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Leadership Moral Foundations
... According to Haidt (2001), this non-deliberative affective response to a moral stimulus is the primary and central component of moral judgment, while the deliberative part of moral reasoning is proposed to occur post-hoc. This means that, in contrast to what rational deliberation approaches assume, the first and immediate reaction of leaders (and followers) to a moral stimulus is affective and precedes conscious reasoning (i.e., deliberately assessing whether something is morally right or wrong) (Haidt, 2001;Egorov & Pircher Verdorfer, 2017;Egorov et al., 2019b;Sadler-Smith, 2012. ...
... While theoretical knowledge about the interplay of moral intuition and moral reasoning allows leaders to better monitor their moral decision-making and behavior (Sadler-Smith, 2012), it is crucial that leaders "understand their own propensities to deliberation or intuition, the factors that influence the activation of each, and the ways" they "can balance each kind of moral judgment in appropriate fashion" (Weaver et al., 2014: 111). In fact, leaders often have limited or biased awareness of how they approach moral issues and the values and principles that underlie their decisions and behaviors (Egorov & Pircher Verdorfer, 2017;Reynolds, 2006;Sonenshein, 2007;Weaver et al., 2014). Yet, leaders' awareness of specific moral issues and how they respond to them are strongly influenced by both moral intuition processes and moral intuition content. ...
With the proliferation of ethical scandals in business and other societal sectors, leadership researchers have become increasingly interested in the moral dimension of leadership (Brown & Mitchell, 2010; Eisenbeiss, 2012; Lemoine et al., 2018; Peus et al., 2010). Consistent with much prior research in the field of organizational behavior and leadership, we use the terms moral and ethical synonymously in this chapter. Broadly described, moral leadership is how leaders use visible moral traits and actions to lead followers towards a purposeful and ethical direction and, thereby, to shape ethical organizations (Cropanzano & Walumbwa, 2010). Against this backdrop, a perennial question asked by researchers and practitioners is: How can we effectively develop moral leaders? To answer this question, it is important to have a thorough understanding of what moral leaders actually do and how underlying moral decision processes occur. While the influence of intuition is well established in the field of organizational decision-making more generally (Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2011; Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 2018), research on the role of moral intuition for moral leadership is just beginning to emerge (Weaver et al., 2014). Accordingly, current concepts of moral leadership and related notions of moral leader development have a strong focus on rational deliberation, while largely neglecting the potential influence of moral intuition in the leadership process (Egorov et al., 2019b; Weaver et al., 2014).
This chapter explores how moral intuition can enhance our understanding of effective moral leader development. It is suggested that moral intuition complements existing common rational deliberation approaches to moral leader development, and thus offers development opportunities that were formerly unavailable or less adequately considered.
... In contrast, congruence on the care moral foundation seems to be less important than generally assumed in ethical leadership research, so far. The topic of moral pluralism has been widely discussed in moral behaviour research and has recently also been gaining increasing attention in moral approaches to leadership (Egorov and Pircher Verdorfer 2017;Lemoine et al. 2018;Weaver et al. 2014). Our findings underscore the need to consider that unethical leadership and ethical leadership models adhere to specific normative principles and these principles can vary across models. ...
While much research has focused on the effects of ethical and unethical leadership, little is known about how followers come to perceive their leaders as ethical or unethical. In this article, we investigate the co-creation of ethical and unethical leadership perceptions. Specifically, we draw from emerging research on moral congruence in organizational behaviour and empirically investigate the role of congruence in leaders’ and followers’ moral foundations in followers’ perceptions of ethical and unethical leadership. By analysing objective congruence scores from 67 leader–follower dyads by means of polynomial regression with surface response analysis, we find partial support for our theoretically derived predictions. Significant effects were revealed for the fairness, loyalty, and authority moral foundations but not for the care and sanctity moral foundations. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of these findings.
... In contrast, congruence on the care moral foundation seems to be less important than generally assumed in ethical leadership research, so far. The topic of moral pluralism has been widely discussed in moral behaviour research and has recently also been gaining increasing attention in moral approaches to leadership (Egorov and Pircher Verdorfer 2017;Lemoine et al. 2018;Weaver et al. 2014). Our findings underscore the need to consider that unethical leadership and ethical leadership models adhere to specific normative principles and these principles can vary across models. ...
What explains followers’ attraction to tyrannical leaders? They systematically coerce, belittle, and manipulate, often at the expense of subordinates’ mental and physical well-being and their organization’s long-term interests. To help address the question, we examine the tendencies of people who view the tyrannical leader prototype (characterized by domineering, pushy, manipulative, loud, conceited, and selfish traits) as a component of effective leadership (Epitropaki and Martin in J Appl Psychol 89:293–310, 2004; Foti et al. in Leadersh Q 23:702–717, 2012). Specifically, we apply moral and evolutionary psychology to propose and empirically test a mediation model in which belief in a dangerous world (Altemeyer in Enemies of freedom: understanding right-wing authoritarianism. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1988) links positively with endorsement of the tyrannical leader traits, as mediated through the binding components (loyalty, authority, and sanctity) of moral foundations theory (Graham et al. J Pers Soc Psychol 101:366–385, 2011). Regarding gender, our model proposes that the link between the binding foundations and tyrannical leadership endorsement is stronger among males than females. Our overall model was supported across two independent samples of working adults; we also anticipated and found a direct negative association between the individualizing moral foundations (care and harm) and endorsement of the tyrannical prototype. These findings provide insights into the circumstances under which tyrannical traits are viewed as part of effective leadership.
Traditional approaches describe ethical decision-making of leaders as driven by conscious deliberation and analysis. Accordingly, existing approaches of ethically-oriented leader development usually focus on the promotion of deliberative ethical decision-making, based on normative knowledge and moral reasoning. Yet, a continually growing body of research indicates that a considerable part of moral functions involved in ethical decision-making is automatic and intuitive. In this article, we discuss the implications of this moral intuition approach for the domain of ethically-oriented leader development. Specifically, we introduce a conceptual model and develop a set of theoretical propositions, suggesting that the moral intuition perspective significantly contributes to effective ethically-oriented leader development. The discussion examines theoretical implications and practical applications of the presented propositions and outlines directions for future research. © 2018 Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature
First, we introduce moralization as the primary process through which followers come to view their leaders as ethical. Second, we use moral foundations theory to illustrate the types of leader behavior that followers are most likely to moralize. Third, we identify motivations to maintain moral self-regard and a moral reputation as two distinct pathways through which moralization influences follower behavior. Finally, we show how the values that underlie leaders' moralized behavior (e.g., compassion, loyalty) determine the specific types of follower behavior that emerge (e.g., prosocial behavior, pro-organizational behavior).
This chapter discusses how morality might be partially innate, meaning organized, to some extent, in advance of experience. It begins by arguing for a broader conception of morality and suggests that most of the discussion of innateness to date has not been about morality per se; it has been about whether the psychology of harm and fairness is innate. Five hypotheses about the origins of moral knowledge and value are considered, and one of them (a form of flexible and generative modularity) is endorsed as being the best candidate. The importance of narrativity in moral functioning is discussed. In some respects, this is another corrective to what is seen as an overemphasis on deductive and calculative conceptions of value and rationality among both philosophers and psychologists. It is shown that a narrative approach to morality fits well with the nativist 'five foundations' view developed in the first part of the chapter, and also helps to explain how the intuitive, evolved foundations of morality are elaborated by cultural activity into the complex, diverse moral functioning that mature human beings display.
Libertarians are an increasingly prominent ideological group in U.S. politics, yet they have been largely unstudied. Across 16 measures in a large web-based sample that included 11,994 self-identified libertarians, we sought to understand the moral and psychological characteristics of self-described libertarians. Based on an intuitionist view of moral judgment, we focused on the underlying affective and cognitive dispositions that accompany this unique worldview. Compared to self-identified liberals and conservatives, libertarians showed 1) stronger endorsement of individual liberty as their foremost guiding principle, and weaker endorsement of all other moral principles; 2) a relatively cerebral as opposed to emotional cognitive style; and 3) lower interdependence and social relatedness. As predicted by intuitionist theories concerning the origins of moral reasoning, libertarian values showed convergent relationships with libertarian emotional dispositions and social preferences. Our findings add to a growing recognition of the role of personality differences in the organization of political attitudes.
The moral domain is broader than the empathy and justice concerns assessed by existing measures of moral competence, and it is not just a subset of the values assessed by value inventories. To fill the need for reliable and theoretically grounded measurement of the full range of moral concerns, we developed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire on the basis of a theoretical model of 5 universally available (but variably developed) sets of moral intuitions: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. We present evidence for the internal and external validity of the scale and the model, and in doing so we present new findings about morality: (a) Comparative model fitting of confirmatory factor analyses provides empirical justification for a 5-factor structure of moral concerns; (b) convergent/discriminant validity evidence suggests that moral concerns predict personality features and social group attitudes not previously considered morally relevant; and (c) we establish pragmatic validity of the measure in providing new knowledge and research opportunities concerning demographic and cultural differences in moral intuitions. These analyses provide evidence for the usefulness of Moral Foundations Theory in simultaneously increasing the scope and sharpening the resolution of psychological views of morality.
How and why do moral judgments vary across the political spectrum? To test moral foundations theory (J. Haidt & J. Graham, 2007; J. Haidt & C. Joseph, 2004), the authors developed several ways to measure people's use of 5 sets of moral intuitions: Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity, Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity. Across 4 studies using multiple methods, liberals consistently showed greater endorsement and use of the Harm/care and Fairness/reciprocity foundations compared to the other 3 foundations, whereas conservatives endorsed and used the 5 foundations more equally. This difference was observed in abstract assessments of the moral relevance of foundation-related concerns such as violence or loyalty (Study 1), moral judgments of statements and scenarios (Study 2), "sacredness" reactions to taboo trade-offs (Study 3), and use of foundation-related words in the moral texts of religious sermons (Study 4). These findings help to illuminate the nature and intractability of moral disagreements in the American "culture war."
Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.
In contrast to older, conventional accounts that treat ethical decision making and behavior as the result of deliberative and intendedly rational processes, a rapidly growing body of social science research has framed ethical thought and behavior as driven by intuition. We review this important new body of knowledge in terms of both the process and content of moral intuition. Then, to demonstrate its value to organizational scholars, we consider the potential impact of moral intuition research in four areas of organizational studies especially suited to insights from this research: leadership, organizational corruption, ethics training and education, and divestiture socialization. Our review and discussion suggest that the literature on moral intuition is incredibly rich, fruitful, and meaningful to a wide range of audiences.
Where does morality come from? Why are moral judgments often so similar across cultures, yet sometimes so variable? Is morality one thing, or many? Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) was created to answer these questions. In this chapter we describe the origins, assumptions, and current conceptualization of the theory, and detail the empirical findings that MFT has made possible, both within social psychology and beyond. Looking toward the future, we embrace several critiques of the theory, and specify five criteria for determining what should be considered a foundation of human morality. Finally, we suggest a variety of future directions for MFT and for moral psychology.
Describes how the concept of motivation in American psychology has broadened to include cognitive aspects. Strict behaviorism and stimulus-response theory was inadequate to deal with various phenomena of memory, language, and perception. One result of the wider perspective on motivation has been the inclusion in a scientific framework of increasingly complex and interesting behaviors which cannot be handled by any current motivational theories. Examples of such behaviors are found in laboratory studies of compliance and hypnotic suggestion, and particularly in real-life studies of destructive and self-destructive acts. All these point toward a need for a hypothesis of the motivational power of ideation, especially in its extreme form, ideology. In ideology there seem to exist whole "transportation systems" of thought which dominate and override other sources of behavioral control. In fact, ideological demands may be in direct conflict to biological demands. The assumption that dominance of behavior by rational cognitive processes will necessarily assure favorable outcomes is challenged; unbridled ideation, especially in its extreme form, ideology, may be as dangerous as unrestrained emotionality. (20 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The field of business ethics is entrenched in a cognitive approach that portrays the ethical decision-making process as a completely deliberate and reasoned exercise. In light of growing concerns about the veracity of this approach, I build upon current knowledge of how the brain functions to present a neurocognitive model of ethical decision making. The model suggests that ethical decision making involves 2 interrelated yet functionally distinct cycles, a reflexive pattern matching cycle and a higher order conscious reasoning cycle, and thereby describes not only reasoned analysis, but also the intuitive and retrospective aspects of ethical decision making. The model sparks research in new areas, holds significant implications for the study of ethical decision making, and provides suggestions for improving ethical behavior in organizations.
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