Political and Civic Participation of Immigrants in Host Countries. An Interpretative Framework from the Perspective of the Origin Countries and Societies

Abstract

The focus of this chapter is the role of origin countries in influencing immigrants’ political and civic participation in their host societies. It is our aim to understand how these processes can affect immigrant integration in destination countries. More specifically, our objective is to explore the following questions: first, whether and how emigration countries can influence immigrants’ political and civic participation in destination countries; and second, whether links between origin countries, civil societies and migrants have an impact on the political and civic participation of the latter in the receiving countries. We also propose to analyse origin countries’ possible influence on political and civic participation through a very specific approach based on the identification of different actors intervening in these processes. In this framework, we distinguish between state and non-state (or civil society) actors and we look at how they can play a role in the political and civic participation of immigrants at destination. The rationale behind this differentiation is that these two categories of actors do not generally use the same tools, and often they may not share the same goals (Gabrielli and Zapata-Barrero 2015).

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87© Springer International Publishing AG 2017
A. Weinar et al. (eds.), Migrant Integration Between Homeland and Host Society
Volume 1, Global Migration Issues 7, DOI10.1007/978-3-319-56176-9_5
Chapter 5
Political andCivic Participation
ofImmigrants inHost Countries.
AnInterpretative Framework
fromthePerspective oftheOrigin Countries
andSocieties
LorenzoGabrielli, SoniaGsir, andRicardZapata-Barrero
Introduction: TheRole ofCountries ofOrigin inPolitical
andCivic Participation ofImmigrants
The focus of this chapter is the role of origin countries in inuencing immigrants’
political and civic participation in their host societies. It is our aim to understand
how these processes can affect immigrant integration in destination countries. More
specically, our objective is to explore the following questions: rst, whether and
how emigration countries can inuence immigrants’ political and civic participation
in destination countries; and second, whether links between origin countries, civil
societies and migrants have an impact on the political and civic participation of the
latter in the receiving countries. We also propose to analyse origin countries’ pos-
sible inuence on political and civic participation through a very specic approach
based on the identication of different actors intervening in these processes. In this
framework, we distinguish between state and non-state (or civil society) actors and
we look at how they can play a role in the political and civic participation of immi-
grants at destination. The rationale behind this differentiation is that these two cat-
egories of actors do not generally use the same tools, and often they may not share
the same goals (Gabrielli and Zapata-Barrero 2015).
Following the main framework of this volume, the present chapter contributes to a
deeper understanding of immigrants’ political and civic participation by considering
not only the host country framework but also that of the origin countries. We consider
the political participation of migrants in a broad sense, which includes civic participa-
L. Gabrielli (*) • R. Zapata-Barrero
GRITIM– UPF, Barcelona, Spain
e-mail: lorenzo.gabrielli@upf.edu
S. Gsir
Centre for Ethnic and Migration Studies, University of Liege, Liege, Belgium

88
tion. As both forms of participation constitute important dimensions of integration,
they have to be considered jointly for several reasons which are outlined below.
The frontier between political and civic participation is, in conceptual terms,
blurred, even if both political and civic participation have been distinguished by
some scholars (e.g. Ekman and Amnå 2009). Moreover, analysing the existing de-
nitions of political participation, Martiniello (2009) proposed a typology based on
the agency of immigrants and their descendants, in which he clearly distinguished
between participation in state politics and participation in non-state politics.
Accordingly, state political participation includes electoral policy, parliamentary
policy and consultative policy while non-state political participation embraces
political party involvement, union politics, other pressure groups, ethnic and com-
munitarian mobilisations, etc. This distinction is analytically useful even if some-
times state and non-state politics can and do overlap.
The political integration of immigrants has been assessed in terms of their ability
to use a repertoire of political actions that can allow them to inuence decision-
making (Morales 2011). However, they can meet many obstacles when they wish to
participate in conventional forms of political life in the destination countries, such
as voting or running for elections, voting on referenda, becoming members of politi-
cal parties, sitting on advisory councils or contributing to other arenas of political
dialogue. Therefore, we consider it necessary not to restrict the analysis solely to
these conventional forms of political participation. It seems necessary to also take
into consideration the non-conventional and extra-parliamentary forms of migrants’
political participation, such as protests, demonstrations, sit-ins, political strikes,
hunger strikes, civil disobedience and boycotts.
Rather than engaging directly in the politics of the new country of residence,
migrants can be involved in civic matters without even realizing that they are taking
part in politics, for instance when they are active in parent-teacher associations
(DeSipio 2011). It is therefore necessary to also consider immigrants’ civic partici-
pation– in terms of their involvement in informal politics such as pressure groups
and NGOs, and in organising lobbying activities– in the same framework. As Ekman
and Amnå (2009: 291) explain, “[c]ivic engagement refers to activities by ordinary
citizens that are intended to inuence circumstances in society that are of relevance
to others, outside their own family and circle of close friends”. Here we address
civic participation in the active dimension and more precisely, in the collective and
public dimension. Civic participation concerns the way immigrants act as citizens,
even though they may not have the nationality or citizenship of their new residence
country and consequently cannot participate in formal politics (Ekman and Amnå
2009). Civic participation is considered the rst form of politics among immigrants,
and is also an opportunity for integration because immigrants can participate regard-
less of their status (DeSipio 2011). It concerns the inclusion of immigrants in the
civic institutions of the receiving country and the way in which foreign citizens
become an accepted part of society in civic terms. Civic integration thus means
becoming a citizen of the receiving society, but not necessarily a full citizen with
nationality and full political rights, which in turn leads to political integration.
What is important in our framework is that immigrants’ participation at the politi-
cal and civic level depends not only on the country of destination, and on the specic
L. Gabrielli et al.

89
characteristics of the migrant, but also on the country of origin. Currently it is widely
recognised that immigrants’ participation in politics or society depends to some
extent on the context of the country of destination, immigration policy (borders and
the accommodation of diversity) and the integration framework. In other words, the
political participation of immigrants depends on changes in the political opportunity
structure that arise from a specic host society. As Morales and Giugni (2011) point
out, it is not only the political but also the discursive opportunity structure in receiv-
ing countries that is a decisive factor which permits the political inclusion of immi-
grants. More specically, these authors refer to local policies towards immigrant
associations, the openness of public authorities and formal institutions, the congu-
ration of local power, general policies towards immigrants and the prevailing dis-
course on immigration and immigrants. With regard to destination, access to
naturalisation gives foreigners the opportunity to vote and to stand for election, giv-
ing the same legal protection and political rights to immigrants as to nationals.
Citizenship has been repeatedly identied as the primary measure of immigrants’
integration in democratic societies. Once naturalised, citizens can further their polit-
ical incorporation through voting. The vote is the pathway through which immigrant
groups become political communities who can alter the political system through
their elected representatives (Fennema and Tillie 1999). In fact, some authors point
out that the vote is a better indicator of political incorporation than naturalisation
(Simpson Bueker 2005). The idea that political participation is a clear indicator of
integration can be applied to both ‘conventional’ and ‘non-conventional’ political
participation.
Within the already existing literature on political and civic participation, the nov-
elty of the interpretative framework that we propose here is its focus on the country
of origin, and on the role it plays in fostering the “active immigrant” (Zapata-Barrero
and Gropas 2012; see also Vogel 2007). We understand active immigrants to be
immigrants who are not passive individuals, workers, or merely receivers of social
services, but rather agents who can participate as citizens in the societies of both
destination and origin countries.
In order to understand the role of origin countries, we identify the main driving
factors behind the choices made by immigrants about whether and how to partici-
pate in the political and civic life of a country. And we use three concepts to grasp
their inuence. First, the country-of-origin effect refers to the political and civic
capital that migrants have acquired in the country of origin, such as political and
civic education and culture, but also refers to language, in which case the effect is
endogenous. But the effect can be also exogenous when it refers to a set of beliefs
about the political system of the country of origin, or in other words, the “country
label”. For instance, a migrant coming from a country labelled as a dictatorship
could be perceived as lacking of democratic experience. Whether the migrant left a
democratic system or a dictatorship may also inuence the political and civic
participation in the new residence country through both an endogenous effect (his/
her agency as citizen) and an exogenous effect (the way the migrant is perceived).
Secondly, through emigration and diaspora policies, countries of origin may also
inuence the civic and political participation of migrants in the host country. We call
this factor the country impact; it assesses the inuence of the country-of-origin
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90
policies that target nationals abroad. Given the effects and impact of the country’s
actions beyond its physical borders, the country of origin can be conceptualized as
a trans-border state. This state has three main characteristics: rst, it has policies
in place that are effectively building the nation (and a sense of belonging) beyond
its physical borders (i.e. across them); second, it supports emigrants beyond its
physical borders; and nally, it is represented by at least two levels of governance:
the government and a civil society, both of which work across borders.
To analyse the ‘country-of-origin effect’, we consider the main methodological
approaches to researching political participation at the micro level– where the term
is used, even if only in a marginal way. These approaches allow us to identify the
extent to which the countries and societies of origin inuence migrants’ political
and civic capital.
To understand the ‘country impact’, which is a new concept in the eld, we are
obliged to enlarge the focus of our literature review and to consider other elds of
the literature on migrants’ political participation vis-a-vis origin countries, namely
diaspora policies and transnational politics, as well as immigrant and civic partici-
pation in mainstream, migrant and bi-national organisations.
An analysis of these specic elds of literature, which concern trans-border link-
ages more than migrants’ characteristics and capital, can also help us to develop our
actor-based approach, allowing us to map the state and non-state actors implicated
in the countries of origin, their strategies, and their actions. We also specically
consider state actors’ strategies and interactions with migrants, in terms of both
conventional and unconventional forms of political participation. Subsequently, we
look at non-state actors and their strategies to inuence migrants’ political partici-
pation, which can be directed at both destination and origin countries.
Thus, we analyse the relation between political and civic participation and inte-
gration, which is a key element in the eld of immigration research as it allows to
consider immigrants’ multiple loyalties and country-of-origin perceptions of this
issue in the integration debate. Finally, based on the ndings (and shortcomings) of
our research, we propose a new research agenda in order to develop a deeper under-
standing of the inuence of origin countries and civil society actors on immigrants’
political and civic participation.
The State oftheArt: TheStandpoints oftheLiterature
onMigrants’ Political andCivic Participation
In this section we review the existing literature in order to identify the different ele-
ments that origin countries and societies can use to inuence the political and civic
participation of migrants. We also consider the more ‘classical’ literature on the
political participation of immigrants in destination countries, and the links between
these issues and the integration debate. However, immigrants’ political participation
L. Gabrielli et al.

91
is oriented not only towards the destination countries; it also takes place between
migrants and their home countries.
Then, in a second part of this section, we focus on other research elds that
explore the transnational political linkages and activities between home countries
and societies on the one hand, and migrants on the other. We refer to studies which
are focused on ‘diaspora policies’ and ‘diaspora engagement policies’ as well as on
‘transnational political practices’. Finally, in a third part, we focus more specically
on additional inputs coming from the literature on the civic participation of migrants.
It has to be underlined that generally the literature on political participation in des-
tination countries concentrates on the micro level, analysing the main factors inu-
encing political behaviour, while the bibliography on diaspora policies and
transnational political ties and interactions focuses more on the macro level, and is
comprised of actors, strategies and tools. A review of both approaches, comple-
mented by an examination of the literature on immigrant civic participation, is a
necessary starting point in the analysis of the possible roles of origin countries and
civil society in inuencing the political and civic participation of immigrants.
A Micro Level Analysis: Individual Factors ofPolitical
Participation ofImmigrants intheHost Countries
The key-question guiding the literature in the eld of immigrant political participa-
tion is: is there a relationship between an effective political participation of immi-
grants and the integration process and if yes: what is it? The immigrants’ political
integration has to do with, rst, self-identication with the political system and if
they feel represented by it; second, active political participation, through voting or
participation in public sphere; and third, with perception of being heard by authori-
ties (Kaldur et al. 2012). The general literature identies a number of factors
explaining various types of political participation, some of them general, others
specic to immigrants. Through their action, origin states and societies can affect
some of those elements and intervene then on the political participation of their
expatriates. The main question we consider here is: which elements explaining
political participation of immigrants at destination can be inuenced by the action
or origin states and societies?
On the one hand, more ‘traditional’ factors are useful to explain general politi-
cal participation (valid for all population), independently from a previous migra-
tion experience or from the origin of the subject (i.e.: see Lipset 1960; Almond
and Verba 1963; Verba and Nie 1972; Wolnger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba etal.
1995). More specically, we must consider such factors as age/generational
cohort, gender, beliefs and values, level of education, linguistic skills, place of
residence, social capital, and socio-economic status. In the specic eld of migra-
tion studies, socio-economic theories conrm also that to participate or not
depends on issues such as incomes or education (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Smith
5 Political andCivic Par ticipation ofImmigrants inHost Countries. AnInterpretative…

92
and Edmonston 1997), or demographic characteristics (Yang 1994). For one of
those ‘traditional’ factors, namely gender, the framework is more complex, in the
sense that it seems to be more connected to immigrants’ origin, and the literature
on those specic issue is particularly limited (Wu and Wang 2007; Gidengil and
Stolle 2009).
On the other hand, other explaining factors of political participation are
‘immigrant- specic’. Martiniello (2005), points out that the rational choice or the
self-identication with or the feeling of belonging in host countries are the main
reasons for immigrant political participation. Other researches underline the
importance of the knowledge of the political system, the political socialisation and
re- socialisation, previous involvement in politics, social capital and density of
social networks (Jones-Correa 1998; Adamson 2007; White et al. 2008; Li and
Jones 2011; De Rooij 2012; Prokic-Breuer et al. 2012). Some authors identied
language competencies and access to reliable information as additional factors
(Zapata-Barrero and Gropas 2012), while other scholars emphasise particularly
the type and the causes of migration, the length of stay and the “structural” (or
socio-economic) position in the receiving country (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001; Portes
1999). These three last elements are connected, more or less directly, with the origin
of the immigrants.
If we look at countries and societies of origin, the ‘mode of migration’ is also
linked to existing emigration policies and bilateral agreements on workers recruit-
ment, and on familiar and home-societal strategies of migration. Referring to the
‘structural position’, this is linked also to homeland socio-economic conditions
prior to departure, as well as to the mode of migration. Moreover, the length of stay
can also depend on homeland situation, on return policy of home country, and on
family and societal strategies.
Among all the factors inuencing immigrants’ political participation, just some
of them have a relation with origin country’s political and socio-economic frame-
work, and also with eventual labour emigration policies and regulations. However,
the majority of the latter relates specically to migrants’ situation in the homeland
before their departure. In some cases they may be targeted by origin countries and
society only with large and general political measures, not directly linked with emi-
gration, as in the case for the level of education, the socioeconomic status previous
to migration or the political socialisation and the previous involvement in politics,
particularly of women. Another part of those factors is independent from the action
that origin countries’ and societies’ may develop towards emigrants already out of
the country. Then, we have to consider the majority of all the micro-level factors
explaining political participation as independent from the origin countries’ and
societies’ action towards migrants after they leave their origin country.
Some scholars focused specically on the existence of a source country effect
which would explain differences in immigrants’ political participation depending
on the country of origin. Following Simpson Bueker (2005), this source country
effect is constituted on several hypotheses. The rst one is the reversibility hypoth-
esis: political participation of an immigrant is inversely related to the ease with
which one can reverse his or her migratory course and return home. The clearest
L. Gabrielli et al.

93
examples are the case of migrants installed in the US from China, former Soviet
Union, Cuba, the countries of the South-East Asia, Philippines and India; following
this hypothesis, the opposite trend is predictable in the case of immigrants in the US
from Mexico, Canada, Great Britain, and Italy. The second is the translation/trans-
ferability hypothesis: political participation of an immigrant is directly related to the
ability to apply prior political knowledge to a new political environment. This
hypothesis is strictly connected with the political re-socialization of immigrants
happening in the country of destination. The third is the mobilisation hypothesis:
political participation of an immigrant is directly related to the level of mobilisation
of the reference group or community. Following this hypothesis, the initial recep-
tion of immigrants, in terms of nancial aid and assistance, would have implications
for the following political incorporation in the country. The example is the case of
Cuban community in the US.Settlement patterns seems to be also signicant in this
process, considering that immigrants’ concentration would help integrating the lat-
est arrivals in the political and economic systems, and also increase the ‘voting bloc’
effect, pushing the interest of major political parties. The fourth is the gender
hypothesis: the place of women in the social and political life of the immigrants’
countries of origin of immigrants can determine a different political incorporation
processes.
We consider that those elements underlined by the source country effect consti-
tute some valuable inspiration to analyse origin countries and societies role at the
micro level of the political behaviour of immigrants.
At this point, a key question is whether those main methodological approaches
in researching immigrants’ political participation allow us to identify the inuence
of the countries and societies of origin in this process. The existing literature on
political participation of migrants in host countries permits only a limited identica-
tion of the inuences that countries and societies of origin can have in this eld.
Consequently we need to enlarge the scope of the review and consider literature
considering a large framework allowing the identication of actors, strategies and
tools developing and sustaining trans-border ties with migrants in their destination
countries.
A Macro-level Analysis: Diaspora Policies andTransnational
Politics
Contemporary migrants, and their predecessors, have maintained, and still main-
tain, a variety of links with their origin countries; while at the same time, they are
incorporated into the countries in which they are settled. Migration has never been
a one-way process, but rather one in which migrants interact simultaneously in dif-
ferent spheres where they live. Most aspects of their lives occur and take place,
frequently, across borders (Levitt and Jaworski 2007). The new sphere where the
political activities occurred faces with the challenges of the currently nation-state,
5 Political andCivic Par ticipation ofImmigrants inHost Countries. AnInterpretative…

94
both supra-national and regional dimension, and with the large ows caused by
migration (Basch etal. 1994). Political and civic participation develop then at mul-
tiples sovereignty levels, as well as at transnational level(Bauböck and Faist 2010;
Faist 1998).
In order to understand the transnational political and civic linkages between the
societies and the countries of origin with their emigrants and state-actors inuence
on political participation, it is crucial to consider emigration policy of origin coun-
tries and their ‘diaspora policies’. The latter constitute a particularly new eld of
research that draws attention to state actors’ inuence on emigrants’ political activi-
ties. Following Scheffer (2003: 9–10), an ethno-national diaspora can be dened as
“a social-political formation, created as a result of either voluntary or forced migra-
tion, whose members regard themselves as of the same ethno-national origin and
who permanently reside as minorities in one or several host countries”. Gamlen
(2008) identies two broad frameworks of action through which the country of
origin remains connected and interacts with his citizens abroad. The rst mecha-
nism is a diaspora building, addressed to recognise pre-existing diaspora communi-
ties or cultivate new ones. The second mechanism, called diaspora integration, looks
for pull emigrants into a “web of rights and obligations” (Gamlen 2008: 842). The
diaspora building mechanism is lled with capacity building policies that “aimed at
discursively producing a state-centric transnational national society, and developing
a set of corresponding state institutions” (Gamlen 2006: 5–6). The diaspora integra-
tion mechanism is composed by two different dimensions: the rst one is aimed to
extending rights to the diaspora, and then to build a legitimate transnational sover-
eignty; the second one is addressed to “extract obligations” from the diaspora, con-
sidering citizens abroad owe loyalty to this legitimate home country (ibid.).
The diaspora policies literature enlightens almost exclusively top down transna-
tional political activities, namely those carried out by states and institutional actors,
in connection with emigrants and diasporas. One of our goals is to understand how
those non-state actors build up those linkages, which tools they use, which actions
they carry on, and what motivations and interests drive those transnational activities
in the political eld. For understanding the role of non-state, or civil society actors
we will need to focus also on bottom-up transnational dynamics, and transnational
networks. For that purpose, it is necessary to consider the literature more speci-
cally focused on transnational political practices.
Literature on immigrant integration and political participation aims, rst of all,
at understanding the conditions of integration from the perspective of the receiving
country. And, in studies on immigrant transnationalism, the key factors are transna-
tional practices and the conditions of emergence rather than consequences on inte-
gration, even though this issue is not completely absent (Snel etal. 2006; Délano
2010). But the transnational perspective seems to offer a relevant theoretical
approach should we wish to grasp what occurs when immigration and emigration
countries are simultaneously taken into account.
Some scholars concentrate their attention on the implications of transnational
political practices at the international relation’s level. Koslowsky (2004), for exam-
ple, details several kinds of emigrant political activity and its recent expansion
through increased migrations and denes those activities as ‘the globalization of
L. Gabrielli et al.

95
domestic politics’. He also underlines how the democratization processes of home
countries are linked with the participation of the emigrants, increasing their possi-
bilities to inuence the homeland politics (ibid.). Scheffer (2003) focuses his analy-
sis specically on diaspora groups that possibly are different from migrants group,
due to their stronger structure and their more homogenous group identity.
Østergaard-Nielsen (2003: 21), for example, underlines that for some authors, dias-
pora politics is a subset of transnational politics concerning groups “that are barred
from direct political participation in the political system of their homeland– or who
do not even have a homeland political regime to support/oppose”, and is closer to
the less common concept of émigré politics (Cohen 1997). Nevertheless, we think
that some of his considerations on political activities of the diasporas, their objec-
tives, their strategies and their tools represent a key feature for a broad understand-
ing of the role that origin countries can play towards their emigrants’ political
participation.
Otherwise, some authors also bring their attention more specically to transna-
tional political practices. Østergaard-Nielsen (2001: 2–3), for example, notes that
the ‘proliferation of political ties, networks, and practices across borders’, is a phe-
nomenon strictly linked with “the sending countries’ particular politico-economic
incentives to mobilise their citizens and former citizens abroad”, between others
factors. About the denitions of the concept of transnational political practices, sig-
nicant differences emerge regarding its range, varying from a narrow denition,
considering only the actual membership of parties or hometown associations, up to
a wide one, including all the political consequences of transnational ties between
migrants and their countries of origin, and also the migration, as ‘unintentional
political action’ affecting national and international level. Other scholars emphasise
the identication of more durable patterns as a continuum of different practices.
Itzigsohn (2000: 1130) gives the following denition of immigrants’ political trans-
national eld: “recurrent and institutionalized interactions and exchanges between,
on the one hand, immigrants and their social and political organizations and, on the
other hand, the political institutions and the state apparatus of the country of
origin”.
Østergaard-Nielsen concentrates on intentional transnational political practices,
and focuses, as a main unit of her analysis, on the transnational political networks
(2001: 5). She distinguishes different types of transnational political practices,
depending on whether the political activities are directed towards host or home
countries. She denes as immigrant politics the political action undertaken by
immigrants and refugees to improve their situation in the host country. Some exam-
ples are the activities carried out to obtain more political, social and economic
rights, or to ght discrimination. When the home country supports emigrants’ activ-
ities, the immigrant politics becomes transnational. Otherwise, when political
actions of immigrants and refugees are addresses to the domestic policy of their
homeland, or to the foreign policy of the latter, they are dened as homeland poli-
tics. In this framework, activities of immigrants and refugees may take the form of
opposition or support to the current political regime in the origin country or to its
foreign policy.
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96
External voting of migrants in another research eld linked to transnational polit-
ical and civic practices that can add useful elements to our analysis on the role that
origin countries and societies can play in the political participation practices of
migrants (Baubock 2007; Jaulin 2015; Laeur 2013). External voting can be dened
as “the active and passive voting rights of qualied individuals, independently of
their professional status, to take part from outside the national territory in referenda
or in supranational, national, subnational, or primary elections held in an country of
which they hold citizenship but where they permanently of temporarily do not
reside” (Laeur 2013: 31).
A Meso-level Analysis: Immigrants andCivic Participation
inMainstream, Migrant andBi-national Organizations
The integration process is gradual and civic integration is also an important part of
it. It takes place at various levels and the question is through which channels it can
be observed and furthermore the role of the origin country and of transnational links
in this process. As mentioned above, temporary absence of citizenship or the limita-
tions on political rights do not prevent migrants from engaging civically in the host
country. One of collective forms of civic participation is to join or create an associa-
tion. Migrants can engage in various types of associations such as migrant organiza-
tions, hometown associations, but also mainstream organizations namely
non-migrant associations, consultative bodies or even bi-national associations. Even
though other forms of civic participation exist, we focus on the involvement of
migrants in organizations. They indeed offer a signicant form of civic participa-
tion, with a collective dimension and with the potential empowerment dimension
for all migrants, whatever their status.
Mainstream Organizations
Migrants can get involved in local politics over mainstream issues or neighbour-
hood issues such as housing, education, urban space, etc. issues that are not specic
to migrants. Even though immigrant participation in mainstream organizations can
be of the utmost importance for integration, in particular in countries with a strong
civil society tradition, literature and case-studies are quite scarce on this, particu-
larly in the case of Europe.1
Mainstream organizations primarily serve the native population or more broadly
the population without distinction of ethnicity (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes
2006). This participation is sometimes also called by some researchers “civic and
community involvement” and can take a lot’s of forms from volunteerism to mem-
1 See a comparative case-study is the INVOLVE project of involvement of third-country nationals
as a means of integration (CEV 2006).
L. Gabrielli et al.

97
bership in different kinds of groups or associations in the community (Ready etal.
2006). Mainstream organizations are sometimes embedded in the receiving societ-
ies, e.g. civic clubs, or at a more local level, neighbourhoods or homeowners
associations.
Participating in mainstream organizations favours interaction with natives
(Ahokas 2010) even though these organizations do not have integration as an aim
(Ramakrishnan and Viramontes 2006). Volunteering in mainstream organizations is
thus a way for immigrants to engage in the civic affairs of the new country of resi-
dence. Nevertheless, it relies a great deal on the openness of mainstream organiza-
tions to immigrants (Ahokas 2010) and in some cases, even though they have joined
these organizations, immigrants prefer to leave and to create their own associations
in particular when they cannot take part in leadership (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes
2006).
The possibilities for origin countries’ actors to directly inuence civic participa-
tion through mainstream organization seem to be very limited. Meanwhile, associa-
tion and participative culture in origin country can affect migrant involvement in
organizations. This can be identied as country of origin effect endogenous rst, but
also exogenous as mainstream organizations gather both migrants and native
population.
Migrant Organizations
Migrants set up all kinds of migrant associations, though these associations are not
easy to dene (Moya 2005). Migrant organizations are, indeed, very diverse: ethnic,
cultural, regional, social, professional, religious, charitable organizations, sports
(Brettel 2005). De Haas (2006: 7) considered a migrant organization as “any kind of
organization consisting mainly of migrants and their descendants, irrespective of
the specic activities of such organizations.” Migrants associations are also called
“ethnic” associations and are oriented towards issues linked to the country of resi-
dence (Portes etal. 2008). Among the various migrant organizations, scholars dis-
tinguished diaspora organizations, which are also called (civic) hometown
associations or even transnational organizations (Ramakrishnana and Viramontes
2006). Hometown associations are “organizations that allow immigrants from the
same city or region to maintain ties with and materially support their places of ori-
gin” (Orozco and Rouse 2007). Hometown associations can also contribute to the
integration of immigrants in the host countries as they are “organized points of
contact and coordination between immigrants, the host governments, and other
institutions” (Somerville etal. 2008: 2).
Migrant associations are considered as the locus of transnational political activi-
ties (Morales and Jorba 2010). Transnational political activities are the activities
“conducted by migrants of the same national origin but residing in different destina-
tion countries or when the state authorities of the sending country interfere with
their emigrants’ activities in the country of residence” (Martiniello and Laeur
2008: 653). “Civil society actors– and, in particular, migrants’ organizations […]
5 Political andCivic Par ticipation ofImmigrants inHost Countries. AnInterpretative…

98
provide the networks and the infrastructure to facilitate and sustain various forms of
transnational engagement by individuals and communities (…), most notably civic
and political transnationalism” (Morales and Jorba 2010: 181). It is then necessary
to focus also on literature specically consecrated to civic participation through dif-
ferent types of organizations.
Migrant organizations are an important place for afrming attachment to the
country of origin (Brettell 2005). They are considered as a means for gathering and
creating links with immigrants from the same country of origin and also for promot-
ing the culture and the language of the home country (ibid.). Their agenda is not
necessarily focused on one society, but it can target both the homeland issues and
the integration problems in the host society (Cordero-Guzmán 2005; Portes etal.
2008). If migrant associations can thus be orientated toward the country of origin
like transnational associations or toward immigrant integration in the country of
immigration, some of those also gradually present a mixed agenda (Faist et al.
2013).
Migrant organizations emerge often spontaneously as informal social networks
but progressively they organise in more formal organizations with several objec-
tives. Migrant associations are not exclusively initiated by migrants. Countries of
origin can encourage their creation (Xiang 2003; Délano 2010; Ramakrishnan and
Viramontes 2006). In this case, we can then talk about country impact. Receiving
countries or regional authorities can also foment migrant organizations especially in
the framework of co-development policies (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009). Furthermore,
migrant organizations can differ from one country or even from one city to another
because “political or institutional opportunities in the host and sending societies
strongly inuence immigrant organizations” (Schrover and Vermeulen 2005: 828).
Bi-national andMulti-national Organizations
Some authors found that some associations are bi-national and serve as bridges
between natives and migrants (Brettel 2005). In some cases, organizations with
mainstream origin become rather hybrid organizations because if initially main-
stream their membership diversied ethnically to a signicant extent (Ramakrishnan
and Veramontes 2006). Another kind of civic body characterized by bi or even multi-
ethnic membership including migrants and natives are the local consultative councils
for foreign residents. Some would argue that consultative bodies refer rather to for-
mal political participation (Martiniello 2009), but they can also be seen as a place of
civic participation as they, in some cases, were developed before allowing foreign
residents to vote. Local consultative bodies for foreign residents are often set up by
local authorities in the residing country and they bring together foreign residents and
local elected representatives (Gsir and Martiniello 2004). These councils pursue two
main objectives: rst, integrating and encouraging the participation of foreign resi-
dents inlocal public life and second, improving or harmonising relations between
foreign residents and other sectors of the community (authorities, administrative bod-
ies, nationals) (ibid.). They, thus, represent a privileged place of civic participation.
L. Gabrielli et al.

99
According to Ramakrishnan and Viramontes (2006: 88), “[h]ybrid and ethnic
civic organizations display a mode of assimilation characterized by a strong desire
to integrate into the mainstream while maintaining allegiance to ethnic-specic
issues and concerns.”
Following this analysis, we can state that migrant organizations and specically
hometowns associations but also bi-national organizations may be considered as
places of civic participation where country of origin actors can have an impact.
The Focus: TheRole ofActors intheCountry ofOrigin
andTheir Strategies
As seen above, combining the ndings of the literature produced in different elds
(political participation of immigrants, diaspora and diaspora engagement policies,
transnational political practices, external voting and civic participation) allows us to
identify the different origin-country actors, and to better understand their specic
interests, as well as the actions and tools they use to inuence migrants’ political
and civic participation. In this way, we are able to identify the different actors who
are interacting with migrants in order to inuence their political and civic participa-
tion, both in the homeland and the destination country. In a broad framework, the
actors involved in migrants’ political participation belong to three main categories:
the host-country actors, the migrants and the home-country actors. We focus on the
state and non-state actors in the home countries in order to understand the interests
that guide the way they operate, and the different tools they use to inuence the
political and civic participation of migrants.
Emigration countries’ interest in their nationals abroad is not new. In addition to
emigration policies, countries of origin have developed diaspora engagement poli-
cies (Gamlen 2006). The emigration policies include the exit rules of the country
and can vary from forbidding emigration to permitting free emigration (Weiner
1985). Diaspora policies are aimed at engaging the diaspora abroad, and at keeping
links with emigrants living in a new country of residence. In various ways, “[…]
emigration states attempt to maintain the umbilical cord between the homeland and
emigrants” (Laeur 2013: 7). Although they have accepted and even promoted emi-
gration, emigration states view emigrants as resources that can be useful for the
country’s interests. As noted by several scholars, countries of origin are mainly
motivated by the potential for attracting emigrant remittances, opening markets and
having a representation (and defence) of national interests in the host country
(Portes 1999; Bauböck 2003; de Haas 2007). Diaspora policies consist of an array
of measures such as ministerial or consular reforms; investment policies to attract
remittances; the extension of political rights (dual citizenship, right to vote from
abroad); the extension of state protection or services; and symbolic policies to rein-
force a sense of belonging (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003). These policies address
emigrants in the receiving country but can also address them when they come back
5 Political andCivic Par ticipation ofImmigrants inHost Countries. AnInterpretative…

100
“home” by offering them specic provisions: for example, advantageous conditions
of investment or protection against rackets.
Diaspora policies also depend on how emigrants are perceived by the country of
origin. Are they considered traitors who ed their homelands or on the contrary, are
they celebrated and perceived as heroes? In several countries, maintaining links
with emigrant workers in anticipation of their eventual (and permanent) return home
has been progressively replaced by simply maintaining links with all emigrants and
their descendants abroad. This strategy takes into account possible pendular travels
between the country of emigration and immigration (Portes 1999; de Haas 2007).
Several studies have demonstrated how countries of origin such as Morocco, Mexico
and China, among others, have shifted from an approach of controlling emigrants
abroad to one of courting them (DeSipio 2002; Xiang 2003; de Haas 2007; Délano
2010; Gamlen 2012). Furthermore, emigrants do not constitute a homogeneous
group, even if they come from the same country or region of origin; some may be in
opposition to the regime or ruling authorities of the country of origin. Therefore, the
government of the country of origin adopts actions depending on the different com-
ponents of the diaspora. For example, the Turkish government may target Kurdish
emigrants differently than other members of the Turkish diaspora (Østergaard-
Nielsen 2003).
State Actors inHome Countries: Their Strategies andActions
TowardsPolitical Participation
Origin countries can have multiple state actors developing political activities
towards emigrants. As Gamlen (2006) clearly explains, “diaspora engagement poli-
cies are more a ‘constellation’ of different institutional and legislative initiatives
implemented at different times, at different state levels, and for different reasons,
than a unitary and coordinated state strategy”. Based on a study of institutions in 30
developing countries, Agunias (2009) has mapped state actors that engage diaspo-
ras, distinguishing “government institutions at home”, “consular networks” and
“quasi-government diaspora institutions”.
Fitzgerald (2006: 260) also argues that emigration policies “are best understood
by a ‘neopluralist’ approach, disaggregating ‘the state’ into a multilevel organisa-
tion of distinct component units in which state incumbents and other political actors
compete for their interests”. This author criticises the realist interpretation of the
state as a unitary actor pursuing ‘national interests’ and competing with other states.
He suggests that this description of states does not capture the internal, multilevel
struggles to determine those interests, not only in the economic sense, but also in
political and ideological terms (Fitzgerald 2006). Considering all these scholars’
remarks above, we can take into account whether initiatives carried out by origin
countries are specic and ad hoc, or if they are part of an overarching strategic
orientation.
L. Gabrielli et al.

101
In view of the multiplicity of state actors, it is also difcult to dene ‘the inter-
ests’ of each country. Consequently, it is also challenging to dene whether the
interests of sending and receiving countries are diverging or converging. At the core
of the question is the issue of migrants’ “loyalty” towards the origin and destination
countries. The question at stake is whether double or multiple loyalties are possible,
and whether or not migrants’ political participation is a zero-sum game. In some
cases, as Scheffer (2003) clearly points out, host countries try to take advantage of
emigrants’ opposition viewpoints towards the destination countries’ governments.
On these occasions, destination countries can support migrants’ criticisms of the
political regimes in their homeland, and at times even encourage migrant activities
against their homeland governments, with the risk of creating a political confronta-
tion between origin and destination countries. The activities of the Cuban diaspora
in the US against their homeland is one of the clearest examples of this situation.
Gamlen (2006: 5–6) says that states, in the framework of their ‘capacity-building
policies’, try to create a transnational ‘relationship of communication’, based upon
the idea of the nation, which he denes as “a system of symbols and signs within
which states can immerse the exercise of power”. A second step is the creation of
the state’s “objective capacities for the realisation of power relations” (ibid.), namely
the building of specic diaspora institutions. A third step of this transnational exer-
cise of state power consists of what he calls the nalised activities, or specic
effects: a kind of transnationalised citizenship (see also Vink, Chap. 9 in this volume)
which is simultaneously comprised of the extension of rights to emigrants and the
extraction of obligations from them.
As he explains, symbolic nation-building policies are used to create “a homoge-
neous national ‘diaspora’, with close ties of allegiance to the home state” (Gamlen
2006: 6), through initiatives that increase migrants’ sense of belonging to a transna-
tional community and enhance the place of the state within the community. More
specically, Gamlen (2006) notes several initiatives that are encompassed in this
group of policies: rhetorical or symbolic gestures celebrating emigrants as national
heroes2; paternalistic claims that expatriates are an “offshore part” of the national
population or an extra administrative district of the state’s territory3; programmes to
teach the national language and history; national celebrations and cultural events
within expatriate communities; expatriate-targeted media, communications and
public relations, meant to “align” emigrants or to mobilise diasporas; and the organ-
isation of large conferences and conventions, designed to show the home country’s
“listening attitude”, gather diaspora ‘representatives’ and eventually establish a
patronage relationship with them or convey the state’s position on various issues.
2 As in the cases of Mexico, Morocco and China, among others, this stance very often represents an
important shift for a state that previously denounced emigrants as deserters.
3 The idea of emigrant communities as off-shore districts of the state is reected in some specic
electoral systems, as in the case of Ecuador and Italy, where external electoral constituencies are
given special representation. Some other examples of these actions, but which have a more pater-
nalistic approach, can be found in Mexico, Haiti and Ireland.
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102
As the same author clearly explains, these policies share the states’ interest in
producing “a communal mentality amongst non-residents; a sense of common
belonging to the home-state that renders expatriates governable” (Gamlen 2006: 7).
This kind of state-actor activity towards emigrants is meant to (re)establish loyalty
toward home countries among the citizens abroad. In this regard, Brubaker (2010:
77) talks about “new forms of external membership” that constitute forms of “trans-
border nationalism”. He also uses the concept of “external politics of belonging”,
which concerns those “who are long-term residents (and perhaps citizens) of other
states, yet who can be represented as belonging, in some sense, to a “homeland” or
“kin” state, or to “its” eponymous nation”.
A further step in state actors’ activities towards emigrants is what Gamlen (2006,
2008) denes as ‘institution-building policies’, which create bureaucratic instru-
ments and systems that give home countries the capacity to promote their political
and economic interests to emigrants. The most common initiatives highlighted in
this eld are:
–the implementation of surveillance, through the foreign service or the migration
bureaucracy, to collect statistics on which to base strategic orientations towards
emigrants and the strategic selection of emigrant actors with whom long-term
relationships can be established;
–the creation by the home state of its own transnational migrant organisations,
often acting as consultative institutions, in order to avoid existing political ten-
sions and to eventually contain possible future conicts with emigrants;
–the creation of specic government ofces, sometimes at the ministerial level,
when a critical mass of governmental activities addressing emigrants is reached
and requires coordination.
In this regard, Itzigsohn (2000) suggests that home countries’ engagement of
emigrants is based on two main interests: on the one hand, politically containing
emigrants, namely by controlling the impact of emigrants’ political activities on
homeland politics; and on the other hand, mobilising emigrants to be lobbyists in
the destination countries. As Scheffer (2003) explains, when emigrant communities
are better-organised and more afuent, they engage in advocacy activities intended
to increase acceptance of the general diaspora phenomenon and tolerance of spe-
cic diasporas and their respective homelands at the political level.
In this sense, Argentina is a very interesting case. At the time of the Malvinas/
Falkland Islands crisis in 2012, the government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner
sent letters to inuential emigrants asking them to support the ofcial state’s posi-
tion on that issue in their destination countries, as well at the international level.
More specically, leading expatriates received two letters, the rst one inviting
Argentineans abroad to mobilise and attend informational meetings at the embas-
sies (including a brieng on the latest news about the issue, and the distribution of
multimedia materials). The second letter was sent by the embassy and invited inu-
ential gures of the emigrant community to sign a statement and to send it to the
UN’s Special Committee of Decolonisation, as members of the “Grupo de Apoyo a
la Cuestión Malvinas” (Support group on the Malvinas issue). This case represents
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103
a clear example of the “selective mobilisation” of emigrants to create public opinion
abroad and to push origin states’ interests at the international level.
In Turkey, we nd another clear example of a state action aiming to mobilise citi-
zens abroad to provide political support and lobbying assistance. Turkey tried to
engage inuential expatriates and emigrant associations in Europe, in order to push
forward the state’s agenda on the issue of EU membership (Østergaard-Nielsen
2003). The state also sponsored academic exchanges and academic chairs as tools
for promoting pro-Turkish ideologies abroad, having rst screened the candidates
for their views on the Armenian massacres (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001).
Looking at examples of state-actors at origin who co-opted inuential expatriates
by encouraging them to stand for elections in external constituencies, we can cite
the cases of Ecuador and of Dora Aguirre, founder and former president of the
Spanish-Ecuadorian association “Rumiñahui”, one of the most important migrant
associations in Spain. In Ecuador’s 2009 legislative elections, Dora Aguirre ran as a
candidate from the external constituency for the ruling party, namely the Alianza
PAIS (Patria Altiva y Soberana), the same party as the president Rafael Correa. She
was nally elected as one of the representatives of Ecuadorians abroad in the
Parliament and re-elected in 2013. During her electoral campaign abroad for the
2013 elections, the main points of Dora Aguirre’s programme were linked to the
conditions of Ecuadorian emigrants and the protection of their rights.
In the case of Mexico, some scholars (Gamlen 2006) suggest that the Mexican
state is seeking to extend its governance of Mexican nationals through urban and
community-scale organisations, containing and co-opting migrant political activity
by inserting state representatives into civic associations.
Another important issue which allows citizens abroad to push forward their
home country’s interests is the promotion of cooperation between host and home
countries and the liberalisation of tariffs and commercial ows. Finally, lobbying by
emigrants can also be used to end economic boycotts and limitations on exportation
and importation to and from origin countries (Scheffer 2003). One of the clearest
examples in this sense is the action by the Jewish diaspora in the US, who lobbied
for the end of the economic boycott of South Africa during apartheid in order to help
the Jewish diaspora (a position which generated tensions not only within the dias-
pora, but also with communities lobbying for the boycott, such as African-
Americans). A similar case is that of the Chinese diaspora lobbying in the US for
more open political and economic approaches to China (Scheffer 2003).
In contrast, emigrants can also engage in lobbying activities to impose boycotts
and sanctions on their home countries, and to gain more political inuence on the
international relations front, as in the case of certain groups in the Cuban and Iranian
diasporas in the US, as well as the Iraqi diaspora in Europe, which mobilised against
the regime of Saddam Hussein (Scheffer 2003).
Nevertheless, home countries’ efforts to co-opt emigrants as lobbyists or inuen-
tial spokespeople are oriented not only towards host countries, but also towards
transnational or international actors, namely public institutions and private compa-
nies. According to Gamlen (2006), origin countries thus seek to inuence capitalist
5 Political andCivic Par ticipation ofImmigrants inHost Countries. AnInterpretative…

104
elites for the purpose of concluding new strategic alliances and attracting foreign
direct investments and technology transfers.
Lastly, home countries have a major impact on emigrants’ formal political par-
ticipation at destination by granting permission for double citizenship, as this action
indirectly allows emigrants to acquire the citizenship of destination countries and
participate in elections there.
Non-state Actors intheSending Societies andTheir Strategies
The role of origin countries cannot be reduced simply to state actors. Different kinds
of non-state actors try to engage or maintain links with emigrants abroad. They
come from the political sphere but also from the civil sphere. Establishing a com-
plete and full-inclusive list of non-state actors in origin countries is complex.
Nevertheless, it is possible to underline some of the main actors: political parties
(specically, opposition parties in the case of authoritarian regimes, and ‘separatist’
parties or ethnic-minority parties in multi-ethnic countries); trade unions; NGOs;
different civil society groups and associations; churches and religious groups;
media; etc. To assess the inuence of these actors on the civic participation of emi-
grants abroad, it is necessary to examine their purpose and agenda. State and non-
state actors do not necessarily have the same interests and the same agendas
regarding diaspora members’ civic participation in the host country, especially in
the case of conicts or contested political situations in the country of origin.
Regarding the non-state actors in origin countries and their interests, it is clear
that voting and standing for election are the most obvious ways in which emigrants
can inuence policy in both their origin and destination countries. But other emi-
grant activities, fostered by sending societies, can also have impacts in the political
arena. Koslowsky (2004: 14) suggests that “a less visible, but perhaps more inuen-
tial, way may be through campaign contributions and other support for contending
political parties”. He points out the importance of the difference in the values of
external currencies compared to home-country currencies during the election pro-
cess. He suggests that in the rst free election in the East European countries, for
example, a 50 dollar donation coming from a Polish resident in the US equalled a
third of the monthly wage of resident of Poland.4 Another example in this sense is
the one of Franjo Tudjiman, leader of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), who
started to raise funds from emigrants in the US and Canada even before non-
communist parties were legalised in Yugoslavia. Apparently, around 80% of the
4 Assuming a monthly average wage of 1,770,000 zloty in 1991 (http://www.stat.gov.pl/
gus/5840_1630_ENG_HTML.htm), that is, around 160 dollars (at the exchange rate at this time:
11,100 Polish zloty/1 dollar [http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/18/world/abortion-ban-sought-by-
church-is-rejected-by-polish-parliament.html?pagewanted=2]. Koslowsky (2004: 14) gives differ-
ent gures, equating 50 dollars with a Polish monthly salary.
L. Gabrielli et al.

105
expenses of Croatian political parties in the 1990 election were covered with funds
coming from Croatian emigrants and their descendants (Koslowsky 2004).
Another clear way to inuence home-country politics is for emigrants to be
appointed as ministers, and particularly as foreign affairs ministers, in newly democ-
ratised countries, as in the case of Armenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (ibid.).
Following the agenda of specic non-state actors in origin countries and support-
ing identity-groups’ alternatives to the dominant actors is another way to inuence
homeland politics. Emigrants can inspire economic backing by leading movements
which project national visions that transcend existing state boundaries and revive
‘dormant’ sub-national identities (ibid.). The challenges that these kinds of emi-
grant actions pose to multinational origin countries are evident. Furthermore, as
Østergaard-Nielsen (2001) suggests, political organisations in the homeland can
coordinate their campaigns with sister organisations elsewhere, pooling nancial
resources and drawing on their expertise and manpower, or with political counter-
parts in other countries, producing joint informational material or organising and
coordinating confrontational activities (demonstrations/mass meetings).
The case of the Kurdish diaspora is particularly relevant: part of this diaspora has
been a key actor in internationalising the politics of Kurdish separatism and bring-
ing Turkey’s treatment of the Kurdish minority to the attention of European coun-
tries through different activities (hunger strikes, protest marches and a terrorist
bombing in Germany) (Koslowsky 2004). Again, the case of Croatian emigrants is
particularly relevant to the issue of reviving ‘dormant’ sub-national identities. They
played a key role as a lobbying group in the case of Germany’s diplomatic
recognition of their independence and contributed to mobilising the Bavarian
Christian Social Union (CSU) and to establishing back-channel contacts between
Franjo Tudjman and the government of Helmut Kohl before Croatia declared its
independence (ibid.).
A very fashionable debate since the ‘Arab spring’ is the role of diasporas in the
democratisation process of their origin countries. The case of the Arab Spring coun-
tries suggests that the actions of home societies in the eld of political participation
have a greater impact when non-state actors at home have diverging interests vis-à-
vis state institutions. Also, when there are fewer opportunities (or more difculties)
for emigrant communities to participate at home, it is possible that they will be more
politically active outside the country to change the situation at home. It is important
to underline that these activities are not exclusive of the Arab countries; for exam-
ple, Chinese citizens abroad have supported movements for political change in their
homeland.
In this sense, two types of actions can help non-state actors in home societies to
push forward their agendas, allowing emigrant groups to express criticism of their
home government or transmit demands concerning the expected behaviour of the
latter. The rst is the use of global institutional structures to facilitate transnational
political practices. In particular, international organisations, under the umbrella of
human rights, can provide an essential framework for negotiations between transna-
tional political networks and home countries. As Østergaard-Nielsen (2001: 15) has
pointed out, “transnational political networks who oppose a state that has strong
5 Political andCivic Par ticipation ofImmigrants inHost Countries. AnInterpretative…

106
allies in their host-states or is simply too powerful for other states to meddle with,
may turn to international organisations such as the UN, OSCE, European Council,
and the like”. In this framework, the role of NGOs in ‘trans-state advocacy’ can be
very useful to facilitating contacts between those transnational political networks
and a level of policymaking that would probably otherwise be unreachable for emi-
grant groups (ibid.). An example of this strategy is the case of the PLO (Palestinian
Liberation Organisation), which has long been lobbying for Palestine to be recog-
nised as a member state of the UN.Similarly, the Tibetan diaspora has engaged in
international advocacy to build support for Tibetan independence and to promote
respect for human rights in the Tibet.
New technologies are another option for non-state actors who are using transna-
tional political activities to involve the diaspora and push their agendas forward.
Internet connections especially, as well as satellite broadcasting and new electronic
media, are of utmost importance for diaspora activities (Scheffer 2003). These
changes substantially transform the nature and size of interactions between diaspora
groups and both governmental and non-governmental organisations in origin and
destination countries (ibid.). Scheffer (2003) underlines that the low cost, the reach
and the interactivity of the internet has increased the range, quality and impact of
several kinds of diaspora activities, as well as the mobilisation and transfer of eco-
nomic, cultural and political resources, and the creation of trans-state political com-
munities. Thus technological changes and the large diffusion of this new means of
communication give more and more emigrant groups access to public opinion and
policymakers, regardless of their economic and political resources, and irrespective
of their locations.
It appears particularly important to consider the centrality of new communica-
tion technologies in the case of interactions between emigrants and home societies
where the government or a majority or dominant social group is unfriendly or
unsympathetic to the specic group of emigrants (Scheffer 2003). Links can easily
be made between ethno-linguistic minority groups in the home country and their
specic diaspora, and between emigrant activities and opposition groups in the
homeland, against totalitarian or authoritarian regimes in the origin countries.
Participating Here andThere: TheIssue ofMultiple Loyalties
andtheIntegration Debate
Maintaining active civic ties with one place (emigration country), while residing
and developing civic links with another (immigration country) raises the question of
multiple membership and allegiance as regards political ties. There is an emergent
literature on the role of migrants’ transnational ties in their integration into the
receiving country (Levitt 1999; Pantoja 2005; Snel etal. 2006; Portes etal. 2008;
Morales and Morariu 2011).
L. Gabrielli et al.

107
At destination countries, not all the actors are comfortable with the political par-
ticipation of immigrants on host societies, with their relationship with origin com-
munities or with maintaining double political link or afliation. In European
receiving countries, states seems to not welcome particularly transnational political
practices of immigrants, independently from their exclusive or inclusive political
systems (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001). Even if this situation is progressively changing,
as underlined by the growing admittance to double or multiple citizenship (Kivisto
and Faist 2010), the issue of “double loyalty” linked to immigrants’ political partici-
pation in both host and home-countries is still at the centre of the debate.
The political and academic debates consider whether immigrants’ political rela-
tions with their origin countries, and their persistence over time, could be or not a
facilitating factor for the integration of immigrants at destination. In the early years
of the century, the academic literature explores whether this link with the countries
of origin is an obstacle to the integration of immigrants (Nieswand 2011; Snel etal.
2006); if the relationship between integration and transnational relations is positive
or negative (Guarnizo etal. 2003, Portes 2003); or if the positive or negative relation
depends, for example, on which social class migrants belong to (Levitt 2003;
Morawska 2003b). Although there is a relationship between transnationalism and
integration of immigrants in the host countries, the mainstream discourses have
been kept separate.
At the core of research debate it is the question of which is the relation between
immigrants political participation in host-countries and towards their homeland.
Two positions are particularly relevant in the case of transnational politics and
political activities and of the recognition of dual citizenship or nationality. When
migrants engage politically in two different societies, this can raise the question of
his/her loyalty to each nation-state. Moreover, the question is whether political and
civic activities oriented towards the country of origin reduce the political and civic
participation of the immigrant in the new residence country and thus limit integra-
tion. What is at stake is the possibility to being faithful to more than one nation-state
on with, beyond this, the question of the development of civic commitment indepen-
dently of the nation-state and of the citizenship acquisition.
On the one hand, some scholars argue that we would be in presence of a ‘zero-
sum game’, in which migrants’ political implication toward homelands is preclud-
ing involvement in receiving countries politics. Some suggest that maintaining links
with homeland countries, particular identities and ethnic enclaves hinder a full
assimilation and integration into ‘mainstream’ society and politics (Huntington
2004). In the rst position, political participation is oriented and linked to one
nation-state, namely the country of origin. Portes (1999) pointed out that in some
cases diaspora policies can provoke conicts in the migrant community because not
all immigrants necessarily agree with homeland politics or with the political regime.
According to him, the efforts of emigration countries can break the solidarity among
immigrants, politicise their civic organisations and jeopardise integration (Portes
1999). As DeSipio (2011) underlines, critics to transnational engagement ranges
from a moderate concern of this activity on immigrant adaptation to the new society,
to a more extreme fear “that transnationally engaged immigrants will act as a desta-
5 Political andCivic Par ticipation ofImmigrants inHost Countries. AnInterpretative…

108
bilizing force on the politics of the new home and act as an agent of the sending
country’s government”. Furthermore, since 9/11, there is even more suspicion
towards emigrants political activities and especially remittances to conict areas
(Kleist 2008). Transnational networks are, thus, perceived as challenging single
allegiance (Kastoryano 2000) and civic activities impeding integration.
On the other hand, some other authors disagree with this ‘zero-sum’ interpreta-
tion of the relation between linkages and transnational practices with migrants’
home countries and integration/assimilation in host countries. An extensive litera-
ture has shown that transnational practices represents more an alternative path of
immigrant incorporation and adaptation than an obstacle (Basch et al. 1994;
Morawska 2003a), and that also foster immigrants’ engagement in receiving-
country politics (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Vertovec 2003; Morales and Morariu
2011). Eva Morawska (2003a), for example, challenges the idea that transnational
involvements of migrants and their children and their assimilation as concurrent
processes. Following Kivisto and Faist (2010), “simultaneity” is the characteristic
relationship between assimilation and transnationalism. Some scholars underlines
how transnationalism provide alternative resources facilitating social mobility in the
host countries, and how transnational practices create skills that migrants can trans-
fer to their lives in destination countries (Portes 1999). Levitt (2003: 178), for exam-
ple, speaks of a “false dichotomy between assimilation and transnationalism”;
Morales and Morariu (2011: 143) considers that transnational practices foster politi-
cal integration “when they generate transferable skills that are useful for engaging
in receiving-country politics”. Fibbi and D’Amato (2008) realised a study based on
a quantitative methodology, comparing different immigrants groups in the same
countries, and the same group in several countries, and underline fact that integra-
tion and transnational engagement are not zero-sum game.
This second position assumes the compatibility of transnational political activi-
ties oriented to the emigration country and political integration in the destination
country (Portes etal. 2008). It views civic and political participation coming from
the belief in democracy and democratic values and possibly developing within more
than one nation-state (beyond methodological nationalism). Certainly, countries of
origin intend to preserve loyalty of emigrants through their diaspora policies (Portes
etal. 2007) but, “[t]ransnational practices, and in particular political transnational-
ism, are viewed as leading to the political incorporation of migrants because they
enable them to forge political coalitions and organisations that will allow them rst
to engage in ‘ethnic’ politics and, later, to become active in receiving-country poli-
tics” (Morales and Morariu 2011). Even in the case of conict in the country of
origin, the INFOCON project– which looked at the portability of conicts in coun-
tries of immigration– revealed that transnational civic participation increased civic
participation in host societies (Perrin and Martiniello 2010). Furthermore, political
participation in the country of origin (political orientation or identication) can dif-
fer according to countries of destination (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009). Turner (2008)
showed that parts of the Burundian diaspora adopted political positions radically
different from the country of origin, relying on the security and the distance pro-
vided by the host country. According to Portes (1999), civic activities oriented
L. Gabrielli et al.

109
towards the country of origin can thus be seen as a means to increase the level of
migrant political awareness, and thus as a rst step in a civic integration process.
The experience of hometown associations is a way for emigrants to be engaged
by participating in homeland politics. They can sometimes gain power in particular
in the country of origin, but they can also develop interest in becoming engaged in
civic activities in their new country of residence. In some cases, transnational civic
engagement creates frustration and become negative: so much so that emigrants will
prefer to give up civic actions concerning the country of origin and they will focus
on the receiving country, instead. The Intipucá organization was disbanded due to
criticism from the country of origin (Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008). Other cases with
Moroccan or Turkish associations in Europe revealed other reasons such as unsatis-
factory implementation of policy or conicting relations with local authorities in the
origin country (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009). Potential conicts between hometown
associations and communities of origin can indeed deter civic participation in
homeland politics when “the transnationalisation of political participation creates
tensions between mobile and relatively immobile people and associations” (Faist
2007: 10).
Nevertheless, Morales and Morariu (2011) highlighted the role of transferable
political skills and capital and the mobilizing capacity of transnationally–engaged
emigrants in their comparative study on the impact of transnational activities of
three ethnic groups in European cities on the political integration in receiving coun-
tries. Then, the expertise that migrants acquire through their political activities
towards their home countries promotes their capabilities for political involvement in
other political arenas (in host countries, but also at international level) at the same
time.
Finally, through their activities in hometown associations (e.g. in terms of
increasing numbers) and thus through transnational civic engagement, emigrants
became more visible in the receiving society. And, public visibility is undoubtedly
an important step for civic integration. Hometown associations can thus serve
migrants and help them to be collectively represented in the public and political
spheres in both origin and receiving countries. And as Brettell (2005: 878) pointed
out “[i]ncorporation involves gaining some sort of public recognition”. Transnational
civic engagement can thus have a positive impact on civic participation in the desti-
nation country and inuence political and civic integration.
Towards aNew Research Agenda Incorporating Origin
Countries’ Inuence andImpact
This chapter aimed to better understand how countries of origin can inuence the
political and civic participation of migrants once they are settled in a new country of
residence. In particular, it questioned the effects– both endogenous and exoge-
nous– and the impact that countries of origin can have on migrants’ civic and politi-
cal participation and integration.
5 Political andCivic Par ticipation ofImmigrants inHost Countries. AnInterpretative…

110
With regard to the endogenous country-of-origin effect, literature focused on the
micro level has shown that it can directly or indirectly play a role in the political and
civic socialisation of emigrants, mainly with respect to ‘political socialisation’, the
place of women in civic and political life in the country of origin, as well as the
mode of migration and the possibility of return. Nevertheless, immigrants’ re-
socialisation in the country of destination can often change the framework of these
dimensions. For instance, immigrants coming from an origin country where politi-
cal and civic participation is limited by a non- or semi-democratic system may dis-
cover new avenues of political and civic participation in the destination country,
through different types of associations. More indirectly, this endogenous country-
of- origin effect can also play a role in other factors, such as education level and
socio-economic class, that inuence the political and civic participation of migrants.
As regards the endogenous country-of-origin effect, the “country label” in desti-
nation countries’ perceptions can also play a role in political and civic participation,
even if at a lower level than in other integration dimensions. This label can affect the
acceptance of immigrants in political parties and mainstream organisations. If we
consider the historical relations between countries of destination and origin to be a
country label as well, the latter can play a major role in formal political participa-
tion. As underlined above, bilateral agreements on political participation and citi-
zenship, as well as pragmatic cooperation on external voting can favour migrants’
integration.
In the eld of political and civic participation, the idea of the trans-border state,
with two levels of governance working across borders via the government and civil
society, has to be clearly considered and analysed in detail. When applied to state
actors, this concept can be univocal, if we consider that different actors connected
with the state administrations of origin countries share the same objectives. By con-
trast, if we consider country-of-origin non-state actors’ inuence on emigrants’
political and civic participation we have to consider that at times their interests can
diverge substantially from those of state actors, as well as from other non-state
actors with different political orientations (Gabrielli and Zapata 2015).
The case of Turkish immigrants– in which as we mentioned before, the state
co- optation of emigrants co-occurs with the Kurdish diaspora’s effort to defend
their rights in Turkey– is clearly representative of one of the possible materialisa-
tions of the divergence of interests between state and non-state actors at origin.
A deeper look at state-of-origin role in the political and civic participation of
their emigrants reveals that sometimes the two axes of their actions, maintaining a
sense of belonging to the nation across border and supporting emigrant integration
in the destination country, can be conictive. Here, as we previously underlined, the
issue of multiple state loyalties is at stake; and even if some evolution occurs, in the
end states may still covet the supposed monolithic and exclusive loyalty of their
citizens.
Depending on which is the prevailing model in the political and civic participa-
tion of a group of immigrants, the country-of-origin effect or impact, several indica-
tions emerge from our analysis. Firstly, in the specic eld of political participation,
and particularly in the formal one, the main lter is clearly the country-of-origin
impact. The existence of bilateral agreements between origin and destination coun-
tries concerning political participation or double citizenship clearly affects immi-
L. Gabrielli et al.

111
grants’ possibilities for formal political participation at destination. Concerning
formal political participation at origin, specic rules allowing emigrants’ active and
passive participation also constitute a key element. In this domain, the dominant
actors are clearly the state institutions. Meanwhile, in the eld of civic participation
and informal political participation, the country-of-origin impact is a less limiting
factor than in formal political participation. Avenues of participation are more open
in these two dimensions: state actors in the country of origin have less power to
control or limit participation; and sometimes they may also have more interest in
curtailing emigrants and using them as a pressure group in the destination society.
Moreover, civil society actors surely play a larger role in civic participation and in
these less formal modes of political participation.
If we try to evaluate whether origin and destination state policies towards inte-
gration in the eld of political and civic participation are complementary or contra-
dictory, some considerations emerge from the analysis. Once more, in the eld of
formal political participation there are more competing interests between origin and
destination state actors. These potential tensions are connected with a shared and
still dominant conception that migrants should have an exclusive loyalty to one
nation-state, even if this perception of emigrants is progressively changing and the
acceptance of multiple loyalties is growing. In the eld of civic participation these
tensions are lower.
Concerning tools, bilateral agreements allowing migrants to vote in their destina-
tion countries (even if still rare) and dispositions allowing emigrants to vote exter-
nally will facilitate political participation as well as integration in this specic
dimension. Also, the cooperation of destination countries in external voting proce-
dures can facilitate the formal political participation of migrants, thereby supporting
their integration. The entire process of external voting (negotiations, organisation
and realisation) can give immigrants the opportunity to establish contacts with des-
tination country institutions, thereby developing political and civic capital that can
be very useful to larger integration patterns.
Thus in the eld of civic and non-formal political participation, we once again
see that the actions and tools of country-of-origin actors are more favourable to the
development of participatory patterns, even when oriented to civic participation in
the countries of origin.
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