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Jane Addams as experimental philosopher
Abstract
This paper argues that the activist, feminist and pragmatist Jane Addams (1860–1935) was an experimental philosopher. To defend this claim, I argue for capacious notions of both philosophical pragmatism and experimental philosophy. I begin in Section 2 with a new defence of Rose and Danks’ [‘In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy’. Metaphilosophy 44, no. 4 (2013): 512–32] argument in favour of a broad conception of experimental philosophy. Koopman [‘Pragmatist Resources for Experimental Philosophy: Inquiry in Place of Intuition’. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 26, no. 1 (2012): 1–24] argues that many twentieth-century American pragmatists (e.g. Peirce, James, Dewey) can make important contributions to contemporary experimental philosophy. In Section 3, I argue that while this may be true, it is also true that under the broad conception, many of the pragmatists just were experimental philosophers. In Section 4, I argue that as a pragmatist philosopher in her own right, Jane Addams also fits the bill of an experimental philosopher, broadly construed. My central argument is that working at Hull House rather than the University of Chicago is no reason to think Addams’ methods any less rigorous or empirical, nor the problems she addressed any less philosophical. I conclude by responding to potential objections to my even broader conception of experimental philosophy, and I briefly consider how my arguments might inform contemporary feminist criticisms of experimental philosophy.
This article examines the potential for critical theories to contribute towards social transformation through a process of popular education that supports learning and organising. Theory can create a platform of understanding across different communities that are resisting social injustice. This can enhance opportunities for translocal learning to catalyse social transformation at scale. Too often, however, academic theories remain disconnected from contemporary struggles for social justice – and as a result their contribution to social transformation is diminished. Therefore, we must reconsider how critical theories develop. Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition that builds theory through social action. It can guide a methodological infrastructure through which to best develop practice-led theory. I will explain how a critical pragmatist approach, anchored in participatory research, is more likely to generate theories that are both resonant to conditions of injustice and relevant for social transformation. The methodological innovations of early 20th century scholars WEB Du Bois and Jane Addams illustrate the key dimensions necessary for a critical pragmatist approach. Du Bois’ contestation of structural problems and Addams’ commitment to participatory experimentalism can inform an effective approach to these issues. In so doing, the article outlines key foundations for a philosophy of social inquiry to support learning and organising about social transformation. The ideas presented in this paper also contribute to debates about how to re-imagine the civic purpose of the academy.
One of the most influential methodological contributions of twentieth-century philosophy was the approach known as conceptual analysis. The majority of experimental philosophy papers are doing cognitive science. They are revealing surprising new effects and then offering explanations those effects in terms of certain underlying cognitive processes. The best way to get a sense for actual research programs in experimental philosophy is to look in detail at one particular example. This chapter considers the effect of moral considerations on intuitions about intentional action, as an example. Working in conceptual analysis aimed to develop analyses of concepts, and in that context, the obvious proposal would be that people should be aiming for simple analyses of concepts. The chapter also focuses on the study of intuitions about knowledge. Experimental philosophy has sought to capture the patterns in people's intuitions through theories about underlying cognitive processes.
The last four decades have seen a reflexive turn in the qualitative social sciences, an increased self-consciousness about the culturally contingent nature of our methods of representing human experience. This has given rise to a wave of experimentation in social science writing. Scholars have sought to develop research that does not just describe the object of study but also deliberately transforms the subject of the reader. In recent years, however, there is a growing sentiment that the obduracy of social reality seems to have been underemphasized in much of this experimentation. This article examines the inquiry methods of turn-of-the-century social theorist and settlement house founder, Jane Addams. The paper identifies themes in Addams’s approach to inquiry that was ahead of her time and relevant to this contemporary discussion. The paper argues that Addams has much to offer as an effort to develop a reflexively realist approach to social science inquiry.
Naturalism dominated twentieth century American philosophy.1 Naturalism is a philosophical worldview that relies upon experience, reason, and especially science for developing an understanding of reality. Naturalism demands that these three modes of understanding together shall control our notion of reality. Varieties of naturalism emerge because the many essential factors of experience, reason, and science can be coherently related in numerous ways. All naturalisms demand that experience, reason, and science be taken most seriously so that no fourth mode of understanding can be permitted to override them. This triadic unity moderates the excesses of phenomenalism and idealism, and filters out spiritualism and supernaturalism for their introduction of radical and mysterious discontinuities into knowledge and reality.
Scientific method and knowledge play a crucial role in all naturalisms. Varieties of naturalism may be distinguished along three dimensions: the degree of ontological confidence given to science; the breadth of explanatory discretion given to science; and the number of scientific fields permitted to describe reality. From the logically possible combinations resulting from these dimensions, seven viable varieties of naturalism are distinguished and contrasted. Each of these varieties of naturalism has had champions in the course of twentieth century American philosophy, such as Dewey, Whitehead, Santayana, Quine, Sellars, Davidson, Churchland, Putnam, and Searle.
The conclusion discusses the three major competitors during the twentieth century for the title of the “genuine” naturalism: Reductive Physicalism, Non-Reductive Physicalism, and Perspectival Pluralism. The struggles among these great naturalisms and the other viable varieties of naturalism have been bequeathed to the twenty-first century, and their outcomes may decide the ultimate fate of naturalism itself.
Stage One: Science, Knowledge, and Reality. There are six primary options when considering whether science yields knowledge about reality:
1. Reality cannot be known at all—radical skepticism.
2. Reality only consists of what science cannot know about—only other non-sciences know reality.
3. Science rarely gives reliable knowledge about reality—other non-sciences know reality far better.
4. Science is able to give increasingly reliable knowledge about reality.
5. Science is the only source of knowledge about reality.
6. Reality only consists of what science knows about.
Each of these six options present pathways to many different worldviews. Because naturalism at minimum presupposes that the knowledge about reality provided by science can seriously rival any other alleged source of knowledge, options 1, 2, and 3 are rejected by naturalists. Options 4, 5, and 6 can lead to varieties of naturalism.
(4) Science is able to give increasingly reliable knowledge about reality. There may be other ways besides science for knowing reality, but those ways are not better than science. Science needs assistance from other ways of knowledge to fully understand reality. This option searches for a comprehensive worldview formed by blending together ways of knowledge. Two interesting varieties:
(4)A. Ontological Dualism: there are two (or more) kinds of reality, knowable through two or more ways. For example, perhaps introspection is a non-scientific way of knowing reality because we are consciously aware of mental realities that science can never explain—leading to Mind-Body Dualism.
(4)B. Synoptic Monism: there is only one kind of ultimate reality, but it is knowable through two or more ways. We consciously know of realities (perhaps mental in nature) that science cannot fully explain. Varieties include Dual Aspect Monism and also Panpsychism, which holds that the natural world explored by science is ultimately composed of entities that have a mental/spiritual aspect. Unlike option (4)A, synoptic monism can be used to develop kinds of naturalism.
(5) Science is the only source of knowledge about reality. The only type of knowledge is scientific knowledge. However, some of reality consists of entities that cannot be known by science, simply because science is not designed to provide knowledge about these entities. Two interesting varieties:
(5)A. Perspectival Realism: we are acquainted with the entities unknowable through science because we experience these entities in some other way. For example, much of experience that provides the data for science is not itself also known by science. Specific types include Emergent Naturalism (mental entities emerge from, but are not reducible to, physical entities) and Pragmatic Naturalism, which both offer...
Experimental philosophers advocate expansion of philosophical methods to include empirical investigation into the concepts used by ordinary people in reasoning and action. We propose also including methods of qualitative social science, which we argue serve both moral and epistemic goals. Philosophical analytical tools applied to interdisciplinary research designs can provide ways to extract rich contextual information from subjects. We argue that this approach has important implications for bioethics; it provides both epistemic and moral reasons to use the experiences and perspectives of diverse populations to better identify underlying concepts as well as to develop effective interventions within particular communities.
At first glance it might appear that experimental philosophers and feminist philosophers would make good allies. Nonetheless, experimental philosophy has received criticism from feminist fronts, both for its methodology and for some of its guiding assumptions. Adding to this critical literature, I raise questions concerning the ways in which “differences” in intuitions are employed in experimental philosophy. Specifically, I distinguish between two ways in which differences in intuitions might play a role in philosophical practice, one which puts an end to philosophical conversation and the other which provides impetus for beginning one. Insofar as experimental philosophers are engaged in deploying “differences” in intuitions in the former rather than the latter sense, I argue that their approach is antithetical to feminist projects. Moreover, this is even (and perhaps especially) the case when experimental philosophers deploy “differences” in intuitions along lines of gender.
A remarkable number of Nietzsche's substantive moral psychological views have been borne out by evidence from the empirical sciences. Moral judgments are products of affects on Nietzsche's view, but the latter are in turn causally dependent upon more fundamental features of the individual. Nietzsche accepts a doctrine of types. The path is short from the acceptance of the Doctrine of Types to the acceptance of epiphenomenalism, as Leiter, and more recently, Riccardi argue. This chapter explains Nietzsche's phenomenological account of willing, which serves as independent motivation for the view that Nietzsche denies the causal efficacy of conscious acts of willing. It also explores that in spite of an absence of volitional freedom, self-control can be usefully understood on a strength-model of motivational resources. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of how Nietzsche, without employing the contemporary methods of empirical psychology, could nonetheless be such a prescient moral psychologist.
Many experimental philosophers are philosophers by training and professional affiliation, but some best work in experimental philosophy has been done by people who do not have advanced degrees in philosophy and do not teach in philosophy departments. This chapter explains that the experimental philosophy is the empirical investigation of philosophical intuitions, the factors that affect them, and the psychological and neurological mechanisms that underlie them. It explores what are philosophical intuitions, and why do experimental philosophers want to study them using the methods of empirical science. The positive program in experimental philosophy shares the goal of the substantial part of traditional philosophy that is concerned with the analysis of important philosophical concepts. The negative program has implications for philosophical projects whose goal is conceptual analysis. There have been a number of responses to the challenge posed by experimental philosophy's negative program. The chapter also focuses on the expertise defense.
In the mid-seventeenth century a movement of self-styled experimental philosophers emerged in Britain. Originating in the discipline of natural philosophy amongst Fellows of the Royal Society of London, it soon spread to medicine and by the eighteenth century had impacted moral philosophy, political philosophy, and aesthetics. Early modern experimental philosophers gave epistemic priority to observation and experiment over theorising and speculation. They decried the use of hypotheses and system-building without recourse to experiment and, in some quarters, developed a philosophy of experiment. In the eighteenth century, the movement spread to the Netherlands, France, and Germany. Its important role in early modern philosophy was subsequently eclipsed by the widespread adoption of the Kantian historiography, which emphasised the distinction between rationalism and empiricism and had no place for early modern experimental philosophy. The re-emergence of interest in early modern experimental philosophy roughly coincided with the development of contemporary x-phi. There are some important similarities between the two.
Experimental philosophy brings empirical methods to philosophy. These methods are used to probe how people think about philosophically interesting things such as knowledge, morality, freedom, etc. This paper explores the contribution that qualitative methods have to make in this enterprise. I argue that qualitative methods have the potential to make a much greater contribution than they have so far. Along the way, I acknowledge a few types of resistance that proponents of qualitative methods in experimental philosophy might encounter, and provide reasons to think they are ill-founded.
Experimental philosophy is often presented as a new movement that avoids many of the difficulties that face traditional philosophy. This article distinguishes two views of experimental philosophy: a narrow view in which philosophers conduct empirical investigations of intuitions, and a broad view which says that experimental philosophy is just the colocation in the same body of (i) philosophical naturalism and (ii) the actual practice of cognitive science. These two positions are rarely clearly distinguished in the literature about experimental philosophy, both pro and con. The article argues, first, that the broader view is the only plausible one; discussions of experimental philosophy should recognize that the narrow view is a caricature of experimental philosophy as it is currently done. It then shows both how objections to experimental philosophy are transformed and how positive recommendations can be provided by adopting a broad conception of experimental philosophy.
Jane Addams's prefaces and introductions are isolated from their texts and examined in chronological order. This throws into sharp focus her basic commitments and methodology and shows how they evolved over time. Her basic premise is that only gradually and with concerted effort can cultural and social barriers be dismantled, thus enabling genuine understanding and mutual, constructive action. Her experimental efforts to construct a social self develop in tandem with a social morality. Both require recognition of the ties that bind us to one another and the corollary that this creates obligations of mutual respect and support. She defined scientific methodology as engaged, perspectival, and value-laden at the very time it was portraying itself as detached, indifferent to context, and valuefree. She showed how lived experience and scientific approaches to knowledge were mutually reinforcing and argued that gathering data and testing it were enhanced, not diminished, by directing it towards social good.
Recent attention given to the upstart movement of experimental philosophy is much deserved. But now that experimental philosophy is beginning to enter a stage of maturity, it is time to consider its relation to other philosophical traditions that have issued similar assaults against ingrained and potentially misguided philosophical habits. Experimental philosophy is widely known for rejecting a philosophical reliance on intuitions as evidence in philosophical argument. In this it shares much with another branch of empiricist philosophy, namely, pragmatism. Taking Kwame Anthony Appiah's forthright and cautious endorsement of experimental philosophy as my model, I show that experimental philosophy and pragmatist philosophy share more than adherents of either philosophical method have yet to allow. I then use this comparison to show how the new experimentalisms could benefit from a rereading of century-old pragmatist insights about philosophical methodology.
This paper argues that early modern experimental philosophy emerged as the dominant member of a pair of methods in natural philosophy, the speculative versus the experimental, and that this pairing derives from an overarching distinction between speculative and operative philosophy that can be ultimately traced back to Aristotle. The paper examines the traditional classification of natural philosophy as a speculative discipline from the Stagirite to the seventeenth century; medieval and early modern attempts to articulate a scientia experimentalis; and the tensions in the classification of natural magic and mechanics that led to the introduction of an operative part of natural philosophy in the writings of Francis Bacon and John Johnston. The paper concludes with a summary of the salient discontinuities between the experimental/speculative distinction of the mid-seventeenth century and its predecessors and a statement of the developments that led to the ascendance of experimental philosophy from the 1660s.
The recent development of a field known as experimental philosophy-in particular, its subfield devoted to moral decision making-invites us to reflect on what it means to experiment in ethics and how it is that philosophers determine the good. Furthermore, as this new discipline uses the methods of experimental psychology to examine our intuitions about such things as praise, blame, and moral responsibility, we ought to consider the relationship between ethics and our psychological makeup. To this end, it will be beneficial to consider the American pragmatists' interpretations of these issues. Ethics, for these thinkers, was both a psychological and an experimental enterprise, one in which all of our psychological capabilities are brought to bear in solving specific moral problems through the testing of hypothetical and tentative solutions. 1 I plan to argue here that the future of experimental ethics will find itself indebted to the American past, not only in its attempts to address the empirical data it already collects but in rethinking the scope of ethics and experimentation. A distinctive contribution that classical American philosophers like William James, John Dewey, and George Santayana made to moral philosophy was the placement of ethics in the context of psychology. According to them, values are not handed down from on high (either via revelation or a priori deduction) but originate from within a biological organism with specific interests regarding its own well-being as well as that of its society. Our cognitive and emotional capacities, our intuitions, and our more deliberate reasoning practices all play important roles in helping us to determine the good for ourselves. From the point of view of the pragmatist, then, there is no way to step fully outside a human perspective, no God's-eye view or absolute position from which to make sense of different moral sensibilities. It is from
Philosophers and historians of biology have argued that genes are conceptualized differently in different fields of biology and that these differences influence both the conduct of research and the interpretation of research by audiences outside the field in which the research was conducted. In this paper we report the results of a questionnaire study of how genes are conceptualized by biological scientists at the University of Sydney, Australia. The results provide tentative support for some hypotheses about conceptual differences between different fields of biological research.
Though many pioneering feminists were deeply influenced by American pragmatism, their contemporary followers have generally ignored that tradition because of its marginalization by a philosophical mainstream intent on neutral analyses devoid of subjectivity. In this revealing work, Charlene Haddock Seigfried effectively reunites two major social and philosophical movements, arguing that pragmatism, because of its focus on the emancipatory potential of everyday experiences, offers feminism its most viable and powerful philosophical foundation. With careful attention to their interwoven histories and contemporary concerns, Pragmatism and Feminism effectively invigorates both traditions, opening them to new interpretations and appropriations and asserting their timely philosophical relevance. This foundational work in feminist theory simultaneously invites and guides future scholarship in an area of rapidly emerging significance.
by Jane Addams. Women's memories : transmuting the past, as illustrated by the story of the Devil baby -- Women's memories : reacting on life, as illustrated by the story of the Devil baby -- Women's memories : disturbing conventions -- Women's memories : integrating industry -- Women's memories : challenging war -- A personal experience in interpretative memory.
Theories of reference have been central to analytic philosophy, and two views, the descriptivist view of reference and the causal-historical view of reference, have dominated the field. In this research tradition, theories of reference are assessed by consulting one's intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations. However, recent work in cultural psychology (e.g. Nisbett, R. E., Peng, K., Choi, I., & Norenzayan, A. (2001). Culture and systems of thought: holistic vs. analytic cognition. Psychological Review, 108, 291-310.) has shown systematic cognitive differences between East Asians and Westerners, and some work indicates that this extends to intuitions about philosophical cases (Weinberg, J., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2001). Normativity and epistemic intuitions. Philosophical Topics 29(1&2), 429-459.) In light of these findings on cultural differences, an experiment was conducted which explored intuitions about reference in Westerners and East Asians. The experiment indicated that, for certain central cases, Westerners are more likely than East Asians to report intuitions that are consistent with the causal-historical view. These results constitute prima facie evidence that semantic intuitions vary from culture to culture, and the paper argues that this fact raises questions about the nature of the philosophical enterprise of developing a theory of reference.
The Social Philosophy of Jane Addams
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