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Abstract

This introduction to human dignity explores the history of the notion from antiquity to the nineteenth century, and the way in which dignity is conceptualised in non-Western contexts. Building on this, it addresses a range of systematic conceptualisations, considers the theoretical and legal conditions for human dignity as a useful notion and analyses a number of philosophical and conceptual approaches to dignity. Finally, the book introduces current debates, paying particular attention to the legal implementation, human rights, justice and conflicts, medicine and bioethics, and provides an explicit systematic framework for discussing human dignity. Adopting a wide range of perspectives and taking into account numerous cultures and contexts, this handbook is a valuable resource for students, scholars and professionals working in philosophy, law, history and theology.
... (Nickel, 2005, p.394) Human dignity is subject to a variety of discourses which pursue different purposes and apply different methods. Important discourses dealing with human dignity include human rights law, constitutional law, political philosophy, sociology, bioethics, and health care (Düwell et al., 2014;McCrudden, 2014). In each discourse, some formal elements of human dignity are accepted. ...
... The question remains on which level planners should pursue human dignity. Legal debates in countries with constitutional dignity clauses prefer rather demanding concepts of human dignity (Ackermann, 2012;Düwell et al., 2014;McCrudden, 2014;Barak, 2015). A demanding concept sets a high threshold for recognizing a violation of human dignity. ...
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Although human dignity has caught the attention of scholars in many different fields, planners remain unresponsive. Three reasons may be given for planners’ neglect of human dignity: (1) so far, nobody has inspired planners to cherish human dignity as a planning value or goal; (2) planners respect and protect human dignity, but do not use the term; (3) planners distrust values that are not too complex for laypersons. Two cases illustrate the possible consequences of ‘planning for dignity’ – the case of the knitting ladies of Blikkiesdorp (Cape Town), and the poor door controversy of 2014. The most important conclusions are that planners, in order to align their plans with human dignity (or ubuntu), must co-produce their selves within local communities affected by their plans. Moreover, planners must recognize the tension that exists between social justice and human dignity: A plan that is socially just can still be humiliating.
... Generally, almost all dignity researchers mention the theological idea of man being created as an image of God. The most frequently mentioned consequences of this are free will, equality (Mieth, 2014), the universality of dignity, and its unconditional character (Dierksmeier, 2015). ...
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This chapter addresses the question: What form of business enterprise promotes human dignity best? A four-step analysis is used to answer this question. Since dignity can be understood in multiple ways, the first step considers diverse sources of reflection about dignity: from propositional (scientific) knowledge to personal individual experience, presentational knowledge (art), and practical knowledge. The second step analyses how these different kinds of knowing are reflected in several approaches to dignity found in the business literature. The presented approaches are examined in the third step, resulting in ten elements of dignity necessary to scrutinize different forms of enterprise. Lastly, we explore how family businesses, limited liability companies (LLCs), public companies, and cooperatives meet the dignity criteria when it comes to governance and decision-making in organizations more broadly.
... These rights protect human dignity by placing limits on how human beings can be treated. 71 70 See in general Braarvig et al. 2014. 71 Renzo 2012 If human rights aim at protecting dignity as a value (and, in fact, are based on the need to ensure human dignity), then, by extension, their proper observation, implementation and realization do too. ...
... However, an additional question that may be asked is whether, despite the variability in values that occurs across cultures, there might nevertheless be one particular value that repeatedly appears within many different cultural traditions, namely the valuing of human dignity. Indeed, there are numerous qualitative analyses which suggest that the concept of human dignity does appear in a wide range of cultures, including the cultures of the indigenous peoples of the Americas, the Islamic world, Buddhism, Confucianism, Chinese Doaism, and the Ubuntu tradition of sub-Saharan Africa (Düwell et al., 2014). However, these same analyses also reveal that there are subtle but important differences in how the concept of human dignity is interpreted within these cultures. ...
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This paper outlines how human dignity, respect, human rights and cultural diversity are interlinked. It is argued that all human beings have intrinsic dignity, and are deserving of respect and respectful behaviour which acknowledges, affirms and protects their autonomy and right to live a life which they choose for themselves, while simultaneously acknowledging that there have to be limits on their autonomy and freedom which require them to similarly respect the autonomy and rights of other people to live a life which they have chosen for themselves. It is proposed that this position provides a logically coherent moral orientation for the field of intercultural relations.
... One does not have to believe, however, that such arguably essential qualities of human nature have a direct divine source. Philosophers-both Catholic and secular-have defended the idea that human beings-during all or most stages of our existence-possess intrinsic dignity: an unmeasurable and inviolable moral worth such that, as Immanuel Kant puts it, no human being can be used by another merely as a means to some other end [19,20]. Within the Catholic philosophical tradition, Thomas Aquinas contends that life is a fundamental good for human beings, as it is the basis for any other goods we may experience or bring about through our actions [21,22]. ...
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In this paper, we discuss the foundational values informing the Catholic perspective on decision-making for critically ill newborns and infants, particularly focusing on the prudent use of medical technologies. Although the Church has consistently affirmed the general good of advances in scientific research and medicine, the technocratic paradigm of medicine may, particularly in cases with severely ill infants, lead to decision-making conflicts and breakdowns in communication between parents and providers. By exploring two paradigm cases, we offer specific practices in which providers can engage to connect with parents and avoid common technologically mediated decision-making conflicts. By focusing on the inherent relationality of all human persons, regardless of debility, and the Christian hope in the life to come, we can make decisions in the midst of the technocratic paradigm without succumbing to it.
... This means all human rights need to be secured and fulfilled. Sigrid Graummann (2014), meanwhile, hypothesizes that human dignity requires the protection of negative and positive rights and access to social services. Promoting a universal and inclusive notion of dignity ensures that individuals with disabilities are able to live a dignified life. ...
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The concept of right to human dignity refers to the proposition that all human beings possess an inherent and inalienable value and deserve utmost respect and protection from all forms of institutionalized and individual acts of exploitation.
... The concept of dignity is among the more controversial ones in the philosophical debate (see Kateb 2011;Rosen 2012;Waldron 2012;McCruddden 2013;Düwell et al. 2015;Debes 2017). In the Charter, dignity seems to refer to the value of the person as a human being, and, insofar as it is common to every and each human being as such, it constitutes the basis of the moral and legal equality of all personsof their equal moral and legal statusand of their equality in fundamental rights. ...
... Issues concerning human dignity are considered by representatives of various scientific disciplines. The concept of human dignity has an impressive history and tradition (Uwell et al. 2012). It is dealt with by ethicists, philosophers, psychologists, lawyers, doctors, or theologians who, though considering it from different perspectives, nevertheless underline that it shows the dimension and quality of a human being. ...
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This article deals with the issue of the dignity and sense of personal dignity of people with disabilities in Poland. According to Statistics Poland, there are over 4.5 million people with disabilities. Although their situation is the subject of analysis conducted by representatives of various scientific disciplines, as well as of social welfare workers, education professionals, health care service workers, and legislators, there are relatively few studies on their understanding and experience of dignity. The presented text includes results of research carried out with a group of 98 people with disabilities. The diagnostic survey method was applied by using a questionnaire. The research tool was the Sense of Self-Dignity Questionnaire (KPWG-3) created by Stanisława Steuden and Paweł Brudek. The obtained empirical material indicates that the surveyed women with disabilities have a higher sense of self-dignity in comparison with the men with disabilities in the scope of the dimension of the disability loss and the total result. However, the studied men with disabilities have a superior self-dignity in the relation (p< 0.001) and experience (p< 0.05) dimensions. Moreover, when taking into account the time of occurrence of the disability, that is to say "congenital disability" vs "acquired disability", there were no statistically significant differences. In addition, the employment activity of the surveyed people with disabilities did not significantly differentiate the statistical result of the sense of self-dignity. However, there were dignificant differences based on level of education in the cognitive (p< 0.05) and experience (p< 0.001) dimensions, and in the general result (p< 0.05).
... For Roger Brownsword, as noted above, there is a value in the ability of human beings to freely make choices, even if these choices are bad (either disadvantageous to the individual, or morally wrong) (Düwell et al. 2014;Brownsword 2004, p. 213). The same does not seem to be true of Kant. ...
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Is there a difference between human beings and those based on artificial intelligence (AI) that would affect their ability to be subjects of (human-like) dignity? This paper first examines the philosophical notion of (human) dignity as Immanuel Kant derives it from the moral autonomy of the individual. It then asks whether animals and AI systems can claim Kantian dignity or whether there is a sharp divide between human beings, animals and AI systems regarding their ability to be subjects of dignity. How this question is answered depends crucially on one’s understanding of what constitutes human dignity and autonomy, and what requirements one places upon systems in order for them to be seen as morally autonomous.
... Over the course of human history, the definition of dignity has evolved (for an overview, see Düwell et al. 2014). The concept of dignitas originated in ancient Rome and signified a high social status in society (Griffin 2017). ...
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Drawing on data from in-depth interviews with participants in the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, this article argues that the notion of human dignity is critical to mass mobilisation at different phases of anti-government protests. At the start of mass protests, the affirmation of human dignity can serve as a powerful motivation for protest participation. With the growing number of protesters, the notion of human dignity provides a key criterion for the construction of collective identity of protesters and their opponents. Furthermore, dignity might be viewed as a guiding principle for a common vision of an ideal society.
... The climate change and extinction crises have brought renewed attention to the demand to grant non-human nature the same legal standing and legal status previously accorded to human beings (Stone 2010). These are among the "frontiers of justice" (Nussbaum 2007) that call upon the concept of dignity to play a new and preponderant role in the theory as in the practice of human rights (Düwell et al. 2014;McCrudden 2014;Debes 2017). Dignity is closely associated with the idea of "human status" (Arendt 2006, 268-9) or "humanity," in virtue of which equal rights are recognized to all members of the human species irrespective of their natural or cultural differences (Tasioulas 2013). ...
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The aim of this article is to give a new reconstruction of the conception of human dignity as a pre-associative yet legal status. Such a legal conception of human dignity carries a universal legal obligation to respect the “innate” right to independence and enables us to move beyond the impasse between moral and political views of human rights. The argument has a normative and a genealogical component. The normative component shows why a legal conception of human rights is grounded on the Kantian idea of an innate legal right to independence, as well as showing that Kant adopted a legal status concept of human dignity. The genealogical component shows that the conception of human dignity as legal status undergoes a transvaluation from its ancient aristocratic to its modern democratic meaning in Dante's political thought, which is itself rooted in the western reception of Arabic philosophy, in particular political Averroism. By contrast to the Christian elaboration of dignity, the Averroist genealogy of dignity better describes the modern pursuit of an ideal of worldly happiness essentially linked with the collective attainment of public happiness through the unrestricted public use of reason facilitated by republican constitutions crowned by human rights.
... However, despite its frequent use, scholars from various disciplines and traditions have been giving different meanings to the concept (McCrudden 2013; Rao 2007). As a result, human dignity remains an indeterminate, abstract and vague concept (Morales 2018;Düwell et al. 2014). Nevertheless, the concept of human dignity is about the realization of socio-economic rights (Eide 1989;Moons 2016) which not only refer to the protection of individual needs, but also to the promotion of social cohesion (Casas 2005). ...
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The right to adequate minimum income protection is one of the key principles included in the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR). The EPSR takes a right-based and normative approach, aiming specifically at fulfilling people’s essential needs, not only by guaranteeing sufficiently high income levels, but also by promoting labour market inclusion and access to affordable goods and services of good quality. This paper takes the EPSR as a starting point to propose a needs-based indicator that assesses the adequacy of minimum income protection including these three dimensions in a comprehensive way. We argue that Reference Budgets (RBs), priced baskets of goods and services that represent an adequate living standard, are well-suited to construct such an indicator. To illustrate this empirically, we use RBs for adequate social participation in Belgium which have been constructed for the first time in 2008 and have been regularly updated since then. Through a combination of hypothetical household simulations of essential out-of-pocket costs and designated tax-benefits for families living on different minimum income schemes, we are able to assess the adequacy of minimum income protection for a range of household types over the period 2008–2017. The paper shows that, the proposed indicator is a useful policy tool for both ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of the adequacy of social policy measures in light of the social protection and inclusion rights included in the Pillar.
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Human dignity is the nature of a human being. It became a modus of human existence, which differentiates humans from other biological species. Human life and human dignity are declared the priority values in international conventions and declarations. Intrinsic character of human dignity was the forerunner for the development of the new multidiscipline named bioethics in the XX century. This article begins with the basics of international regulations in the field of human dignity, definitions, analysis of main characteristics and doctrines of human dignity, inherent values and constitutional values. Further the author stresses the importance of understanding the meaning of inherent human dignity in connection with manipulations with somatic rights. The author concludes that the lack of human life and human dignity evaluation is the main point of the core principle of inherent human dignity based on personal selfawareness. In this regard the article focuses on the statement that human dignity should be an absolute value based on bioethical principles. Then the author goes on to compare constitutional values and human dignity as a value. The research is concluded with the suggestion that inherent human dignity is a base of constitutional values in the particular field of legal relations. In addition, inherent dignity may be the framework of constitutional values.
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Recent works on the concept of dignity have opened up the otherwise quite deadlocked debate about assisted death (AD). Rather than just reinforcing already fixed positions, it seems to me that these conceptions of dignity make room for a moderate and normatively richer position on the moral permissibility of AD. I do not think that we have seen the full potential of the said conceptions and interpretations. I try in this article to contribute my part. First, I briefly recapitulate some of the paradoxical ways in which dignity is typically invoked in the debate and try to clear up some of the obvious confusions. Then, I go on to explore a particular Kantian line of thought in some recent works on dignity and AD that seems to pave the way for a moderate position with a more principled foundation than the usual compromise positions.
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Over the past two centuries, the concept of human dignity has moved from the fringes to the centre of the international legal system. This book is the first detailed historical, theoretical and legal investigation of human dignity as a normative value, the intellectual sources that shaped its legal recognition, and the main legal instruments used to give it expression in international law. Ginevra Le Moli addresses the broad historical and philosophical developments relating to the legal expression of dignity and the doctrinal geography of human dignity in international law, with a focus on international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international criminal law. The book fills a major lacuna in the literature by providing a comprehensive account of dignity within international law that draws on an extensive documentary and archival basis and a vast body of decisions of international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies.
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The article examines bioconstitutionalism and neuroconstitutionalism as theoretical and constitutional-legal categories in modern multifaceted jurisprudence; scientific approaches to understanding dignity in bioethics, bio-law and neuro-law, its role in the formation of the humanistic, existential and bioethical core of modern bioneuroconstitutionalism; conceptual, international legal and constitutional aspects of the formation of a complex meta-legal and intersectoral institution of bioneuroconstitutionalism. The author undertakes the research to critically evaluate the ethical and legal foundations of bio-law and neu-rolaw; it reveals the problem of the limits and significance of the constitutionalization of bio-rights and neuro-rights in the modern doctrine of constitutionalism and human rights. The aim in this article is to study the meaning and prospects of the formation of bioneuroconstitutionalism as a legal dialogue focused on new human rights (biosocial and bioethical living creatures) between human dignity and human personality, on the one hand, and the achievements of bioethics, biomedicine, and neuroscience, on the other hand. The article considers dignity as a humanistic, existential, and bioethical core in the structure of bioneuroconstitutionalism. Part II of the article analyzes the problem concerning: individual’s bioethical integrity and the right to new rights in the bioneurosphere; functions of human dignity in bioneuroconstitutionalism, i.e. the role in promoting cultural diversity, ensuring human vulnerability, the principle of human solidarity, justifying new human rights, bioethical well-being, genetic equality; and dignity as a universal principle of global and national bioethics and biomedicine. The article also proposes the discussion of the concept of “cognitive dignity” in neuroethics and neurolaw. The author uses the discursive approach and critical rationalism in legal research, methods of dialectics, legal hermeneutics, and legal engineering, which allow to reveal the legal, biosocial, and bioethical nature of human dignity and constitutionalism in the context of the risks associated with posthumanism and transhumanism. The conclusions are: the nature of bioconstitutionalism and neuroconstitutionalism is formed under the influence of the ideas of bioethics, posthumanism and transhumanism, new bioneurotechnologies; it involves the creation of regulatory requirements and restrictions for the use of such technologies, as well as for the establishment, guarantee and possible constitutionalization of new bioethical and neuroethical human rights.
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Science, Technology, and Society - edited by Todd L. Pittinsky November 2019
Article
The right to dignity of sexual minorities has continued to be violated across Africa, necessitating the need to deploy national, regional, and global human rights to secure its promotion and protection. Human dignity is a central value of the international human rights normative system and over the last few decades, the international human rights system has generally accepted the notion that all humans are endowed with equal dignity. Although the concept of dignity itself and the scope of its application continues to be contested by states, human rights documents acknowledge the recognition of the inherent dignity of all persons without discrimination. Unfortunately, sexual minorities in Africa continue to be stripped of their dignity through acts of public and private humiliation; criminalisation of their identities under laws that specify penalties ranging from prison terms to the death sentence, and through hate speech and acts of violence. The application of the concept of human dignity to the protection of sexual minorities in Africa remains problematic in state law and policy. This article contends that, based on the state’s recognition and protection of the inherent dignity of human beings, all African states still owe obligations toward sexual minorities. To this end, this article examines the development of the concept of dignity in Western thought and its subsequent impact on international human rights law. It also teases out the meaning of dignity in international human rights law under global and regional jurisprudence with a view to highlighting the obligations of African states towards sexual minorities.
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The discussion of values protected by international law will not diminish in significance. Those are quite diverse and heterogeneous as is the extent to which they have been established or clarified in law. If some of them have already been legally well defined, this is not so for others. The concept of humanity belongs to such yet undefined concepts. While it is hard to imagine a more compelling and global idea for appeal in the modern public discourse worldwide than the idea of humanity it is also difficult to find a more ambiguous category. No explicit definition of ʻhumanityʼ currently exists in international legal documents or in relevant case-law. The chapter argues that without understanding this basic underlying value many important questions will continue arising on the precise nature of key relevant legal categories in different branches of international law. It then offers several observations on the role of humanity in international law: first, there has been no comprehensive formulation for the concept of humanity, in international law or beyond; second, the notion of humanity found itself constantly reinstated in different civilizations and societies, always carrying with it the same fundamental and basic values, or humanitarian sentiments; third, the concept of humanity does not represent an autonomous source of international law. Subsequently, the chapter discusses the concept (value) of humanity in light of several legal branches constituting an integral part of ICSL: international criminal law, international humanitarian law and international human rights law, with a view to demonstrating the role of humanity for the pertaining legal categories and its relationship with those (e.g., humanity as a central protected interest of crimes against humanity at both domestic and universal levels). A comprehensive view of humanity as ʻhumannessʼ, or status of being human, is offered as instrumental in the understanding of the protective scope of the examined branches of law. In conclusion, a recommendation is made to secure a holistic definition of humanity at the international treaty level.KeywordsHumanityHumannessPrinciple of humanityHuman dignityCrimes against humanityInternational lawInternational criminal law
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Once limited to issues in maritime and trade law, today, the most recognizable examples of international law govern issues such as human rights, intellectual property, crimes against humanity, and international armed conflicts. In many ways, this proliferation has been a welcomed development. However, when coupled with international law’s decentralized structure, this rapid proliferation has also posed problems for how we (and in particular judges) identify if, when, and where international law exists. This article puts forward a novel, dignity-based account for how we answer this question: arguing that an international law exists if and only if it is consistent with respecting dignity. The upshot of this account is twofold. First, it explains many features of international law that other theories leave unaccounted for or under-explained. And second, my dignity-based account provides for a mechanism through which the system can continue to be developed and improved.
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In 2020, the world faced a new pandemic. The corona infection hit an unprepared world, and there were no medicines and no vaccines against it. Research to develop vaccines started immediately and in a remarkably short time several vaccines became available. However, despite initiatives for global equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines, vaccines have so far become accessible only to a minor part of the world population. In this article, I discuss the global distribution of COVID-19 vaccines from an ethical point of view. I reflect on what ethical principles should guide the global distribution of vaccines and what global justice and international solidarity imply for vaccine distribution and I analyse the reasons for states to prioritize their own citizens. My focus is on ethical reasons for and against ‘vaccine nationalism’ and ‘vaccine cosmopolitanism.’ My point of departure is the appeal for international solidarity from several world leaders, arguing that ‘Where you live should not determine whether you live’. I discuss the COVAX initiative to enable a global vaccination and the proposal from India and South Africa to the World Trade Organization to temporarily waive patent rights for vaccines. In the final section, I argue for global vaccine sufficientarianism, which is a modified version of vaccine cosmopolitanism.
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This chapter offers a general introduction to the subject of human dignity in the literature in African philosophy. To do so, it does the following. It begins by specifying the two aims of the book. It proceeds to discuss various aspects related to the concept of human dignity in moral philosophy: (1) its contested nature; (2) the different senses associated with it and (3) its importance in moral and political philosophy. Next, it considers the onto-moral resources posited as the basis for human dignity in the literature in African philosophy – vitality, community and personhood. Finally, it highlights the three themes in applied ethics that will be considered in the book.
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Jeder Mensch hat eine Würde. Daraus scheint unmittelbar zu folgen, dass es kategorisch verboten ist, andere Menschen zu verachten. Aber so einfach ist das mit der Verachtung nicht. Denn schnell lassen sich Beispiele finden, bei denen es nicht offensichtlich falsch ist, wenn ein Mensch einen anderen Menschen verachtet. Wenn das Opfer eines Verbrechens den Täter verachtet, dann erscheint das durchaus angemessen, vielleicht sogar eine begrüßenswerte Reaktion zu sein. Dafür möchte ich jedenfalls auf der Grundlage der Würdetheorie von Ralf Stoecker argumentieren.
Thesis
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In this thesis I have analysed the theories of distributive justice from a feminist and relational egalitarian perspective. I have presented the main liberal theories of distributive justice, the numerous feminist critiques targeting them as well as the alternative proposals advanced by relational egalitarians. The thesis consists of six chapters which can be read as independent articles.
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The article interprets the crisis of liberal democracy in the 21st century as the result of an ongoing, dual revolution of dignity. One such revolution is the work of “humanist outliers”: small groups and individuals dedicated to compassionate social emancipation. Thus anti-authoritarian revolutions like that of Solidarity in Poland (1980–81) succeed in large part thanks to cultural and political innovations springing from the work of such small groups. However, the humanist revolution of dignity – featuring altruism and cooperation – has its “tribal doppelgänger”: a twin revolution that strives to reclaim national dignity and pride at the price of submission to authoritarian rule.
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Dass Armut in vielen Fällen moralisch problematisch ist und daher unserer Aufmerksamkeit bedarf, ist unstrittig: Wer in Armut lebt, hat empfindliche Einschränkungen des (für ihn ansonsten erreichbaren) Wohlergehens zu verkraften, besitzt weniger Möglichkeiten, ein gutes Leben zu führen und lebt allgemein gesprochen in einem Zustand, der nicht allein für ihn schlecht, sondern auch aus personenneutraler Perspektive verbesserungswürdig erscheint. Während die Grenzen unserer moralischen Verpflichtungen gegenüber der Minderung oder Beseitigung von Armut umstritten sind (vgl. etwa Bleisch/Schaber 2007), ist es unkontrovers, dass Handlungen, die die Bekämpfung der Armut zum Ziel haben, zumindest pro tanto als moralisch richtig oder gut klassifizierbar sind. Deutlich wird dies nicht zuletzt daran, dass alle wichtigen Traditionslinien der normativen Ethik über Ressourcen verfügen, die Wertschätzung, die wir solchen Handlungen gewöhnlicherweise entgegenbringen, zu rechtfertigen: sei es über die Identifikation entsprechender Pflichten (vgl. Ross 2002 [1930], Kap. 2), Tugenden (vgl. Slote 2001, Kap. 1), moralisch wertvoller Zustände (vgl. Hooker 2000, Kap. 8) oder Überlegungen wechselseitigen Vorteils (vgl. Stemmer 2000, § 7).
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This article addresses two questions: First, how does the value of human dignity distinctively bear on a state’s responsibilities in relation to migrants; and, secondly, how serious a wrong is it when a state fails to respect the dignity of migrants? In response to these questions, a view is presented about the distinction between wrongs that violate cosmopolitan standards and wrongs that violate the standards that are distinctive to a particular community; about when and how the contested concept of human dignity might be engaged; and, elaborating a three‐tiered and lexically ordered scheme of state responsibilities, about how we should assess the seriousness of a state’s failure to respect the dignity of migrants.
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The text aims to explore legal and moral aspects of torture. Under the legal aspect the text compares three definitions of torture: UN definition, Brazilian definition, and Spanish definition. In this regard, neither the UN formulation nor the Brazilian formulation are ideal, because the Brazilian legal definition restricts the element of action by the part of the perpetrator of torture, and the UN convention restricts the effect on the victim, given that pain or suffering should be severe. The hypothesis is that a better proposal could be linked to the Spanish Penal Code, which in its art. 174 defines torture as the submission of someone “to conditions or procedures that, due to their nature, duration or other circumstances, involve physical or mental suffering, the suppression or decrease of their faculties of knowledge, discernment or decision, or that otherwise undermine their moral integrity”. Concerning the moral meaning of the repulse to torture it is intended to defend the paradigmatic character of the human right to not be tortured in at least two respects. The first aspect refers to its universalizing vocation in the full sense, since it can be extended to all sentient beings. In this regard, the prohibition of torture goes beyond the dominium of personality to advance in the direction of a domain of suffering not determined by the mask of personality. The second aspect is that the prohibition stands for an absolute right with no exceptions, precisely because of its deeper moral content.Keywords:radical evil, torture, perpetrator.
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Projekttitel: "Gelingendes" und "gesundes" Alter(n) in der pluralistischen Gesellschaft. Sys-tematische Übersicht ethischer Fragen, gefördert durch das Bundesministerium für Gesund-heit Förderkennzeichen: ZMV I1-2516 FSB 016 Ausschreibung: Ethische Aspekte des Demographischen Wandels.
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This paper explores Lutheran conceptions of human dignity expressed by European/Americans (Oswald Bayer and John Witte, Jr.) and Dalits (Raj Bharath Patta and Surekha Nelavala). The former emphasize the human coram Deo, the lost dignity of the individual sinner, and the imputed dignity of the justified. The latter attend especially to humans coram hominibus, the dignity of the “sinned upon” in Indian society, and the full inclusion of Dalits. While neither view replaces the other, I argue that European/Americans must become more responsive to differentiated social realities in which persons are “sinful” and “sinned upon” in unequal ways.
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The idea of global justice faces a serious challenge. We live in one global society and many regional and local societies at the same time. The existing plurality of institutional as well as cultural levels of social connection leads to this general question: what is the right site for addressing different questions of justice? Some philosophers argue that the paramount place for thinking about justice is the global level, but other philosophers claim that questions of justice presuppose a certain institutional structure. It is therefore only at the local level, preferentially in the form of sovereign states, where questions of justice arise. I want to argue that it is possible to understand some issues of justice as global in an irreducible way, while other issues are best addressed on a local level not only for pragmatic reasons, but also for reasons that have to do with the normative significance of local institutions, cultural connections and social identities.
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Dignity and axiological rationality. Raymond Boudon’s legacy. It may seem surprising to reconcile dignity and value rationality in Raymond Boudon’s plea for the objectivity of ethical values. Yet he saw in it the central value of our Western modernity, dominating our entire moral hierarchy. It is on this unknown role of the principle of equal dignity in Raymond Boudon’s thought that the emphasis will be placed in this article, from which his theory of axiological rationality will also be questioned.
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This chapter focuses on the question what constitutes aging with dignity. I argue that it is not least our lack of willingness to grant old age its own place in life that makes older people vulnerable for violations of their dignity. In this sense, dignity can also be a question of the correct anthropology.
Article
This paper argues that human dignity is a sui generis status principle whose function lies in unifying our normative orders. More fully, human dignity denotes a basic status to be preserved in any institution or process; it is a principle demanding determination in different contexts; and it has its most characteristic application where the legal, moral, and political place competing obligations on individuals. The implication of this account is that we should not seek to reduce human dignity to either a legal norm or a legal principle.
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On July 26, 2018, the Pew Research Center released the results of a survey conducted among 2,537 adults in the United States to assess their views on the appropriateness of genome editing for babies (Funk and Hefferon 2018). A majority of the individuals surveyed (72%) favored gene editing that would treat a serious disease or condition, but a majority (80%) also thought that using these techniques to enhance a child’s intelligence would take this technology “too far.” One striking finding of the survey was that there is a large difference in acceptance of genome editing between those respondents who self-identify as highly religious and those who are less so, where religious Americans are more likely to view gene editing negatively. Where a significant number of respondents with high religious commitment (87%) thought that testing gene editing on human embryos was taking the technology “too far,” for example, this number was significantly smaller (44%) among those with a low religious commitment. How do we explain these divergent views?
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In this article I explain and defend a new conception of human rights, drawing upon Jeremy Waldron’s account of dignity and Richard Rorty’s account of human rights. Following Rorty, I argue for a conception of human rights on which the central question is not “what is human nature?”: but rather “what kind of world should we leave to future generations?” I suggest that we can make progress on this question by developing Waldron's claim that dignity is a conferred status, as opposed to an inherent feature of persons, into the claim that “the human” is a social kind.
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A theory of crimes against humanity needs to consist of both conceptual and normative foundations as argued in the preceding chapter. This chapter deals with the normative part of the theory of humanness. It considers the major relevant aspects and consequences flowing out of the application of the doctrine of Rechtsgutstheorie including its functions in the law. It further contains a consideration of the past and ongoing criticism of the Rechtsgutstheorie in legal literature as well. Then, the abovesaid elements of the doctrine, namely, its relevant aspects, functions and consequences are reviewed on the matter of whether the definitional scope of the doctrine allows for the inclusion of “humanity” in the normative list of Rechtsgüter (i.e., legal interests). The reasons why the answer here would be “yes” are explained within the analytical exercise in the last section of the chapter. That exercise consists of two main parts: the analysis of humanity as a Rechtsgut and review of legal consequences of Rechtsgutstheorie in terms of the theory of humanness. Finally, the chapter is not limited to the argumentation in support of normatively justifying the criminalization of the gravest attacks against humanity as crimes against humanity at the domestic state level; it also contains the initial reasoning on such justification at the international level using the fundamental premise of the Rechtsgutstheorie as a social contract doctrine.
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How do economic systems shape the way we treat other people? Major economic paradigms before the Keynesian Revolution began from a view that human beings had an inviolable dignity. The Consumption paradigm treats human beings as bundles of irrational appetites that respond to stimuli and can be easily manipulated. Since our economic lives include our most intimate and important personal decisions, political control over the economy implies political control over nearly every decision. This creeping totalitarianism of economic management is the gravest threat of hollow prosperity.
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Bu makale, insan onuru kavramına dini-ahlaki bir değer olması yönüyle yaklaş-maktadır. Makalede farklı dini, ahlaki ve felsefi geleneklerde insan onuruna dair perspektifler inceleme konusu yapılmıştır. Çalışma, insan onurunun ideal bir ta-sarım olarak değil, bilakis bir beşeri tecrübe konusu olarak kendi tarihsel şartları içinde gerçek anlamını bulabileceğini ve farklı geleneklerde de gerekçelendirilebileceğini varsaymaktadır. Bu bağlamda makalede önce çeşitli dini-ahlaki gele-neklerin insanın değeri ve onuruna ilişkin yaklaşımları ele alınmıştır. Ardından temel İslami kaynakların insan onuruna dair metinleri kendi kişisel yorum tecrübemiz açısından değerlendirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Abstract: This article approaches the concept of human dignity as a religious-moral value. In this context, we will discuss the perspectives on human dignity in different religious, moral and philosophical traditions. The study assumes that human dignity is not an ideal design. But it is a matter of human experience. So the article assumes that the concept of human dignity can find its true meaning in its own historical conditions and can be justified in different traditions. In this context, firstly, we will examine the attitudes of various religious-moral traditions towards the value and dignity of man. Afterwards, we will evaluate the texts which referring to human dignity in the basic Islamic sources.
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The historical making of human dignity is usually understood either as a result of a progressivehistory of the recognition of the human being’s worthiness or as an upward equalization of ranks.The present article offers a novel and different analysis. It takes the Renaissance idea ofdignitashominisas an object of study and reframes it through Michel Foucault’s insights on ‘archaeology’,power and subjectivity. In doing so, the article demonstrates howdignitas hominiswas producedwithin the so-called Renaissance episteme and as a result of what Foucault defines as the ‘pastoratecounter-conducts’. Therefore, the article argues thedignitas hominisnarrative aimed to debunk theauthority of the ecclesiastical authorities and moulded other ways of ‘being conducted’ and of‘conducting oneself’ in spiritual life. More radically, this narrative fashioned a ‘spiritual counter-subjectivity’ that removed confession as the main technique producing the Christian subject
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In dit artikel wordt het begrip waardigheid (Engels: dignity) in HRM beschreven. Op basis van de vraag welke rol HRM in de huidige en toekomstige wereld kan spelen, wordt een nieuw paradigma afgezet tegenover het huidige dominante instrumentele paradigma in mainstream HRM onderzoek. Dit nieuwe paradigma is geformuleerd op basis van waardigheid. Dit artikel beschrijft het concept waardigheid en formuleert een theorie over 'waardigheid op het werk'. Vervolgens wordt de relatie tussen waardigheid en HRM geanalyseerd, en worden de meest relevante implicaties van een waardigheidsparadigma voor de kernvragen van HRM besproken. Daarnaast wordt aandacht besteed aan de theoretische onderbouwing van HRM-vraagstukken en de praktische implicaties voor onderzoek binnen HRM.This paper describes the concept of dignity in HRM. On the basis of the question which role HRM could play in the current and future workplace, two paradigms are discussed: the current dominant paradigm of instrumentality of the human being in HRM, and a new paradigm on the basis of dignity. The article describes what dignity is and formulates a new theory on dignity at work. Subsequently, the relationships between dignity and HRM are analysed, and the most relevant implications of a dignity paradigm for core questions within HRM, the theoretical underpinning of HRM, and practical implications for HRM are discussed.
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