Britain, America, and the Special Relationship since 1941
Abstract
Britain, America, and the Special Relationship since 1941 examines the Anglo-American strategic and military relationship that developed during the Second World War and continued until recent years. Forged on a common ground of social, cultural, and ideological values as well as political expediency, this partnership formed the basis of the western alliance throughout the Cold War, playing an essential part in bringing stability to the post-1945 international order. Clearly written and chronologically organised, the book begins by discussing the origins of the ‘Special Relationship’ and its progression from uneasy coexistence in the eighteenth century to collaboration at the start of the Second World War. McKercher explores the continued evolution of this partnership during the conflicts that followed, such as the Suez Crisis, the Vietnam War, and the Falklands War. The book concludes by looking at the developments in British and American politics during the past two decades and analysing the changing dynamics of this alliance over the course of its existence. Illustrated with maps and photographs and supplemented by a chronology of events and list of key figures, this is an essential introductory resource for students of the political history and foreign policies of Britain and the United States in the twentieth century.
The article explains diverse learning trajectories and outcomes linked to the annual simulation game of the College of Europe’s diplomacy studies programme at the Bruges campus. This novel analysis solidifies the intersection between educational science and diplomatic practice studies. Process tracing based on the literature review, as well as semi-structured interviews with participants and facilitators of the game carve out how the College’s doxa equip future professionals of diplomacy with expertise and practical insight into the EU foreign policy and crisis management procedures. Practice theory-guided analysis argues for a comprehensive study of similar active learning exercises to better grasp these events' multifaceted role in shaping the intellectual dispositions and overall handson learning skills of future diplomats concerning the post-Westphalian routines and actorness of the EU. The role of academically fostered esprit de corps, and the enactment of blended and hybrid diplomacy encounters with the EU characteristics is illustrated with diverse examples from the weeklong roll-out of the game.
By examining the early political career of the Conservative MP Julian Amery, this article considers how the British government attempted to restore its international influence. Using Amery’s career as a lens, this article explores the international context which enforced his change in political leanings; shifting away from neo-colonial imperialism towards Europeanism. It will build upon existing literature, notably Sue Onslow and Lucia Bonfreschi’s contribution on Amery’s career, and go against a recent trend of examining the legacies of Powellite politicians. In doing so, it examines three key themes. Firstly, it investigates the role of the Mau Mau rebellions in fostering a more radical role as an advocate for sustaining British imperial controls abroad. While Amery offered no solution to the rebellion, the Kikuyu attacks laid bare the weakening of the United Kingdom’s overseas influence. In turn, Amery became one of Prime Minister Eden’s most prominent critics during the Suez Crisis. The Anglo-French Agreement of 1954 was viewed as another act of British appeasement towards emerging nationalist governments, which ultimately damaged the United Kingdom’s international reputation.
The Conservative Heath government dropped the term special relationship from the vernacular of Anglo-American relations. Britain’s usefulness to the US was in question, too, epitomised in the April 1975 Wall Street Journal headline of ‘Goodbye Great Britain’. Yet the succeeding Wilson and Callaghan Labour governments were determined to revive Anglo-American relations. This article argues they achieved more to this end than hitherto acknowledged through how they managed Anglo-American relations. Particular attention is drawn to resetting the tone of relations, strategies of engagement of American officials to control fallout from British retrenchment and a discursive modernisation of the special relationship.
This review article focuses on three studies of different aspects of Anglo-American relations, and it attempts to place these studies in the larger context of Anglo-American scholarship. Kori Schake examines British-American affairs over a period of almost two centuries with the intention of explaining the unique process by which an established hegemonic power gave way to a rising power without an armed conflict. This thesis is articulated with a concern about the prospect of the threat of a rising China. Andrew Mumford emphasizes the extent to which the Anglo-American special relationship has been strained by counter-insurgency conflicts since World War II. In various of these crises, both Britain and the United States had different interests, constituencies, and counter-insurgency military methods that alienated and created tension between the two allies. B.J.C. McKercher takes a broader historical look at Anglo-American relations in the twentieth century and finds the special relationship much more flexible and workable than either Schake or Mumford does. He concludes that both countries needed allies and that Britain and the United States still have more in common with each other than with the rest of the international community. Anglo-American relations remains a topic of international interest and relevance.
This two-volume set provides a chronological view of the foreign policy/national security doctrines of key American presidents from Washington to Obama, framed by commentary on the historical context for each, discussions of major themes, and examinations of the lasting impact of these policies.
The National Security Doctrines of the American Presidency: How They Shape our Present and Futureprovides a chronological examination of the foreign policy and national security doctrines of key American presidents from Washington to Obama, covering everything from our missionary zeal and our pursuit of open navigation of the seas, to our involvement in the ongoing political and military conflicts in the Middle East. It addresses the multiple sources behind the doctrines: real, rhetorical, and ideological. Arranged chronologically, each chapter offers commentary on the historical evolution of these doctrines, identifies the major themes, and highlights unique revelations.
Ideal for universities, colleges, libraries, academics, classroom teachers, policy makers, and the educated electorate, this two-volume set represents a compendium of national security doctrines that explains how these first doctrines have constrained, restrained, and guided every American president regardless of party, providing comprehensive information that cannot be found in any other single source. Further, the work presents the reader with examples and explanations of precisely how these doctrines from long ago as well as those from recent history directly affect our present and future.
Allies at Odds examines America's Vietnam policy from 1961 to 1968 in an international context by focusing on the United States' relationship with its European partners France, West Germany, and Great Britain. The European response to America's Vietnam policy provides a framework to assess this important chapter in recent American history within the wider perspective of international relations. Equally significant, the respective approaches to the "Vietnam question" by the Europeans and Americans reveal the ongoing challenge for nation-states of transcending narrowly defined state-centered policies for a global perspective pursuant of common goals among the trans-Atlantic allies. Blang explores the failure of France, West Germany, and Great Britain to significantly influence American policy-making.
Despite the vigorous study of modern American fiction, today's readers are only familiar with a partial shelf of a vast library. This book describes the distorted, canonized history of the twentieth-century American novel as a record of modern classics insufficiently appreciated in their day but recuperated by scholars in order to shape the grand tradition of Hemingway, Fitzgerald, and Faulkner. It argues that in presenting literary history this way, scholars have forgotten a rich treasury of realist novels that recount the story of the American middle-class's confrontation with modernity. Reading these novels now offers an extraordinary opportunity to witness debates about what kind of nation America would become and what place its newly dominant middle class would have—and, the book suggests, should also lead us to wonder how our own contemporary novels will be remembered.
This book offers a portrait of the most powerful man in Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration. It shows how Harry Hopkins, an Iowa-born social worker who had been an integral part of the New Deal's implementation, became the linchpin in FDR's—and America's—relationships with Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin, and spoke with an authority second only to the president's. Hopkins could take the political risks his boss could not, and proved crucial to maintaining personal relations among the Big Three. Beloved by some—such as Churchill, who believed that Hopkins “always went to the root of the matter”—and trusted by most—including the paranoid Stalin—there were nevertheless those who resented the influence of “the White House Rasputin”.
Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) was an American naval officer, considered one of the most important naval strategists of the nineteenth century. In 1885 he was appointed Lecturer in Naval History and Tactics at the US Naval War College, and became President of the institution between 1886–1889. This highly influential volume, first published in 1890, contains Mahan's analysis of naval warfare and tactics between 1660–1783. Mahan discusses and analyses the factors which led to Britain's naval domination during the eighteenth century, and recommends various naval strategies based on these factors. His work was closely studied by contemporary military powers, with his tactics adopted by many major navies in the years preceding the First World War. This volume is considered one of the most influential published works on naval strategy, and is invaluable for the study of naval warfare both before and during the First World War.
Delimiting the margin that makes a patient treatable or untreatable is an operation fraught with risk, most of all because the different psychopathological variables and their interaction always produce specific profiles which never match each other perfectly. This makes it extremely difficult to derive precise data and criteria for determining in advance the conditions of treatability and the outcomes of psychotherapeutic intervention. Weakness of self, impairment in integration, egocentrism, lack of empathy and poor moral sense, and high level of narcissism are described as the principal variables that must be considered in evaluating the level of treatability.
Beginning with the Cold War and concluding with the 2003 invasion of Iraq, this book explores the overlooked opposition of U.S. diplomats to American foreign policy in the latter half of the twentieth century. During America's reign as a dominant world power, U.S. presidents and senior foreign policy officials largely ignored or rejected their diplomats' reports, memos, and telegrams, especially when they challenged key policies relating to the Cold War, China, and the wars in Vietnam and Iraq. The book recovers these diplomats' invaluable perspective and their commitment to the transformative power of diplomatic writing. It showcases the work of diplomats whose opposition enjoyed some success. George Kennan, John Stewart Service, John Paton Davies, George Ball, and John Brady Kiesling all caught the attention of sitting presidents and policymakers, achieving temporary triumphs yet ultimately failing to change the status quo. The book follows the circulation of documents within the State Department, the National Security Council, the C.I.A., and the military, and it details the rationale behind “The Dissent Channel,” instituted by the State Department in the 1970s, to both encourage and contain dissent. Advancing an alternative narrative of modern U.S. history, the book connects the erosion of the diplomatic establishment and the weakening of the diplomatic writing tradition to larger political and ideological trends while, at the same time, foreshadowing the resurgent significance of diplomatic writing in the age of Wikileaks.
It has long been argued that Baldwin's second government, especially the Foreign Office led by Austen Chamberlain, was to blame for the deterioration in Anglo-American relations in 1927–9. This book argues that Austen Chamberlain, by suggesting a reduction in maritime belligerent rights, consistently worked for an improvement in relations and found the means for a settlement in 1929, though Labour's success in the general election caused the credit to go to others and Chamberlain's reputation remained tarnished. While the earlier view was based mainly on the memoirs of contemporary critics, Dr McKercher bases his analysis on a wide range of public and private archival material.
A compelling account of the diplomatic and military actions that led to Kosovo's independence and their implications for future U.S. and UN interventions.
Kosovo, after its incorporation into the Serbian Republic of Yugoslavia, became increasingly restive during the 1990s as Yugoslavia plunged into internal war and Kosovo's ethnic Albanian residents (Kosovars) sought autonomy. In March 1999, NATO forces began airstrikes against targets in Kosovo and Serbia in an effort to protect Kosovars against persecution. The bombing campaign ended in June 1999, and Kosovo was placed under transitional UN administration while negotiations on its status ensued. Kosovo eventually declared independence in 2008. Despite internal political tension and economic problems, the new nation has been recognized by many other countries and most of its inhabitants welcome its separation from Serbia.
In Liberating Kosovo, David Phillips offers a compelling account of the negotiations and military actions that culminated in Kosovo's independence. Drawing on his own participation in the diplomatic process and interviews with leading participants, Phillips chronicles Slobodan Milosevic's rise to power, the sufferings of the Kosovars, and the events that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. He analyzes how NATO, the United Nations, and the United States employed diplomacy, aerial bombing, and peacekeeping forces to set in motion the process that led to independence for Kosovo. He also offers important insights into a critical issue in contemporary international politics: how and when the United States, other nations, and NGOs should act to prevent ethnic cleansing and severe human-rights abuses.
George W. Bush has launched a revolution in American foreign policy. He has redefined how America engages the world, shedding the constraints that friends, allies, and international institutions impose on its freedom of action. He has insisted that an America unbound is a more secure America. How did a man once mocked for knowing little about the world come to be a foreign policy revolutionary? In America Unbound, Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay dismiss claims that neoconservatives have captured the heart and mind of the president. They show that George W. Bush has been no one's puppet. He has been a strong and decisive leader with a coherent worldview that was evident even during the 2000 presidential campaign. Daalder and Lindsay caution that the Bush revolution comes with significant risks. Raw power alone is not enough to preserve and extend America's security and prosperity in the modern world. The United States often needs the help of others to meet the challenges it faces overseas. But Bush's revolutionary impulse has stirred great resentment abroad. At some point, Daalder and Lindsay warn, Bush could find that America's friends and allies refuse to follow his lead. America will then stand alone-a great power unable to achieve its most important goals.
In September 1978 William Quandt, a member of the White House National Security Council staff, spent thirteen momentous days at Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland, where three world leaders were holding secret negotiations. When U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin emerged from their talks, they announced a signal accomplishment: the first peace agreement between Israel and one of its Arab neighbors, Sadat’s Egypt. Quandt, drawing on what he saw and heard during the talks and on official documents, wrote Camp David in order to show how presidents negotiate difficult issues. His book has become, with time, a scholarly classic and, as Martin Indyk notes in his foreword, “a model of critical, in-depth, fact-based, policy-relevant research." Quandt’s book is not only an eyewitness account but also a scholar’s reconstruction of a milestone event in Middle East diplomacy, with insights into the people, politics, and policies. His Camp David has provided a comprehensive and lasting guide to the difficult negotiations surrounding the talks, including the fraught scenario leading up to the meetings at the presidential retreat and the talks and accord that would lead to Sadat and Begin jointly receiving the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize. Praise for Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics “The most authoritative account of a major historic event, written with scrupulous scholarship by a key behind-the-scenes participant." -Zbigniew Brzezinski, Adviser to the President for National Security Affairs, 1977-81 “An excellent piece of work… will represent a major contribution to the academic literature on American Middle East policy during the Carter administration. No one but Bill Quandt could, in my view, write so knowledgeable, yet so judiciously balanced, an account." -Hermann Frederick Eilts, Director, Boston University Center for International Relations, and ambassador to Egypt, 1973-79 “Quandt writes as a participant in the process and as a thoughtful, proven scholar, an expert on international diplomacy and on the Middle East." - Foreign Affairs.
The Cold War continues to shape international relations almost twenty years after being acknowledged as the central event of the last half of the twentieth century. Interpretations of how it ended thus remain crucial to an accurate understanding of global events and foreign policy. The reasons for the Cold War's conclusion, and the timing of its ending, are disputed to this day. In this concise introduction to the Cold War and its enduring legacy, John Prados recognizes the debate between those who argue the United States was the key player in bringing it to a close and those who maintain that American actions were secondary factors. Like a crime scene investigator meticulously dissecting evidence, he applies a succession of different methods of historical analysis to illuminate the key cataclysmic events of the 1980s and early 1990s from a range of perspectives. He also incorporates evidence from European and Soviet intelligence sources into the study. The result is a stunning narrative that redefines the era, embraces debate, and deconstructs history, providing a coherent explanation for the upheavals that ended the conflict. How the Cold War Ended also provides an in-depth guide to conducting historical inquiries: how to choose a subject, how to frame a narrative, and how to conduct research and draw conclusions. Prados does this for a variety of methods of historical analysis, furnishing a how-to guide for "doing history" even as it explores a crucial case study.
The conflict in Iraq is characterized by three faces of war: interstate conflict, civil war, and insurgency. The Coalition’s invasion of Iraq in March 2003 began as an interstate war. No sooner had Saddam Hussein been successfully deposed, however, than U.S.-led forces faced a lethal insurgency. After Sunni al Qaeda in Iraq bombed the Shia al-Askari Shrine in 2006, the burgeoning conflict took on the additional element of civil war with sectarian violence between the Sunni and the Shia. The most effective strategies in a war as complicated as the three-level conflict in Iraq are intertwined and complementary, according to the editors of this volume. For example, the "surge" in U.S. troops in 2007 went beyond an increase in manpower; the mission had changed, giving priority to public security. This new direction also simultaneously addressed the insurgency as well as the civil war by forging new, trusting relationships between Americans and Iraqis and between Sunni and Shia. This book has broad implications for future decisions about war and peace in the twenty-first century. © 2010 by Heather S. Gregg, Hy S. Rothstein, and John Arquilla.
British North America on the Eve of Confederation - Canadian Confederation and Historical Explanation - The Origins of British Support for Canadian Confederation -The British and Their Perceptions - Motives and Expectations of the British - The Role of the British in the Launching of Confederation - The Role of the British in the Achievement of Confederation - Conclusion - Abbreviations - Endnotes - Index
The transition of Hong Kong from a British dependent territory to a Special Administrative Region formally began with the conclusion of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984. The British and Chinese governments agreed that Hong Kong would be returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 under the ‘one country, two systems’ formula. According to the agreement the territory would be ruled by local Hong Kong Chinese with ‘a high degree of autonomy’. Its existing political, economic, legal and social systems would also remain unchanged for at least 50 years.