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Structural Adjustment Programme in Nigeria and its Implications on Socio-Economic
Development, 1980-1995
By
Abah, Danladi
Department of History of History, Benue State University Makurdi, Nigeria
Email: danladiabah@gmail.com
&
Peter Wilfred Naankiel
Department of History and International Studies, Federal University Lafia, Nasarawa
State
Email:naankiel@gmail.com
Abstract
This article examines the emergence, objectives and dynamics of the Structural Adjustment
Programme (SAP) in Africa with particular emphasis on Nigeria. It also examines the
implementation strategies of this economic reform and contends that the SAP policies led to
the collapse of manufacturing and agricultural industries, heightened unemployment and
social insecurity. It also contends that SAP led to the collapse of Nigeria state which gave
fecundity for ethno-religious manipulations and further affected the Nigeria labour sector and
caused intense strain and disorganization of labour movements, this was manifest in sporadic
industrial disputes and strikes which hampered economic development in Nigeria. From a
neo-liberal theoretical paradigm, this paper concludes that SAP culminated to identity
transformation, conflicts and economic crisis in Nigeria. Secondary source of data is
employed.
CITATION FOR THIS ARTICLE: ‘Structural Adjustment Programme in Nigeria and
its Implication on Socio-Economic Development, 1980-1995’ in The Calabar Historical
Journal, Vol.6, No.2 December, 2016, ISSN: 2315-8816. A Publication of the Department of
History and International Studies, University of Calabar, Calabar, Nigeria.
Introduction
The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was a neo-liberal economic reform initiated by
the Britton Woods Institutions; World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
which negatively led to the collapse of African economies including Nigeria. The objectives
of SAP were intended to restructure and diversify the productive base of the economy and
curtail dependence on oil, achieve fiscal and balance payment viability and improve
efficiency through private-led development. The strategies for the realization of SAP by
government were through adoption of realistic exchange rate policy, devaluation,
rationalization of tariff regime to aid diversification, trade and payment liberalization,
commercialization and privatization of public sector enterprises among others.
The collapse of most African economies in the 1980s had been variously linked to the
excessive state intervention in the market, coupled with fall in global oil prices.
1
With
bogus, inefficient public sector, many African countries including Nigeria due to global oil
glut of the 1980 lacked the financial resources or capacity to generate adequate foreign
exchange earnings to provide basic services. As a result of these, many African countries
applied for foreign loans to finance its budgets. However, the loans were to be given upon the
fulfilment of certain basic conditionality which was packaged and christened Structural
Adjustment Programme.
2
The introduction of the neo-liberal economic reform- Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP) in Africa and Nigeria in particular generated heated debates
among scholars and policy makers. Apart from the nationwide debate which the then Military
President of Nigeria Ibrahim B. Babangida organized to sample the opinion of Nigerians on
the adoption or rejection of SAP, the effects of the potpourri of the IMF/WB conditionality
which were attached to this reform had cataclysmic impact on the socio-economic and
political development of Nigeria.
Olukoshi observes, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was largely an
adaptation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank economic reform
introduced in Nigeria in July 1986 by the IBB regime to help the regime access the foreign
loans from western capitalist financial institutions.
3
In the same perspective, Mike Obadan
avers that:
SAP was an International Monetary Fund, IMF-World Bank supported policy
package aimed at restructuring and diversifying of the productive base on the
economy in order to curtail dependence on the oil sector, and enhance non-
export base and bring the economy bulk to non-inflationary growth….the
major strategies for achieving the objectives of SAP emphasized market-
oriented development strategy with focus on private sector led development,
small government, efficient resource allocation and determined prices
including interest and exchange rates. The specific measures implemented
included exchange rate or Naira devaluation, liberalization of the economy,
and export trade, abolition of agricultural commodity marketing boards, cut-
back in extra-budgetary spending and adoption of tight fiscal policy, reduction
in subsidies privatization and commercialization of public enterprises.
4
The implementation of structural Adjustment program (SAP) policy options by the
Government of Nigeria under former President Ibrahim B. Babangida in 1986 created further
problems for the economy and in fact, worsened the social and political development woes of
the country in which it was supposed to address. These problems, Olukoshi poignantly
identified, include; Low capacity utilization in manufacturing industries due to insufficient
foreign exchange to purchase raw materials and spare parts, the exorbitant rate of foreign
Currency to Naira which led to increase in cost of imports, this since the steel industry
depends on the importation of most of its critical raw materials, the situation tremendously
increased the funding requirements of the industry which the then Nigerian Government was
not capable of bearing due to its already burgeoning external debt burden.
5
In this article, attempt is made to investigate the following research questions; what
economic dynamics necessitated the entrenchment of the Structural Adjustment Programme
(SAP), in Nigeria? What were the objectives of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)?
How SAP was implemented and what strategies were adopted by government in the
implementation of SAP? Also important is, what was the impact of SAP on Nigeria’s
economic development? In order to address these questions, this article in addition to the
introduction, is deliberately divided into four parts, namely; Conceptual and Theoretical
Issues, Background to SAP: Its Objectives and Implementation Strategies, while section four
examines the Impact of SAP in Nigeria.
SAP: Conceptual Clarifications and Theoretical Framework of Analysis
Structural Adjustment Programme is trenchantly seen as the adoption of macro-
economic measures and strategies to reform a non-performing economy. Economists believe,
correctly too, that an economy is organically linked in a functional whole with different parts
working for the growth and development of a system. Thus, structurally, a nation’s economy
cut-across diverse sectors such as industrial, financial, trade, transport, manufacturing,
education, agriculture, among others. Adjustment is the process of altering or change of a
process or system through the introduction of new set of conditions in order to make such a
system work better. Adjustment is a small change made to something in order to correct or
improve. Programme in this context mean reforms, laws or palliatives.
6
Neo-liberalism theory is the most suitable theory for this study and it emphasizes the
efficiency of private enterprise, liberalized trade and relatively open markets to promote
globalization. Neoliberalism advocates the supremacy of the private sector in determining the
political and economic priorities of the world and seeks the transfer control of the economy
from public to the private sector.
7
Anthony further observes that the main components of
neo-liberalism which also constituted the critical core parts of SAP include; fiscal policy
reform, redirection of public spending, removal of subsidies on basic social services, tax and
interest rates reforms, floating of exchange rates, trade and financial liberalization,
privatization and deregulation.
8
Adoga, summarized the key elements of neo-liberal
reforms as implemented by Bretton Woods’ institutions, that is, the IMF and World Bank,
thus:
In the structural reform, it entails “reducing direct control by government
organs and placing the operations of public sector enterprises on a sounder
commercial basis, redefining cost/pricing relations to eliminate
distortions…encouraging foreign investment”; … The fiscal policy component
entails “reducing the ratio of fiscal deficit to GDP, cutting subsidies…and
changing the basis of valuation of custom duties from the official to the
commercial exchange rate”;.. In monetary and credit policies, it entails
“reducing the rate of credit creation and raising interest rates…devaluation-
cum-unification of the exchange rate supported by managed floating.
9
Neoliberalism generally also includes the belief that freely adopted market
mechanisms is the best optimal way of organizing all exchanges of goods and services. Free
markets and free trade will, it is believed, set free the creative potential and the
entrepreneurial spirit which is built into the spontaneous order of any human society, and
thereby lead to more individual liberty and well-being, and a more efficient allocation of
resources.
SAP in Nigeria: Background, Objectives and Implementation Strategies
The idea towards the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in
Nigeria was orchestrated by the global oil glut of 1980 which saw the foreign exchange
earnings of most oil dependent economy fall drastically, Nigeria inclusive.
10
It was under
President Shehu Shagari that the global oil price fell and this affected negatively public
expenditure. Thus, by 1981 the country economy crumbled. President Shagari consequently
asked the National Assembly for special power to tackle the crisis. The legislature gave him
an Economic Stabilization Act of 1982.
11
The Act among other things, gave the President the power to: “ration foreign
exchange earnings, restrict import licenses, increase import duties and initiate import deposit
Programme” the crisis reached a boiling point in 1983 when oil prices plunged further to 45
per cent from the 1980 levels. As a result of the centrality of oil in Nigeria, other economic
indices equally fell. For instance, GDP growth was 6.7 per cent, non-oil and petroleum
sectors growth was -9.3 and -2.5 per cent respectively. External current account deficit badly
affected the country’s access to foreign capital while budget deficit to GDP ratio stood at 13
per cent.
12
The economic failures worsened under Shehu Shagari thereby necessitating the
military overthrow of his government by General Muhammad Buhari on 31
st
December,
1983. By this time, Shagari had squandered N90 billion in four years made up of N43.6
billion oil earnings, N20 billion external borrowings, N10 billion local loans, N15 billion
internally generated revenues and N3.5 billion he inherited from Olusegun Obasanjo in 1979.
General Buhari abandoned the economic policies of Shagari because of the stringent loan
conditionality. He closed the borders, restricted imports and tightened immigration laws.
13
However, radical economic reforms occurred in Nigeria in 1986 when Ibrahim
Babangida, who overthrew Buhari on August 27 1985, abandoned development planning and
opted for greater neo-liberal market approach and private sector driven development strategy,
known as the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)
14
Structural Adjustment Programme SAP was introduced in July 1986. It was an
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank supported short term reform package
and was expected to last till June 1988 but it effectively stretched to 1993 and was finally
abandoned in 1994. It was the most revolutionary approach to Nigeria’s long-standing
economic problems. SAP programme aimed principally at restructuring and diversifying of
the productive base of the economy in order to reduce dependence on the oil sector and
enhance non-oil export.
Olukoshi clearly identified the Objectives of SAP to include the following
i. To restructure and diversify the productive base of the economy by curtailing
Nigeria’s over-reliance or dependence on the oil sector. Through this means,
SAP was expected to stimulate the development of non-oil sectors such as
agriculture, mining, manufacturing;
ii. To promote export of non-oil commodities and boost foreign exchange
earnings;
iii. Curtail inflationary growth in the economy by removing all barriers to
effective and efficient trade;
iv. Attract Foreign Direct Investment to Nigeria through the adoption and
implementation of deregulation and privatization policies;
v. Create employment opportunities for Nigeria;
vi. Reduce public expenditure and entrench fiscal prudential in management of
the economy
15
In order to realize these lofty objectives, certain strategies were to be adopted by the
Nigerian Government. Officials of the Bretton Woods institutions (that is the International
Monetary Fund, IMF and World Bank) were to monitor the process of implementation of
SAP. It should be stressed that this was part of the stringent conditions attached to the
IMF/WB loans which accompanied SAP. In a nutshell, some of the strategies for the
Implementation of SAP include;
i. Rule of the Market
ii. Cutting public expenditure for social services
iii. Deregulation, commercialization/privatization
iv. Elimination of public goods/community goods
v. Removal of subsidies and abolition of agricultural marketing boards
vi. Devaluation of currency(Naira)
vii. Staff rationalization in government ministries, parastatals and agencies
16
Structural Adjustment Programme in Nigeria: Impact Assessment of an Economic
Reform
The “Structural Adjustment Programme(SAP) was no doubt the most revolutionary
approach to Nigeria’s long standing economic problems, and also constituted the most
controversial package of economic policies ever instituted in Nigeria.”
17
Thus, extant
literature on the impact of SAP in Nigeria and Africa is nuanced. Some scholars especially
World Bank study groups and academics from mainstream western scholarship have hailed
SAP as the best economic reform ever designed to leapfrog development in Nigeria but failed
because of bad leadership, bribery and corruption. They argue that the gains of SAP were
visible in the “reversal of negative economic growth trend of the early 1980s, substantial
increase in price of agricultural exports (in Naira terms), improvement in external payments
arrangements and international credit worthiness.”
18
This strand of thought have been
criticized by African scholars and justified by the economic failures that had characterized
African countries since the adoption of SAP. In this perspective, Afrocentric scholars such as
Mike Obadan, F.S. Idachaba, Olatunbosu, criticized SAP as the bane of Nigeria’s economic
woes particularly since the 1980s.
The introduction of SAP did not transform the economy of Nigeria or stimulate
industrialization. Numerous economic problems remained intractable. For instance;
There was apparent lack of commitment to adjustment and national
development by previous government and certain economic agents who have
command over resources…. During the course of implementation of SAP,
many distortions surfaced while others defied solutions. Of particular
significance were the problems of continuing depreciation of the Naira in
foreign exchange market, high and volatile interest rates, slow growth and
near paralysis of the real sector, sky-rocketing inflation, unsustainable fiscal
deficit profile, heavy external debt overhang, increasing unemployment,
emergence of social movements and militia groups among others
19
The removal of subsidies which was necessitated by the introduction of SAP in 1986
affected Agricultural production in Nigeria. Government banned importation of rice, maize,
wheat and vegetable oils. It also phased out food subsidy. The measures led to price increases
for local produce due to devaluation of Naira. Output also increased, especially in rice and
poultry and fishery production became less profitable because of high cost of imported inputs
such as agro-chemicals. However, subsidy withdrawal reduced profitability to farmers. This
led to loss of farm holdings.
20
More importantly, the devaluation of Naira affected the
manufacturing sector which imported most of their machines.
21
As Jibrin Ibrahim truly,
contends, “the positive effects of SAP are yet to be seen”.
22
Since the upsurge in the Privatization of public enterprises in Nigeria, its socio-
economic costs on the people had been calamitous. By the late 1970s, Nigeria had over
15000 public enterprises which generated over 65 per cent employment. As a policy measure,
SAP adoption meant the rationalization of these Public enterprises through privatization.
Between 1988 and 1999 for instance, over 55 Public enterprises were privatized. This
scenario led to massive sack of workers.
23
The adoption of the Structural Adjustment
Programme in Nigeria worsened unemployment challenges in the country. Through the staff
rationalization of government ministries, parastatals and agencies, many civil servants lost
their jobs. The accompanying retrenchment caused social dislocations as many families lost
their jobs and had no alternative means of livelihood.
24
More lamentably, local manufacturing companies which were averagely doing very
well in business prior to the deregulation and subsequent devaluation of the currency (Naira)
also had to drastically reduce its workforce thereby heightening unemployment crisis. For
instance, available statistics show that the Workforce of United Africa Company, UAC, one
of Nigeria’s biggest conglomerates compressed from 23,850 workers in 1985 to 9,000
workers in 1988.
25
As a corollary to the economic turmoil orchestrated by SAP, there was
reduction in capacity utilization which remained abysmally low between 30 and 37 per cent
and income per capita collapsed from 778 US dollars to 108US dollars in 1989.
26
This
unsavory scenario also led to a fall in standard of living, galloping inflation and
underdevelopment in the country.
In addition, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) led to proliferation of ethnic
militia movements in Nigeria which emerged as a result of the atavistic nature of the state and
its comprador bourgeoisie. Some of these social movement groups became rallying points for
disempowered and marginalized proletariats to aggregate their power to challenge the state.
This gave fecundity to the emergence of political epitaphs like neo-patrimonia, pre-bendal,
rentier state classification in Africa. Egwu, reiterating the effects of SAP in Africa clearly
adumbrates that:
The imposition of neo-liberal macroeconomic reform policies which began
with the Structural Adjustment Programme in the mid-1980s further reduced
the capacity of the African state to deal with the challenges of development
and welfare. The consequences were the mounting unemployment problem,
inflation, and widespread poverty on the continent. The social dimensions of
Adjustment are well known and harmful especially in engineering social and
political unrests (emphasis is mine).
27
The decomposition of the state in Africa as a result of the adoption and
implementation of SAP created immense socio-political conflicts in Africa and Nigeria in
particular. The pursuit and implementation of deregulation and Privatization for instance,
gradually, led to loss of state capacity of providing basic social services to the people. Egwu,
in this perspective identified four fundamental effects of SAP on the African state as:
First, it eroded the cultural, economic and political glues that sought to
integrate the different elements of nation state. second, it deepened the process
of uneven development along ethnic and regional lines, leading to tension and
feeling of exclusion at all levels of governance, third, the social polarization
that accompanied the process undermined the viability of the middle class that
would have provided a stabilizing force for the state, fourth, it led to the
flowering of ethnic and religious extremism because the loss of social security
represented by the state constituted religious and ethnic solidarities to
alternative sites of organizing social life
28
The state sudden loss of capacity to provide basic public goods heightened people’s
apprehension against the military junta of Babaginda and the entire SAP package. More
worrisomely, inflation increased astronomically immediately after the implementation of
SAP in July 1986 from 5.4% to a staggering 40.9% in 1989. The effect of this high
inflationary trend were enormous; first, it after the structure of Nigeria’s balance of payment
which was generated by devaluation of Naira-the nation’s currency. Furthermore, the
removal of social subsidies particularly in schools and agriculture had cataclysmic effects on
students and farmers while the abolition of commodity boards which hitherto regulated the
prices of goods and services especially agro-allied produce led to price collapse as local
farmers could not compete with foreign made produce. In fact, with liberalization occasioned
by SAP, Nigeria economy was opened and determined by the forces of demand and supply.
29
From the political economy perspective, SAP institutionalized identity politics with
its negative consequences on the nation’s development. The collapse of the economy made
the state the only rallying point for resource generation, accumulation and distribution.
30
The
state was no longer a productive arena but that for resource distribution among a select few
comprising of the ruling elite, military echelon and the capitalist bourgeoisie. Jega argues that
as manufacturing and productive activities collapsed, Nigerian capitalist class
gravitated around the state for patronage to source of accumulation through
contracts, consultancies and other non-productive services, a situation which
has greatly strengthened their compradorial attributes…politicians saw politics
as a do or die affair, jettisoning the rule while the personalization of
governance became the order of the day…The frugal spending of the military
coupled with high inflationary trend made external borrowing inevitable.
Through SAP, Nigeria external debt profile rose to an all-time high.
31
The Egbus Boy, Area Boys in Lagos, Yandaba in Kano and other Northern states of
Nigeria dislocated and disarticulated the pattern of development that characterized pre-SAP
Nigeria. As Ya’u trenchantly discussed, the economic crisis occasioned by the structural
Adjustment Programme engendered a growing impoverishment of greater sections of the
Nigerian society particularly the youth. This impoverishment forced many social (youth)
disadvantaged groups to seek some means of coping with the situation. Following increase
job losses in the midst of deregulated education system, there was high cases of youth school
drop-out.
32
There was decrease in number of transition from primary to secondary schools
and secondary to university. Removal of social subsidies led to a meteoric rise in school fees
which made many people to drop out of schools. SAP thus, created an identity crisis in which
violent youth gangs emerged and threatened societal peace and security. The case of Yandaba
in Kano city helps to drive home this argument
Yandaba, were gangs of unemployed youth who reject the poor conditions to which
their social background has relegated them and by taking refuge in secluded places, (daba)
spent much of their time in petty hunting, experimentation of drugs and in some cases
clearing public spaces. However, with the emergence SAP, Yandaba was transformed. SAP
initiated certain changes which led to the construction of a new violent identity in Yandaba.
The sharp turn to violence by Yandaba was one of the ways in which SAP engineered social
insecurity in Kano city, Nigeria. The turn to violence was due to acute economic hardship
and suffering of its members who needed to survive by all means. Mass retrenchment which
characterized SAP made many families unable to fend for all their children.
33
Consequently,
criminal youth dominated gangs like Yandaba became a ready avenue to absorb the latent
energy of these youths. Apart from Yandaba in the North, Egbesu boys and Area Boys in
Lagos and other cities in South Western Nigeria sprang up and became more violent-driven.
In Lagos, Area Boys engaged in violent criminal activities such as broad day light stealing,
armed robbery and intimidation of civilians. The rise in the phenomenon of militia movement
in Nigeria gained fecundity as from the 1980s through the 1990s because of the harsh
economic situation orchestrated by the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies of SAP.
From industrial perspective, SAP adoption and implementation in Nigeria generated
intense industrial disputes particularly among the various Labour Unions in Nigeria.
“Organized labour generally reacted against SAP and all it stood for by using its grievance
weapons and other available subtle strategies, ...such as demonstrations, public enlightenment
rallies and strike actions”
34
Thus, members of both trade and labour unions such as the
Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), National
Association of Nigeria Students (NANS), and Trade Union Congress (TUC) among others
doggedly resisted SAP policies in Nigeria. The reasons for their resistance were due to harsh
economic policies coupled with high job loss arising from retrenchment of workers in
government and private sectors, high cost of goods and the muzzling of freedom by the
military government. Students unrests coupled with ASUU strike in most parts of the country
disrupted academic activities in many universities in Nigeria. For instance, in 1982, there
were a total of 341 trade disputes out of which 253 resulted in strike. Between 1986 and
1993, the number of strikes tripled even as the military government intensified its survivalist
strategies by banning labour unions and arresting unionists. The table below shows the
number and dynamic of labour disputes and strikes taking into cognizance the number of
workers involved and days lost.
Year Trade
Dispute
(1)
Work
Stoppages
(2)
Workers
Involved
(3)
Strike Days
(4)
Average
Strikers
Days(4)/(3)
Strike
Propensity
(2)/(1)
1980 355 265 221,088 2,350,998 10.63 0.75
1981 258 234 323,700 2,218,223 6.85 0.91
1982 341 253 2,874,721
9,652,400 3.39 0.74
1983 184 131 629,177 404,822 0.64 0.71
1984 100 49 42,046 301,809 7.18 0.49
1985 77 40 19,907 118,693 5.96 0.52
1986 87 53 157,165 461,345 2.94 0.61
1987 65 38 57,097 142,506 2.5 0.58
1988 156 124 55,620 230,613 4.15 0.79
1989 144 80 157,342 579,968 3.69 0.56
1990 174 102 254,540 1,339,105 5.26 0.59
19991 198 95 403,412 1,957,074 4.85 0.48
1992 185 92 127,546 396,619 3.11 0.5
1993 160 90 880,244 6,192,167 7.03 0.56
1994 175 103 1,537,890
234,299,461
152.35 0.59
1995 196 124 1,546,328
235,069,010
152.02 0.63
Source: CBN Annual Reports adapted from Adesina(2000)
Conclusion
The adoption and implementation of the neo-liberal policies of the Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP) in many African countries between the 1980s and 1990s
truncated and stagnated the pace and pendulum of economic growth and development in the
continent. The reform was ill-conceived and un-suitable for African economies considering
its poor volatility and skewed structure and form. The SAP policies of deregulation and
privatization worsened the unemployment crisis which had reached a crisis point by the mid-
1980s, Also, the devaluation of currency, removal of social subsidies and abolition of
marketing boards immersed the people with severe economic hardship and poverty through
relegation of their purchasing power parity and the increase in accessing of basic social
services such as schools and hospital facilities. Furthermore, farmers and manufacturers were
exposed to the vagaries of international capitalist competition which made them to occupy
fringe positions in international trade. From the political economy perspective, SAP in Africa
and Nigeria heightened the upsurge in the emergence of international multinational
corporations plundering Nigeria resources for the benefits of its shareholders in Europe and
America. SAP also impacted on identity politics and violent conflicts negatively in Nigeria,
which hampered democratization. Social movements such as ethnic militia groups like the
Yandaba in the North, Area Boys in the South West and Niger Delta militants were highly
orchestrated by the debilitating consequence of SAP. What is more, the preponderance of
labour unrests and human rights abuse in Nigeria occasioned intimidation, arrest and
incarceration of different Labour and Trade Union leaders and members such as the Nigeria
Labour Congress(NLC), Academic Staff Union of Universities(ASUU), Trade Union
Congress(TUC), National Association of Nigerian Students(NANS) who openly challenges
government adoption of SAP.
Endnote
1. S. Adejumobi, Adjustment Reform and its Impact on the Economy and Society, in
Adejumobi, S., and A., Momoh, (eds) The Political Economy of Nigeria under
Military Rule: 1984-1993, Harare: SAPES Books, 1995
2. A. Jega, General Introduction, Identity Transformation and the Politics of Identity
Under Crisis and Adjustment, in Jega, A., (ed), Identity Transformation and Identity
Politics Under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria, Sweden, Nordic Africa, Uppsala,
2000
3. A. Olukoshi, Crisis and Adjustment in the Nigerian Economy, Lagos: JAD Publishers,
1990
4. Mike Obadan quoted by Demola, A., The Years of Despondency, Newswatch
Magazine, October, 4 2010, p.20
5. A. Olukoshi, et’al (eds), Structural Adjustment in West Africa, Lagos: NIIA, 1994
6. J.C. Anyanwu, President Babangids’s Structural Adjustment Programme and Inflation
in Nigeria, Journal of Social Development in Africa, 7(1), 5-24
7. I. Bonny, Structural Adjustment, Authoritarianism and Human Rights in Africa,
Journal of Comparative Studies of Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol.XIX,, 1999
8. O.O. Anthony, et’al., The Domestic and International Implications of Fuel Subsidy
Removal in Nigeria, Arabia Journal of Business and Management Review, Vol.1.,
No.,6, 2012, p60
9. O. Adoga, Critical Appraisal of Privatization in Nigeria,
http://www.hr.org/articule.asp?id=5491, accessed 10/08/2016
10. A. Olukoshi, Crisis and Adjustment in the Nigerian Economy, Lagos: JAD Publishers,
1990
11. A. Demola, The Years of Despondency, Newswatch Magazine, October, 4 2010, p.20
12. A. Demola, The Years of Despondency, Newswatch Magazine, October, 4 2010, p.20
13. A. Demola, The Years of Despondency, Newswatch Magazine, October, 4 2010, p.21
14. A. Olukoshi, et’al (eds), Structural Adjustment in West Africa, Lagos: NIIA, 1994
15. A. Olukoshi, Crisis and Adjustment in the Nigerian Economy, Lagos: JAD Publishers,
1990
16. S. Mohammed, The Military and Governance in Nigeria: Prospects and Challenges of
Democratic Consolidation, in Barkindo, B.M., et’al (eds) Nigeria at Fifty: Issues and
Challenges in Governance, 1960-2010,Makurdi: Aboki Publishers, 2011,pp582-583
17. Mike Obadan quoted by Demola, A., The Years of Despondency, Newswatch
Magazine, October, 4 2010, p.21
18. Mike Obadan quoted by Demola, A., The Years of Despondency, Newswatch
Magazine, October, 4 2010, p.21
19. Mike Obadan quoted by Demola, A., The Years of Despondency, Newswatch
Magazine, October, 4 2010, p.20
20. F. Heidhues, & O. Gideon, Lessons from Structural Adjustment Programme and Their
Effects in Africa, Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture, Vol.1.No.50, 2011
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1990
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Jega, (ed) Identity Transformation and Identity Politics Under Structural,p.45
23. S. Magaji, & A.M. Adamu, Youth Empowerment in Nigeria since Independence, in
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1960-2010,Makurdi: Aboki Publishers, 2011,p.693
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25. A. Olukoshi, Crisis and Adjustment in the Nigerian Economy, Lagos: JAD
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26. A. Jega, The State and Identity Transformation under Structural Adjustment in
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Shedrack, G.B., Introduction to Peace and Conflicts Studies in West Africa: A reader,
Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2005, 425
28. S.G. Egwu, Beyond the “Revival of old Hatred”: The State and Conflicts in Africa, in
Shedrack, G.B., Introduction to Peace and Conflicts Studies in West…p425
29. E.N Nwabugo, The Story of Structural Adjustment Programme in Nigeria from the
perspective of Organized Labour, Australian Journal of Business and Management
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30. A. Jega, The State and Identity Transformation under Structural Adjustment in
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Structural Adjustment in Nigeria, Sweden, Nordik Africa, Upssala, 2000
31. A. Jega, The State and Identity Transformation under Structural Adjustment in
Nigeria, in Jega, A., (ed), Identity Transformation and Identity Politics Under
Structural Adjustment in Nigeria, Sweden, Nordik Africa, Upssala, 2000
32. Y.K. Ya’u, The Youth , Economic Crisis and Identity Transformation: The Case of
the Yandaba in Kano, in Jega, A., (ed) Identity Transformation and Identity Politics
Under Structural or see Momoh, A., Youth Culture and Area Boys in Lagos, in Jega,
A., (ed) Identity Transformation and Identity Politics Under Structural, p178
33. Y.K. Ya’u, The Youth , Economic Crisis and Identity Transformation: The Case of
the Yandaba in Kano, in Jega, A., (ed) Identity Transformation and Identity Politics
Under Structural or see Jibril Ibrahim, The Transformation of Ethno-Regional
Identities in Nigeria, in Jega, A., (ed) Identity Transformation and Identity Politics
Under Structural
34. E.N Nwabugo, The Story of Structural Adjustment Programme in Nigeria from the
perspective of Organized Labour, Australian Journal of Business and Management
Research, Vol.1.No7,2011,
