Reinventing regional security institutions in Asia and Africa: Power shifts, ideas, and institutional change
Abstract
Regional security institutions play a significant role in shaping the behavior of existing and rising regional powers by nurturing security norms and rules, monitoring state activities, and sometimes imposing sanctions, thereby formulating the configuration of regional security dynamics. Yet their security roles and influence do not remain constant. Their raison d’être, objectives, and functions experience sporadic changes, and some institutions upgrade military functions for peacekeeping operations, while others limit their functions to political and security dialogues. The question is: why and how do these variances in institutional change emerge? This book explores the mechanisms of institutional change, focusing on regional security institutions led by non-great powers. It constructs a theoretical model for institutional change that provides a new understanding of their changing roles in regional security, which has yet to be fully explored in the International Relations field. In so doing, the book illuminates why, when, and how each organization restructures its role, function, and influence. Using case studies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/African Union (AU), it also sheds light on similarities and differences in institutional change between regional security institutions.
... Various types of security institutions exist globally (Koga, 2017a). Among them, the major ones are three-fold. ...
... Under such a circumstance, states reassess raison d'être of institutions. In this process, the norms and rules are likely to be reinterpreted while institutional objectives are also modified (Koga, 2017a). ...
... Rather than excluding external powers, such as the United States, China, Japan and Russia, ASEAN has begun to include them into its institutional frameworks. ASEAN's objective has been to prevent itself from being diplomatically overshadowed by newly established regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), potentially led by great regional powers, such as the United States (Koga, 2017a). In so doing, ASEAN has been able to constrain their behaviour by ASEAN's institutional norms, particularly its non-interference principle (Koga, 2018). ...
... The United States and European states intensively debate over whether the humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect (R2P) would be legally permitted, when the international community sees a possibility or the existence of "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" (UN office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, n.d.). This concept radically departs from the traditional interpretation of the non-interference principle, differing even from the conditional non-interference that African states have attempted to practice since the end of the Cold War (Koga, 2017a). 1 Because of these evolutions of principles, different approaches have emerged even among those who support the LIO, let alone between the WIO and the LIO. ...
... African states' original conceptualization of the conditional interference aims to maintain security and stability of the region by preventing internal conflicts from spilling over the neighboring states(Koga, 2017a). 2 However, Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been initially criticized internationally because of such issues as environmental issues, lack of transparency, and strings attached (for example, MOFA, 2021a; Hoshiro, 2022). ...
... The United States and European states intensively debate over whether the humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect (R2P) would be legally permitted, when the international community sees a possibility or the existence of "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" (UN office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, n.d.). This concept radically departs from the traditional interpretation of the non-interference principle, differing even from the conditional non-interference that African states have attempted to practice since the end of the Cold War (Koga, 2017a). 1 Because of these evolutions of principles, different approaches have emerged even among those who support the LIO, let alone between the WIO and the LIO. ...
... African states' original conceptualization of the conditional interference aims to maintain security and stability of the region by preventing internal conflicts from spilling over the neighboring states(Koga, 2017a). 2 However, Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been initially criticized internationally because of such issues as environmental issues, lack of transparency, and strings attached (for example, MOFA, 2021a; Hoshiro, 2022). ...
... In such a circumstance, states reassess the institutions' raison d'être. In the process, the norms and rules are likely to be reinterpreted while institutional objectives are also modified (Koga 2017). Yet, such a process is likely to be slow because instead of hastily deciding to change the institutions, the member states seek an optimal solution by discussing with each other their strategic posture in the new environment. ...
... However, this institutional framework could potentially conflict with ASEAN's institutional objectives, norms, and principles, namely regional autonomy and ASEAN Centrality. Regional autonomy in Southeast Asia has been arguably ASEAN's most important institutional objective, and ASEAN aims to prevent external actors, particularly regional major powers, from intruding in Southeast Asian affairs without the consent of the regional states (Koga 2017). This is well illustrated by ASEAN's continued emphasis on the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, by which ASEAN declared its desire to have 'regional neutrality' and to prevent external intervention. ...
... While there is a paucity of literature on theoretical models on the collapse of international institutions, the closest theme to institutional collapse is institutional displacement (or replacement) developed by Koga and Cottrell (Cottrell, 2016;Koga, 2017). Institutional displacement refers to the replacement of a particular norm embedded in an institution with a new one. ...
... Yet, given that agents' range of choices are shaped by past institutional decisions, the agents do not have absolute freedom of choices. In this sense, this theoretical model is based on agent-centered historical institutionalism (Koga, 2017). ...
This article examines the causal process of the institutional collapse of the Asia Pacific Council (ASPAC) in 1973 by focusing on Malaysia’s foreign policy behavior, and highlights implications for today’s ASEAN. Specifically, it argues that the institutional collapse of ASPAC was caused by Malaysia’s withdrawal, which stemmed from a shift in its balance of ontological security from security dependence on the UK and the West to greater political autonomy in Southeast Asia. This occurred after a change in the regional distribution of power caused by the UKs withdrawal from East of Suez, and to a lesser extent, US disengagement from Southeast Asia. In the 1960s and 1970s, Malaysia demonstrated the conflicting duality of ontological security, consisting of strategic and aspirational identities. Malaysia’s strategic identity was its association with the West, particularly the UK, which was nurtured through Malaysia’s routinized strategic interaction with them in the security realm. This identity prevented Malaysia from easily or completely abandoning its security ties with them, even when the strategic benefit was significantly marginal. On the other hand, Malaysia’s aspirational identity was to attain greater political autonomy without external interventions, particularly from great powers, which Malaysia experienced during its colonial period. Such sentiments emerged at the end of World War II and the following decolonization process, and were partly illustrated by Malaysia’s pursuit of the non-aligned movement.
... Thirdly, states may be motivated by a desire to enhance their regional identity and contribute to the collective well-being of the region. This motivation is rooted in the concept of a shared regional identity, shaped by factors such as proximity, cultural affinity, and shared values (Koga, 2017;Wehner, 2015). States that strongly identify with their region may be eager to represent the RO's interests during high-level visits, fostering a sense of unity and collective purpose among member states. ...
This study examines the representation of regional organization (RO) interests during high-level visits of their member states to the United States using a novel dataset of 1,040 news articles from 1991 to 2023. The data analysis focuses on ASEAN, BRICS, ECOWAS, and GCC and employs sentiment analysis and topic modeling to explore how member states leverage these visits and how U.S. news media frames these events. The analysis of data reveals that member states strategically utilize high-level visits to promote RO agendas and interests, with varying levels of success depending on the RO and the U.S. media’s reception. Furthermore, the analysis reveals a shifting focus from bilateral issues to regional and international concerns over time, underscoring the evolving priorities of RO member states in a globalized world. The findings offer valuable insights into the interplay of national and regional interests during high-level diplomatic visits and the influential role of U.S. news media in shaping public perception.
... Kawasan Indo-Pasifik adalah kawasan yang strategis, baik dalam aspek ekonomi, politik, maupun militer. Di kawasan ini terdapat negara-negara berpenduduk lebih dari satu miliar (India dan Tiongkok), berteknologi militer modern, SDM militer yang besar, yang berpengaruh terhadap ekonomi dan politik global (Koga, 2017). Sementara itu negara-negara major power lainnya seperti Jepang, India dan Australia juga turut mempengaruhi tata kelola interaksi di kawasan Indo-Pasifik. ...
... Other themes may include development states and industrialization between Malaysia, Ghana, Egypt, and Uganda (Adem and Thomas 2018). Other sub-political approaches emphasize business competitiveness, the trade imbalance between Southeast Asia and Africa, and the comparative regional performance of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Bhattacharya 2018;Carmody, 2013;Koga 2016). By middle of the 1990s, growing numbers of Sudanese, Somalis and other African students writing their defence and strategic studies master and doctoral theses have resulted in monograph publications on Malaysian blue helmet experiences in several UN peacekeeping operations in various African conflict zones (Authors personal communication with Hamidin on July 25, 2018). ...
In this obituary and research note, we dedicate our prayers and peaceful thoughts to the late Associate Professor Dr Hamidin Abdul Hamid (1970-2022), who recently passed away in the late afternoon of September 19, 2022. Malaysians knew him through his national television appearance, famous witty commentaries on national electoral issues, past adjuncts and visiting posts, and consultations. He will always be remembered for his contributions and legacy in advancing African Studies in Malaysia. To colleagues, former students, supervisees, and known associates and academic networks within and outside the circle of History, African Studies, Leadership, and Malaysian elections, his presence is always felt. We are always honoured to know his excellent works in many impactful ways. As part of this attribute to the late Dr Hamidin, the rest of this research note provides updates on current trends in Malaysia-Africa relations and African Studies at Universiti Malaya and in Malaysia generally. We also would like to express our sincere gratitude to SINERGI's Editor-in-Chief and the rest of her editorial team, UKM Press, and SPHEA, UKM, for allowing us to share our views on research in Africa-Malaysia relations.
... Beginning in the 2000s, a newer literature, coexisting with the earlier conceptions, has investigated more genuinely "regional" security organizations in the Global South (Acharya 2003;Koga 2017;Mares and Kacowicz 2015;Suarez, Villa, and Weiffen 2017). However, and unsurprisingly if one thinks through the implications, the stated aims of most contemporary security communities not anchored by global great powers do not include actual mutual defense guarantees. ...
The paper posits a powerful mutuality of interests between global multilateralism and independent regionalism in the global South. The more-or-less liberal international order established following the Second World War struggles to retain political and financial support from advanced industrial countries. Since the underlying source of this tension reflects a structural shift in the interstate distribution of power capabilities toward rising global multipolarity, the only viable medium-term solution for peak multilateralism is achieving greater legitimacy among a wider field of countries. Greater innovativeness is a second benefit to central multilateralism of expanded regional access: important international policy challenges are not “seen” until those who experience them have sufficient voice. The counterpart challenge within the global South is the frustration of policy entrepreneurs from small and intermediate powers. Most recognize the need for prior interest-aggregation to exercise influence in peak international organizations where great powers dominate. However, effective regionalism, a perennial and obvious choice for non-great powers, in practice has been difficult, especially in Latin America. Yes, one explanation is vicious partisan squabbling in the neighborhood, but subtle, structural factors also undermine cooperation, as a quick comparison with Europe demonstrates. In this context, “regionalism” is best conceptualized as a mix of formal organizations and regionally-based transnational epistemic communities or activist networks. A case study of Latin America-focused policy entrepreneurship over several decades around the global financial governance of currency and sovereign debt illustrates these observations.
... This strategic thinking was born in the process of the establishment of the ARF in 1994, because many competing ideas, such as a Council on Security Cooperation in Asia (CSCA), would threaten the raison d'être of ASEAN as a sole regional multilateral, multi-purposed framework in Asia that successfully contains intra-member conflicts. 64 To this end, ASEAN has withheld an agenda-setting capacity from its chairmanship while embedding the "ASEAN Way"-a set of ASEAN's traditional principles, such as consensus decision-making and non-interference principles-in its institutional frameworks in East Asia and beyond. 65 Placing itself at the centre of Asia's regional political, security and economic architectures, ASEAN has been able to prevent external great powers from encroaching on its institutional autonomy. ...
... Envisioning the creation of a Southeast Asian community in the future, and pursuing regional autonomy and security stability, ASEAN incorporated the basic principles of the UN Charter and NAM, such as the principle of non-interference, the preservation of national identities, and the notion of no permanent foreign bases (ASEAN Secretariat 1967). The decision-making was based on consensus, and the core institution in ASEAN was the annual foreign ministers meeting, the so-called ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) (Koga 2017). Given the membership structure, other Southeast Asian states such as Myanmar and Cambodia considered an anti-communist bloc, making it difficult for them to be included as members of ASEAN (Acharya 2012: 156). ...
This paper analyzes why ASEAN survived while ASPAC collapsed by comparing their institutional evolution during the 1960s and 1970s. Its central argument is that a structural factor—a change in the regional distribution of power caused by the withdrawal of the United States and the United Kingdom from Southeast Asia and the intensification of Sino-Soviet rivalry in Asia—created a condition under which both ASEAN and ASPAC required institutional changes for their survival. However, it is ultimately an agent factor, namely Malaysia that played a decisive role in both ASEAN’s institutional survival and ASPAC’s collapse by promoting the idea of “regional neutrality” in ASEAN and withdrawing from ASPAC. This illustrates the importance of ideas to sustain regional institutions.
... Sierra Leone would continue to have a great deal of economic value, owing to its vast reserves of diamonds, bauxite, titanium and gold. The elected government of Tejan Kebbah in Sierra Leone would be overthrown by a coup in 1997 led by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); allegedly this happened because of his termination of EO's contract under pressure from the international community (Koga, 2017). ...
Based on a scoping review of English-language scientific literature for the period of 1990–2022, the article presents a synthetic outline of previous research, focusing on factors influencing the specifics of foreign military bases (FMBs) as examples of facilities that mostly generate negative attitudes known as ‘Not In My Backyard’ (NIMBY). The specific characteristics of different categories of objects that generate various social attitudes are also presented. The results of the analyses include a classification of factors and aspects related to the local impacts of foreign military bases, which have not been analysed before.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been widely condemned by governments of the ‘political West’. Most other states have been either neutral or even Russia-leaning in this war. Southeast Asia is no exception. There is a sense in the West that the primary explanation for this reluctance to unambiguously side against Russia is the relationship, perhaps even dependency, that these states may have vis-à-vis Moscow; prima facie, a logical presumption. This article finds that while there is some truth to this claim, the relations between individual governments’ responses to the war and their bilateral relationships with Moscow is too uneven to suffice as a satisfactory explanation. Instead, one must look beyond materialistic, mono-causal explanations. To get the full picture, one must appreciate Southeast Asia’s diplomatic tradition, their form of open and inclusive regionalism and the continued focus on domestic politics. This research provides the first comprehensive empirical categorisation of Southeast Asian responses to the Ukraine war and traces these to ASEAN’s diplomatic culture.
This chapter conceptualizes the types of institutional strategy and constructs a theoretical model based on agent-centered historical institutionalism to understand the timing of its strategy shifts. This theoretical model analyzes how the member states of a regional security institution perceive and assess their immediate security environment and create or change the institutional strategy. Since member states’ perception is generally affected by the regional distribution of power, the chapter emphasizes the importance of analyzing the regional strategic environment as well as agent’s decisions. The methodology of the analyses is briefly discussed through case studies on the role of ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions regarding the SCS issue. The chapter also provides an overview and assessment of the general trend of the strategic environment in the SCS from 1990 to 2020 over four phases: 1990–2002, 2003–2012, 2013–2016, and 2017–2020. These four phases will be used as a principal indicator to understand the change and continuity of institutional strategies employed by ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions.
Does ASEAN play a role in managing security issues in Southeast Asia and beyond? This chapter introduces the book’s core argument that, since the 1990s, ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions have individually devised and/or shifted their own institutional strategy to manage the great-power politics pertaining to the South China Sea disputes, and that each institutional strategy aims to constrain great powers’ behavior and avoid being entrapped by their strategic competition so as to ensure member states’ interests. Strategy creation or shifts generally occur when member states perceive a change in the strategic environment relating to the South China Sea. But when ASEAN faces difficulty changing its strategy, it establishes a new institution to expand its strategic tools, which assumes a different functionality, geopolitical scope, and raison d'être. In doing so, ASEAN nurtures a quasi-division of labor among its institutions to manage the great-power politics in the South China Sea.
After the Cold War, not only the United Nations (UN) but also regional organisations began to engage in the internal conflicts of their member states. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has long intervened in West African conflicts, and institutionalised its approach to interventions in 1999. Since then, member states have maintained and even increased their commitment to managing conflicts in West Africa regionally – a willingness that implies their ownership of interventions. This article argues that ECOWAS member states share ownership because they have developed a common understanding about intervention. The development of this common understanding is analysed with a focus on the origin and evolution of ECOWAS, that is, on the multi-level process of generating consensus and on the principle and practice of sharing the costs of resource mobilisation. I will show that, in practice, these processes led each state to perceive an enhanced sense of ownership in ECOWAS interventions. Case studies of ECOWAS interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Cote d’Ivoire in the 1990s and the 2000s, the period when the organisation’s interventions became institutionalised, support the argument.
The essay assesses NATO’s reaction to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. Building on a synthesis of recent advances in strategic studies and works looking at institutional adaptation of security organisations, it presents an analytical framework for assessing strategic adaptation based on innovativeness, scope and cohesiveness. It takes inspiration from two techniques established in the visual arts and music, applying the concepts of pastiche and sampling to the analysis. The analysis concludes that, despite some problems and remaining challenges, NATO’s readjustment to Russian revisionism can be characterised as a moderately successful strategic sampling.
Whilst there is no shortage of analyses on the politics of regions in International Relations, little attention has been paid to states who perceive that they do not properly fit in the regions they happen to be located in. These are the ‘misplaced states’: they stand out not so much because of material capacities but because they espouse an identity, manifested in different ways, in marked contrast to the states around them. This article asks what causes this process of a change in identity amongst misplaced states in different parts of the world. Comparing across regions, it analyses why and how states reconstruct their identities in order to enhance or deemphasise their degrees of regional conformity. By focusing on the ‘role-location process’ rooted in role theory, this article contributes to the literature by conceptualising the phenomenon of ‘misplacement.’ A state is misplaced when there is mismatch between its aspirations and others’ expectations for it. The article also details how and why misplacement occurs and studies its implications both for the states in question as well as for the politics of their geographical regions.
International institutions constitute the basis of global order. As they struggle to accommodate shifts in power and emerging threats, their legitimacy - their political authority and right to govern - often comes under fire, at times fuelling perceptions of crisis. Yet scholars seldom ask why some institutions are replaced while others are not. Blending theory with history, M. Patrick Cottrell examines some of the world's landmark security institutions, arguing that the possibility of replacement hinges on the sources of institutional legitimacy and the nature and timing of the challenges to it. The analysis not only reveals different pathways to replacement, but also offers a window into the future, including a potential dark side of too much legitimacy. Indeed, as global society becomes ever more dynamic, the fault lines of conflict with the most significant implications for order will not occur over territory, but rather over the legitimacy of international institutions. Provides new perspectives on continuity, crisis, and change in international institutions through a novel focus on replacement A fresh application of the concept of legitimacy revealing a paradoxical 'dark side' of legitimacy Draws on history and theory to provide an accessible analytic narrative of some of the world's landmark security institutions.
As we enter the 1990s in East Asia we find an overall trend toward strategic asymmetry and political uncertainty, especially in such countries as the Soviet Union, China, Cambodia, North Korea, and the Philippines. Although the ending of the Cold War in Europe with the advent of German unification and collapsing communism in East Europe are having a positive impact on the major power relationships and on the regional conflicts in Asia, the strategic trends here seem to be quite different from those in Europe in that Asia is facing a decade of transition in political and economic fields.
This essay argues that cooperation in a sub‐regional setting such as ASEAN, involving six countries in Southeast Asia, can strengthen cooperation in the wider region, such as APEC. This argument lends support to ASEAN's strategy of concentric circles of cooperation in which cooperation within the smaller grouping strengthens the group's participation within a larger grouping. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), for example, is seen as providing a training ground for the ASEAN countries in their multilateral trade liberalization. However, APEC trade liberalization appears to be moving faster and will be broader in its coverage than AFTA. Nonetheless, it is possible that cooperation in the wider regional setting, such as APEC, could stimulate and strengthen ASEAN cooperation. This mutuality of influences between the smaller and the larger groupings creates the dynamics of the strategy of concentric circles of cooperation.