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Spear-Phishing in the Wild: A Real-World Study of Personality, Phishing Self-Efficacy and Vulnerability to Spear-Phishing Attacks

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Recent research has begun to focus on the factors that cause people to respond to phishing attacks. In this study a real-world spear-phishing attack was performed on employees in organizational settings in order to examine how users’ personality, attitudinal and perceived efficacy factors affect their tendency to expose themselves to such an attack. Spear-phishing attacks are more sophisticated than regular phishing attacks as they use personal information about their intended victim and present a stronger challenge for detection by both the potential victims as well as email phishing filters.While previous research showed that certain phishing attacks can lure a higher response rate from people with a higher level of the personality trait of Neuroticism, other traits were not explored in this context. The present study included a field-experiment which revealed a number of factors that increase the likelihood of users falling for a phishing attack: the factor that was found to be most correlated to the phishing response was users’ Conscientiousness personality trait. The study also found gender-based difference in the response, with women more likely to respond to a spear-phishing message than men. In addition, this work detected negative correlation between the participants subjective estimate of their own vulnerability to phishing attacks and the likelihood that they will be phished. Put together, the finding suggests that vulnerability to phishing is in part a function of users’ personality and that vulnerability is not due to lack of awareness of phishing risks. This implies that real-time response to phishing is hard to predict in advance by the users themselves, and that a targeted approach to defense may increase security effectiveness.
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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2544742
Spear-Phishing in the Wild: A Real-World Study of
Personality, Phishing Self-efficacy and Vulnerability to
Spear-Phishing Attacks
Tzipora Halevi
Computer Science and
engineering
NYU Polytechnic School of
Engineering
Six MetroTech Center
Brooklyn, NY 11201
thalevi@nyu.edu
Nasir Memon
Computer Science and
engineering
NYU Polytechnic School of
Engineering
Six MetroTech Center
Brooklyn, NY 11201
memon@nyu.edu
Oded Nov
Technology Management and
Innovation
NYU Polytechnic School of
Engineering
Six MetroTech Center
Brooklyn, NY 11201
onov@nyu.edu
ABSTRACT
Recent research has begun to focus on the factors that cause people
to respond to phishing attacks. In this study a real-world spear-
phishing attack was performed on employees in organizational set-
tings in order to examine how users’ personality, attitudinal and
perceived efficacy factors affect their tendency to expose them-
selves to such an attack. Spear-phishing attacks are more sophisti-
cated than regular phishing attacks as they use personal information
about their intended victim and present a stronger challenge for de-
tection by both the potential victims as well as email phishing fil-
ters. While previous research showed that certain phishing attacks
can lure a higher response rate from people with a higher level of
the personality trait of Neuroticism, other traits were not explored
in this context. The present study included a field-experiment which
revealed a number of factors that increase the likelihood of users
falling for a phishing attack: the factor that was found to be most
correlated to the phishing response was users’ Conscientiousness
personality trait. The study also found gender-based difference
in the response, with women more likely to respond to a spear-
phishing message than men. In addition, this work detected nega-
tive correlation between the participants subjective estimate of their
own vulnerability to phishing attacks and the likelihood that they
will be phished. Put together, the finding suggests that vulnerabil-
ity to phishing is in part a function of users’ personality and that
vulnerability is not due to lack of awareness of phishing risks. This
implies that real-time response to phishing is hard to predict in ad-
vance by the users themselves, and that a targeted approach to de-
fense may increase security effectiveness.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.5.m. [Information Interfaces and Presentation (e.g. HCI)]:
Miscellaneous
General Terms
Security, Human Factors
Keywords
Phishing, Personality traits, Security
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2544742
1. INTRODUCTION
Spear-phishing attacks continue to be a serious threat [24] and are
often the root cause of security breaches. These attacks are more
targeted than phishing emails and use personal information about
their intended victims in an attempt to seem authentic and improve
the likelihood that the target responds to the attacks. Therefore,
these attacks are very hard to detect by the users and pose increas-
ing security concerns for online users.
Previous studies looked into the technical aspects that contribute to
phishing vulnerability [9, 31, 20]. However, other aspects that may
contribute to such vulnerability, such as personality traits, started
being investigated [14]. Personality traits may affect the user per-
ceived evaluation of the urgency in responding to specific emails,
as well as the authority conveyed in them, thus causing the users
to ignore the risks in engaging in this behavior. Psychologists have
demonstrated that personality traits are a stronger predictors than
economic factors of certain risk-based decisions [30]. In the con-
text of phishing, this work is based on the hypothesis that the Big
Five personality traits model - a well established model of personal-
ity - captures differences in how users assess the actions they need
to take in response to the perceived rewards and risks offered by
those attack emails.
Therefore, this work examines how psychological traits correlate to
deception detection and phishing response. This study follows the
hypothesis that responding to phishing emails represents an error
in judgment (similarly to responding to scams [33]), which is due
to certain emotional biases. The ability to provoke such emotional
triggers may be connected to specific personality traits, where peo-
ple who score high on certain traits may be more likely to fall vic-
tims to such attacks.
Despite the rise in phishing attacks, their connection to psycho-
logical factors has not been thoroughly explored. Identifying the
personality characteristics that may cause higher vulnerability to
online threats is an important step in creating defenses and protect-
ing users from email attacks and other security threats.
Previous work showed that people with a high level of a specific
personality trait, neuroticism, are more vulnerable to certain types
of phishing attacks [14]. This personality trait was also shown to
be related to a lower ability to detect lies [12]. However, messages
may also be tailored to other personality traits [17]. While custom-
tailored advertisements were shown to be evaluated more positively
by study participants with high level of those traits, the effect on
vulnerability to phishing attacks has not been demonstrated. This
work describes the types of messages that can be used to lure dif-
ferent participants. It further runs an actual real-world attack tar-
geting the more challenging personality trait, and shows that even
participants that practice rational decision making can be lured into
making judgment errors with a custom-tailored message.
Another factor that affect users’ online behavior is the perceived
benefits vs. the risks online communication offers. Previous re-
search showed that users tend to have an optimism bias [6] for
online activities, and that users tend to ignore risks and concen-
trate on perceived benefits of new technology [8, 28]. In addition,
new models have been developed in the last few years to measure
computer-mediated communication (CMC) competence in an at-
tempt to evaluate how it affects personal relationship and inter-
action with new media technology. However, the effect of CMC
competence on user cyber-security behavior has not been explored.
This study looks at the effect of the users’ online risk perception as
well as CMC competence on actual response to phishing threats.
The goal of this study is therefore to better understand the relation-
ship between personality characteristics and phishing vulnerability
in real world settings, for the purpose of developing customized
user interfaces and security awareness education, designed to in-
crease users’ privacy and security in the future.
2. RELATED WORK
2.1 Scams and Personality
In classical decision theory, decision making under risk is assumed
to be based on pure logic. Under these assumptions, reasonable
people make rational choices based on objective factors. However,
Kahneman et al. [19] have shown that people’s decisions tend to be
biased and are not purely logical.
A scam is a pretense in which a fraudulent attacker attempts to
extract valuable information or monetary gain from the victim. A
response to scam can be viewed as a decision error, where the user
does not estimate correctly the risk, due to certain biases. Scams
are widespread due to the fact that a certain percentage of people
tend to fall for them. They provide the malicious attacker with an
opportunity to steal the victim’s personal information (or get money
directly from the scam victims).
Scams appeal to different human vulnerabilities, such as the desire
for immediate gain, the desire to help people and the desire to be
liked by the scam initiators. It has been suggested that certain peo-
ple have “victim personalities” that make them more vulnerable to
scams. These victims may fall for scams repeatedly.
One of the factors that may make it more likely for certain people to
become victims is the lack of emotional control. A research by the
University of Exeter [33], found that scam victims reported being
unable to resist responding to persuasion and being undiscriminat-
ing about the offers they respond to. One of the study conclusions
was that there is a particular segment of people (about 10-20% per-
cent of the population) who are particularly vulnerable to scams.
Some people become serial scam victims, who fall repeatedly for
scams.
2.2 Personality Types and Internet Behavior
Research of cyber-security has begun to look at how different as-
pects of psychology can compromise Internet security. One exist-
ing concern is that the internet may replace normal social activities
and that people who are preoccupied with the internet may be com-
pensating for loneliness and social seclusion.
Two studies by Hamburger et al. [1, 15], detected differences be-
tween the genders. In particular, their research showed that for
women, neuroticism was positively related to loneliness, while for
men, the correlation was significantly lower. Also, for women, both
neuroticism and the feeling of loneliness were positively related to
the use of social services (while extraversion was negatively related
to both). For men, these correlations were significantly lower. One
explanation for these results may be that women are more sensitive
to their emotional and social needs and realize the ability of the
internet to help fill those needs.
In another research by Schrammel et al. [18], no correlation was
found between personality traits and disclosure of information on-
line, but correlation was found between time spent online and in-
formation disclosure.
A recent study by Hirsh et. al. [17] looked into tailoring prod-
uct advertisement to users’ personality. In this study, each message
was framed to appeal to each of the big-five personality trait. For
example, for the messages that appealed to conscientiousness, ef-
ficiency and goal pursuit motives were included in the message.
The study found that personality-framed advertisement were rated
more favorably the more they were correlated to the participants
personality traits.
2.3 Internet Usage and Risk Perception
Optimistic bias is well-established in the literature as it relates to
a variety of off-line risks and activities [34]. Campbell et. al. [6]
examined if optimistic biases also apply to online users, focusing
on users estimation of the likelihood of engaging in positive inter-
net activities vs. risky online activities. To measure this perceived
self-efficacy, a survey tool was developed for measuring both inter-
net positive activities as well as risky activities. The study found
that the student participants had positive bias towards their online
activities, with heavy internet users reporting a higher optimistic
bias than light internet users.
In another recent study by Efcom (an independent regulator and
competition authority for the UK communications industries) [11],
the relationship between internet usage and negative activity for on-
line users was examined . The study found that ‘narrow’ internet
users, which are defined as those who use the internet for fewer
purposes, were significantly less likely than all users to have expe-
rienced negative online activity. This was also found true for newer
users.
While both those studies suggest a relationship between usage and
negative effects, none look at how it affects user response to a neg-
ative online event. Therefore, one of the aspects examined in this
work is whether these variables relate to user’s response to a phish-
ing attack.
2.4 CMC Competence Model
Spitzberg [32] developed a theoretical model of computer-mediated
communication (CMC) competence. The model pays attention to
the role that the new media plays in development of personal rela-
tionship and concentrates on motivation, knowledge, skills, context
and outcome of CMC competence. The study supports the view
that the competence with which a person utilizes new technologies
is likely to affect how he views the technology and interacts with it.
Since computer competence affects the user perception and interac-
tion with new technologies, this study examines whether a relation-
ship exists between CMC competence and response to a real-live
cyber-attack.
2.5 Phishing Vulnerability
Phishing is an attack that uses fraudulent electronic mail (email)
that claims to be from a trustworthy source. The goal of phishing
emails is to get personal information from the users, such as user
ID and passwords. The attacker can then use this information to
impersonate a user and access the user account for financial gain. In
the last few years there has been a significant increase in phishing
and spear phishing activity, with many of the emails designed to
target directly their victims in an effort to raise the likelihood that
the user will respond to the emails.
Researchers have argued that technical understanding (or lack of it)
makes people fall for phishing. Studies have looked into technical
cues and for methods to improve the user ability to detect such
attacks. Dhamija et al. [9] found that many of the users either were
not familiar with the technical cues of secure websites or did not
look for them. This implies that standard security indicators may
not be useful in many cases as users do not understand them or
neglect to search for them, even when actively trying to determine
if a site is authentic.
Sheng et al. [31] performed a demographic study of phishing sus-
ceptibility. Their study found that women were more likely to fall
for phishing. While the women in the study had less technical ex-
pertise, they had a higher level of familiarity with anti-phishing
education. This further supports the hypothesis that while anti-
phishing education is a key factor in user protection, creating com-
plementary customized awareness education may further help in
defending certain users against phishing threats.
This research assumes that responding to phishing, just like re-
sponding to scams, results from an error of judgment. The goal is
to understand the psychological traits that cause certain people to
make such errors. In addition, the work seeks to see if these corre-
late to other lapses of judgment in online behavior (such as posting
personal data on social networks sites). The success of a phish-
ing attack depends on users responding to it and providing their
information. Therefore, understanding the psychological reasons
for responding to such emails is imperative to developing effective
defenses against such phishing attacks.
Clearly, phishing is ultimately an exercise in the exploitation of
user trust. In particular, this phishing study sends an email which
pretends to be from an authority figure inside the company (sec-
tion 4.1.2). Due to evolutionary reasons, people are pre-disposed
to trusting and cooperating with other people [16]. Decision mak-
ing regarding online transactions is often dependent on the users
‘trust’ of online parties. However, it has been shown that inter-
net users often make the wrong ‘trust-based’ decisions. Familiar-
ity with phishing and other cyber-attacks may raise the user dis-
trust of online entities. Kumaraguru et. al. [20] developed a trust
model for online activities, which distinguished between ‘experts’
and ‘non-experts’. The study showed that online ‘experts’, who
have a high level of familiarity with internet threats and defenses,
are more likely to detect correctly signals of a suspicious email and
distrust it vs. ‘non-experts’ users, who are less familiar with the sig-
nals of malicious emails. This study is aimed at further exploring
the personality factors that cause some people to trust a phishing
email while other users may distrust it.
2.6 Big Five Framework
Personality is a consistent pattern of how people respond to stim-
uli in their environment and their attitude towards different events.
The five factor model of personality assessment is currently one
of the most widely used multidimensional measures of personality
[21]. Its goal is to encapsulate personality into five distinct factors
which allow a theoretical conceptualization of people’s personality.
These dimensions are: Neuroticism - indicates a tendency to expe-
rience negative feelings that include guilt, disgust, anger, fear and
sadness. Extroversion - being more friendly and outgoing and in-
teract more with the people around them, while introvert are more
reserved. Openness - indicates the willingness to try new experi-
ences. Agreeableness - Agreeable people are co-operative, eager to
help other people and believe in reciprocity. People who score low
on agreeableness are egocentric and competitive. Conscientious-
ness - tendency to be dependable and hardworking. This model
is considered superior to other models in capturing the common
elements of personality traits and providing a precise personality
structure description [35]. In addition, there is evidence that the
traits are hereditary, which suggests an underlying biological basis
[7].
Conscientious people have high self-control. Previous studies [27]
showed that conscientious people value achievement, order, and
efficiency. They are typically purposeful and strong-minded. Con-
scientiousness is the most relevant trait to phishing vulnerability, as
conscientiousness was found to positively predict rational decision-
making [26]. Therefore, examining the susceptibility of users with
high conscienceless level to a customized spear-phishing message
demonstrates the likelihood that even rational decision makers and
people who typically have high self-control will disregard the risk
and respond to such an attack, indicating an error in judgment.
3. STUDY HYPOTHESES
This work follows the premise that personality is a contributing
parameter in vulnerability to phishing attack. Previous research
demonstrated that neuroticism is correlated to susceptibility to a
certain type of phishing messages (prize message) [14]. Neuroti-
cism has also been shown to correlate to other vulnerabilities, such
as online gambling [22] and compulsive buying [2] as well as a
lower likelihood of detecting lies [12].
However, messages may be tailored to different personality traits
as well. For example, a message that applies to extraverts may em-
phasize rewards and social attention. Messages designed to appeal
to conscientious people would focus on efficiency and order.
The hypotheses pursued in this study is that custom-tailored mes-
sages to the target recipient can be more effective and cause a
decision-making bias towards responding to phishing emails. The
dependent variable examined was phishing vulnerability: this work
investigates the vulnerability of the participants to a phishing at-
tack, by sending them an actual phishing email.
To test our hypotheses, this work included a phishing attack in real-
life settings. In particular, the study tests the hypothesis that even
Conscientious people, who typically are highly rational, can be per-
suaded to respond to a phishing attack, ignoring warning signs. In
addition, we examined the role of other factors in users’ vulnerabil-
ity to a real-world phishing attack, such as gender, general online
usage characteristics and online risk perception.
In summary, the study explores the following hypotheses:
H1: Higher levels of Conscientiousness will lead to higher
phishing vulnerability. While Conscientious people are typ-
ically hard-working and have high self-control, we hypothe-
size that an appeal to efficiency and order will over- come the
participants self-control and raise the likelihood of respond-
ing to a spear-phishing attack.
H2: Participants who use the internet for more diverse pur-
poses will also be more aware of its risks. This is supported
by the recent Efcom study [11].
H3: CMC Competence will be related to phishing vulner-
ability, such that participants with higher CMC proficiency
will be less likely to respond to phishing. This is because
regular users are more likely than ‘narrow’ or new users to
encounter a computer virus [11], and it is therefore expected
that they will be able to detect them better in real-life due to
previous familiarity.
H4: Gender is related to phishing vulnerability, with women
more likely to respond to a phishing attack. This trend has
been found by [14]. In another study [31], prior to being
trained, women responded more to phishing emails, and after
clicking the phishing link, also were more likely to provide
information to the corresponding website.
H5: Users who are more aware of cyber-risks will be more
careful and attempt to protect themselves by not responding
to phishing emails. Risk perception has been related to risk
behavior in off-line behavior. For example, studies found
a consistent relationship between health-related risk percep-
tions and vaccinations [4, 3]. This hypothesis assumes the
same relationship applies to online risk perception and be-
havior.
H6: Users are not able to successfully estimate their likeli-
hood of being phished, with negative correlation between the
response to the live phishing email and the original estimates
of the users. Since certain phishing studies [9] rely on partici-
pants viewing phishing emails and determining whether they
are fraudulent, the effective of such studies is based on the
assumption that participants can estimate correctly their re-
sponse to real-live phishing email. On the other hand, Sheng.
et. al. [31] showed that people with a higher financial risk
perception were less likely to fall for phishing. Our hypoth-
esis is that cyber risk perception has a similar relationship to
falling for real-live phishing emails, with a higher perception
leading to actually lower response rate.
4. OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS
4.1 Methodology
The setting for this real-world phishing study was a large Indian
company. The study was based on deception, and included two
parts: In the first, the participants filled out a survey. In the second
part, a phishing email was sent to the them. Deception, which is
an acceptable approach to phishing research [13], was necessary to
make the study and the setting realistic, and elicit users’ authentic
responses to phishing. The study was conducted with permission
of the company’s management, and with strict confidentiality, such
that no personal data was made available to the company. An IRB
approval was received prior to starting it.
In order not to reveal the real goal of the study as we collect data
about users’ demographics, personality, attitudes and likelihood,
employees of the company were first requested to fill out a gen-
eral survey named ‘Personality and Technology in the Workplace’.
The survey was presented to employees as intended to learn about
their general technology preferences and demographics. The par-
ticipants were not informed about the real purpose of the study and
were not in advance about the phishing part of the experiment.
120 employees in the company were contacted, and 45 of them
consented to the invitation. However, when the survey link was
sent, only 40 people filled out the survey. The participants included
30 men and 10 women, all of whom were promised a gift card of
$10.
The participants’ ages can be found in 1.
4.1.1 Stage 1: Questionnaire
In the first part of the experiment, the volunteers were given a link
to an online questionnaire and were asked to fill it out. The person-
ality, CMC and Internet usage and risk perception were captured
Age group No of people
18-24 5
25-29 22
30-34 8
35-39 5
Table 1: Age range of the study participants
using a five-point Likert scale with which users rated the extent to
which they agreed with statements. The questionnaire items can be
found in the Appendix.
The questionnaire included the following:
Personality: The advantages of the five factor model led to
its integration in a wide array of previous personality traits-
based studies in different fields, including employment [29]
and education [5]. The framework has been identified as a
robust model for understanding the relationship between per-
sonality and various academic behaviors. A 20-item ques-
tionnaire to measure the big-five factor model was developed
by Donnellan et. al. [10] and is called the Mini-IPIP scale.
The Mini-IPIP had consistent results over multiple studies,
and showed comparable results to other broad big-five mea-
sures. This scale is used in this study.
Demographics: Age group and gender were used in the ques-
tionnaire.
CMC Competence: We used a short version of the CMC
questionnaire based off of Spitzberg’s CMC questionnaire
[32] of online users’ CMC Competence (see Appendix).
Internet usage and pessimism: A 10-questions short survey
adapted from Campbell et al. [6] and Young [36] was used.
The survey asked the users about their online typical behav-
ior, including what functions they perform online.
Participants’ responses were recorded and associated with the em-
ployees’ email addresses for the next stage in the study.
4.1.2 Stage 2: Spear-Phishing
As part of the study, two weeks after the surveys were conducted,
an email was sent to the users through the company email system
warning them of missing time sheet information. The email to each
participant included the participants’ full name, therefore targeting
each participant separately in a spear-phishing attack. The email
claimed to be from the company’s IT manager, in order to include
a cue of authority which triggers response. Users who clicked on
the link were forwarded to another screen that showed a button
requesting that they download a missing plug-in. The address of
the website in which the request was made was different than the
company’s web address. The text of the email (see Figure 1 was
designed to target conscientiousness. Since conscientious people
value efficiency and order [27], the email was designed such that
the participants were asked to help restore time sheet data that was
compromised. In addition, a sentence that includes a specific trig-
ger to conscientiousness was added: ‘and configure the data effi-
ciently’.
Users who clicked on the link were forwarded to another screen
which showed a button requesting that they download a missing
plug-in (see Figure 2). In attempt to make it clear to suspicious
users that they should pay more attention to the request, the address
of the website in which the request was made was different than
the company’s web address, and was therefore supposed to arouse
suspicion.
Our back- end system recorded which users clicked on the link and
those who clicked on the download button.
5. RESULTS
Out of the 40 participants who filled the questionnaire, 25 clicked
on the link and 12 clicked on the ‘download plug-in’ button. Over-
all, 30% of the participants were phished, with 40% of the women
and 26% of the women responding to the phishing attack (see Fig-
ures 3 and 4). All the correlations in this paper were calculated
using the Bi-variate Pear- son two-tailed correlation. For the five-
point Likert scale, the results were ranked from 1 (strongly disagree
or very unlikely) to five (strongly agree or most likely). The cor-
relations between phishing responses and conscientiousness, risk
perception and CMC competence appear in Table 2.
Figure 3: Phishing results. 62.5% of the participants clicked
the link, out of which 30% of the participants continued to
clicking the download button,
Figure 4: Phishing as a function of gender. A higher percentage
of women fell for the phishing attack.
Among women, conscientiousness was found to be significantly
correlated (at p<0.05) with both clicking on the link in the email
(with correlation = 0.72) and clicking on the plug-in download but-
ton (at p< 0.1, with correlation = 0.59).
Figure 1: The text of the Phishing email (in the study the real name of the company appeared in the email address). People who
clicked on the link were forwarded to a screen with a download button.
Figure 2: Second screen with Download Button. Users who clicked on the button were considered phished
A significant inverse correlation was also found between risk per-
ception and response to phishing (with correlation = -0.40 at p<
0.05), which suggests people who underestimate the likelihood of
cyber-attacks are more likely to click on a phishing email. This is
in line with the findings in [31], that showed that people who had a
higher financial risk perception were less likely to fall for phishing.
A comparison between the Conscientiousness level of those phished
(i.e. clicked on the download link) and those who did not can be
found in Figure 5. The level was normalized between 0 and 1, with
the overall Conscientiousness level of the participants found to be
0.74 and the standard deviation 0.133.
For clicking the phishing link, we see a lower correlation to the dif-
ferent variables. This is due to the fact that 25 people clicked the
phishing link, but only 12 proceeded to click on the download but-
ton. This shows that when participants considered the risk before
clicking the button, they did not proceed. However, participants
with higher Conscientiousness level and lower risk perception were
more likely to ignore the risks and chose to download the missing
plug-in.
Figure 5: Conscientiousness levels comparison for the partic-
ipants. There is a significant difference between the average
level of Conscientiousness between the participants that were
phished and those that were not phished
6. DISCUSSION
The findings in this study support the hypothesis that personality-
targeted messages can elicit response to phishing attacks from par-
ticipants who typically employ rational decision making. It there-
fore raises the need for more targeted defenses. Furthermore, this
study found that people who under-estimate the likelihood of being
phished or being subjected to viruses may be more likely to re-
spond wrongly to phishing attacks. This finding indicates the need
to create better defenses that protect less suspicious online users. A
key finding of this study is that susceptibility to phishing attacks is
hard to self-estimate, and in fact, people who under-estimate their
susceptibility may be more likely to be attacked. Therefore, run-
ning real-world phishing attacks may provide more accurate esti-
mate (compared to asking people to look at phishing emails and
detect which ones look suspicious). One of the likely contributing
factors to this phenomenon may be that in real world settings, some
victims concentrate on the feelings the email invokes, such as ur-
gency to respond and set their data in order, and ignore the risk in
responding to the phishing email.
Following is a summary of hypotheses testing:
H1: While Conscientiousness people are hardworking and
have high self-control, it was the hypothesis of this study that
an appeal to efficiency and order will overcome the partici-
pants self-control and raise the likelihood of responding to a
spear-phishing attack. This hypothesis was supported, with a
significant correlation between the response and the targeted
personality trait.
H2: Internet usage and risk attitude: Participants who use the
internet for more diverse purposes will also be more aware of
its risks. This hypothesis was not supported, with no corre-
lation between using the internet and being phished.
H3: CMC competence will be related to phishing vulnera-
bility. This hypothesis was not supported with no correlation
between CMC competence and phishing response.
H4: Gender will be related to phishing vulnerability. This
hypothesis was supported, with women more likely to re-
spond to the phishing email.
H5: Users who are more aware of cyber-risks will be more
careful and attempt to protect themselves by not responding
to phishing emails. This hypothesis was supported, with in-
verse correlation between people’s internet-usages risk per-
ception and their response to phishing.
H6: Users will not estimate correctly their likelihood of being
phished: this hypothesis was supported, with negative corre-
lation between the response to the email and the estimate of
the users.
This study is the first of its kind perform a real- life spear-phishing
attacks that target a specific personality trait (conscientiousness).
Previous research included a general phishing attack [14] that ap-
pealed to neuroticism. This study shows that messages that appeal
to conscientiousness, can also be used to lure participants, espe-
cially participants who have a high level of this trait. While this
may seem counter-intuitive, as conscientious people tend to make
rational decisions, this finding can be explained by the strong ap-
peal of the message to this trait, and demonstrates that the right
hook can cause targeted victims to fall for such an attack. This
shows that emotional response may overcome rational decision mak-
ing when a certain personality trait is targeted. This is an important
finding as it points to the strong appeal of targeted hooks and the
fact that custom defenses should be custom-designed against such
attacks.
The findings have important implications for design and manage-
ment of secure organizational cyberspace: Since the personality
test is a short 20-question questionnaire, and many such tests are al-
ready used by employers, the findings suggest developing custom-
designed security tools for employees based on several key per-
sonal attributes. Following is a general frame for such a poten-
tial defense tool: This system will be designed to scan suspicious
emails based on the user personality traits. Such a system may in-
clude an initial setup stage, in which the employee will fill the short
personality test. This information should be encrypted and only re-
side on the employee computer to ensure the employee privacy.
Then, if the system detected a higher level of certain personality
traits, the software will scan incoming emails looking for keywords
that may trigger responses by the user. If those are found, the user
will come up with a warning when the user attempts to click on a
Clicked the email phishing link Phished (clicked to download)
Conscientiousness 0.19 0.32**
Risk Perception (Pessimism) -0.27* -0.40**
Internet Usage -0.13 0.05
CMC -0.05 -0.07
Perceived likelihood of getting spam emails -0.12 -.038**
Perceived likelihood of getting misled -0.31* -.034**
Perceived likelihood of being infected with a computer virus -0.22 -0.27*
* - Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
** - Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 2: Phishing and personal factors correlation. There was a statistically significant correlation between the phishing response
and Conscientiousness, and an inverse correlation to self-assessment of cyber-risks
link or respond to an email that has any of those triggers. The warn-
ing will let the user know of the risks in the email and will prompt
him to reconsider responding to it. A related idea was suggested in
[23], where a system that recommends the Facebook privacy set-
tings based on the user personality traits was created. Designing
such a system to defend against malware attacks based on the em-
ployee personality can therefore help companies minimize the risks
to the employees from such attacks, by helping to detect certain
triggers that may otherwise elicit response from those users.
Employers can also educate participants about the current existing
cyber-threats, such as phishing attacks and computer malware and
viruses. Employees should be aware that these threats are grow-
ing. Statistical information may also be used by the employers as
a tool to demonstrate the current likelihood of getting attacks. This
will prevent under-estimation of the risks by employees, which this
study found to be correlated to higher likelihood of wrong response
to such attacks.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This research examines the factors that contribute to susceptibility
to online security and privacy attacks. The findings have important
implications, as they show that a certain personality trait (conscien-
tiousness) can be targeted to result in higher phishing vulnerability.
This study also found, similar to a previous study [14] that women
may be more susceptible to prize phishing attacks than men. Fi-
nally the findings suggest that users underestimate the likelihood
of them falling for a phishing attack, which may result in over-
confidence and increased vulnerability.
Future work should concentrate on email phishing attacks with dif-
ferent message types. The message in this study targeted conscien-
tiousness and emphasized restoring order efficiently. As the emo-
tional motivations for responding to different email types is likely
to be different for different people, further repeating the experiment
with different types of phishing emails targeting different person-
ality traits may show the effectiveness of other potential triggers.
In addition, future studies should explore the effect of training on
participants with different personalities, which can help in future
design of defenses against online attacks.
8. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported in part by the NSF (under grants 0966187
and 1359601). The views and conclusions contained in this docu-
ment are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as neces-
sarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied,
of any of the sponsors.
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APPENDIX
A. SURVEY INSTRUMENT
A.1 Personality Test (Donnellan et. al. [10])
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each
statement.
I am the life of the party.
I sympathize with others’ feelings.
I get chores done right away.
I have frequent mood swings.
I have a vivid imagination.
I don’t talk a lot.
I am not interested in other people’s problems.
I often forget to put things back in their proper place.
I am relaxed most of the time.
I am not interested in abstract ideas.
I talk to a lot of different people at parties.
I feel others’ emotions.
I like order.
I get upset easily.
I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas.
I keep in the background.
I am not really interested in others.
I make a mess of things.
I seldom feel blue.
I do not have a good imagination.
A.2 Demographics
What is your gender?
Male
Female
What is your age group?
Under 18
18-24
25-29
30-34
34-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70 or older
A.3 CMC Competence (Spitzberg’s [32])
We are interested in how people use various computer-mediated
communication (CMC) technologies for conversing with others.
For the purpose of this questionnaire, please consider CMC to in-
clude all forms of e-mail and computer-based networks (e.g., in-
stant messaging, world-wide-web, chat rooms, personal data as-
sistant, electronic bulletin boards, terminal-based video-telephony,
etc.) for sending and receiving written messages with other people.
For this survey, indicate the degree to which each statement regard-
ing your use of various CMC media is true or untrue of you, using
the following scale:
1= not at all true of me
2= mostly not true of me
3= neither true nor untrue of me; undecided
4= mostly true of me
5= very true of me
I am very knowledgeable about how to communicate through
computers.
I don’t feel very competent in learning and using communi-
cation media technology.
I feel completely capable of using almost all currently avail-
able CMCs.
When communicating with someone through a computer, I
know how to adapt my messages to the medium.
I am confident I will learn how to use any new CMCs that are
due to come out.
I’m nervous when I have to learn how to use a new commu-
nication technology.
I find changes in technologies very frustrating.
I always seem to know how to say things the way I mean them
using CMC.
I quickly figure out how to use new CMC technologies.
I am very familiar with how to communicate through email
and the internet.
I know I can learn to use new CMC technologies when they
come out.
I am never at a loss for something to say in CMC.
If a CMC isn’t user friendly, I’m likely not to use it.
A.4 Internet Usage and Risk Perception (Camp-
bell et. Al. [6])
Please rate the chances that the event would likely happen to you
when using the internet, ranging from: 1= very unlikely to 5= very
likely
Keeping in touch with family
Online behavior being tracked
Downloading movies
Employer reading your email
Get spam email
Finding new friends
Getting misinformation or being misled
Winning a prize
Be infected with a computer virus
Play games
... Spear-phishing Spear phishing refers to targeted attacks that use personal information of the potential victim [17]. This type of attack often causes major security breaches. ...
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