Tuna or Tasi? Fishing for Policy Coherence in Zanzibar’s Small-Scale Fisheries Sector

Abstract

Zanzibar in 1964 merged with Tanganyika to become the United Republic of Tanzania (URT). Zanzibar enjoys autonomy in the governance of marine resources having adverse effects on the implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication (SSF Guidelines) as Zanzibar is not a member of the FAO as a unit on its own, but only as a part of the URT. While the Guidelines were still unknown to Zanzibar a new fisheries policy was formulated complicating their implementation, as the Guidelines clashes with the new fisheries policy. We examine this clash using the concept policy coherence defined as the coherence between (a) development and other policies, and (b) development policies of different donors. We downscale it to apply to policies within one sector, small-scale fisheries, by comparing the fisheries policy which is grounded in liberal ideas like commercialization and capitalization, with the SSF Guidelines which ideationally are based in human rights and a view of fishing as also culture and not just any economic activity subject to economic laws. We argue that conflicts between the two may result in failure to implement the SSF Guidelines as they do not come with World Bank and other external funding as the new fishery policy does. Choosing between conflicting policy elements the choice will likely be the fishery policy if the implementation of SSF Guidelines comes with a cost.

Full text

Chapter 5
Tuna or Tasi? Fishing for Policy Coherence in Zanzibar’s
Fisheries Sector
Lars Lindström and Maricela de la Torre-Castro
Abstract Zanzibar in 1964 merged with Tanganyika to become the United Republic of
Tanzania. Zanzibar enjoys autonomy in the governance of marine resources having adverse
effects on the implementation of the FAO Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable
Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication as Zanzibar is
not a member of the FAO as a unit on its own, but only as a part of the URT. While the
Guidelines were still unknown to Zanzibar a new fisheries policy was formulated
complicating their implementation, as the Guidelines clashes with the new fisheries policy.
We examine this clash using the concept policy coherence defined as the coherence
between a) development and other policies, and b) development policies of different donors.
We downscale it to apply to policies within one sector, small-scale fisheries, by comparing
the fisheries policy which is grounded in liberal ideas like commercialization and
capitalization, with the FAO SSF Guidelines which ideationally are based in human rights
and a view of fishing as also culture and not just any economic activity subject to economic
laws. We argue that conflicts between the two may result in failure to implement the FAO
SSF Guidelines as they don’t come with World Bank and other external funding as the new
fishery policy does. Choosing between conflicting policy elements the choice will likely be
the fishery policy if the implementation of FAO SSF Guidelines comes with a cost.
Keywords: ● Policy coherence ● Institutional fit ● Small-scale fisheries governance ●
Zanzibar
Introduction
In June 2014, a historical event in the advancement of the valuation of global fisheries took
place: the endorsement of the Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale
L. Lindström ()
Department of Political Science
Stockholm University, SE-106 91, Stockholm, Sweden
e-mail: lasse.lindstrom@statsvet.su.se
M. de la Torre-Castro
Department of Physical Geography
Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
e-mail: maricela@natgeo.su.se

Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication (hereafter SSF Guidelines)
by 147 FAO member countries. This document represents the first real acknowledgement of
the important role of small-scale fisheries for not only food but also income security for the
world population, contributing as it does to about half of global fish catches (FAO 2015, ix).
More importantly, though, they are targeted at the equitable development of small-
scale fishing communities and consider its contribution to poverty eradication. The SSF
Guidelines do so by emphasizing participatory policies and the rule of law, as well as by
raising public awareness of the broader cultural and social role played by small-scale
fisheries.
What remains now for those countries that have adopted the SSF Guidelines is to
implement them, or to ‘walk the talk’ (Jentoft 2014). The implementation gap - the distance
between stated goals and objectives and the realization of them - is often wide, particularly in
developing countries. Corruption, lack of human and material resources, and unstable
political environments are only a few of the factors that impede implementation in these
contexts.
However, we will analyze a different implementation problem: the one of ‘double
talk’, or when policies are not coherent, which can create synergies, but rather are in conflict
with one another, which turns the walk into limping. The concept of ‘policy coherence’ has
gained increasing weight ever since the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, and
is now part of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and
European Union aid frameworks. It is also part of the SSF Guidelines’ instruments.
In this chapter, we turn our attention to the case study of Zanzibar. The former
sultanate of Zanzibar is an archipelago off Tanzania’s coast that merged with former
Tanganyika in 1964 to become the United Republic of Tanzania (URT). Zanzibar enjoys
autonomy in non-union matters, one of which is the governance of marine resources. Thus,
the URT and Zanzibar have their own institutions, both political and administrative, for the
governance of small-scale fisheries. As a consequence of the peculiar institutional design of
the URT, which resembles a federation without a federal level, Zanzibar is not a member of
the FAO as a unit of its own, but through its inclusion within the URT state. Zanzibar was,
therefore, not invited to the FAO negotiation process that began in 2010 and ended in the
adoption of the SSF Guidelines in 2014. Zanzibar neither participated on its own terms nor
was invited to the Tanzanian representation. Thus, the talk was unheard by Zanzibar’s
government! It was not until the authors of this chapter inquired about the implementation in
September 2015 that it was clear that the Zanzibar authorities had no previous knowledge, or
opportunities to be part, of the negotiations, consultation process, or the drafting of the final
document.
It seems unlikely, though, that the architects behind the new fisheries policy (FP),
SWIOfish and SMARTfish (see below), were unaware of this process, which started in 2010
and involved more than 4,000 representatives of governments, small-scale fishers, fish
workers and their organizations, researchers, development partners, and other relevant
stakeholders from more than 120 countries in six regions and more than 20 civil society
organization-led national consultative meetings, leading up to the endorsement of the SSF
Guidelines in June 2014 (FAO 2015, v).
The Zanzibar elections in October 2015 were annulled because of alleged violations
of the electoral laws and the political situation remained in limbo until new elections were
held in March 2016. It was not until early summer 2016 that the new administration had
taken over.
In addition to the lack of knowledge about the FAO negotiations by key authorities
involved in marine resources, the SSF Guidelines were also unknown to other members of
Zanzibar society. Interviews with representatives of civil society organizations and individual

fishers in July-August 2016 showed a complete unawareness of even the existence of the SSF
Guidelines.
As we will demonstrate below, these factors will have adverse effects on the prospects
for the effective implementation of the SSF Guidelines in Zanzibar. Furthermore, since a new
FP was being developed while negotiations in the context of FAO were taking place, policy
coherence with the new Guidelines under development was not on the agenda in creation of
the new FP.
In what follows, we will present Zanzibar’s small-scale fisheries context, then present
the policy framework and, finally, examine the inherent conflicts between the new FP and the
SSF Guidelines. At the end of the chapter, we interpret our findings against the broad key
objectives in the SSF Guidelines.
Small-Scale Fisheries in Zanzibar
Small-scale fisheries in Zanzibar are de facto operated as an open access system, mainly
taking place inshore in intertidal areas with less than 20-30 meters depth around both major
islands, Pemba and Unguja. The fishers use traditional vessels like small wooden boats,
canoes, and outrigger canoes chiseled out from huge tree trunks, and use a variety of fishing
gears including different types of nets (drag-nets, gill nets, ring nets, beach-seines, etc.),
basket traps (demas), longlines, as well as hook and line. Fishing takes place along the whole
seascape comprising different ecosystems - coral reefs, mangroves, sandbanks, and seagrass
beds - while a few fishers reach deeper waters (de la Torre-Castro et al. 2014). A large
variety of fin-fish and invertebrate species is targeted, and it has been considered that the
fishery in Tanzania (including Zanzibar) is in decline and in urgent need of management
reform (Jiddawi and Öhman 2002; Eriksson et al. 2010). There are about 35,000 fishers using
approximately 8,500 vessels, of which 10-15% are equipped with outboard engines (ZFC
2007, 2010; RGZ 2016).
It is difficult to estimate the importance of fish production and related activities to the
national economy, since large parts of the sector are predominantly unregulated. Although
monitoring agents (Bwana dikos) take catch data, the statistics are error prone (de la Torre-
Castro 2006). In addition, the coastal population depends almost entirely on small-scale
fisheries for income and food security. With a population of about 1.3 million and an average
family size of seven persons - a staggering 250,000 persons, or about 20% of Zanzibar’s total
population - are directly dependent on small-scale fisheries.
Moreover, small-scale fisheries are by and large the most important livelihood sector
in the coastal villages in Unguja. Based on information in diaries, the small-scale fisheries
sector (including not only harvest, but 21 different livelihood activities) is the most important
for the coastal people. It provides both the highest income and the highest frequency of
performed activities (de la Torre-Castro et al. in press). Although male-dominated, small-
scale fisheries in Zanzibar are performed by, and are important for, both men and women.
There is a gendered differentiation of activities, ecosystems used, and species targeted, but
the importance of small-scale fisheries are high for all coastal inhabitants. In this context,
even small children at pre-school age fish in their villages and start interacting with markets,
active fishers, and traders as early as before five years of age.
Markets are mainly local, but some valuable products, such as sea cucumbers, have
IUU (Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported) characteristics and reach international markets
through clandestine commercialization that takes place parallel to the established legal
market (Eriksson et al. 2012). The local markets present a high degree of complexity, with a
myriad of actors varying from auctioneers, middlemen, credit providers, sidewalk fishers,

women fish traders, fish cleaning children, and many other actors. The market chains are also
complex, with distribution of fish products to local people, restaurants, hotels, and larger
markets in Zanzibar town (e.g. Darajani and Mwanakwerekwe). Market dynamics are not
thoroughly studied, but it is clear that the inclusion of female fish traders in management
would be a positive management action, as well as a deeper understanding of the ecological
effects of market exploitation which targets different functional groups and all maturity
stages of fish (Fröcklin et al. 2013; Thyresson et al. 2013). The high fishing pressure, as well
as the complex market in which the diverse array of market agents currently buys up all that
is offered, seem to create a situation in which there is no refuge for fish (and invertebrates) to
complete their life-history undisturbed.
Small-scale fisheries in Zanzibar have a management history similar to many other
sites in developing countries. They have passed through periods of local traditional
management marked by sustainable practices and robust local institutions. Like in many other
countries in post-war and/or post-colonial periods, fisheries in Zanzibar experienced radical
systemic changes characterized by external management interventions and the disruption of
historical well-functioning management practices by donor-funded projects (de la Torre-
Castro and Lindström 2010; de la Torre-Castro 2012). The introduction of extensive Marine
Protected Areas (MPAs) with the support of the World Bank between 2005 and 2011 has
radically changed the national management path, moving Zanzibar’s fisheries into traditional
Western management. Small-scale fisheries in Zanzibar are clearly in need of better
governance. Catch decline, destruction of ecosystems, inadequate fishing gears, gender
inequality, and lack of proper policy and management are major problems threatening the
sustainability of the overall fisheries governance system. The problem of destructive gear use
and the unsuccessful gear exchange programs are particularly important negative factors
(Wallner-Hahn et al. 2016). Also, the selective fishing of key species, such as sea-urchin
predators, contributes to cascade effects which are detrimental to both coral and seagrass
ecosystems (Wallner-Hahn et al. 2015).
Fig .5.1. Tasi, rabbit fish (Siganus sutor), at the local fish market. Tasi is
key for small-scale fisheries in Zanzibar providing animal protein and
monetary income. Photo: M. de la Torre-Castro

The Institutional Setup
Zanzibar is a semi-autonomous part of the United Republic of Tanzania, and RGZ and its
Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, Livestock, and Fisheries (MANLF) enjoy full
rights to regulate marine resource use. Thus, RGZ exercises sovereignty over fisheries
governance. Fisheries are formally regulated by mainly the Fisheries Law of 1993 and the
Fisheries Act of 2010, but also informally by the daily praxis of fishers and other
stakeholders (RGZ 1993; 2010a).
In addition to the legislative assembly, the government agencies engaged in the
governance of fisheries are the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, Livestock and
Fisheries at the central level, a number of District Fisheries Offices at the regional level, and
Bwana Diko (fishing monitoring agents), who operate at the majority of landing sites. At the
local level, there is a variety of informal institutions established by fishers themselves, as well
as the fishers’ committees that were formalized by the previously called Department of
Fisheries during the last decade (Lindström and de la Torre-Castro 2015).
The Bwana Dikos have a key role at the local level as they record catches on a regular
basis and report these to higher levels of government, as well as issue fishing licenses and are
supposed to report law breakers. They are, however, caught in a number of dilemmas. Their
remuneration is low and issues related to kinship, multitasking, poverty, and control
complicate their monitoring and sanctioning roles (de la Torre-Castro 2006).
Policy Coherence
In the following analysis, we will make use of the concept of policy coherence that has
become one of the pillars in OECD and EU development policy, as well as in FAO
documents like the one on trade and agricultural policy and as a policy objective in the SSF
Guidelines (FAO 2006; EC 2013; FAO 2015, 10.1; OECD 2016). The concept refers to the
reduction of conflicts and the promotion of synergies between, both vertically and
horizontally, and within different policy areas to achieve the desired outcomes (Nilsson et al
2012). We apply the concept to Zanzibar’s fisheries sector by analyzing horizontal conflicts
within the fisheries sector, showcased in the comparison of the new FP announced in 2014
and the SSF Guidelines (RGZ 2014; 2016; FAO 2015). More precisely, we will conduct a
policy analysis by comparing the policy objectives and instruments in the two policies in
terms of conflicting and incompatible objectives and instruments.
We argue that the less coherence between the two policies, the more difficult it will be
for government agencies to implement the SSF Guidelines. This challenge is heightened by
the fact that the new FP comes with international donor funding. Struggling with meagre
finances makes it tempting to choose that the policy option which comes with funding.
Policy Framework
Tanzania has been a major recipient of foreign aid for decades and the coastal management
sector, including fisheries, are no exemption. The World Bank has been a major actor in
shaping the governance and management trajectories of small-scale fisheries. Since the early
1980s, there have been efforts and donations directed at commercialization and the increase
of fish catches (World Bank 1984). In addition, from the early 2000s, the Bank’s presence
has been critical in changing the management system through the Marine and Coastal

Environment Management Project (MACEMP) (World Bank 2012). The project was made
possible with an approximate $63 million USD World Bank loan and a grant from the Global
Environment Facility (World Bank 2013). It was designed and implemented in cooperation
with the Union Government and the RGZ. The purpose of MACEMP was to ‘improve
management of coastal and marine resources, to enhance the contribution of these resources
to economic growth, to reduce poverty, and to develop the scientific understanding of the
marine and coastal resources and major threats to them’ (URT 2005, 9). However, during the
period of intervention (2005-2011), the project mainly focused on creating a series of MPAs
and, although the objective was to achieve conservation and development at the same time,
the positive results of the project are limited and difficult to see by the local people,
especially since many issues of procedural and distributive injustices have been reported
(Gustavsson et al. 2014). A new project supported by the World Bank after MACEMP is now
in effect, the ‘First South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Governance and Shared Project
Growth’ (SWIOFish). This project comprises a larger geographical area, targeting South
West Indian Ocean countries and addressing fisheries as a key sector in which regional
collaboration, improved management, and governance, as well as economic benefits, are
needed. The investment for this project consists $75.5 million USD from the International
Development Association (IDA) and $15.5 USD from the Global Environmental Facility.
Each country included in the project elaborates its own fisheries policy. Tanzania will
receive a sum of $36 million USD to continue the work for better governance and
management, improve livelihoods, and increase private sector participation in fishing
industry activities. This new World Bank project is projected to operate until 2021 (World
Bank 2016).
Other guiding policy documents are The Zanzibar Vision 2020 (RGZ 2002) and The
Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, MKUZAII (RGZ 2010b). The
former articulates the overall development goals for Zanzibar as the eradication of absolute
poverty and the attainment of sustainable human development. The Vision’s policy on
fisheries is to strengthen the management of marine and coastal resources to support
sustainable tourism development while conserving the richness of the environment. The
Vision also recognizes the key role played by the fisheries sector in the social and economic
development of the country.
The Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, MKUZAII, recognizes that
fisheries are of great importance to the economy of Zanzibar. It also stresses that recent
government efforts have been directed towards the conservation of marine and coastal
environments and that this has largely contributed to significant increases in fish catch
(however, there are no scientific catch data to substantiate this assertion). Despite this
positive performance, MKUZAII highlights that marine resources further offshore in deeper
waters are still underutilized, as most fisheries activities are done in inshore waters which are
unsustainably over-exploited. It also emphasizes that there is a great potential on the part of
domestic fishers for offshore fishery expansion in Zanzibar.
Double Talk
The new FP was announced on December 1, 2014, with a first draft published in June 2014
(RGZ 2014) and a second draft in July 2016 (RGZ 2016). The first draft had as its main
objective the protection of coral reef ecosystems in order to promote tourism, a clearly non-
fishing and non-ecological objective. This was removed from the second draft. Both drafts
have been developed within the context of SWIOfish, financed by the World Bank, and
SmartFish, funded by the EU. The second draft has three main objectives, namely to:

i. Enhance sustainability of fishery resources through preserving biodiversity of marine
ecosystems
ii. Enhance the social and economic performances of the fishery sector through
improvement fisheries management
iii. Increase fish production and improve quality of fish and fish products in line with
food security and safety requirements in compliance to international standards (RGZ
2016, 14).
These objectives are indicated to be achieved through a set of guiding principles:
sustainability, conservation, research, equity, poverty reduction, gender equity, and good
governance principles like participation, transparency, and accountability, as well as a
number of policy instruments (RGZ 2016, 14-15). In the following section, we will analyze
the policy objectives and instruments with bearing on small-scale fisheries, or artisanal which
is the term used in the policy documents, in a comparison with the SSF Guidelines.
From Tasi
1
to Tuna
A main objective in the second draft of the new FP is to ‘promote responsible and sustainable
development of artisanal fisheries further offshore in deeper waters with an aim to increase
the contribution of the fishery sector to economic growth and food security. Meanwhile to
facilitate the removal of fishing capacity in shallow waters for improved fisheries
management in coastal zones’ (RGZ 2016: 21).
2
This goal, however, depends upon the replacement of simple wooden inshore vessels
with large fiberglass ones equipped with engines which would enable fishers to go offshore.
Through the MACEMP program, a few vessels like these, along with sizeable gill nets, were
distributed freely among the villages to be controlled by the Village Fisheries Committees.
However, our study shows that this introduction of technology contributed to distributional
injustices, as only a few fishers were granted access to these vessels, predominantly the upper
ranks of the Committees (Gustafson et al 2014). In the new FP, fishers are expected to buy
fiberglass boats, engines, and fishing nets by taking up loans on the commercial market (RGZ
2016, 22). Given that most fishers have an income slightly above the poverty line (de la
Torre-Castro et al. 2014; de la Torre-Castro et al. in press) the policy will likely contribute to
a segregation of the fishery into a few ‘haves’ and the many ‘have nots’. Those that cannot
afford the technical upgrading will be forced to remain inshore and intertidal areas, where
they most probably will be squeezed by the extension and establishment of MPAs and other
Marine Conservation Areas (MCAs). There are also risks that the poorest fishers may enter
disadvantageous relationships with market traders, seeking loans and pressed by their wish to
retain their livelihoods and fishing as a cultural life style.
This kind of stratification runs contrary to what the SSF Guidelines state: “States
should also adopt measures to facilitate equitable access to fishery resources for small-scale
fishing communities” (FAO 2015, 6).
3
Those remaining inshore will also struggle to compete
1
Tasi is the Kiswahili word for the predominantly seagrass-associated Rabbit fish Siganus spp. Tasi is mainly
fished inshore and is a valuable species particularly for food security and often targeted using basket traps
(demas).
2
Emphasis added by authors.
3
Emphasis added by authors.

on the market with their less valuable species (there are signs that intertidal invertebrates are
decreasing and fish juveniles fetch lower value in the market). Thus, the policy may
contribute to Zanzibar’s export earnings but it is difficult to perceive how it will secure or
improve food and income security of small-scale fishers or communities outside of a small
elite group.
In addition, offshore fisheries will benefit from “technological (fishing and navigation
techniques, type and localization of Fish Aggregating Devices, etc.” (RGZ 2016, 22), as well
as value addition like fish preservation on-board, fish storage, processing and marketing,
further aggravating the situation for those left to remain inshore. It also implies that the
vessels required will be far larger than, for example, simple 25ft fibreglass boats with
outboard engines, thus requiring an even larger investment that few small-scale fishers can
afford. Wallner-Hanh et al. (2016) demonstrated that the economic constraints to change
gears among Zanzibarian fishers are huge and difficult to overcome. It is expected that, when
it comes to investments in boats and all extra inputs needed for such a radical change in the
way of fishing, the economic constraints will increase disproportionally for lower-income
harvesters. The strategy of fishing offshore, rather, privileges large commercial vessels
owned by pavement fishers employing a captain and a small crew manning 25ft wooden
boats mainly engaged in inshore fishing, an already fairly common arrangement.
However, these changes are all in line with the objective of removing fishing capacity
in shallow waters, which stands in conflict with the SSF Guidelines’ principles of poverty
reduction and equity (FAO 2015; RGZ 2016). The equity principle, as formulated in the new
FP, is restricted to encouraging “local and international researchers into the equitable use,
distribution, and conservation of marine resources in sustainable ways that limits in
transboundary oceanic fisheries. Meanwhile, the Government will establish transparent and
equitable rules and frameworks for assessing and distributing conservation burdens for all
fisheries stakeholders” (RGZ 2016, 15). Indeed, this is a strange conceptualization of equity.
That rules and frameworks are transparent and equitable is far from the same as the burdens
of conservation being equitable distributed.
The SSF Guidelines speak differently. While the draft of the FP refers to regulation
being equitable, the SSF Guidelines discusses equitable distribution of “the benefits yielded
from responsible management of fisheries and ecosystems” (FAO 2015, 5).
The new FP puts much emphasis on leaving inshore fishing and instead develop an
industrial tuna fleet together with “Zanzibar potential investors” (RGZ 2016: xx). It is
interesting to note the emphasis given to include private actors in the new FP. In addition, the
development of aquaculture activities in the form of seaweed, pearls, and fish is promoted
(RGZ 2016, 19-25). Some of these priorities are, at least is on the surface, in line with the
SSF Guidelines, which also looks to the creation of complementary and alternative income
generating activities (FAO 2015, 9). What is problematic, however, is that fishers cannot
realistically turn to seaweed aquaculture as this is predominantly, at least in Zanzibar, is a
business of women and is one of the already existing complementary livelihoods for coastal
families (Fröcklin et al. 2012). Men in the household are engaged in fin fishing, and women
in seaweed farming.
It is also questionable if seaweed farming is a sustainable venture, with common
occurrences of declining crop yields and falling prices. The price of Euchema denticulatum,
locally known as spinosum seaweed, was previously around 700 Tanzanian shillings per kg,
but is now selling at 300 shillings per kg, while the price for Kappaphycus alvarezii, locally
known as cottonii, the high-quality variety of seaweed, has plummeted from around 1100
shillings per kg to 700 (Daily Mail, 1 May 2016). Seaweed farming is a major livelihood only
for a few, while it is complementary activity for the overwhelming majority of the female
farmers. Most of the seaweed farmers report that working with seaweed alone is not

sufficient for a decent income and, thus, women seaweed farmers are forced to perform other
activities. In fact, during the last 10-15 years an abandonment of the activity has been
reported and observed. The new FP’s push to cement a poor income generating activity such
as seaweed farming will result in the reduction of income security, running contrary to one of
the main objectives of the SSF Guidelines.
Together with the economic problems faced by the activity, climate change poses a
larger threat to seaweed farming. Increasing sea surface temperature in the intertidal zone,
where seaweed is grown, has negative effects and diseases have been reported, causing a
substantial decrease in production (Lindström and de la Torre Castro, 2016). The production
of seaweed also shows several negative health effects for women (Fröcklin et al 2012).
Another concern related to climate change is shifting distribution patterns of target species in
the overall fishery. Increasing sea temperatures in the wake of climate change result in the
migration towards the poles of many fish species, as is also stated in the new FP (RGZ 2016,
26). This change will, however, also affect fish cultivations whether in ponds or in the sea
itself and how this in the long run affects income and food security is not properly addressed.
When introduced, seaweed farming was targeted as an alternative livelihood for men
to decrease fishing pressure. However, as soon as men realized the lack of profits, they
abandoned the activity and women took over. Why do women perform such an activity which
negatively affects their health and provides so little income? It has been argued that the
advantage of seaweed farming is that it allows women to continue with activities of
production and reproduction since they are able to take care of the household duties while
earning some cash (de la Torre-Castro et al. in press). Given the historical context, the new
proposition of male fishers turning to seaweed farming may completely fail and, if it
succeeds, the shift will force women out from the business, effectively violating gender
equity principles in an already patriarchal division of labour.
Which Talk to Walk: Coherent Policies?
The ideas expressed in the different fisheries policy documents in Zanzibar clearly expose the
wish to solve a perceived problem of an overcrowded and overexploited fishery in near
coastal waters. The ideas are explicit and there is no doubt about the wish to promote radical
changes. Two key policy objectives from this policy are troubling in particular:
1. “The Government will play a catalytic role in the gradual development of artisanal
fisheries further offshore in deeper waters through promoting the formulation and the
implementation of an Integrated FAD Fisheries Development and Management
Programme and through improving efficiency and safety at sea” (RGZ 2016, 22).
2. “To promote the development of a domestic offshore industrial fishing fleet targeting
tuna and tuna-like species in Tanzania EEZ thorough examining all possibilities that
could provide incentives for potential local investors” (RGZ 2016, 22).
The offshore solution is portrayed as a viable alternative since this part of the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) is perceived as low or non-exploited by national Tanzanians, while
foreign vessels are harvesting the economic benefits by landing in neighboring countries
(RGZ 2016). Our analysis. as well as our previous research, show that the idea of making the
proposed radical changes to the way of fishing in the area, and in the coastal activities to be
supported, are both in direct contradiction to the SSF Guidelines and are highly prone to
failure.

We have identified incoherencies between small-scale fishers’ activities and strong
conservation approaches; between small-scale fishers and the economic capacity needed to
change their fishing techniques; between small-scale fishers and spatial issues (by removing
them from inshore areas and promoting fishing offshore); between small-scale fishers’
production and new activities, mainly aquaculture, that have their own social and economic
repercussions.
The proposed new FP does not convincingly provide for a secure situation for small-
scale fishers in Zanzibar. To the contrary, their livelihoods, lifestyle, and way of fishing will
be jeopardized and face the threat of either disappearing or experiencing radically change.
Due to these implications, the proposed new FP is in incoherent with the SSF Guidelines.
Livelihood security including economic security, gender equity, minimum rights to design
one’s own management regimes and long term sustainability, and tenure rights over the
fishing resources and ecosystems are all weak. A tailored and already decided solution is
presented at hand. The following table (Table 5.1) illustrates our findings regarding the
governance implications of the proposed new FP in reference to the general objectives stated
in the SSF Guidelines.

Table 5.1 Policy Incoherence between the SSF Guidelines (FAO 2015) and the new Zanzibar Fisheries Policy
(RGZ 2016)
SSF Guidelines’ Broad Objectives
Incoherencies with the Draft New Fisheries Policy
 To enhance the contribution of small-scale
fisheries to global food security and
nutrition and to support the progressive
realization of the right to adequate food
 Radical changes in fishing ways and techniques that
promote export and commercialization rather than
enhancement of production for local consumption.
Relocation of SSF and promotion of industrial fleet
which jeopardizes lifestyle and might reduce access to
fish protein for locals
 To contribute to the equitable development
of small-scale fishing communities and
poverty eradication and to improve the
socio-economic situation of fishers and fish
workers within the context of sustainable
fisheries management
 Low gender equity as men and women activities are
put in competition
 Key actors in the fishery system such as women fish
traders are not addressed in the FP
 Low overall economic equity as actors which are
economically strong will be able to fish offshore while
poor ones are not
 Poor conditions on coastal people health as promotion
of aquaculture activities with detrimental health
effects are encouraged and proposed
 No convincing efforts to manage near coastal fisheries
in a sustainable way, since much emphasis is put on
‘Western solutions’ such as strengthening MPAs,
MCAs, and a regulations and control approach.
Emphasis to ‘move’ the problem to offshore waters
 To achieve the sustainable utilization,
prudent and responsible management and
conservation of fisheries resources
consistent with the Code of Conduct for
responsible Fisheries (the Code) and related
instruments
 No explicit synergies between the new proposed FP
and this FAO code
 To promote the contribution of small-scale
fisheries to an economically, socially and
environmentally sustainable future for the
planet and its people
 In the new FP, there is an aspiration towards this
broad objective, however, the proposed policy
oversees the complexity of the SSF situation, the local
ecological knowledge of the fishers and the scientific
research produced in the area
 To provide guidance that could be
considered by States and stakeholders for
the development and implementation of
ecosystem friendly and participatory
policies, strategies and legal frameworks
for the enhancement of responsible and
sustainable small-scale fisheries
 Although well-functioning and healthy ecosystems are
named a number of times in the policy document, it is
unclear how this will be achieved in practical terms
and how fishers will contribute
 To enhance public awareness and promote
the advancement of knowledge on the
culture, role, contribution and potential of
small-scale fisheries, considering ancestral
and traditional knowledge, and their related
constraints and opportunities
 Weak, vague and with a discourse towards
“technological advancements and improvements”
rather than supporting ancestral and traditional aspects
 Traditional knowledge and traditional fisheries
management practices are used sometimes in the
policy document but mainly linked to complement
conservation approaches, e.g. traditional knowledge is
useful when it informs for example closed fishing
seasons or can be part of the Marine Conservation
initiatives

If these incoherencies remain, it is not difficult to foresee that the new FP has the
winning hand, given its attachment to extensive donor funding. The SSF Guidelines are not
confined to responsible fisheries governance, but also to furthering social development and
decent work, gender equality, and basic civil and political rights, which implies costs without
funding. In the context of poor budgetary resources, Zanzibar, like most other developing
nations, will find it difficult to implement the bulk of the principles in the SSF Guidelines.
While the new FP seems founded in common ideas of expansion, capitalization, and
commercialization as problem solvers, the SSF Guidelines’ ideational foundation is in human
rights. This forms the most fundamental conflict between the two.
It is interesting to note how the Zanzibar management path differs from the global
patterns of fishery management history. While an emphasis on industrial fisheries and
offshore exploitation was increased globally during the 1950s-1970s, small-scale fisheries
were seen as backwards and underdeveloped. However, overcapitalization and extensive
fishery collapse has turned attention worldwide to potential solutions, including traditional
management and small-scale fisheries (Carvalho et al. 2011). In contrast, Zanzibar goes the
other way, probably since they have not reached the degree of industrialization of other
fishing nations. The question here is if they necessarily have to embrace and experience that
phase, and the harmful mistakes that come with it, or learn from world experiences and jump
directly into a fisheries governance regime that emphasizes and protects the sustainability of
small-scale fisheries.
Another aspect worth mentioning is that other cases which address tuna fisheries
dynamics have shown that competition between industrial fleets and small-scale fishers is
present and can exacerbate conflicts and resource depletion (SPC 2013; Leroy et al. 2016); in
contrast, this dynamic has so far been unforeseen by Zanzibarian policy makers. Industrial
fishing is not necessarily deemed to constitute unsustainable practices. When the industry is
responsible, supportive of ecosystem-based management, have working systems for resource
allocation and conflict resolution as well as real commitment to long-term work, they can be
a positive and viable economic alternative (Bodal 2003). However, it is difficult to see that
the proposed offshore tuna fleet adheres to those conditions. The potential for conflict is
especially high considering the sensitive issue of potential conflicts between foreign vessels
already fishing, small-scale fishers, and new actors entering the system financed by private
capital.
It is apparent that authorities in Zanzibar are struggling to write the Fisheries Policy
drafts from a position in which they are squeezed between differing interests, economic
constraints, and strong global actors. The SSF Guidelines were adopted in 2014, implying
that a very short period of time for reflection on the implementation and the previous lack of
knowledge about this new policy instrument have without a doubt been important factors
contributing to their lack of consideration in the proposed new FP. What we may hope for is
that an eventual third draft of the new FP will be released which pays close attention to this
and address coherence issues. Hopefully, in doing so, most of the principles and objectives in
the SSF Guidelines will be included and reinforced in the ultimate final fisheries policy, and
hopefully also implemented in practice.
Acknowledgements We are grateful to the Department of Fisheries Development in Zanzibar for always being
friendly with us, and for sharing information and documentation. Thanks to two anonymous reviewers for
appreciated reviews of previous versions of the manuscript. To TBTI for continued energy injections to work
with small-scale fisheries. A very special thanks to two individuals for their invaluable assistance in the field:
Narriman S. Jiddawi and Tesfaye Ayele Woubshet. This work was partly financed by the Swedish Research
Council VR project diarienr. 344-2011-5448.

Fig. 5.2. Back from work after one tidal cycle in the ocean, small-scale fishers
leave their catch to particular “assistants” to sell through auction.
Photo: M. de la Torre-Castro.
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