ArticlePDF Available

From leaders to majority: a frontrunner paradox in built-environment climate governance experimentation

July 2017
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 61(1):1-19

DOI:10.1080/09640568.2017.1350147

Authors:

Victoria University of Wellington

This paper seeks to better understand the possible paradox of frontrunners in experimental climate governance. This paradox refers to the situation where frontrunners are required to push boundaries in terms of developing governance innovations and to experiment with these, but where, at the same time, a too strong focus on frontrunners may result in a situation where lessons from these experiments and the innovations developed do not resonate with the majority. In such a situation, an innovation may not be capable of being scaled up or of being transferred to another context. This paper draws lessons from a series of nine experimental and innovative governance instruments for low-carbon building development and transformation in Australia. It points out that for these instruments the frontrunners paradox provides a partial explanation as to why they have not yet been able to scale up from a small group of industry leaders to the large majority.

Overview of interviewees

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For Peer Review Only

From leaders to major

ity: A frontrunner paradox in built

environment climate governance experimentation?

Journal:

Journal of Environmental Planning and Management

Manuscript ID

CJEP-2017-0041.R2

Manuscript Type:

Research Article

Keywords:

governance innovations, urban governance, low-carbon transitions,

Australia

Abstract:

This article seeks to better understand the paradox of frontrunners in

experimental climate governance. This paradox refers to the situation

where frontrunners are required to push boundaries in terms of developing

governance innovations and to experiment with these, but where, at the

same time, a too strong focus on frontrunners may result in a situation

where lessons from these experiments and the innovations developed do

not resonate with the majority. In such a situation an innovation may not

be capable of being scaled up or of being transferred to another context.

This article draws lessons from a series of nine experimental and

innovative governance instruments for low-carbon building development

and transformation in Australia. It points out that for these instruments the

frontrunners paradox provides a partial explanation as to why they have

not yet been able to scale up from a small group of industry leaders to the

large majority.

URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cjep Email: Sarah.Cherrill2@newcastle.ac.uk

Journal of Environmental Planning and Management

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From leaders to majority: A frontrunner paradox in built-environment climate

governance experimentation?

Introduction

Over recent years, scholars have pointed to an emerging trend of experimentalist climate

governance around the globe (Ansell and Bartenberger 2016; Laakso, Berg, and Annala

2017; McFadgen and Huitema 2017). They are specifically concerned with the development

of innovative climate governance instruments through iterative processes of implementation,

learning, and adaptation—sometimes framed as “governance by experiment” (Bulkeley and

Castan Broto 2013; Caprotti and Cowley 2016; Hoffmann 2011). This experimental climate

governance appears to be particularly popular for low-carbon built-environment development

and use (Bulkeley, Castan Broto, and Edwards 2015; Evans, Karvonen, and Raven 2016;

Johnson, Toly, and Schroeder 2015; Smedby 2016).

The literature is not univocally positive about the capacity of these experiments to

effectively address climate change challenges in general and to accelerate the transition to

low-carbon built environments in particular (Harman, Taylor, and Lane 2015; Scott 2015;

Van der Heijden 2017). Indeed, the literature is becoming increasingly critical of the

transferability of innovative governance instruments from one context to another as well as

the scalability of lessons learnt from experimental to formal settings (Evans and Karvonen

2014; Kivimaa, Hildén, Huitema, Jordan, and Newig 2015; Vreugdenhil, Taljaard, and

Slinger 2012).

Seeking to better understand what may hamper transferability and scalability, this

article explores an intuitive paradox in experimental and innovative climate governance—the

necessity and constraints of involving frontrunners in such experiments. On the one hand,

frontrunners are required to push the boundaries in terms of innovation and to have actors

willing to accept the risks of experimentation (Andresen and Agrawala 2002; Gunningham

and Sinclair 2002). On the other hand, a too strong focus on frontrunners may result in a

situation where the lessons drawn from experiments and the innovative instruments

developed do not resonate with the majority in an industry or sector (Moore 2002; E. M.

Rogers, Medina, Rivera, and Wiley 2005).

In what follows, the discussion first briefly reviews the literature on climate

governance experimentation, with a focus on the built environment, seeking to understand

what may be expected of such experimentation. This review also further explores the

possibility of a frontrunner paradox in climate governance experimentation and innovation

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and its possible consequences. From here on, the article studies a series of nine instruments

for low-carbon built environments in Australia that are characterised by experimentation and

innovation (the research design is explained in what follows) and assesses their performance.

From this research, it becomes clear that industry frontrunners are indeed a key characteristic

of governance experiments and that the strong focus on involving them in experiments comes

with constraints on how the innovative instruments perform and how they can be transferred

and scaled. In other words, the frontrunner paradox is a considerable challenge for those

involved in governance experimentation and innovation. The article concludes by identifying

the main lessons learnt and discusses their relevance to experimental and innovative climate

governance.

Experimentation and innovation: The balancing act of virtue and mechanism

The field of “governance by experiment” is rapidly gaining traction. In what follows, a brief

review of the literature is provided to introduce core aspects of experimental governance

relevant for understanding the empirical study that follows; readers interested in the origins,

conceptual underpinnings, and breadth of experimental governance are referred to the

excellent meta-reviews available elsewhere (Ansell and Bartenberger 2016; Bai, Roberts, and

Chen 2010; Bulkeley and Castan Broto 2013; Laakso et al. 2017).

There is no single definition of what climate governance experimentation with

innovative instruments entails, but some “ideal type” characteristics recur in the literature. Of

these, the first and foremost is a shift away from technocratic processes of instrument

development towards iterative ones, involving the trialling of governance instruments within

a bounded jurisdiction or population and with the ambition of scaling up these instruments

once lessons have been drawn (Bulkeley and Castan Broto 2013; Kivimaa et al. 2015). The

second is a shift away from government as the sole authority to govern climate problems and

a move towards the involvement of public and private sector stakeholders or even the

development of climate governance instruments without any government involvement at all.

Through collaborative and consensus-oriented approaches (i.e., experimenting), the tacit

knowledge of those governed can be included in the development and implementation of

governance instruments, which may further their (local) effectiveness (Ansell and

Bartenberger 2016; Hoffmann 2011). The third is a shift towards governance instruments that

encourage self-organisation, market solutions, or both as substitutes for or complements to

mandatory command-and-control style instruments, often combined with a shift towards

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instruments that reward voluntary compliance as opposed to enforcing mandated behaviour

(Bos and Brown 2012; Evans et al. 2016).

At building and city level, governance experimentation is considered particularly

promising because of scaling possibilities: if an experimental governance instrument works in

a specific (part of a) city, then it, or the lessons learnt from it, might easily be scaled up to

other parts of the city or even to other cities (Sassen 2015). Yet, moving from experimental

governance as a virtue to experimental governance as a mechanism appears to come with

constraints, and concerns have been expressed. Some scholars argue that whilst experiments

may achieve promising results in one context it will be difficult to replicate these in other

contexts. Small differences between contexts in, for example, legal requirements, may have

considerable impact on an experiment’s performance (McFadgen and Huitema 2017; Rocle

and Salles 2017). Others warn that the original participants in an experiment have specific

incentives to ensure its success. Such motivations may, however, not be shared by the

broader population, implying that once an initiative is formalised in public policy it will not

yield the same results as during its experimental phase (Laakso et al. 2017; Sidiki, Carboni,

Koski, and Sadiq 2015). Then, whilst experimental governance is not limited to a specific

size, studies find that the scale of experiments is often too small to have a meaningful impact

(Bai et al. 2010; Van der Heijden 2017).

But what can be considered a successful experiment? This is a question that haunts,

particularly, the evaluative literature (Ansell and Bartenberger 2016; Laakso et al. 2017). If

drawing lessons is considered a main goal, then an experiment with a climate governance

instrument that fails to achieve carbon emissions can, paradoxically, be considered a great

success—at least now we know not to use that instrument (Van der Heijden 2017). Yet, if

being able to scale up and scale out is the main goal of an experiment, then this hypothetical

example would be considered a major failure (Sassen 2015). It is particularly between the

evaluative categories of “drawing lessons” from a governance experiment and “capacity for

scaling up” that governance experiment that a specific potential paradox sits, which could

explain why an experiment can be considered at the same time a success and a failure.

The possibility of a frontrunner paradox

At first glance, experimentation, innovation, and frontrunners are logical allies (Bos and

Brown 2012; Hoffmann 2011; Termeer and Nooteboom 2014). Experiments look for actors

who want to be actively involved in solving a problem, who do not mind deviating from

routines, and who are willing to take risks. Innovations look for actors who think outside of

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the box, who do not take routines for granted, and who see opportunities where others do not.

We naturally assign such traits to frontrunners (Teisman, van Buuren, and Gerrits 2009). It is

from these actors and their involvement in experiments with innovative governance

instruments that we may draw valuable lessons about those instruments.

Indeed, the empirical literature on climate governance experimentation often points to

the role played by frontrunners in government, civil society, and particularly in industry as

being crucial for getting experiments off the ground, for developing innovative instruments,

and for trialling them (Andresen and Agrawala 2002; Borck, Coglianese, and Nash 2008;

Gunningham and Sinclair 2002). This relates directly to the diffusion of innovations literature

that argues that any innovation needs to be committed to and taken up by a group of leaders

before it can scale up to the majority (Rogers 1995; Rogers et al. 2005). In short, these

frontrunners trial the experiment and demonstrate its advantages to the majority, who will

then, so goes the argument, be convinced and will also commit to the innovation and

mainstream it (Moore 2002; E. M. Rogers 1995).

The literature on the diffusion of innovations does, however, point to a critical

moment in this scaling process. If the majority are not convinced by the insights and

experiences shared by the frontrunners, they may reject an innovation (Moore 2002). In non-

homogenous areas—those characterised by a wide variety of actors, products, and services—

this risk is substantial because the majority may not consider frontrunners as their peers or

equals (Clarysse, Wright, Bruneel, and Mahajan 2014; Jahanmir and Lages 2016). In other

words, the lessons drawn by the frontrunners may not resonate with the majority market to

which the experiment aims to scale. Since many climate governance experiments and

innovative climate governance instruments seek to address complex problems in non-

homogenous areas, this “frontrunner paradox” may be particularly challenging. This holds

particularly for the built-environment with its large numbers of building types and contexts,

professions, forms of ownership, and so on. The paradox has, however, received limited

attention in the empirical literature on climate governance experimentation. In what follows,

this frontrunner paradox is explored by studying a series of experimental and innovative

urban climate governance instruments for reducing carbon emissions from the built

environment in Australia.

Towards urban climate governance experimentation and innovation in Australia

As in many other countries, the Australian building stock is a key source of the nation’s

carbon emissions (Rauland and Newman 2015). The construction, maintenance, and use of

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buildings account for approximately 25 per cent of Australia’s annual carbon emissions—

approximately four metric tonnes per capita annually.

The dominant governance instruments

in place to address building-related carbon emissions in Australia reflect those in force in

other countries (IEA 2013; Van der Heijden 2014). The Building Code of Australia is key. It

pursues improved sustainability in buildings primarily through building energy efficiency

codes. These were introduced in 1997 and their stringency has since been increased. Over the

years, considerable critique has been expressed towards them. The Building Code of

Australia applies only to the development of new buildings and major retrofits of existing

ones. New and amended regulatory requirements normally exempt the existing stock from

compliance. Because most of the existing Australian stock predates the 1980s, well before

any energy efficiency requirements were in force, its energy efficiency is poor and its related

carbon emissions high (Bond 2011). Yet, even the younger stock shows poor performance

(Maller and Horne 2011). Building energy efficiency codes were introduced relatively late in

Australia and are lenient when compared to the United States and Europe (IEA 2013). This

problem is amplified by the fact that mandatory requirements for low-carbon building

development (such as energy efficiency requirements) are found to face poor regulatory

enforcement, increasing the likelihood of non-compliance (Healthy Environs 2015).

These critiques relate to broader critiques of mandatory, top-down, government-led

instruments for low-carbon buildings. Although, in theory, these instruments hold great

potential to accelerate the transition to low-carbon buildings (IEA 2013; UNEP 2009), they

face a political and instrumental reality that is not in their favour (Van der Heijden 2014).

Acknowledging these complications, government, industry, and civil society have begun to

experiment with innovative governance instruments of the kind discussed before, seeking to

reduce the carbon emissions of the Australian building stock beyond what is required by

mandatory instruments (McGuirk, Bulkeley, and Dowling 2014; McGuirk, Dowling,

Brennan, and Bulkeley 2015).

Research design

Between 2010 and 2015, nine innovative governance instruments for low-carbon building

development and transformation were studied in Australia to gain a better understanding of

how they perform and how their performance can be explained. In addition, a series of 26

Data from: www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/greenhouse-gas-measurement/tracking-emissions (20

July 2016).

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related instruments from other countries were also studied, including the United States and

the Netherlands (van der Heijden, 2017). However, due to space limitations, these related

instruments are not discussed in this article.

The nine instruments that form the basis of this article were chosen from the larger

pool to represent the variety of designs and contexts but without resulting in too much

repetition of instruments in the pool of Australian cases. They fit three broad types of

innovative urban climate governance instruments: certification instruments that make visible

the resource performance of a building via a label, action networks that bring together actors

to explore how to achieve the transition to low-carbon buildings, and novel forms of

financing that seek to financially support property owners and developers (these broad types

relate to those identified in the literature on experimental and innovative climate governance;

cf., Evans et al. 2016; Van der Heijden 2016; Wurzel, Zito, and Jordan 2013). Although the

nine instruments are indicative of the full pool of cases studied in the larger research project

(in terms of design and performance),

by no means does this article claim that they are

representative of all possible designs and contexts of innovative governance instruments for

low-carbon building development and transformation around the globe. Table 1 provides a

brief overview of the instruments studied for this article and online Appendix A gives a more

extensive description of each instrument.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

As the research project sought to gain an in-depth understanding of the performance

of these instruments, a qualitative comparative research design was chosen (Newell, Pattberg,

and Schroeder 2012). Cases (experimental and innovative governance instruments) were

identified through internet searches and desk research. Whilst all cases discussed in this

article are illustrative of a trend of innovative climate governance instruments, not all cases

studied were in a similar stage of experimentation. Some were terminated during the research

project (including the Sustainable Development Grant and the Building Innovation Fund),

others were started just at the same time this project began and experimented with during the

whole period of research (including the Better Buildings Partnership and CitySwitch Green

Office), and yet others had moved beyond their initial experimental stages and were only

The larger pool includes 16 certification instruments, eight action networks, and 11 innovative forms of

financing (van der Heijden, 2017). The set studied here includes three, two, and four respectively.

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modified incrementally following conventional policy change processes during the research

project (including NABERS and Green Star).

The NABERS building certification instrument provides a good illustration here. It

was implemented by the state of New South Wales as a voluntary programme in 1998 to gain

insight into the resource consumption of the existing building stock and to influence the

office market. It was expected that insight into building energy and water performance would

drive demand for energy- and water-efficient office space, resulting in an upgrading of

offices. Between 1999 and 2004, other state governments in Australia adopted it, and in 2005

the Australian Commonwealth Government adopted NABERS as a nationwide voluntary

instrument. In 2010, the Commonwealth Government went further by introducing the

Building Energy Efficiency Disclosure Act of 2010. The Act applies to office buildings with

a net lettable area greater than 2,000 square metres and requires the owner or tenant to

disclose the energy efficiency rating when such a building comes onto the market for sale or

lease or when an existing lease is renewed. The Act requires that a NABERS energy

certificate be made available but does not stipulate that a specific level of certification for a

building has to be met. Finally, in 2015, NABERS was exported to New Zealand, where it is

implemented as a voluntary instrument.

A comparison of older versions of NABERS with newer ones indicates that over the

years the rules underlying the instrument have been increased in stringency, the scope of the

instrument has been increased to include more types of buildings, the star rating on which it

builds has been expanded to make visible exceptional performance, and so on. This was all

done based on lessons learnt during its implementation. The instrument was developed in

close collaboration with industry stakeholders, builds on market solutions, and rewards

voluntary beyond-compliance performance.

Data collection and analysis

The relevant data for analysing the instruments were obtained from websites, reports, and

other sources. New data were obtained through a series of interviews. Interviews sought to

fill gaps in the data from other sources, to resolve conflicts in data from other sources, and to

gain additional insight into the instruments under scrutiny. Interviewees were recruited

through Internet searches and social-network websites, particularly LinkedIn. A total of 55

interviewees from various backgrounds, including policymakers, bureaucrats, property

www.nabersnz.govt.nz (18 August 2016).

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developers, architects, engineers, and property owners, were interviewed for insights into the

nine instruments studied here. The interviewees were often aware of and involved in more

than one instrument. It is expected that this (partially) helped to overcome the sampling bias

of administrators (and participants) who were overly enthusiastic about their “own”

instruments. Table 2 provides a brief overview of the interviewees.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Data were processed following conventional practice for this type of research (Brady

and Collier 2004; Goertz and Mahony 2012; Silverman 2001). That is, the interviews were

recorded and, based on the recording and notes taken during the interviews, a summary report

was drafted that was returned to the interviewees for validation. Interviews lasted for

approximately one hour and were generally conducted at the interviewees’ work locations.

The interview data and additional data were coded using a systematic coding scheme (online

Appendix B provides an overview of codes used) and then processed using data analysis

software (Atlas.ti). Using this approach, the data were systematically explored and insight

was gained into the “repetitiveness” and “rarity” of the experiences shared by the

interviewees and the insights provided by additional sources.

Findings

To better understand whether there is indeed such as thing as the frontrunner paradox and, if

so, what its implications are, this empirical section is structured into four topics that follow

from the literature discussed to further tease out the tension between drawing lessons and

scaling up in urban climate governance experiments: (1) the role of industry frontrunners in

the innovative governance instruments studied, (2) the lessons learnt from experimenting

with the instruments, (3) the performance achieved relative to the problem the instruments

seek to address, and (4) the potential to scale up the instruments or to replicate them in other

settings.

The role of industry frontrunners

All instruments were developed through collaborations between government and industry.

Interviewees involved in their development and implementation were particularly vocal about

the need to involve industry frontrunners in these processes—where interviewees used the

terms “leader” and “frontrunner” interchangeably. “You need leaders in the market place

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showing a better way of doing things, and you need the market place to be inspired and

driven by those leaders”, explained a representative of a sustainable construction peak body

(int. 33).

Interviewees argued that governments have a limited understanding of what is

possible in terms of low-carbon buildings and that by bringing in industry frontrunners in

these instruments, their knowledge can be used. “From [our] point of view,” explained a

policymaker in Sydney (int. 42), “we need their expertise and experiences to show us and

challenge us to get the best solutions.” A policymaker in Melbourne (int. 26) added, “You

can say all these things should be in regulation, but then it forces leadership into something

traditional. You won’t help businesses to build something that is leading. Something that is

on the edge.” Thus, this interviewee argued that only by involving industry frontrunners in

the development of these instruments is it possible to move beyond traditional solutions.

Not only were industry frontrunners deeply involved in the development and

implementation of the instruments, but also the instruments themselves focused strongly on

rewarding industry frontrunners. An illustrative example is Green Star, a building

certification instrument that makes visible the environmentally sustainable credentials of a

building through the use of a label. As a senior board member of the Australian Green

Building Council (int. 22)—the organisation that administers Green Star—explained, “When

developing Green Star, we faced this question: Do you aim for the top 5 per cent of the

market and neglect the other 95 per cent?” He continued, “Aiming [for] the top 25 per cent

appeared a way to address the leaders in the market, without losing engagement.” To indicate

its emphasis on rewarding only the top quartile, Green Star awards three labels, the minimum

of which is a 4 Star rating (referred to as “Best Practice”), followed by 5 Star (“Australian

Excellence”), and 6 Star (“World Leadership”).

The same senior board member concluded that “If you address the leaders, you will

push the followers” (int. 22). Interviewees repeatedly mentioned this expectation of a

spillover effect from frontrunners in the industry to the majority. As a policymaker in

Brisbane (int. 27) noted, “The developer looks down the road, sees a Green Star building and

thinks, ‘I’ve got to compete with that’. You get to a tipping point where it becomes the

norm.” According to the interviewees, another advantage of acknowledging frontrunners is

that it rewards, and therefore stimulates, innovation: “For me it really shows what the market

is capable of”, observed a policymaker in Adelaide (int. 51). “You often see ambition [in

Interviewees were promised anonymity in research publications. Interviewees are numbered consistently

throughout all publications resulting from the larger project.

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government] to lift the minimal standards, but then the interest groups squeal and say ‘That

cannot be done’. But with [these instruments] you see that it can be done, that it makes them

think to go further, to push the boundaries.”

The focus on industry frontrunners is dominant, even in the way the instruments are

marketed. For example, the website of the Green Building Council of Australia, the

organisation that administers Green Star, mentions the word “leadership” no less than 6,500

times on its pages.

Yet, the instruments are also marketed using subtler wording to attract

frontrunners in the industry. The instrument 1200 Buildings, which helps property owners

secure funds for retrofits, claims on its website that participation helps in “improving

corporate image”, helps to “lower environmental footprint”, and helps in “making the

building more attractive to investors”.

The Mayor of Melbourne is also vocal in the media

about the “leadership role” that participants have taken in committing to this instrument.

That having been said, participants were less vocal about a need to involve frontrunners in

these instruments. For them, there is no need to distinguish between the frontrunners and the

majority in these instruments. Their aim is to gain the rewards of the instrument and not, or at

least less so, to make the instrument a success, which is a key goal for instrument

administrators (cf., E. M. Rogers 1995).

Lessons learnt and knowledge created

Again, particularly instrument administrators and those involved in the process of

experimenting with it were very positive about the various lessons learnt and the knowledge

created from the experiments. When discussing the value of experiments with innovative

climate governance instruments in Sydney, a city policymaker argued (int. 42) that “[these

experiments are] a good way of demonstrating what actually can be done. It is a good way of

showing facts about the efficiencies [that can be achieved] in energy and water

[consumption].” Likewise, the representative of a sustainable building peak body argued (int.

33) that “[these experiments] are necessary in setting the vision [of] what the right thing is.

Because if we don’t show what the right thing is, [the construction and property industries]

are doing the wrong thing.”

Indeed, all instruments studied have (or had) sections on their websites dedicated to

best practices and lessons learnt (see also online Appendix B). These range from very brief

www.new.gbca.org.au (18 August 2016).

www.melbourne.vic.gov.au/1200buildings/Pages/GoodForBusiness.aspx (10 August 2016).

www.greenlifestylemag.com.au/news/1894/melbournes-big-green-overhaul (18 August 2016).

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descriptions of exemplary buildings constructed or retrofitted in some instruments to

extensive case studies in others that spell out opportunities, challenges, costs, and participant

and administrator experiences. A challenge in communicating best practices and knowledge,

explained programme administrators, is moving from very project- or participant-specific

insights to knowledge that is transferable across different (types of) projects and participants.

Another challenge is data collection. Often the notion of drawing lessons from trialling or

experimenting with an instrument came only after the very first phases of developing or

implementing it. Often in the initial stages of an experiment, no formal structure of drawing

and storing lessons was in place. As an administrator of one of the instruments studied

explained after its first year of experimentation (int. 18), “[We do not] collect lessons

systematically, but still some mutual learning is achieved. We are seeing things better now.

Where are the opportunities [in building-energy reduction]? Where is most energy used?

Where can we make savings? But systematic collection of data will be the next step.”

While participants were also positive about the ability to draw lessons from these

experiments, there was little mention of using the best practices and case studies developed

and provided by instrument administrators. Reflecting on Green Star, a manager of one of

Australia’s largest development firms stated (int. 45), “It is like when Green Star started.

Back then a four-star Green Star building was very [exceptional]. Now a four-star Green Star

building is just the minimum [in Australia’s major central business districts].” To this he

added, “It has taken some time to build up the knowledge on the returns that are generated

through certain solutions, how much energy can be saved, and so on. But the engineers now

are very knowledgeable about this and very experienced with it.” This latter part reflects well

how other participants discussed the knowledge generated through the innovative climate

governance instruments too: they often discussed how they themselves or how their advisors

or suppliers had come to understand the instrument. Yet, they did not touch on the value of

the best practices available on the various instrument websites.

In sum, as with the focus on involving leaders in these experiments, there appears a

difference between how instrument developers and administrators view the value of best

practices and knowledge generated and how participants view it. Again, the knowledge and

best practices serve different interests. For participants, it is relevant to know how exactly an

instrument will serve them, which requires very detailed knowledge that can, likely, only be

generated by using the instrument. For administrators, such knowledge is also relevant, but

too detailed, too case-specific information will likely not appeal to a broad community of

potential participants. That is, knowledge and best practices provided on instrument websites

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also serve a signalling function to attract participants. This in itself may result in situations

where being able to present an attractive “best practice” overrides the ambition to present

meaningful knowledge. CitySwitch Green Office provides an example here. “[The] key of the

[instrument] is learning,” a local administrator explained, “and we can best be understood as

a facilitator in this learning process through the meetings and lectures we organise” (int. 35).

Yet, a national administrator stated that not all data underlying the lessons learnt and the best

practices presented on the CitySwitch website are sound because the quality of insights

provided by participants. “This distorts the data we have. Based on the current data only very

flawed predictions of [best practices] can be made”, she observed (int. 41). The reported

lessons learnt and best practices presented are likely to constitute theoretical best-case

scenarios, with real performance being substantially lower than recorded numbers.

Performance: participants attracted and reductions achieved

An accepted approach in climate governance studies was followed to assess the performance

of the instruments (Borck and Coglianese 2009; de Vries, Nentjes, and Odam 2012). First, the

number of participants an instrument has attracted was considered as a percentage of the full

pool of prospective participants to which it reaches out. This was done to gain an insight into

the uptake of the instrument. Second, average reductions in energy or carbon emissions

achieved per participant were contrasted with reductions that are claimed to be achievable in

Australia at net cost-benefit by using available and well-trialled technology and insights on

low-impact behavioural change—in other words, 50 per cent reductions by 2030 (ASBEC

2016; Beyond Zero Emissions 2013; Greensense 2013). Third, the overall reductions claimed

by instrument administrators in 2015 were contrasted with the total energy consumption or

carbon emissions of the specific area addressed by the instrument in the year of its

implementation to gain an insight into the relative performance of the instruments.

Table 1 shows that, with the exception of the Better Buildings Partnership and

NABERS, none of the programmes studied have attracted a large percentage of the full pool

of the targeted participants.

Most programmes have achieved an uptake of 1 to 6 per cent—

well below the 15 to 25 per cent that is conventionally considered to be required to make a

These second and third approaches to evaluation may be critiqued because factors other than participating in

the instrument may also have caused reductions and because the data used, which were provided by instrument

administrators, may present an overly positive narrative (Borck & Coglianese, 2009). For this article, this is not

a major concern because it points to a pattern of generally poor performance of the instruments—even whilst the

data underlying that pattern may have been too positive in the first place.

Performance data is reported to great extend elsewhere (van der Heijden, 2017).

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transition from frontrunners to majority (E. Rogers and Weber 2010; E. M. Rogers 1995).

Green Star performs better, but the 18 per cent market uptake only reflects its penetration in

the office market in Australia. The programme is marginally applied in the other areas it

seeks to serve, such as retail, residential, and educational buildings. In addition, the

instrument saw a rapid increase in the number of participants in its first years, but its growth

has since levelled out (GBCA 2015). The contrastingly high participation of NABERS office

energy labelling, 77 per cent, is explained by the mandatory requirements set by the Building

Energy Efficiency Disclosure Act of 2010 (see above). That being said, the voluntary

NABERS office water labelling is applied in 46 per cent of the office market in Australia.

Finally, the participation of all originally targeted participants under the Better Buildings

Partnership can be explained by the simple fact that they constituted only 14 major property

owners.

Table 1 also shows that, with the exception of the Better Buildings Partnership, none

of the instruments are on track to achieve an average per participant reduction of 50 per cent

of energy consumption or carbon emissions by 2030 compared with the year the instrument

was launched. More worrying, again with the exceptions of the Better Buildings Partnership

and NABERS, all instruments have thus far had, at best, marginal impacts (here considered

as less than 5 per cent) on reducing the overall energy consumption or carbon emissions in

the specific areas they target. Before looking at the outlier, the Better Buildings Partnership,

this poor performance is further unpacked.

What explains the poor uptake of the instruments by prospective participants? Part of

the answer to that question appears to be the dominant focus on rewarding frontrunners and

industry leadership. For example, when closely scrutinising the participant base of

CitySwitch, an instrument that supports office tenants in reducing their resource

consumption, it was learned that it attracts participants that already show building energy

consumption below average market levels when they commit to the instrument (CitySwitch

2013, 2014, 2015). In other words, this instrument attracts tenants who are already leading

and not the majority of average and/or poor performers. The rewards that come with the

instrument may explain this. A yearly award ceremony is held to highlight the best-

performing participants and considerable media attention is given to these frontrunners.

“CitySwitch helps leaders to feel good about what it is they are doing, and we very much aim

to market [their performance] to the best of our ability,” a national CitySwitch administrator

(int. 41) explained, “but do they win business with it? Probably not.” This led interviewees

involved in CitySwitch at local level to be highly critical. “What we found is that the first

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thing people in [City X] ask is: What’s in it for me?” said a local CitySwitch administrator

(int. 50). “And [after we explain the advantages of participating] they say: I can do that

anyway. What is it that the council is going to pay for?” He was particularly concerned that

the strong focus on frontrunners makes the instrument attractive to a small segment of office

tenants only—ironically those that are already performing well.

What explains the poor average participant performance? In developing innovative

governance instruments, administrators have to make a difficult decision: introduce a highly

ambitious instrument with high participation criteria—but run the risk of a low uptake

because not many can actually comply with these criteria—or introduce a moderately

ambitious one with moderate requirements that are attractive to and achievable by a large

group of prospective participants (Potoski and Prakash 2009). When considering the

Australian instruments—and also those studied from other countries (van der Heijden,

2017)—it appears that administrators prefer the latter design over the former. For example, to

achieve the lowest level of labelling, Green Star requires participants to outperform the

energy performance requirements set by the Australian Building Code by 10 per cent (GBCA

2014). This is a fairly unambitious requirement in the light of possible reductions but is still

considered “Best Practice”. In contrast, the certification instrument EnviroDevelopment sets

more ambitious criteria and requires that buildings outperform mandatory requirements by at

least 20 per cent. However, this ambition seems to have backfired: only 6 per cent of all new

residential property built in Australia has been EnviroDevelopment certified, representing

less than 1 per cent of Australia’s housing stock.

Low levels of participation, moderately ambitious criteria, or both logically result in a

situation where the overall performance of these instruments is marginal. But what explains

the promising performance of the Better Building Partnership? The answer is straightforward.

The Partnership covers the relatively small area of Sydney’s central business district and only

applies to some 100 high-profile office buildings. It is an absolute elite group of property

sector leaders managing a total of AU$105 billion worth of property, which indicates that

they have the financial means to carry out retrofits. It is much easier for an instrument

administrator to reach out to such a close-knit pool of prospective participants than to any of

the pools of prospective participants in the other instruments (Olson 1965). In addition, the

reported performance should be considered in the light of the fact that some improvements

had been made (or planned) by participants well before the Partnership was implemented in

www.envirodevelopment.com.au, www.hia.com.au, and www.abs.com.au (6 July 2015).

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2011. The participants’ energy consumption in 2006 is used as a benchmark, which

considerably skews the reported performance.

Potential to scale or replicate

Interviewees were particularly vocal about the limitations on scaling or replicating the

instruments studied. Policymakers and administrators in cities other than Sydney, for

example, pointed to the Better Buildings Partnership as being impossible in their

jurisdictions: “We host the back offices of the big companies. It is in the interest of these big

companies to have the city in which they have their headquarters—the city from where they

want to be the springboard to the world—to have these cities hum and look fantastic”, said an

administrator from another city (int. 50). “It is not necessarily of interest to them to have their

back offices be a high-cost work environment, with [higher levels of built-environment]

sustainability, higher rental costs and all that”, he continued. The Better Building Partnership

turned out to be such a success, he further explained, because it only involves a small

jurisdiction, a relatively small number of buildings, and Australia’s most ambitious and

wealthy property owners.

Criticisms expressed about the other instruments resonate with this insight. For

example, Green Star is predominantly applied in the absolute top end of the new commercial

property market: high-end and flagship offices in the central business districts of Australia’s

major cities. It is here that Green Star has a market coverage of 18 per cent. Governmental

agencies and large corporations occupy these offices, and occupying low-carbon office space

is in line with their policies of social corporate responsibility. Green Star is, however, less

sought after by small and medium sized businesses, homeowners, and those interested in

retrofitting existing buildings. In these parts of the construction and property sectors, the

uptake of Green Star is marginal.

Moreover, the higher levels of labelling under

certification instruments were not considered to see much scaling: “It simply is not viable to

develop a Green Star six-star rated multi-unit residential project,” a sustainability manager at

a major property developer in Australia (int. 44) explained. He continued, “unless, of course,

you want it to be a flagship development of your portfolio and you know you’re going to

make a loss on it”.

In particular, interviewees who represented participants indicated that the frontrunner

awards that come with participating—having the opportunity to market this frontrunner

www.new.gbca.org.au (18 August 2016).

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position through a label, being recognised by government as an industry leader, and so on—

are of no interest to a large segment of prospective participants. “Look, we are talking about

the top end of town [that seeks Green Star certification]. Think government, blue-chip

companies, financial institutions, lawyers and accounting firms. But there is another level

where the consumer does not currently see the benefit of sustainable buildings,” explained a

senior manager at a major Australian development firm (int. 47). He continued, “and even if

they do see the benefit, they probably are not willing to pay a premium for it”. Further, a

senior consultant at one of Australia’s major environmental consultancy firms (int. 23) said,

“The [high-end] commercial market is hit. There it’s seen as creating value. But this does not

relate to the residential market. It is not proven [homeowners] want to pay for it.” The

interviewees argued that other incentives were more important to the majority of the market:

“[For them] cost reduction is one of the biggest drivers to participate. The bigger companies

[may be] very keen to market themselves as leaders in this area but the biggest driver is cost”,

concluded a senior programme officer from NABERS (int. 40).

A further complication appears to be the marketing of leadership on which many

programmes rely. 1200 Buildings provides an example. The majority of commercial property

in Melbourne’s central business district, the area targeted by 1200 Buildings, is owned

privately (small and medium-sized firms and individuals) rather than by large professional

corporations (City of Melbourne 2013). “Private owners often do not have the corporate

structures and resources to research, facilitate and track building performance”, the team

leader of 1200 Buildings explained (quoted in Aliento 2014). Private owners are often

unaware of the energy performance of the building or buildings they own and take a passive

stance toward building energy performance. More than large firms, they consider building

energy retrofits a sunk cost rather than an investment that might generate a cash flow in the

form of energy-cost savings (Perinotto 2014). Still, the instrument is marketed in terminology

that resonates more with large (and front-running) property owners than it does with smaller

ones, as discussed earlier: “improving corporate image”, “lower environmental footprint”,

and “making the building more attractive to investors”. The administrators do little to market

the instrument as an attractive opportunity for small and medium-sized firms and individual

commercial property owners.

Discussion and conclusion: Is it time to focus on what lies beyond frontrunners?

This article has studied nine governance instruments for low-carbon buildings in Australia

that share many characteristics of experimental and innovative climate governance. It was

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particularly interested in exploring the paradox of frontrunners in climate governance

experiments and innovations, that is, the conflict of having to rely on frontrunners to work

towards innovations and to be able to experiment but at the risk of relying too much on them

and thus losing touch with the majority. Without convincing the majority to commit to an

innovation it will be very hard, if not impossible, to see it scale up.

Before drawing conclusions, particularly on the frontrunner paradox, it is of relevance

to note that the chosen research approach limits the generalisability of the presented findings.

Other studies, in other countries and other areas, may find related patterns and processes but

it is unlikely that they will be exactly the same—what follows can be considered “moderatum

generalisations” (Payne and Williams 2005). Furthermore, although the poor performance of

the instruments studied can, in part, be assigned to the frontrunner paradox, other

explanations are possible, and two stand out. First, apart from the (partly) mandatory

instrument NABERS, all instruments ask for voluntary participation. The broader literature

on voluntary programmes indicates poor performance in terms of participation along the lines

observed here (Prakash and Potoski 2012). Second, except for the Better Buildings

Partnership, which is characterised by a relatively small and highly homogenous pool of

participants, all instruments seek to attract a large and relatively heterogeneous pool of

participants. The broader literature on groups and collective action indicates the complexities

of attracting participants along the lines observed here (Olson 1965). Finally, while this study

does not indicate that the frontrunner paradox plays out differently for the type of instrument

experimented with, its context, or the actors involved, future research may seek to explore

whether this holds more broadly or whether it results from the sample of nine cases studied.

That said, the bottom-line finding is that most instruments studied fall short of

attracting meaningful numbers of participants or achieving a meaningful improvement in

participants’ behaviour or both. Still, they have provided a wealth of knowledge about and

best practices in low-carbon building development, retrofitting, and use in Australia. Some

building developers, owners and users have, often supported by instrument administrators,

introduced innovative building designs and use practices that have resulted in resource

efficiencies and waste reductions that reach well beyond mandatory requirements in

Australia. It remains a question for future research, however, whether they have done so

seeking to achieve instrument rewards or whether they would have been frontrunners also

without the instruments in place. Another question for future research is how well the

knowledge created by them as well as their best practices resonate with the majority market.

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When taking a step back and looking at the instruments from some distance, a

similarity that helps to explain their poor performance comes to the fore. All instruments

adopt a fairly homogenous marketing narrative around frontrunners and the leadership

benefits that come from committing to these instruments. The markets targeted by these

instruments are, however, not homogenous and are not only made up of (prospective)

frontrunners. With the exception of the Better Buildings Partnership, all instruments seek to

attract a variety of market sectors, including professional and non-professional property

owners, large and small firms, single family dwellings and full-scale residential development

projects, international developers and local contractors, and so on. The frontrunner narrative

and the marketed leadership benefits might resonate well with specific segments of these

markets but not with all of them. In particular, for smaller firms and non-professional

property-owners, this narrative may not be sufficiently attractive or convincing. The

knowledge created by frontrunners and their best practices may also not resonate well with

other segments of the markets. In addition, and perhaps of interest to explore in future

scholarship, the data indicated a difference between how developers and administrators of

instruments view the need to involve frontrunners and the value of the knowledge created

through experiments and how participants of the instruments do.

The development and property industry lacks aspects that are essential for the

diffusion from frontrunners to majority to occur naturally (Moore 2002). First, because of the

heterogeneity of the industry, the frontrunners are not always considered to be inspirational

peers by the majority. Second, because of high fragmentation of the industry, power laws

(such as the 80/20 rule) do not hold: targeting a small number of organisations with much

influence is normally not possible in the development and property industry. The

instruments’ dominant focus on involving, stimulating, and rewarding frontrunners fails to

interpret the heterogeneity and fragmentation of the industry. Thus, the time seems ripe for

instrument administrators to move away from (solely) targeting frontrunners and marketing

the leadership benefits of these instruments and to begin to target specific market sectors with

more tailored narratives and more tailored instruments. For example, 1200 Buildings could be

split into an instrument for large property owners and one for medium and small property

owners. These groups have different needs, will probably respond to different rewards, and

will require different narratives to get them on board with an innovative governance

instrument.

In conclusion, frontrunners are important in climate governance experiments and

innovations. There is, however, a risk of a frontrunner paradox when instrument developers

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and administrators too easily assume that the majority will follow leading practice and use

knowledge created in experiments. This risk particularly boils down to the following: lessons

and best practices that result from experiments have little value when seeking to scale up the

innovative climate governance instruments experimented with when there is a mismatch

between the groups that have created these best practices and knowledge and those that are

sought for scaling up (i.e., frontrunners vs. majority). Instrument developers and

administrators need to understand the configuration of the pool of prospective participants

they target—Is it homogenous? Is it heterogeneous? Do power laws hold? Is substantial peer

pressure present? Whether the frontrunner paradox holds similarly in other complex areas of

climate governance remains to be seen. This article has, however, pointed out that there are

good reasons to assume it might.

Acknowledgements

The research reported on in this article was funded through grants from the Netherlands

Organisation for Scientific Research, grant number 451-11-015 and grant number 016-165-

322; and a grant from the Australian Research Council, grant number DE15100511. Thanks

to two anonymous reviewers and the editors of the journal for providing helpful comments to

an earlier version of the manuscript.

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Tables

Table 1 – Summary of instruments studied

Name Brief description Participants relative

to pool of prospective

participants

Average reductions

by participants

Relative effectiveness

1200 Buildings (since

2010)

Financing instrument that bridges the City of

Melbourne government, finance providers, and

commercial property owners (participants). It aims to

retrofit 1200 buildings in the Melbourne central

business district (CBD).

4 per cent. Unknown (too few

buildings retrofitted

yet).

Minimal† when

considering

Melbourne’s 2011

commercial building

energy consumption.

Better Buildings

Partnership (since

2011)

Action network for reduced commercial property-

related carbon emissions in Sydney’s CBD. It aims for

a 70 per cent reduction of 2006 emissions by 2030.

100 per cent (all 14

initially targeted

participants).

35 per cent, and on

track to reach 70 per

cent by 2020.

Approximately 18 per

cent when considering

Sydney’s 2006

commercial building

energy consumption in

the CBD.

Building Innovation

Fund (2008–2012)

Competitive financing instrument that funded only the

most promising building retrofit proposals from a pool

of proposed retrofits of commercial buildings in the

City of Adelaide.

Less than 2 per cent

(fewer than 10 projects

were supported over

the lifetime of the

instrument).

Over 20 per cent, but

not on track to achieve

50 per cent reductions

by 2030.

Minimal when

considering Adelaide’s

2008 commercial

building energy

consumption.

CitySwitch Green

Office (since 2010)

Action network for reduced resource consumption

office users (participants). Challenges participants in

6 per cent. 13–16 per cent, but not

on track to achieve 50

Less than 1 per cent of

Australia’s 2010 office

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Australia to reduce their resource consumption and

achieve a specified classification (4 stars) under

NABERS (see below).

per cent reductions by

2030.

building energy

consumption.

EnviroDevelopment

(since 2006)

Certification instrument for resource efficient

buildings. It allows property developers and owners

(participants) to communicate the resource

consumption of their property.

6 per cent (of new

residential buildings).

Over 20 per cent, but

not on track to achieve

50 per cent reductions

by 2030.

Approximately 1 per

cent of Australia’s

2006 residential

building energy

consumption.

Environmental

Upgrade Agreements

(since 2011)

Financing instrument that bridge the City of Sydney

government, finance providers, and commercial

property owners. Comparable to 1200 Buildings

(above) but without a pre-specified emission target.

Less than 1 per cent. Unknown (too few

buildings retrofitted

yet).

Minimal when

considering Sydney’s

2011 commercial

building energy

consumption.

Green Star (since

2003)

Certification instrument for resource efficient

buildings. It allows property developers and owners

(participants) to communicate the environmental

credentials of their property.

18 per cent of new

office buildings.

Over 20 per cent (but

paper performance*)

but not on track to

achieve 50 per cent

reductions by 2030.

Approximately 4 per

cent of Australia’s

2003 office building

energy consumption

(but paper

performance*).

NABERS (nationwide

since 2010)

Certification instrument for resource efficient

buildings. It allows property developers and owners

(participants) to communicate the energy and water

consumption of their property.

77 per cent. Over 20 per cent but

not on track to achieve

50 per cent reductions

by 2030.

Approximately 15 per

cent of Australia’s

2010 office building

energy consumption.

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Sustainable

Development Grant

(2007–2011)

Competitive financing instrument that funded only the

most promising building retrofit proposals from a pool

of proposed retrofits for commercial buildings in

Brisbane.

Less than 2 per cent

(fewer than 15 projects

were supported over

the lifetime of the

instrument).

Around 20 per cent

(but paper

performance*) but not

on track to achieve 50

per cent reductions by

2030.

Minimal when

considering Brisbane’s

2007 commercial

building energy

consumption.

† The qualitative descriptor ‘minimal’ indicates a maximum of 0.5 per cent.

* The term ‘paper performance’ indicates that these are expected reductions, not observed reductions; most certificates have been issued for the

design of a building and not the performance of a building in operation.

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Table 2 – Overview of interviewees

Interviewee background Government Non-government

Policymaker 4

Administrator 22 12

Architect, engineer, advisor 7

Contractor, developer 3

Property owner 4

Other 3

Total 26 29

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Online Appendix A—An overview of cases studied

1200 Buildings (Melbourne, 2010)

Urban climate governance instrument developed and implemented by the Melbourne City

Council in 2010 in collaboration with one national bank, a major fund manager, and property

owners. The Melbourne City Council administers the instrument. It encourages and supports

building owners, managers and facility managers to improve building energy and water

efficiency, and to reduce landfill waste. In particular, it aims to accelerate the retrofitting of

commercial buildings in Melbourne’s central business district, and has set a target of two-

thirds of this building stock being retrofitted by 2020 (City of Melbourne, 2010; da Silva,

2011). A crucial part of the instrument is environmental upgrade financing, an approach to

supporting financially property owners who are unable to source funds for retrofits

elsewhere.

Under the instrument individual property owners commit to a minimum reduction of

energy consumption of their office buildings of 38 per cent in a letter to the Mayor of

Melbourne, outlining the retrofits they will undertake to achieve this aim. Neither the current

Building Code of Australia nor other Australian mandatory requirements set performance

requirements for existing buildings. As such it asks for considerable beyond compliance

behaviour of its participants. In return the City of Melbourne provides these property owners

with funds to retrofit their buildings, and recovers these from the property owners through a

statutory charge linked to rates collection. The City has entered into an agreement with banks

to acquire the funds it provides to the property owners. The City monitors and enforces

compliance with the instrument as part of its broader building code enforcement regime.

Through the program the City of Melbourne further seeks to provide property owners with

information on how to retrofit their buildings, particularly through a publicly accessible

website, and it also aims to create a community of rule-takers capable of benefiting from each

other’s experiences. Participants may use the promotional ‘1200 buildings’ logo to showcase

their leading practice.

Website: www.1200buildings.com.au

Source: REMOVED FOR REVIEW

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Better Building Partnership (Sydney, 2011)

Urban climate governance instrument launched by the by the Sydney City Council in 2011,

bringing together the Council and the City of Sydney’s 14 major property owners. It aims to

reduce the carbon emissions, waste, energy, and water consumption in buildings belonging to

these major property owners. Together, these property owners account for over fifty per cent

of all commercial property in Sydney’s central business district. The instrument requires its

participants to reduce their existing buildings’ carbon emissions in 2030 by 70 per cent as of

2006 emissions.

Participating property owners in the Partnership sign a letter to the Mayor of Sydney

pledging that they will make improvements to their buildings to achieve this goal. In return

the City of Sydney keeps these property owners involved in prospective policy deliberations

so that they can plan their property portfolios accordingly. It further seeks to reduce

regulatory barriers these property owners face in retrofitting their property, as well as

financial barriers they face in doing so. In addition, the City of Sydney promotes the ‘beyond

compliance’ performance and leadership of the participants in various media outlets,

including a website that is dedicated to the instrument. The program builds on self-reporting

of performance data by its participants, and makes these data publicly available through the

program’s website and annual reports. Compliance data are relatively easy to verify as they

predominantly relate to energy consumption information provided by utilities and energy

suppliers. More recently the program has begun to focus on barriers faced by office tenants in

improving their urban sustainability behaviour. By linking and seeking to overcome barriers

faced by office tenants and the property owners of their buildings, the program hopes to

create synergies that accelerate the improvement of urban sustainability in Sydney’s central

business district. It does so particularly by seeking synergies with CitySwitch Green Office

(see below).

Website: www.sydneybetterbuilding.com.au

Building Innovation Fund (South Australia, 2008–2012)

This competitive funding instrument was developed and implemented by the Government of

South Australia in 2008 and concluded in 2012. A fund of AU$2 million was established to

demonstrate innovative ways to reduce the carbon footprint and resource consumption of

existing commercial buildings.

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Prospective participants seeking to obtain funding would propose a solution to

improve the urban sustainability of property they owned by lodging a fully developed

construction or retrofitting plan. The proposals were then evaluated by a jury consisting of

Government of South Australia representatives, City of Adelaide representatives, academics,

and representatives of the property industry. The most promising proposals in terms of

resource consumption and waste reductions would be awarded grant funding. Grant funding

was considerable when compared to construction and retrofitting costs. A total of 11 projects

were awarded, including the installation of a living wall system, in which plant-covered wall

improved the thermal efficiency of a building, funded AU$214,000; and the installation of a

solar façade made up of translucent photo-voltaic cells, funded AU$240,000.

The program

rules did not specify minimum criteria for its participants to meet—note that the Australian

Building Code and other mandatory requirements for urban sustainability do not apply to

existing buildings in Australia. It was expected that the competitive aspect would incentivise

participants to propose projects with far-reaching levels of environmental sustainability.

Compliance was monitored and enforced by the state government, and partly relied on

building code enforcement of construction work by the City of Adelaide building authority.

Website: www.sa.gov.au/topics/water-energy-and-environment/climate-change/tackling-

climate-change/what-organisations-business-and-industry-can-do/building-innovation-fund

CitySwitch Green Office (2010 Sydney, 2011 national)

Urban climate governance instrument launched by the Sydney City Council in 2010 to bring

together the Council and office tenants, and made a nationwide program in 2011. It is

administered by local councils and state governments and serves as a platform for office

tenants to learn about energy efficiency, share information, network, and showcase good

practices. A yearly awards ceremony recognises leading practice in different categories.

By participating in the network, office tenants come to agreements with councils

about their future environmental performance. Commitment to the program involves

participants voluntarily undertaking a set of energy actions and providing an annual report on

their achievements. Specifically, tenants agree to meet a specific rating within NABERS (see

above). The required rating for CitySwitch participants (4 stars under NABERS)

Data obtained from: www.sa.gov.au/topics/water-energy-and-environment/climate-

change/tackling-climate-change/what-organisations-business-and-industry-can-do/building-

innovation-fund (25 February 2015).

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approximates a modest beyond-compliance performance with mandatory requirements for

new office development in Australia. Compliance with NABERS requirements is evaluated

by third-party assessors. However, interviews with CitySwitch administrators indicated that

not meeting the agreed NABERS rating is not penalised under the program (REMOVED

FOR REVIEW). In return for participation, councils provide tenants with support to meet

these goals. Certain Councils provide financial support to office tenants, while others

facilitate meetings and ensure an ongoing supply and distribution of information. The

national CitySwitch organisation maintains a website that provides information to

participants and non-participants alike, including case studies, best practices, and information

about other urban climate governance instruments in Australia. More recently it has begun to

focus on the interaction between tenants and landlords, and the barriers they face when

seeking improved urban sustainability of existing office buildings (for instance, through

collaboration with the Better Buildings Partnership—discussed above). CitySwitch

participants are permitted to use the promotional CitySwitch logo to promote their leading

practice.

Website: www.cityswitch.net.au

EnviroDevelopment (national, 2006)

Certification and classification instrument developed and implemented in 2006 by the Urban

Development Institute of Australia, a peak industry body with strong support from the

Queensland Government. It acknowledges sustainability credentials of buildings and city

development projects that move beyond compliance with the Building Code of Australia. The

instrument is benchmark-based, and tailored to different development types: master-planned

communities (projects larger than 1,500 dwellings), residential subdivision (projects up to

1,500 dwellings), senior or retirement living, multi-unit residential projects, industrial, retail,

education, and healthcare buildings. It can be applied to individual buildings, but in practice

it is used for large-scale development projects.

In line with other certification and classification instruments (for a review, see Van

der Heijden, 2015) it builds on a set of criteria a building or development project has to meet

in order to be certified. Among other conditions, it requires a reduction of 20 per cent of

greenhouse gas emissions and 20 per cent of water consumption compared to specifications

of the Building Code of Australia. Assessment of development projects against the

EnviroDevelopment criteria is carried out by third-party assessors. Certification is subject to

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yearly renewal. It differs from other certification and classification programs, however, in

that it does not accumulate criteria in its final level of certification, as popular labelling-based

programs do. Instead, it awards certification in different categories of performance:

ecosystems, waste, energy, materials, water, and community. Once a development project is

certified, property developers and owners can use the EnviroDevelopment logo, a series of

coloured leaves on a branch representing the categories of certification. Each leaf indicates

that the development project performs better than the benchmark set for that category, but

does not indicate how the project’s performance compares with other certified projects in that

category.

Website: www.envirodevelopment.com.au

Environmental Upgrade Agreements (Sydney, 2011)

This Government–property owner network was developed and implemented by the Sydney

City Council in 2011. The program is inspired by and resembles the earlier-discussed 1200

Buildings program in Melbourne (see above).

Website: www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/business/business-support/greening-your-

business/environmental-upgrade-finance

Green Star (national, 2003)

This is a certification and classification instrument developed and implemented in 2003 by

the Green Building Council of Australia, a non-profit organisation with close relations to the

property and construction industries. Initially it was targeted at the top 25 per cent of the

commercial property market. It acknowledges urban sustainability credentials of buildings

and city development projects that move beyond compliance with the Building Code of

Australia. It is an example of labelling-based certification, tailored to different development

types: offices, office interiors, educational buildings, industrial buildings, multi-unit

residential buildings, retail centres, healthcare buildings, public buildings, and precinct

development projects. The program is mainly applied to commercial property.

In line with other labelling-based programs, Green Star builds on a set of criteria a

building or development project has to meet in order to be certified. Its standards do not

directly relate to the Building Code of Australia, or other mandatory requirements in

Australia. The more criteria met, the higher the class of certification. Assessment of projects

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is conducted by a third-party assessor. Certification can be obtained in the categories ‘as

designed’ (when a building design meets Green Star requirements), ‘as built’ (when the

constructed building meets Green Star requirements), and ‘performance’ (when a building in

operation meets Green Star requirements). The latter category of certification is subject to

periodical renewal. Green Star awards three classes of certification: 4 Star (lowest tier), 5 Star

(mid-tier), and 6 Star (highest tier). When introduced, it was decided not to issue certificates

for relatively low ‘beyond compliance’ behaviour. Certification in the 4-Star class, however,

requires a building only to perform slightly better in terms of energy efficiency than

compliance with the Building Code of Australia. Once a project is certified under Green Star,

property developers and owners may use the Green Star logo and star classification for

promotional activities.

Website: www.gbca.org.au/green-star

NABERS (National Building Energy Rating System, Australia: regional 1998; national 2005)

NABERS is a certification and classification instrument developed and implemented in 1998

by the New South Wales Government Sustainable Energy Development Authority—a state

level agency; now the Office of Environment and Heritage—and adopted by the Australian

Commonwealth Government in 2005. It is a ratings-based instrument for existing and new

buildings, focusing on energy and water consumption. Buildings can be certified in six star

classes, including half stars, with a 6-Star NABERS classification indicating the highest level

of energy or water efficiency. It was initially developed to certify energy consumption of

office buildings only. While it has expanded its reach to include other building types, it is still

mostly applied to office buildings. It has also been included in the Australian Building

Energy Efficiency Discloser Act of 2010.

NABERS certifies the actual energy and water consumption of buildings in use. To

generate the rating, the actual performance data are adjusted for a building’s size and

occupancy, the climate conditions in which it operates, the hours of its use, the level of

services it provides, and the energy sources it uses. A building with a 2.5 to 3-Star rating

indicates average performance as compared to other buildings in its class. A building with a

4-Star rating performs at the same level as a newly developed building under the Building

Code of Australia. Assessment is undertaken by a third-party assessor and certificates are

issued by the New South Wales Government Office of Environment and Heritage. Because

no mandatory energy efficiency requirements apply to existing buildings, NABERS de facto

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certifies beyond compliance performance. Certification is subject to renewal: with office

buildings, for instance, a certificate has to be renewed when a building of 2,000 square metres

or larger comes to the market for sale or lease. Building owners and tenants may use the

NABERS logo and star classification for promotional activities. NABERS is incorporated

into a range of other Australian innovative governance programs studied, including Green

Star and CitySwitch Green Office (see above).

Website: www.nabers.gov.au

Sustainable Development Grant (Brisbane, Australia, 2007–2010)

This competitive funding instrument was developed and implemented by the Brisbane City

Council in 2007, and terminated in 2011. It aimed to improve the urban sustainability of

major office development projects. A system of criteria was introduced that assigned scored

grades defining the sustainability performance of grant applicants’ developments. The criteria

moved above and beyond those of the Building Code of Australia. If a threshold score was

reached, the applicant would receive a grant. Higher scores corresponded with greater levels

of sustainability and would attract larger financial grants. The minimum score to be achieved

corresponded with a 4-Star rating under Green Star (see above). In particular, it aimed to

reward best practice within the Brisbane office market.

Assessment of projects was carried out by the Brisbane City Council. Funds would

not be released to rule-takers before they had obtained Green Star certification of their

building project. In the first two years of the program AU$10 million grant funding was

available. Grant funding awarded related to gross floor area of a development project. As a

result of the 2011 flood damage, Brisbane City Council determined that funding for these

Grants was to be redirected towards Brisbane’s flood recovery effort.

Website: no longer accessible.

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Online Appendix B—Codes used for data analysis

The interview data were processed by means of a systematic coding scheme, and qualitative

data analysis software (Atlas.ti). The coding was carried out in three rounds, from roughly

coding parts of interviews in which, for instance, interviewees discussed the outcomes of an

instrument, to fine-grained coding within earlier-identified codes when, for instance,

interviewees discussed whether an instrument was considered effective because it had

resulted in carbon reduction. Using this approach, the data were systematically explored,

enabling insight into the ‘repetitiveness’ and ‘rarity’ of experiences shared by the

interviewees. Table D.3 provides an overview of codes used.

Table B.1 – Overview of codes for data analysis

Primary codes Secondary codes Tertiary codes

Context conditions Country Australia

India

Malaysia

Netherlands

Other country

Singapore

United States

Economic circumstances Global Financial Crisis

Existing legislation Lenient

Stringent

Societal pressure

Development motivations Affirmative Cheaper than formal regulation

Cost savings

Green consumers

Green financing

Job creation

Overcoming legal barriers

Overcoming split incentives

Showcasing good practice

Showcasing leadership

Sufficiency

Negative Hindering competitors

Industry capture

Prevent future regulation

Societal pressure

Worker pressure

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Development process

Collaboration/participation

Consensus building

Context based

Deliberation/discussion/dialogue

Devolved decision making

Heterarchy

Ongoing learning and readjustment

Mandatory vs voluntary

Mandatory is needed

Mandating voluntary

programs

Role of government

Assembling

Facilitating

Guarding

Supporting

Launching customer/consumer

Participation motivations

Affirmative

Altruism

Cost savings (general)

Energy cost savings

Financial gain (general)

Green consumers

Green financing

Regulatory relief

Showcasing good practice

Showcasing leadership

Sufficiency

Negative

Liability and legitimacy

Peer pressure

Poor past performance

Reputational harm

Societal pressure

Program design

Certification

and classification

Benchmarking

Labelling

Rating

Enforcement and monitoring

Administered monitoring

Government monitoring

Self

monitoring

Third

party monitoring

Existing buildings

Flexibility

Funds

Knowledge

Rules

Lenient

Stringent

Residential property

Rewards

Information

Interaction with government

Financial gain

Public recognition

Sanctioning

Financial penalty

Reputational penalty (shaming)

Warning

Target and result orientation

Transparency

Other design category

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Program outcome

Attracting rule

takers

Changing rule

takers’ behaviour

Effective/efficient

Best practice

Changed norm

Lessons learnt

Physical results (buildings;

energy)

Reducing CO2 emissions

Success factor

Spill-over effects

Not effective/efficient Failure factor

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Journal of Environmental Planning and Management

'We like sharing energy but currently there's no advantage': Transformative opportunities and challenges of local energy communities in Europe

Article

Full-text available

Nov 2023

Bernd Bonfert

Rising energy costs expose the instability of our energy system and underline the urgency of transitioning towards decentralized renewable energy provision. Many European countries have tasked municipalities with driving this transition and the European Union has designated local energy communities to receive stronger support. Energy communities involve public, private or community actors in co-producing and distributing renewable energy. They are often praised for helping democratize, decentralize and socially embed the energy system, but remain constrained by economic and legal barriers. To what extent they can contribute to transforming the energy system thus depends on their ability to scale beyond their niche. This article identifies opportunities and challenges encountered by energy communities, especially regarding legislation, municipal governance, and stakeholder participation. Drawing on 'foundational economy' concepts, it explains to what extent energy communities are governed and scaled by public, private or community actors, and discusses the transferability, social cohesion, and democratizing potential of energy innovations. The article compares qualitative findings from four energy community pilot projects in the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and the UK, based on interviews, observation and document analysis. It finds that while many cities are well-positioned to launch energy communities, they lack the authority and means to scale up innovations, thus having to rely on other actors. While private companies are often hesitant about adopting innovations, municipal companies are more willing to do so, yet citizen participation is lacking across cases. Findings thus underline a need for legislation to remove barriers to energy innovation and enable democratic participation.

Study supporting the assessment of EU Missions and the review of mission areas: Mission climate-neutral and smart cities assessment report

Technical Report

Full-text available

Jul 2023

This is a first assessment of the implementation of the EU Cities Mission after 2-3 years of implementation. Focusing on cross-sectoral, systemic, and place-based solutions, the ‘Cities Mission’ represents a major effort to achieve climate neutrality in specific urban environments and identify the key levers in the governance and achievement of urban transitions towards climate neutrality.

Unlocking the Power of the Circular Economy in the Australian AEC Industry: A Journey through Attitudes, Barriers and Enablers

Book

Full-text available

Jun 2023

The architecture, engineering, and construction (AEC) industry in Australia holds significant potential for driving the adoption of a circular economy (CE). With a contribution of up to 9% to the country's gross domestic product (GDP) and an anticipated annual growth rate of 2.4%, the AEC industry is poised to play a crucial role in advancing CE practices. However, to facilitate widespread adoption of CE in the Australian AEC industry, it is essential to understand stakeholders' perceptions of the concept. This report presents stakeholders' perspectives on transitioning to CE adoption and identifies the main barriers and enablers influencing its implementation. The research study employs a mixed-methods approach, incorporating semi-structured interviews and surveys conducted among key stakeholders associated with CE in the Australian AEC industry. The survey resulted 132 duly completed responses, which were further complemented by 10 interviews providing valuable additional insights. The report not only informs policy development activities but also lays the groundwork for a roadmap to enhance CE adoption within the Australian AEC industry. It offers recommendations and calls to action for key stakeholders, stressing the importance of a cohesive and collaborative approach to effectively address barriers and maximise the impacts of enablers.

An optimized solution for retrofitting building façades: Energy efficiency and cost-benefit analysis from a life cycle perspective

Article

Sep 2022
J CLEAN PROD

The study aims to conduct a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis (CBA) for incremental energy star ratings in Melbourne and Perth by upgrading the thermal performance of the building façade. CBA is performed over 20, 40, and 60 years by considering the refurbishment of an existing building façade or a newly constructed house to ensure the highest energy efficiency at the lowest reasonable cost. The hybrid approach of using a dynamic energy simulation tool (FirstRate5) and @RISK optimizer provides a feasible solution for obtaining a specific star rating. This study shows energy saving costs can offset the additional investment of insulation levels and energy-efficient glazings. However, life cycle energy savings are minimized after a certain point of supplementary yield insulations, such as ceilings R(6) and walls R(3). Hence the results are evaluated in terms of financial appraisals, such as net present value (NPV), benefit-cost ratio (BCR), internal rate of return (IRR), and other indicators for incremental star-rated designs. The results of the financial appraisals recommend upgrading the obligatory star rating from 6-star to 8-star is a cost-effective solution irrespective of climate and time horizon. Sensitivity indices of design variables exhibit the significance of functionality and cost implications in the established energy rating scheme. Possible economic recession (at > 7%) due to COVID and the Ukraine war, the investment coefficient (r ≤ −0.56) with NPV increases significantly against energy savings cost (r ≥ 0.8). Given the present energy rating scheme, these findings provide an exhaustive perception of policy implications.

Governing climate mitigation in a megacity: Tapping opportunities in the multi-level governance system?

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Extending urban energy transitions to the mid-tier: Insights into energy efficiency from the management of HVAC maintenance in ‘mid-tier’ office buildings

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ENERG POLICY

Évaluation de la mesure de l’empreinte environnementale urbaine en fonction de la capacité de charge de la Terre

Thesis

Full-text available

May 2022

Marie Vigier

Our global demand for resources currently exceeds the Earth’s carrying capacity (ECC), defined as the limit of anthropogenic pressure that our ecosystem can withstand within its regenerative and assimilative capacities. Representing a significant share of global environmental degradation, cities are seen as having the potential to catalyze a transition to a truly sustainable state in compliance with ECC. However, in order to do so, urban decision-makers must rely on robust measurement tools representing the complex dynamics or urban systems to guide their actions. This paper asks what tools exist to bridge this gap between theory and practice, what role urban planners are now giving to the ECC, and what the sustainability status of high-income reductionleading cities is in relation to the ECC. Ten assessment frameworks and four sustainability indicators were identified as compatible with the One Planet goal and adapted to measure key urban flows. Sustainability is primarily considered through the lens of climate at the urban scale, and existing assessment standards lack comprehensibility, leading to an overall underestimation of cities’ total environmental footprint. To select and analyze the leading cities in impact reduction, we used the following criteria : achievement of an absolute GHG emission reduction greater than 15 % over the period 1990-2020, and intentionality/commitment to sustainability through active membership in specific environmental knowledge transfer groups. Twenty-four cities were identified whose GHG reductions since 1990 range from 24-49 %, which is between 2-4 times lower than what is required by high-income cities by 2050 to reach the goal of living within ECC. To achieve a "one-planet life", cities must address their overconsumption using systemic tools that incorporate the notion of ECC and consider indirect emissions related to urban consumption. Various obstacles to this approach have been identified, of a practical, economic, cultural and geopolitical nature, and must be taken into account in order to promote the wider use of ECC as the ultimate goal of sustainability. Achieving a global state that respects ECC is everyone’s concern. Hence, the establishment of specific reduction targets, based on collaboration and effort-sharing approaches, must be promoted to ensure an environmentally efficient and socially just transition.

Understanding heterogeneity in city networks

Thesis

Jan 2022

Vicente Sayel Cortes Berrueta

How to Identify Cities on the Path Towards Real Sustainability?

Chapter

Full-text available

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Despite rising awareness concerning climate change, global anthropic impacts on the environment are forecasted to increase in the overcoming years, exceeding our planet’s ecological limits. The accelerating pace of climate degradation calls for a quick and efficient response from our societies, should we have a chance to limit the impacts of global warming. Being main nodes of over-consumption and pollution, thus having a high potential for footprint reduction, cities are crucial actors for climate mitigation. Hence, to successfully achieve a transition towards real sustainability, knowledge transfer needs to happen from the cities that are aiming towards life-respecting planetary boundaries to other urban regions worldwide. Although gaining momentum in the literature, a life respecting Earth’s Carrying Capacity (ECC) is not yet explicitly nor widely set as the ultimate goal for cities wanting to realistically face climate change. This article’s purpose is to reflect on the identification of cities actively aiming for ECC and point out the various obstacles to this goal. A misrepresentation of cities’ impact, both induced by misused sustainability terms and incomplete assessment methodology, is found to be hindering cities from reducing their footprint with the efforts needed to adequately face climate change. To that extent, it is crucial that ECC becomes a wider used target for cities, and that compliant assessment methods along with more holistic indicators are used to evaluate and monitor their progress. Finally, other technical issues regarding the incompleteness of standards, accessibility, and representativeness of qualitative data must be addressed.

Urban sustainability and resilience

Book

Full-text available

Feb 2017

Jeroen van der Heijden

“Pioneers but not guinea pigs”: experimenting with climate change adaptation in French coastal areas

Article

Full-text available

Jun 2018
POLICY SCI

Uncertainty surrounding climate change has encouraged policy makers to engage in flexible and exploratory policies and forms of policy making. The article examines the potential of experimentation in devising coastal adaptation policies, taking into account its political dimensions. We analysed a multi-level experiment, funded by the French Ministry for the Environment from 2012 to 2015, where coastal municipalities volunteered to simulate the implementation of planned retreat as an adaptation strategy. Using insights from discursive institutionalism, we tracked developments throughout the experiment period. We highlight a combined process of governance experiment, allowing social innovation at local and regional scales, and a more strategic tool for the state, governing and steering local coastal policy with new instruments. We shed light on a particular policy entrepreneur (a public organization dealing with coastal management) playing at the intersection of these two forms, and in the interplay of policy scales. Although the experiment contributed to the innovation of legal and economic instruments and produced policy feedbacks in local planning and governance, learning capacities of the multi-scale architecture are still moderate to make planned retreat a reality in the near future. The conclusion considers performative and interpretive effects of policy experiments as further research questions to explore.

Experimentation at the interface of science and policy: a multi-case analysis of how policy experiments influence political decision-makers

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Full-text available

Jun 2018
POLICY SCI

For decades now, scholars have grappled with questions about how knowledge producers can enhance the influence of their knowledge on users and improve policy making. However, little attention has been paid to how policy experiments, a flexible and ex ante method of policy appraisal, obtain influence over political decision-making. To address this gap, an exploratory framework has been developed that facilitates systematic analysis of multiple experiments, allowing hypotheses to be tested regarding how an experiment’s institutional design can influence the views of political decision-makers. Cash’s categories of effectiveness are used to describe an experiment’s conceptual influence; being how credible, salient, and legitimate decision-makers perceive an experiment to be. The hypotheses are tested using 14 experiment cases found relevant to climate adaptation in the Netherlands, with complete survey responses from over 70 respondents. The results show that although, in general, the experiments had medium to high influence on decision-makers, institutional design does have a noticeable impact. Organisers should make choices carefully when designing an experiment, particularly in order to maintain relevance during an experiment’s implementation and to build community acceptance. Suggestions for future research include a comparison of experiment effects with the effects of non-experimental forms of appraisal, such as piloting or ex ante impact assessment.

Interrogating urban experiments

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2016

The notion of the “urban experiment” has become increasingly prevalent and popular as a guiding concept and trope used by both scholars and policymakers, as well as by corporate actors with a stake in the future of the city. In this paper, we critically engage with this emerging focus on “urban experiments”, and with its articulation through the associated concepts of “living labs”, “future labs”, “urban labs” and the like. A critical engagement with the notion of urban experimentation is now not only useful, but a necessity: we introduce seven specific areas that need critical attention when considering urban experiments: these are focused on normativity, crisis discourses, the definition of “experimental subjects”, boundaries and boundedness, historical precedents, “dark” experiments and non-human experimental agency.

Innovations in Urban Climate Governance: Voluntary Programs for Low-Carbon Buildings and Cities

Book

Jul 2017

Jeroen van der Heijden

Environmental Governance in Bengaluru

Chapter

Mar 2018

Rapidly urbanising cities in Asia have two defining features, i.e. demographic expansion and urban concentrated economic growth and, secondly, scattered forms of urbanisation creating islands of ‘agglomeration, suburbanisation and urban sprawl’ threatening environmental management (Dahiya, B. (2012). 21st century Asian cities: Unique transformation, unprecedented challenges. Global Asia, 7(1), 98–104.). Environmental governance in India is challenged by an unprecedented urbanisation, demographic explosion, environmental degradation coupled with multi-level institutional jurisdictions and actors. More importantly, urban setting in India is often characterised by an overwhelming rural-urban migration, population growth, economic growth-related industrialisation, urbanisation-induced growth of slums that severely impinge on the natural resources, thereby adversely affecting the environment.

Decarbonising Cities

Article

Jan 2015

This book sets out some positive directions to move forward including government policy and regulatory options, an innovative GRID (Greening, Regenerative, Improvement Districts) scheme that can assist with funding and management, and the first steps towards an innovative carbon credit scheme for the built environment. Decarbonising cities is a global agenda with huge significance for the future of urban civilisation. Global demonstrations have shown that technology and design issues are largely solved. However, the mainstreaming of low carbon urban development, particularly at the precinct scale, currently lacks sufficient: standards for measuring carbon covering operational, embodied and transport emissions; assessment and decision-making tools to assist in design options; certifying processes for carbon neutrality within the built environment; and accreditation processes for enabling carbon credits to be generated from precinct-wide urban development. Numerous barriers are currently hindering greater adoption of high performance, low carbon developments, many of which relate to implementation and governance. How to enable and manage precinct-scale renewables and other low carbon technologies within an urban setting is a particular challenge.

Dynamics of experimental governance A meta-study of functions and uses of climate governance experiments

Article

Apr 2017
J CLEAN PROD

Societies around the world are faced with wicked problems such as climate change. In this context, experimental governance approaches have emerged as tools with potential utility in both top-down and bottom-up governance efforts. At the same time, experimental governance has gained momentum as a desirable policy goal in its own right. As the various experimental approaches differ in their origins and serve different purposes, there is a need to organize the field. If more experimental development processes are desired, what can be expected from certain kinds of experiments? How can the field be organised in a way that benefits those designing, conducting, and evaluating experimental governance processes? In attempting to answer these questions, we carried out a meta-study of 25 articles on experimental climate governance. On the basis of the results and the previous work on experiments, we have built a ‘triangle model of experimental governance’ that proposes both vertical and horizontal dynamics within and between different functions and uses of experiments.

Urban Governance and the Politics of Climate Change

Article

Feb 2017
WORLD DEV

Vanesa Castán Broto

Cities and urban areas are increasingly recognized as strategic arenas for climate change action. Processes of urban governance addressing climate change reconfigure the politics of climate change. Practitioners and scholars may be interested in the transformation of urban governance that follows global advances in climate change and urban policy. They may specifically be interested in how the urban governance of climate change is achieved and with what consequences for international development. This review evaluates the deep changes in urban governance that follow attempts to address climate change and how, in turn, attempts to govern climate change in urban areas reconfigure discourses informing the politics of climate change. The review shows that efforts to institutionalize climate change governance in urban areas reflect the conditions of specific contexts; that cities and sub-national entities have gained traction in international climate policy through heterogeneous forms of network governance; that governing climate change in urban areas relates to the production and deployment of new climate rationalities, or governmentalities; and that governing experiences in cities are reconfiguring discourses of climate change governance toward an increasing emphasis on experimentation as a means to deal with the open ended processes of governing urban areas.

Varieties of experimentalism

Article

Oct 2016
ECOL ECON

Across a range of disciplines and issues, experimentalism has emerged as a prominent approach for addressing environmental problems. Yet the meaning of “experiment” varies markedly across these domains. We survey the diversity of experimentation, identifying three distinct experimental logics—controlled, Darwinian, and generative. Building on Pragmatist philosophy, we argue that each of these logics has different strengths and weaknesses, but taken together they offer a valuable experimentalist approach to environmental problem-solving. However, from a transdisciplinary perspective, it is important to recognize the different values, purposes, and stances toward knowledge that they entail. Controlled experiments primarily aim to isolate causality, while Darwinian experimentation endeavors to enhance systemic innovation and generative experimentation seeks to generate new solution concepts. Appreciating these differences allows us to be more reflexive about an experimentalist agenda, illuminating the appropriate role of these logics and suggesting possibilities for fruitfully combining them. To advance this reflexive agenda, we also distinguish between epistemic and political learning and argue that experimental approaches to environmental problem-solving may benefit from being more sensitive to this distinction.

From leaders to majority: a frontrunner paradox in built-environment climate governance experimentation

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