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Transparency in multilateral climate politics: Furthering (or distracting from) accountability?: Transparency in climate politics
Abstract
This article analyzes the interplay between transparency and accountability in multilateral climate politics. The 2015 Paris Agreement calls for a “pledge-and-review” approach to collective climate action with an “enhanced transparency framework” as a key pillar of the Agreement. By making visible who is doing what, transparency is widely assumed to be vital to holding countries to account and building trust. We explore whether transparency is generating such effects in this context, by developing and applying an analytical framework to examine the link between transparency and accountability. We find that the scope and practices of climate transparency reflect (rather than necessarily reduce) broader conflicts over who should be held to account to whom and about what, with regard to responsibility and burden sharing for ambitious climate action. We conclude that the relationship between transparency and accountability is less straightforward than assumed, and that the transformative promise of transparency needs to be reconsidered in this light.
... In climate governance, transparency is heralded as one of the pillars to achieving the global climate goals. Taking the form of report and review, the multilateral climate transparency mechanism operating under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) requires countries to generate and disclose information on their individual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and removals-implying mitigation policy. 1 As such, transparency is expected to facilitate countries to hold each other to account to enhance mutual trust and improve mitigation policy by furthering understanding on successes as well as challenges in policy implementation (Gupta & van Asselt, 2019;UNFCCC, 2015). The Paris Agreement's Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) aims to generate information that provide clarity on and track progress towards achieving, Parties' 2 individual mitigation commitments (UNFCCC, 2015). ...
... Conversely, an emphasis on capacity building may further encourage major developed countries to evade their obligation to take the lead in the global mitigation efforts and be held accountable for failing to meet this responsibility. This situation reflects broader political-economic and geopolitical power dynamics among major economies, which can influence and shape domestic decisions on climate transparency within and beyond the UNFCCC (Gupta and van Asselt, 2019;Mason, 2020). ...
... Adopting a reflexive capacity lens provides a new perspective on how the global transparency mechanism operates and influences the capacities of those involved in process. Through this lens, our study provides empirical evidences supporting the theorised and widely assumed link between transparency and climate (mitigation) action and ambition, accountability, and compliance with UNFCCC decisions and agreements (Gupta & van Asselt, 2019;Gupta et al., 2021;Weikmans & Gupta, 2021;Weikmans et al., 2020). Furthermore, this article offers first-hand accounts from government actors and policymakers in the Global South, which are often overlooked or underrepresented in broader studies on climate policy and governance (Geden, 2016). ...
As the multilateral climate transparency mechanism increasingly blurs the differentiation between developed and developing countries, it catalyses international pressure on the latter to adopt more ambitious mitigation policies and stringent reporting. This article delves into the relationship between the International Consultation and Analysis (ICA), a climate transparency mechanism under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the mitigation policies of emerging economies, namely Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and Mexico. Using the conceptual framework of reflexive capacity, we explore how the ICA enhances the ability of these countries' governments to recognize, reflect upon, and respond to demands for mitigation information. Our research draws on interviews with key government officials, UNFCCC personnel, and experts involved in the ICA process, participant observation, and extensive analysis of primary documents including the Biennial Update Reports, Technical Analysis Synthesis Reports, and countryspecific submissions. The findings demonstrate that the ICA fosters the enhancement of government actors’ reflexive capacities by furthering their understanding of transparency’s significance, advancing their technical reporting expertise, and subjecting individual country performance to scrutiny. Such capacities not only lead to improvements in domestic practices related to the generation and disclosure of mitigation-related information but also empower these countries to assert their entitlement to differentiated responsibilities in the face of increasing demands for mitigation and reporting. The enhanced reflexive capacity and heightened scrutiny are anticipated to play pivotal role in facilitating the development of more ambitious mitigation policies and more effective climate transparency mechanisms at both domestic and global levels.
... As enforcement mechanisms are rare in GEG, accountability mechanisms to track national implementation and collective progress toward global goals have been favored to promote compliance with MEAs. The premise is that, by fostering transparency, accountability mechanisms can increase public pressure on states and facilitate cooperation, which in turn can enhance compliance (Gupta and van Asselt 2019;Raustiala 2000). However, despite increasing transparency, traditional state-to-state accountability mechanisms have largely failed to improve the implementation of MEAs (Gupta and van Asselt 2019;Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al. 2018). ...
... The premise is that, by fostering transparency, accountability mechanisms can increase public pressure on states and facilitate cooperation, which in turn can enhance compliance (Gupta and van Asselt 2019;Raustiala 2000). However, despite increasing transparency, traditional state-to-state accountability mechanisms have largely failed to improve the implementation of MEAs (Gupta and van Asselt 2019;Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al. 2018). This generalized crisis of public accountability in GEG has led to a proliferation of accountability mechanisms that involve corporations and civil society as well as states (Chan and Pattberg 2008;Kramarz and Park 2019). ...
... These include the lack of binding obligations to back up accountability mechanisms (Harrop and Pritchard 2011); the focus on agenda setting and shallow review of previous commitments (Morgera and Tsioumani 2010); the vague character of goals, targets, and indicators (Xu et al. 2021); the absence of global stocktaking of ambition for national implementation (Kok and Ludwig 2021); and the lack of a peer-review mechanism for regular discussion of national implementation on a country-by-country basis (Ulloa et al. 2018). In this article, I have elaborated on the argument that the availability of accountability mechanisms is not enough to foster transformative accountability dynamics (Gupta and van Asselt 2019;Kramarz and Park 2019). Conversely, I argue that constructive dialogue has potential to address implementation challenges and persuade states to fulfill their global environmental commitments, which points out the value of critical commentary and feedback, lessons learned over time, and cooperation to influence state behavior (Mashaw 2006;Raustiala 2000). ...
State-to-state accountability has greatly failed to improve compliance with multilateral environmental agreements. As this is also the case in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), this article explores how and with what effect nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) persuade states to fulfill their commitments to conserve biodiversity. The article conceptualizes accountability as learning-enabling dialogue with the potential to influence state behavior through the provision of constructive criticism. The underlying argument is that NGOs can contribute to overcoming implementation challenges by engaging in constructive dialogue with states. The triangulation of interviews with NGOs, CBD documents, and gray literature suggests that NGOs can challenge or even prevent states’ inertia by establishing critical but cooperative multilevel partnerships with states to advance implementation. Reconceptualizing accountability as constructive dialogue may contribute to realizing the transformative potential of accountability. However, more evidence is needed to understand the roles of NGOs in fostering learning and the impact of learning on improving implementation, compliance, and environmental outcomes.
... transparent (observable to third parties), accurate (a classifications of resources, whilst also highlighting the pernicious influence of wealth and power in securing fossil fuels in a range of settings: see, for example, Sovacool et al. (2020). 3 For a similar scheme, albeit further disaggregated into five categories, see Gupta and van Asselt (2019). 4 For discussion of this element, see Harrison (2015) and Steininger et al. (2016). ...
... Accordingly, they provide the normative and factual basis for holding the relevant agents to account. This brings us to element (iii), which concerns the institutions or practices by which a relevant agent is held to account (Gupta and van Asselt 2019;Newell 2008). Some international regimes include formal compliance systems. ...
... The vast scope for gaming in carbon accounting processes makes it easy for states to present themselves as taking meaningful action whilst in fact doing little to address the systemic drivers of GHG emissions (Kuch 2015;Shishlov, Morel, and Bellassen 2016;Stevenson 2021). The resulting epistemic murkiness does not appear to have built trust and confidence among participating states or resulted in increased ambition (Gupta and van Asselt 2019). 8 With the Paris Agreement's more decentralised, voluntary and heterogeneous approach to mitigation, the pursuit of accountability for carbon fluxes has only become more elusive (Keohane and Oppenheimer 2016;Weikmans, van Asselt, and Roberts 2020). ...
For decades, the object of international climate governance has been greenhouse gases. The inadequacy of decarbonization based on this system has prompted calls to expand climate governance to include restrictions on fossil fuel supply. Such initiatives could rely on accountability frameworks based on fossil fuel reserves, production, or infrastructure, yet there has been little consideration of the different implications of these options. We inform such discussions by undertaking a sociotechnical analysis of existing schemes for the monitoring, reporting and verification of fossil fuels. We identify serious risks from anchoring climate governance in fossil fuel reserves. More promising directions for supply-side governance lie in accountability frameworks based on a combination of fossil fuel production volumes and infrastructure, since these are more transparent to multiple actors. This transparency would provide much-needed opportunities for democratic oversight of the data underpinning climate governance, opening new channels for holding states accountable for their climate performance.
... This was preceded by long-standing conflicts over continued differentiation of transparency obligations between developed versus developing countries (Winkler et al., 2017). India and Brazil, for example, insisted on continued differentiation, while the United States and other developed countries called for a common framework applicable to all (Gupta & van Asselt, 2019). The resulting ETF is a compromise of 'neither a bifurcated system, nor a single common framework' (Winkler et al., 2017, p. 858). ...
... Furthermore, as a result of arduous negotiations between developed and developing countries, 'flexibility' is provided to developing countriesaccording to their capacitieson some of the 'shall' reporting requirements (Gupta & van Asselt, 2019;UNFCCC, 2015;Van Asselt et al., 2016). Going forward, an axis of conflict is how to interpret and institutionalize such flexibility, and with what implications for designing capacity-building initiatives. ...
... A second, more critical view is found in the broader transparency literature. In analysing the link between transparency and accountability, Gupta and van Asselt (2019) note that countries with the lowest capacities are also those least responsible for climate change, an aspect to keep in mind when requiring transparency. Klinsky and Gupta (2019) highlight that an extensive focus on building GHG reporting capacity in developing countries risks deflecting attention away from necessary actions to be taken by the historically biggest emitters. ...
Elaborate transparency systems are now at the core of the 2015 Paris Agreement, with the assumption that this will enhance accountability, trust, and greater climate policy ambition. Much attention is now being devoted to increasing the capacity of developing countries to comply with climate transparency requirements. Contrary to viewing capacity building merely as a neutral ‘means of implementation’, our point of departure here is that capacity building has the potential to shape the nature and direction of climate transparency to be generated by countries. Key unasked questions are: What kind of transparency is facilitated through capacity-building efforts, and to further what climate policy ends? The potential steering effects of capacity building for transparency remain, in our view, largely unexamined. In addressing this research gap, we undertake a synthesis review of diverse perspectives on the ‘what, how and who’ of capacity building for transparency, as identifiable in (i) academic and grey literature; (ii) policy perspectives advanced by developed and developing countries; and (iii) emerging practices in two prominent capacity building for transparency initiatives. We draw on this three-part review to shed light on the scope and extent of climate transparency (to be) generated by developing countries in practice, with implications for the transformative potential of transparency in global climate governance.
Key policy insights
• Transparency about climate actions is central to the 2015 Paris Agreement.
• Efforts are underway to build capacities of developing countries to comply with transparency requirements.
• Rather than merely a neutral ‘means of implementation’, capacity building has the potential to influence the scope and extent of transparency generated by countries.
• To date, the focus has remained on building capacities to report on GHG emissions and mitigation, notwithstanding diverse additional priorities.
• There is a need for empirical analysis of capacity building’s steering effects in domestic contexts.
... Generally, greater transparency is widely assumed to be essential to realizing important environmental and climate governance outcomes, such as enhanced clarity, trust and accountability (for a discussion and critique, see e.g., Gupta, 2008Gupta, , 2010Mason, 2020). Yet, a growing body of 'critical transparency studies' literature is now revealing that the potential of climate transparency to realize more accountability, trust or improved outcomes is constrained by broader political conflicts in the climate regime (Gupta & Mason, 2016;Gupta & van Asselt, 2019;Konrad et al., 2022;Van Deursen & Gupta, 2024). ...
... Developed country reports undergo a process called 'International Assessment and Review' (IAR), while developing countries participate in a process named 'International Consultation and Analysis' (ICA). These distinct terminologies illustrate recurrent contestations under the UNFCCC over differentiated transparency obligations for developed and developing countries, with the latter terms (consultation and analysis) seen as less onerous than the former (assessment and review) (Gupta & van Asselt, 2019;Weikmans & Gupta, 2021). Both these international review processes include two stages: first, a technical expert review of their submitted BRs (for developed countries) and technical analysis of their submitted BURs (for developing countries); and second, a peer-to-peer political account-giving process between countries, held during UNFCCC meetings. ...
Developing countries’ ambitious climate action hinges on the provision of climate finance from developed countries. Yet, despite decades of debate and contestation over this, substantial controversies continue to persist over whether and how much climate finance is flowing, including whether it is ‘new and additional’ to existing development assistance, whether it targets climate mitigation or adaptation, and whether it is delivered as grants or loans. In this article, we draw on a little-examined source of self-reporting by countries to shed light on these persisting climate finance controversies. Elaborate transparency arrangements have been set up under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), whereby countries report on climate finance provided and received. We examine transparency reports submitted by 26 countries from 2014 to 2021 by both developed and developing countries, and international review of these reports, to ascertain the extent to which country self-reporting under the UNFCCC sheds light on the nature of climate finance flows between developed and developing countries. We find that both the reports submitted and the international review of these reports are not furthering clarity around climate finance provided and received. This is because of (a) a persisting lack of multilaterally agreed definitions of key aspects of climate finance provided, and a resulting heterogeneity of definitions used by countries to self-report; and (b) because international review of country self-reporting is subject to politically negotiated limitations. We conclude that clarity remains elusive on climate finance provided and received under the UNFCCC, a situation that seems likely to continue under the Paris Agreement’s enhanced transparency framework, due to be implemented in 2024.
... By their very nature, the transparency arrangements established under the UNFCCC have always eschewed political judgment, making it harder to hold countries to account (Gupta & van Asselt, 2019). Overall, the ETF is similarly designed to avoid making any political judgment on the ambition of individual Parties in terms of climate action. ...
... 9 In the lead-up to the Paris Climate Conference, some Parties pushed for the inclusion of an ex-ante review of NDCs that would help clarify whether pledges are sufficient ( van Asselt, Saelen, & Pauw, 2015). However, the idea of such a review was integrated in the global stocktake, which is an ex-post review that focuses on collective rather than individual efforts (Gupta & van Asselt, 2019;Hermwille, Siemons, Förster, & Jeffery, 2019;Milkoreit & Haapala, 2019). ...
... Firstly, most developing countries are concerned that detailed reporting adaptation requirements may entail a risk of further shifting the burden to adapt to climate change to developing countries. In highly contested global environmental governance challenges such as climate change, first-order questions pertaining to "who is to be accountable to whom for what" fundamentally shape the design of the transparency arrangements (Gupta and van Asselt, 2019). Secondly, the establishment of new adaptation reporting and planning processes (for example Adaptation Communications) by the Paris Agreement may ultimately be burdensome for developing countries that have limited capacities. ...
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the centre of the global policy response to climate change. The Paris Agreement, a legally binding treaty under the UNFCCC, has located climate change adaptation as a critical component of the global response to climate change. The Paris Agreement also establishes an enhanced transparency framework to track progress towards Parties climate change commitments. However, the UNFCCC has consistently maintained a marked difference in provisions for reporting climate change adaptation and climate change mitigation. Consequently, reporting on climate change adaptation lags far behind in detail when compared to that for reporting on climate change mitigation. Using literature review as the main method of analysis, this paper aims to understand the underlying factors that have resulted in the lack of specificity of reporting provisions of the UNFCCC for climate change adaptation and the consequences of non-mandatory provisions for reporting on climate change adaptation on national and global adaptation practice. The paper then highlights the benefits of regular reporting of climate change adaptation to the UNFCCC. It makes important contribution to the growing literature on global environmental governance, especially on national reporting of adaptation information, an under-studied and a poorly understood field.
... 27 Such analyses can provide an indication of shifting attitudes and practices among policymakers, the topics and actions they prioritize, or shifts in political discourse, for example. However, reporting on adaptation is both relatively infrequent and open to politically motivated interpretations, 28,29 making it difficult to draw objective and generalizable conclusions from such data. Other studies have instead focused on scientific papers, producing overviews of the evidence on topics such as expected climate impacts, 30 implemented adaptations, 5,31 and the wider adaptation-related literature. ...
... On this basis, international review could identify implementation shortcomings and suggest remedies, or potentially also impose penalties (A. Gupta & van Asselt, 2019). In addition to the effects of government-to-government scrutiny, international transparency provisions and review processes also provide non-party actors with information and political fora to appeal to public opinion and put pressure on governments to remedy insufficient policies (Dai, 2010;Hale, 2020). ...
Buildings constitute one of the main GHG emitting sectors, and energy efficiency is a key lever to reduce emissions in the sector. Global climate policy has so far mostly focused on economy-wide emissions. However, emission reduction actions are ultimately sectoral, and opportunities and barriers to achieving emission reductions vary strongly among sectors. This article therefore seeks to analyse to what extent more targeted global governance may help to leverage mitigation enablers and overcome barriers to energy efficiency in buildings. To this end, the article first synthesises existing literature on mitigation enablers and barriers as well as existing literature on how global governance may help address these barriers (“governance potential”). On this basis, the article analyses to what extent this governance potential has already been activated by existing activities of international institutions. Finally, the article discusses how identified governance gaps could be closed. The analysis finds that despite the local characteristics of the sector, global governance has a number of levers at its disposal that could be used to promote emission reductions via energy efficiency. In practice, however, lacking attention to energy efficiency in buildings at national level is mirrored at the international level. Recently, though, a number of coalitions demanding stronger action have emerged. Such frontrunners could work through like-minded coalitions and at the same time try to improve conditions for cooperation in the climate regime and other existing institutions.
... Transparency and accountability can reduce the risk of corruption and unethical behavior while increasing public trust in government institutions [59], [60]. Transparency and accountability are interlinking elements in governance systems [61]. Transparency refers to the public availability of usable information, which mitigates corruption risks and allows scrutiny of rulers' decisions [62]. ...
Background
Since the withdrawal of government forces from Northwest Syria due to the conflict, several national initiatives have aimed to create alternative governance approaches to replace the central governmental system. One of the recent initiatives was the formulation of so-called ‘Central Bodies’ as institutional governance structures responsible for thematic planning and service provision; for example, the referral unit is responsible for planning and delivering medical referral services. However, the governance and administrative rules of procedures of these bodies could be immature or unsystematic. Assessing the governance of this approach cannot be condoned, especially with the urgent need for a methodical approach to strategic planning, achieving strategic humanitarian objectives, and efficiently utilizing available resources. Multiple governance assessment frameworks have been developed. However, none were created to be applied in protracted humanitarian settings. This research aims to assess the extent to which the existing health governance structure (central bodies) was capable of performing the governance functions in the absence of a legitimate government in Northwest Syria.
Methods and materials
A governance assessment framework was adopted after an extensive literature review and group discussions. Four principles for the governance assessment framework were identified; legitimacy, accountability and transparency, effectiveness and efficiency, and strategic vision. Focus Group Discussions were held to assess the levels of the selected principles on the governance thermometer scale. Qualitative and quantitative data were analyzed using NVivo 12 and SPSS 22 software programs, respectively.
Results
The level of the four principles on the governance thermometer scale was between the lowest and middle quintiles; ‘very poor or inactive’ and ‘fair and requires improvement’, respectively. The results indicate that the governance approach of Central Bodies in NWS is underdeveloped and summons comprehensive systematic development. The poor internal mechanisms, poor planning and coordination, and the absence of strategic vision were among the most frequent challenges to developing the approach.
Conclusion
Humanitarian actors and donors should pay more attention to health governance approaches and tools in protracted crises. The central bodies must improve coordination with the stakeholders and, most importantly, strategic planning. Establishing or utilizing an independent planning committee, with financial and administrative independence, is crucial to maintain and improving contextual governance mechanisms in Northwest Syria.
... Regarding the geographical area, Figure 3 shows that many articles (28.45%) investigate more than one country (labeled "International"), and other articles (12.03%) do not deal with a specific area (labeled "Not applicable") since they are theoretical or qualitative studies (e.g. Hood, 2007;Neu et al., 2015;Gupta and van Asselt, 2019). In addition, about 2% of the articles analyze transparency in the European Union (EU) as a whole, considering this institution as a supranational organization (e.g. ...
Purpose
Literature about transparency in public-sector organizations has been attracting the attention of scholars for the last two decades. This study reviews the existing literature with the intention of creating a description of the state of the art, categorized by geographical areas, levels of government, topics, and methodologies.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors have developed a structured literature review following a rigorous protocol. The initial search was launched on 25 April 2022 on Scopus and Web of Science, resulting in 3,217 articles. After removing duplicates and studies that did not meet all the inclusion criteria specified in the review protocol, the final sample includes 956 articles from 1991 to 2021.
Findings
The analyses show a considerable increase in studies since 2005, especially in the last two years, when 30% of the publications have been produced. Most of the studies analyze the national/central level of government. Many authors compare different countries, while other scholars focus on specific countries, overall, the USA and the UK. The local level of government has also been widely studied, especially in the Spanish and Chinese contexts. The most frequently used methodologies are quantitative and empirical techniques, and the most common topics are those associated with accountability.
Originality/value
This study uses a huge sample (956 articles over the period 1991–2021), which has never been used before, to examine the literature on transparency. The structured literature review facilitates the identification of gaps that can be filled by future studies. These include analyzing transparency in specific geographical areas like Africa, Asia, and Latin America, studying transparency at different levels of government, especially at the regional and federal levels, and providing comparative studies and case study collections.
... Each of the pathways discussed above represents a possible mechanism to improve governance and contribute to the various benefits associated with greater transparency. However, increased access to information has not always improved governance, casting doubt on the effectiveness of transparency reforms (Weil et al., 2006;Gupta, 2008Gupta, , 2010bDingwerth and Eichinger, 2010;Gupta and van Asselt, 2019). It is therefore critical to understand what conditions enable these pathways for transparency to be an effective governance tool. ...
When fisheries managers cannot see who is fishing or where fishing occurs, their scope for management interventions is limited. This lack of transparency in spatial fishing activity is considered a key enabler of illegal fishing and overfishing and hinders managers and consumers who aim to achieve sustainable fisheries. Increasing transparency in vessel location tracking is gaining momentum as a promising way to improve management of global fisheries. However, the mechanisms through which transparency in vessel activity can improve management have not been carefully studied. This paper provides a conceptual overview of the potential for greater transparency, both in quantity of vessels tracked and availability of data, from vessel tracking to help achieve sustainable fisheries goals. We identify four pathways through which these data can improve fisheries management and the conditions that enable transparency to be an effective governance tool. We qualitatively examine the costs and benefits of alternative models of transparency, including a hypothetical, fully transparent system. We highlight how potential costs and benefits of greater transparency depend on both governance context and management goals, and identify opportunities for future research to address key information gaps.
... In much of the literature (largely originating from collaborating experience in Western or international contexts), external imposition is enforced as the result of extensive policy challenges that require concentrated external authorities for incentives and mandates (Emerson and Nabatchi 2015). These challenges can be domestic, such as pandemic control or regional economic integration, or global, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) in the coordination of multinational public health projects, the International Court of Justice in the resolution of conflicts between countries, or the Council of the European Union in the redistribution of greenhouse gas emissions targets among EU member states (WHO 2012; Gupta and Asselt 2019). In these policy contexts, an external authority with sufficient power guides and directs collaborative activities while placing significant constraints on group autonomy (Wehde and Choi 2021). ...
When institutional frictions threaten to disrupt collaborations, an external authority can be brought in to resolve disputes. How effective is such external imposition? What are the institutional circumstances in which it works? Framed by the collaborative governance regime (CGR), which sees established procedures and institutions as a critical collaborative capacity, this research employs a unique concept—collaborative friction—to explore the role of external imposition in collaboration among entities with significant institutional differences. We examined 965 recorded collaborative frictions from four large collaborative infrastructure projects between governments in Hong Kong and mainland China. Our finding suggests a significant, but limited, effect of the central government's imposition on collaborative frictions. We also find a significant role of sociopolitical circumstances in collaboration. Based on the findings, we make several theoretical propositions articulating external imposition's role in collaboration.
... In general, a lack of transparency and oversight is thought to exacerbate moral hazard in agency relationships (Jensen and Meckling 1976). On the other hand, Gupta and Van Asselt (2019) have found that in the context of multilateral climate politics, the level of transparency may 'reflect (rather than necessarily reduce) broader conflicts over who should be held to account to whom and about what' (p. 18). ...
This book showcases a multidisciplinary set of work on the impact of regulatory innovation on the scale and nature of tax evasion, tax avoidance, and money laundering. We consider the international tax environment an ecosystem undergoing a period of rapid change as shocks such as the financial crisis, new business forms, scandals and novel regulatory instruments impact upon it. This ecosystem evolves as jurisdictions, taxpayers, and experts react. Our analysis focuses mainly on Europe and five new regulations: Automatic Exchange of Information, which requires that accounts held by foreigners are reported to authorities in the account holder’s country of residence; the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting initiative and Country by Country Reporting, which attempt to reduce the opportunity spaces in which corporations can limit tax payments and utilize low or no tax jurisdictions; the Legal Entity Identifier which provides a 20-digit identification code for all individual, corporate or government entities conducting financial transactions; and the Fourth and Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directives, that criminalize tax crimes and prescribe that the Ultimate Beneficial Owner of a company is registered. Working from accounting, economic, political science, and legal perspectives, the analysis in this book provides an assessment of the reforms and policy recommendations that will reinforce the international tax system. The collection also flags the dangers posed by emerging tax loopholes provided by new business models and in the form of freeports and golden passports. Our central message is that inequality can and has to be reduced substantially, and we can achieve this through an improved international tax system.
... To be certain, I do not wish to downplay some of the problems recounted by Frey and Burgess. It is, for instance, indeed doubtful that the Paris Agreement's transparency framework will lead to greater accountability and effectiveness (Gupta and van Asselt, 2019). Nor do I intend to discard their suggestions for reform altogether. ...
... As a result, statements on the effectiveness of the Paris framework often rely more on theoretical assumptions than on empirical observation. This applies to the capacity of the agreement's ambition mechanism to build trust and exert pressure (Gupta and van Asselt 2019). It also applies to the question "whether and for how long the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)-the Conference of the Parties (COP) or the Secretariat-has been an orchestrator" and, if so, "through precisely what causal mechanisms" they have exerted influence (van Asselt and Zelli 2018, 36). ...
Global climate governance is in transition. As the focus shifts from negotiations to implementation, the quest for ways to effectively coordinate ambitious climate action has become a key concern. While existing studies frame this problem mostly in terms of institutional design (to “facilitate” state ambition) and strategic delegation of authority (to “orchestrate” nonstate action), this article builds on dramaturgical policy analysis to examine soft coordination in practice. Using ethnographic methods, we analyze public performances at the twenty-fifth Conference of the Parties (COP25) in Madrid. We find that these were shaped by preestablished governance scripts and social roles available to participants, but also by creative improvisations and interventions. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat and COP Presidency intervened to configure the physical setting of the conference, mold its narrative arch, and shape available roles. We conclude that performances and dramaturgical interventions are important tools of soft coordination in global climate governance. Their analysis constitutes a productive entry point for grasping contemporary transformations in global politics.
... International institutions may enhance the transparency of their members' actions by collecting and analyzing relevant data, and identify and hold parties to account for any implementation deficits (Ciplet et al., 2018;Gupta & van Asselt, 2019;Park & Kramarz, 2019). Now that the "Paris rulebook" has been completed, the COP could promote implementation by devoting more attention to its transparency and accountability function. ...
The gap between the internationally agreed climate objectives and tangible emissions reductions looms large. We explore how the supreme decision‐making body of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Conference of the Parties (COP), could develop to promote more effective climate policy. We argue that promoting implementation of climate action could benefit from focusing more on individual sectoral systems, particularly for mitigation. We consider five key governance functions of international institutions to discuss how the COP and the sessions it convenes could advance implementation of the Paris Agreement: guidance and signal, rules and standards, transparency and accountability, means of implementation, and knowledge and learning. In addition, we consider the role of the COP and its sessions as mega‐events of global climate policy. We identify opportunities for promoting sectoral climate action across all five governance functions and for both the COP as a formal body and the COP sessions as conducive events. Harnessing these opportunities would require stronger involvement of national ministries in addition to the ministries of foreign affairs and environment that traditionally run the COP process, as well as stronger involvement of non‐Party stakeholders within formal COP processes.
This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > International Policy Framework
... In this regard Gupta and Van Asselt proposed a progressive model of accountability exploring two basic themes of accountability i.e. answerability and enforceability. 11 It have been further explored by dividing it into five elements constituting relations, standards, judgements, sanctions and redress. 12 The first three elements can be used to gauge the level of answerability and the remaining two to gauge enforceability in any system of accountability. ...
An Intergovernmental Working Group is established by the Human Rights Council to adopt a treaty on Business and Human Rights. According to the draft treaty the enforcement mechanism relies on a treaty body working through a reporting-based mechanism. In this article the enforcement mechanism of the treaty is analysed through the progressive model of accountability presented by Gupta and Van Asselt. It also takes further the analysis based on the progressive model by Nadia Bernaz of the enforceability measures adopted within the treaty. The enforceability of the treaty is further discussed in this article and a relative enforcement mechanism is proposed. The proposal includes structural changes within the treaty body and inclusion of the role of non-state entities for more efficient enforcement.
... Transparency and review mechanisms are expected to build trust among states, contribute to policy learning and exert pressure on laggards through 'naming and shaming'. Their capacity to do so, however, is often assumed rather than being empirically observed (Gupta & Van Asselt 2019). Analyses of how reporting and assessment exercises unfold in practice are therefore critical. ...
The working paper examines the UN climate conference (COP26) organised in Glasgow in November 2021 as a transnational mega-event, which constituted not only an important moment in international climate talks, but also a temporary convergence point for a multitude of actors and an arena for conflicts and contestation over framing within a broader global policy space. This perspective allows us to offer a view of the current state of global climate politics more comprehensive than those of analyses focused mainly on the negotiations. Using collaborative event ethnography, over two weeks eight researchers identified the material, spatial and social dimensions of the conference. We identify three circles of climate governance, which framed practices, interactions and debates in Glasgow. These comprise an inner circle of state-led negotiations (‘The In’), an official side programme (‘The Off’) and a relatively heterogeneous wider environment of self-organised events (‘The Fringe’). Each circle is populated by a different set of actors and enacts a distinct representation of ‘the global’. Our analysis of dynamics within each of these circles shows that climate governance has entered a new and contradictory phase, where some boundaries are blurred while others are reaffirmed, and where old conflicts resurface while new dividing lines appear. The Paris architecture for reporting and review has been finalised, but thus far the new approach has failed to close gaps between pledges and objectives for mitigation and climate finance. Global political and corporate elites have seemingly come to acknowledge the climate emergency and the need for a global low-carbon transformation, but the solutions proposed in Glasgow remained partial and fragile, and tightly contained within the dominant horizon of capitalist market- and techno-fixes. The communication strategy of the UNFCCC and the UK Presidency used increasingly radical terms to convey urgency and momentum, which in turn risked emptying activist notions of their content and force. A growing part of the climate movement reacted with critiques of corporate takeover and calls for “real zero” instead of “net zero”. In the conclusion, we examine a series of contentious issues and provide avenues for reflection on the future of climate governance.
... International assessment and review-which hinges on data availability-can foster transparency, trust, and accountability among different actors (Asselt, Pauw, and Saelen 2015). Transparency is a widely assumed precondition for creating mutual trust within the multilateral processes and enhance accountability of the individual actor's progress towards meeting their climate pledges (Gupta and van Asselt 2019;Mason 2020;Weikmans et al., 2020;Gupta et al., 2021). In this paper, we focus on all processes, mechanisms and tools related to "climate change accounting and reporting" (Gulluscio et al., 2020), which can apply to greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories for the purposes of complying with regulations or international frameworks like the Paris Agreement, or voluntary management. ...
The Paris Agreement’s decentralized and bottom-up approach to climate action poses an enormous accounting challenge by substantially increasing the number of heterogeneous national, sub-national, and non-state actors. Current legacy climate accounting systems and mechanisms are insufficient to avoid information asymmetry and double-counting due to actor heterogeneity and fragmentation. This paper presents a nested climate accounting architecture that integrates several innovative digital technologies, such as Distributed Ledger Technology, Internet of Things, Machine Learning, and concepts such as nested accounting and decentralized identifiers to improve interoperability across accounting systems. Such an architecture can enhance capacity building and technology transfer to the Global South by creating innovation groups, increasing scalability of accounting solutions that can lead to leapfrogging into innovative systems designs, and improving inclusiveness.
... Governance by disclosure has become a popular mechanism for catalyzing action and keeping countries accountable to their peers and their constituents. Although there are no 'hard' sanctions for not fulfilling commitments made, disclosure mechanisms aim at raising ambitions and enhancing accountability through informal praising and shaming of government efforts as information on their performance becomes accessible to other state and non-state actors (Gupta and van Asselt, 2019;Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al., 2018;Weikmans et al., 2020). While recognizing the varying capacities among countries, the Paris Agreement requires countries to submit Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to communicate their ambitions for climate action and regularly report on progress and achievements through the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF). ...
The Paris Agreement encourages countries to monitor and regularly report on progress in responding to the impacts of climate change. So far, discussions on adaptation tracking have focused on the technocratic reasons for limited progress on adaptation tracking, for example, financial, methodological, and technical capacity gaps. Substantial variation exists in the institutional context within which adaptation takes place and is being tracked. Yet, recent discussions overlook the importance of the extent to which new systems of adaptation tracking fit within the prevailing rules and practices of knowledge production and use. Although such fit-for-context has been considered important in other fields, no adequate frameworks exist to operationalize it within adaptation tracking. We develop a six-dimensional framework for analyzing institutional structure as the first step towards alignment in the design and use of adaptation tracking: 1) stakeholder participation, 2) transparency, 3) bureaucratic accountability, 4) engagement with experts, 5) politico-administrative relations, and 6) coordination within the administration. For each dimension, we synthesize academic literature, provide variables for operationalization, and provide examples drawn from various regions. The resulting framework allows the description of the institutional structures of knowledge production and use and supports the context-specific design of new programs, tools, and practices for tracking adaptation progress.
... To examine this issue, we develop a conceptual framework showing how input and throughput legitimacywhat we call procedural legitimacymay relate to the (output) effectiveness of policies (Karlsson--Vinkhuyzen and McGee 2013; Gupta and van Asselt, 2019). Specifically, we identify how different dimensions of procedural legitimacy shape included actors' perceptions about both the legitimacy of the process and the potential effectiveness of joint-action. ...
How do governance arrangements affect perceptions of legitimacy and effectiveness amongst non-state actors? This is a pertinent question as the roles of non-state actors have been strengthened in global climate governance. In this paper, we focus on how actors involved in climate governance processes perceive trade-offs and specific factors that risk undermining legitimacy and potential effectiveness of those arrangements. We argue that different rules of procedural legitimacy generate sociological views about whether an institution or its policies will be effective and, in turn, are ‘worthy of support’. To establish this, we engage in an analysis of how nonstate actors have been engaged in the UNFCCC, pre- and post-Paris. We find that efforts to deepen engagement is generating contestation between actors, not fostering collaboration. Focusing on how actors view procedural rules and their potentialities for effective outcomes sheds light on support for those institutions and the development of effective policies.
... A seemingly simple relationship between transparency and accountability becomes further complicated by systems of transparency becoming sites of political conflict and negotiation over who bears responsibility for taking what action, and who should thus be held accountable to whom for what (Gupta and van Asselt, 2019). Furthermore, looking beyond the nation state, there are additional challenges in operationalizing accountability, as responsibility for taking action is increasingly diffuse and operates at multiple scales. ...
This article interrogates the assumed promises and perils of climate cryptogovernance or deployment of cryptographic technology (i.e., blockchain) within climate governance. We distill how climate cryptogovernance is
being discussed by influential climate policy actors, and the implications for reinforcing or challenging how climate governance currently occurs. Specifically, through discourse analysis, we explore how blockchain technology is presented in the communications of international organisations and multistakeholder initiatives in the climate policy space. We identify a dominant storyline being advanced that views blockchain as an enabler of ambitious climate action, through its potential to enhance the reliability, transparency, accountability, and
democratic quality of climate governance. We critically interrogate each of these component elements of the dominant storyline, arguing that, taken as a whole, they tend to privilege a technocratic, market-oriented approach to climate governance. We conclude by reflecting on whether this risks reinforcing a problematic ‘post-political’ turn in environmental governance in the future.
... Accountability involves assignment of responsibility for addressing climate change through adaptation and ensuring that the intended goals of adaptation finance are achieved and that local impact happens. 9 The work of the Taskforce in the run up to, and after, COP26 represents the beginning of a long process that must culminate in improved access to climate finance by countries and actors in the Global South and ultimately local adaptation mechanisms being in place to deal with the climate emergency. However, the focus on the financing and functioning of the GCF also presents an opportunity for actors globally to demand that the GCF demonstrates increased transparency and accountability. ...
... However, the relationship between transparency, accountability, and regime effectiveness is often more assumed than empirically scruti-nized Mason, 2020). How the different elements of the "accountability continuum" of the Paris Agreement (Voigt and Gao, 2020) are further operationalized and implemented in practice is therefore key (Gupta and Van Asselt, 2019). In this regard, the "small" assessment and review cycle conducted in 2018-2020 was unsatisfactory. ...
In the annual Hamburg Climate Futures Outlook, CLICCS researchers make the first systematic attempt to assess which climate futures are plausible, by combining multidisciplinary assessments of plausibility. The inaugural 2021 Hamburg Climate Futures Outlook addresses the question: Is it plausible that the world will reach deep decarbonization by 2050?
... 1 Institutions' secretariats may either themselves collect relevant data or receive reports from individual parties. On this basis, the institution may engage in a review of the quality and comparability of submitted data and of parties' implementation (Gupta and van Asselt, 2019). The effort required may depend on the activities regulated. ...
This article develops a sectoral approach to the analysis of global climate governance. This approach advances the assessment of global climate governance by focusing on complexes of intergovernmental and transnational institutions co-governing key socio-technical sectoral systems. The actual and potential contribution of these sectoral institutional complexes to advancing decarbonization can be assessed according to five key governance functions: (1) providing guidance and signal to actors, (2) setting rules to facilitate collective action, (3) enhancing transparency and accountability, (4) offering support (finance, technology, capacity-building), and (5) promoting knowledge and learning. On this basis, we can assess the potential of international cooperation to address the challenges specific sectoral systems face in the climate transition as well as the extent to which existing sectoral institutional complexes deliver on this potential. This provides a solid starting point for developing options for filling identified gaps and enhancing the effectiveness of global climate governance.
... This entailed maintenance, in their view of the pre-Paris differentiated transparency systems in place, wherein developing countries had to comply with less stringent and less regular reporting and review obligations. Yet the 2015 Paris Agreement agreed to move towards an 'enhanced transparency framework applicable to all', with some flexibility built in, but based on differing capacities to participate in more stringent transparency arrangements (Gupta and van Asselt 2017). ...
Equity has remained a deeply contested concept in multilateral climate politics ever since the Brundtland Commission report, with academic debate and geopolitical conflict alike focusing on how to conceptualize the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (CBDR-RC) of industrialized and developing countries in combating climate change, enshrined within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The focus here is on scrutinizing equity-in-practice, i.e. how equity is being operationalized within multilateral climate governance. The authors trace how the two component elements of the CBDR-RC principle (‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ and ‘respective capabilities’) are being operationalized within the obligations and institutional arrangements relating to mitigation and adaptation within the UNFCCC. The focus of equity is shifting away from the ‘responsibility’ component to that of ‘capabilities’ (with capabilities reduced, furthermore, to a technical notion of capacity building). Equity-in-practice is thus increasingly coming to be equated, within the UNFCCC, with capacity building. The authors discuss whether such a taming of equity is also discernible in newer developments, such as negotiating the rule-book for the enhanced transparency framework of the 2015 Paris Agreement, and debating the role within climate policy of climate engineering technologies. The authors draw out the implications of this analysis for the prospects of UN-led multilateralism to deliver on climate equity in the pursuit of sustainable development.
The study seeks to understand the antecedents influencing the effectiveness of cross-functional coopetition and the consequences that go deeper into the significance of cross-functional coopetition within Quick-Service Restaurants (QSRs) by examining its impact on organisational ambidexterity, specifically exploitative and exploratory innovation. Using partial least structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM), data was collected from 336 employees in QSRs. While the results confirmed the hypothesized relationships, development culture and hierarchy culture have no relationship to cross-functional coopetition. There is a link between cross-functional coopetitive ability and competition in (a) exploitative innovation and (b) exploratory innovation, but social cohesion makes that link stronger. Cross-functional coopetition partially mediates the relationship between both ‘organisational structure and culture’ and organisational ambidexterity. General implications of the findings for coopetition and research on both ‘organisational structure and culture’ and organisational ambidexterity are discussed.
This article scrutinizes the role of transparency in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Specifically, it examines a widely heard claim that ‘transparency is the backbone of the Paris Agreement’, and the assumption that mandatory transparency (reporting and review) is essential to fill potential gaps in climate action left by voluntary, nationally determined climate targets. We subject this claim to critical scrutiny by tracing the political contestations around the desired role of transparency in the UNFCCC, with a focus on mitigation-related transparency. Our analysis shows that, despite developing countries expressing concerns during the pre-Paris negotiations, the Paris Agreement's enhanced transparency framework (ETF) is almost exclusively ‘enhanced’ (compared with earlier provisions) for developing countries, with some instances of regression for developed countries. Furthermore, the effects of such enhanced reporting are not straightforward and might de facto have an impact on countries’ autonomy to nationally determine their mitigation targets in diverse ways, even as all the detailed reporting does not facilitate comparability of effort. With implementation of the ETF due to start in 2024, our analysis provides a timely exploration of the extent to which transparency is really a backbone of the Paris Agreement, and for whom and with what implications for ambitious action from all under the international climate regime. It calls into question whether the transformative potential of transparency, much extolled within the UNFCCC process, will materialize for all countries in a similar manner or rather will have an impact on countries differentially.
The Paris Agreement, related intergovernmental decisions, and transnational climate change governance initiatives mobilize data as a means of measuring, managing, and addressing changing climatic conditions. At the same time, the Paris Agreement formally acknowledges the human rights implications of the unfolding climate crisis. Given the reliance on data and rights in climate change governance, the aim of this article is twofold. Firstly, it analyzes how processes of datafication at transnational and local levels promise, yet struggle, to render the climate governable. Secondly, the article critically reflects on the capacity of human rights to complement datafied governance processes meaningfully – specifically, in what ways rights can (and cannot) alleviate local concerns regarding datafication. Methodologically, the article develops a perspective that foregrounds situated sense-making and experience in place. It is based on an empirical case study of the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy, a transnational alliance of cities that have committed to working towards the goals of the Paris Agreement; and it engages with ethnographic literature that conceptualizes rights as lived forms of meaning-making, articulation, struggle, and resistance. Attending to place, the article confronts problematic assumptions about the universality, neutrality, and representativeness of data and rights, raising critical questions about their capacity to ‘govern’ climate change.
This contribution examines whether just energy transition partnerships (JETPs), a new type of financial agreement between G7/G7‐allies and low‐to‐middle income states, can serve as accountability mechanisms for the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It identifies important structural elements from the existing literature on climate governance for holding actors to account and then assesses the extent to which they are present within JETPs. While JETPs appear in theory to offer increased potential to shore up accountability in the UNFCCC, the case of the South African JETP demonstrates that the presence of these structural elements is likely insufficient to ensure accountability vis‐à‐vis the UNFCCC. This preliminary analysis therefore finds several practical limitations to accountability within JETPs and dense governance spaces in general. It thus points to the importance of identifying the underlying conditions needed for institutional accountability structures to function as designed.
The first ever Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement requested submission from a wide variety of actors. We extract over a quarter million paragraphs from all submissions and create a multilingual guided topic model using BERTopic to analyse the content of the submissions. Results show a wide variety of topics being discussed, with considerable variation between regions and languages. Broadly, the Global North submissions emphasize forward-looking mitigation-focused topics, while the Global South stresses impacts and vulnerabilities, in line with their political priorities. Comparing our findings to the official technical Synthesis Report, we note that many regionally important topics are not included; that non-English language submissions are under-represented; and that language in the report often most closely mirrors other synthesis efforts, such as those by the IPCC. This limits the Stocktake’s utility and underlines how data science methods can be of added value to global stocktaking.
Self-reporting is an important mechanism of the UNFCCC to collect information about what countries are doing to achieve their climate change mitigation and adaptation targets and how much progress has been made. Here we empirically test four hypotheses about what countries prioritise in their self-reporting through the National Communications. Using quantitative text analysis methods (structural topic modelling and keyness statistics), we analyse over 600 submissions (from 1994 to 2019) and find evidence that vulnerable countries highlight impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation rather than mitigation targets, whereas high-emitting countries tend to focus their messaging more on mitigation. Despite the Paris Agreement being considered a “watershed moment”, we find no statistically significant increase in focus on climate solutions post-Paris, and no significant increase in attention to adaptation. Our global assessment and the methods used offer a novel perspective to understand what gets framed as important by governments. Finally, we provide reflections on how self-reporting mechanisms can be used for global stocktaking of progress on climate action.
The article “Governing through the nationally determined contribution (NDC): five functions to steer states’ climate conduct“ by Jernnäs (2023) is part of an important research effort to understand how climate governance under the Paris Agreement operates. The article succeeds in demonstrating that the adoption of the Paris Agreement did not resolve many of the long-standing differences between states, but further clarity is needed to accurately interpret its results. In this response, I outline five aspects to guide future research on NDCs as a governance instrument including the crucial distinction between exploring potential NDC functions based on submissions during the negotiation process and examining the actual NDC functions based on the adopted Paris rulebook and empirical observations. My response draws on participant observation at the United Nations climate change negotiations since 2015 (Leiter 2022, Langlet et al. 2023) and is further substantiated through literature on global climate change negotiations.
Transparency arrangements, in the form of regular reporting by nations and a review of the reported information, have become a backbone of international governance. They are often expected to bring about increased ambition and improved implementation to fulfill the aims of the multilateral agreement in which they are embedded. However, little is still known about how these arrangements result in such effects. In this article, we review compliance theories and use these to explain the various roles of transparency arrangements in changing state behavior. We distinguish between different compliance schools and show how they attribute subtly different functions to transparency. We examine these variations through the development of a framework made up of seven idealized causal pathways that offer plausible explanations for the mechanisms that allow transparency arrangements to induce state behavior change. We also illustrate how these pathways work in practice by providing several examples from existing multilateral transparency arrangements. In doing so, we seek to form a bridge between international regime theory, critical transparency studies, and empirical studies on the functioning of transparency arrangements in international governance.
This policy paper outlines key options for enhancing the EU's evolving climate governance framework with a focus on accelerating the transition to climate neutrality and negative greenhouse gas emissions. The paper identifies key areas for improvement, including strengthening National Energy and Climate Plans, Long-Term Strategies, climate-neutrality targets, consistency and climate policy integration across different policy portfolios, independent scientific expert advisory bodies, review of progress and implementation, effective implementation, access to justice in climate matters, and public participation. The paper aims to stimulate further discussion and encourage the development of coherent sets of options to make EU climate governance fully fit for supporting the climate and energy transition.
In the negotiations on a new international agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), states had also been negotiating normative expectations for climate mitigation efforts by developing countries since 2005. These norms, expecting mitigation efforts in general and in forestry in particular, had then been operationalized in voluntary governance concepts, such as ‘Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions’ (NAMAs) and ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation’ (REDD+) from 2007 onwards. Subsequently, developing countries have increasingly adopted mitigation efforts, without being legally obligated to do so. But why and how have nation-states (in the Global South) engaged with these international norms (on climate change) both internationally and domestically? In order to explain such dynamics, I propose a new theoretical framework: norm glocalization. This approach allows to analyze the interaction of proactive external (e.g., foreign governments) and domestic actors (i.e., Indian government), for explaining outcomes. It enables explanations of changing glocalized norm interpretations by the domestic government, which are influenced by both external and domestic actors. The concept includes several norm glocalization phases that explain the interactions of domestic with external actors at the international and domestic level, ranging from contestation over international norm reshaping to domestic action formulation and implementation. Lastly, the framework incorporates scientific realist insights, enabling comprehensive explanations of outcomes based on multiple interacting mechanisms under facilitating or hampering conditions.
I apply this framework to the case of India from 2005 through 2019. India has been the third largest greenhouse gas emitter since 2006, and had rejected domestically financed mitigation efforts until 2007 when this began to change. This raises the research question of why and how India has changed its engagement with the developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm. I answer this question by applying process tracing and qualitative content analysis of primary and secondary sources, including 70 expert interviews conducted in India. This contains explanations of India’s shift from contestation towards the international reshaping of norms, ensuring that international funding would be provided. I subsequently explain further shifts at the domestic level towards a glocalized norm interpretation: In the 2008 ‘National Action Plan on Climate Change’, the Indian government adopted domestically financed actions that promote economic development and have co-benefits for climate mitigation, while not aiming to reduce emission-intensive activities. This glocalized norm interpretation subsequently informed India’s mitigation target in 2009, and its ‘Nationally Determined Contributions’ under the Paris Agreement in 2015. It also guided the Indian governments formulation and implementation of climate-related forestry actions. Overall, I find that India’s climate policy-making has been strongly linked to developments in international climate negotiations. The main factors shaping India’s mitigation approach were international pressure, lesson drawing from external and domestic sources, as well as domestic actors’ aspirations for achieving international recognition, strategic foreign policy interests, and sufficient carbon space.
Esta traducción del “Capítulo 14: Cooperación internacional de la contribución del Grupo de Trabajo III al Sexto Informe de Evaluación del IPCC” no es una traducción oficial del IPCC. Ha sido realizada por profesores y alumnos de la Maestría en Derecho y Economía del Cambio Climático de FLACSO Argentina con el objetivo de reflejar de la manera más precisa el lenguaje utilizado en el texto original.
Citar como: Patt, A., L. Rajamani, P. Bhandari, A. Ivanova Boncheva, A. Caparrós, K. Djemouai, I. Kubota, J. Peel, A.P. Sari, D.F. Sprinz, J. Wettestad, 2022: Cooperación internacional. En IPCC, 2022: Cambio Climático 2022: Mitigación del Cambio Climático. Contribución del Grupo de Trabajo III al Sexto Informe de Evaluación del Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Reino Unido y Nueva York, NY, Estados Unidos. (Traducido por FLACSO Argentina) (2022).
Este artículo compara los tratados de gobernanza climática con el Tratado de la Carta de la Energía, explica los efectos que el otorgar derechos a la naturaleza a nivel estatal tiene con relación a la gobernanza ambiental global del cambio climático y su importancia para América Latina. Argumenta que promover y conceder derechos a la naturaleza a escala estatal es um elemento que contribuye a la activación socio-legal coordinada de diversos actores, y presiona la implementación efectiva de medidas y el cumplimiento de compromisos multilaterales dentro de la “orquestación” de gobernanza ambiental global. Del mismo modo, y desde una perspectiva de derechos humanos, expone que, dentro de la trayectoria de la gobernanza climática transnacional, la acción a nivel estatal, a través de la aceptación de derechos de la naturaleza, representa una medida precautoria insoslayable, dada la presión, cada vez mayor del Norte Global por los bienes y servicios de la naturaleza en el contexto de la transición energética.
Our understanding of climate change has expanded to include issues beyond reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, we do not have a sound empirical understanding of how negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations have evolved to address an increasingly wide range of issues relevant to climate change. To understand what the climate talks have focused on and how the volume of work has changed, the authors create a Climate Negotiations Database that categorizes negotiation agenda items starting from the first Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1995. Overall, the volume of work in the negotiations is shown to have steadily increased over time but it is not necessarily tied to the negotiation of new rules enshrined in major agreements or outcomes. While the negotiations have broadened to include a wider range of issues, we demonstrate that transparency and mitigation matters traditionally dominate the agendas. This finding lends support to the call for greater balance among issues. Transparency and mitigation show different patterns. While mitigation issues are more negotiations-intensive, and often about markets, the transparency discussions tend to be more implementation-focused. The database provides an empirical base for further research on various aspects of global climate governance.
Key policy insights
• Intergovernmental agendas provide one way to study how countries collectively view climate change and potential governance options.
• The Climate Negotiations Database finds relative stability in the top ten climate issues discussed over time, with mitigation and transparency as the top two categories.
• The range of issues discussed in the context of international climate negotiations has expanded, especially since 2007. The climate talks have broadened their focus beyond reducing emissions.
• There is a mismatch between the recurrence of mitigation sub-items and substantive outcomes that would yield emissions reductions. Half of the mitigation sub-items relate to market mechanisms and forests, perhaps indicating a lack of attention to the core work of reducing emissions from industrial sources.
• The number of agenda sub-items for the climate regime spiked at the start of the Paris Agreement negotiations and remained relatively high. Under the Paris Agreement, the balance of issues considered may shift and potentially amplify the recent downturn in mitigation-related items.
How do global and regional climate targets, rules, policies, and standards emerge and under which conditions are they effectively enabled within domestic political systems? When and how do national policy innovations diffuse and who are the principle actors involved? This paper aims to shed light on the multilevel intermediation processes that shape climate policy development and implementation, with a particular focus the interplay between the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), regional multilateral institutions, and their member states. As per the original project deliverable, the aim of this study is both descriptive – providing a detailed and historical perspective on “multi-level implementation of the UNFCCC regime through coordinated action within and between member states” – as well as analytical, namely, to assess its “effectiveness and ability to accelerate climate governance implementation”. It builds upon earlier ground-clearing research that produced a comprehensive mapping of the current UNFCCC regime and the wider climate governance regime complex, illuminating scope for action by a wide variety of actors at all scales, from the sub-national to the highest global level of political assembly (Coen, Kreienkamp, and Pegram 2020). By focusing on interscalar interactions on the regional level, this paper zeroes in on particularly important dynamics within this complex ecosystem of global climate governance. More specifically, we compare governance arrangements in the European Union (EU), where supranational climate policymaking is most advanced, to those in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), where regional cooperation on climate change remains very limited.1 Regional organizations provide an instructive domain of analysis because they sit neither at the “top” nor at the “bottom” of the global climate change regime, providing vital governance (regulatory) as well as meta-governance (steering) functions.2 Although there are significant differences between the EU and ASEAN, both case studies point to linkages between global, regional, and national climate governance, with the international framework setting boundary conditions for regional and national policy development and vice versa. However, while these linkages have, at several points in time, accelerated policymaking processes in the EU, they have created few opportunities for significant policy change within ASEAN. Whereas our previous mapping of the global climate governance landscape employed scholarship on regime complexity to illustrate the growing institutional diversity on the inter- 1 This emulates recent scholarship seeking to advance comparative leverage between the EU and ASEAN focused on institutional design, in light of temporal and spatial variation in regional integration processes (Hofmann and Yeo 2017). 2 Meta-governance arrangements do not regulate or govern directly but rather engage in the “organization of self-organization” by providing ground rules for and ensuring the coherence and consistency of different governance regimes and mechanisms, whether through networks, markets, or hierarchical steering (Jessop 1998, p. 42). 4 and transnational level, this paper aims to provide a more sophisticated account of the governance dynamics playing out within this cluster of institutional arrangements through a multilevel governance (MLG) lens. Given space constraints, our focus is on the UNFCCC regime, which remains at the core of the broader climate regime complex (Keohane and Victor 2011). While the regime complexity literature is primarily concerned with the rising density of institutions on the same level of governance and the resulting proliferation of overlapping rules (Alter and Meunier 2009), MLG is more concerned with linkages and interactions between multiple scales and levels of governance and how this affects where policymaking authority is located. This provides a useful frame for exploring if, how, when, and why the UNFCCC regime affects the design of regional and national institutional arrangements and how, in turn, actors at various levels of governance seek to shape the rules and institutions that make up the regime. We show how MLG structures can be exploited by progressive policy entrepreneurs, who advance novel policy solutions, as well as policy obstructers who, for various reasons, are invested in the status-quo. To do so, we employ John Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams framework (MSF), which highlights both the structural conditions that facilitate or impede non-incremental policy change – problem perception, availability of policy solutions, and political willingness – as well as the ability of different agents to exploit these conditions. Understanding these processes, and under which conditions they result in more ambitious climate action, is vital for any efforts to make existing governance arrangements more effective. As such, this paper speaks not just to scholars of global governance, International Relations, public policy, and related disciplines but first and foremost to policymakers at various levels of decision-making, seeking to better understand and reform policy processes. We supplement the EU and ASEAN case studies – which focus primarily on vertical interactions in multilevel governance arrangements – with a case study on transnational policy diffusion, tracing how national climate framework laws have emerged as important governance tools for internalizing UNFCCC rules and norms, mostly in Europe but increasingly beyond. Climate laws are significant because they enshrine binding long-term mitigation targets and establish overarching governance frameworks to realize these targets. While they have primarily diffused horizontally, we also document how policy entrepreneurs have recently managed to “upload” the concept to the EU-level. Some design elements of climate framework laws are even reflected in the Paris Agreement. Because the latter does not set legally binding mitigation targets for individual countries, relying instead on voluntary national commitments, climate laws can provide an important “link between international obligations and national policymaking” (Nash and Steurer 2019, p. 1061). However, for mitigation commitments to be meaningful, accountability structures must be in place to ensure that targets are grounded in science and implemented effectively. As we will show, independent climate advisory bodies 5 (ICABs) can play an important role in this regard – but only if they are properly resourced and vested with requisite powers. To date, only a handful of countries, primarily in Europe, have implemented strong and robust climate laws, with ambitious and quantifiable long-term targets, clear governance provisions, and ICABs that are not just offering scientific advice but also rigid progress monitoring. Meanwhile, in the ASEAN region, long-standing structural limitations to political accountability, participation, and civil society engagement have impeded the development of climate laws and formal ICABs. However, as we will argue, the emergence of informal monitoring regimes comprised of domestic civil society organizations could provide an alternative, albeit “softer”, avenue for driving more ambitious climate action and holding governments to account. This paper begins by introducing multilevel governance (MLG) and the multiple streams framework (MSF), which provide the theoretical anchor for our case studies. We then apply these concepts to reflect on the development of climate governance in the EU, with particular focus on the interplay between the EU and the UNFCCC. This is followed by a case study on ASEAN, where regional climate governance structures are much less developed and there is little coordinated engagement with the UNFCCC regime. To illustrate the diversity of national approaches within ASEAN and identify obstacles and opportunities for more sophisticated climate governance arrangements, we supplement the regional case study with reflections on the current situation in Indonesia and Singapore. The next part of the paper focuses on national climate framework laws, explaining their emergence and ongoing diffusion as well as weighing in on their potential as innovative governance solutions. The paper concludes by reflecting on the future of global, regional, and national climate governance in light of conflicting problem definitions and the need for urgent action, even in the face of other pressing challenges, such as the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.
This article draws lessons for the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement’s pledge and review mechanisms from the performance of comparable review mechanisms established under other international treaties. The article employs systematic evidence synthesis methods to review the existing literature on international review mechanisms in the human rights, trade, labour, and monetary policy fields and identifies six common factors influencing their performance. Applying these findings to the Paris Agreement, the analysis finds that its review mechanisms incorporate many of these factors. In particular, they combine both expert and peer review, allow for repeated interaction and capacity building, and facilitate the regular and transparent provision of information. The comparative analysis also highlights two major deficiencies of the Paris Agreement: the absence of procedures to assess the adequacy of national pledges and actions taken to implement them, and resource constraints in carrying out a complex and arduous review process. Active engagement of non-state actors with review mechanisms is identified as a potential remedy to these shortcomings. However, the overall experience of other regimes suggests that, on their own, review mechanisms provide few incentives for states to undertake significant policy changes. Rather, the political context of each regime conditions the performance of review mechanisms. We therefore conclude that the Paris Agreement’s review mechanisms alone are unlikely to bring about the necessary ratcheting up of climate policy ambitions.
Key policy insights
• Review mechanism performance relies on six factors that are common across international agreements: the ability of the mechanism to solicit accurate information, the involvement of experts and state peers in the review process, the ability to ensure repeated interaction, the institutional capacity to carry out the review, the transparency of the review process and its outputs, and the salience and practicality of the outcomes produced by the review.
• The Paris Agreement’s strengths lie in its rules designed to facilitate the transparent provision of information, the inclusion of both expert and peer review, its facilitation of repeated interaction and in providing support to build the reporting capacities of states.
• The Paris Agreement severely restricts the salience and practicality of its review outcomes by prohibiting an assessment of the adequacy of national pledges.
• It remains uncertain whether the UNFCCC secretariat’s capacity and resources will suffice to carry out the arduous review task.
This article conceptualizes corporate accountability under international law andintroduces an analytical framework translating corporate accountability into seven core elements.Using this analytical framework, it then systematically assesses four models that could be used ina future business and human rights treaty: the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business andHuman Rights model, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights model, the progressive model, andthe transformative model. It aims to contribute to the BHR treaty negotiation process by clarifyingdifferent options and possible trade-offs between them, while taking into account political realities.Ultimately, the article argues in favour of the BHR treaty embracing a progressive model of corporateaccountability, which combines ambitious development of international law with realistic prospectsof state support.
Many forest-related problems are considered relevant today. One might think of deforestation, illegal logging and biodiversity loss. Yet, many governance initiatives have been initiated to work on their solutions. This Element takes stock of these issues and initiatives by analysing different forest governance modes, shifts and norms, and by studying five cases (forest sector governance, forest legality, forest certification, forest conservation, participatory forest management). Special focus is on performance: are the many forest governance initiatives able to change established practices of forest decline (Chloris worldview) or are they doomed to fail (Hydra worldview)? The answer will be both, depending on geographies and local conditions. The analyses are guided by discursive institutionalism and philosophical pragmatism. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
An ecofeminist criticism of neoliberalism, this book uses economic growth, CSR and the press coverage of environmental affairs as a case study. The author argues that CSR is part of a wheel of neoliberalism that continually perpetuates inequality and the exploitation of women and Nature. Using an ecofeminist sense-making analysis of media coverage of food waste, global warming, plastic, economic growth and CSR, the author shows how the press discourse in writing is always similar and serves to preserve the status quo with CSR being just a smokescreen that saved capitalism and just one cog in the wheel of neoliberalism. While available research offers perspectives from business and public relations studies, looking at how CSR is implemented and how it contributes towards the reputation of businesses, this book explores how the media enforce CSR discourse while at the same time arguing for environmental preservation. The book presents a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to explain how and why CSR is being pushed forward by the news media, and how the media preserves the status quo by creating moral panic on environmental issues while at the same time pushing for CSR discourse and economic growth, which only contributes towards environmental degradation. The original research presented in the book looks at how the media write about economic growth, plastics, food waste, CSR and global warming. This interdisciplinary study draws on ecofeminist theory and media feminist theory to provide a novel analysis of CSR, making the case that enforcing CSR as a way to do business damages the environment and that the media enforce a neoliberal discourse of promoting both economic growth and environmentalism, which does not go together. Examining the UK media as a case study, a detailed methodological account is provided so that the study can be repeated and compared elsewhere. The book is aimed at academics and researchers in business and media studies, as well as those in women’s studies. It will also be relevant to scholars in business management and marketing.
The climate regime, comprising the Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992 and the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, contains elements of prescription for and leadership of developed countries and differentiation in favor of developing countries. The nature and extent of differentiation in favor of developing countries in the climate regime, however, has remained contentious through the years. While there is a shared understanding among states that they have common but differentiated responsibilities in addressing climate change, there is little agreement on the formulae for differentiating between states in doing so. This Article argues that the outcomes of international climate negotiations in recent years, in particular the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 and the Cancun Agreements of 2010, offer a distinctive vision of differential treatment. Through these instruments, the international community appears to be moving from differentiation in favor of developing countries towards differentiation or exibility for all countries, as well as towards increasing parallelism between developed and developing countries. The Durban Platform of 2011, which launches a new process to negotiate a post-2020 agreement, con rms this trend, setting the scene for the erosion of differential treatment in the future/post-2020 climate regime. This Article explores the nature of differentiation, as it is evolving, in the emerging climate regime, in particular as it relates to mitigation obligations, and the impact this is likely to have on the design, ambition, reach and rigor of the emerging climate regime.
The Paris Agreement commits nations in Article 2(1) to “Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.” However there is an absence of internationally agreed accounting rules that would permit overall assessments of progress to this goal and any meaningful comparisons of performance between countries. This is true also for the quantitative Copenhagen/Cancún promise by developed nations to jointly mobilize US$100 billion by 2020. Our goal is to provoke discussion about the depth of the problems this lack of a functional definition and accounting system have created and perpetuated. We do so by describing the fragmented system of national reporting of climate finance and how the OECD’s Rio Marker system is serving neither contributors nor recipients. More than a trust issue between developed and developing countries, we argue that the lack of modalities to account for climate finance also considerably impedes the effective functioning of the bottom-up approach that now prevails under the UNFCCC. The deadline to propose "modalities of accounting climate finance" by 2018 is a crucial window in which to address this chronic issue in international climate policy.
As the contours of a post-2012 climate regime begin to emerge, compliance issues will require increasing attention. This volume considers the questions that the trends in the climate negotiations raise for the regime’s compliance system. It reviews the main features of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol, canvasses the literature on compliance theory and examines the broader experience with compliance mechanisms in other international environmental regimes. Against this backdrop, contributors examine the central elements of the existing compliance system, the practice of the Kyoto compliance procedure to date and the main compliance challenges encountered by key groups of states such as OECD countries, economies in transition and developing countries. These assessments anchor examinations of the strengths and weaknesses of the existing compliance tools and of the emerging, decentralized, ‘bottom-up’ approach introduced by the 2009 Copenhagen Accord and pursued by the 2010 Cancun Agreements.
Debates about globalization have centered on calls to improve accountability to limit abuses of power in world politics. How should we think about global accountability in the absence of global democracy? Who should hold whom to account and according to what standards? Thinking clearly about these questions requires recognizing a distinction, evident in theories of accountability at the nation-state level, between “participation” and “delegation” models of accountability. The distinction helps to explain why accountability is so problematic at the global level and to clarify alternative possibilities for pragmatic improvements in accountability mechanisms globally. We identify seven types of accountability mechanisms and consider their applicability to states, NGOs, multilateral organizations, multinational corporations, and transgovernmental networks. By disaggregating the problem in this way, we hope to identify opportunities for improving protections against abuses of power at the global level.
The role of transnational partnerships in contemporary global environmental discourse raises larger questions of the legitimacy, effectiveness and accountability of networked governance. This article advances a conceptual framework for evaluating the legitimacy of partnership networks. Furthermore, it examines, in particular, the multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development announced at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg 2002. Partnership networks have been branded as a new form of global governance with the potential to bridge multilateral norms and local action by drawing on a diverse number of actors in civil society, government and business. Does the rise of global partnerships imply a re-location and diffusion of authority from government to public–private ‘implementation networks’? Recent evaluations of the Johannesburg partnerships suggest that they can gain from a clearer linkage to existing institutions and multilateral agreements, measurable targets and timetables, more effective leadership, improved accountability, systematic review, reporting and monitoring mechanisms. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.
The concepts of transparency and accountability are closely linked: transparency is supposed to generate accountability. This article questions this widely held assumption. Transparency mobilises the power of shame, yet the shameless may not be vulnerable to public exposure. Truth often fails to lead to justice. After exploring different definitions and dimensions of the two ideas, the more relevant question turns out tobe: what kinds of transparency lead to what kinds of accountability, and under what conditions? The article concludes by proposing that the concept can be unpacked in terms of two distinct variants. Transparency can be either 'clear'or 'opaque', while accountability can be either 'soft'or 'hard'.
Public-private partnerships (PPP) have been advanced as a new tool of global governance, which can supply both effective and legitimate governance. In the context of recent debates on the democratic legitimacy of transnational governance, this paper focuses on accountability as a central component of legitimacy. The aim of this paper is to map transnational climate partnerships and evaluate their accountability record in terms of transparency, monitoring mechanisms and representation of stakeholders. Three types of partnerships are identified with respect to their degree of public-private interaction: public-private (hybrid), governmental and private-private. Most of the climate partnerships have functions of advocacy, service provision and implementation. None are standard setting, which indicates that governmental actors are less willing to "contract out" rule-setting authority to private actors in the climate change. Some partnerships, such as the World Summit on Sustainable Development climate partnerships and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects represent "new" modes of hybrid governance with high degree of public-private interaction. However, many partnerships, not least the voluntary technology agreements such as the APP, rest on "old" form of governance based on the logic of lobbying, corporatism, co-optation and interstate bargaining. Private (business-to business) climate partnerships are to varying degrees geared toward quantitative targets in the Kyoto Protocol. The accountability record is higher for hybrid climate partnerships, such as the CDM, due to extensive reporting and monitoring mechanisms, while lower for the governmental networks, such as voluntary technology agreements. Partnerships do not necessarily replace or erode the authority of sovereign states, but rather propels the hybridization and transformation of authority that is increasingly shared between state and nonstate actors. (c) 2008 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
This article uses the lens of accountability to explore the shifting strategies of a range of civil society groups in their engagement with key actors in the global regime on climate change. It first reviews traditional strategies aimed at increasing the 'public accountability' of governments and UN bodies for agreed actions on climate change. This approach is then compared with the growing tendency to pursue the accountability of private corporations with respect to climate change. These strategies aim, among other things, to promote 'civil regulation': that is, governance of the private sector through civil society oversight. The final part of the article reflects on the possibilities and limitations of civil society actors performing such accountability roles in the contemporary politics of climate change and suggests key challenges for future climate advocacy. It argues that success in enhancing the accountability of public and private actors on the issue of climate change has been highly uneven and reflects both the effectiveness of the strategies adopted and the responsiveness of the target actors and institutions. (c) 2008 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Private rule-making features prominently on the research agenda of International Relations scholars today. The field of forest politics in particular has proven to be a lively arena for experimenting with novel policies (for example, third party certification and labeling) and procedures (for example, power-sharing in stakeholder bodies). This article focuses on the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), one of the earliest and most institutionalized private certification schemes, in order to assess the role and relevance of accountability politics for global forest governance. Specifically, we ask three related questions: first, what role did a deepening accountability crisis and the resulting reconstruction of accountability play in the formation of the FSC? Second, how is accountability organized within the FSC? And finally, what accountability outcomes emerge as a result of the FSC's policies and operations? The article closes with some reflections about the limitations of private-based accountability in global environmental politics. (c) 2008 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Non-state actors will play a unique and crucial role in the implementation of the Paris Agreement. Although much of the focus in the run-up to Paris was on mitigation commitments and actions taken by those actors, this essay focuses on another valuable contribution: to hold the Parties to their obligations under the Paris Agreement. Specifically, it argues that, while the formal avenues for non-state actor participation in review processes – seen here to encompass the review of implementation, compliance and effectiveness – remain limited, there are several other ways in which non-state actors can be, and already have been, influential.
There are many reasons why the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) reporting framework requests information from countries. These include understanding and tracking progress with individual or collective commitments or pledges, providing confidence and enhancing accountability in quantified information measured and reported, and providing background information on the scope and ambition of national climate responses. This paper highlights the gaps, inconsistencies and uncertainties in the current reporting framework, which was developed for both long-standing obligations and mitigation pledges for the period to 2020. The paper also identifies possible improvements in the UNFCCC reporting framework in the context of the post-2020 transparency framework and nationally determined contributions (NDCs) for the post-2020 period.
Non-state actors will play a unique and crucial role in the implementation of the Paris Agreement. Although much of the focus in the lead-up to Paris was on the mitigation commitments and actions of non-state actors, this essay focuses on another valuable contribution they can make: to hold the parties to their obligations under the Paris Agreement. I argue that, while the formal avenues for non-state-actor participation in review processes - encompassing the review of implementation, compliance, and effectiveness - remain limited, there are several other ways in which non-state actors can be, and already have been, influential.
A solution to the problem of climate change requires close international cooperation and difficult reforms involving all states. Law has a clear role to play in that solution. What is not so clear is the role that law has played to date as a constraining factor on state conduct. International Climate Change Law and State Compliance is an unprecedented treatment of the nature of climate change law and the compliance of states with that law. The book argues that the international climate change regime, in the twenty or so years it has been in existence, has developed certain normative rules of law, binding on states. State conduct under these rules is characterized by generally high compliance in areas where equity is not a major concern. There is, by contrast, low compliance in matters requiring a burden-sharing agreement among states to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions to a safe level. The book argues that the substantive climate law presently in place must be further developed, through normative rules that bind states individually to top-down mitigation commitments. While a solution to the problem of climate change must take this form, the laws development in this direction is likely to be hesitant and slow. The book is aimed at scholars and graduate students in environmental law, international law, and international relations.
The 2015 Paris Agreement represents a historic achievement in multilateral diplomacy. After years of deeply discordant negotiations, Parties harnessed the political will necessary to arrive at a climate change agreement that strikes a careful balance between ambition and differentiation. The Paris Agreement contains aspirational goals, binding obligations of conduct in relation to mitigation, a rigorous system of oversight, and a nuanced form of differentiation between developed and developing countries. This article will explore the key building blocks of the Paris Agreement—ambition and differentiation—with an eye to mining the text of the Agreement for its interpretative possibilities and underlying politics.
Accountability is seen as an essential feature of governments, businesses and NGOs. This volume treats it as a socially constructed means of control that can be used by the weak as well as the powerful. It contributes analytical depth to the diverse debates on accountability in modern organizations by exploring its nature, forms and impacts in civil society organizations, public and inter-governmental agencies and private corporations. The contributors draw from a range of disciplines to demonstrate the inadequacy of modern rationalist prescriptions for establishing and monitoring accountability standards, arguing that accountability frameworks attached to principal-agent logics and applied universally across cultures typically fail to achieve their objectives. By examining a diverse range of empirical examples and case studies, this book underscores the importance of grounding accountability procedures and standards in the divergent cultural, social and political settings in which they operate. © Cambridge University Press 2007 and Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Transparency is increasingly evoked within public and private climate governance arrangements as a key means to enhance accountability and improve environmental outcomes. We review assumed links between transparency, accountability and environmental sustainability here, by identifying four rationales underpinning uptake of transparency in governance. We label these democratization, technocratization, marketization and privatization, and assess how they shape the scope and practices of climate disclosure, and to what effect. We find that all four are discernible in climate governance, yet the technocratic and privatization rationales tend to overtake the originally intended (more inclusive, and more public-good oriented) democratization and marketization rationales for transparency, particularly during institutionalization of disclosure systems. This reduces transparency's potential to enhance accountability or trigger more environmentally sustainable outcomes.
As negotiations for the post-2020 agreement on climate change are underway and expected to be concluded by the end of 2015, the call for ensuring accountability with respect to the implementation of the agreement is attracting increased attention. Hence, one need to have a clear understanding of the meaning of the term "accountability", particularly as it is used in relation to climate change. Accountability, a term used frequently in politics, is rather new in international law. This paper examines the history of achieving accountability in climate change negotiations, and examines that history under three headings, namely, (1) accountability for historical emissions of developed countries, (2) accountability under the Convention and (3) accountability under the Kyoto Protocol. Through a reflection on past accountability practices, this paper intends to establish that two different modes for achieving accountability have emerged: (1) international legal accountability, and (2) international political accountability. These may well provide useful guides to those involved in crafting the post-2020 agreement. As past practice in climate negotiation has shown, achieving accountability has been fraught with difficulties due to its implications for sanctions or political pressures on a sovereign State. These same concerns would persist in the discussion of the accountability regime for the post-2020 agreement.
The Kyoto Protocol is remarkable among global multilateral environmental agreements for its efforts to depoliticize compliance. However, attempts to create autonomous, arm’s length and rule-based compliance processes with extensive reliance on putatively neutral experts were only partially realized in practice in the first commitment period from 2008 to 2012. In particular, the procedurally constrained facilitative powers vested in the Facilitative Branch were circumvented, and expert review teams (ERTs) assumed pivotal roles in compliance facilitation. The ad hoc diplomatic and facilitative practices engaged in by these small teams of technical experts raise questions about the reliability and consistency of the compliance process. For the future operation of the Kyoto compliance system, it is suggested that ERTs should be confined to more technical and procedural roles, in line with their expertise. There would then be greater scope for the Facilitative Branch to assume a more comprehensive facilitative role, safeguarded by due process guarantees, in accordance with its mandate. However, if – as appears likely – the future compliance trajectories under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change will include a significant role for ERTs without oversight by the Compliance Committee, it is important to develop appropriate procedural safeguards that reflect and shape the various technical and political roles these teams currently play.
Transparency—openness, secured through greater availability of information—is increasingly seen as part of the solution to a complex array of economic, political, and ethical problems in an interconnected world. The “transparency turn” in global environmental governance in particular is seen in a range of international agreements, voluntary disclosure initiatives, and public-private partnerships. This is the first book to investigate whether transparency in global environmental governance is in fact a broadly transformative force or plays a more limited, instrumental role.
After three conceptual, context-setting chapters, the book examines ten specific and diverse instances of “governance by disclosure.” These include state-led mandatory disclosure initiatives that rely on such tools as prior informed consent and monitoring, measuring, reporting and verification; and private (or private-public), largely voluntary efforts that include such corporate transparency initiatives as the Carbon Disclosure Project and such certification schemes as the Forest Stewardship Council. The cases, which focus on issue areas including climate change, biodiversity, biotechnology, natural resource exploitation, and chemicals, demonstrate that although transparency is ubiquitous, its effects are limited and often specific to particular contexts. The book explores in what circumstances transparency can offer the possibility of a new emancipatory politics in global environmental governance.
Observers often cite transparency as a response to the accountability concerns of global actors, but how disclosure and openness actually affect the behavior of international organizations, transnational corporations, and nation-states remains theoretically and empirically under-specified. This article identifies three forces—market pressure, external discourse, and internal norms—that can have a regulatory effect on global actors who make their actions transparent. It also highlights the limitations of such accountability tools and stresses the need for an accounting actor, typically civil society, to bring them to bear. The article then considers the implications of transparency-based accountability for larger questions of global governance, especially its potential to create the kind of nonterritorial, problem-based polities that scholars have called for to address problems that transcend national boundaries.
Two weeks of wrangling and grandstanding at the United Nations climate change conference ended with the "Copenhagen Accord", which was a paper-thin cover-up of what was a near complete failure, though it does enable the process to move forward. These reflections on the climate negotiations first provide a brief encapsulation of events, followed by a discussion of the key negotiation issues that took centre stage. It then provides a political interpretation of the Copenhagen Accord and its future prospects. The reflections locate the process in the context of the larger, and unresolved tensions between the North and the South. The article concludes with an outline of what the Copenhagen experience suggests is needed in the Indian climate debate.
Aimed at the increasing number of policy-makers, stakeholders, researchers, and other professionals working on climate change, this volume presents a detailed description and analysis of the international regime established in 1992 to combat the threat of global climate change. It provides a comprehensive accessible guide to a high-profile area of international law and politics, covering not only the obligations and rights of countries, but ongoing climate negotiations as well.
During the 1990s, increasing transparency emerged as a key objective of those attempting to design the structures of contemporary global governance, touted as "the solution to everything from international financial crises to arms races to street crime".2 A wide array of social forces, non-governmental organisations, state and inter-state agencies have invoked the ideal of transparency in the making of the various structures of global governance. Transparency has featured in competing normative visions of global governance, taking on a range of contested meanings in differing contexts. Inquiry into the drive for increased transparency offers, then, a useful vantage point from which to consider the political processes associated with the making of the structures of contemporary global governance. This paper traces and accounts for the drive for increased transparency as it has been felt in global environmental governance (GEG). Scholars in International Studies (IS) concerned with GEG cast transparency as a norm that has become significant in transforming state behaviour. Increased transparency with regard to states' environmental performance assists in the implementation of inter-state environmental treaties. It is the contention of this paper that such a representation of the rise of transparency in GEG is at best narrow and partial and, at worst, misleading. The impact of transparency in GEG is not as clear as the existing research would suggest. Transparency has become significant not simply in terms of implementing inter-state environmental treaties, but is coming to permeate the structure of environmental governance in a broader and more pervasive manner. Transparency tends to prompt a belief in the desirability of a release of information concerning the environmental performance of institutionalised practices across both state and market institutions. Inquiry into this broader drive for transparency serves to illuminate important contested processes of change currently underway in the making of GEG.
It has been argued that the EU suffers from serious accountability deficits. But how can we establish the existence of accountability deficits? This article tries to get to grips with the appealing but elusive concept of accountability by asking three types of questions. First a conceptual one: what exactly is meant by accountability? In this article the concept of accountability is used in a rather narrow sense: a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences. The second question is analytical: what types of accountability are involved? A series of dimensions of accountability are discerned that can be used to describe the various accountability relations and arrangements that can be found in the different domains of European governance. The third question is evaluative: how should we assess these accountability arrangements? The article provides three evaluative perspectives: a democratic, a constitutional and a learning perspective. Each of these perspectives may produce different types of accountability deficits.
World politics has never been a democratic realm. Now, with interdependence and globalization prompting demands for global governance, the lack of global democracy has become an important public issue. Yet the domestic analogy is unhelpful since the conditions for electoral democracy, much less participatory democracy, do not exist on a global level. Rather than abandoning democratic principles, we should rethink our ambitions. First, we should emphasize, in our normative as well as our positive work, the role played by information in facilitating international cooperation and democratic discourse. Second, we should define feasible objectives such as limiting potential abuses of power, rather than aspiring to participatory democracy and then despairing of its impossibility. Third, we should focus as much on the powerful entities that are the core of the problem, including multinational firms and states, as on multilateral organizations, which often are the focus of criticism. Finally, we need to think about how to design a pluralistic accountability system for world politics that relies on a variety of types of accountability: supervisory, fiscal, legal, market, peer and reputational. A challenge for contemporary political science is to design such a system, which could promote both democratic values and effective international cooperation.
This introductory article draws on the contributions to this special issue to consider the implications of a transparency turn in global environmental and sustainability governance. Three interrelated aspects are addressed: why transparency now? How is transparency being institutionalized? And what effects does it have? In analyzing the spread of transparency in governance, the article highlights the broader (contested) normative context that shapes both its embrace by various actors and its institutionalization. I argue that the effects of transparency-whether it informs, empowers or improves environmental performance-remain uneven, with transparency falling short of meeting the ends many anticipate from it. Nonetheless, as the contributions to this issue make clear, transparency has indeed come of age as a defining feature of our current and future politics. (c) 2010 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Although transparency is a key concept of our times, it remains a relatively understudied phenomenon in global environmental politics. The link between transparency and accountable, legitimate and effective governance is assumed, yet the nature and workings of this link require further scrutiny. Transparency via information disclosure is increasingly at the heart of a number of global environmental governance initiatives, termed "governance-by-disclosure" here. The article identifies two assumptions that underpin such governance-by-disclosure initiatives, and calls for comparative analysis of the workings of such assumptions in practice, as a way to illuminate the nature and implications of a transparency turn in global environmental governance and its link to accountable, legitimate and effective governance. (c) 2008 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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