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Recht und Ökonomik: Zur Bedeutung rechtlicher Expertise für die Industrieökonomen

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Abstract

Die Industrieökonomik bildet – wie etwa auch Law and Economics – einen Zweig der angewandten Mikroökonomik. Industrieökonomische Analysen, die Marktregeln zum Gegenstand haben, können auch als spezielle Law and Economics-Forschung verstanden werden, gleichsam als „Competition Law and Economics“. Indes unterscheiden sich das Verhältnis der Rechtswissenschaft zur Industrieökonomik einerseits und andererseits zur (allgemeinen) Law and Economics-Forschung – d. h. zur ökonomischen Theorie des Deliktsrechts, Vertragsrechts, Kapitalgesellschaftsrechts usw. – erheblich.

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