Moral nihilism and its implications

Abstract

Philosophers have identified a number of principles that characterize morality and underlie moral judgments. However, philosophy has failed to establish any widely agreed-upon justification for these judgments, and an “error theory” that views moral judgments as without justification has not been successfully refuted. Evolutionary psychologists have had success in explaining the likely origins and mechanisms of morality but have also not established any justification for adopting particular values. As a result, we are left with moral nihilism -- the absence of any unarguable values or behaviors we must or should adopt. The philosophical and psychological implications of this nihilism suggest accepting shared, non-absolute values as “good enough”; a revised, humbler view of moral and other value judgments; and the possible acceptance of the hard truth of a value nihilism.

Full text

Moral Nihilism and its Implications
Marc Krellenstein
Northeastern University
Copyright 2017, The Institute of Mind and Behavior, http://www.umaine.edu/jmb/. Author
preprint. Published in The Journal of Mind and Behavior, 38(1), 75-90. Correspondence
concerning this article should be addressed to Marc Krellenstein, 360 Huntington Avenue,
Boston, Massachusetts 02115. Email: m.krellenstein@neu.edu. I would like to thank Paul Bloom
for comments on an early version of this paper and Raymond Russ for detailed comments on
later versions.

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Abstract
Philosophers have identified a number of principles that characterize morality and underlie moral
judgments. However, philosophy has failed to establish any widely agreed-upon justification for
these judgments, and an “error theory” that views moral judgments as without justification has
not been successfully refuted. Evolutionary psychologists have had success in explaining the
likely origins and mechanisms of morality but have also not established any justification for
adopting particular values. As a result, we are left with moral nihilism -- the absence of any
unarguable values or behaviors we must or should adopt. The philosophical and psychological
implications of this nihilism suggest accepting shared, non-absolute values as “good enough”; a
revised, humbler view of moral and other value judgments; and the possible acceptance of the
hard truth of a value nihilism.
Keywords: ethical nihilism, moral psychology, psychological philosophy

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Crisply defining morality has proven difficult, though there’s some consensus among
philosophers that it applies to impartial, universal judgments about what is right or obligatory to
do (e.g., Loeb, 2008; Singer, 1993; Williams, 1985). Finding a basis for these judgments has
been even more difficult. As Singer (1993) states:
Can we use this universal aspect of ethics to derive an ethical theory that will give us
guidance about right and wrong? Philosophers from the Stoics to Hare and Rawls have
attempted this. No attempt has met with general acceptance. (p. 12)
Mackie (1977) has presented an “error theory” that tries to show that no attempt at justification
can ever succeed -- that making a moral judgment is always an error. Many have adopted this
view, including Gill and Nichols (2008), Greene (2002), Joyce (2001), Rosenberg (2011) and
others (see the contributors to Joyce and Kirchin, 2010). Psychologists and some philosophers
(e.g., Greene, 2013; Haidt, 2012; Joyce, 2006) have moved to explain morality psychologically -
- rooted in evolution, shaped by culture and providing benefits for human cooperation. Greene
(2013) refers to this view as “… a consensus that’s been building since Darwin: morality is a set
of psychological adaptations that allow [sic] otherwise selfish individuals to recap the benefits of
cooperation” (p. 185). But understanding morality and moral differences as mostly psychological
still leaves us with Mackie’s moral nihilism -- the lack of any objective basis for grounding our
beliefs and actions. We are left with the questions of what to believe and how to live given the
absence of foundations that have historically endured.
What follows briefly reviews the failure in refuting moral nihilism (or, alternatively, the
success in establishing it) and its implications. These implications may include the acceptance of
mostly shared non-absolute values as good enough and a correspondingly revised view of moral

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judgment and responsibility. They may also include resisting the appeal of false beliefs or
experiences and accepting the hard truth of a value nihilism.
Moral Nihilism
There is no successful chain of reasoning that has been offered as to why we must adopt any
fundamental value or moral obligation over another, or any at all … the very concept of an
objective moral truth that commands obedience is, while familiar, unlike any other concept.
Mackie (1977) has dubbed moral obligation “queer” (in the original sense of the term). Hume
(1738/1969) observed that any attempt to somehow deduce an “ought” from any observation or
fact about the world is self-evidently impossible: one can’t arrive at the idea of obligation from a
description of objective facts without first introducing obligation as some sort of fact.
That people often act as if there are valid moral commands is clear, as it is that many values
and behaviors are shared and others are not. But there is no knockdown argument we can offer
someone who believes deeply in a fundamental value we do not share, or in its greater
importance than another value. Consider, for example, arguments over abortion that set the
absolute sanctity of any form of unique human life against the absolute right of control over
one’s own body, or debates in “trolley” problems over diverting a runaway trolley to kill one
person in order to save the five in its path (e.g., Thomson, 1985). The variation in moral beliefs
across and within cultures also argues against the possibility that there exist absolute moral
obligations that all people recognize (this is the argument from relativity in Mackie, 1977). No
attempt to rationalize these differences has succeeded.
It could be argued that the belief that there are no absolute foundations is itself an absolute
belief. But, rather than being absolute, it is an observation that no rational argument has

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established absolute values. It leaves open the possibility that evidence may yet be offered that
proves otherwise.
Moral Agreement and Disagreement are Arbitrary
We may judge another’s behavior morally wrong to indicate its inconsistency with what we
perceive as moral commands, or at least with our deepest feelings and principles about how
people should treat each other -- principles such as respect for an individual’s rights, maximizing
the greatest good, acceptance of a social contract, a particular sense of justice, the word of God
or whatever we believe comprises and justifies that belief (see Rachels, 1993, for a survey of
moral principles).
We may assert underlying principles of morality but they remain arbitrary in the absence of
agreement about their overriding value. This does not prevent us from reasoning with those with
whom we share values to show that a behavior is in fact consistent or inconsistent with those
values. These discussions occupy much of what counts as moral debate. Some disagreements can
also be seen as disagreements over purported facts, such as whether a 24-week-old fetus can feel
pain. Other disagreements may be over predictions of what will result from a particular behavior:
will allowing euthanasia, for example, start us down a slippery slope to allowing other behaviors
we consider unacceptable. However, it is when the facts or likely outcomes are not in dispute and
discussion breaks down that we are faced with a conflict that debate cannot resolve because of
the absence of common fundamental values.
Singer (1993) recommends we accept at least some moral point of view because it can give
meaning to our lives, something beyond ourselves. The quest for meaning by many people is
clear, and some claim to have found meaning this way. But others may resist the pragmatism of
wholeheartedly adopting relatively arbitrary principles.

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Evolution is the Origin of Morality
It appears that our moral sense has its origins in evolution (see, for example, Joyce, 2006, and
Street, 2006). This includes both the very existence and “ought” of moral judgments as well as
many of our intuitively powerful moral precepts. As many evolutionary psychologists have
argued, an innate sense of sympathy, tit-for-tat reciprocity and other similar traits probably
provided evolutionary advantages when they first appeared, increasing the likelihood of the
survival of the individual or perhaps a group with similar shared characteristics (though the idea
of group selection remains controversial). Evidence for this includes the nearly universal
presence of good/bad judgments of some kind, even in infants (e.g., Bloom, 2013). Individual
choice, culture and, more generally, the sort of human brain given by evolution that allows for
our apparent ability to choose and the creation of cultures can then take morality far beyond what
was determined by evolution. Deeply rooted norms become efficient ways for biology and
culture to maintain the benefits of coordinated behavior -- we do not need to reason through
every situation -- and norms may reinforce overall beneficial behavior when reasoning alone
would not suffice. Examples of this include situations where individuals do better only if both
cooperate rather than act in their apparent self-interest (see Nozick, 2001, on these Prisoner’s
Dilemma situations).
But while certain values are likely built in through evolution, produce pleasure and lead to our
survival, this does not justify particular behaviors without agreement on the underlying value of
what is innate or productive of survival or pleasure. Values may be shared, and we may jointly
agree to pursue them. But the fact that they are shared does not compel any obligation to pursue
them.

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It is no surprise that specific moral intuitions and developed practices built on them have not
yielded to a single principle of explanation, such as the greatest good. There is little reason for
evolution to have crafted us (to the extent we are shaped by evolution) in a way that is simple,
consistent or clear to rational examination. Only net survival benefit counts for evolution.
Moral Realism is Unlikely
Could it yet be possible that there are moral truths even if we cannot establish them by reason
alone? The existence of transcendent, objective moral truths -- the position known as moral
realism -- seems unlikely. Joyce (2001) has suggested that most moral philosophers -- though not
most philosophers overall -- are probably moral realists or they would have been unlikely to
pursue moral philosophy. That may skew the philosophical literature to that position, but a
broader reading, as Joyce suggests, shows that most philosophers consider moral realism
speculative at best.
A more practical moral realism might mean some principles exist that provide a path to a life
that most individuals, even if maybe not all, would choose if informed and freely able to choose
… or they would likely be better off if they made such a choice. However, literary theorist Terry
Eagleton (2003) reminds us that “people who are brutal and violent can be happy” (p. 122), and
any principles it would be prudent to follow are still short of obligations one is commanded to
follow. It is also unlikely that there are moral truths that apply to all behaviors considered
morally relevant given the complex way our psychological nature develops as a result of biology
and environment. More conventionally, the split between conservative and liberal attitudes found
in so many societies suggests at least a bifurcated set of moral principles and possible root
psychology (and perhaps many more than just two groups if Haidt, 2012, is correct).
The Source of Moral Disagreement is Psychological

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A purely philosophical discussion cannot establish irrefutable moral principles. These
discussions ultimately rely on the intuitive acceptance or rejection of premises that simply seem
reasonable or not. Haidt (2001, 2012) has persuasively argued that morality is primarily driven
by a range of intuitions and emotions. He believes moral discourse plays a role in persuading
others what to do but only a secondary one in determining what is moral in the first place.
Similarly, Caputo (2000) has observed that ethical reasoning usually starts with conclusions, not
premises. This resonates both with traditional philosophical intuitionism -- morality grounded on
directly perceived intuitions -- and with emotivism -- that morality is more a matter of emotional
approval/disapproval than specific principles.
A better way to understand moral judgments would be to view them psychologically.
Cushman and Young (2009) demonstrated how “the conflict between psychological mechanisms
is paralleled by prominent philosophical debates between different moral theories” (p. 9), giving
rise to moral dilemmas among different people and within one person. The role of personality in
philosophers’ judgments has been demonstrated by Schulz, Cokely, and Feltz (2011), and
Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2015) have shown how common biases affect philosophers’
judgments. Eisenberg and others (e.g., Athota et al., 2009; Eisenberg, 1986, 2010; Miller and
Eisenberg, 1988) have written about the role of empathy and other personality factors in
determining moral reasoning and behavior.1
The Absence of Free Will Undercuts Moral Responsibility
Though debates about free will continue, compatibilism is a consensus position among
philosophers (Bourget and Chalmers, 2014): we appear to have free will -- to have been able to
1 See Krellenstein (1995) for a discussion on the possible role of individual differences in
explaining diverse beliefs on difficult problems such as the origin of the universe.

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have chosen otherwise and be subject to (or subject others to) persuasion or deterrence -- but the
appearance of free will is actually an illusion, since everything is physically determined. This
determinism is the result of the chemical and ultimately physical processes that underlie our
thoughts and behavior. The materialist worldview herein assumed does not allow for any other
causes.
As many philosophers have observed (e.g., Greene, 2013; Greene and Cohen, 2004;
Rosenberg, 2011), the lack of true free will has implications for our notions of responsibility and
punishment. We already consider those with conventionally understood diminished capacity --
children, the mentally unfit, the legally “insane” -- as having only limited responsibility for their
actions and upon whom it is not fair to impose punishment. But if we accept, as it seems we
must, that no one has intrinsic freedom to do as they want, then accepting punishment as a “just
desert” for anyone seems questionable. This position is strengthened by the lack of objective
moral value.
This does not mean we need to surrender the concept of responsibility. It is useful to enact
laws and interpret individuals as responsible for behavior they could in fact be deterred from
performing (or encouraged to do). We can also isolate them for their or our protection or to deter
them or others from future undesirable behavior, or to engage in their “rehabilitation” --
ultimately a form of adjusting (the causes of) their behavior to produce behavior we prefer. But
that is a narrower concept of responsibility that we generally entertain.
Moral Nihilism is Hard to Accept
Steven Pinker (2002) acknowledges that there is an evolutionary basis for moral nihilism: the
view that there are no objective moral truths and no resulting guaranteed path to a meaningful

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and happy life. This is because evolutionary adaptation happens only by chance and persists only
because of its survival value. Pinker believes (and seems to hope) this nihilism can be avoided
because moral behavior may have evolved in conformance with an objective morality grounded
in the logic and benefits of reciprocal, cooperative behavior -- the fact that we benefit overall
from certain behaviors and that it is hard to argue that someone has an obligation without being
similarly obliged. Pinker adds that even if there is not an objective morality, our moral sense is
“real for us” and cannot simply be dismissed.
But the logic of reciprocal obligation only applies if we already accept someone having an
obligation to do something rather than just finding it desirable; not wanting you to hurt me does
not imply you have an obligation not to hurt me (Harman and Thomson, 1996) or what might be
the resulting obligation for me not to hurt you. The net benefits of cooperation also do not imply
obligations; a given individual or nation-state at a particular time may be better served by acting
selfishly.
While morality is still “real for us,” this too falls short of the objective grounding of morality
needed to refute moral nihilism. That does not mean that moral practice and discussion are an
unimportant part of our lives or that we are not willing to live by, enforce, and defend those
practices. The narrator of John Barth’s The Floating Opera (1956/1988) concludes his
ruminations on life’s futility this way: “I considered … whether, in the real absence of absolutes,
values less than absolute might not be regarded as in no way inferior and even be lived by” (p.
252). But those values cannot be grounded in more than our individual or community
determination to pursue certain goals and adhere to certain norms of conduct. That lack of
grounding makes our choice to adhere strongly to our values both tenuous and momentous.

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Dennett (1996) also tries to avoid the fundamental moral nihilism implied by the materialist,
evolutionary viewpoint he so forcefully endorses. Sommers and Rosenberg (2003) have observed
that the Darwinian banishment of a higher purpose should have made Darwinians not only into
“metaphysical nihilists” but also “ethical nihilists,” and that seeing ethics so “exuberantly
defended by no less a steely eyed Darwinian than Dennett is something of a surprise” (p. 653).
Similarly, Joshua Greene (2013) has not exactly renounced his earlier conclusion (in Greene,
2002) about the impossibility of moral truth but now doubts its certainty, and certainly its
importance compared to what he sees as the more practical question of how to cope with the
moral “morass” in which we find ourselves (p. 189). He now looks to ground things on the
widely shared goals of being happy and avoiding suffering. Sommers (2009) backs away from a
position that was once more similar to Rosenberg’s and states that Rosenberg’s views no more
“undermine” our moral judgments than the position could undermine Sommers’ love for his
daughter (which Rosenberg, 2009, assures him he is not trying to do). Harris (2010) thinks that
the very science that leads to this nihilism can somehow still salvage objective moral truth, while
Thagard (2012) thinks neuroscience can show life is objectively meaningful and that it grounds
what he considers to be our primary interests of work, play, and love.2
But current science, while not denying these moral judgments, cannot ground them despite
our strong desire to do so; the is-ought divide remains. The desire for grounding leads to
sometimes forced attempts to avoid nihilist conclusions that follow from one’s own work and
that may arise from innate needs to explain what we feel, or for compelling stories in general
(Rosenberg makes much of this last point). Perhaps the desire to avoid nihilism in enhanced by
having children, as suggested by the exchange between Sommers and Rosenberg.
2 Landau (2013) responds specifically to Thagard on this and on the contingency of any
particular set of interests.

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In fact, many philosophers view moral nihilism as obviously wrong, an absolutist position
against all value as unattractive as a harshly stated absolutism in favor of a particular morality.
Eagleton (2003) says the nihilist is a “disenchanted absolutist” (p. 214). But a lack of objective
moral truths does not imply the rejection of (relative) value or human happiness, or attempts to
better achieve certain shared values (and as science-based is open to revision as scientific facts
develop or change). Rather, rejecting or waffling on the truth of moral nihilism distorts our
knowledge of how things are and can encourage the uncompromising behaviors that make it
difficult to live together harmoniously.
The Implications of Moral Nihilism
The existentialist accepts a form of moral (and broader) nihilism but aims to counter it with
acts of will and choice, creating value where none existed before:
… existentialists tend to emphasize the conventionality or groundlessness of values, their
“ideality,” the fact that they arise entirely through the projects of human beings against the
background of an otherwise meaningless and indifferent world…. For Sartre, “values derive
their meaning from an original projection of myself which stands as my choice of myself in
the world.” (Existentialism, 2004/2015)
This may be a good strategy to try to live by, though what will work for one may not work for
another. More significantly, the sort of nihilism presented here forces us in the end to reject any
claim that the existentialist can create value through acts of will in more than a personal sense.
Some people may experience this, others not, and these acts will not necessarily persuade anyone
of the value of a particular course of action.
Moral choices, unlike others, are considered obligatory. The absence of actual obligations
puts morality and other goals and pleasures on a more level playing field. The arguments against
absolute moral value can be applied to the claimed dominance of any other value and in support
of a broader value nihilism. Is seeking truth, or the presence or pursuit of beauty, less (or more)

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important than showing great kindness? All may largely be the accidents of birth, and provide
pleasure to an individual or society that, if different, are not intrinsically “better” than one
another. One or another may be judged to provide more benefits to more people. Someone may
embrace them as better for that reason, and many people may share that viewpoint. But it is not a
view that can be rigorously defended against those who hold a contrary view.
As a practical matter, most of us have deep-rooted beliefs, or at least deeply felt emotions
about what we want or believe is or is not acceptable even if we cannot justify those beliefs and
do not view them as absolutes. Personal values play a significant role in living the life we do. To
the extent we examine our beliefs, and we may not very much or at all, we may adopt a
pragmatic viewpoint, accepting certain things as quasi-foundational. We then reason -- or more
often rationalize after the fact, if Haidt is correct -- from the beliefs we have and towards the
goals we have and choose, to the extent we choose them.
We can choose to be with others with similar values, to express ourselves, to value or love
others, to exercise competency or control, to maximize our sensual pleasures … or, more
commonly, some combination of these and others. Perhaps we choose some of these because, for
us, there really is no other choice, or some choices work better for us even if we cannot ground
that choice in anything beyond dispute. We choose what we do because of innate temperament
and the cumulative effects of all we have learned. We do some things simply because they have
become habitual.
Most of us strive to be happy and enjoy life one way or another, and the data suggest most
succeed (Diener and Diener, 1996). If we examine morality closely we come to accept, or not,
the absence of certain foundations, but overwhelming concern about that is rare. Rosenberg
(2011) argues that “the notion that we need something to make life meaningful in order to keep

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living is another one of those illusions.” (p. 280).3 However, we might add that for those who do
need meaning it seems it can usually be found in the particular people, values, or pleasures we
embrace.
Similarly, lack of free will may be more a technical issue that could inform public policy on
punishment than an everyday operating principle. Sitting back and waiting for non-free-will
determined behavior to take place gets boring. The point is captured in the title of an article by
Paul Bloom (2012): “Free Will Does Not Exist. So What?”
Still, accepting the lack of real free will may have some personal impact. It may relax the
urgency or import of making decisions and feeling complete responsibility for them. This is not
to eliminate the useful notion of responsibility as it occurs in law or relationships, or in creating a
happier life, but it could soften it. It might humble us. It suggests we not take ourselves too
seriously. Humility also follows from value nihilism itself, as Williams (2013) has observed:
Conceptualizing ourselves from the perspectives of the universe at large is humbling when we
consider that our values are just that: ours. And we should cherish them and promote them the
best we know how. But we shouldn’t delude ourselves into thinking these values are imbued
with a special intrinsic “goodness” that holds for all rational agents. That’s a philosophical
pipedream.
Beliefs for Which There is No Evidence
Some people have an unquestioned and, for them, unquestionable conviction in the way
people must be treated, or about the purpose of life in general. These unquestioned beliefs may
loosely be characterized as religious. For certain people, tolerance of other views may not be
acceptable or make sense.
3 This is contrary to Camus (1955), who accepted “the absurd” but thought meaning and value
must and could be found in confronting and rebelling against life’s meaninglessness.

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It could be argued that unquestioned beliefs are a benefit to those who have them. Perhaps
these individuals possess a certain biological disposition to religious belief that is itself the result
of evolution, e.g., people susceptible to unquestioned beliefs might have been more inclined to
sacrifice themselves in situations where it furthered the survival of those same genes in offspring
and related group members. There is some evidence that religious belief is correlated with
greater overall happiness and longer life expectancy.4
Does the conviction of people with deeply held religious or moral beliefs imply anything
about the truth of those beliefs? The positive correlation between a lack of religious belief and
education and intelligence (Lynn et al., 2009, Sacerdote and Glaeser, 2001) suggests that
conviction alone does not provide support for the truth of beliefs that cannot be demonstrated but
only seen as self-evident by those who hold them.
But if there are benefits to certain unquestioned beliefs should we attempt to become believers
if we are not? Perhaps, if people are able to and so inclined. For many people, setting out to
believe in something without question is not attractive and probably difficult to achieve, even if
it can happen more or less unintended. We might recognize having unquestioned beliefs as
providing greater happiness but still reject seeking them because doing so is inconsistent with
what currently makes us happy, including valuing what we consider to be more (rather than less)
knowledge of the world as it really is or valuing the autonomy that such a state would reduce.
Experiences Which are Not Real
4 There are many correlational studies confirming these associations. Questions remain about the
direction of causation -- does religious belief lead to subjective well-being or do happier people
tend to be more religious -- but the effect seems to remain when controlling for confounding
variables. See, for example, McCullough et al. (2000) and Myers and Diener (1995).

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Similar to choosing beliefs or values that may be false but beneficial is choosing experiences
that are pleasurable but somehow not real. Nozick (1974) says we might not choose to hook
ourselves up to “experience machines” that could deliver any kind of reality we chose -- maybe
the experience of writing a great novel -- because we value our experiences being real in addition
to having the experiences themselves. Most of the characters in The Matrix (Silver et al., 1999)
feel the same way. Something like this is probably part of some people’s uneasiness about
certain forms of psychopharmacology. Psychotherapy seems preferable for many individuals
seeking relief from their problems because they think it produces its improvements by “really”
transforming us — our beliefs, behaviors and emotions — rather than by giving us a more
temporary drug-induced experience. But it is not clear from the evidence that psychotherapy
always works this way, or that some drugs may not be more transformational. Peter Kramer
(1993) reports that some people believe the prescribed drugs allowed them to be their “real
selves” and that the effects of these drugs may continue after their discontinuance. This is not
surprising. From a materialist perspective, drugs are not fundamentally different from
psychotherapy or any other form of personality manipulation, including religious conversion. All
of these, if successful, must work through changes in the brain that produce the desired effects
with greater or less difficulty, with fewer or more undesirable side effects (and the risk of future
side effects as yet unknown) and with varying degrees of permanence and related changes (or the
ability to deliberately reverse them).
Medication or therapy can also produce effects that we did not explicitly want but with which
we are happy, or at least newly tolerant. These might include effects that we not only did not
choose but would have avoided if we knew they would occur. Kramer reports that few patients
he’s aware of discontinue SSRI-type anti-depressants despite experiencing the common sexual

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side effect of delayed, or the inability to attain, orgasm. It may be that some patients do not
simply tolerate these unwanted side effects but no longer experience them as undesirable in the
same way. This fits with Kramer’s idea that the drugs effect a broader transformation than
simply addressing symptoms.
Curtailing Biologically Based Tendencies
Human nature has evolved and has been encoded in biology, at least in the form of underlying
tendencies. Our culture also places limitations on us, or makes some choices much harder or
easier than others. There is an interesting list of behaviors found in all cultures, including sexual
jealousy and modesty (see Brown, 1991, and Pinker, 1997). However, what is natural or
culturally produced (and they are often at odds) still has no automatic claim to being of
paramount value, of making us happy or of being unchangeable. But just how changeable are
we?
Curtailing an evolved biological tendency tends to result in frustration. This is especially true
for the deeply felt motivations (and pleasures), including those involving food and sex, which are
most directly needed for survival and reproduction.5 This frustration may be reduced or not
experienced as negatively if in exchange we perceive a personal benefit, or a social benefit that
returns an indirect personal benefit (as with prohibitions against violence). It may be possible to
further reduce or eliminate frustration if the tendency can be modified through learning or
habitual non-practice. Freud (1930/1961) thought our biological instincts could be transformed,
and needed to be for the sake of civilization, though he did not think satisfaction of the
5 It is a long-discussed question whether a life devoted mostly to sensual pleasures can be a
(maximally?) happy one … or, if not, what the right balance of these versus other pleasures is, at
least for a given individual. Such discussion is outside the scope of this work, but it can be noted
that the lack of objective moral principles and values undercuts any distinction between so-called
“lower” and “higher” pleasures, making the question a clearly empirical one.

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transformed (sublimated) instincts could be as pleasurable as satisfaction of the original. Few
theorists today believe that all our pleasures and activities derive their psychic energy from sex
or other basic instincts. But we sometimes perceive connections or experience passionate
pleasure from different activities in a similar way, possibly indicating conflated origins and a
common neurophysiology.
We choose to develop interests or acquire tastes but have less control over our personality or
what is most important to us. Some changes may be forced on us, or become a part of us through
daily routine. We can work towards personal and social transformation and deliberately build
some changes in ourselves and others over time, to some extent.
Individual variability and external reinforcement play a significant role in what is possible.
Most people can learn to control urges for revenge. Some people choose celibacy, while for
some monogamy is difficult to sustain. Pinker (1997) casts doubt on the 1960’s ambitions of free
love and an egalitarian society, arguing for the widespread existence, evolutionary origins, and
great difficulty in overcoming sexual jealousy and competition. Modern day capitalism has lately
run rampant over alternative economic models in its appeal to a view of human nature based on
universal and mostly unmodifiable self-interest. But just how desirable (or undesirable) and
unchangeable are these and other tendencies? These questions remain mostly open.
Changing Moral Intuitions
Greene (2008) wonders which innate moral tendencies we might choose to change. He says
“if science tells me that I love my children more than other children only because they share my
genes … should I feel uneasy about loving them extra?” (p. 76). Greene does not directly answer
this question but states that “consequentialist principles [i.e., some form of greatest good

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reasoning], while not true, provide the best available standard for public decision making and for
determining which aspects of human nature it is reasonable to change and which ones we would
be wise to leave alone” (p. 77). Greene’s choice of consequentialist principles for public
decision-making is pragmatic, reflecting the fact that increasing the common good benefits us in
ways most of us want even if we cannot argue decisively for those principles. His suggestion that
we might use the same principles to determine what to change for an individual is less clear and
more problematic. In his early work, Greene (2002) recognized some utility in preserving
individual responses such as the desire to punish a wrongdoer, while in the above example
(Greene, 2008) he suggested it could be worth working towards individual change. Pinker (2002,
p. 182) argues that the very non-consequentialist, seeming irrationality of some behaviors — he
refers to the “implacable need for retribution” — provides an indirect consequentialist
contribution: there will be punishment even if it is not for the greatest good in a particular
situation, deterring individuals more strongly than a consequentialist calculus could alone.
Immediate, irrational reactions are also less open to gaming. Greene might respond that, if true,
the behaviors should be preserved by the very consequentialist standard he is advocating.
But what if the consequentialist argument for retribution, for example, cannot be made?
Greene may be right that it is too often at odds with the common good. But the personal, if
emotional, satisfaction that retribution provides for someone might still be judged without
contradiction as a practical individual benefit of greater personal value than the value for the
common good and its indirect individual benefit. Once we are making pragmatic decisions in the
absence of absolute standards the value criteria by which judgments are made are inevitably open
to different estimations of personal value, though society as a whole may choose to encourage
changes (or create certain prohibitions) that a given individual would resist.

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We Might be Better Off not Using the Word “Moral”
Given the widespread but apparently false belief that there are true, absolute moral values, it’s
worth considering if we would be better off eliminating from our vocabulary the words that
imply the existence of these values -- words including moral, right, and wrong. Such moral
abolitionism has been suggested by others who have denied the existence of moral absolutes,
including Burgess (in an early unpublished work finally published in 2007), Garner (2007) and
Greene (at least in 2002). It might be better to refer to positions one strongly favors or opposes
rather than to describe them as right or wrong. This would not prevent us from reasoning about
values and their implications. It would also not prevent us from adopting particular values, from
supporting/condemning certain actions, or choosing to punish those who violate norms we
endorse. But it would eliminate language that implies there are values or obligations that
command obedience of oneself or another because of their objective truth. Discussing values as
personal and relative (if sometimes strongly held and widely shared) could make moral
disagreements less intractable and more like other disagreements, increasing the possibilities for
compromise. Compromise would not be required (nothing is) … but the choice would be more
accurately framed as a practical decision to compromise or not, rather than a decision that allows
no compromise by definition.
Some philosophers who hold that moral values are not absolute nevertheless think we would
be better retaining the fiction of moral absolutes and continue to speak of right and wrong…and
that such talk would better reinforce the shared values a community has, providing a net benefit.
Joyce (2001) has championed such moral fictionalism. Whether this would provide an agreed
upon net benefit is an empirical question, though one might hope that people could eventually
see values for what they are while still respecting their importance. Jerry Coyne observed that the

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feared social disintegration that reduced religiosity might bring about appears not to have
generally occurred in Scandinavian countries where religious belief has greatly declined.6
One exception to eliminating the language of moral realism might be for raising children,
where a simpler approach may be needed to encourage particular behaviors. Greene (2002)
observes that we might “simply allow or even encourage realist dialogue with those who are too
young to handle the meta-ethical truth [that there are no moral absolutes]” (p. 279). We could
hopefully expect more of adults.
The Angst of Moral Nihilism
Rosenberg’s (2011) “nice nihilism” espouses an evolutionary-based moral nihilism (and a
broader nihilism he believes follows from a thoroughly naturalistic point of view) that he
considers nice because values are mostly shared even if not objectively true. As a result, conflict
is minimized and we do not have to worry much about abhorrent people. But worry only enters
the picture if we assume we are in Rosenberg’s “two standard deviations from the mean” of
people who want to be nice and who want to be treated nicely despite there being no objective
grounding for that (p. 286). This also implies we are operating on the assumption that people’s
worries about themselves amount to something. Rosenberg might argue that this is part of our
illusory sense of what matters and how things influence us.
If we can’t eliminate our worry, Rosenberg suggests drugs: “If you still can’t sleep at night,
even after accepting science’s answers to the persistent questions, you probably just need one
more little thing besides Epicurean detachment. Take a Prozac or your favorite serotonin
6 Coyne made this point in a discussion recorded in Forman (2012, Day 3, second session).

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reuptake inhibitor, and keep taking them till they kick in” (p. 315). The worry is ultimately a
chemical (brain) problem, so Rosenberg provocatively suggests fixing it chemically.
But the suggestion misses something. It’s not pseudo-moral qualms about using drugs to
improve our lives. As Rosenberg points out, mental change is all about rewiring the brain, and
different methods -- education, therapy, drugs -- may differ in approach (and in effectiveness,
permanence, side effects, etc.) but there are no (pseudo-) moral differences.
Rather, the difficulty is that Rosenberg too quickly dismisses the psychological significance
of a mostly nihilist viewpoint. It is hard to argue with a lack of significance if one starts from
nihilist principles. But if Rosenberg is willing to grant our (illusory) worries can and should be
minimized, he might also grant that the (illusory) significance that is reduced for us should count
for something, even if we do not need absolute values or a complete theory of a meaningful life
to be happy. There is a reason so many ardent materialists resist materialism’s conclusions about
the arbitrary nature of morality and value, even if the reason is itself rooted in our evolved
minds. Prozac may or may not help with any persistent anxiety that comes from this realization.
It will not, however, dampen our sober appreciation of it. Some of us would also not want it to
… no more than we would want to enjoy a perfect life by being attached to Nozick’s experience
machine.

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