The Secret to Happiness: Feeling Good or Feeling Right?

Abstract

Which emotional experiences should people pursue to optimize happiness? According to traditional subjective well-being (SWB) research, the more pleasant emotions we experience, the happier we are. According to Aristotle, the more we experience the emotions we want to experience, the happier we are. We tested both predictions in a cross-cultural sample of 2,324 participants from eight countries around the world. We assessed experienced emotions, desired emotions, and indices of well-being and depressive symptoms. Across cultures, happier people were those who more often experienced emotions they wanted to experience, whether these were pleasant (e.g., love) or unpleasant (e.g., hatred). This pattern applied even to people who wanted to feel less pleasant or more unpleasant emotions than they actually felt. Controlling for differences in experienced and desired emotions left the pattern unchanged. These findings suggest that happiness involves experiencing emotions that feel right, whether they feel good or not.

Full text

Running head: FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 1
The Secret to Happiness: Feeling Good or Feeling Right?
Maya Tamir1, Shalom H. Schwartz1,2 Shige Oishi3, & Min Y. Kim4
1The Hebrew University
2National Research University—Higher School of Economics, Moscow
3The University of Virginia
4Keimyung University, Daegu, Republic of Korea
In press (2017): Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Author Note. This work was supported by Grant 794/11 from the Israel Science Foundation. The
authors thank Jan Cieciuch, Michaela Riediger, Claudio Torres, Christie Scollon, Vivian Dzokoto
and Xiaolu Zhou for their help with data collection. The ideas and data presented in this paper were
previously presented at colloquium talks at the Hebrew University and UC Berkeley.

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 2
Abstract
Which emotional experiences should people pursue to optimize happiness? According to
traditional subjective well-being (SWB) research, the more pleasant emotions we experience, the
happier we are. According to Aristotle, the more we experience the emotions we want to
experience, the happier we are. We tested both predictions in a cross-cultural sample of 2,324
participants from eight countries around the world. We assessed experienced emotions, desired
emotions, and indices of well-being and depressive symptoms. Across cultures, happier people
were those who more often experienced emotions they wanted to experience, whether these were
pleasant (e.g., love) or unpleasant (e.g., hatred). This pattern applied even to people who wanted to
feel less pleasant or more unpleasant emotions than they actually felt. Controlling for differences
in experienced and desired emotions left the pattern unchanged. These findings suggest that
happiness involves experiencing emotions that feel right, whether they feel good or not.
Keywords: happiness, well-being, emotion, culture, motivation

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 3
The Secret to Happiness: Feeling Good or Feeling Right
Happiness is often defined as “a state of well-being and contentment” (Merriam-Webster,
2016). It is perhaps one of the most salient of human pursuits (Diener, Sapyta, & Suh, 1998). How
can one attain this state of well-being? One answer is by increasing pleasure and decreasing pain
(Kahneman, 1999). Indeed, some psychologists argue that happiness involves maximizing pleasant
emotions and minimizing unpleasant emotions (e.g., Diener, 1984; Kahneman, Diener, & Schwarz,
1999; Kuppens, Realo, & Diener, 2008; Lucas, Diener, & Suh, 1996). This approach has
dominated the field of subjective well-being (SWB) over the last 30 years (see Diener, 2013, for a
recent review). The present article explores another possible answer based on the Aristotelian
approach. Aristotle suggested that happiness involves feeling the right emotions. Such emotions
are not necessarily pleasant emotions and may even be unpleasant, like anger or fear (Thomson,
1955). Indeed, Aristotle held that the absence of unpleasant emotions is not an indicator of
happiness. Instead, happiness is linked to feeling unpleasant emotions when they are appropriate
and goal-conducive. The present research is a first attempt to test whether feeling the right
emotions may be critical in attaining happiness.
What Are the Right Emotions?
For Aristotle, happiness entails experiencing the right emotions (Nicomachean Ethics,
1105b25–6). In Book 2 of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that “to have these feelings at the
right times on the right grounds towards the right people for the right motive and in the right way
is (…) the mark of virtue” (1106b9-1107a1; Thomson, 1955, p. 101). Anger, fear, as well as
pleasure are right, for some people, for some reasons. For example, for a minority group member
who seeks justice because people in the majority mistreat him, feeling anger may just be the right
emotion. Whether an emotion is right, therefore, depends on the goals and needs of each

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 4
individual. Whereas anger may feel right to some, it may feel wrong to others. Happiness,
according to Aristotle, should involve feeling emotions that people deem to be appropriate given
their needs and motives. Building on Aristotle’s account, therefore, we define “feeling right” as
feeling emotions that one considers to be desirable.
Which emotions people consider desirable differs systematically across situations,
individuals, and cultures. Individuals differ in the extent to which they desire pleasant states. For
instance, whereas some individuals desire high arousal pleasant emotions, such as excitement,
others desire low activation pleasant emotions, such as calmness (Rusting & Larsen, 1995). This
pattern also differs by culture, such that Americans, on average, desire high arousal pleasant
emotions more than East Asians do (Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006). Individuals also differ in the
extent to which they desire unpleasant states. For instance, European Americans seem to be more
motivated to minimize unpleasant states, compared to Germans (Koopmann-Holm & Tsai, 2014).
In addition, whereas European Americans seek to maximize pleasant experiences and minimize
unpleasant experiences, members of collectivistic cultures seek more balanced emotional
experiences, and are less motivated to minimize unpleasant experiences (e.g., Miyamoto, Ma, &
Peterman, 2014; Sims et al., 2015).
We have recently proposed that people’s values are one factor that might determine which
emotions they desire (Tamir, Schwartz et al., 2016). In a cross-cultural study, we found that people
desired emotions that were consistent with their core values. For instance, individuals who valued
self-transcendence (benevolence, universalism) desired more love, trust, and compassion (i.e., self-
transcending emotions) than others did, whereas those who valued self-enhancement (power,
achievement) desired more pride, but also more anger, hatred and contempt (i.e., self-enhancing
emotions) than others did.

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 5
Aristotle claimed that feeling emotions that are consistent with one’s values feels right, and
feeling right relates to greater happiness. Is this indeed the case? Furthermore, is this the case even
when the right emotions are unpleasant to experience? To address these questions, the present
investigation tested whether individuals are happier if they experience the emotions they desire
than if they do not, whether the emotions are pleasant or unpleasant.
We assessed the degree to which a person feels the right emotion by computing the
discrepancy between the amount of the emotion the person desires to feel and the amount of that
emotion the person actually feels. Previous research on pleasant emotions found that the smaller
the discrepancy between experienced and desired pleasant states, the more satisfied people are
(e.g., Kämpfe & Mitte, 2009; Larsen & McKibban, 2008; Rice, McFarlin, & Bennett, 1989). When
individuals desire pleasant emotions, the Aristotelian prediction is the same as the prediction of
traditional SWB researchers: people are happier if they experience as much of a pleasant emotion
as they desire. However, when people desire unpleasant emotions, the Aristotelian prediction and
the prediction of traditional SWB researchers are in stark contrast. The Aristotelian prediction is
that such people would be happier the more they feel the emotion they desire, even though that
emotion is unpleasant. The traditional SWB prediction is that people would be happier the less
they feel that unpleasant emotion, whether they desire it or not. That is because SWB researchers
typically treat pleasant emotions as good and unpleasant emotions as bad (at least for SWB;
Diener, 1984; Kahneman, 1999).
Right Emotions and Happiness across Individuals and Cultures
To our knowledge, the Aristotelian claim regarding feeling right has not been explicitly
tested in well-being research. However, this claim is consistent with several existing theoretical
approaches. For example, according to the value-as-a-moderator model of SWB (Oishi, Diener,

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 6
Suh, & Lucas, 1999), sources of SWB (e.g., achievement, self-esteem, social relationships) differ
across individuals and cultures depending on their values. For instance, satisfaction with one’s
daily achievements predicted the overall daily life satisfaction of individuals more strongly if they
were high (vs. low) in achievement values (Oishi et al., 1999). Likewise, satisfaction with one’s
finances predicted life satisfaction more in poor countries than in wealthy ones (Oishi, Diener,
Lucas, & Suh, 1999). This pattern also extends to hedonic experiences. For instance, daily physical
pleasure predicted overall daily satisfaction more among people high (vs. low) in sensation seeking
(Oishi, Schimmack, & Diener, 2001). Similarly, experiencing excitement increased life satisfaction
more among individuals high (vs. low) in sensation seeking (Oishi, Schimmack, & Colcombe,
2003, Study 5). At the national level, positive emotions related more strongly to life satisfaction in
countries that stress self-expression values than in countries that stress survival values (Kuppens et
al., 2008).
To the extent that value priorities differ across cultures (Schwartz, 2011), it is reasonable to
assume that different emotions may be associated with happiness across cultures (Mesquita, de
Leersnyder, & Albert, 2014). Kitayama, Markus, and Kurokawa (2000), for instance, found that
interpersonally disengaging pleasant emotions (e.g., pride) were strongly associated with happiness
among Americans, whereas interpersonally engaging pleasant emotions (e.g., fureai) were strongly
associated with happiness among Japanese (see also Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, &
Ramaswamy, 2006). De Leersnyder, Kim, and Mesquita (2015) reported that people are happier
the more they experience emotions that are characteristic of their culture. They found that the
higher the correlation between a person’s emotion profile and the average profile of their culture
the greater that person’s well-being among Koreans, Belgians, and European Americans. In

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 7
general, there is evidence that people tend to be happier when their personal values are consistent
with the dominant cultural values (e.g., Fulmer et al., 2010).
Both values and desired emotions differ across cultures (e.g., Eid & Diener, 2001;
Schwartz, 2011). However, according to the Aristotelian account, regardless of their culture,
individuals should be happier the more they feel emotions that they personally deem desirable.
Thus, although experienced emotions and desired emotions may differ across cultures, the degree
to which individuals experience discrepancies between them (i.e., the degree to which people feel
‘right’) should relate consistently to happiness across cultures. An alternative prediction is that
feeling right relates differently to happiness across cultures. For instance, feeling right might relate
more strongly to happiness in wealthier countries than in poorer countries, where happiness may
depend more on satisfaction of basic needs (see Tay & Diener, 2011). To test these hypotheses, the
present investigation examined the links between feeling right and happiness across a set of
countries that vary on an index of general development (Human Development Report, 2014).
The Current Research
Previous research on the link between well-being and feeling “right” focused exclusively
on pleasant affective experiences (e.g., excitement in Oishi et al., 2003) and a small set of cultures
(e.g., Japan vs. U.S.). None of the previous research tested whether feeling “right” predicts life
satisfaction and depressive symptoms above and beyond feeling “good.” The current research
assessed the desirability of distinct emotions, including both pleasant (e.g., love and compassion)
and unpleasant (e.g., anger and hatred) emotions, and tested the Aristotelian prediction across
cultures. The inclusion of distinct emotions enabled us to test whether happiness is related to
feeling right across distinct emotions or whether happiness is related to experiencing certain right
emotions more than others. We assessed relations of the absolute discrepancies between

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 8
experienced and desired emotions with greater well-being and depressive symptoms in eight
countries around the globe.
We recently identified four emotion categories that map onto key dimensions of core values
(i.e., self-transcendence, self-enhancement, openness to experience, and conservation; Tamir et al.,
2016). We demonstrated that, across cultures, people desire emotions that are more consistent with
their values. People who value self-transcendence (e.g., universalism), for instance, desire more
empathy than others do. Similarly, people who value self-enhancement (e.g., power) desire more
anger than others do. Would people who desire more anger be happier if they experienced more
anger? Or would experiencing more anger make them less happy? To address these questions, we
assessed discrepancies between experienced and desired self-transcending emotions (e.g., love,
empathy), negative self-enhancing emotions (e.g., anger, hatred), opening emotions (e.g.,
excitement, interest) and conserving emotions (e.g., calmness, relief). We tested whether smaller
absolute discrepancies are linked to higher life satisfaction and less depressive symptoms.
Methods
Participants
Participants in this study came from eight countries (i.e., United States, Brazil, China,
Germany, Ghana, Israel, Poland, and Singapore). We chose these countries to represent seven of
the eight world cultural regions (i.e., Anglo, Latin American, Confucian, West European, Sub-
Saharan African, East Central European, and South-Asian) distinguished by both Inglehart and
Baker (2000) and Schwartz (2006). We recruited only native speakers in each country. The entire
sample included 2,324 university students (57.5% female, Mage = 22.47), recruited either through
ads or through local participant pools in their respective universities. Participants received

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 9
monetary compensation (equivalent to $3-$5) or course credit. Table 1 presents the characteristics
of each sample.
Procedure
Participants completed the study in their native language or in their formal language of
instruction. They responded either online (i.e., the study was administered on Qualtrics) or in
writing (see Table 1). For non-English versions, we carried out iterations of translation and back-
translation by independent bilinguals until we obtained satisfactory versions. Separate gender-
matched versions of the survey were used in those languages that distinguish gender. After giving
consent, participants first completed a scale of basic values (PVQ-R; Schwartz et al., 2012).1
Participants then rated their desired emotions. To minimize carryover effects, they next completed
an unrelated, affectively neutral task for five minutes (i.e., creating words from letters in longer
words; e.g., ‘go’ from ‘geography’). Finally, participants rated their experienced emotions,
completed indices of depressive symptoms and well-being, and provided demographic
information.
Materials
Desired and experienced emotions. To assess desired emotions, participants rated how
often they wanted to experience various emotions in their daily life. To assess the actual experience
of emotions, participants rated how often they experienced the same emotions in their daily life.
All ratings were made on 1 (= never) to 5 (= most of the time) scales. We assessed self-
transcending emotions (i.e., love, affection, trust, empathy, compassion; = .59 and .66 for desiredα
1 In Tamir et al. (2016), we examined links between values and desired emotions, controlling for
experienced emotions. No analyses were reported in that paper involving well-being or depressive
symptoms. In contrast, the current study investigates relations of well-being and depressive
symptoms to discrepancies between the two types of emotions. This study does not concern values
at all and includes the emotions themselves as controls rather than the predictors of interest.

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 10
and experienced emotions, respectively), negative self-enhancing emotions (i.e., anger, contempt,
hostility, hatred; = .66 and .70 for desired and experienced emotions, respectively)α2, opening
emotions (i.e., interest, curiosity, excitement, enthusiasm, passion; = .64 and .70 for desired and α
experienced emotions, respectively), and conserving emotions (i.e., calmness, relaxation, relief,
contentment; = .53 and .67 for desired and experienced emotions, respectively). Emotion terms α
were presented in a predetermined and fixed order.3
To confirm that our emotion indices were empirically distinct, we ran principal axis factor
analyses with varimax rotation, separately on desired and experienced emotions, imposing four-
factor solutions. The scree plots and eigenvalues supported the choice of four factor solutions.
Table 2 presents the varimax rotated factor matrices for experienced and desired emotions,
respectively. The table presents only loadings greater than .20. In each matrix, the items assigned a
priori to each emotion composite loaded positively and most highly on one factor. For desired
emotions, negative self-enhancing emotions loaded on Factor 1, conserving emotions on factor 2,
opening emotions on factor 3, and self-transcending emotions on factor 4. For experienced
emotions, conserving emotions loaded on factor 1, negative self-enhancing emotions on factor 2,
2 The original composite included ‘pride’ as an additional item. However, to compare feeling
‘right’ to ‘feeling good’ we created a composite that is exclusively negative in valence and dropped
this item from the composite. We refer to the new composite as capturing ‘negative self-enhancing
emotions’.
3 For desired emotions, items were presented in the following order: contentment, affection,
enthusiasm, interest, compassion, contempt, curiosity, trust, excitement, hostility, pride, empathy,
passion, hatred, calmness, relief, relaxation, love, and anger. For experienced emotions, items
were presented in the following order: empathy, compassion, excitement, hostility, relief, calmness,
passion, pride, enthusiasm, love, contempt, curiosity, anger, relaxation, contentment, affection,
interest, trust, and hatred. The order of the desired emotion terms differed from the order of
experienced emotion terms.

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 11
self-transcending emotions on factor 3, and opening emotions on factor 4. These findings lend
support to the discriminant validity of the four desired and experienced emotions scales.
Well-being and depressive symptoms. We assessed well-being with the Satisfaction with
Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) that includes 5 items ( = .83) rated α
on a strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7) scale. We measured depressive symptoms with the
10-item ( = .83) version of the Center of Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES–D; α
Andresen, Malmgren, Carter, & Patrick, 1994). Participants rated how frequency they experienced
each symptom on a scale from rarely or none of the time (1) to most or all of the time (4).
Cross-cultural measurement equivalence. We applied multi-group confirmatory factor
analyses (MGCFA) to test the measurement equivalence of our measures (e.g., Byrne, Shavelson,
& Muthen, 1989; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). These analyses are important to ensure that
individuals from different cultures responded to our measures in comparable ways. We evaluated
the models with multiple fit indices (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004). First, for
each measure, we tested whether items loaded on the same latent factor across cultures (i.e.,
configural invariance). Second, we tested whether the loadings of items on their latent factors were
equal across cultures (i.e., metric invariance). All our measures demonstrated either partial or full
metric invariance. This indicates that each of the cultural groups calibrate their measures the same
way, so the manifest scales have the same meaning across groups. This justifies comparing patterns
of associations between measures across cultures. Finally, we tested whether item intercepts were
equal across cultures (i.e., scalar invariance). As is often the case in cross-cultural studies, our
measures did not demonstrate scalar invariance. This means that identical observed scores do not
necessarily map on to the same latent scores across cultures. Hence, it is not appropriate to
compare means across cultures.

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 12
The final metric invariance model for the life satisfaction scale had good fit (CFI = .965,
RMSEA = .033, SRMR = .048), as did the final metric invariance model for the depressive
symptoms scale (CFI = .967, RMSEA = .021, SRMR = .065). The metric equivalence of
experienced and desired self-transcending, opening, and conserving emotions was established and
the relevant fit coefficients are reported in Tamir et al. (2016). Because we dropped ‘pride’ from
our original self-enhancement composite, we reran the measurement equivalence models for
desired and experienced self-enhancement, excluding pride. The partial metric invariance model
for the negative self-enhancing emotions had good fit for experienced emotions (CFI = .989,
RMSEA = .049, SRMR = .030) and adequate fit for desired emotions (CFI = .913, RMSEA = .097,
SRMR = .069).
Human Development Scores. The Human Development Index (HDI) provides scores that
rank countries on their level of development. HDI combines indicators of life expectancy,
education, and per capita income. We used HDI scores for 2013 (Human Development Report,
2014), the year we gathered our data.
Results
Discrepancies between Experienced and Desired Emotions
To compute discrepancy scores, we subtracted experienced emotions from desired
emotions, separately for each target emotion category. We use difference scores because they
provide an intuitively clear, direct representation of the conceptual discrepancy between desired
and experienced emotions. Below, we explain how we dealt with the limitations of difference
scores (Griffin, Murray, & Gonzalez, 1999; Zuckerman, Gagne, Nafshi, Knee, & Kieffer, 2002).
Figure 1 presents the histograms, means, and standard deviations for the discrepancies in each
emotion category. On average, people desired more pleasant (i.e., self-transcending, opening, and

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 13
conserving emotions) and less unpleasant (i.e., negative self-enhancing) emotions than they
experienced. However, there was substantial variation in discrepancy scores. Many individuals
desired more pleasant emotions than they experienced, but some desired less. For instance, 11% of
our sample wanted to feel less self-transcending emotions, such as love and empathy, than they
actually felt. Many individuals desired less unpleasant emotions than they experienced, but some
desired more. For instance, 10% of our sample wanted to feel more negative self-enhancing
emotions, such as anger and hatred, than they actually felt.
Happiness and Absolute Discrepancies between Experienced and Desired Emotions
Correlations. We examined correlations of absolute emotional discrepancy scores with
well-being and depressive symptoms within each emotion category.4 We examined the correlations
in the entire sample and separately for people who desired more frequent emotions than they
experienced and for people who desires less frequent emotions than they experienced. As shown in
Table 3, greater absolute discrepancies between experienced and desired emotions correlated with
lower life satisfaction and more depressive symptoms. This was true for people who felt less
pleasant and more unpleasant emotions than they desired, but, critically for the Aristotelian
hypotheses, it was also true for people who felt more pleasant and less unpleasant emotions than
they desired.
Multilevel modeling. We predicted that smaller absolute discrepancies between desired
and experienced emotions would be associated with greater well-being and less depressive
symptoms, even when controlling for experienced and desired emotions. We further predicted that
such patterns would hold across cultural samples. We tested these hypotheses with multilevel
4 In these analyses, we weighted samples equally to control for unequal sample sizes.

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 14
modeling analyses using the Hierarchical Linear Modeling program HLM 7.0 (Raudenbush, Bryk,
Cheong, Congdon, & Du Toit, 2011). For each of our four target emotion categories, we tested one
model that predicted well-being and another that predicted depressive symptoms. The predictor
variable was the absolute discrepancy between desired and experienced emotion, controlling for
experienced emotion, desired emotion, gender, and age. The effects of a discrepancy score may be
due to either or both of the variables from which it is derived and with which it is correlated. We,
therefore, included both experienced and desired emotions as predictors to control for their effects.
Any effect of the absolute discrepancy scores over and above the effects of the experienced and
desired emotions can then be attributed to the discrepancy between them (see Dyrenforth, Kashy,
Donnellan, & Lucas, 2010).5 In our analyses, gender was grand-mean centered and other predictors
were group-mean centered. By running random-coefficient regression models, we also tested
whether effects of the absolute discrepancy and control variables varied across cultures. Below is
an example of a level-1 equation predicting life satisfaction:
SWLSij=β0j + β1jGender + β2jAge + β3jExperienced Emotion + β4jDesired Emotion +
β5jABS(Desired-Experienced Emotion) + rij
β0j is the mean level of life satisfaction across groups. βij are the average regression coefficients of
the predictor variables across groups. rij is the individual level variance in life satisfaction that the
predictor variables do not explain.
Table 4 presents the results of the HLM analyses predicting life satisfaction. As expected,
experiencing more frequent positive emotions (i.e., self-transcending, opening, and conserving
5 A reviewer noted that discrepancy scores may have different effects depending on experienced
emotions. To test this possibility requires adding an interaction term between the discrepancy
scores and experienced emotions to the multi-level models for each emotion. We conducted these
analyses. They did not affect the conclusions reported below. Part 1 of the Supplementary
Materials describes the results of these additional analyses.

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 15
emotions) and less frequent negative emotions (i.e., negative self-enhancing emotions) predicted
greater life satisfaction (row 4). Similarly, desiring more frequent positive emotions and less
frequent negative emotions also predicted greater life satisfaction (row 5). Critically, supporting
our hypothesis, smaller absolute discrepancies between experienced and desired emotions
predicted greater life satisfaction for all four emotion categories (row 6).
The random effects analyses assessed variation across cultures. Life satisfaction varied
across cultures (row 7) as did the effects of desired negative self-enhancing and opening emotions
(row 11). In contrast, effects of experienced emotions (row 10) and of desired self-transcending
and conservation emotions did not vary across cultures (row 11). Critically for our hypothesis, the
effects of the absolute discrepancies between experienced and desired emotions on life satisfaction
did not vary by culture, except for self-transcending emotions (row 12). Smaller absolute
discrepancies between experienced and desired self-transcending emotions predicted greater life
satisfaction in every country, but this effect was not significant in Ghana (slope = -.15, p = .34) and
China (slope = -.42, p = .071).
Table 5 presents the results of the HLM analyses predicting depressive symptoms. As
expected, experiencing less frequent positive emotions (i.e., self-transcending, opening, and
conserving emotions) and more frequent negative emotions (i.e., negative self-enhancing)
predicted depressive symptoms (row 4). Similarly, desiring more frequent negative emotions and
less frequent positive emotions (row 5) predicted depressive symptoms. Supporting our hypothesis,
larger absolute discrepancies between experienced and desired emotions predicted depressive
symptoms for all emotion categories (row 6).
The random effects analyses revealed that depressive symptoms varied across cultures (row
7). Effects of experienced emotions (row 10) and desired emotions (row 11) on depressive

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 16
symptoms did not vary across cultures, except for desired opening emotions. Critically for our
hypothesis, the effects of the absolute discrepancies between experienced and desired emotions on
depressive symptoms did not vary by culture, except for self-transcending emotions (row 12).
Larger absolute discrepancies between experienced and desired self-transcending emotions
predicted more depressive symptoms in every country, but this effect was not significant in Ghana
(slope = .08, p = .224) or China (slope = .02, p = .856).6
Variation across cultures. As noted, for self-transcending emotions, the effects of emotion
discrepancies on life satisfaction and on depressive symptoms varied across cultures. In order to
understand the source of this variation, we examined whether socioeconomic development, one of
the most important characteristics on which countries differ, moderated this effect. Specifically, we
tested the possible moderation effect of the country level of development as indexed by HDI. We
did this by running the multi-level analyses for self-transcending emotions with HDI as a level-2
predictor and as a moderator of the effect of the absolute emotion discrepancy score. The cross-
level interaction between HDI and the absolute discrepancy tested the moderation effect.
Table 6 presents the results of these analyses for both life satisfaction (left) and depressive
symptoms (right). The interactions between HDI and the absolute discrepancy were significant for
both (row 8). This indicates that the country level of development moderated the effects of the
6 In addition to testing the effects of absolute discrepancy scores, we tested the quadratic effect of
the signed difference scores on life satisfaction and depression in another series of multi-level
models. Predictors in these models included gender, age, experienced emotions, desired emotions,
the signed discrepancy scores, and the squared discrepancy scores. All these models yielded
significant fixed effects for the squared discrepancy scores, as hypothesized. Indeed, in 7 of the 8
models the squared discrepancy score was the only significant predictor. However, these models
did not produce reliable estimates of random effects due to multicollinearity between the
experienced or desired emotions and the signed discrepancy scores. We, therefore, report the
findings with absolute differences in the text and provide the fixed effects of the quadratic models
in Part 2 of the Supplementary Materials.

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 17
absolute discrepancy between desired and experienced emotions on life satisfaction and on
depressive symptoms. Moreover, once this moderation effect was included, no significant cross-
cultural variation in the effects of the absolute discrepancy remained (row 16). Figure 2 portrays
the significant interactions. Figure 2 (left) portrays the slopes for the interaction predicting life
satisfaction and Figure 2 (right) portrays the slopes for the interaction predicting depressive
symptoms.
Figure 2 (left) shows that life satisfaction dropped more sharply in more developed than in
less developed countries as the discrepancy people felt between the self-transcending emotions
(e.g., love and empathy) they desired and those they experienced increased. Figure 2 (right) shows
that depressive symptoms rose more sharply in more developed than in less developed countries as
the discrepancy people felt between the self-transcending emotions (e.g., love and empathy) they
desired and those they experienced increased.
Discussion
For Aristotle, happiness entailed feeling the right feelings (Nicomachean Ethics, 1105b25–
6). What feels right, in turn, differs across people and situations. Happier people, he argued, are
those who feel what they consider the right feelings, given their unique circumstances. Our
findings support Aristotle’s claims empirically. We found that happier people are those who more
frequently experience the emotions they want to experience, whether those emotions are pleasant
(e.g., love or excitement) or unpleasant (e.g., anger and hatred).
What feels right often feels good. However, the two types of feelings are conceptually
distinct and do not necessarily overlap. Our design enabled us to distinguish empirically between
these two types of feelings and to test whether happiness is linked to maximizing ‘right’ feelings
even if they are not ‘good’ feelings. Consistent with the predictions of the traditional SWB

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 18
approach, we found that people were happier the more they experienced pleasant emotions and the
less they experienced unpleasant emotions, on average. However, over and above this effect, we
also found that people were happier when they experienced smaller discrepancies between the
emotions they experienced and the emotions they desired. The secret to happiness, then, may
involve not only feeling good but also feeling right.
Implications for Studying Emotions and Well-being
In this investigation, we adopted Aristotle’s ideas regarding the potential links between
emotions and happiness. This Aristotelian model differs from hedonic models of well-being
because it suggests that both pleasant and unpleasant emotional experiences may be linked to well-
being if they feel ‘right’. Emotional experiences feel right when people perceive them as desirable,
given their motives and the situational context. The Aristotelian model also differs from extant
eudaimonic models of well-being. First, eudaimonic models (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryff, 1989)
assume the universal importance of specific life domains or psychological needs for all people and
cultures. For instance, Ryff’s (1989) eudaimonic model assumes that eudaimonia consists in
functioning well in six life domains: autonomy, self-acceptance, environmental mastery, personal
growth, purpose in life, and positive relations with others. Similarly, Ryan and Deci’s (2001) well-
being model assumes that the satisfaction of basic human needs such as autonomy, competence,
and relatedness is key. In contrast, our current research concerns feeling “right” emotions rather
than functioning well in specific life domains or satisfying basic psychological needs. Second, like
SWB models (e.g., Diener, 2013), eudaimonic models focus on positive attributes such as
autonomy, successful goal pursuit, and positive relations (e.g., Emmons, 1986; Sheldon & Kasser,
1995; Waterman, 1984). None of these models posits that well-being may derive from feeling
anger or hatred.

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 19
The hedonic, eudaimonic, and Aristotelian models of happiness are likely to overlap to
some extent and to complement each other. For instance, it is plausible that emotions feel right
when basic human needs are satisfied and that satisfying such needs induces positive affect. In
such cases, happiness reflects feeling right, satisfying basic needs, and maximizing pleasure.
However, to attain the best understanding of happiness and its variation across people, it is
important to identify the unique cases in which the models of happiness make opposing
predictions. The current investigation identified cases in which people are happier when they feel
right even if they do not feel good. Of course, such cases are less common, but studying them
enabled us to compare the predictions of different models. It demonstrated the unique importance
of feeling right for happiness, independent of pleasure and pain.
Our findings show that happiness depends, in part, on the match between what people feel
and what they want to feel. Consequently, understanding the link between emotions and happiness
requires studying not only experienced emotions but also desired emotions. Our findings reinforce
the evidence for the potential role of desired emotions in well-being (e.g., Bastian, Kuppens, De
Roover, & Diener, 2014) and depression (e.g., Millgram, Joormann, Huppert, & Tamir, 2015).
They highlight the importance of understanding what people strive for emotionally. Consistent
with the importance of discrepancies between actual and desired states (e.g., Higgins, 1999), our
findings further highlight the importance of understanding how people compare their experienced
emotional state to the emotions they strive for.
Implications for Studying Emotions and Well-Being across Cultures
The emotions people desire differ substantially across individuals, cultures, and situations
(for a review, see Tamir, 2016). If well-being is linked to discrepancies between experienced and
desired emotions, researchers and practitioners must be sensitive to such differences in desired

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 20
emotions and understand what underlies them. Some people may be happier if they experience
more empathy, and some may be happier if they experience more anger, at least to some extent.
Such patterns are likely to depend on cultural contexts (e.g., De Leersnyder, Heejung, & Mesquita,
2015; Ford et al., 2015). To enhance happiness around the world, researchers should acknowledge
and respect the differences in the emotions people desire and understand how they vary across
cultures.
Although we found that people across cultures differ in the emotions they experience and
desire, people were generally happier the more their emotional experiences matched the emotions
they desired. This held for negative self-enhancing (e.g., anger, contempt), opening (e.g., interest,
excitement), and conserving (e.g., calmness, relief) emotions. However, for self-transcending
emotions (e.g., empathy, love), the effects of the match between experienced and desired emotions
on happiness varied somewhat across countries. Specifically, the match between experienced and
desired self-transcendence values enhanced life satisfaction and reduced reported symptoms of
depression more in highly developed countries than in less developed countries. Unlike the other
emotions we examined, self-transcending emotions (e.g., love, trust) are linked to social
connectedness. Social connectedness, in turn, is presumably a basic human need and a key
determinant of well-being (e.g., Myers & Diener, 1995; Ryan & Deci, 2001). Perhaps, therefore,
for people who struggle to meet their basic needs, the amount of love they actually feel matters
more for their happiness than whether this amount feels right or not. Future research should
explore further when, why, and how the links between emotion discrepancies and well-being varies
across countries.
Limitations and Future Directions

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 21
Our correlational design has several limitations. First, our findings are consistent with two
interpretations (see Hardin & Larsen, 2014; Larsen & McKibban, 2008) – namely, that happiness
is related to greater ideal self-actualization (i.e., experiencing emotions one desires) or to greater
actual self-regard (i.e., desiring emotions one experiences). By providing empirical evidence for
links of happiness to discrepancies between desired and experienced emotions, our findings
highlight the need to consider these potential accounts. Testing each account is an important task
for future research.
Second, our findings do not allow us to infer causality. Smaller discrepancies between
experienced and desired emotions may lead to greater happiness, but it is also plausible that people
who experience greater happiness report smaller discrepancies between experienced and desired
emotions. Future research should employ experimental designs to test these possibilities. It would
also be beneficial to use longitudinal designs to examine experienced emotions, desired emotions,
and happiness as they evolve and interact over time.
Finally, we investigated a limited set of emotion categories. Our selection was based on the
idea, which was tested elsewhere (Tamir et al., 2016), that certain categories of emotions map on to
certain values. Whereas our previous investigation was focused on differences between emotion
categories, in this investigation, we highlight a principle that applies equally across them.
Regardless of whether emotions differed as a function of values, valence or other dimensions,
smaller discrepancies between desired and experienced emotion was linked to greater happiness.
The emotion categories we examined allowed us to compare emotions that differ in valence but not
arousal (i.e., negative self-enhancing and opening emotions), in arousal but not valence (i.e.,
opening and conserving emotions), and in other ways (e.g., self-transcending emotions and
opening emotions). We did, however, examine a limited set of emotions. For instance, we assessed

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 22
only one category of unpleasant emotions (i.e., negative self-enhancing emotions). Future research
could test whether the current effects generalize to other negative emotions such as fear, guilt,
sadness and shame, and assess potential cultural differences.
Summary
What emotions should people strive for to be happy? Consistent with Aristotle’s claims, our
investigation suggests that people are happier when they experience emotions they desire, whether
such emotions are pleasant or unpleasant. To the extent that people desire emotions that are
consistent with their values, this suggests that happiness entails feeling emotions that are valued, as
determined by the unique personal, social, and cultural context of each individual.

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 23
References
Andresen, E. M., Malmgren, J. A., Carter, W. B., & Patrick, D. B. (1994). Screening for depression
in well older adults: Evaluation of a short form of the CES–D. American Journal of
Preventive Medicine, 10, 77–84.
Bastian, B., Kuppens, P., De Roover, K., & Diener, E. (2014). Is valuing positive emotion
associated with life satisfaction? Emotion, 14, 639-645. doi: 10.1037/a0036466
Byrne, B. M., Shavelson, R. J., & Muthén, B. (1989). Testing for the equivalence of factor
covariance and mean structures: The issue of partial measurement invariance. Psychological
Bulletin, 105, 456-466. doi: 10.1037/00332909.105.3.456
De Leersnyder, J., Kim, H., & Mesquita, B. (2015). Feeling right is feeling good: psychological
well-being and emotional fit with culture in autonomy- versus relatedness-promoting
situations. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 630. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00630
Diener, E. (1984). Subjective well-being. Psychological Bulletin, 95, 542-575.
Diener, E. (2013). The remarkable changes in the science of subjective well-being. Perspectives on
Psychological Science, 8, 663-666. doi: 10.1177/1745691613507583
Diener, E., Emmons, R. A., Larsen, R. J., & Griffin, S. (1985). The satisfaction with life scale.
Journal of Personality Assessment, 49(1), 71-75. doi: 10.1207/s15327752jpa4901_13
Diener, E., Sapyta, J. J., & Suh, E. (1998). Subjective well-being is essential to well-being,
Psychological Inquiry, 9, 33-37.
Dyrenforth, P. S., Kashy, D. A., Donnellan, M. B., & Lucas, R. E. (2010). Predicting relationship
and life satisfaction from personality in nationally representative samples from three
countries: The relative importance of actor, partner, and similarity effects. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 690-702.

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 24
Eid, M., & Diener, E. (2001). Norms for experiencing emotions in different cultures: inter-and
intra-national differences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 869-885. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.81.5.869
Emmons, R. A. (1986). Personal strivings: An approach to personality and subjective well-being.
Journal of Personality and Social psychology, 51, 1058-1068. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.51.5.1058
Ford, B. Q., Dmitrieva, J. O., Heller, D., Chentsova-Dutton, Y., Grossmann, I., Tamir, M., …, &
Mauss, I. B. (2015). Culture shapes whether the pursuit of happiness predicts higher or lower
well-being. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144, 1053-1062. doi:
10.1037/xge0000108
Fulmer, A., Gelfand, M., Kruglanski, Chu Kim-Prieto, Diener, E., Pierro, A., & Higgins, T. (2010).
On “feeling right” in cultural contexts: How person-culture match affects self-esteem and
subjective well-being. Psychological Science, 21, 1563-1569. doi:
10.1177/0956797610384742
Griffin, D., Murray, S., & Gonzalez, R. (1999). Difference score correlations in relationship
research: A conceptual primer. Personal Relationships, 6, 505-518.
Happiness (2016). In Merriam-Webster.com. Retrieved September 30, 2016, from
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/happiness
Hardin, E. E., & Larsen, J. T. (2014). Distinct sources of self-discrepancies: Effects of being who
you want to be and wanting to be who you are on well-being. Emotion, 14, 214-226. doi:
10.1037/a0033893
Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-discrepancy: a theory relating self and affect. Psychological Review, 94,
319-340.

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 25
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis:
Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation Modeling, 6, 1–55.
doi:10.1080/10705519909540118 Hu
Inglehart, R., & Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization, cultural Change, and the persistence of
traditional values. American Sociological Review, 65, 19-51. doi: 10.2307/2657288
Kahneman, D. (1999). Objective happiness. In D. Kahneman, E. Diener, & N. Schwarz (Eds.),
Well-being: Foundations of Hedonic Psychology (pp. 3-25).
Kahneman, D., Diener, E., & Schwarz, N. (1999). Well-being. The Foundations of Hedonic
Psychology. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
Kämpfe, N., & Mitte, K. (2009). What you wish is what you get? The meaning of individual
variability in desired affect and affective discrepancy. Journal of Research in Personality, 43,
409-418. doi: 10.1016/j.jrp.2009.01.007
Kitayama, S., Ishii, K., Imada, T., Takemura, K., & Ramaswamy, J. (2006). Voluntary settlement
and the spirit of independence: Evidence from Japan's" northern frontier." Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 369-384. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.91.3.369
Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R., & Kurokawa, M. (2000). Culture, emotion, and well-being: Good
feelings in Japan and the United States. Cognition and emotion, 14, 93-124.
Koopmann-Holm, B., & Tsai, J. L. (2014). Focusing on the negative: Cultural differences in
expressions of sympathy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 107, 1092-1115.
Kuppens, P., Realo, A., & Diener, E. (2008). The role of positive and negative emotions in life
satisfaction judgment across nations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 66-
75. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.66

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 26
Larsen, J. T., & McKibban, A. R. (2008). Is happiness having what you want, wanting what you
have, or both? Psychological Science, 19, 371-377. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02095.x
Lucas, R. E., Diener, E., & Suh, E. (1996). Discriminant validity of well-being measures. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 616-628. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.71.3.616
Marsh, H. W., Hau, K. T., & Wen, Z. (2004). In search of golden rules: Comment on hypothesis-
testing approaches to setting cutoff values for fit indexes and dangers in overgeneralizing Hu
and Bentler's (1999) findings. Structural Equation Modeling, 11, 320-341. doi:
10.1207/s15328007sem1103_2 Marsh
Mesquita, B., De Leersnyder, J., & Albert, D. (2014). The cultural regulation of emotions. In J. J.
Gross (Ed.), Handbook of Emotion Regulation (2nd Ed., pp. 284-301). New York: Guilford
Press.
Millgram, Y., Joormann, J., Huppert, J. D., & Tamir, M. (2015). Sad as a Matter of Choice?
Emotion-Regulation Goals in Depression. Psychological Science, 26, 1216-1228. doi:
10.1177/0956797615583295
Miyamoto, Y., Ma, X., & Peterman, A. G. (2014). Cultural differences in hedonic emotion
regulation after a negative event. Emotion, 14, 804-815.
Myers, D. G., & Diener, E. (1995). Who is happy? Psychological Science, 6, 10–19.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1995.tb00298.x.
Oishi, S., Diener, E. F., Lucas, R. E., & Suh, E. M. (1999). Cross-cultural variations in predictors
of life satisfaction: Perspectives from needs and values. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 25, 980-990. doi: 10.1177/01461672992511006
Oishi, S., Diener, E. F., Suh, E. M., & Lucas, R. E. (1999). Value as a moderator in subjective
well‐being. Journal of Personality, 67, 157-184. doi: 10.1111/1467-6494.0005

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 27
Oishi, S., Schimmack, U., & Colcombe, S. (2003). The Contextual and systematic nature of life
satisfaction judgments. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 232-247. doi:
10.1016/S0022-1031(03)00016-7
Oishi, S., Schimmack, U., & Diener, E. (2001). Pleasures and subjective well-being. European
Journal of Personality, 15, 153–167. doi:10.1002/per.406
Raudenbush, S. W., Bryk, A. S., Cheong, Y. F., Congdon, R. T., & Du Toit, M. (2011). HLM 7.
Lincolnwood, IL: Scientific Software International Inc.
Rice, R. W., McFarlin, D. B., & Bennett, D. E. (1989). Standards of comparison and job
satisfaction. Journal of Applied Psychology, 74, 591-598. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.74.4.591
Rusting & Rusting, C., & Larsen, R. (1995). Moods as sources of stimulation: Relationships
between personality and desired mood states. Personality and Individual Differences, 18,
321–329. doi:10.1016/0191-8869(94)00157-N
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2001). On happiness and human potentials: A review of research on
hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 141-166. doi:
10.1146/annurev.psych.52.1.141
Ryff, C. D. (1989). Happiness is everything, or is it? Explorations on the meaning of psychological
well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 1069-1081. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.57.6.1069
Schwartz, S. H. (2006). A theory of cultural value orientations: Explication and applications.
Comparative Sociology, 5, 137-182. doi: 10.1163/156913306778667357
Schwartz, S. H. (2011). Values: Individual and cultural. In S. M. Breugelmans, A. Chasiotis, & F.
J. R. van de Vijver (Eds.), Fundamental Questions in Cross-Cultural Psychology (pp. 463-
493). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 28
Schwartz, S. H., Cieciuch, J., Vecchione, M., Davidov, E., Fischer, R., Beierlein, C., Ramos, A.,
Verkasalo, M., Lönnqvist, J.-E., Demirutku, K., Dirilen-Gumus, O., & Konty, M. (2012).
Refining the theory of basic individual values. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
103, 663-688. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0029393.
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being:
informative and directive functions of affective states. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 45, 513-523. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.45.3.513
Sheldon, K. M., & Kasser, T. (1995). Coherence and congruence: two aspects of personality
integration. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 531-543. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.68.3.531
Sims, T., Tsai, J. L., Jiang, D., Wang, Y., Fung, H. H., & Zhang, X. (2015). Wanting to maximize
the positive and minimize the negative: Implications for mixed affective experience in
American and Chinese contexts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 109, 292-
315.
Suh, E., Diener, E., Oishi, S., & Triandis, H. C. (1998). The shifting basis of life satisfaction
judgments across cultures: Emotions versus norms. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 74, 482-493. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.2.482
Tamir, M. (2016). Why do people regulate their emotions? A taxonomy of motives in emotion
regulation. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 20, 199-222. doi:
10.1177/1088868315586325
Tamir, M., Schwartz, S. H., Cieciuch, J., Riediger, M., Torres, C., Scollon, C., & Vishkin, A.
(2016). Desired Emotions Across Cultures: A Value-Based Account. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology. Advance online publication. doi:10.1037/pspp0000072

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 29
Tay, L., & Diener, E. (2011). Needs and subjective well-being around the world. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 101, 354-365. doi: 10.1037/a0023779
Thomson, J. A. K. (1955). The Ethics Of Aristotle - The Nicomachean Ethics. Baltimore, MD:
Penguin.
Tsai, J. L., Knutson, B., & Fung, H. H. (2006). Cultural variation in affect valuation. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 288-307. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.90.2.288
United nations development programme. (2014). Human Development Report. Retrieved from
http://hdr.undp.org/en/2014-report
Vandenberg, R. J., & Lance, C. E. (2002). A review and synthesis of the measurement invariance
literature: Suggestions, practices, and recommendations for organizational research.
Organizational Research Methods, 2, 4-70. doi: 10.1177/ 109442810031002
Waterman, A. S. (1984). The Psychology of Individualism. New York: Praeger.
Zuckerman, M., Gagne, M., Nafshi, I., Knee, C. R., & Kieffer, S. C. (2002). Testing discrepancy
effects: A critique, a suggestion, and an illustration. Behavior Research Methods,
Instruments, and Computers, 34, 291-303.

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 30
1796 < 0 0 < 236
255 < 0 0 < 1816 M = -.63
SD = .69
M = .53
SD = .57

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 31
Figure 1. Distributions of the discrepancies between experienced and desired emotions for the four
types of emotions. Means and standard deviations are noted on the upper right of each graph. The
dotted line represents zero discrepancy. Number of people in the sample who were below the
dotted line (i.e., experienced more frequent emotions than they desired) or above it (i.e., desired
more frequent emotions than they experienced) are listed to the left and right of it, respectively.
The normal curve is depicted in black on each histogram.
229 < 0 0 < 1871 M = .84
SD = .73
M = .59
SD = .59
190 < 0 0 < 1962

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 32
HDI below
mean
HDI above
mean
HDI above
mean
HDI below
mean

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 33
Figure 2. Life satisfaction (left) and depressive symptoms (right) as a function of the absolute
discrepancy between experienced and desired self-transcending emotions (+/- 1 SD from the
mean) in countries above and below the mean of HDI in our sample.

FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 34
Country N%
female
Language Age M (SD) %
married
Mode %
Psychology
majors
Brazil 65
3
64 Portugues
e
24.35
(5.78)
8% Online 17
China 21
3
53 Chinese 20.82
(1.97)
1% Paper and pencil 53
Germany 20
0
50 German 25.03
(4.12)
10% Paper and pencil
and online
30
Ghana 20
7
59 English 22.90
(2.81)
3% Paper and pencil 46
Israel 24
8
53 Hebrew 24.21
(2.91)
12% Online 24
Poland 29
9
52 Polish 21.72
(1.74)
3% Paper and pencil 7
Singapore 20
1
69 English 21.23
(1.83)
0% Online 12
United States 30
3
54 English 19.51
(1.80)
0% Online 34
Table 1. Sample characteristics.

Running head: FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 35
Table 2. Varimax rotated matrices from principal axis factor analyses of experienced (left) and desired (right) emotions.
Experie
nced
emotions
Desired emotions
Item Factor Item Factor
1
(conserving
)
2
(negative
self-
enhancing)
3
(self-
transcending)
4
(opening
)
1
(negative
self-
enhancing)
2
(conserving
)
3
(opening
)
4
(
s
e
l
f
-
t
r
a
n
s
c
e
n
d
i
n
g
)
Relaxation .698 Hatred .644 -.205

Running head: FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 36
Calmness .620 Hostility .619
Contentmen
t.604 Anger .502 -.202
Relief .451 Contempt .500
Hatred -.201 .701 Relaxation -.265 .563
Hostility .626 Relief .488
Contempt .528 Calmness -.231 .389
Anger -.261 .494 Contentmen
t-.227 .388
Compassion .725 Curiosity .592
Empathy .565 Interest .267 .532
Love .279 -.266 .437 Enthusiasm .264 .509
Trust .266 -.287 .363 Passion .239 .434
Affection .224 -.230 .361 Excitement -.284 .341
Interest .301 .201 .582 Compassion
.
7
8
0
Curiosity .556 Empathy .239
.
4
0
1
Enthusiasm .292 .215 .498 Affection .281
.
3
4
8
Excitement -.249 .244 .415 Love -.263 .235
.
3
4
1

Running head: FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 37
Passion .275 .292 .389 Trust -.345 .265
.
3
2
7

Running head: FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 38
Table 3. Zero-order correlations between indices of well-being and depressive symptoms and
absolute discrepancies of desired and experienced emotions, separately for each target emotion
category.
Emotions Sample Life satisfaction Depressive symptoms
Self-transcending Total -.24 .30
Experienced > Desired -.18 .18
Desired > Experienced -.27 .32
Negative self-
enhancing
Total -.22 .36
Experienced > Desired -.22 .38
Desired > Experienced -.20 .17
Opening Total -.20 .26
Experienced > Desired -.00a.10
Desired > Experienced -.23 .27
Conserving Total -.21 .34
Experienced > Desired -.02a.11
Desired > Experienced -.24 .36
M(SD) 4.21 (1.16) 1.96 (.53)
a p > .05, for all other entries p < .05.
Note: The table presents correlations in the entire sample (Total) and separately for individuals
who experienced the emotion more frequently than they wanted to experience it (Experienced >

Running head: FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 39
Desired) and individuals who wanted to experience the emotion less frequently than they actually
did (Desired > Experienced).

Running head: FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 40
Table 4. Multilevel models predicting life satisfaction from the absolute discrepancy of desired and experienced emotion, controlling
for gender, age, experienced emotion, and desired emotion.
Emotion
Self-Transcending Negative self-
Enhancing Opening Conserving
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Fixed effects
Overall mean 4.33** .11 4.33*** .11 4.33*** .11 4.34*** .11
Gender -.001 .06 0.10 .06 .13* .06 .18* .07
Age -.05* .02 -.04 .02 -.04 .02 -.03 .01
Experienced emotion .26* .08 -.39** .11 .38** .09 .55*** .08
Desired emotion .24* .07 -.11 .10 .08 .10 .12 .07
Absolute discrepancy -.61** .12 -.26* .09 -.41** .08 -.27** .08
Random effects Variance X2Variance X2Variance X2Variance X2
Culture sample mean .09 132.67*** .09 133.60*** .09 133.77*** .10 145.56***
Gender slope .006 6.18 .007 5.10 .007 6.52 .02 10.08
Age slope .002 50.82*** .002 41.92*** .002 40.44*** .001 25.56***
Experienced emotion slope .02 14.25 .054 15.67* .29 10.68 .02 11.68
Desired emotion slope .01 9.61 .05 15.19* .05 15.32* .02 7.55
Absolute discrepancy slope .09 22.89** .03 7.92 .02 7.72 .02 4.95
% variance explained .15 .12 .13 .17

Running head: FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 41
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Running head: FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 42
Table 5. Multilevel models predicting depressive symptoms from the absolute discrepancy of desired and experienced emotion,
controlling for gender, age, experienced emotion, and desired emotion.
Emotion
Self-Transcending Negative self-
Enhancing Opening Conserving
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Fixed effects
Overall mean 1.95*** .04 1.95*** .04 1.95*** .04 1.95*** .04
Gender .05 .04 .03 .03 .01 .04 -.01 .04
Age .002 .004 -.0008 .003 -.002 .003 -.003 .003
Experienced emotion -.11* .03 .26*** .04 -.12* .04 -.26*** .04
Desired emotion -.02 .03 .06 .03 -.07 .04 -.02 .03
Absolute discrepancy .26** .06 .10* .03 .23** .05 .14** .04
Random effects Variance X2Variance X2Variance X2Variance X2
Culture sample mean .01 91.89*** .01 103.27*** .01 93.99*** .01 102.43***
Gender slope .01 27.10*** .003 14.22* .009 23.05** .006 18.67**
Age slope .0001 8.65 .00001 8.80 .00001 7.07 .00002 5.17
Experienced emotion slope .002 12.05 .006 14.53* .003 6.01 .009 12.06
Desired emotion slope .002 10.71 .002 6.54 .008 14.13* .003 8.44
Absolute discrepancy slope .02 21.12** .0003 7.32 .009 7.75 .004 8.34
% variance explained .11 .18 .12 .18

Running head: FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 43
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Running head: FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 44
Table 6. Multilevel models testing whether socio-economic development (HDI) moderates the
effects of the absolute discrepancy between desired and experienced self-transcending emotions
on life satisfaction (left) and depressive symptoms (right)
Life
satisfaction Depressive symptoms
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Fixed effects
Overall
mean
4.33*** .11 1.95*** .04
Individual-
level
Gender .002 .05 .05 .04
Age -.05 .02 .0002 .005
Experienced
emotion
.26* .09 -.10 .04
Desired
emotion
.24* .08 -.03 .04
Absolute
discrepancy
-.61*** .08 .27*** .04
Country-
level
HDI 1.74 .76 -.23 .33
Interaction:
HDI x
Absolute
discrepancy
-2.1** .48 .88* .29
Random
effects
Variance X2Variance X2
Culture
sample mean
.09 113.61*** .01 90.38***

Running head: FEELING GOOD OR FEELING RIGHT 45
Gender
slope
.006 6.25 .01 27.22***
Age slope .002 48.51*** .00009 9.52
Experienced
emotion slope
.03 13.37 .008 12.09
Desired
emotion slope
.03 9.63 .005 10.73
Absolute
discrepancy
slope
.02 5.09 .005 6.84
Residual
variance
1.12 .25
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001