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1.5°C To Stay Alive?: AOSIS and the Long Term Temperature Goal in the Paris Agreement

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Lisa Benjamin at University of Oxford
Lisa Benjamin
Adelle Thomas at University of the Bahamas (UB)
Adelle Thomas
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Abstract

The global temperature goals contained in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement have been widely touted as a major marker of the success of the agreement. In particular, the aspirational goal of pursuing efforts to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels was a surprise to many observers of the negotiations. However, inclusion of the 1.5°C long term temperature goal had been a long-fought struggle, led by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), and resulted mainly from the Structured Expert Dialogue (SED) on the 2013-2015 review. This insight piece provides an overview of the results of the 2013-2015 review in light of the 1.5°C temperature goal, and its importance for small island states. The piece also charts the convoluted course of the outcome of the 2013-2015 review in the Paris negotiations, the consequential recognition of the 1.5°C goal in the agreement, and provides some initial thoughts of the adequacy of this provision in the Paris Agreement.
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1.5°C TO STAY ALIVE?:
AOSIS and the Long Term Temperature Goal in the Paris Agreement
Lisa Benjamin* and Dr Adelle Thomas**
The global temperature goals contained in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement
1
have been widely touted
as a major marker of the success of the agreement. In particular, the aspirational goal of pursuing
efforts to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels was a surprise to
many observers of the negotiations. However, inclusion of the 1.5°C long term temperature goal had
been a long-fought struggle, led by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), and resulted mainly
from the Structured Expert Dialogue (SED) on the 2013-2015 review. This insight piece provides an
overview of the results of the 2013-2015 review in light of the 1.5°C temperature goal, and its
importance for small island states. The piece also charts the convoluted course of the outcome of the
2013-2015 review in the Paris negotiations, the consequential recognition of the 1.5°C goal in the
agreement, and provides some initial thoughts of the adequacy of this provision in the Paris
Agreement.
In 2010 the Cancun Agreements set a long-term global goal of limiting the global average temperature
increase to below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.
2
It was agreed that this temperature goal would be
reviewed periodically to ensure its adequacy in preventing “dangerous” human interference with the
climate system, particularly in the context of a 1.5°C global goal.
3
Parties also agreed to establish the
2013-2015 review that was mandated with investigating the need to strengthen the temperature goal
and potentially limit temperature increases to 1.5°C.
4
At the Durban COP in 2011, the parties agreed
that the review would be informed by IPCC assessment reports, UN agency reports, observed regional
changes as well as submissions from parties, and was to be assisted by the Subsidiary Body for
Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technology Advice (SBSTA).
5
The
2013-2015 review focused on gathering and assessing scientific evidence to determine an appropriate
temperature goal that would limit impacts from climate change, and included involvement of over
seventy experts and parties. The SED held four meetings throughout the two-year period of its
mandate,
6
and was required to end its work at COP 21 in Paris.
Results from the SED show that there has been an increase of the global average temperature of
0.85°C since 1880.
7
This increase in temperature has had significant, observable impacts on a global
scale, including decreased food production, declines in marine fisheries, increases in sea level rise and
flooding, loss of glaciers and ice sheets and detrimental effects on ecosystems.
8
The current
* Assistant Professor, The College of The Bahamas
** Assistant Professor, The College of The Bahamas. The authors were members of the Bahamian national
delegation at the Paris negotiations and are co-founders of The Climate Change Initiative at The College of The
Bahamas, however this insight piece was written in their personal capacities.
1
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9.
2
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 Decision 1/CP.16 para I.4.
3
ibid.
4
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 Decision 1/CP.16 para V.138-140.
5
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 Decision 2/CP.17 paras 157-167.
6
See Chronology 2013-2015 Review at http://unfccc.int/science/workstreams/the_2013-
2015_review/items/7522.php
7
‘Report on the structured expert dialogue on the 2013-2014 Review’ FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1 para 16.
8
Ibid para 36.
temperature increase has resulted in impacts that already exceed the adaptation capacity of many
people and ecosystems.
9
Deliberations regarding the qualification of “dangerous” human interference
with the climate system show that there is no universally safe level of climate change or temperature
increase.
10
Species, people and communities that are currently affected by climate change impacts
are already coping with unsafe changes, making further increases to the temperature even more
harmful.
Results also showed that as the global average temperature rises above current levels of warming,
there are significant increases in impacts on a global scale, including higher levels of risk to unique and
threatened ecosystems, more intense extreme weather events, increases in coastal and inland
flooding and more disruption to livelihoods.
11
While temperature increases result in amplified effects
globally, risks to some regions are higher than others due to greater levels of vulnerability and
limitations to adaptation. For small islands in particular, increased warming results in very high risks
to coastal erosion, flooding, terrestrial and marine ecosystems, livelihoods, health and economic
stability.
12
With 2°C of warming, the rate of climate change would exceed the adaptation capabilities for a
number of species and geographic areas, including small islands. A warming of 2°C was found to be
inadequate to prevent dangerous levels of impacts on a global scale.
13
For small islands the difference
in projected risks between 1.5°C and 2°C of warming was found to be significant. Although there will
be increased environmental changes with a warming of 1.5°C, terrestrial and marine species would be
able to adapt, coral reefs would have a higher likelihood of survival, sea level rise would likely remain
below 1 metre, and there would be more adaptation options available to small islands to cope with
impacts.
14
Consequently, the 1.5°C long term temperature goal became a red line for AOSIS at the
Paris negotiations.
AOSIS has been calling for a global goal to limit temperature increase to 1.5°C since 2008, using the
slogan ‘1.5°C to stay alive.’
15
AOSIS requested that the 2013-2015 review take place in order to
9
Ibid para 37, 39.
10
Ibid para 40.
11
Ibid para 22, para 31.
12
Ibid Figure 7.
13
Ibid Message 5.
14
Ibid para 110.
15
For more information on AOSIS see www.aosis.org, ‘Alliance of Small Island States 25 Years of Leadership at
the United Nations’ 2015 AOSIS available at http://aosis.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/AOSIS-BOOKLET-
FINAL-11-19-151.pdf; Carola Betzold ‘Borrowing Power to Influence International Negotiations: AOSIS in the
Climate Change Regime, 1990–1997’ (2010) 1–14, available at
<http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/1603_1456.pdf; John Ashe, ‘The Role of the Alliance of Small
Island States (AOSIS) in the Negotiation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC)’ 23 Natural Resources Forum (1999) 209–220; Tuiloma Neroni Slade, ‘The Making of International
Law: The Role of Small Island States’, 17 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal (2003) 531–544;
Jenny Grote, ‘The Changing Tides of Small Island States Discourse – A Historical Overview of the Appearance of
Small Island States in the International Arena’, 43 Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee (2010) 164–191; Pamela S.
Chasek, ‘Margins of Power: Coalition Building and Coalition Maintenance of the South Pacific Island States and
the Alliance of Small Island States’, 14 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law
(2005) 125–137; Ian Fry, ‘Small Island Developing States: Becalmed in a Sea of Soft Law’ 14 Review of
consider strengthening the long term temperature goal of 2°C, and to conclude at the 2015 Paris
negotiations in order for the results of the review to inform the outcome of the 2015 negotiations.
At the conclusion of the SED review, AOSIS called for the results of the SED to be put before the
Conference of Parties (COP) in Paris in order for the COP to consider strengthening the overall long
term temperature goal. AOSIS viewed the outcome of the SED as a “paradigm shift”
16
in the way in
which the world should view the current 2°C limit. On the basis of the review, AOSIS also called for a
below 1.5°C temperature limit to become a benchmark in the Advanced Durban Platform
negotiations, and ultimately in the Paris Agreement.
17
It should be noted, however, that AOSIS
conceded that even with a 1.5°C temperature goal, SIDS would still experience significant residual
impacts due to climate change.
18
AOSIS had requested the 2013-2015 review in part to increase the urgency and ambition of parties’
nationally determined contributions at the Paris COP. One of the key goals for AOSIS was to ensure
that the emission pathways in the Paris Agreement did not make the 1.5°C goal “infeasible”.
19
Despite
the two year SED process, which included receiving inputs from parties, the 43rd sessions of SBI and
SUBSTA regarding the outcomes 2013-2015 review were contentious. A few countries within these
meetings attempted to obstruct the outcomes of the 2013-2015 review being forwarded for
consideration by the COP, despite the 2011 Durban Outcomes anticipating that the ADP process would
consider the results of the 2013-2015 review.
20
The AOSIS statements at the closing of the SBI and
SUBSTA meetings called these obstructions “unacceptable”,
21
and cited its “extreme” disappointment,
going so far as to say that as a group it was “appalled” by the actions of some countries.
22
This is very
forceful language, and indicates the precariousness of the situation at a critical juncture of the Paris
negotiations.
23
AOSIS insisted that the review be considered in the ADP process.
European Community and Environmental International Law (2005) 89–99; Lisa Benjamin, ‘The Role of the
Alliance of Small Island Developing States (AOSIS) in UNFCCC Negotiations. International Environmental Law-
making and Diplomacy Review, Eds. Ed Couzens and Tuula Hokonen, (Joensuu, University of Eastern
Finland/UNEP), (2011) 117-132.
16
Submission by AOSIS on the Outcome of the Structured Expert Dialogue and the 2013-2015 Review, May
2015 available at
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/SitePages/sessions.aspx?showOnlyCurrentCalls=1&populateData=1&exp
ectedsubmissionfrom=Parties&focalBodies=SBSTA&themes=Science%20and%20Research
17
Submission by AOSIS on the Outcome of the Structured Expert Dialogue and the 2013-2015 Review, May
2015 available at
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/SitePages/sessions.aspx?showOnlyCurrentCalls=1&populateData=1&exp
ectedsubmissionfrom=Parties&focalBodies=SBSTA&themes=Science%20and%20Research
18
FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1 para 113 .
19
Submission by AOSIS on the Outcome of the Structured Expert Dialogue and the 2013-2015 Review, May
2015 available at
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/SitePages/sessions.aspx?showOnlyCurrentCalls=1&populateData=1&exp
ectedsubmissionfrom=Parties&focalBodies=SBSTA&themes=Science%20and%20Research
20
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 Decision 2/CP.17 para 166.
21
Statement delivered by the Maldives on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) at the Closing
SBSTA Plenary Paris 2015 available at http://aosis.org/documents/climate-change.
22
Statement delivered by the Maldives on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) at the Closing
SBI Plenary Paris 2015 available at http://aosis.org/documents/climate-change.
23
See also the G77 and China statements on the closing of the SBI and SBSTA which expressed disappointment
at the inability of the parties to reach a consensus on the issue, available at
In the end it was perhaps the secret “high ambition coalition” which broke the deadlock in the
negotiations over the 1.5°C temperature goal.
24
The coalition was formed in July 2015, and included
both developed and developing countries (although omitted China and India). The four main aims of
the coalition included a legally binding agreement in Paris, a long term temperature goal in line with
scientific advice, a review mechanism for countries’ emission contributions, and a coherent
transparency mechanism.
25
Critically, the US joined this coalition, which included 79 countries,
26
including a number of SIDS.
27
Ultimately, the Paris Agreement includes a long term temperature goal
of “well below 2°C” above pre-industrial levels, with an aspirational goal of limiting temperature
increase to 1.5°C.
28
The significant efforts of AOSIS over several years did result in a successful mention of the 1.5°C limit,
but ultimately the measure of these efforts will be determined by whether or not the quasi-voluntary
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) collectively meet the long term temperature goal. While
parties have an obligation in the Paris Agreement to prepare, communicate and maintain successive
rounds of NDCs, these NDCs merely represent the “intention” of parties,
29
and are no longer legally
binding targets as they were in the Kyoto Protocol. The language regarding NDCs is therefore very
weak, and current NDCs put the world on track for approximately a 2.7°C, or higher, warming.
30
The
long term temperature goal, therefore, serves as a marker of the collective, global ambition gap
represented by NDCs.
The Paris Agreement may be seen as a success if viewed as a process agreement only, as the substance
of the legal obligations do not currently ensure that the world will achieve the well below 2°C or 1.5°C
temperature limit. Binding commitments were only achieved in terms of transparency processes and
five-yearly global stocktakes. Transparency as well as monitoring, reporting and verification processes
won the day in Paris, and this type of nationally-determined climate regime has superseded the old
“top down” Kyoto model with legally binding targets and sanctions. Language regarding
implementation and compliance under the Paris Agreement is weak, and any compliance mechanism
will now be “facilitative in nature.”
31
Compliance at the international level is likely to follow a
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/SitePages/sessions.aspx?showOnlyCurrentCalls=1&populateData=1&exp
ectedsubmissionfrom=Parties&focalBodies=SBI and
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/SitePages/sessions.aspx?showOnlyCurrentCalls=1&populateData=1&exp
ectedsubmissionfrom=Parties&focalBodies=SBI.
24
‘The Huge, Secret Coalition that Could Deliver at Win at Paris’ available at
http://magazine.good.is/articles/secret-climate-coaltion-high-ambition-paris-cop21;
25
‘Climate Coalition breaks cover in Paris to push for binding and ambitious deal’ available at
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/08/coalition-paris-push-for-binding-ambitious-climate-
change-deal.
26
‘COP 21: US joins ‘high ambition coalition’ for climate deal’ http://www.bbc.com/news/science-
environment-35057282.
27
The coalition as allegedly initiated by Tony de Brum, foreign minister for the Marshall Islands, see ‘Climate
Coalition breaks cover in Paris to push for binding and ambitious deal’ available at
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/08/coalition-paris-push-for-binding-ambitious-climate-
change-deal.
28
Article 2, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9.
29
Article 4(2).
30
http://climateanalytics.org/latest/climate-pledges-will-bring-27c-of-warming-potential-for-more-action.
31
Article 15(2) FCCC/CP/2015/L.9.
managerial model, emphasizing reputation and respectability at the international level as drivers of
ambition.
32
Whether these largely process-based arrangements can ensure the world achieves a long term
temperature goal of 1.5°C shall remain to be seen. Subsequent scientific reviews of the long term goal
which are designed to inform the collective efforts of nations are built into the Paris Agreement and
Decision.
33
The five-yearly global stocktake is one of the few remaining levers at the international level
designed to incentivize increased ambition by countries. Scientific reviews which coincide with
subsequent global stocktakes are likely to highlight continuing ambition gaps. The challenges AOSIS
experienced in attempting to ensure that parties took into account the outcomes of the SED at the
high-profile Paris negotiations are instructive, and worrisome. It is, therefore, of concern how
seriously parties will receive subsequent expert reviews and recommendations that may highlight
ambition gaps between the long term temperature goal and collective global efforts to reach that
goal.
32
See for example Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with
International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 1998).
33
See Paris Agreement Article 4(9), Article 13(11) & (12), Article 14, and 1/CP.21 paras 19-21, 100-102.
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Full-text available
  • Feb 2022
Climate change models project that, within the Caribbean basin, rainfall intensity is likely to increase toward the end of this century, although the region is projected to be drier overall. This may affect the frequency and severity of floods in Jamaica and the Caribbean Small Island Developing States. We investigate how flood hazards may be affected by increases in global mean surface temperature of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5°C above pre-industrial levels using a case study of a Jamaican watershed. Rainfall projections from the PRECIS regional climate model for the Caribbean are analysed. Six members from the Quantifying Uncertainty in Model Predictions (AENWH, AEXSA, AEXSC, AEXSK, AEXSL and AEXSM) were used to create 100-year flood inundation maps for the Hope river for different global warming levels using hydrological and hydraulic models. Model runs projected peak discharges at 2.0, 2.5 and 1.5°C warming that were higher than discharges in the historical record of events that damaged sections of the watershed. Projections from the hydraulic model show increased flow area, depth and extent for 1.5 followed by 2.0 and 2.5°C rises in temperature. These results imply continued flood risk for the vulnerable areas of the watershed. This article is part of the theme issue 'Developing resilient energy systems'.
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Overcoming gridlock? The role of city networks in transnational cooperation on climate mitigation
Article
  • Jun 2024
Local governments engage in combating global warming by cooperating in transnational city networks. These networks are often hailed as an alternative to the alleged gridlock of interstate cooperation. Still, it remains unclear if and how the institutional characteristics of city networks can overcome this gridlock. Therefore, we analyze to what extent cooperation in city networks faces the same institutional challenges as those related to interstate collaboration. Our research focuses on six climate networks and draws on 33 in‐depth interviews, which are analyzed through qualitative directed content analysis. Three findings stand out. First, networks struggle with growing multipolarity, as they lack the capacity to engage with all members. While adopting a strongly regionalized approach, the necessary centralization to efficiently coordinate regional suboffices seems lacking. Second, targets tend to be regarded as a general direction rather than proper objectives that must be implemented within a specific time frame. Third, city officials have a less clear overview of the landscape of networks than network employees. At the same time, they indicate that the proliferation of networks complicates the internal organization of networking activities. Taken together, we conclude that climate city networks do not necessarily allow structurally avoiding the causes of interstate gridlock.
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Climate Security and Global Climate Injustice: The Case of St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Chapter
  • May 2023
St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG), like other Small Island Developing States (SIDS), have experienced the debilitating effects of the existential threat of climate change despite their negligible contribution to global greenhouse emissions. These impacts are no longer simply an environmental or economic challenge, but are increasingly discussed as threats to national, human, and ecological security. This chapter explores the different ways climate change manifests itself as a security issue in SVG and the island’s response, especially in light of its election as a non-permanent member of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) for the 2020–2021 term. The study draws on empirical material from a number of government reports, policies, papers, and news articles on SVG from 2007 to 2020 to examine how climate change is framed within the context of climate security and climate justice. The findings show that climate change security issues were less important in the traditional sense in terms of instigating violent conflict and were more important in relation to protecting the rights of vulnerable people and communities. The findings also demonstrate an interplay between ecological and human security issues, encompassing food security, water security, and financial security. In response, the country seeks to reduce these impacts through mitigation and adaptation efforts. However, given its constraints as a SIDS, the study also puts forward a climate justice argument built on the premises that global emitters have a responsibility to honour commitments to reduce their contribution to greenhouse gases significantly and for major donors to uphold and scale up financial commitments to help SIDS respond effectively to climate impacts.KeywordsSt. Vincent and the GrenadinesClimate securityClimate justiceHuman securitySmall Island Developing States
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The Role of the Alliance of Small Island Developing States (AOSIS) in UNFCCC Negotiations
  • Jan 2005
  • 89-99
European Community and Environmental International Law (2005) 89–99; Lisa Benjamin, 'The Role of the Alliance of Small Island Developing States (AOSIS) in UNFCCC Negotiations. International Environmental Lawmaking and Diplomacy Review, Eds. Ed Couzens and Tuula Hokonen, (Joensuu, University of Eastern Finland/UNEP), (2011) 117-132.
climate-pledges-will-bring-27c-of-warming-potential-for-more-action
  • Jan 2015
30 http://climateanalytics.org/latest/climate-pledges-will-bring-27c-of-warming-potential-for-more-action. 31 Article 15(2) FCCC/CP/2015/L.9.