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Family Policies and the Weakening
of the Male Breadwinner Model1
Rosa von Gleichen and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser
Oxford Institute of Social Policy, University of Oxford
PAPER PREPARED FOR PRESENTATION AT THE
29th ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE SOCIETY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SOCIO-
ECONOMICS
LYON, JUNE 29-JULY 1, 2017
Abstract
Family policies within the OECD world have undergone significant transformations. While family
allowances, parental leave, and child care continue to vary significantly from country to country, policy
change has followed a common trajectory moving away from support for the male breadwinner and
towards the dual-earner household and to reconcile tensions between work and family. The article will
identify early adopters and laggards of policy change among OECD countries as well as the ‘drivers’
leading to change. It will be shown that the early adopters in Scandinavia were largely driven by the
normative aim for gender equality, while in laggard countries more instrumental reasoning, such as
improving the use of human capital through increased female employment or addressing demographic
challenges, was employed. Methodologically, the chapter will be based on an analysis of secondary
literature as well as various datasets.
Key words: family policy; male breadwinner model; dual-earner model; adult-worker model; drivers of
family policy change; parental leave; family allowances; family services; childcare coverage; OECD.
Introduction
The male-breadwinner model dominated labour markets and the institutional design of social policies in
OECD countries during the ‘golden era’ of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990; Lewis 1992; Jenson
& Saint-Martin 2006). Although female labour force participation increased in many OECD countries
since the late 1960s and early 1970s, many social policies, particularly family policies supporting the male
breadwinner, remained in place for some time. This chapter provides an overview of family policy
1 Rosa von Gleichen is grateful to the ESRC for supporting her work with a scholarship. Martin Seeleib-
Kaiser is indebted to the WZB Berlin Social Science Center for providing him an excellent academic
environment during his sabbatical in 2016/2017 as well as to Oxford University in supporting the work
on this chapter through the Higher Studies Fund.
2
trajectories relating to the male-breadwinner model in a historical and international comparison. We
examine the development of the three policy domains of time, benefits and services in 18 affluent and
democratic OECD countries. Although we witness a clear movement away from policies supporting the
male-breadwinner model in the OECD world since the 1970s, that movement has been at times
protracted and has proceeded at multiple speeds. Analysing family policy over time and across countries
allows us to assess to what extent the state supported a certain family model or division of labour within
the family.
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section provides an overview of the concept of
the male-breadwinner model. The second section focuses on policy trajectories over time and across
countries. Based on employment rates we show from an outcome perspective to what extent the male
breadwinner model has changed over time in such diverse countries as Germany, Japan, Sweden and the
US. We then shift the focus to assessing the three policy dimensions in 18 OECD countries and analyse
to what extent these policies have weakened or stabilised the male-breadwinner model. Subsequently we
address the timing of policy change, identifying pioneers; early, median and late adopters; as well as
laggards, stagnators and regressors for individual policies. Finally, we discuss the drivers of policy change.
Understanding the male breadwinner model
Lewis characterizes the male breadwinner model as prescribing “breadwinning for men and
caring/homemaking for women” (1992: 161), and differentiates between “weak”, “moderate” and
“strong” male-breadwinner model countries. On the one hand she takes a rights perspective, highlighting
women’s “welfare dependency” when entitlements are attached to labour market participation. On the
other hand, she takes a policy perspective, associating the structure of and spending on certain policies
with a male-breadwinner model. She also specifies several policies that indicate “a shift away from a
strong male-breadwinner model towards something very different: ‘a dual-breadwinner model’” (1992:
162). Here she specifically highlights individual taxation, parental leave and high levels of public childcare
provision.
A decade later Lewis (2001) observed a shift in the behavioural underpinnings of the male breadwinner
model in social reality, as well as European policy makers’ assumptions about the gendered division of
male and female paid work, which had lead to a decline in the male-breadwinner model, including among
countries where this model was historically ‘strong’. In recognition of a new prescriptive politics that
encouraged female labour market participation, including for lone mothers, Lewis widened the concept of
a ‘dual-breadwinner model’ to an ‘adult-worker model’. Theoretically, the adult worker model is the
gender-neutral opposite of the gender-specific male breadwinner model with respect to the gendered
division of paid work. However, it encompasses various models of dividing work and care between men
and women, including considerations of one or both parents working part-time and additional childcare
being provided by the market, family, state or voluntary sector (Lewis 2001: 147). Daly (2011)
problematizes a lack of specificity in policies addressing gendered divisions of paid work and care, and
connects this gap to an ambiguous family policy formation. By attempting gender neutrality through the
concept of the ‘adult’ worker, existing gendered constraints may remain unaddressed by policy. This lack
of specificity may contribute to a resurgence of ‘familialism’2 (Saraceno 2010; see also Lister 1994;
2 ‘Familialism’ (alternatively also referred to as familism) signifies the degree to which welfare states
encourage the gendered division of work and care associated with the prototypical male breadwinner
3
Estévez-Abe et al. 2016) and turn out to support traditional gendered divisions of work and care. The
outcome of such an approach may not be a clear shift away from the male breadwinner and toward an
adult worker model, but rather toward a gendered dual earner model (Daly 2011).
Crompton (1999) was one of the first to highlight that ‘dual breadwinning’ was manifest in different
arrangements of breadwinning and caregiving across countries. In a modern variant of the male
breadwinner model, the 1½ male-breadwinner model, the mother has periods outside the labour market
devoted to care, and works part-time when participating in the labour market. However, there are also
two forms of dual breadwinning in which the gendered division of paid work is more equal. These are
the dual-earner/state-carer family model and the dual-earner/market-carer family model (Crompton
1999). While the 1½ earner model has replaced the ‘pure’ male-breadwinner model to varying degrees
across continental Western Europe (Crompton 1999, Lewis 2009), the dual-earner/state-carer model is
associated with the Scandinavian or social-democratic welfare states, while the dual-earner/market carer
family model is linked to the Anglo-Saxon or liberal welfare states.
While Daly (2005, 2011), Lewis (1992, 2001) and Saraceno (2010) address European types of policy
formation in the domain of family policy, O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver (1999) focus on the Anglo-Saxon
policy approaches. Orloff (1993, 2006) in particular highlights the fact that full individualization through
the socialization of care can be realized through the market as well as through the state, and that the US
has successfully pioneered a market version. While class-based differences are amplified by market
systems, Orloff (2006) notes that the model of individualization through the state-socialization of care has
resulted in strong occupational segregation in Sweden, which creates new gender inequalities in the
division of paid work even under the label of an egalitarian dual-breadwinner model3.
Much of the extant literature on the male breadwinner focuses on individual countries or small-n
comparisons. In the following we will compare developments in 18 affluent OECD countries that have a
legacy of uninterrupted democracy since the Second World War (cf. from different perspectives
Montanari 2000; Scruggs & Allan 2006; Ferragina & Seeleib-Kaiser 2015). Across these countries, we
focus on ‘family policies’ as they have often been explicit elements of the arrangements supporting the
male breadwinner model. Following Kamerman and Kahn (1979; 1981; 1994) our empirical analysis
builds on the three policy domains of benefits, time and services.4
model, “when there are no publicly provided alternatives to family care and financial support” (Saraceno
2010; Leitner 2013).
3 It is important to note that a crucial and prevalent source of care across many countries in Europe is the family,
particularly grandparents (OECD 2012). However, the recognition of grandparental care through state family
policies remains limited and understudied.
4 While it is important to note that the broader architecture of family policy must encompass policies
supporting families in their ability to care for the elderly, we focus on family policies designed to enable
families to combine employment and care for children.
4
The male breadwinner model across time and countries
A majority of women have worked outside the home for much of the early industrial era, yet the rate at
which they have engaged in employment has varied considerably by class. Comparative studies indicate
that the majority of working class women were engaged in paid employment during the late 19th and early
20th century (Hudson & Lee 1990, Pott-Butler 1993). It was not until the post-WWII period that male
wages had increased significantly and welfare state arrangements had been expanded to reduce the
economic necessity of labour market participation for the majority of women (Land 1980), leading to the
institutionalization of variations of the ‘male breadwinner model’ (Lewis 1992). In many countries,
especially in Christian-democratic welfare states, it was perceived to be the ‘natural’ role of mothers to
care for their children (Moeller 1993). However, this view was also initially supported by Social
Democrats; e.g. Alva Myrdal and Viola Klein (1956) suggested that mothers should take a 15-20-year
career break after the birth of a child.
As attitudes to work among women began to change in the 1960s (Mason et al. 1976), female labor force
participation across western democracies began to rise. This increase is closely associated with the
transition from an industrial to a service economy (Daly 2000; Nelson & Stephens 2013). Below, we
illustrate the change of female labour force participation in Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the United
States. These countries were chosen as illustrative examples, as they are prototypical of four different
welfare regimes, and the similarities between them highlight the pervasiveness of the observed patterns
across the OECD. Specifically, the examples show both the increase in female labour force participation
since the 1970s, as well as the persistent difference in participation between men and women. In all four
cases, male labour force participation has changed comparatively little in the same timeframe, which is
why we have only graphed the male labour force participation data from 20155.
When comparing Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the United States, it becomes obvious that significant
changes to patterns of female labour force participation occurred first in Sweden (Fig 1) during the 1970s.
Whilst the female participation rates by age were clearly M-shaped in 1970, thus more or less in line with
the suggested role of mothers taking a career break, by 1980 this pattern was much less pronounced and
since then the pattern was virtually no longer existent, as rates for different age groups followed the
pattern of male labour force participation, albeit at a lower level.
5 The most dramatic change in male labour force participation across all four countries has been the
decreased participation rates for both men and women between 15 and 24 years of age, largely because
they spend more time in full-time education before seeking employment.
5
Figure 1: Swedish labour force participation by sex and age
Data source: OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics Database (2016)
Based on the overall labour force participation rates of the 1960s and 1970s, the United States (Fig. 2)
had a strong male-breadwinner model with very low female participation rates, similar to the model in
Germany (Fig 3). However, a key difference between the United States and Germany was that in the
United States the curve of the female participation rate was more strongly M-shaped, indicating that
women sought to return to employment after childcare, whilst in Germany women tended to leave the
labour market on a permanent basis (Fig. 3), leading to participation of below 50 percent for women
older than 25 years of age in 1970.
The prevalence of a strong male-breadwinner model in the United States during the immediate post
WWII era becomes even more apparent, when analysing maternal participation rates. For instance in
1948, only about 17 percent of married mothers were in the labour force. Nevertheless, by the 1980s
maternal labour force participation had become an integral part of mothers’ lives in America and by 1995
their labour force participation rate had reached 70 percent (Cohany & Sok 2007).
6
Figure 2: US labour force participation by sex and age
Data source: OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics Database (2016)
In Germany the increase in female labour force participation was rather protracted with significant
increases only occurring since the 1990s -- with strong increases in the western part of Germany --, but
then surpassing the level reached in the United States (see Fig 3). The data for Germany is thus illustrative
of a stark change in two ways: first in terms of the overall rise in female labour force participation since
the 1970s, as illustrated by the ‘lifting’ of the curve; and second in terms of more time spent in the labour
force during peak childbearing years, as illustrated by the ‘rounding’ of the curve between the ages of 24
and 35. The nature of both these changes stand out not only in contrast to the United States, but even
more so in comparison to Japan (Figure 4 below).
7
Figure 3: German labour force participation by sex and age
Data source: OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics Database (2016)
Figure 4: Japanese labour force participation by sex and age
Data source: OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics Database (2016)
Of the four countries examined, Japan retains the strongest male breadwinner model as illustrated by the
persistent, comparatively low level of female labour force participation. However, the M-shape of the
curve depicting women’s participation also indicates that, while women with young children would exit
the labour market, many would return once their children were older. This stands in contrast to the
pattern observed in the German labour market up until and including 1990. Nevertheless, of the four
observed countries, the M-shape remains the strongest in Japan.
8
The labour force participation rates in the four countries clearly show that the male breadwinner model
was not limited to a specific welfare regime, but historically was prevalent in the very different welfare
states of Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the United States. Although in Germany and Sweden the welfare
state played a bigger role in enabling the male breadwinner arrangement, for instance through child
allowance payments or derived social security coverage, than in the United States, the American labour
market afforded comparatively high wages for male workers enabling families to only depend on one
breadwinner (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012).
As clearly demonstrated, despite significant increases, female labour force participation continues to be
lower than the levels for men in all four countries, but especially in Germany, Japan and the United
States, indicating that the dual breadwinner model has not been achieved at the macro level in any of
these countries. Furthermore, women continue to have higher part-time employment rates than men
(OECD 2015). In addition, labour force participation rates are of course a very crude measure and mask
substantial differences in the nature of female labour force participation, for instance relating to the
participation of childless women and mothers (Correll et al. 2007; Budig et al. 2012), mothers of multiple
children (Billingsley & Ferrarini 2014), and women with different degrees of educational attainment
(Korpi et al. 2013).
While an overall increase of female labour market participation could be witnessed across the OECD
world, the pattern of development with regard to the degree of the male breadwinner model markedly
differed (Lewis 1992). A mix of national factors including labour and family policy, industrial relations,
values about gendered employment and care patterns and degrees of education and economic
opportunity contribute to these differences (for a comprehensive overview, see Crompton 1999).
One indicator to assess the normative strength of past policies supporting the male breadwinner model in
the late 1960s and 1970s is to compare current spending for survivors’ benefits. Survivors’ benefits are
pension benefits paid to a survivor, mostly widows, based on their deceased spouse’s earnings record.
High current spending indicates a high dependence of women on the derived income of a male
breadwinner in old age6. Based on this indicator the continental European welfare states had particularly
strong policies supporting the male breadwinner model towards the end of the ‘golden welfare state era’,
which still have an impact today (Tab. 1), whilst the Scandinavian welfare states and the Netherlands with
their basic pension approach have had pension policies supporting the individual citizen.
6 Although it needs to be acknowledged that the level of survivors’ benefits is also dependent on the kind
of pension system, whether earnings-related or flat basic pension system.
9
Table 1: Spending on survivors’ benefits as percent of total government expenditure (2010)
Low Spenders
Percent
Median Spenders
Percent
Denmark
0.0
Finland
1.7
United Kingdom
0.2
Ireland
1.7
New Zealand
0.3
United States
1.7
Netherlands
0.4
High Spenders
Australia
0.5
Norway
0.6
Switzerland
3.0
Canada
0.9
France
3.2
Sweden
0.9
Japan
3.5
Austria
3.8
Belgium
3.9
OECD 18 average: 1.7
Germany
4.4
Italy
5.1
Data Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (2016), aggregated data
Data: Variables and Indicators
After having focused primarily on labour force participation in the previous section, we now turn to a
policy-based analysis of the male breadwinner model. Here we deviate slightly from Lewis’ original
conceptualisation, which characterised countries as ‘strong’, ‘modified’ or ‘weak’ male breadwinner
models. Instead, we employ a binary categorisation to determine whether family policies ‘stabilise’ or
‘weaken’ the male breadwinner model7, and following Kamerman and Kahn (1994) we distinguish
between policies governing time, benefits and services. We attempted to include as many indicators as
possible to assess the different policy dimensions, including for instance the important dimension of
taxation supporting the male breadwinner model, the significance of derived benefits for spouses and the
replacement rates for parental leave. However, we were unable to identify robust internationally
comparable data to include these important variables in our analysis. Therefore, we restricted our analysis
to the following three variables: availability of gender-neutral parental leave, the ratio between public
spending on family benefits and services and the child-care coverage rate of children younger than three
years of age in the year 20108. Hence, our analysis is partially driven by the availability of comparable data,
which continues to remain poor in the domain of family policy.9
Furthermore, we have restricted our analysis to policies addressing the reconciliation of employment and
care for young children, although we acknowledge the importance of policies reconciling employment
7 The dividing line between ‘weakening’ and ‘stabilising’ in our assessment varies by policy as detailed
below.
8 Of our indicators the childcare coverage data has the most missing values. We chose the year 2010 as
our reference year because it was the most recent, relatively complete year (missing values only for
Australia, Canada and Belgium). For these three countries we used 2008 data.
9 Even the newly released Parental Leave Benefit Dataset (http://www.sofi.su.se/spin/data/description-
of-datasets/parental-leave-benefit-dataset-plb), which is a great step improvement does not provide the
information necessary for our analysis.
10
and elder care. Our reasoning is both empirical and theoretical. Empirically, robust comparative historical
data on policies relating to elder care are not available. Theoretically, our analysis centres on long-term
policy change, and policies explicitly reconciling employment and elder care are relatively new – in part
developing as a consequence of the initial phases of decline of the male breadwinner model. However, we
acknowledge that the discussion of elder care is becoming ever more relevant for evaluating
breadwinner/carer models, as retirement ages are set to rise across the OECD and create new conflicts of
work and family.10
With regard to leave policies, we examine whether countries offer gender-neutral parental leaves, and
consider both paid and unpaid leaves. Our analysis is based on the Family Policy Database (Gauthier
2011), supplemented by additional data for Austria and Italy11. In our analysis, we consider the availability
of gender-neutral parental leave as weakening, and its absence as stabilising the male breadwinner
model.12 This measure is based on the assumption that if only mothers are entitled to leave, the state
clearly supports the female carer and male breadwinner model. Historically child benefits had the
function to complement the wage of the male breadwinner and provide a sufficient family income for
most workers, thus supporting the family as an institution. In some countries child benefits were initially
only introduced for larger families, as the collectively negotiated ‘family wage’ would be based on a
‘standard family’ with two children. Larger families with only one (low-wage) breadwinner were dependent
on the receipt of child benefits in order to avoid poverty (Bleses & Seeleib-Kaiser 2004). The provision of
family services, especially childcare, gives the opportunity to at least partially overcome the male
breadwinner/female carer division, as care becomes (partially) socialised. The ratio of spending on
benefits and services might thus provide us with a proxy measure to what extent government policy
rather supports a male breadwinner or a dual earner approach. A ratio of less than one, indicating that the
country is spending more financial resources on services than on benefits, is defined in our analysis as
weakening the male breadwinner model.13 To calculate this ratio we have employed the OECD Social
Expenditure Dataset (OECD 2016b). We supplement our analysis by including childcare coverage data
for children below the age of three, as this also includes market provision.14 The rationale here is that the
extent of childcare provision for children under the age of three is especially indicative of a country’s
support for dual earners/breadwinners. Benchmarking against the EU 2020 target, we assess a coverage
rate of less than 33 percent for children under the age of three in childcare as stabilising, an equal or
higher percentage as weakening the male breadwinner model.15
Lastly, we analyse the timing of policy change. We created seven timing labels to signify when in relation
to other countries a particular policy began to change in favour of a dual-earner/breadwinner model.
Table 2 below summarizes these labels and their definitions.
10 For a broader understanding of intergenerational policy regimes and the dimensions that can be used to
asses these, see Saraceno and Keck (2010). We would like to thank our anonymous reviewer for pointing
us towards this literature.
11 For these two countries, the Gauthier (2011) database significantly conflicted with data from case
studies. For these two cases we therefore used data provided by country experts, Saraceno (2015) for Italy
and Leitner (2013) for Austria.
12 See Error! Reference source not found. on page 21 of the appendix for the individual country
evaluation.
13 See Error! Reference source not found. on page 22 of the appendix for the individual country
evaluation.
14 Data source: OECD family database (2016a).
15 See Error! Reference source not found. in the appendix for the individual country evaluation.
11
Table 2: Timing Labels
Timing Label
Definition
Pioneer
First among countries to display a trend away from the male
breadwinner model.
Early adopter
Among the first half of countries to exhibit a policy change away from
the male breadwinner model.
Median adopter
Country that began its policy change in the median year relative to
the timing of change observed in the other countries.
Late adopter
Among the second half of countries to exhibit a policy change away
from the male breadwinner model.
Laggard
Country that has begun a change away from the male breadwinner
model, with the change falling short of our benchmark for weakening
the male breadwinner model.
Stagnator
Country that has not begun a change away from the male
breadwinner model.
Regressor
Country with policy change to reinforce the male breadwinner model.
Policy Analysis
Family policies within the OECD world have undergone significant transformations moving away from
approaches supporting the male breadwinner. Analysing our three indicators in 18 OECD countries, we
witness a weakening of the male breadwinner model in 17 countries along at least one policy dimension
by 2010. Switzerland seems to be an outlier. However, family policy change has not been uniform and
advanced along different trajectories.
a) Comprehensive Policy Change
A third of countries have undergone comprehensive policy change. Six of the 18 OECD countries,
namely Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom show a
weakening of the family policies supporting the male breadwinner model along all three policy
dimensions. Substantively the results for Denmark, France, Norway, and Sweden are closely in line with
Lewis’ (1992) analysis of ‘weakened’ and ‘modified’ male breadwinner models. These four countries have
often been pioneers or early adopters of policy change. For instance, the three Nordic countries already
started to significantly increase their spending on childcare provision during the 1970s and 1980s (Flora
1986).
A notable exception among the Nordic countries with regard to the dimension of childcare coverage is
Finland, which in 2010 had comparatively low childcare coverage rates of 28 percent for children younger
than three – far lower than Denmark (66 percent), Norway (54 percent) or Sweden (47 percent). In part
this exceptionalism can be explained by a policy emphasising parental ‘choice’ between home-based and
institutional care for children (Duvander & Ellingsæter 2016; Salmi 2006) – a policy approach that some
scholars have classified as “neo-familist” (Mahon 2002; Duvander & Ellingsæter 2016). Overall, the
Scandinavian model is build on the dual earner / state carer model (with some limitations with regard to
Finland).
12
Among the six countries that witnessed a weakening of the male breadwinner model along all three policy
dimensions, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are particularly remarkable. Both originally
belonged to the group of countries identified by Lewis (1992, 2001) as following the strong male-
breadwinner model. Historically, the Netherlands was the OECD country with the lowest female
employment rate. Although change came comparatively late, significant changes were made along all
three policy dimensions, including the introduction of a 26-week parental leave (den Dulk 2016: 3).
Between 2009 and 2014 parental leave was paid through tax credits at a level of 50 percent of the
statutory minimum wage. However, this statutory entitlement to pay has ended16 (den Dulk 2016), leaving
only parental leave payments agreed to in collective bargaining with employers. In contrast to many other
Continental European welfare states, collective bargaining in the Netherlands is quite encompassing.
Hence, collective agreements have played a vital role both in the development of Dutch family policy and
the care mix that exists in the Netherlands today, including in the domains of parental leave, and childcare
services (see Yerkes and Tijdens (2010), and Yerkes (2014) for detailed discussion). Statutory policy in the
Netherlands has focused on working time in the form of providing employees with a right to request
part-time work, as well as “an unprecedented expansion” of support for parents to fund childcare
(Morgan 2013: 78). The latter is captured by the spending ratio, indicating a high proportion of spending
on services, as well as high childcare coverage rates.
In the United Kingdom change across all three dimensions is to a large extent associated with market and
means-tested public provision. While funding of childcare services has increased substantially over the
last two decades, the UK remains a country with one of the highest childcare costs throughout the
OECD world; free childcare is only provided for a rather limited number of hours per week and remains
subject to parents’ employment and earnings conditions (Daly & Borrell-Porta 2016). The practice of
subsidizing providers and providing subventions for parents’ childcare payments “has perpetuated the
existing mixed economy model, in which the private sector dominates” (Lewis et al. 2009: 130). With
respect to leave, it is important to note that while the UK has instituted gender-neutral parental leave, and
thus is categorized as ‘weakening’ its male breadwinner model on the time dimension, that leave is unpaid
and only provides for a maximum duration of four weeks per year. Although, the UK has introduced an
expanded shared maternity leave and pay in April 2015, parents are only entitled to an earnings-related
parental leave benefit for a maximum of six weeks and rank last in the European Union in providing
parents with well-paid leave (Bradshaw et al. 2015). In a nutshell, the UK is moving away from the male
breadwinner model towards a dual-earner / market carer model.17
Although our data for Germany does not warrant including the country in the category of comprehensive
change, more recent evidence strongly supports such categorisation. Historically, the country was
characterised as having a particularly strong male breadwinner model (Lewis 2001) -- a strength, which is
evidenced today by the high current spending for survivors’ benefits (see Table 1 above). According to
our data Germany has undergone significant policy shifts, providing a gender-neutral and earnings-related
parental leave benefit and a greater emphasis on services, while seemingly continuing to stabilise the male
breadwinner model according to our coverage indicator. However, this assessment is largely a
consequence of the construction of our indicator and the choice of our cut-off year. Moreover, since
2013 every child older than 1 year of age is entitled to a place in a public or publicly funded childcare
facility, based on a law enacted in 2008. Overall, the policy changes in Germany can be categorised as a
16 While statutory entitlements to maternity leave pay (16 weeks, capped at maximum daily sickness
benefit) and parternity leave pay (2 days at 100% of earnings) remain (den Dulk 2016).
17 For a critical assessment of the policies see Bradshaw et al. (2015).
13
paradigm shift away from a policy supporting the male breadwinner and towards an employment-oriented
gender-neutral family policy (cf. Leitner 2010; Seeleib-Kaiser 2010; Fleckenstein & Seeleib-Kaiser 2011).
b) Partial, Contradictory and Late Policy Change
Although we can also identify a weakening of policies supporting the male breadwinner model in English-
speaking countries outside Europe, this weakening in general came rather late, was partial and at times
contradictory and to a large extent is market based. With the exception of Canada18, all English-speaking
countries have been late adopters with regard to the introduction of gender-neutral leave policies. The
more limited development in English-speaking countries might be partially associated with the fact that
these countries have chosen different approaches than explicit family policies to move away from the
male breadwinner model. For instance the United States chose an approach largely limited to labour
market regulation. Orloff (2006: 257) notes that successes in anti-discrimination and equal opportunity
legislation surrounding employment were some of the “most significant equality achievements” in the US.
Also, as family policy was primarily a private affair, historically explicit family policies were less developed
in these countries. Nevertheless, our crude measures for family policy change might even overstate the
development in some countries: For instance the measure assessing the relationship between benefits and
services in the United States suggests the country shifted its policy away from benefits to
18 Canadian family policy is challenging to characterize due to the differing policy logics in the French and
English speaking parts of the country. For an analysis of how Canadian federalism has helped bring about
differing policy environments within Canada see Mahon et al. (2016).
Table 1: Patterns of policy impact and timing
Gender-neutral parental leave
Spending Ratio
Coverage
Impact
Timing
Impact
Timing
Impact
Timing
Australia
weakening
late adopter
stabilising
laggard
stabilising
laggard
Austria
weakening
median adopter
stabilising
laggard
stabilising
laggard
Belgium
weakening
late adopter
stabilising
laggard
weakening
late adopter
Canada
weakening
median adopter
stabilising
laggard
stabilising
laggard
Denmark
weakening
early adopter
weakening
early adopter
weakening
early adopter
Finland
weakening
early adopter
weakening
early adopter
stabilising
laggard
France
weakening
early adopter
weakening
late adopter
weakening
early adopter
Germany
weakening
early adopter
weakening
late adopter
stabilising
laggard
Ireland
weakening
late adopter
stabilising
laggard
stabilising
laggard
Italy
weakening
late adopter
weakening
early adopter
stabilising
laggard
Japan
weakening
late adopter
stabilising
regressor
stabilising
laggard
Netherlands
weakening
median adopter
weakening
late adopter
weakening
late adopter
New Zealand
weakening
late adopter
stabilising
laggard
weakening
late adopter
Norway
weakening
early adopter
weakening
late adopter
weakening
early adopter
Sweden
weakening
pioneer
weakening
early adopter
weakening
early adopter
Switzerland
stabilising
stagnator
stabilising
laggard
stabilising
laggard
United Kingdom
weakening
late adopter
weakening
late adopter
weakening
late adopter
United States
weakening
late adopter
weakening
early adopter
stabilising
laggard
Note: The majority of data used to assess the current impact of policies on the male breadwinner model stem from the year 2010.
However, childcare coverage data from 2010 was not available for Canada, Australia and Belgium, so impact assessment in this
column refers to the year 2008.
15
service provision quite early. However, this shift has to be seen in the context of overall very low
spending for family policies. The United States has the lowest spending on family policy as a
percentage of GDP among our 18 affluent and democratic OECD countries.1 The US system is
clearly based on a dual earner / market carer model.
Australia and New Zealand introduced gender-neutral parental leave relatively late (in 1997 and
2002 respectively) and have qualitatively quite similar provisions. In both countries, the policy
provides 52 weeks of leave, although the gender-neutrality of the full parental leave only dates from
April 2016 in New Zealand, before which 16 of the parental leave weeks were reserved for the
mother (McDonald 2015; McDonald & Morrissey 2016). In Australia the leave remained unpaid
until 2011, but now both countries provide 18 weeks of paid parental leave. In Australia, the
payment rate is set at the national minimum wage. In New Zealand, while the replacement rate is
officially set at 100 percent of earnings, the cap is so low as to effectively compensate at the level of
minimum wage (McDonald & Morrissey 2016; OECD 2015). Both countries continue to spend
more on family benefits than on services. The two countries differ in terms of their coverage rates
for children under the age of three. However, this is partially due to our benchmark (at 33 percent)
and cut-off year (2010) for childcare coverage. In 2010, 36 percent of children in this age group
were in formal childcare in New Zealand, and 29 percent in Australia in 2008. Australia now has a
childcare sector that is quite costly to the government while quality standards remain comparatively
low, similar to the situation observed in the UK (White & Friendly 2012). New Zealand, while also
following a predominantly market-provision model, has a greater commitment to childcare quality
as part of a larger emphasis on early education, which dates back to the early 1990s (White &
Friendly 2012).
Mediterranean and East-Asian countries have historically relied heavily on the male breadwinner
approach, although they have not been in the focus of much of the Eurocentric welfare state
research (but see Estévez-Abe et al. 2016). Italy witnessed partial and contradictory policy changes
at a relatively late stage, introducing a gender-neutral parental leave as late as 2000. By contrast, the
country appears to have been relatively early in shifting financial resources towards services, based
on our benefit/service ratio. However, this result is partly explained by the relatively long history of
institutionalized formal childcare for children between the ages of three and six (Knijn & Saraceno
2010) and the non-adjustment of family allowances to changing levels of inflation, rather than by a
comprehensive reform (Blome 2017). Although childcare for children under the age of three has
improved, with national coverage rates of 24 percent in 2010, stark regional differences continue to
exist (Blome 2017). In 2010 enrolment rates for children under the age of three in the south of the
country remain below four percent (Boca et al. 2015). In Japan, we observe a late and modest
weakening of the male breadwinner model along the leave dimension as the result of the
introduction of gender-neutral parental leave in 1992. In addition to its limited statutory nature, it is
limited in scope, as it excludes employees in non-standard contracts, which includes approximately
half of the female workforce (Seeleib-Kaiser & Toivonen 2011). Furthermore, Japan is the only
country where we observed a regressive trend in our spending indicator; since the early 2000s Japan
has begun spending more on family allowances than on services.
Switzerland is the only country among our OECD world of 18 countries that showed no
weakening of the male breadwinner model along any of the three dimensions examined. The
country does not support any kind of statutory parental leave and a motion submitted by a green
MP, proposing 18 months of parental leave with fathers eligible for at least six of those months,
1 Public and mandatory private spending, OECD Social Expenditure Database (2016).
16
was rejected by the lower house of parliament in September 2016 (Swiss Parliament 2016).2
Switzerland continues to spend significantly more on family allowances than family services at the
federal level (the ratio stood at 2.65 : 1 in 2010), and childcare coverage for children below the age
of three remains at a rate that stabilises the male breadwinner model (OECD 2016b). However, it is
worth noting that the coverage indicator only narrowly missed our benchmark, with 31 percent of
children under three in Switzerland enrolled in formal childcare in 2010 (OECD 2016a).
c) Drivers of change across countries
How can we explain these different policy trajectories?3 Within the comparative welfare state
literature there seems to be a consensus that Social Democracy and a strong women’s movement,
represented in parliament, with the aim of achieving greater gender equality was crucial for
establishing the early and rather comprehensive movement away from the male breadwinner model
and towards the establishment of an employment-oriented family policy, focusing on the provision
of childcare services and (earnings-related) gender-neutral leave arrangements in Scandinavian
countries, enabling a dual earner model (Hernes 1987; Bergqvist et al. 1999; Borchorst & Siim 2008;
Huber & Stephens 2000; Iversen & Stephens 2008).
Somewhat surprising is that we have seen more recent movements towards employment-oriented
family policies in a number of countries across the OECD world that neither have a strong Social
Democracy nor a strong women’s movement, but have been or continue to be dominated by
Christian-democratic parties that in the past have been associated with a more conservative or
traditional approach towards family policies supporting the male breadwinner (Van Kersbergen
1995; Seeleib-Kaiser et al. 2008). Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2015) identify an ideational shift
towards a ‘modern’ understanding of family as an important variable explaining the more recent
policy developments in countries without strong Social Democracy. In the two countries that we
have identified as having undergone significant policy shifts or paradigm changes to more public
support in family policies, i.e. the Netherlands and Germany, these have been associated with
changed political and economic constellations. Economic pressures to increase female labour
market participation in combination with favourable coalition politics from the early 1990s to early
2000s help explain this significant policy change in the Netherlands (Yerkes 2014, Knijn &
Saraceno 2010). Whilst in Germany a modernising Christian-Democratic party, with the aim of
attracting female voters in urban centres, changed its policy stance and was able to gain the crucial
support of employers’ organisations to overcome the strong opposition against an employment-
oriented family policy by parts of the Catholic church and their supporters within the party. It is
important to note that the political justification for the policy change was primarily based on human
capital arguments and demographic imperatives with almost no reference to gender equality
(Seeleib-Kaiser 2010; Fleckenstein & Seeleib-Kaiser 2011). As Jenson and Saint-Martin (2006)
observed, this more economically instrumentalist rather than rights-based justification for policy
change is also present in a wide range of other countries, such as Canada, the UK and the US.
The commonalities among the English-speaking countries as well as Japan and Switzerland are the
absence of a strong Social-Democratic party and the comparatively low overall support for the
welfare state. Although the women’s movement played an important role in the United States, its
2 Various motions concerning maternity and paternity leave and pay are still pending (cf. Valarino
2016).
3 Our wide geographical and temporal sample of countries does not allow for in-depth country discussions,
but rather offers a stylized illustration of drivers in comparative perspective. We draw attention to country-
specific idiosyncrasies where their omission would be misleading.
17
success was not in the domain of fostering a comprehensive family policy, but in promoting a
regulatory employment framework focusing on anti-discrimination (Orloff 2006). The push
towards an employment-oriented family policy approach, and thereby towards a policy which
would weaken the male breadwinner model, especially for people on low-income, was part of the
agenda of the “new right” towards an activation policy. The policy was continued by subsequent
governments in the UK and US, which generally showed a far stronger market orientation and shift
to the right than earlier Labour and Democratic administrations respectively. The ideological
drivers of welfare reform in the United States during the 1980s contributed to a later rise of “new
right” morality politics in the United Kingdom, which stressed the importance of personal
responsibility and the obligation of benefit recipients (including lone mothers) to engage in paid
labour (Lewis 2001). By the late 1990s and into the 2000s it was New Labour’s labour activation
politics, which also had the support of employers (Fleckenstein & Seeleib-Kaiser 2011), that helped
to implement many of the policy changes that lead to the weakening of the male breadwinner
model. Electoral politics have also had some impact (Morgan 2013). While scholars continue to
argue over the extent to which New Labour’s emphasis on childcare represents a break from older
philosophies of welfare (see Lister (2006) and Daly (2010) for differing approaches to this
question), the welfare activation measures are widely seen as having been a strong driver of policies
weakening the male breadwinner model in the UK. In Australia and New Zealand, the drivers
behind childcare policy are similar to those in the other Anglophone countries, with a strong
emphasis on activation measures designed to increase labour force participation among mothers
(Obinger et al 2005, Brennan 2007, White & Friendly 2012). In addition, for-profit childcare
providers played an influential role in Australia, advocating increased government funding of
private provision while opposing an expansion of both maternity leave and quality oversight
(Brennan 2007; White & Friendly 2012).
The strength of the cultural and normative roots of the male breadwinner model in Italian society,
coupled with an institutional political framework not conducive to large-scale change are core to
understanding the modest weakening of the male breadwinner model in Italy. Support for the male
breadwinner model remained more widespread in Italy than in other countries, as centre-right
parties were able to position themselves “as the defenders of the traditional family” without being
electorally challenged (Blome 2017: 179). Even centre-left parties for whom gender equality was
ideologically relevant could not afford to neglect the traditional beliefs of “the decisive groups of
voters in the political center” (Blome 2017: 180). Estevez-Abe and Naldini (2016) highlight Italy’s
institutional arrangement as an obstacle to change, as there is little incentive to push for far-
reaching reform. In sum, Italy lacked popular support and a cross-party consensus that could have
eased the way for more than a partial and late weakening of the male breadwinner model. In Japan,
the modest family policy change was also underpinned by a mix of structural and cultural drivers
(Schoppa 2010; Estevez-Abe & Naldini 2016). It was the “discovery” of low fertility in the early
1990s which brought family policy onto the political agenda in Japan. The ensuing debate fuelled
the introduction of parental leave in 1992 and has remained the focus of family policy initiatives
(Seeleib-Kaiser & Toivonen 2011; Schoppa 2010). According to Schoppa (2010) a lack of
consensus among stakeholders reduced the incentives for politicians to push for further family
policy expansion4.
The (sparse) literature addressing drivers of family policy in Switzerland – or lack thereof – offers
structural, cultural and economic explanations. Firstly, family policy in Switzerland is largely within
the jurisdiction of the cantons, impeding a concerted centralized policy shift, and creating regional
variation (Bonoli & Trein 2015; Obinger et al. 2005). Secondly, Switzerland is a direct democracy
4 This is true for the case of formal childcare. For an analysis of election-oriented policy shifts in
the realm of elder care see Estevez-Abe and Naldini (2016).
18
with a long history of rejecting proposals to provide any form of leave or pay to both mothers and
fathers, dating back from the end of the second world war (Bonoli & Trein 2015). Cultural drivers
are likely fuelling these referendum outcomes, as continued support for the male breadwinner
model may be contributing to the rejections of parental leave initiatives by popular vote. In the last
ten years the centre-right Christian democratic CVP has revived the discourse on family with a
rhetoric linked to conservative Catholic thinking, highlighting the importance of protecting the
family (Daum & Jäggi 2015). Lastly, the rejection by parliamentary vote of the most recent parental
leave proposal in September 2016 was justified by concerns relating to the financial cost of such a
scheme (Swiss Parliament 2016). Furthermore, parliament explicitly prioritized the expansion of
childcare over parental leave, on the grounds that formal childcare supports parents beyond the
‘immediate’ timeframe following childbirth. This supports Bonoli and Trein’s (2015: 7) conclusion
that family policies in Switzerland are motivated by the desire (both on the side of parents and the
state) to activate female labour market participation by instituting a “market-based vision” of
childcare in particular and family policy more generally.
Our discussion highlights that partisanship, electoral competition, ideas and the role of employers
have been important drivers of policy change and continuity. Although historically Social
Democracy and the women’s movement have been important in explaining the weakening of the
male breadwinner model, alternative causal pathways have evolved more recently in countries with
relatively weak centre-left parties.
Conclusion
Our analysis clearly shows that family policies supporting the male breadwinner model have been
weakened over the past decades. Across the OECD world the female employment rate has
increased in all countries; with the exception of the Netherlands and Switzerland, more than 60
percent of working women are employed on a full-time basis. Whereas policies along the three
family policy dimensions have clearly moved away from supporting the male breadwinner, the
timing, drivers and approaches differ significantly. In Scandinavia we see a clear and early move
towards a dual earner and state carer model compared to the rest of the OECD world. We can
identify a similar trend in the formerly strong male breadwinner country of Germany, albeit much
less comprehensive and occurring comparatively late. The Netherlands do not fit as neatly into the
category of dual earner and state carer, as part-time employment by women, but also by men,
private care provision paid through state subsidies to parents and a leave arrangement with strong
reliance on collective bargaining, characterise this model. The English-speaking countries, and
especially the UK, have also moved away from family policies supporting the male breadwinner
towards different variants of a dual earner and market carer model. Italy and Japan, as core
examples of the Mediterranean and East-Asian familistic welfare cluster, have embarked on a
fragmented and contradictory trajectory, whereas Switzerland seems to be a stagnator.
Early change was most prevalent in the Nordic countries where concerns over gender-equality, as
well as the combination of Social Democracy and women’s movements played a decisive role.
Although changed attitudes towards the role of women have been identified as an important factor
among those countries that experienced policy change later, economic factors and instrumental
justifications also played a key role in Germany and the Netherlands in the weakening family
policies supporting the male breadwinner model. Change in family policies of the English-speaking
countries came rather late and was largely driven by moralistic ideas and a desire for labour market
activation initially formulated by conservative parties, whereas policy change away from the male
breadwinner in Italy and Japan has been even more protracted as a result of deeply held normative
19
views towards the role of women/mothers. In Switzerland federalism has played an important role
in putting a break on explicit employment-oriented family policies.
In sum, our analysis has shown that while the decline of the male breadwinner model is almost
universal in affluent and democratic OECD countries, the shape and speed of that decline differ
significantly among countries. Drivers in particular have proven very context-specific, and while we
were able to identify several drivers that have influenced the decline of the male breadwinner model
across time and countries, these drivers manifest, combine and impact differently depending on
national context.
20
Appendix
Table 1: Gender-neutral parental leave
Data source: Gauthier family policy database, supplemented by data for Austria
(Leitner 2013) and Italy (Saraceno 2015)
Note: The median year for adoption of gender-neutral parental leave was 1990.
Country
Since
Impact
Timing
Australia
1997
Weakening
Late adopter
Austria
1990
Weakening
Median adopter
Belgium
1998
Weakening
Late adopter
Canada
1990
Weakening
Median adopter
Denmark
1985
Weakening
Early adopter
Finland
1985
Weakening
Early adopter
France
1977
Weakening
Early adopter
Germany
1986
Weakening
Early adopter
Ireland
1998
Weakening
Late adopter
Italy
2000
Weakening
Late adopter
Japan
1992
Weakening
Late adopter
The Netherlands
1990
Weakening
Median adopter
New Zealand
2002
Weakening
Late adopter
Norway
1977
Weakening
Early adopter
Sweden
1974
Weakening
Pioneer
Switzerland
No gender-neutral leave
Stabilising
Laggard
United Kingdom
1999
Weakening
Late adopter
United States
1993
Weakening
Late adopter
21
Table 2: Ratio of spending on family allowances versus family services
Country
Status
2010
Impact
Since
Timing
Australia
2 : 1
stabilising
pre-1980
laggard
Austria
3.2 : 1
stabilising
pre-1980
laggard
Belgium
1.5 : 1
stabilising
pre-1980
laggard
Canada
3.5 : 1
stabilising
pre-1980
laggard
Denmark
0.5 : 1
weakening
pre-1980
early adopter
Finland
0.5 : 1
weakening
pre-1980
late adopter
France
0.5 : 1
weakening
1998
late adopter
Germany
1 : 1
weakening
2010
late adopter
Ireland
1.7 : 1
stabilising
pre-1980
laggard
Italy
0.5 : 1
weakening
1990
late adopter
Japan
1.4 : 1
stabilising
2010
regressor5
The Netherlands
0.8 : 1
weakening
2000
late adopter
New Zealand
1.3 : 1
stabilising
pre-1980
laggard
Norway
0.3 : 1
weakening
1995
late adopter
Sweden
0.3 : 1
weakening
pre-1980
early adopter
Switzerland
2.6 : 1
stabilising
pre-19906
laggard
United Kingdom
0.6 : 1
weakening
2001
late adopter
United States
0.1 : 1
weakening
1994
early adopter
Data source: OECD Social Expenditure Database 2016
Note: Among those countries that have made the change, the median year for cross-
over to spending more on services than allowances was 1995.
5 Japan was the only country we found to have previously had a spending ratio we would consider
as weakening the male breadwinner model, but reversed that policy in 2010 to a spending ratio we
categorize as stabilising the male breadwinner model.
6 Data for Switzerland before 1990 is not available.
22
Table 3: Childcare coverage
Country
Coverage
Rate
20107
Impact
Per/child Spending
Increase Since
Timing
Australia
29 %
stabilising
1987
laggard
Austria
14 %
stabilising
2000
laggard
Belgium
48 %
weakening
1998
late adopter
Canada
24 %
stabilising
2000
laggard
Denmark
66 %
weakening
pre-1980
early adopter
Finland
28 %
stabilising
1986
laggard
France
48 %
weakening
1990
early adopter
Germany
23 %
stabilising
1990
laggard
Ireland
29 %
stabilising
1994
laggard
Italy
24 %
stabilising
1990
laggard
Japan
26 %
stabilising
1992
laggard
The Netherlands
61 %
weakening
1998
late adopter
New Zealand
36 %
weakening
1991
late adopter
Norway
54 %
weakening
pre-1980
early adopter
Sweden
47 %
weakening
Flat since 1980
early adopter
Switzerland
31 %
stabilising
1998
laggard
United Kingdom
42 %
weakening
1997
late adopter
United States
26 %
stabilising
1998
laggard
Data source: OECD Family Policy Database and OECD Social Expenditure Database 2016
Note: The ‘Timing’ column indicates when, in relation to other countries, a given country began to
increase spending per child on family services. Among those countries which have achieved
coverage levels that weaken the male breadwinner model, the median year of a spending increase
was 1991.
7 Data source: OECD Family database (2016a). Participation rates for 0-2 year olds in formal
childcare and pre-school services. All coverage rates stem from the year 2010, except for Australia
(2011), Belgium (2012) and Canada (2008).
23
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