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Truth and Progress : Philosophical Papers / R. Rorty.
Abstract
Nacido en 1931 y muerto en 2007, Richard Rorty se formó en las universidades de Chicago y de Yale y, aunque se adhirió inicialmente a la filosofía analítica, pronto se volvió un crítico severo de ella y en general de toda la filosofía esencialista centrada en las grandes preguntas. Conocido militante del pragmatismo iniciado por John Dewey, Rorty cuestionó siempre las verdades absolutas y los significados inamovibles y, en contraposición, sostuvo que las ideas deben ser valoradas por su utilidad para facilitar una mejor convivencia social y para que los hombres sean más felices. Nacido en una familia de izquierda, nunca renunció a determinadas reivindicaciones sociales, aunque cierta crítica lo acusa de haberse sometido en demasía a la sociedad del bienestar.
... Several special education scholars have advocated for a perspective reminiscent of Rorty's cognitive relativist framework. Richard Rorty (1979Rorty ( , 1989Rorty ( , 1991Rorty ( , 1998, a philosopher, developed a controversial brand of pragmatism that significantly departed from the views of classical pragmatists like Charles Sanders Peirce (Haack, 1998(Haack, , 2009). Rorty (1979Rorty ( , 1989Rorty ( , 1991Rorty ( , 1998 rejected the possibility of objective truth in both natural and social sciences. ...
... Richard Rorty (1979Rorty ( , 1989Rorty ( , 1991Rorty ( , 1998, a philosopher, developed a controversial brand of pragmatism that significantly departed from the views of classical pragmatists like Charles Sanders Peirce (Haack, 1998(Haack, , 2009). Rorty (1979Rorty ( , 1989Rorty ( , 1991Rorty ( , 1998 rejected the possibility of objective truth in both natural and social sciences. According to Rorty's viewpoint, while the world may exist independently of human minds, truth emerges as a product of human language and interpretation. ...
The field of specific learning disabilities (SLDs) has faced three kinds of challenges. Constitutional challenges arise from classification and definitional complexities, identification issues, comorbidity, and ontological debates. Internal challenges include the inherent difficulties of scientific thinking that compete with intuitionism and confirmation bias, the lack of randomized controlled trials to evaluate interventions, the low rate of replication studies, publication bias, and the gap between research on evidence-based practices and implementation. External challenges include philosophical movements in academia, primarily social constructionism and cognitive relativism. They also encompass broader social trends such as neurological reductionism, educational fads, and political conformism. This article specifically focuses on the influence of cognitive relativism in the field of SLDs. Despite these challenges, the field has made incremental progress by committing itself to scientific inquiry. The fundamental purpose of research is truth-seeking, aiming to expand the knowledge base on how best to support students with SLDs. The development of cognitive theories of dyslexia illustrates the refining nature of scientific inquiry as it moves closer to the truth. Upholding rigorous scientific standards is crucial for the future development of the field, providing effective support and consistently enhancing educational outcomes for students with SLDs.
... Several special education scholars have advocated for a perspective reminiscent of Rorty's cognitive relativist framework. Richard Rorty (1979Rorty ( , 1989Rorty ( , 1991Rorty ( , 1998, a philosopher, developed a controversial brand of pragmatism that significantly departed from the views of classical pragmatists like Charles Sanders Peirce (Haack, 1998(Haack, , 2009). Rorty (1979Rorty ( , 1989Rorty ( , 1991Rorty ( , 1998 rejected the possibility of objective truth in both natural and social sciences. ...
... Richard Rorty (1979Rorty ( , 1989Rorty ( , 1991Rorty ( , 1998, a philosopher, developed a controversial brand of pragmatism that significantly departed from the views of classical pragmatists like Charles Sanders Peirce (Haack, 1998(Haack, , 2009). Rorty (1979Rorty ( , 1989Rorty ( , 1991Rorty ( , 1998 rejected the possibility of objective truth in both natural and social sciences. According to Rorty's viewpoint, while the world may exist independently of human minds, truth emerges as a product of human language and interpretation. ...
The field of specific learning disabilities (SLDs) has faced three kinds of challenges. Constitutional challenges arise from classification and definitional complexities, identification issues, comorbidity, and ontological debates. Internal challenges include the inherent difficulties of scientific thinking that compete with intuitionism and confirmation bias, the lack of randomized controlled trials to evaluate interventions, the low rate of replication studies, publication bias, and the gap between research on evidence-based practices and implementation. External challenges include philosophical movements in academia, primarily social constructionism and cognitive relativism. They also encompass broader social trends such as neurological reductionism, educational fads, and political conformism. This article specifically focuses on the influence of cognitive relativism in the field of SLDs. Despite these challenges, the field has made incremental progress by committing itself to scientific inquiry. The fundamental purpose of research is truth-seeking, aiming to expand the knowledge base on how best to support students with SLDs. The development of cognitive theories of dyslexia illustrates the refining nature of scientific inquiry as it moves closer to the truth. Upholding rigorous scientific standards is crucial for the future development of the field, providing effective support and consistently enhancing educational outcomes for students with SLDs..
... Duggan (2003) argues that some scholars define the identity and cultural politics of the left "as the irresponsible, trivial, divisive other of serious left analysis and organizing" (71). The reasoning behind this othering of identity politics is the so-called lack of emphasis and distraction from the fight against capitalist systems, political economy, and issues of class (Fraser 1995(Fraser /2000Gitlin 1995;Rorty 1998;Dean 2009;Michaels 2016), when identity takes the foreground in social movements that fight racism, sexism, ableism, and homophobia. ...
... From this perspective, movements of identity politics are blamed for fragmenting and dividing leftist efforts (Bramen 2002;Gitlin 1995;Rorty 1998;Fraser 2013) and transforming left politics into a 'politics without politics' (Dean 2009: 21). In this sense, identity politics is seen to fail in uniting and mobilising against the neoliberal capitalism that threatens livelihoods, damages communities, and jeopardises habitats (Fraser 2013). ...
Full text available at: urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-98987
This thesis is concerned with the problematics of contemporary identity politics of body acceptance as situated in the visibility logics of digital media. It examines how seemingly progressive narratives of body-acceptance can rely on normative discourses and dominant ideologies. Thus, it carries out a case study of an American online body-acceptance platform called StyleLikeU which claims to strive for social change by challenging normative beauty ideals. StyleLikeU, also claims to create visibility for everyone, interviews individuals as they take off their clothes while talking about their experiences of suffering due to their non-normativities. This study applies multimodal critical discourse analysis to examine the textual, visual and audio-visual online content created by StyleLikeU. Theoretically, the Foucauldian understanding of neoliberal governmentality is applied. Moreover, emotional capitalism is mobilised in terms of the commodification of affect and affective publics of digital media. Lastly, postfeminism is adopted and viewed through the lens of depoliticisation and inclusion. From this perspective, the analysis focuses on how SLU represents its movement, its actions, its participants and its aims as an online movement. The study concludes that although StyleLikeU claims to challenge normative beauty ideals, it heavily relies on normative neoliberal, postfeminist and middle-class discourses around identities, bodies, beauty and suffering. The study also finds that while StyleLikeU claims to liberate people from normative judgements of beauty with their online content, it creates a new category of non-normativity of its own. The study argues that StyleLikeU makes use of online content to create and sustain affective publics by highlighting personal experiences of suffering which, in turn, become colonised and commodified as they are situated in the landscape of emotional capitalism.
... This quest, Rorty argues, inevitably opens the door to skepticism: "Any theory which views knowledge as accuracy of representation, and which holds that certainty can only be rationally had about representations, will make skepticism inevitable" (Rorty, 1979, p. 113). Employment of these distinctions and pursuits of correspondence have, Rorty (1998) posits, "proved to lead nowhere, proved to be more trouble than they were worth" (p. 45). ...
Skepticism is a stance that is both called for and warned against in the public discourse in general, and in education in particular. Although the size of the educational literature dedicated to this topic is limited, the importance of cultivating skepticism has been discussed by a number of critically oriented researchers. When skepticism is discussed as a desirable trait for education to cultivate, this recommendation nonetheless comes with cautionary adjectives like “healthy,” “constructive,” and “hopeful.” These adjectives suggest that the desirability of skepticism is a matter of degree: Pushed to the extreme, skepticism becomes unhealthy, naïve, destructive, and dismissive. This makes intuitive sense, but with a spirit of skepticism, the following question is posed— when is it necessary to judge whether a particular enactment of skepticism is healthy or not? It is important to explore different vocabularies to enliven educational conversations on skepticism.
At different historical junctures, skepticism manifests with different emphasis and orientations: from the ancient attitude associated with the figure of Pyrrho, in which skepticism is a means to achieve the goal of ataraxia , to the epistemological project initiated by Descartes, and taken to its logical endpoint by Hume, that raises a generalized, global doubt of our ability to attain knowledge. More recently, there have been two anti-foundationalist responses to skepticism: one by Richard Rorty and another by Stanley Cavell. Although their diagnoses of philosophical skepticism do not differ substantially, Rorty and Cavell diverge significantly in their response to it: While Rorty turns it into a futile project, Cavell takes it as an inevitable crisis for finite linguistic beings. A juxtaposition of their widely different responses provides a useful set of vocabulary for nuanced treatment of skepticism in education.
... Una vez refutados, puestos en paréntesis, pierden su objetividad. (Rorty, 1989;1998). ...
Different conceptual positions are conjugated on the notion of intersubjectivity and the transmission of messages, containing
them in the elaboration of an interactive and interpersonal construct that accounts for the constructive nature of the development of the
self, together with the elucidation of the mechanisms involved in its disorders. Concepts such as individuality, mind and ego, are
specified as the transitory manifestation of permanent identification processes, and not as the expression of arrangements solidly installed
in the depths of the psyche, since their different faces vary, as the context undergoes combinations of changes., and order permutations,
which, although apparently new, and random. They are governed by the same and conserved principles of communication, and patterns
of interaction. The present text is proposed to support the thesis that; the naturally intuitive and universal notion of the pronoun I lacks
an intrinsic, immovable, objective, or per se established foothold on which to leverage. Its essenceless nature makes it inevitably
insubstantial. A non-deterministic point of view is held to explain the ontogenesis and expression of the multiple images of a self, which
being nothing more than an open concept, is a totipotential constant, covered with temporary masks, of a broken nature, not continuous.
In short, the self is nothing more than; acting roles in a specific time-space context.
... Ethical decisions are taken at every action that becomes more or less frequent in the behavioral repertoire. Fundamentally, these decisions are not to be rooted on a rationalist milestone: on the contrary, they rely on a sentimentalist one-or, as Rorty (1998) wrote, "most of the work of changing moral intuitions is being done by manipulating our feelings rather than by increasing our knowledge" (p. 172). ...
A philosophical tradition characterized by the praising of rationality, science, and critical thinking, secular humanism also consists in a cultural movement that opposes the resort to religious, ideological dogmas, pseudoscientific practices, and superstitions as criteria for morality and decision-making processes. Historically, different manifestos and declarations emerged as iconic expressions of such movement, one of the most important being the 1980 Secular Humanist Declaration. Taking as its starting point a controversy involving the presence of B. F. Skinner among the countersigners of the declaration, this piece examines the extent to which radical behaviorism could be considered a secular humanist philosophy. To this end, the ten tenets set out in the Secular Humanist Declaration are presented and evaluated in terms of their affinities or divergences in relation to Skinner's stances expressed throughout his philosophical work. Finally, we evaluate how radical behaviorism could feasibly contribute to a secular humanist agenda, by providing more effective ways for the accomplishment of secular humanist values.
... To repeat, I am not suggesting that truth is unimportant or that science cannot attain truth. I am arguing only that scientific progress is to be judged by reference to changes in justification rather than achievement of truths or approximations to truth (which is, thus, a version of pragmatism, insofar as some pragmatists dispense with a truth norm but emphasise justification; see Rorty 1998). Science can come to discover truths about the world precisely by engaging in its justificatory practices, perhaps by adopting what Nagel called a view from nowhere (1986). ...
I defend a novel account of scientific progress centred around justification. Science progresses, on this account, where there is a change in justification. I consider three options for explicating this notion of change in justification. This account of scientific progress dispels with a condition for scientific progress that requires accumulation of truth or truthlikeness, and it emphasises the social nature of scientific justification.
No presente artigo, examinamos criticamente os conceitos de conhecimento e de certeza do senso comum na filosofia de Ludwig Wittgenstein e de G. E. Moore, cotejando suas perspectivas sobre o tema. Nosso fito é aprofundar alguns aspectos do tema, insuficientemente esclarecidos na literatura pertinente. Assim, ensejamos responder primeiro se há uma falácia lógica no argumento dogmático de Moore; segundo, como este problema conduz a um impasse epistêmico de posições irreconciliáveis, que denominamos problema do empate; e terceiro, por que, para mitigá-lo, precisamos distinguir entre o conceito de certeza e o de conhecimento. Como argumento negativo, propomos de partida que Moore vale-se de um uso ambíguo e portanto falacioso do termo “saber”, ora particularista, ora metodista. Sustentamos ademais que tal ambiguidade, requerida para que o termo atenda a ambos o realista e o cético, redunda na aporia do problema do empate. Por outro lado, positivamente, defendemos que o desenlace desse entrave lógico-epistêmico não consiste em decidir qual dos sentidos de “saber” é o correto, senão em reconhecê-los como categorias filosoficamente distintas, ou mesmo opostas. Vindicamos, assim, que o estatuto de proposições imunes à dúvida é lógico, e não epistemológico.
This volume is a comprehensive reference for conducting political analyses of emerging welfare systems in the Global South. These countries have adopted a development-oriented approach, one distinct from the social policy trajectory observed in industrialized capitalist states. However, the pervasive influence of globalization since the 1990s has significantly reshaped policy priorities in these regions. Notably, the political discourse surrounding social policy concepts developed in Northern capitalist states has gained prominence. Irrespective of the geographical focus of the chapters, the volume delves into fundamental social policy concepts and debates, including the ongoing discourse between ‘universalism’ and ‘selectivity’, the challenges posed by the welfare residuum, the intricate role of institutional norms and apparatuses in achieving justice or engendering feelings of shame among social assistance recipients, and the examination of ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ poverty. Additionally, the volume investigates the pendulum shift within social welfare policies, the complex politics surrounding the portrayal of welfare recipients, and the newly established link between poverty and shame. Comprising 12 chapters, the volume employs a case study–based approach to test the applicability and universality of social policy theories and concepts. The central focus lies in assessing the adaptability of concepts and theories developed in the Global North to comprehend the intricacies of welfare politics in the Global South. These case studies contribute to theoretical generalizations that can explain universal principles relevant to both the Global South and North.
In recent pragmatist-leaning philosophy and ethics, the Jamesian notion of the cries of the wounded has reemerged as a method of evoking moral progress. Philosophers like Philip Kitcher have argued that a surefooted approach to the complaints of those harmed by given social moral arrangements may lead to an improvement of moral thought, practices and institutions. Yet, at the same time, it has been acknowledged that this comprises a most evident problem: many wounded stakeholders do not cry out about their sorrow, not at last because they may not be capable of doing so. In this paper, we aim at providing a more detailed account on the communicative range of social unrest, capable of overcoming the reductive vision of some possibly harmed as being silent. Some moral philosophers have highlighted the role of the arts and the humanities in the fostering of a more empathetic imagination. With the aid of continental aesthetics (T. W. Adorno and M. Beistegui), we acknowledge the value of artistic imagination as a communicative faculty extending beyond the limits of discursive reason through non-conceptual tools. Taking it into account in moral inquiry effectively expands and provides a more detailed account on the wounded that are apparently silent, as it includes a variety of forms of communication as moral standpoints and conversational apostrophes. This finally leads us to reread James’ take on the notion of the cries of the wounded, to emphasize the necessity to understand it as a fruitful stance about inclusive moral inquiry exceeding the limits of a conceptual-discursive focus.
O conceito de democracia pode ser analisado sob duas abordagens principais: o constitucionalismo e o igualitarismo. No enfoque do constitucionalismo, a democracia é entendida como um sistema em que o poder é exercido por governantes eleitos, com base em um conjunto de regras e estruturas estabelecidas por uma constituição. A ênfase recai sobre as instituições e os mecanismos formais que regulam o poder, garantindo que as ações dos governantes estejam restritas pelos limites da lei fundamental. O modelo de democracia constitucional valoriza a legalidade e a organização das instituições políticas, assegurando a distribuição equilibrada do poder, de forma que ele seja exercido de maneira previsível e estruturada. Por outro lado, o igualitarismo propõe uma visão da democracia centrada na igualdade de direitos e oportunidades para todos os indivíduos. Nesse modelo, a democracia não se resume a quem detém o poder, mas também envolve a garantia de que todos os cidadãos tenham acesso igualitário aos recursos, oportunidades e que suas necessidades e direitos sejam igualmente atendidos. O igualitarismo coloca em destaque a justiça social e a equidade, buscando construir uma sociedade onde as diferenças de status, riqueza e poder não gerem discriminação ou tratamento desigual. Neste contexto, o presente trabalho tem como objetivo principal analisar o conceito de democracia à luz das ideias do filósofo Richard Rorty. Rorty oferece uma perspectiva singular ao destacar a importância da contingência e da flexibilidade dentro de uma sociedade liberal. Ele argumenta que a democracia não é apenas uma questão de estruturas formais ou distribuição de recursos, mas também envolve a capacidade de uma sociedade se adaptar às mudanças e rever continuamente suas práticas e instituições. A escolha do tema se justifica pela relevância das ideias de Rorty para a compreensão contemporânea da democracia. A pesquisa busca realizar uma análise detalhada da obra de Richard Rorty, bem como de outros pensadores que discutem o conceito de democracia, a fim de avaliar como suas concepções podem contribuir para o debate atual. O método empregado envolve uma leitura crítica das obras de Rorty, com ênfase em suas reflexões sobre a relação entre poder, justiça e igualdade. Dessa forma, o estudo pretende explorar como sua visão pragmática pode fornecer novas maneiras de interpretar as dinâmicas democráticas na sociedade contemporânea.
The article presents a response to Igor Dzhokhadze’s critical review of Oksana Tselishcheva’s book Richard Rorty: A Marginal Analytical Philosopher.” The main reproach of Dzhokhadze lies in the incorrect, from his point of view, depiction of the figure of Rorty, who, according to Dzhokhadze, is “a monoideist philosopher who, for 35 years of his life, adhered to one essentially unchanged position [of a pragmatist].” The author rejects this “monoideism” attributed to Rorty, showing that, firstly, Dzhokhadze ignores Rorty’s assessment of his own philosophy, and secondly, wrongfully restricts his philosophical evolution — from a linguistic turn to analytical philosophy and its criticism and the subsequent turn to an increasingly rich palette of philosophical prose with its inherent relativism syncretism, ecumenism and pluralism. The author questions Dzhokhadze’s confidence that Rorty’s “pragmatism” excludes the above-mentioned evolution of the philosopher’s views, showing that pragmatism itself acts as an umbrella term for a rather diverse philosophical techniques and views. The article refutes the popular view supported by Dzhokhadze that criticism of analytical philosophy resulted in Rorty’s final rejection of its methods and values, and shows that the evolution of his philosophy led to the recognition of its parity with the “instructive, revolutionary, hermeneutic” philosophy recognized by him. This is evidenced by the title of Tselishcheva’s book, quoting Rorty’s own confession. Unlike Dzhokhadze, the author considers Rorty’s re-description of himself to be the most important topic, which is reflected in the evolution of his views on the essence of philosophy, from “philosophy as the conversation of mankind” to “philosophy as cultural policy.” Critical assessments of other researchers, in order to limit the consideration of Rorty’s work to the “more or less accurate and well-founded” opinion of one researcher (in this case, Dzhokhadze), are not motivated by scientific considerations, which are indicated in this article.
Arguably, Rosa’s interpretation of modernity suffers from a hidden degree of fatalism. Rosa’s tendency to attribute a moment of constitutive uncontrollability to the ways in which the world presents itself to us is in danger of understating the important civilizational achievements that have allowed humans to make significant progress of different types and in numerous respects throughout their evolutionary history as a species. There is a considerable amount of historical and empirical evidence to suggest that our species-distinctive attempt at making more and more aspects of the world controllable has had, and continues to have, both negative and positive, disempowering and empowering, repressive and emancipatory consequences. A balanced approach needs to account for this ambivalence, which appears to be built into the human condition.
La diffusione della comunicazione attraverso canali non convenzionali, in primo luogo i social network, sta alimentando una serie di preoccupazioni relative all’emersione della cosiddetta narrazione cospirativa. Il saggio cerca di comprendere la struttura di tale tipologia narrativa evidenziando come la società occidentale presenti i sintomi di quella che Girard chiamava «crisi sacrificale» (ricerca spasmodica di un capro espiatorio e spirito profetico diffuso). Tuttavia, lo storytelling emergente non riesce ad approdare a uno schema narrativo tragico, che potrebbe dischiudere la possibilità di una catarsi per i fruitori, ma resta intrappolato in una narrazione fortemente polarizzata. Questo tipo di struttura caratterizza sia le interpretazioni della realtà dette comunemente complottiste sia le contro-spiegazioni a difesa dell’establishment che si auto-definiscono scientifiche e demistificatorie. Questa narrazione riflette la nostra regressione immaginativa dovuta all’impossibilità di pensare un futuro al di fuori del sistema capitalista, i cui squilibri vengono percepiti come naturali e inevitabili.
The post-Soviet period (1989–2022) was, in its own way, an unprecedented era in human history. Its uniqueness lied not only in the fact that the USSR’s dissolution had opened opportunities for the people and nations of Eastern Europe and northern Eurasia to experience freedom and test their creative powers, but also in the fact that these opportunities did not extract a price comparable to the cost in human lives
and suffering during the Russian Revolution and Civil War of 1917–24. The post-Soviet Human attempted to establish free politics and economy, as well as to gain collective emancipation and personal freedom during this era. Even though these attempts failed in most cases, the post-Soviet Human’s political creativity—with its democratic and autocratic achievements—was an intriguing phenomenon worth deeper study and understanding. Without learning the lessons of post-Soviet history, the East European and north Eurasian peoples are doomed to perpetually repeat its vicious cycles of tragedy and destruction.
This article argues that Richard Rorty’s philosophy has a blind spot regarding our relationship with nature. It examines his distinct version of pragmatism to find ways to address this shortcoming. Rorty’s antirepresentational “pragmatism as anti-authoritarianism” and its anthropocentric character are discussed. His linguistic instrumentalism is problematized since it entails an unapologetic Baconian view of knowledge as power and nature as a manipulable object. While Rorty’s Darwinian image of the human being somewhat relativizes this Baconian humanism, it does not address the dependence of the human species on its natural environment. According to the romantic dimension in Rorty, the human being is rather exalted, and the imperative of infinite self-creation ignores natural limits. However, there are valuable resources in Rorty’s philosophy that can limit this imperative and his instrumentalism. For instance, Rorty’s anti-authoritarianism reminds us of the moral responsibility of choice about (our) nature. Furthermore, his inclusivist ethic of solidarity implies the potential extension beyond the human species. Lastly, his notion of philosophy as cultural politics could foster democratic discussion on the pressing issues of technological advance.
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were a set of measurable goals and targets agreed to by all United Nations (UN) member countries in 2001 or thereafter to achieve substantial socio‐economic improvement for all developing countries by 2015. The MDGs were defined by some as an ‘international super‐norm’ that made the eradication of extreme poverty a global policy and responsibility. In this article, we examine the broader historical and discursive context that facilitated this institutional emergence and draw on Rorty and Braithwaite to suggest that the MDGs can be considered an ‘institution of hope.’ The paper contextualises the political economy of despair that prevailed in the 1990s before outlining Rorty's critique of neo‐liberalism and post‐developmentalism and explaining the political value of hope as a collective motivating emotion. The paper then examines critiques of the MDGs before concluding that the MDGs performed a valuable function in reinvigorating global concern over poverty eradication, even if, in retrospect, the MDGs themselves remained only what Rorty referred to as a ‘plausible narrative of progress.’
In this essay, I seek to clarify and defend a unified account of realism, i.e. a conception of realism that does not only apply to philosophy of science, but also acknowledges how realism is understood in other philosophical disciplines—particularly, how moral realism is treated in metaethics. I will argue that integrating scientific and moral realism is less straightforward than is commonly assumed, due to several substantial, but often unnoticed disanalogies that obtain between both views. As a consequence, scientific realists should consider modifying their traditional understanding and move towards an alternative conception of realism—one that is much more in line with the conception that moral realists usually adopt. Realism (about science or ethics) is, in the final analysis, best characterised as an alethic view which restricts itself to an idea about the objectivity of truth, rather than an epistemic view which underwrites more extensive theses concerning the accessibility of this truth for human knowledge.
У статті здійснено спробу дослідити теоретичні основи феномена чуток. Проаналізовано доробок західних науковців, які окреслюють контекст і передумови виникнення й поширення чуток, їхні функції та змістовний складник. Проаналізовано філософські підвалини дослідження феномена чуток в українській та закордонній науковій думці. Здійснено спробу продемонструвати трансформацію феномена чуток та особливості підходів до них із появою інтернету і соціальних медіа. У праці окреслено теоретичні підходи до вивчення чуток представниками різних наук. Зроблено спробу окреслити погляди дослідників на практичні аспекти протидії шкідливим чуткам.
Enactivism does not have its primary philosophical roots in pragmatism: phenomenology (from Husserl to Jonas) is its first source of inspiration (with the exception of Hutto & Myin’s radical enactivism). That does not exclude the benefits of pragmatist readings of enactivism, and of enactivist readings of pragmatism. After having sketched those readings, this paper focuses on the philosophical concept of intentionality. I show that whereas enactivists endorse the idea that intentionality is a base-level property of cognition, pragmatism offer(ed) us some reasons not to proceed this way. It is therefore doubtful to hold that pragmatists and enactivists would converge in the defence of a common, non-representational conception of intentionality.
The main purpose of this paper is to assess the validity of the contention that, over the past few decades, the public sphere has undergone a new structural transformation. To this end, the analysis focuses on Habermas’s recent inquiry into the causes and consequences of an allegedly ‘new’ or ‘further’ [erneuten] structural transformation of the political public sphere. The paper is divided into two parts. The first part considers the central arguments in support of the ‘new structural transformation of the public sphere’ thesis, shedding light on its historical, political, economic, technological, and sociological aspects. The second part offers some reflections on the most important limitations and shortcomings of Habermas’s account, especially with regard to key social developments in the early twenty-first century. The paper concludes by positing that, although the constitution of the contemporary public sphere is marked by major—and, in several respects, unprecedented—structural transformations, their significance should not be overstated, not least due to the enduring role of critical capacity in highly differentiated societies.
Seit nunmehr vier Jahrzehnten beschäftigt die Renaissance des Pragmatismus Philosophen und Theoretikerinnen. In verschiedenen Fächern, von der Philosophie und den Literaturwissenschaften bis zur Soziologie und Jurisprudenz, haben die sich um den Pragmatismus zentrierenden Diskussionen zu interessanten neuen Einsichten geführt. Allerdings ist es bisher nicht gelungen zu erhellen, auf welch komplexe Art und Weise Pragmatismus, Humanismus, Antiautoritarismus und die Idee einer genuin post-metaphysischen Kultur zusammenhängen. Seine Version des Pragmatismus als Antiautoritarismus verstehend, sucht Richard Rorty den antiautoritären Gestus aus den praktischen Bereichen der Ethik und Politik auf die Epistemologie zu übertragen. Sein Antiautoritarismus besagt, dass es keine nicht-menschliche Autorität gibt, deren Befehlen Menschen zu gehorchen hätten; weder die Wahrheit oder der Wille Gottes noch die Vorstellung einer objektiven Realität oder die Idee des wirklich Realen können als Autoritäten wirken. Die Vorstellung, es gäbe so etwas wie menschliche Verantwortlichkeit gegenüber etwas Nicht-Menschlichem, gilt es zu verabschieden. Dieser Aufsatz gliedert sich in drei Teile. Der erste sucht dazulegen, inwiefern der Pragmatismus als Antiautoritarismus zu verstehen ist. Der zweite Teil diskutiert die folgende Frage: Wie lässt sich innerhalb eines antiautoritären Rahmens, der bestimmt ist von Kontingenz, Antiessentialismus und der Praxis einer radikalen Historisierung, die Idee der Solidarität denken? Es wird argumentiert, dass die Literatur, und insbesondere der Roman, eine wichtige Rolle bei der Beantwortung dieser Frage spielt. Dieser Teil konzentriert sich auf Rortys Position. Ein kurzer abschließender Teil beschäftigt sich mit der Frage von Antiautoritarismus und ästhetischer Form.
This essay introduces the work of Richard Rorty via a brief biography, and concentrates on the four Rortian themes. Here, Freeman presents a pragmatic vision for business and theories about business in hopes of stimulating more reading and discussion of Rorty’s work. Furthermore, the chapter suggests that scholars need to develop criteria by which they judge the usefulness of work and connect it to how value actually gets created for stakeholders.
Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition that emphasizes the primacy of practice in human knowledge. Although many streams of philosophy fit this description, the moniker usually refers to the approach originated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, with important antecedents in Darwin, Emerson, Hegel, and Kant, among others. Pragmatism was an influential movement from its inception down to the World Wars. Its appeal waned with the rise of behaviorism, pluralism, and critical theory. Recently pragmatism has enjoyed a renaissance thanks to the efforts of neopragmatists like Richard Rorty and Cornel West along with fellow travelers like Richard Bernstein, Jürgen Habermas, Nancy Fraser, and Axel Honneth, and now pragmatic perspectives are well established in numerous domains of political thought.
A key intellectual figure of the late twentieth century and primary force behind the resurgence of American pragmatism, Richard Rorty gained notoriety for his sweeping critique of the western philosophical tradition in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature . As he developed the consequences of his pragmatic philosophy over the next three decades in works like Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity , Truth and Progress , Achieving Our Country , Philosophy and Social Hope , and Philosophy as Cultural Politics , a deep set of democratic commitments and a vision for realizing them emerged. Rorty's thought depicts a mode of political theorizing that aims to move beyond “the entire cultural tradition which made truth a central virtue” of which political theorists have only begun to take full stock. Hope replaces transcendental knowledge, a lightly sketched possible future takes the place of appeals to an independent reality, stories supplant rational arguments, and abstract notions of humanity and rights are abandoned for felt, emotional identifications with particular communities. His work offers a large‐scale program for self‐criticism and reform of western societies by modifying their “self‐image” to make them more responsive to suffering and injustice, both at home and abroad.
In this paper, I discuss the importance of practices of disidentification and imagination for democratic progress and change. To this end, I bring together certain aspects of Stanley Cavell’s and Richard Rorty’s reflections on democracy, aesthetics, and morality with Jacques Rancière’s account of the importance of appearance for democratic participation. With Rancière, it can be shown that any public–political order always involves the possibility (and often the reality) of exclusion or oppression of those who “have no part” in the current order through a particular order of perceptibility, and that democratic action, therefore, requires rupturing acts of political agency on the part of self-proclaimed political actors through which disidentifications and constructions of difference against such existing orders become possible. With Cavell and Rorty, in turn, it can be shown that these rupturing moments, in order to actually become politically effective, require a responsive disposition and a willingness to engage in practices of imagination on the part of those who occupy dominant positions on existing orders, insofar as they must acknowledge the expression of others’ sense of injustice. The upshot of my discussion is that a comprehensive account of the aesthetic dimension of democratic politics must simultaneously address the interruption of political action on the one hand and responsiveness on the other, and that Rancière and the neo-pragmatists Rorty and Cavell complement each other insofar as they illuminate the blind spots of their respective approaches.
This contribution to the Common Knowledge symposium “Whatever Happened to Richard Rorty?” endorses Nicholas Gaskill's analysis of Rorty's limited legacy in the field of science and technology studies. It shows how, rather than engaging with scientific practice in a substantial way, Rorty relied heavily on the ideas of Thomas Kuhn. The article surveys the development of science studies since Kuhn's day, sketching an intellectual genealogy for Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers, whose work addresses—much more directly than Rorty's—current concerns with the climate crisis and environmental degradation.
In Richard Rorty: Outgrowing Modern Nihilism , Tracy Llanera places Richard Rorty in conversation with philosophers confronting nihilism as a “malaise of modernity.” She shows how Rortyan thought offers a horizontal and relational approach to “redemption,” as opposed to religious or philosophical paths to be saved by higher beings or ideas. This essay focuses on Llanera's redescription of Rorty and whether amplifying Rorty's use of “redemption” and “transcendence” is wise. Leaving behind this laden vocabulary might better serve Llanera's purpose of illuminating a path to outgrow, rather than overcome, the anxiety of nihilism. After exploring Llanera's redescription of Rorty, the essay suggests that a different vocabulary—composed of words such as ease, hope, and comfort, and potentially as capable of supporting Llanera's overarching aim—is available in Rorty's writings. Turning to this other vocabulary might strengthen Llanera's significant contribution to the nihilism debate and to Rortyan and pragmatist philosophy more generally.
Philosophy and Social Hope contains cogent accounts of Rorty’s core positions on truth, metaphysics, and ethics once hope replaces certainty. On display is his democracy-centered pragmatism’s wide range of application for promoting moral progress, the project of fostering richer and more humane lives of citizens and making communities more inclusive and just. This chapter situates the book’s chief philosophical claims within his larger project and provides an overview of his pragmatism’s emphasis on philosophy as an instrument of change, expanding the reach of our moral community, and pluralism over commensuration. It then sketches his timely efforts to address the neglect of economic injustice.KeywordsDemocracyEthicsKnowledgeResponsibilityTruth
Richard Rorty is first introduced as both the best known and the most controversial neopragmatist. This introduction then offers a sketch of Rorty’s version of pragmatism that focuses on his democratic anti-authoritarianism, whose transformative aspiration must be taken seriously. The introduction then outlines the main themes of Rorty scholarship for users of the Handbuch, e.g. the questions of truth, realism, relativism, and religion. The debates in the scholarship revolve around Rorty’s transformative aspiration and around what are taken to be the (too rigid) key distinctions he draws: argumentation/redescription, causation/justification, and private/public.One goal of this companion is to continue the conversation among researchers about Rorty. However, it is primarily intended to provide a systematic and comprehensive overview. The presentation of a systematic and comprehensive overview of Rorty’s work informs the resulting structure and individual parts of the volume. The introduction concludes with acknowledgments and general remarks about Rorty’s neopragmatism.KeywordsNeopragmatismTransformative claimAnti-authoritarianismKey distinctions (argumentation/redescriptioncausation/justificationprivate/public)Rorty scholarship
In this chapter, I argue that despite Rorty and MacIntyre’s shared historicism, critics are right to claim that Rorty is more of a relativist than MacIntyre because the latter provides a more substantial conception of rational progress. At its most fundamental, MacIntyre’s inter-tradition conception of rational progress recognizes incoherence as a general ill and the pursuit of truth as a general good, whereas the specter of incommensurability precludes Rorty from establishing generalities regarding progress. Thus, after a brief introduction I present the key points of confluence found in Rorty’s and MacIntyre’s respective conceptions of historicism focusing on their conceptions of “justification” and “rationality” as well as their attempts to reject the charge of relativism. Then I show how MacIntyre’s conception of rational progress and the role he envisions for truth as the ideal end of enquiry set him apart from Rorty. Finally, I conclude that these differences make MacIntyre less susceptible to the charge of relativism and that this, in turn, makes his conception of progress more alluring than Rorty’s.KeywordsHistoricismProgressRelativismMacIntyreJustificationRationalityTruth
This chapter focuses on Rorty’s two major published works on feminist theory and practice: his essay “Feminism and Pragmatism” and his essay “Feminism, Ideology, and Deconstruction: A Pragmatist View.” The first essay takes up issues about the ontological integrity of the term “woman” and defends forms of feminist discourse that are based in radical feminist political discourse, arguing that the hopes and visions projected by the prophetic nature of such discourse can be assisted by pragmatism better than by traditional philosophy. “Feminism, Ideology, and Deconstruction” criticizes the project of ideological critique that Rorty thinks is unhelpful for feminist political projects and further develops his idea of philosophy as a process of “ground-clearing” contrasting it with the work of social change and activism.KeywordsFryeMacKinnonButlerFraserWomanPracticeProphecyIdeological critiqueNew beingRhetoricAppearance versus realityLawPolitics of language
Rorty has made many comments about the nature of philosophy and its professionalized status throughout his career, and these comments often reflect his worries about the extent to which philosophy as a discipline has become irrelevant to contemporary social and political problems and to human lives. This essay focuses on his ideas about philosophy as a kind of writing, a way of tracing a tradition, and on the questions about what makes philosophy like and unlike poetry and prophecy.KeywordsAntifoundationalismAntirepresentationalismTruthHegelKuhnWittgensteinLiterary genre
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