essential when the system is faced with abrupt or
unanticipated environmental change.
4.1.3. Decision-Making Centers Participate in Cross-Scale Linkages or Other
Mechanisms for Deliberation and Learning. In the commons literature, deliberation
and learning have been posited as processes that support a governance system’s
adaptive capacity (see Berkes, 2010; Blomquist, 2009; Folke et al., 2005; Gelcich, 2014).
Learning, defined here as gaining knowledge from social interactions to inform natu-
ral resource management (see Crona & Parker, 2012), is a process that depends upon
ample opportunities for communication and interfacing. It is promoted by delibera-
tion, including “[w]ell-structured dialogue involving scientists, resource users, and
interested publics, and informed by analysis of key information and environmental
and human environment systems” (Dietz et al., 2003, p. 1910). If there were no
exchange of information among decision-making centers, each would have to learn
on its own through trial-and-error processes without the benefit of knowing what
policies instituted by others may have succeeded or failed (see E. Ostrom, 1999).
Such an approach could undermine the governance system’s ability to adapt at the
pace of change.
Given that decision making in polycentric governance systems is dispersed
among governmental and nongovernmental actors, achieving predicted functionality
may require forums designed to bring decision makers together for deliberation and
learning (see Galaz, Crona, €
Osterblom, & Folke, 2011). We therefore specify in this
enabling condition that decision-making centers participate in cross-scale linkages or
other formal or informal mechanisms for deliberation and learning. The term “cross-
scale linkage” generally refers to a point of interaction or cooperation (often in for-
malized organizations) among actors that exist at different scales or at different levels
of political or social organization (Heikkila, Schlager, & Davis, 2011). The term is also
used to refer to linkages among actors that exist at the same level of political or social
organization but across space (i.e., “horizontal” linkages) (Berkes, 2002). With some
polycentric governance systems, particularly those in smaller settings or with a sig-
nificant degree of overlap among decision-making centers, informal social and pro-
fessional networks may provide sufficient opportunities for interaction, deliberation,
and learning. There is a risk, however, that reliance on informal networks may result
in ad hoc decision making (Wyborn, 2015) and foster group homophily that dimin-
ishes adaptive capacity (Galaz et al., 2008).
Policy Studies Journal, 47:4
938

Cross-scale linkages or multi-stakeholder forums may be especially vulnerable
to domination or capture by powerful interests (see Adger, Brown, & Tompkins,
2005; Bixler et al., 2016). When networks or cross-scale linkages are captured by one
or more powerful actors, the governance system may become dominated by a hege-
mony of ideas and interests that stifle dialogue, creative problem solving, and elimi-
nate the diversity of institutions that underlie adaptive capacity. Adger et al. (2005)
find that when cross-scale linkages are characterized by power asymmetries, more
powerful actors seeking to further their interests can dominate the linkages in a way
that further skews knowledge and information in their favor. No social organization
is ever without power asymmetries, but at some threshold, they may inhibit
the intended functioning of a cross-scale linkage. As McCay (2002) characterizes it,
“[t]he question becomes to what extent are the decisions due to open and honest
exchange and deliberation or instead the result of the ‘governing mechanisms’ of
money and political power and authority, on the one hand, or of prestige and social
influence, on the other” (p. 384).
While cross-scale linkages have been advocated for their potential to foster delib-
eration, learning, and adaptation, more empirical research is needed to understand
how better to leverage their benefits. Important areas for research include the levels
at which collaboration is most effective and the circumstances under which coordina-
tion is necessary (Wyborn, 2015). Similarly, more empirical research is needed to bet-
ter understand pathologies in cross-scale linkages associated with power
asymmetries and to identify strategies for preventing or mitigating them. Given the
relative paucity of research in this area and the importance of context, it would be
inappropriate to propose a blueprint for the design of cross-scale linkages that are
effective at preventing or managing such pathologies. Ensuring that actors in a cross-
scale linkage have adequate resources to enable their participation, however, is an
important consideration (see Adger et al., 2005).
4.1.4. Mechanisms for Accountability Exist within the Governance System. The func-
tionality of a governance system, including its capacity to adapt to change, depends
upon the possibility of holding decision makers accountable for poor performance,
corruption, or failing to meet the needs and expectations of those whom they repre-
sent. As Skelcher (2005) observes, “[a]n intrinsic element of jurisdictional integrity in
a democratic system is that citizens are enabled to give consent to and pass judgment
on the exercise of authority by that governmental entity” (p. 89). Lebel et al. (2006)
note that downward accountability to local constituents is often weak in natural
resource governance, and they contend that this can compromise not just a gover-
nance system’s adaptive capacity, but an entire social-ecological system’s adaptive
capacity. As their argument goes, mechanisms for accountability allow socially vul-
nerable groups that bear disproportionate risks and receive insufficient benefits from
natural resource policies to challenge decision-making authorities. Any resulting
efforts to improve the distribution of risks and benefits may enhance the adaptive
capacity of vulnerable groups, which in turn may benefit the social-ecological system
as a whole by reducing conflict and strengthening weak links (Lebel et al., 2006).
Carlisle/Gruby: Polycentric Systems of Governance in the Commons 13
939

In the case of a polycentric governance system, conventional mechanisms for
accountability (e.g., the electoral process, deliberative processes, public hearings,
demonstrations [Skelcher, 2005]) may prove inadequate on account of the dispersal
of decision-making authority among governmental and nongovernmental actors.
Lieberman (2011) examined polycentric governance of infectious disease control in
the Eastern Cape of South Africa and found that it was difficult for citizens to hold
governance actors accountable because multiple actors were responsible for perform-
ing the same or similar tasks, resulting in confusion over whom to blame or punish.
Governance actors had strong incentives to shirk responsibilities because they could
rely upon other actors who were assigned the same responsibilities, and they were
not likely to be blamed or held accountable for inaction. Similar concerns were raised
by Blomquist and Schlager (2005), who note that accountability in some polycentric
governance systems may be challenged because of the high number of governance
actors, each with his or her own line of accountability, and the fluidity or lack of clar-
ity that often characterizes relationships between the actors.
To the contrary, Sovacool (2011) suggests that polycentric governance systems
may actually enhance accountability because it may be more difficult for parochial
interests to capture multiple levels of governance than to capture a single level. Simi-
larly, E. Ostrom (2000) observes that polycentric governance systems, with their mul-
tiple centers of power at different levels, provide more opportunity for citizens and
officials to correct maldistributions of authority and takeover by opportunistic indi-
viduals. This generally comports with V. Ostrom (1999b) who, in writing about
“rule-ruler-ruled” relationships, states that “complex configuration[s] of institutional
arrangements” where “everyone exercises some basic prerogative of governance and
no one exercises unlimited prerogatives of governance” may help to stem abuses of
power (p. 181). The topic of accountability, while clearly important, has not been
explored in sufficient depth in the literature on polycentric governance for us to out-
line general strategies for closing accountability gaps. However, Agrawal and Ribot
(1999) list a number of possibilities for decentralized governance arrangements,
including monitoring by independent third parties (e.g., media or NGOs), auditing
and evaluation, public reporting requirements for governmental decision makers,
education, performance awards, and oversight by higher levels of government.
4.1.5. A Variety of Formal and Informal Mechanisms for Conflict Resolution Exist
within the System. This enabling condition addresses the means by which decision-
making centers in a functional polycentric governance system resolve conflicts that
could otherwise erode coherence and undermine cooperative processes that maintain
adaptive capacity (see da Silveira & Richards, 2013). V. Ostrom et al. (1961) state that
having “recourse to central mechanisms to resolve conflicts,” is necessary for the
coherent functioning of polycentric governance systems (p. 831). The authors’ use of
the term “central mechanisms” does not mean that recourse to courts or higher-level
government bodies is required or necessarily desirable for resolution of all conflicts.
The submission of some disputes to judicial or higher-level governmental bodies
may be unavoidable, particularly for decision-making centers that lack political or
material clout (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). But there is value in resolving conflicts
Policy Studies Journal, 47:4
940

through informal means, as V. Ostrom et al. (1961) recognize, because when higher
levels of government are invoked to resolve conflict, it tends to centralize decision-
making and control. This, in turn, may impede adaptive capacity, as local decision
makers sacrifice autonomy to innovate contextually adapted solutions to resolve con-
flict at the local level (see V. Ostrom et al., 1961). Moreover, formal conflict resolution
can be costly and protracted. In this regard, one of the design principles that Elinor
Ostrom (1990) found to be associated with robust institutions for sustaining
common-pool resources is rapid access to low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms.
Rather than creating strict hierarchical systems, E. Ostrom (2008) proposes
“[d]esigning multiple tiers of arenas that can engage in rapid discovery of conflicts
and effective conflict resolution” (p. 18). It is unclear how one might operational-
ize such a multi-tiered system, but the important point may be that conflict resolu-
tion systems should possess a diversity of forums and offer a variety of
approaches (e.g., conciliation, mediation, and arbitration) so that disputants have
a choice in selecting a forum and mechanism most appropriate to the nature of the
dispute and to their material circumstances. As Dietz et al. (2003) note, conflict res-
olution mechanisms “range from ballots and polls, where engagement is passive
and participants interact minimally, to adversarial processes that allow parties to
redress grievances through formal legal procedures, to various experiments with
intense interaction and deliberation aimed at negotiating decisions or allowing
parties in potential conflict to provide structured input to them through participa-
tory processes” (p. 1909). The existence of a variety of formal and informal conflict
resolution mechanisms may be particularly important in polycentric governance
systems on account of their diversity of governance actors with varying degrees of
political standing and material resources.
4.2. Institutional Fit
A second advantage of polycentric governance systems commonly cited by com-
mons scholars is that they are capable of producing institutions that are a good fit for
natural resource systems (e.g., Lebel et al., 2006). Often referred to as “institutional
fit,” the term very generally refers to the match or congruence between an institution
and the problem or need it is meant to address. Institutions that exhibit good institu-
tional fit may be more robust and effective in accomplishing desired outcomes
because they better account for the characteristics of natural resource systems that
they seek to address (Folke, Pritchard, Berkes, Colding, & Svedin, 2007). Epstein
et al. (2015) identify three types of institutional fit in the literature on social-
ecological systems, two of which are relevant to the claim about polycentricity: (i)
ecological fit, which typically considers whether institutions are aligned with the spa-
tial, temporal, and functional characteristics of the ecosystem problem being
addressed; and (ii) social fit, which is concerned with institutions that “reflect the
interests, values, beliefs, and psychological needs of groups” (p. 36). Scholars also
sometimes credit polycentric governance systems more generally with producing
Carlisle/Gruby: Polycentric Systems of Governance in the Commons 15
941

“context-specific” institutions, a claim that essentially concerns institutional fit with-
out labeling it as such (e.g., Gelcich, 2014).
The claim that polycentric governance systems provide good institutional fit for
natural resource systems is partly based on the concept of “near decomposability”
(Blomquist, 2009). Nearly decomposable systems are comprised of a multilevel hier-
archy of subsystems within larger systems. The subsystems operate largely indepen-
dently but also impact or depend upon the other subsystems to varying degrees (see
Simon, 1962). The concept of near decomposability has been extended to the analysis
of natural resource systems, which are typically conceived as having multiple levels
of subsystems that function independently in many respects but are also functionally
linked with higher-level and lower-level subsystems within the larger natural
resource system (see E. Ostrom, 2007). The partial independence of each subsystem
implies that a governance configuration capable of producing good institutional fit
would include decision makers at the level of each subsystem to make context-
specific institutions as well as decision makers with authority over the entire natural
resource system in order to address cross-level interactions (see Blomquist, 2009).
Thus, Folke et al. (2005) observe that polycentric governance systems may be capable
of producing institutions at levels that are most appropriate to ecological scale or
level. The various human behaviors, values, preferences, and norms pertaining to,
and interacting with, an ecological system are also heterogeneous and multiscale or
multilevel. This further complicates the challenge of institutional design, and a gov-
ernance system that is similarly heterogeneous and complex may be better suited to
the task (Blomquist, 2009). The diverse mix of state and nonstate governance actors
in a polycentric system may be an advantage in this regard because governance
actors may be able to leverage complementary knowledge (e.g., local or traditional
knowledge and scientific knowledge) about social and ecological systems to inform
more contextually adapted institutions, thereby enhancing fit (see Cash et al., 2006).
In terms of the model, both attributes and two previously introduced enabling
conditions contribute to the realization of good institutional fit. Given their full expli-
cation above, we address their pertinence to institutional fit in brief here. First, the
existence of multiple, overlapping decision-making centers operating with some
degree of autonomy (attribute one) helps make possible the production of place-
specific institutions that are better tailored to a particular context or problem (see
Folke et al., 2005; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012). For example, Pahl-Wostl et al. (2012) state
that “the distribution of authority among centers in a polycentric regime further ena-
bles place-specific responses to heterogeneity and uncertainties that a centralized sys-
tem would make difficult” (p. 32). As Galaz et al. (2008) observe, these “place-
specific responses” take the form of diverse institutional arrangements, implicating
enabling condition 4.1.1, which stipulates that decision-making centers employ
diverse institutions. A one-size-fits-all approach to natural resource governance is
antithetical to the concept of institutional fit, as we would expect decision-making
centers to employ a diversity of institutions to effectively address the governance
challenges of heterogeneous and dynamic commons (see E. Ostrom, 2012). More-
over, given the complexity of natural resource systems, it is unlikely that any single
decision-making center possesses the range of knowledge necessary for the
Policy Studies Journal, 47:4
942

production of good institutional fit (Galaz et al., 2008). This speaks to the importance
of decision-making centers taking one another into account, including through coop-
erative processes (attribute two), to enhance their capacity to produce institutions
that are well-matched to social and ecological context. As governance actors may be
widely dispersed in a polycentric governance system, participation in cross-scale
linkages or other mechanisms for deliberation and learning (enabling condition 4.1.3)
may be necessary for this purpose (Galaz et al., 2008; Imperial, 1999). Such participa-
tion can build trust among disparate governance actors to encourage cooperation
and stimulate institutional innovation to deal with challenging natural resource con-
cerns (see Dietz et al., 2003).
We have identified two additional enabling conditions, discussed below, that
may be necessary or conducive to achieving the advantage of good institutional fit.
4.2.1. Decision-Making Centers Exist at Different Levels and across Political
Jurisdictions. The claim that polycentric governance systems provide good institu-
tional fit for natural resource systems is based largely on the characteristic that
they exhibit decision-making capability at different levels (e.g., local, state, and
federal) that generally correspond to the multiple spatial levels or dimensions of
natural resource systems (see Folke et al., 2005). While the existence of decision-
making centers at different levels is partly implied in our first attribute by the
criteria that decision-making centers be multiple and overlapping, we make this
explicit and expand upon it by specifying that decision-making centers also exist
or operate across political jurisdictions. Local-level decision makers may be able
to respond to environmental feedbacks more quickly than centralized decision
makers (Folke et al., 2007) and to craft institutions that are better adapted to local
interests and norms of behavior (E. Ostrom, 2005), but they often lack the capac-
ity or authority to deal with transboundary issues. In this case, higher-level and/
or cross-jurisdiction decision makers in a polycentric governance system are nec-
essary to deal with concerns that cascade across levels or jurisdictions (Galaz
et al., 2008; Lebel et al., 2006). Cross-jurisdiction decision making may be espe-
cially critical to fit, as Folke et al. (2007) argue that that the ecosystem properties
that are most challenging for governance actors are those that are linked across
jurisdictions or scales. McGinnis and Ostrom (2011) observe that the existence of
cross-jurisdictional decision makers is an important component of polycentricity
that distinguishes it from federalism:
polycentricity conveys more than just federalism as it typically is under-
stood. A federal system may consist only of a sequence of neatly nested
jurisdictions at the local, state or provincial, and national levels, but a poly-
centric system also includes cross-cutting jurisdictions specializing in par-
ticular policy matters, such as an agency managing a river basin that cuts
across state lines. (p. 15)
The foregoing suggests that cross-jurisdiction decision-making centers may be
an integral feature in any polycentric governance system. However, this may not be
Carlisle/Gruby: Polycentric Systems of Governance in the Commons 17
943

sufficient to ensure the production of institutions that are aligned with the spatial
extent of a natural resource system or associated problem. As described in the fol-
lowing subsection, there should also be congruence between the jurisdiction of deci-
sion-making centers and the boundaries or spatial extent of the natural resource
problem of concern.
4.2.2. The Jurisdiction or Scope of Authority of Decision-Making Centers Is
Coterminous with the Boundaries of the Problem Being Addressed. A core concern of
institutional fit in the commons is that decision-making centers have jurisdiction or
authority over the full spatial extent of a natural resource system or associated prob-
lem (Folke et al., 2007). In this regard, Cash et al. (2006) note that spatial scale mis-
matches occur when the extent of a decision maker’s authority does not map
coherently onto the spatial scale of the social or ecological problem at issue. They cite
transboundary pollution, migratory fish stocks, and aquifer management as exam-
ples of concerns that often extend beyond the reach of a single decision maker or
governance system (Cash et al., 2006). V. Ostrom et al. (1961) make a similar point,
observing that the boundaries of a political jurisdiction should “include the relevant
set of events to be controlled” (p. 835). They note, for example, that the city of Pasa-
dena suffers from smog attacks, but its political boundaries do not encompass an area
sufficient to control the social and meteorological variables that contribute to the prob-
lem (V. Ostrom et al., 1961). We therefore specify as an enabling condition in the
model that the jurisdiction or scope of authority of decision-making centers be coter-
minous with the boundaries of the problem being addressed. To the extent decision-
making centers cumulatively do not have coterminous authority to make decisions
pertaining to a particular concern, this enabling condition also contemplates that a
new decision-making center with appropriate jurisdiction could enter the governance
system, including through a collaboration with existing decision-making centers.
4.3. Mitigation of Risk through Redundancy
The final theoretical advantage we address is the claim that polycentric gov-
ernance systems mitigate the risk of institutional failure and resource losses on
account of their redundancy (e.g., Gelcich, 2014; Nelson, Howden, & Smith, 2008;
E. Ostrom, 1999). This claim encompasses two related forms of redundancy: (i)
the duplication of functions by decision-making centers within a given domain
or issue area, and (ii) the existence of a diversity of institutions for managing a
natural resource system across spatial and/or issue areas (see Low et al., 2003).
This advantage is commonly proposed without a great deal of exposition. How-
ever, E. Ostrom (2012) provides the following hypothetical that illustrates the
intuitive appeal of the claim:
Let us imagine a series of inshore fisheries located along the coast of a
region and posit that every policy innovation has a probability of failure of
1/10. If the region were regulated by a single governing agency, one out of
ten policy changes would be failures for the entire region. If designing rules
Policy Studies Journal, 47:4
944

were delegated to three genuinely independent authorities, each of these
authorities would still face a failure rate of one out of ten. The probability
that a failure would simultaneously occur along the entire coast, however,
would be reduced from 1/10 to 1/103or 1/1000. On a coast with many rela-
tively separable inshore fisheries that are governed by local authorities, the
likelihood of a coastal-wide failure is reduced still more. (p. 129)
As this example illustrates, the existence of redundant or back-up teams of deci-
sion makers experimenting with different rule combinations may significantly
reduce the risk of policy failure for an entire region, thereby increasing the stability
or resilience of a natural resource system (Galaz et al., 2008). Dietz et al. (2003) note
in this regard that catastrophic resource collapses have resulted when central govern-
ments exerted sole authority over resources.
Redundancy for purposes of this advantage may exist when there are multi-
ple local-level decision-making centers across a larger resource system, as in the
previous example, or when there are redundant decision-making centers at
higher and lower governance levels in the same governance domain (Andersson
& Ostrom, 2008). With respect to the latter, Low et al. (2003) note that the Maine
lobster fishery represents a successful example of a redundant resource regime
where decision making occurs at state and local levels. Local lobster fishers con-
trol access and make some of the day-to-day informal rules for the fishery, while
state government has enacted laws that protect breeding stock (Low et al., 2003).
While the two centers of decision making serve largely complementary roles,
state regulators have intervened when local-level failures threatened the viability
of the resource (Low et al, 2003). While the creation of redundant decision-mak-
ing centers in a polycentric governance system may entail additional costs and
appear inefficient, it may in fact be an efficient governance strategy if it avoids
the loss of a resource (Galaz et al., 2008).
In terms of the model, we introduce no new enabling conditions on account
of this posited advantage, as the most essential conditions for its realization have
been previously described. Fundamental to the claim that polycentric gover-
nance systems mitigate risk through redundancy are a single attribute and two
enabling conditions. First, the existence of multiple, overlapping decision-mak-
ing centers with some degree of autonomy (attribute one) helps ensure that
redundant teams of decision makers are engaged in a governance domain. In cer-
tain contexts, such as the Maine lobster fishery, a successful configuration of
redundant decision making will consist of lower- and higher-level decision-mak-
ing centers. Thus, enabling condition 4.2.1, which specifies that decision-making
centers exist at different levels and across jurisdictions, may be essential to real-
izing this advantage. The claim also presumes that decision-making centers pro-
duce diverse or different institutions in a governance domain (enabling
condition 4.1.2) (see Andersson & Ostrom, 2008). Otherwise, if an institution or
policy experiment fails, there would be no alternative institutional approaches
that could mitigate any resulting resource losses.
Carlisle/Gruby: Polycentric Systems of Governance in the Commons 19
945

4.4. Theoretical Model
In Table 1, we present a model of a functional polycentric governance system for
the commons. The two defining attributes are represented in the far-left column,
while the enabling conditions are in the adjacent column grouped below the attribute
with which they are most closely associated. In the three columns to the right, we
indicate which of the theoretical advantages are most directly supported by a partic-
ular attribute or enabling condition, recognizing that all of the elements in the model
may contribute at least indirectly to realization of each advantage.
Presence of the elements we specify in the theoretical model is no guarantee that
a polycentric governance system will perform effectively or achieve the advantages
Table 1. Theoretical Model of a Functional Polycentric Governance System for the Commons
Attribute Enabling Condition
Advantage:
Enhanced
Adaptive
Capacity
Advantage:
Good
Institutional
Fit
Advantage:
Risk
Mitigation/
Redundancy
Multiple,
overlapping
decision-making centers
with some degree of
autonomy
XX X
Decision-making centers
employ diverse institutions
XX X
Decision-making centers exist
at different levels and
across political jurisdictions
XX
The jurisdiction or scope of
authority of decision-
making centers is
coterminous with the
boundaries of the problem
being addressed
X
Choosing to act in ways that
take account of others
through processes of
cooperation, competition,
conflict, and conflict
resolution
XX
Generally applicable rules
and norms structure
actions and behaviors
within the system
X
Decision-making centers
participate in cross-scale
linkages or other
mechanisms for
deliberation and learning
XX
Mechanisms for
accountability exist within
the governance system
X
A variety of formal and
informal mechanisms for
conflict resolution exist
within the system
X
Policy Studies Journal, 47:4
946

claimed by commons scholars. We emphasize that there are innumerable contextual
factors that contribute to the emergence and maintenance of any governance system.
Based on development of the concept in the literature to date, we assert that their
presence makes robust and functional governance of natural resources more likely.
Of course, there are no perfect governance systems, and it is unlikely that a polycen-
tric governance system exists that fully manifests all the attributes and enabling con-
ditions we prescribe and fully delivers on all the theoretical advantages proposed by
commons scholars. Polycentricity presents in degrees, and polycentric governance
systems may be more or less polycentric and more or less “system-like” in character
(see Andersson & Ostrom, 2008; Galaz et al., 2011; Gruby & Basurto, 2013). It is
therefore not our intention to develop a binary “litmus test” for polycentric gover-
nance systems. The model instead represents a stylized ideal type of a functional
and fully polycentric governance system based on the current state of knowledge
and research. In our final section below, we summarize some of the implications of
the model and propose an agenda for future research.
5. The Path Forward
In developing the theoretical model, we encountered a tension between, on the
one hand, more specifically defining and bounding the concept of a functional poly-
centric governance system, and on the other, leaving open enough space for context-
specific application and further development. We believe a more systematic
approach to conceptualizing polycentric governance can better facilitate critical
examination of the claims associated with it and the development of more nuanced
theories concerning the features and circumstances associated with functionality. We
viewed our task here as taking polycentric governance a step further toward specific-
ity, including identifying the underlying assumptions of commons scholars in attrib-
uting particular advantages to it, without sacrificing the generality necessary for
contextual application. As previously noted, the theoretical model can never fully
explain the emergence and success of a polycentric governance system (or lack
thereof). The success of a particular polycentric governance system depends upon a
myriad of factors, including the success and endurance of individual decision-mak-
ing centers, which in turn may depend upon the extent to which they exhibit some
combination of the eight design principles formulated by Elinor Ostrom (1990).
Moving forward, work that investigates where, and under what circumstances,
polycentricity in governance can lead to expected or desired outcomes is a critical
avenue for further research. Additionally, comparative studies that integrate the
findings and theoretical developments concerning polycentric governance and other
similar concepts, such as multilevel governance (Hooghe & Marks, 2001) and net-
work governance (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Provan & Kenis, 2007), could prove very
useful in advancing our understanding of polycentricity in complex governance sys-
tems (see Galaz et al., 2011; McGinnis & Ostrom, 2011). Other issues ripe for research
include: (i) investigating how various degrees or manifestations of polycentricity are
related to environmental and social outcomes, (ii) exploring the quality and degree
of autonomy necessary for achieving well-performing polycentric governance
Carlisle/Gruby: Polycentric Systems of Governance in the Commons 21
947

systems in different settings, (iii) examining the benefits of cross-scale linkages and
other coordination mechanisms and exploring how power asymmetries may be
reproduced and amplified through such mechanisms and how they may be man-
aged, and (iv) investigating mechanisms for increasing the accountability of decision
makers in polycentric governance systems.
Finally, this article should not be read to suggest that polycentric governance
systems are the definitive “answer” for the governance of natural resource systems.
Therearenopanaceas,asElinorOstromwaswellknownforsaying,andthisiscer-
tainly as true for polycentricity as it is for other governance approaches. What suc-
ceeds in one setting may very well fail in another. Recent empirical studies suggest,
however, that polycentric governance systems may be more likely than monocentric
or centralized governance to exhibit enhanced adaptive capacity and therewith lead
to better environmental and social outcomes (see Pahl-Wostl & Knieper, 2014; Pahl-
Wostl et al., 2012). Much more empirical research is clearly needed to better predict
when, where, and under what circumstances, polycentric governance systems are
likely to perform well or poorly.
It is our hope that this article will continue a conversation that seeks to build
clarity around the concept of polycentric governance systems and the advantages
they may yield. As noted earlier in this article, polycentricity in governance is likely
already a pervasive condition in much of the world, yet degradation of natural
resources continues at an alarming rate (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005).
This suggests that many polycentric governance systems may not be performing
effectively. It is therefore critical that commons scholars move beyond making broad
pronouncements concerning the theoretical benefits of polycentric governance for
natural resources and begin to develop more nuanced and contextualized theories.
There is ample reason to believe that polycentric governance systems, with their
multiple avenues for collective action and creative problem solving, have the potential
to lead to better social and ecological outcomes in many contexts. Given this poten-
tial and the challenges that natural resource governance presents, work that advan-
ces understanding of the concept, including factors associated with better
performance, should be a priority for commons scholars.
Keith Carlisle is a doctoral candidate, Human Dimensions of Natural Resources,
Colorado State University, Fort Collins.
Rebecca L. Gruby is an assistant professor, Human Dimensions of Natural Resour-
ces, Colorado State University, Fort Collins.
Notes
We wish to thank The David and Lucile Packard Foundation for supporting this work. Earlier versions of
this article were presented at the 15th Global IASC Conference in Edmonton, Canada, May 25–29, 2015,
and at a symposium on polycentricity held at the Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analy-
sis at Indiana University, December 14–18, 2015. We thank the participants in those events for their com-
ments and suggestions, especially Edella Schlager, whose feedback was invaluable. Earlier drafts of the
article also benefited significantly from the comments of three anonymous reviewers.
Policy Studies Journal, 47:4
948

1. Our usage of the terms “commons” and “natural resource systems” as the context or domain of a poly-
centric governance system includes social systems dependent upon or associated with the resource of
concern. Some scholars prefer the term “social-ecological system” to emphasize the integration of
humans in nature and the artificial nature of delineating social systems from ecological systems (Folke
et al., 2005).
2. For clarity, we are developing theory only insofar as we are synthesizing the various bodies of litera-
ture already existing on the concept to propose a model of a polycentric governance system that exhib-
its features scholars have posited as necessary or conducive to achieving certain advantages in the
commons. We are not proposing any novel features that have not previously been linked to the func-
tionality with which we are concerned. We also note that although we developed the model with natu-
ral resource governance in mind, we make no claims about the suitability of the model for other
contexts or settings.
3. It is not our intention in formulating attributes and enabling conditions to provide measurable indica-
tors of a functional polycentric governance system. Our focus here is qualitative description of the ele-
ments of a functional polycentric governance system for the commons that necessarily leaves enough
generality for contextual application and further development. Our contribution is to clarify a very
complex concept and to focus critical attention on institutional features associated with expected func-
tionality. As such, this article should aid future efforts to operationalize the concept and to develop
measurable indicators.
References
Adger, W. Neil, Katrina Brown, and Emma L. Tompkins. 2005. “The Political Economy of Cross-Scale
Networks in Resource Co-Management.” Ecology and Society 10 (2). http://www.ecologyandsociety.
org/vol10/iss2/art9/. Accessed July 21, 2017.
Agrawal, Arun, and Clark C. Gibson. 1999. “Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community
in Natural Resource Conservation.” Worlld Development 27 (4): 629–49.
Agrawal, Arun, and Jesse Ribot. 1999. “Accountability in Decentralization: A Framework with South
Asian and West African Cases.” The Journal of Developing Areas 33 (4): 473–502.
Aligica, Paul D., and Vlad Tarko. 2012. “Polycentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom, and Beyond.” Gover-
nance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 25 (2): 237–62.
Andersson, Krister P., and Elinor Ostrom. 2008. “Analyzing Decentralized Resource Regimes from a
Polycentric Perspective.” Policy Sciences 41: 71–93.
Berkes, Fikret. 2002. “Cross-Scale Institutional Linkages: Perspectives from the Bottom Up.” In The Drama
of the Commons, ed. Elinor Ostrom, Thomas Dietz, Nives Dol
sak, Paul C. Stern, Susan Stonich, and
Elke U. Weber. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 293–321.
———. 2006. “From Community-Based Resource Management to Complex Systems: The Scale Issue and
Marine Commons.” Ecology and Society 11 (1): 45.
———. 2010. “Devolution of Environment and Resources Governance: Trends and Future.” Environmen-
tal Conservation 37 (4): 489–500.
Bixler, R. Patrick. 2014. “From Community Forest Management to Polycentric Governance: Assessing
Evidence from the Bottom Up.” Society & Natural Resources: An International Journal 27 (2): 155–69.
Bixler, R. Patrick, Dara M. Wald, Laura A. Ogden, Kirsten M. Leong, Erik W. Johnston, and Michele
Romolini. 2016. “Network Governance for Large-Scale Natural Resource Conservation and the Chal-
lenge of Capture.” Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 14 (3): 165–71.
Blomquist, William. 2009. “Multi-Level Governance and Natural Resource Management: The Challenges
of Complexity, Diversity, and Uncertainty.” In Institutions and Sustainability, ed. Volker Beckmann
and Martina Padmanabhan. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer Science 1Business Media B.V.,
109–26.
Blomquist, William, and Edella Schlager. 2005. “Political Pitfalls of Integrated Watershed Management.”
Society and Natural Resources 18: 101–17.
Carlisle/Gruby: Polycentric Systems of Governance in the Commons 23
949

Brie, Michael. 2014. “Towards a Plural and Polycentric World of Self-Organising Actors—Elinor Ostrom’s
Research Programme.” International Critical Thought 4 (2): 160–77.
Cash, David W., W. Neil Adger, Fikret Berkes, Po Garden, Louis Lebel, Per Olsson, Lowell Pritchard,
and Oran Young. 2006. “Scale and Cross-Scale Dynamics: Governance and Information in a Multi-
level World.” Ecology and Society 11 (2). http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss2/art8/.
Accessed July 21, 2017.
Crona, Beatrice I., and John N. Parker. 2012. “Learning in Support of Governance: Theories, Methods,
and a Framework to Assess How Bridging Organizations Contribute to Adaptive Resource Gov-
ernance.” Ecology and Society 17 (1): 32.
da Silveira, Andr
e R., and Keith S. Richards. 2013. “The Link Between Polycentrism and Adaptive Capac-
ity in River Basin Governance Systems: Insights from the River Rhine and the Zhujiang (Pearl River)
Basin.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 103 (2): 319–29.
Dietz, Thomas, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul C. Stern. 2003. “The Struggle to Govern the Commons.” Science
232: 1907–12.
Epstein, Graham, Jeremy Pittman, Steven M. Alexander, Samantha Berdej, Thomas Dyck, Ursula
Kreitmair, Kaitlyn J. Rathwell, Sergio Villamayor-Tomas, Jessica Vogt, and Derek Armitage. 2015.
“Institutional Fit and the Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems.” Current Opinion in Environmen-
tal Sustainability 14: 34–40.
Folke, Carl, Thomas Hahn, Per Olsson, and Jon Norberg. 2005. “Adaptive Governance of Social-
Ecological Systems.” Annual Review of Environmental Resources 30: 441–73.
Folke, Carl, Lowell Pritchard, Jr., Fikret Berkes, Johan Colding, and Uno Svedin. 2007. “The Problem of
Fit Between Ecosystems and Institutions: Ten Years Later.” Ecology and Society 12 (1): 30.
Galaz, Victor, Beatrice Crona, Henrik €
Osterblom, and Carl Folke. 2011. “Polycentric Systems and Interact-
ing Planetary Boundaries—Emerging Governance of Climate Change–Ocean Acidification–Marine
Biodiversity.” Ecological Economics 81: 21–32.
Galaz, Victor, Per Olsson, Thomas Hahn, Carl Folke, and Uno Svedin. 2008. “The Problem of Fit between
Ecosystems and Governance Systems—Insights and Emerging Challenges.” In Institutions and Envi-
ronmental Change: Principal Findings, Applications, and Research Frontiers, ed. Oran Young, Leslie A.
King, and Heike Schroeder. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 147–86.
Gelcich, Stefan. 2014. “Towards Polycentric Governance of Small-Scale Fisheries: Insights from the New
‘Management Plans’ Policy in Chile.” Aquatic Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems 24: 575–81.
Gruby, Rebecca L., and Xavier Basurto. 2013. “Multi-Level Governance for Large Marine Commons: Poli-
tics and Polycentricity in Palau’s Protected Area Network.” Environmental Science & Policy 33: 260–
72.
Heikkila, Tanya, Edella Schlager, and Mark W. Davis. 2011. “The Role of Cross-Scale Institutional Link-
ages in Common Pool Resource Management: Assessing Interstate River Compacts.” Policy Studies
Journal 39 (1): 121–45.
Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2001. Multi-Level Governance and European Integration. Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Huitema, Dave, Erik Mostert, Wouter Egas, Sabine Moellenkamp, Claudia Pahl-Wostl, and Resul Yalcin.
2009. “Adaptive Water Governance: Assessing the Institutional Prescriptions of Adaptive (Co-)Man-
agement from a Governance Perspective and Defining a Research Agenda.” Ecology and Society 14
(1): 26.
Huntjens, Patrick, Louis Lebel, Claudia Pahl-Wostl, Jeff Camkin, Roland Schulze, and Nicole Kranz. 2012.
“Institutional Design Propositions for the Governance of Adaptation to Climate Change in the
Water Sector.” Global Environmental Change 22: 67–81.
Imperial, Mark T. 1999. “Institutional Analysis and Ecosystem-Based Management: The Institutional
Analysis and Development Framework.” Environmental Management 24 (4): 449–65.
Komakech, Hans C., and Pieter van der Zaag. 2013. “Polycentrism and Pitfalls: The Formation of Water
Users Forums in the Kikuletwa Catchment, Tanzania.” Water International 38 (3): 231–49.
Koppenjan, Joop, and Erik-Hans Klijn. 2004. Managing Uncertainties in Networks: A Network Approach to
Problem Solving and Decision Making. London: Routledge.
Policy Studies Journal, 47:4
950

Lebel, Louis, John M. Anderies, Bruce Campbell, Carl Folke, Steve Hatfield-Dodds, Terry P. Hughes, and
James Wilson. 2006. “Governance and the Capacity to Manage Resilience in Regional Social-
Ecological Systems.” Ecology and Society 11 (1).
Lieberman, Evan S. 2011. “The Perils of Polycentric Governance of Infectious Disease in South Africa.”
Social Science & Medicine 73: 676–84.
Low, Bobbi, Elinor Ostrom, Carl Simon, and James Wilson. 2003. “Redundancy and Diversity: Do They
Influence Optimal Management?” In Navigating Social-Ecological Systems: Building Resilience for Com-
plexity and Change, ed. Fikret Berkes, Johan Colding, and Carl Folke. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 83–111.
Marshall, Graham R. 2005. Economics for Collaborative Environmental Management: Renegotiating the Com-
mons. London, UK: Earthscan.
——— 2008. “Nesting, Subsidiarity, and Community-Based Environmental Governance Beyond the
Local Level.” International Journal of the Commons 2 (1): 75–97.
———. 2009. “Polycentricity, Reciprocity, and Farmer Adoption of Conservation Practices under
Community-Based Governance.” Ecological Economics 68: 1507–20.
———. 2015. Polycentricity and Adaptive Governance. Working Paper presented at the 15th Biannual Inter-
national Conference of the International Association for the Study of the Commons, Edmonton,
Canada.
McCay, Bonnie J. 2002. “Emergence of Institutions for the Commons.” In The Drama of the Commons,ed.
Elinor Ostrom, Thomas Dietz, Nives Dol
sak, Paul C. Stern, Susan Stonich, and Elke U. Weber.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 361–402.
McGinnis, Michael D. 1999. “Introduction.” In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, ed. Michael D. McGinnis. Ann Arbor, MI: The Uni-
versity of Michigan Press, 1–27.
McGinnis, Michael D., and Elinor Ostrom. 2011. “Reflections on Vincent Ostrom, Public Administration,
and Polycentricity.” Public Administration Review 72 (1): 15–25.
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. 2005. Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: General Synthesis. Washing-
ton, DC: World Resources Institute.
Nagendra, Hahini, and Elinor Ostrom. 2014. “Applying the Social-Ecological System Framework to the
Diagnosis of Urban Lake Commons in Bangalore, India.” Ecology and Society 19 (2). https://doi.org/
10.5751/ES-06582-190267. Accessed April 21, 2015.
Nelson, Rohan, Mark Howden, and Mark S. Smith. 2008. “Using Adaptive Governance to Rethink
the Way Science Supports Australian Drought Policy.” Environmental Science & Policy 11 (7):
588–601.
Newig, Jens, and Oliver Fritsch. 2009. “Environmental Governance: Participatory, Multi-Level—and
Effective?” Environmental Policy and Governance 19: 197–214.
Olsson, Per, Carl Folke, and Fikret Berkes. 2004. “Adaptive Comanagement for Building Resilience in
Social–Ecological Systems.” Environmental Management 34 (1): 75–90.
Olsson, Per, Carl Folke, Victor Galaz, Thomas Hahn, and Lisen Schultz. 2007. “Enhancing the Fit
through Adaptive Co-Management: Creating and Maintaining Bridging Functions for Matching
Scales in the Kristianstads Vattenrike Biosphere Reserve, Sweden.” Ecology and Society 12 (1):
28.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1999. “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons.” Annual Review of Political Science 2: 493–535.
———. 2000. “The Danger of Self-Evident Truths.” PS: Political Science and Politics 33 (1): 33–44.
———. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
———. 2007. “A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas.” PNAS 104 (39): 15181–87.
———. 2008. “The Challenge of Common Pool Resources.” Environment 50 (4): 1–20.
———. 2010. “Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global Environmental
Change.” Global Environmental Change 20: 550–57.
Carlisle/Gruby: Polycentric Systems of Governance in the Commons 25
951

———. 2012. “Keynote Lecture: Why Do We Need to Protect Institutional Diversity?” European Political
Science 11: 128–47.
Ostrom, Elinor, and Roger B. Parks. 1987. “Neither Gargantua nor the Land of Lilliputs: Conjectures on
Mixed Systems of Metropolitan Organization.” In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings
from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, ed. Michael D. McGinnis. Ann Arbor, MI:
The University of Michigan Press, 284–305.
Ostrom, Vincent. 1991. The Meaning of American Federalism. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary
Studies Press.
———. 1999a. “Polycentricity (Part 1).” In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Work-
shop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, ed. Michael D. McGinnis. Ann Arbor, MI: The University
of Michigan Press, 52–74.
———. 1999b. “Cryptoimperialism, Predatory States, and Self-Governance.” In Polycentric Governance and
Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, ed. Michael D. McGin-
nis. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 166–85.
Ostrom, Vincent, and Elinor Ostrom. 1977. “Public Goods and Public Choices.” In Polycentricity and Local
Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, ed. Michael D.
McGinnis. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 75–103.
Ostrom, Vincent, Charles M. Tiebout, and Robert Warren. 1961. “The Organization of Government in
Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry.” American Political Science Review 55: 831–42.
Pahl-Wostl, Claudia. 2009. “A Conceptual Framework for Analysing Adaptive Capacity and Multi-Level
Learning Processes in Resource Governance Regimes.” Global Environmental Change 19: 354–65.
Pahl-Wostl, Claudia, and Christian Knieper. 2014. “The Capacity of Water Governance to Deal with the
Climate Change Adaptation Challenge: Using Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis to Dis-
tinguish between Polycentric, Fragmented and Centralized Regimes.” Global Environmental Change
29: 139–54.
Pahl-Wostl, Claudia, Louis Lebel, Christian Knieper, and Elena Nikitina. 2012. “From Applying Panaceas
to Mastering Complexity: Toward Adaptive Water Governance in River Basins.” Environmental Sci-
ence & Policy 23: 24–34.
Polanyi, Michael. 1951. The Logic of Liberty. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Poteete, Amy R., and Elinor Ostrom. 2004. “Heterogeneity, Group Size and Collective Action: The Role of
Institutions in Forest Management.” Development and Change 35 (3): 435–61.
Provan, Keith G., and Patrick Kenis. 2007. “Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management and
Effectiveness.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 18: 229–52.
Simon, Herbert A. 1962. “The Architecture of Complexity.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society
106 (6): 467–82.
Skelcher, Chris. 2005. “Jurisdictional Integrity, Polycentrism, and the Design of Democratic Governance.”
Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 18 (1): 89–110.
Sovacool, Benjamin K. 2011. “An International Comparison of Four Polycentric Approaches to Climate
and Energy Governance.” Energy Policy 39: 3832–44.
Wyborn, Carina. 2015. “Cross-Scale Linkages in Connectivity Conservation: Adaptive Governance Chal-
lenges in Spatially Distributed Networks.” Environmental Policy and Governance 25 (1): 1–25.
Policy Studies Journal, 47:4
952