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A Terrorist Group’s Strategic Communication—The Case of the Red Army Faction
Abstract
Recent terrorist attacks in Europe point to the intense terrorism-propaganda-connection that has been described by both communication and terrorism studies scholars. The current debate, however, neglects the fact that Europe, in the past, has already experienced attacks from terrorist groups that were accompanied by sophisticated public relations and propaganda, their motives, however, being social-revolutionary, not religious. Therefore, this article elaborates to what extent the Red Army Faction applied strategic communication in order to achieve its (political) goals. Theoretical considerations about the concepts of terrorism as propaganda of the deed, terrorism as a media event and Fourth Generation Warfare precede the case study. An important finding is that even though the RAF was indeed a very media-savvy group at the time, this savviness did not help them to achieve their long-term goal of political revolution.
... A diferencia del cri-Adrián Tarín men social, cuya preferencia es permanecer en el anonimato, el terrorismo es una expresión de violencia política, y la política consiste en hacer algo público (Errejón y Mouffe 2015). Por esa razón, resulta habitual que las organizaciones armadas combinen actividades clandestinas, como los atentados, y abiertas, como la difusión de comunicados justificando sus postulados ideológicos y militares (Rothenberger 2017). Parece existir un amplio consenso en vincular ambos fenómenos (comunicación y violencia) en, al menos, dos sentidos: (1) analizar las propiedades comunicativas inherentes a las acciones armadas, y (2) comprender cómo el terrorismo necesita ser comunicado (Matusitz 2013;Alonso 2016;Rothenberger, Müller y Elmezeny 2018). ...
Este artículo tiene como objetivo aportar datos complementarios, fiables y replicables sobre el conteo de víctimas provocadas por las guerrillas del Cáucaso norte, para explicar su actual debilidad. La metodología empleada es el análisis de contenido de todas las publicaciones realizadas entre 2010 y 2019 en su órgano oficial de propaganda, Kavkaz Center. Esto se complementa con un análisis del contexto histórico. Se concluye que existe una coincidencia general en el aumento y la disminución de las variables producción propagandística y víctimas causadas a lo largo del tiempo. Por tanto, el escrutinio de la propaganda de las guerrillas ayuda a conocer su vigor con mayor certidumbre que si solo se tiene en cuenta el número de ataques perpetrados. Replicar el análisis en otros contextos permitiría conocer si puede establecerse una norma en ese sentido.
... objectives (Rothenberger, 2017), less attention has been devoted to explore what prevents certain groups compared to others to embrace communicational prowess. The gap has important academic, policy and practical implications. ...
The central hypothesis of this article is that there are a large number of terrorist groups which prolifically employ strategic communication (stratcom), while paradoxically, there are others who markedly underutilize it, and therefore, fail to mobilize support for the professed cause. The decisive determinant for either of the two ends, it is argued, obtains in the intellectual endowment or its banality among the conspiratorial groupings. A case of stratcom by two leading Pakistani Taliban groups – Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and TTP – Jammat ul Ahrar – is systematically investigated. The analysis clearly engenders that these terrorist organizations are communication un-savvy, because, they are not only religiously and secularly less informed and increasingly rhetorical but are intellectually far less creative to articulate a people inspired rhetorical vision. The brutalization of the civilians further trivializes their discourses. They have thus largely failed to evoke meaningful social mobilization. Besides further elaborating on the findings, the conclusion reflects on a few limitations of the research, offers input for broadening the research scope of some of the key dimensions of terrorism literature and ends with the discussion on some policy implications.
... [10] This ancillary aspect of public relations or propaganda used for terrorist purposes has been relatively ignored by the strategic communication academic literature whichparticularly after September 11 -has been focused mostly on the use of digital communication by international terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State. [11] However, although some attention has been paid to the activities of the IRA (Irish Republican Army) [12], collaterally ETA itself [13] and social-revolutionary groups such as the Red Army Faction [14], 'old-fashioned' European-style pre-digital era terrorism style in general has received little academic attention in the strategic communications literature. ...
This conceptual article analyzes the use of strategic communication by the terrorist group ETA, whose goal (for a period of 60 years) was to gain independence for the Basque region from Spain. It argues that the use of strategic communication management techniques, including assassinations and kidnappings, was successful in generating fear and led to political change. It created a spiral of silence whereby people who opposed not only terrorism but Basque nationalist ideology were less willing to express their ideas even under a democratic regime. This case study shows ETA's social and political fabric supported the fear strategy almost as much as its criminal activity.
... It must be kept in mind that the same kind of strategic communications that are intended to prevent group radicalization and global system destabilization, can also be skillfully misused by stimulating negative emotions, radicalization, and destabilization of security environment (Johnson, 2007;Rothenberger, 2017). The communication sphere is accessible to almost everybody (Holtzhausen & Zerfass, 2015), so that the originators of strategic communications today may also become targets of another's strategic communications tomorrow. ...
Pervasiveness of extreme negative emotions, especially anger, hatred and humiliation, as well as negative appraisal style, has a significant impact on the process of societal radicalization. Dominance of such emotions, and the corresponding appraisal style, very often threaten societal security. Emotionally Based Strategic Communications (EBSC), proposed in this article, can be used as a communications strategy for mitigating negative and promoting positive emotions within societal groups exposed to radicalization processes. Essentially, EBSC as mechanisms of positive emotional regulation strategy are based on reshaping the (re)appraisal style of radicalized groups. Grounded in the appraisal theories of emotions, EBSC are entirely non-coercive, and applicable to a wide variety of groups. Such communications strategies are also extendible to Internet-based social media networks, opening new possibilities in deradicalization processes using sentiment analysis, cognitive computing, botnets and other ICT-based methods and techniques.
Background On October 22, 2014, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed a soldier standing guard at the Canadian National War Memorial.
Analysis Using a pragma-dialectical approach, this article analyzes the three chronological sequences of communication related to the attack: the pre-crisis period, the crisis itself, and the post-crisis management.
Conclusions and implications This article asserts that before the crisis, the constitution and the functioning of the crisis management team impacted its ability to communicate effectively. Insufficient communication prompted the crisis to remain in the spotlight numerous years after its conclusion.
Analysis Using a pragma-dialectical approach, this article analyzes the three chronological
sequences of communication related to the attack: the pre-crisis period, the crisis itself, and
the post-crisis management.
Conclusions and implications This article asserts that before the crisis, the constitution
and the functioning of the crisis management team impacted its ability to communicate effectively.
Insufficient communication prompted the crisis to remain in the spotlight numerous
years after its conclusion.
The objective of this research is to analyze the potential use of strategic communication, and specifically, strategic brand management and online communications directed to a foreign target by the Islamic State (IS). For this purpose, a review of official the IS online media releases was carried out to determine if they reflect characteristics, components, or tools of strategic communication. In this pursuit, a content analysis of a purposive sample of 381 events-photographs, infographics, English written content, and videos-were applied using two independent judges. Statistically relevant results substantiate claims that the IS uses communication strategies and tactics. Descriptive and inferential statistics point out that Delegitimize Opponents, Utopia-Religion, and Military are the three most commonly used themes, in line with the reported IS identity. Also the IS uses breadth of contents, targets, media outlets, and formats, showing content and social media communications such as in online communication. As far as the authors are aware, it is the first content analysis from a strategic communication perspective used to interpret potential branding by the IS. This study is timely, important and lends credibility to the use of communication and marketing terminology by terrorist experts, as well as bridging brand management and strategic communication and terrorism identifying potential targets, messages , channels and tools for counter arguing and positioning. ARTICLE HISTORY
This is a classic textbook in public relations, which emphasizes a theoretical, managerial approach to public relations.
This article examines the relationship between warfare and the media, arguing that both terrorists and conventional warfare planners in the Pentagon factor communications and public relations into their planning. In this regard, the article sketches out how the Pentagon developed a new genre of `public relations-ized' warfare - warfare planned, not only as a military exercise, but as a televisual media event. Similarly, it will be argued that those attacking the World Trade Center deployed an understanding of terrorism as a `media event', and a grasp of how USA politics (and warfare) has been `media-ized'. This understanding was used by al-Qaeda to provoke the USA into the `War against Terrorism'. This war created a number of public relations problems for the Pentagon. The Pentagon's response to these problems is examined.
This article examines the nature of strategic communication, which is defined as the purposeful use of communication by an organization to fulfill its mission. Six relevant disciplines are involved in the development, implementation, and assessment of communications by organizations: management, marketing, public relations, technical communication, political communication, and information/social marketing campaigns. The nature of the term strategic is examined, and key aspects of communication are identified. This article is based, in part, on a panel discussion involving the journal's editors and international scholars at the International Communication Association in May 2005 in New York.
Grand strategy or overall strategy is essential to successful strategic communication planning as are the tactics of any campaign to accomplish that longer-term strategy. That is what is meant in thinking of big strategy to little strategy in the title of this study. The terms play off the phrase, the big idea, generally credited to David Ogilvy who some call the father of advertising but also used by Edward Bernays, who some call the father of public relations, in his 1936 work, Biography of an Idea: The Founding Principles of Public Relations. The purpose of the present study was to meld the big and little concepts of strategy in public relations through analyzing strategic communication plans for Multi-National Forces-Iraq, a United Nations military force of 40 countries led by the United States. It encompassed multiple case studies that included interviews, documents, participant observation, and direct observation in strategic communication planning. It also confirmed the usage of research and overarching goals as big strategy, and the operational and tactical parts of public relations planning as little strategy although big strategy can be elevated to the highest corporate levels as well.
All PR, whether for charities or arms manufacturers, is weak propaganda. Though it has its undeniable benefits (it grabs attention and helps circulate more information), it also has costs (such as selective messaging). This extensively revised edition of a classic text fully investigates PR, updating and expanding earlier arguments and building upon the successful first edition with new thoughts, data and evidence. Thought-provoking and stimulating, Rethinking Public Relations 2nd Edition challenges conventional PR wisdom. It develops the accepted thinking on the most important question facing PR - its relationship with democracy - and finds a balance of advantages and disadvantages which leave a residue of concern. It tackles topical issues such as: PR as a form of propaganda which flourishes in a democracy; the connections between PR and journalism; the media, promotions culture and persuasion. Designed to appeal to final year undergraduates, postgraduates and researchers studying public relations, media and communications studies, this book explores the most important relationship PR has - the connection with democracy - and asks what benefits or costs it brings to politics, markets and the media.
The objective of this article is to further our understanding of terrorist public relations initiatives through exploring communicative efforts that are inherent in terrorist activities and associated with terrorist actors and by scrutinising discourse emanating from terrorist movements and perpetrators. By analysing this content and output, the article identifies three core and interrelated components of terrorist public relations initiatives: (1) the communicative aspect of the terrorist act itself, (2) conveyance of ideological tenets and (3) counter-narrative work. The article concludes by considering some of the theoretical implications of the analysis and the relevance to different disciplines, highlighting the importance of understanding terrorist mobilisation efforts through public relations.
This article analyses terrorism and counter-terrorism within a framework of communication. This analytic framework views violence as a form of communication that interacts with other forms of social and political communication, whether by non-state actors or state actors. By looking at how terrorism and counter-terrorism fit into the wider context of social and political life, both at the national and the international level, the analyst can better understand how terrorism emerges from other social or political activity, how it can evolve into legal or nonviolent action, and how it can be but one tool in a political or social struggle that includes both violent and nonviolent tactics. By including counter-terrorism and the array of control institutions used to battle terrorism and related phenomena, the model forces a degree of self-reflectivity and self-awareness upon the analyst, who must examine societal, state and international institutions and forms of social control alongside strategies and tactics of protest and political agitation. In a post-11 September world, this analytic task is all the more challenging.
A growing number of frameworks for envisioning and enacting public relations posit social harmony as a core goal of the discipline. Such frameworks include two-way symmetry, communitarianism, fully functioning society theory, Isocratean rhetoric, and aspects of the reflective paradigm. A goal of social harmony, however, has been challenged as being overly idealistic, utopian, and incongruous with the competitive nature of human beings and organizations. This article examines the evolutionary biological theories of Charles Darwin and Peter Kropotkin – in particular, Kropotkin’s theory of mutual aid – and details their conclusion that the processes of natural selection favor communities built upon cooperation rather than competition. The processes of evolution and natural selection thus provide a scientific foundation for a goal of social harmony within public relations frameworks.
∗ Abstract: This paper reviews the major theoretical approaches to the study of terrorism. Despite the abundance of policy-oriented research in the field, terrorism, as an immensely complex subject, is underdeveloped in terms of theorizing. In this essay, I aim to present basic theoretical frameworks that evaluate terrorist behavior and discuss their potential to further develop as scientific theories. Instrumental, organizational, political communication, economic, and psychological theories of terrorism are discussed and some conclusions are drawn as to the future of terrorism studies.
In order to achieve permanent peace in Northern Ireland, major changes to all aspects of life are required. Discussion has increasingly focused on the news media and coverage of terrorist campaigns. It is widely recognized that propaganda is a crucial element of terrorist campaigns and, therefore, media coverage is vital. As a result, searching questions have been asked about the role, behavior, and capability of the media when dealing with manipulation by terrorist organizations. These organizations are becoming more and more adept at using the media to their own advantage and, consequently, strict guidelines have been issued to which the media must adhere. This has, in turn, led to heated discussion. Many people insist that freedom of the press is essential for the maintenance of a liberal democracy, while others believe that there is an urgent need for journalists to be curtailed when reporting on terrorism.
In this, the 1983 Farley Manning Fellowship Address, Daniel J. Edelman reports on his own view of the future and those of others he surveyed in preparation for composing this Address.
“Upward mobility”—of individuals in public relations and of the profession as a whole—will be a key emphasis among those with management oversight in public relations firms, he predicts. Upgrading training with formal programs, making employee and client recruitment more effective by making it more sophisticated, and staying abreast of state-of-the-art communications technology—all of these will be important factors in managing the next century's public relations organization.
The author is the president of Daniel J. Edelman, Inc., with offices in Chicago, New York, Washington, Los Angeles, Miami, St. Louis, London and Frankfurt.
Modern terrorism and public relations share a symbiotic, if different, relationship with the mass media, says the author of this article. Both share the objectives of commanding attention, delivering a message, and influencing opinion. Though some of the similarities are compelling, are they sufficient to equate terrorism with public relations?
Public relations is a process that may be invoked by anyone for any purpose. But in spite of some similarities between terrorist techniques with the media and persuasive public relations campaigns, what ultimately separates the two is the social responsibility of the practitioner and the social utility of the end. Terrorism seeks legitimacy through self-definition, not through the mandate of society, the author writes.
S. E. Rada is an associate professor in the Center for Communication Arts, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.
In this article, we discuss some of the arguments for and against government communication about potential public policies. This form of government communication is controversial, as it can be perceived as tax-financed propaganda for the politician or political party that is in power. Our basic argument here, however, is that an administration can communicate about potential policies in an ethical manner that also strengthens the democratic relationship between politicians and citizens by opening up the policy formulation process.
The idea that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' has led to the errone-ous conclusion that defining terrorism is, in the final analysis, a subjective activity about assigning negative connotations to one's opponents and positive connotations to one's proponents. Terrorism, both as practiced and justified by terrorist themselves, is a tool used to achieve a specific outcome by using force or violence on one segment of society with the primary goal of causing fear in the larger society to make change in that society. This article will review the historical development of the use of terror and demonstrate that regardless of the actor, all terrorists share the common belief that terror is a tool of change. The desired change, the chosen target, and the justification of the use of terror can be specific to the society and the perpetrators. The goal of this paper will be to show the common strands of uniformity of the understanding of terror as a tool of change through history. Though there are differences between terrorists and waves of terror, the utility of terror is not different.
Key Definitions for CrisisCrisis Management ProcessGeneral Nature of Crisis Communication ResearchCrisis Communication: Overview and HistoryConclusion
References
Informationen sind Waffen. Das gilt besonders in Zeiten asymmetrischer Kriege. So schreibt das Britische Magazin Economist zu Beginn einer Serie über „Terrorism and civil liberty“:
„In every war, information is a weapon. In a ‚war against terrorism‘, where the adversary wears no uniform and hides among
the civilian population, information can matter even more.“ (Economist v. 22.09.2007: 65)
Nicht erst seit dem 11. September 2001 wissen wir: Information kann nicht nur von Bedeutung sein. Sie muss für einen globalen Terrorismus verfügbar und gestaltbar sein, um seine Ziele zu erreichen. Die Terroristen sind auf die öffentliche
Wahrnehmung ihres Handelns angewiesen, um ihre Botschaft der Bedrohung und der gewaltsamen Durchsetzungsfähigkeit ihrer Forderungen
in der Wahrnehmung einer Gesellschaft oder eines politischen Systems zu verankern und womöglich auch Sympathie und Anerkennung
zu gewinnen. Jeder Terrorakt transportiert einen Komplex an Botschaften, die bei verschiedenen Zielgruppen unterschiedliche
Wirkung erzielen sollen. „Anschläge [...] sind zugleich immer auch kommunikative Akte.“ (Kraushaar 2006: 37)
This article1 addresses a paradox in the public communications of liberal democracies and suggests an easement of the social tensions created by it. Communication by public relations (PR) is an unavoidable consequence of such democracies, yet PR produces communicative inequalities, which offend the egalitarian and libertarian ethos of their civil societies and freely accessed markets. PR in this way renders itself into weak propaganda: historically and currently more available to principals rather than to subalterns. This is a conclusion most PR academics and practitioners reject. The former also distance themselves from persuasion and in their attachment to communicative symmetry they have ironically weakened the role of ethics in PR production. We seek to restore propaganda, persuasion and ethics to the centre of PR thinking. Our restoration begins with the establishment of propaganda detectors and regulators in the EU. We call them institutes for propaganda analysis after the example of the American Institute for Propaganda Analysis 1937–1942. These whistleblowers will measure the flows of PR propaganda amongst organisations and groups in the political economy and civil society; and counter-intuitively, will provide PR resource subsidies for those wanting to be heard in public via a PR ‘voice’ but who lack the capacity to produce it. In this way, a minimal communicative equality of PR production capacity will be created and European citizens and consumers given a more level playing field of information sources. PR propaganda is constitutive of liberal democracy, their civil societies and of capitalist markets but it needs reformation in the interests of equality of communication resources. This is a worthy and legitimate public policy goal to work towards.
This study explores whether the current United States military strategy should focus more on a comprehensive interagency approach as a more efficient way of focusing all elements of national power to defeat our enemies in the Long War on Terrorism. The method used to determine this question is initially accomplished by framing the scope of the current operating environment in the context of Fourth Generation Warfare. The definition of Fourth Generation Warfare is developed based on Col. Thomas X. Hammes' writings and then is further developed to show relevance and applicability to current operations in the Long War on Terrorism. A comparative analysis is conducted by utilizing a single case study of the United States experience during Vietnam. This is done to develop an understanding of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program in order to gain an understanding of the lessons learned while conducting interagency operations during the Vietnam conflict. The analysis identifies how the collaboration and coordination of all governmental agencies was used to conduct operations during Vietnam. These lessons are then compared to the current written policy and guidance and then assessed to determine if an appropriate level of synchronization and coordination are currently being utilized to meet our National objectives in the Long War on Terrorism within the context of the current operating environment. The findings of this study are that the current United States military strategy is making considerable progress within this context. This study also concludes that the national strategy, however, should focus even more on a comprehensive interagency approach as a more efficient way of focusing all elements of national power to defeat our enemies in the Long War on Terrorism.
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