No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
Assessing the credibility of how climate adaptation aid projects are categorised
Abstract
This article presents the findings of a re-evaluation of all 5,200 aid projects that OECD donors reported for 2012 as “climate change adaptation”-related, based on the “Rio marker” classification system. The findings confirm those from the academic and grey literature that the absence of independent quality control makes the adaptation Rio marker data almost entirely unreliable. This lack of credibility impedes meaningful assessments of progress toward the mainstreaming of adaptation in development cooperation activities. It also erodes trust in international climate negotiations, given that these data are frequently used in the financial reporting of developed countries to the UNFCCC.
... We see three main trends across different areas that represent new topics with very high growth rates. 13 new activity clusters aim to support diversity, equal opportunities, and empowerment for marginalised groups, such as through labor market development and access to education. Another 11 clusters are dedicated to addressing environmental sustainability and climate change, including reducing greenhouse gas emissions and promoting energy efficiency. ...
... Step 2: Adaptation classification The project descriptions assessed by Weikmans et al. 13 for their adaptation focus were processed using ClimateFinanceBERT. Weikmans and colleagues conducted a manual assessment of 5,202 project descriptions, which were categorized based on their emphasis on adaptation according to the Rio markers. ...
... The findings can be observed in Supplementary Tables 12 and 13. It is evident that a high proportion (78%) of projects identified as primary adaptation finance in the study by Weikmans et al. (13), with the inclusion of significant projects, have also been categorized as adaptation finance according to ClimateFinanceBERT. Conversely, 70% of the projects categorized as adaptation finance by Climate-FinanceBERT were also identified as primary adaptation finance by Weikmans et al. (13) (reaching 85% when factoring in significant projects). ...
First part :Tracking international development assistance offers critical empirical insights for policymakers seeking to fund the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In response to the constraints of current monitoring methodologies, we have devised a machine learning framework that facilitates a thorough and detailed classification of development aid initiatives using the content of their textual descriptions. In particular, we categorise the descriptions of approximately 3.2 million aid initiatives implemented from 2000 to 2018, amounting to a total of US80 billion. Our results further emphasise the need to consider that the real figures might be significantly lower compared to present estimates utilising Rio markers.
... The Rio marker r can take three values: 2, if CCA is the principal objective; 1, if CCA is a significant objective; and 0, if CCA is neither a principal nor a significant objective. However, there is increasing evidence that the level of adaptation financing is in fact lower than public figures suggest (Weikmans et al., 2017;Junghans and Harmeling, 2012). The authors refer to this phenomenon as overreporting, which primarily indicates a discrepancy between the qualitative descriptions of the financing purposes and the specified Rio markers. ...
... Hence, aggregate figures of adaptation finance are increasingly considered unreliable given that they comprise thousands of individual aid activity descriptions from the CRS data. Consequently, assessments of credibility have to date relied on analysis of small samples covering a limited period of time (Weikmans et al., 2017). Returning to the fact that the COP is utilizing these reports, among other things, as source of information the unreliable nature of these reports jeopardizes the well-being of the people who are affected by climate change. ...
... In recent years, several studies have estimated the level of overreporting in CCA finance (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011;Weikmans et al., 2017;Junghans and Harmeling, 2012;Schramek and Harmeling, 2021). These studies are distinguished, first, by the rigor of their methodology to assess overreporting and, second, by the number of aid activities they analyze. ...
... However, there is increasing evidence that the level of adaptation financing is in fact lower than published figures suggest (Weikmans et al., 2017;Junghans and Harmeling, 2012). One possible reason is that there is no common practice for reporting climate finance (Weikmans and Roberts, 2019;Weikmans et al., 2020) and reporting agencies thus follow different reporting rules. ...
... Hence, aggregate figures of adaptation finance are increasingly considered unreliable given that they comprise thousands of individual aid activity descriptions from the CRS data. Consequently, assessments of credibility have to date relied on analysis of small samples covering a limited period of time (Weikmans et al., 2017). ...
... In recent years, several studies have estimated the level of overreporting in CCA finance (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011;Weikmans et al., 2017;Junghans and Harmeling, 2012;Schramek and Harmeling, 2021). These studies are distinguished, first, by the rigor of their methodology to assess overreporting and, second, by the number of aid activities they analyze. ...
Development funds are essential to finance climate change adaptation and are thus an important part of international climate policy. % However, the absence of a common reporting practice makes it difficult to assess the amount and distribution of such funds. Research has questioned the credibility of reported figures, indicating that adaptation financing is in fact lower than published figures suggest. Projects claiming a greater relevance to climate change adaptation than they target are referred to as "overreported". To estimate realistic rates of overreporting in large data sets over times, we propose an approach based on state-of-the-art text classification. To date, assessments of credibility have relied on small, manually evaluated samples. We use such a sample data set to train a classifier with an accuracy of (tenfold cross-validation) and extrapolate to larger data sets to identify overreporting. Additionally, we propose a method that incorporates evidence of smaller, higher-quality data to correct predicted rates using Bayes' theorem. This enables a comparison of different annotation schemes to estimate the degree of overreporting in climate change adaptation. Our results support findings that indicate extensive overreporting of with a credible interval of .
... This gap in international climate finance could be even larger due to over-estimation problems in donors' self-reporting of bilateral climate aid to the OECD. The credibility of these declarations has been questioned by the academic and grey literature (Michaelowa and Michaelowa [2011]; Junghans and Harmeling [2012]; Weikmans et al. [2017]; CARE [2021]). These studies show that donor countries misreport a significant number of their bilateral development projects as climaterelevant. ...
... The use of the Rio markers in the OECD reporting system has only been mandatory since 2007. Prior 2007, Rio markers data were only reported by DAC donors on a voluntary basis (Weikmans et al. [2017]). Three markers were defined corresponding to the objectives of the Rio Convention, namely biodiversity, desertification and climate change. ...
... As a whole, when considering aid in USD, they find 55 − 69% of adaptation aid to be overcoded, the higher ratio corresponding to the 50% discount applied to significant adaption aid. Weikmans et al. [2017] also use the OECD-DAC data on bilateral aid and focus on the 5, 201 adaptation projects reported for the year 2012. They undertake a systematic hand-coding of the projects to avoid the shortcomings related to the use of limited keywords and recode the projects following the scoring system of the Rio Markers methodology (principal, significant, not related). ...
Dans les négociations climatiques, les pays développés se sont engagés à aider les pays en développement dans leurs efforts d’atténuation et d’adaptation au changement climatique. L’aide climatique est pourtant jugée insuffisante par les pays receveurs. La littérature montre que les pays développés surestiment le contenu climatique des projets qu’ils financent. Nous proposons une revue des aides climatiques bilatérales et de leur surestimation par les pays donateurs en nous appuyant sur l’analyse empirique de Bayramoglu et al. [2022], à partir de la base de données de l’OCDE-CRS qui couvre 28 donateurs, 154 receveurs et 63 195 projets entre 2002 et 2018.
... Here we propose a consistent and replicable approach to estimating bilateral climate finance from ODA using machine learning. Our analysis complements previous studies that have typically compared ICF reported in ODA to Rio markers with keyword searches and hand-coding 10,13 . We focus on bilateral climate finance because (1) it constituted the largest part of public ICF since the beginning of contributor-based reporting in 2013 (52%), (2) contributing countries have direct control over the spending in contrast to being shareholders of a multilateral contributor, (3) multilateral climate finance is undergoing an accounting revision 14 and (4) data coverage for multilateral contributors is incomplete in the OECD DAC statistics. ...
... In general, we find evidence for both over-and under-reporting, partly by the same contributors (Supplementary Discussion 2), which supports criticism of reporting quality [5][6][7][8][9][10][11] . Our findings strengthen previous studies 9, 10,13 arguing that contributors use the Rio markers inconsistently and, in some cases, inaccurately. Although the US$100 billion pledge also includes multilateral and mobilized private ICF, this finding points to challenges in achieving the pledge. ...
... One third of the descriptions were sampled on the basis of a Rio marker tag for mitigation or adaptation, one third were sampled from the energy sector and one third were sampled from other sectors with possible relevance for climate change (for example, environment, agriculture or transport). We added 42 of the descriptions ex-post, representing descriptions evaluated as adaptation finance by Weikmans et al. 13 but missed by ClimateFinance-BERT after initial training (these descriptions were excluded from the validation; see the next section). Those project descriptions covered preparedness and resilience projects for natural disasters more directly related to climate change (such as floods and droughts 20,21 ) but had no explicit mention of climate change and associated developments (for example, rising temperatures) in the description. ...
International climate finance is key to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement. Here we develop a machine learning classifier to identify international climate finance from 2.7 million official development assistance projects between 2000 and 2019, resulting in a consistent and replicable inventory of 82,023 bilateral climate finance projects (US$80 billion). Our findings reinforce concerns that the actual numbers may be much lower than current estimates made with Rio markers. A reliable and consistent inventory is important for the international community to track and promote the progress of climate finance. A machine learning classifier reveals that the current framework may overestimate the actual number of bilateral climate finance projects.
... Most of this funding is channelled through development finance institutions and is reported as development finance to the OECD. We note that the issue of 'new and additional' resources, which is politically important to African countries, has never been clarified in the UNFCCC context (African Group, 2018;Khan et al., 2020;Weikmans et al., 2017;Weikmans & Roberts, 2019;Weiler et al., 2018). A central concern of developing countries in this discussion is whether finance to tackle climate change represents new resources or is simply re-labelled and diverted from traditional development finance. ...
... Our analysis concentrates on financial support that was reported as principally targeting climate change adaptation and/or mitigation (see Supplementary Annex A). The main reason for excluding activities that were tagged as significantly targeting adaptation or mitigation is that the data quality in this category is much less reliable and its inclusion therefore has a substantial distorting effect (Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011;Weikmans et al., 2017). There seems to be a tendency to overstate the relevance of adaptation in development projects and this over-reporting is more prevalent under the significant category (Donner et al., 2016;Henders et al., 2019;Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011;Weiler et al., 2018), which increases the risk of overestimating finance amounts. ...
... This judgement is made by the bilateral and multilateral funders and is not independently verified. For example, a number of studies argue that the self-reporting of donors and the lack of independent quality control results in low data reliability and sometimes significant overestimations of finance flows identified with the use of Rio Markers (AdaptationWatch, 2015;Junghans & Harmeling, 2012;Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011;Weikmans et al., 2017). Second, the rigour and level of disaggregation used by funders when reporting data to the OECD DAC or the MDBs varies, and can introduce errors. ...
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, international financial assistance is expected to support African and other developing countries as they prepare for and adapt to the impacts of climate change. The impact of this finance depends on how much finance is mobilized and where it is targeted. However, there has been no comprehensive quantitative mapping of adaptation-related finance flows to African countries to date. Here we track development finance principally targeting adaptation from bilateral and multilateral funders to Africa between 2014 and 2018. We find that the amounts of finance are well below the scale of investment needed for adaptation in Africa, which is a region with high vulnerability to climate change and low adaptation capacity. Finance targeting mitigation (US16.5 billion). The relative share of each varies greatly among African countries. More adaptation-related finance was provided as loans (57%) than grants (42%) and half the adaptation finance has targeted just two sectors: agriculture; and water supply and sanitation. Disbursement ratios for adaptation in this period are 46%, much lower than for total development finance in Africa (at 96%). These are all problematic patterns for Africa, highlighting that more adaptation finance and targeted efforts are needed to ensure that financial commitments translate into meaningful change on the ground for African communities.
Key policy insights
• Between 2014 and 2018, adaptation-related finance committed by bilateral and multilateral funders to African countries remained well below US5 per person per year; these amounts are well below the estimates of adaptation costs in Africa.
• Funders have not strategically targeted support for adaptation activities towards the most vulnerable to climate change African countries.
• Lessons from countries that have been more successful in accessing finance point to the value of more sophisticated domestic adaptation policies and plans; of alignment with priorities of the NDC; of meeting funding requirements of specific funders; and of the strategic use of climate funds by national planners.
• A low adaptation finance disbursement ratio in this period in Africa (at 46%) relates to barriers impeding the full implementation of adaptation projects: low grant to loan ratio; requirements for co-financing; rigid rules of climate funds; and inadequate programming capacity within many countries.
... They focus, for example, on whether countries have progressed their adaptation policies and actions over time (Lesnikowski et al., 2015;Nachmany et al., 2019b), the extent of implemented adaptation globally (Leiter, 2021a;Leiter, 2021b), and the type and actors of responses (Berrang-Ford et al., 2021), evidence for reduced vulnerability to climate-related hazards (Formetta and Feyen, 2019;UNDRR, 2019) or adaptation planning in cities across the globe (Araos et al., 2016a;Reckien et al., 2018a;Olazabal et al., 2019a). Each of these assessments draws (Donner et al., 2016;Doshi and Garschagen, 2020); evidence of over-reporting (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011;Weikmans et al., 2017) ...
... While a guidebook with requirements for adaptation as a principle or significant objective has been developed (OECD, 2016), several studies have shown that OECD DAC donors tend to overestimate the number of activities in their portfolio that genuinely have adaptation objectives (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011;Weikmans et al., 2017;CARE, 2021). Hence, the amount of adaptation finance from public sources may be lower than reported. ...
Chapter 17 assesses the options, processes, and enabling conditions
for climate risk management, a key component of climate resilient
development. This chapter focuses on the ‘how’ of climate risk management and adaptation. It covers: the adaptation and risk management options that are available; the governance and applicability of options in different contexts; residual
risk and Loss and Damage; the methods and tools that can be drawn
on to support climate risk management planning and implementation;
enabling conditions and drivers for adaptation; the role of monitoring
and evaluation for integrated risk management and tracking progress,
success and the risk of maladaptation; and finally, integration of risk
management across sectors, jurisdictions, and time horizons, under
dynamic conditions of environmental and societal change.
... They focus, for example, on whether countries have progressed their adaptation policies and actions over time (Lesnikowski et al., 2015;Nachmany et al., 2019b), the extent of implemented adaptation globally (Leiter, 2021a;Leiter, 2021b), and the type and actors of responses (Berrang-Ford et al., 2021), evidence for reduced vulnerability to climate-related hazards (Formetta and Feyen, 2019;UNDRR, 2019) or adaptation planning in cities across the globe (Araos et al., 2016a;Reckien et al., 2018a;Olazabal et al., 2019a). Each of these assessments draws (Donner et al., 2016;Doshi and Garschagen, 2020); evidence of over-reporting (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011;Weikmans et al., 2017) ...
... While a guidebook with requirements for adaptation as a principle or significant objective has been developed (OECD, 2016), several studies have shown that OECD DAC donors tend to overestimate the number of activities in their portfolio that genuinely have adaptation objectives (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011;Weikmans et al., 2017;CARE, 2021). Hence, the amount of adaptation finance from public sources may be lower than reported. ...
... The criticisms of transparency and accounting issues stem from the fact that donor countries are able to decide what part of their ODA qualifies as climate finance (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2010). Many find this ability to arbitrarily categorise ODA as climate-related rather concerning (Weikmans et al., 2017;Reuters, 2023). ...
To be in line with the goal of the Paris Agreement and guided by the needs and perspectives of national stakeholders ensuring domestic support and ownership, International Climate Finance (ICF) not just needs to be channelled toward low-carbon investments and climate protection measures but also needs avoid leading to new carbon lock-ins. To finance the green transformation in developing countries, sectoral transitions require special attention.
But how does and how can the ICF architecture enable sectoral transitions in emerging economies? Shortcomings of the ICF architecture seem to limit the value for advancing transition activities: Provided funding is not only lower than expected, but also mostly takes place in the form of loans and often not in local currency, which tends to exacerbate the economic strains of developing countries, especially increasing sovereign debt burden. Developed countries are criticized for rebranding some of their existing official development assistance (ODA) target as climate finance, instead of providing additional funding.
In this report, we explore the experiences related to the use of financial instruments and policies to support sectoral transitions in developing countries. It aims at addressing the challenges for financing transitions in energy, industry, and infrastructure sectors alongside suitable types of finance instruments to overcome these hurdles.
... Moreover, the significant gap between the estimated $93.7 billion needed annually for effective climate action and the average $14.8 billion provided, as reported by the OECD, echoes the conclusions of [94], who identified similar disparities in climate finance allocations. Despite the international community's pledges at COP27 and COP28 to enhance funding mechanisms, the consistency and adequacy of financial flows remain problematic, as also noted by [95,96], who emphasized the importance of transparent and predictable funding [97]. Therefore, the current study supports previous findings that stress the need for reformed, stable, and transparent climate finance frameworks to effectively support LDCs in their climate action endeavors [98,99]. ...
This study aimed to investigate the complex landscape of climate finance, assessing the adequacy, predictability, and implications for sustainable development in least developed countries (LDCs). This study is motivated by the pressing need to assess the adequacy, predictability, and implications of climate finance for sustainable development in least developed countries (LDCs). Employing an econometric framework, this study utilizes ARIMA models to analyze time series data (from 2000 to 2021) on climate finance. The analysis revealed a notable gap between the needed and actual climate funding received by LDCs. Despite an annual requirement of 14.8 billion annually since 2015. The study suggests that climate funding for LDCs lacks predictability and falls short in meeting their needs, potentially facing an 80% decrease by 2030 under certain scenarios. It advocates for a strategic revamp in climate finance mechanisms to ensure adequacy and predictability, urging policymakers and international funding bodies to adopt more robust, fair, and needs-based approaches to climate financing. This research emphasizes the responsibility of developed nations and global agencies in bridging the considerable funding gap faced by LDCs. By integrating advanced forecasting techniques with a comprehensive analysis of global economic and political factors, this study sheds light on the challenges LDCs encounter in securing stable and sufficient climate finance, stressing the urgency for systemic reforms in global climate finance policies.
... The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), consisting of mostly developed countries, estimates that climate finance reached US$115.9 billion in 2022, exceeding for the first time the annual US$100 billion goal, which until 2022 had not been realized (OECD, 2024). However, various observers have long argued that climate finance figures amount to much less than those claimed by the OECD (Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011;Oxfam, 2023;Toetzke et al., 2022;Weikmans et al., 2017). For example, Oxfam (2024) estimates that the 'true value' of climate finance provided by developed countries in 2022 is only between US$28 billion and US$35 billion. ...
Developing countries’ ambitious climate action hinges on the provision of climate finance from developed countries. Yet, despite decades of debate and contestation over this, substantial controversies continue to persist over whether and how much climate finance is flowing, including whether it is ‘new and additional’ to existing development assistance, whether it targets climate mitigation or adaptation, and whether it is delivered as grants or loans. In this article, we draw on a little-examined source of self-reporting by countries to shed light on these persisting climate finance controversies. Elaborate transparency arrangements have been set up under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), whereby countries report on climate finance provided and received. We examine transparency reports submitted by 26 countries from 2014 to 2021 by both developed and developing countries, and international review of these reports, to ascertain the extent to which country self-reporting under the UNFCCC sheds light on the nature of climate finance flows between developed and developing countries. We find that both the reports submitted and the international review of these reports are not furthering clarity around climate finance provided and received. This is because of (a) a persisting lack of multilaterally agreed definitions of key aspects of climate finance provided, and a resulting heterogeneity of definitions used by countries to self-report; and (b) because international review of country self-reporting is subject to politically negotiated limitations. We conclude that clarity remains elusive on climate finance provided and received under the UNFCCC, a situation that seems likely to continue under the Paris Agreement’s enhanced transparency framework, due to be implemented in 2024.
... Analysis by Dickin et al. (2020) showed that sanitation accounted for less than 0.025% of the GCF-approved project budgets as of 2019, and only 3% of ODA funding was related to water supply and sanitation. Even when projects are categorized as related to adaptation, there are questions about the credibility of this assessment (Weikmans et al., 2017). ...
Adapting urban sanitation systems to changing climate conditions will require substantial investments. However, there is a gap in understanding the funding strategies for such adaptation measures, especially amid concerns that resilience measures might reinforce existing urban sanitation inequalities. Through cross-case document analysis and complementary key informant interviews, we examined the sanitation adaptation investments in eight cities, focusing on their funding arrangements and social and intergenerational equity implications. Debt financing of sanitation adaptation often relies on repayment through customer bills with only opaque considerations of the affordability for different socio-economic customer groups. The lack of appropriate accounting for the lifecycle costs of resilient infrastructure threatens to mortgage future generations. There is no convincing evidence that ‘greening’ of adaptation financing either shifts or redistributes the financial risk more equitably nor does it make the repayment of the investments substantially cheaper for customers. We conclude that a public sector funding approach is most appropriate to ensure social and intergenerational equity within climate-resilient sanitation systems.
... Such analysis is constrained by data availability and limitations (Canales et al. 2023;Roberts and Weikmans 2022), including around definitions, methodological differences among finance providers, accounting issues, confidentiality restrictions and a lack of universally accepted definitions (for an overview see AFG Update 2023). Several studies claim that the self-reporting by climate finance providers and the lack of independent quality control result in low data reliability and sometimes substantial overestimations of finance flows (Weikmans et al. 2017;UNEP 2021b;Toetzke, Stünzi and Egli 2022). This reduces the accountability and transparency of climate finance, which is fundamental for building trust in climate negotiations (Pauw et al. 2022b). ...
Despite the clear signs of accelerating climate risks
and impacts worldwide, the adaptation finance gap is
widening and now stands at between US366 billion per year. Adaptation finance needs
are 10–18 times as great as current international public
adaptation finance flows – at least 50 per cent higher than
previously estimated.
This is the main conclusion of a comprehensive assessment
of the literature and new analyses to provide updated
estimates of the costs and needs of adaptation in developing
countries, as well as the international finance flows required
to address these needs. The report also provides updates
on adaptation planning and implementation and concludes
that global progress on adaptation is slowing rather than
showing the urgently needed acceleration.
... This is a challenging and contested process, as development, environment, and climate vulnerability are intrinsically linked. Challenges in classifying adaptation stem from both epistemic difficulties and political considerations, with different methodologies for classifying adaptation revealing vastly different measures of funds (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2011, Hall 2017, Weikmans et al 2017. For the most part, the concern is that adaptation finance is significantly overstated by donors, who tend to count ODA in one sector (such as for disaster risk management, or water resource management) also as 'adaptation' in order to overstate their contributions (Roberts et al 2021). ...
The significant body of research on the distribution of international finance for climate change adaptation shows that it is not well correlated to the vulnerability of countries. Vulnerability differs greatly within countries as well, yet very few studies examine subnational flows of adaptation finance. Here, we present evidence of the subnational allocation of international adaptation finance within the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI). The RMI is a highly salient case as it is a small island developing state comprised solely of low-lying atolls that is both in need of and a recipient of adaptation finance. We describe patterns of adaptation finance in the RMI between 2015 and 2019 based on analysis of a comprehensive government database of bilateral and multilateral aid projects. We find that flows of adaptation finance were heavily skewed towards a small number of large-scale civil works projects in urban areas funded by multilateral institutions. Rural areas attracted smaller scale projects funded largely by bilateral donors. The overall distribution of adaptation finance across islands is highly sporadic, with hotspots of activity and areas of neglect. Our results suggest the allocation of adaptation finance to the RMI is insufficient relative to needs, poorly coordinated, and fails to reach places where it is most needed.
... Even funding that explicitly targets the most vulnerable may be directed along existing channels of political and ethnic patronage, thereby benefitting already advantaged households (Browne & Razafiarimanana, 2022). Funds, marked as adaptation finance but that routinely exaggerate their adaptation relevance (Weikmans et al., 2017), serve the interests of a global investor class and perpetuate the hegemonic status quo (Ciplet et al., 2022). ...
Accumulation by adaptation names the phenomenon by which political and economic elites profit from climate adaptation efforts. As with the notion of 'accumulation by dispossession' from which it derives, the term speaks to the injustice of capital accumulation-in this case, accumulation associated with configuring some groups' vulnerability to climate change as business opportunities. However, unlike accumulation by dispossession, the mechanisms by which accumulation by adaptation proceeds have not been adequately conceptualized. This review synthesizes critiques of Marx's formulation of primitive accumulation, recent scholarship on colonial racial capitalism, and critical adaptation studies to locate how capital circulates through and reproduces the violence of climate change. K E Y W O R D S accumulation, adaptation, climate vulnerability, colonialism, racial capitalism
... It is for these reasons that scholars have argued that econometric studies should be considered with caution. Furthermore, adaptation finance data are generally poor 79,80 , and vulnerability indicators have largely been determined to be unreliable, especially with respect to the arbitrary assignment of weights 18,55,81 . Some studies argue that the data are simply not yet available to guide such allocation (especially for the smallest SIDS, for example, Nauru, Niue, Tuvalu), citing the difficulty of assessing countries' climate vulnerability because of scientific uncertainty or pointing out that "many existing indices of vulnerability have neglected the human dimensions of exposure, resilience and sensitivity" 82 . ...
... This problem persists because even after three decades since 1992, no agreement could be reached on what climate finance is, or how to measure it. Each developed country decides what it counts as such, why, and whether it can be considered as "new and additional" (Weikmans et al., 2017). Obviously, this is a core demand from developing countries, but developed countries resist discussions on this. ...
Special Issue New Hopes, New Horizons and G20
... This problem persists because even after three decades since 1992, no agreement could be reached on what climate finance is, or how to measure it. Each developed country decides what it counts as such, why, and whether it can be considered as "new and additional" (Weikmans et al., 2017). Obviously, this is a core demand from developing countries, but developed countries resist discussions on this. ...
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the interregional relations of the European Union with Latin America and the Caribbean and the need for a renewed relationship. This relationship must face what Antonio Gramsci called “morbid symptoms”, that is, as expressions of a stage of organic crisis and interregnum in the international political economy. It is argued that this relationship and its renewed rationality must respond to an agenda of common societal challenges that must have a normative dimension. Specifically, it must respond to the diversification of external relations to ensure greater strategic autonomy on both sides, and to a development agenda driven by a triple socio-economic, digital, and green transition that contributes to the renewal of the social contract in both regions. This paper also examines the opportunities and risks presented by the EU-Mercosur agreement for this objective, and the difficulties and risks posed by its eventual signature and ratification. Finally, we present some reflections on the future of the political dialogue between the two regions, highlighting the framework of challenges and opportunities that this represents.
... Using these markers, donors indicated whether activities target mitigation and/or adaptation by identifying whether an objective is 'significant' (a score of 1) or 'principal' (2) to the project. A score of 0 indicates that the activity was examined but does not target the objective, while those that are not assessed are left blank but can be assumed to not target climate change given tendencies towards overreporting and mislabelling 58,59 . ...
Pacific Island actors have long called for climate justice in the international climate regime, particularly in the form of financial support. While climate finance can be conceptualised as a mechanism of climate justice, the extent to which climate finance does indeed contribute to climate justice is contested. We explore these contestations by looking at Australia’s development programme in the Pacific between 2010 and 2019, examining both policy documents and climate finance flows. This analysis is conducted through a climate justice lens that we conceptualise as consisting of three dimensions: adequacy, additionality, and predictability; balance between adaptation and mitigation and priority provision of adaptation finance to vulnerable recipients; and donor coordination. Our analysis shows that Australian public climate finance has not acted as a mechanism of climate justice according to our criteria in the period studied, even if does meet some criteria of climate justice. From a justice perspective, Australia has approached climate change inconsistently and at times incoherently across its development program in Pacific Island countries. These results provide important lessons for Australia’s approach going forward, under a new government and a new development policy framework.
... It is worth noting that analyses relying on donor self-reporting and tagging, or screening of project titles and abstracts only, may lead to an overestimation of the number of projects and volumes of financing targeting health [48,49] Our content analysis found only 10 projects out of the 50 projects tagged as "health" were directly tied to the health sector (i.e. health system capacity building) or the prevalence of health conditions (i.e. ...
Climate change is adversely affecting human health. Rapid and wide-scale adaptation is urgently needed given the negative impact climate change has across the socio-environmental determinants of health. The mobilisation of climate finance is critical to accelerate adaptation towards a climate resilient health sector. However, a comprehensive understanding of how much bilateral and multilateral climate adaptation financing has been channelled to the health sector is currently missing. Here, we provide a baseline estimate of a decade’s worth of international climate adaptation finance for the health sector. We systematically searched international financial reporting databases to analyse 1) the volumes, and geographic targeting, of adaptation finance for the health sector globally between 2009–2019 and 2) the focus of health adaptation projects based on a content analysis of publicly available project documentation. We found that health was largely a co-benefit, not the principal objective, within the projects. We estimate that USD 1,431 million (4.9%) of total multilateral and bilateral adaptation has been committed to health activities across the decade. However, this is likely an overestimate of the true figure. Most health adaptation projects were in Sub-Saharan Africa, with average project funding comparable to East Asia and the Pacific and the MENA region. Fragile and conflict affected countries received 25.7% of total health adaptation financing. The paucity of health indicators as part of project monitoring and evaluation criteria and the lack of emphasis on local adaptation were particularly significant. This study contributes to the wider evidence base on global health adaptation and climate financing by quantifying adaptation funds directed towards the health sector and revealing specific gaps in financing health adaptation. We anticipate these results will support researchers in developing actionable research on health and climate finance and decision-makers in mobilizing funds to low-resource settings with high health sector adaptation needs.
... A score of 0 indicates that the activity was examined but does not target the objective, while those that are not assessed are left blank but can be assumed to not target climate change given overreporting and mislabelling. 40,41 Despite their limitations, the OECD CRS and Rio marker system provide a widely used and comprehensive proxy for public climate finance flows that allow for comparability with wider development finance flows. We used official development assistance (ODA) and other official flows (OOF) disbursements between 2010 and 2019 and reclassified each data point according to its Rio Marker(s) for mitigation and adaptation. ...
Pacific Island actors have long called for climate justice in the international climate regime, particularly in the form of financial support. While climate finance can be conceptualised as a mechanism of climate justice, the extent to which climate finance does indeed contribute to climate justice is contested. We explore these contestations by looking at Australia’s development programme in the Pacific between 2010 and 2019, examining both policy documents and climate finance flows to the Pacific. This analysis is conducted through a climate justice lens that we conceptualise as consisting of three dimensions: adequacy, additionality and predictability; balance between adaptation and mitigation and priority provision of adaptation finance to vulnerable recipients; and, donor coordination. Our analysis shows that Australian public climate finance has not acted as a mechanism of climate justice in the period studied, even if does meet some criteria of climate justice. From a justice perspective, Australia has approached climate change inconsistently and at times incoherently across its development program in Pacific Island countries. These results provide important lessons for Australia’s approach going forward, under a new government and a new development policy framework.
... A key contested area of the climate finance accounting debate concerns the issue of (mis-)categorization of projects and programmes 6 . Observers have claimed for years that many aid projects reported by donor countries as 'climate-related' cannot be justified as such based on public data [7][8][9][10] . Different donor countries vary in their methods of categorizing and counting climate finance, and individual projects are often categorized by untrained staffers in national ministries. ...
Wealthy countries failed to meet their US$100 billion climate finance pledge, and research now suggests that they may be further away from their goal than previously thought. Machine coding of finance projects may help settle the debate and could be part of a more rigorous tracking system.
... There has been an argument that the OECD's reported amount lacks a clear basis. Weikmans et al. (2017) reassessed the 5,200 aid activities of USD 10.1 billion reported as adaptation-related in the OECD Common Reporting Standard (CRS) database for bilateral flows in 2012. Donors reported 1,393 and 3,807 of these activities to have adaptation as the primary objective and the key objective, respectively. ...
It is estimated that developing countries will need at least USD 100 billion annually for climate change adaptation by 2030. Developed countries are required to provide new and additional funds for the adaptation of developing countries and report the amount. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reports that the member countries have provided a total of USD 78.9 billion to the developing countries in 2018 for public and private financing, approaching the target set for 2020. However, there is no widely adopted definition of climate financing or no scientific consensus regarding the definition of adaptation. Developed countries have come to adopt these definitions arbitrarily. Researchers and NGOs claim that the OECD report is an overestimate and that the actual provision made by member countries was much smaller than what the developing countries actually needed. Nevertheless, multilateral development banks and internationally agreed funds such as the Global Environment Facility, Adaptation Fund, and Green Climate Fund have been providing support to facilitate the adaptation of developing countries. The private sector is also interested in investment in infrastructure, which contributes toward the enhancement of the resilience of developing countries.KeywordsFinancial flowsTargets for ODARio MarkerGlobal environment facilityResilience bonds
... For example, Roberts et al. [45] found that only 25% of projects with Rio markers were actually relevant to climate change, and Michaelowa and Micahelowa [46] and Junghans and Harmeling [47] later came to similar conclusions. Consequently, environmental markers lack reliability as well as validity [44,48]. ...
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) has become an important element of donor policy, because numerous governments have expressed their commitment to helping countries vulnerable to natural hazards by mainstreaming DRR into their development programs. Meanwhile, countries that are considered fragile, as well as conflict-affected states, have faced a high risk of disasters brought on by natural hazards. However, there has been little research that addresses the complex relationship between disasters, conflict, and fragility in the context of development cooperation. Against this backdrop, this study analyzed the determinants of DRR aid allocation from Japan and South Korea—two East Asian countries that have shown a strong commitment to disaster resilience and peacebuilding—to investigate whether they are responsive to countries experiencing the combined risks of disasters and conflicts and/or fragility. Despite the vulnerable countries being in the most need, the study found that both Japan and Korea’s aid allocation has not been influenced much by the concurrence of disasters and conflict. Rather, it has been more driven by the level of a country’s climate vulnerability than the level of a country’s fragility. This suggests that developing countries facing multiple risks and challenges are at a major disadvantage in terms of the responsiveness of donors toward their needs and vulnerability.
... However, it is argued that the adaptation-specific component of ODA for each sector might be challenging to quantify as adaptation finance can be integrated across all these sectors to a certain extent (OECD D., 2016). Although using Rio marker is suggested as an alternative way to segregate adaptation finance from ODA, it is not recommended as a reliable source for measuring adaptation finance (Weikmans et al., 2017). Moreover, our study considers ODA disbursement from all sources since 1995, unlike available data in the Rio marker, which provides complete data only on bilateral adaptation aid commitments since 2010. ...
Increasing climate vulnerability in developing countries impedes inclusive and sustainable development.
The paper examines the linkages between official development assistance (ODA) and climate
vulnerability while analysing the mediating role of adaptation readiness in 119 developing countries
using a panel correlated standard error estimator. The study also investigates the relationship
between ODA’s sectoral composition and climate vulnerability. The findings reveal that ODA is
positively associated with climate vulnerability across all models and regions. However, ODA
disbursement according to governance readiness criteria is associated with low vulnerability. The
sectoral analysis reveals that the share of social infrastructure, humanitarian, and debt assistance is
more in highly vulnerable countries. In contrast, these countries receive less aid specific to production,
economic infrastructure, and multi-sector, and donors commit most climate-related ODA in these
sectors. Overall, findings suggest a lack of adaptation mainstreaming into ODA disbursements.
Furthermore, it calls for exploiting unexplored opportunities for vulnerability reduction through ODA
in those sectors where the share of ODA is high in vulnerable countries.
... However, it is argued that the adaptation-specific component of ODA for each sector might be challenging to quantify as adaptation finance can be integrated across all these sectors to a certain extent (OECD D., 2016). Although using Rio marker is suggested as an alternative way to segregate adaptation finance from ODA, it is not recommended as a reliable source for measuring adaptation finance (Weikmans et al., 2017). Moreover, our study considers ODA disbursement from all sources since 1995, unlike available data in the Rio marker, which provides complete data only on bilateral adaptation aid commitments since 2010. ...
Increasing climate vulnerability in developing countries impedes inclusive and sustainable development. The paper examines the linkages between official development assistance (ODA) and climate vulnerability while analysing the mediating role of adaptation readiness in 119 developing countries using a panel correlated standard error estimator. The study also investigates the relationship between ODA's sectoral composition and climate vulnerability. The findings reveal that ODA is positively associated with climate vulnerability across all models and regions. However, ODA disbursement according to governance readiness criteria is associated with low vulnerability. The sectoral analysis reveals that the share of social infrastructure, humanitarian, and debt assistance is more in highly vulnerable countries. In contrast, these countries receive less aid specific to production, economic infrastructure, and multi-sector, and donors commit most climate-related ODA in these sectors. Overall, findings suggest a lack of adaptation mainstreaming into ODA disbursements. Furthermore, it calls for exploiting unexplored opportunities for vulnerability reduction through ODA in those sectors where the share of ODA is high in vulnerable countries. ARTICLE HISTORY
... We use the OECD external development finance data on committed climate-relevant ODA 1 to assess to what SDGs climate finance has contributed during the period 2010-2018. While ODA data entails some weaknesses due to the self-reporting procedure which is likely to produce overestimations and labelling mistakes (Junghans & Harmeling, 2012;Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011;Roberts et al., 2021;Weikmans et al., 2017;Weinlich et al., 2020), it remains the best data source available (Weikmans and Roberts, 2019). Here, we used finance data from the recipients' perspective to enhance comparability with NDCs, in view of disagreement between donors and recipients on reported ODA (Weikmans and Roberts, 2019). ...
Climate change and development are strongly interconnected. An efficient use of financial resources would, thus require alignment between climate finance and development priorities, as set out in the context of both the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In this paper, we investigate to what extent climate-related official development assistance (ODA) before and after the Paris Agreement adoption supports the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Moreover, we assess to what extent donors align this finance with recipient countries’ climate-related priorities as spelled out in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). First, we find that climate-relevant ODA contributes to multiple SDGs, above all SDG 7 (energy) and SDG 11 (cities). Second, we find that there is substantial alignment between donors’ and recipients’ SDG priorities, but that this alignment has not improved in recent years, since the conclusion of the Paris Agreement. Third, we find that albeit climate-finance continues to be allocated more to climate-change mitigation than to adaptation, the difference became smaller in recent years. This reduced the misalignment with recipient countries’ NDC climate activities, which focus more on adaptation than mitigation. Overall, we identify coherence, gaps and opportunities for further alignment of climate and development actions, and related finance. Such an alignment is essential to increase the likelihood of implementation of the two international agreements and to ensure that action is guided by recipient countries’ needs.
... Un score de zéro ou aucune information indique que le projet ne vise ni l'adaptation ni l'atténuation. Au vu de la pression internationale pour soutenir les projets climatiques, il est peu probable que les bailleurs de fonds laissent une case vide pour les projets avec une dimension climatique, d'autant plus que plusieurs études remarquent une sur-déclaration et un étiquetage trompeur (Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011 ;Donner et al., 2016 ;Weikmans et al., 2017). ...
The german climate aid policy
Climate finance – financial support from developed to developing countries for climate change mitigation and adaptation – is a key pillar of international climate negotiations and agreements, as well as central to climate justice. Yet it remains unclear and contested as to what extent donors comply with their climate finance promises, or to what extent climate finance contributes to climate justice in practice. We here focus on Germany, a major climate donor, and examine its contribution to climate finance through a climate justice lens. Using data from the OECD, we analyse German climate aid between 2009 and 2019, with a focus on three elements of climate justice: how much weight is given to adaptation compared to mitigation? What role does vulnerability play? And to what extent is climate finance additional to other forms of aid? Our results show that while Germany seems to some extent to take climate justice into account, there remains room for improvement, in particular with regard to the support for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), as well as in the use of grants as opposed to subsidies.
... Tutkimuksen mukaan selvä enemmistö maiden sopeutumishankkeiksi luokittelemista hankkeista ei ollut niitä julkisesti saatavien tietojen perusteella. Monet niistä olivat kyllä luokiteltavissa ympäristöhankkeiksi, mutta ilman sopeutumiskomponenttia. 42 Myös rahoituksen vivutukseen ja sen raportointiin liittyy ongelmia. Ylipäätään vivutetun rahoituksen todentaminen on vaikeaa, koska sitä voidaan mitata pitkälti vasta jälkikäteen. ...
Tämän Kehityspoliittisen toimikunnan (KPT) ajankohtaisanalyysi tarkastelee kansainvälistä ilmastorahoitusta kehityspolitiikan näkökulmasta ja pyrkii edistämään aiheesta käytävää keskustelua ja päätöksentekoa Suomessa. Lähestymistapamme perustuu Suomen globaalin vastuun ja ilmasto-oikeudenmukaisuuden edistämiseen osana YK:n kestävän kehityksen Agenda2030-toimintaohjelman toimeenpanoa. Ilman ilmastotoimia ja luontokadon pysäyttämistä ei kestävän kehityksen tavoitteita voida saavuttaa.
https://www.kehityspoliittinentoimikunta.fi/wp-content/uploads/sites/27/2022/01/KPT-Suomen-kansainvalinen-ilmastorahoitus-tarvitsee-selkea-suunnan-analyysi-1.pdf
... At the same time, studies highlight the multiple challenges in relation to methods and data. These do not only address the difficulties in operationalizing vulnerability (see above section) but also the fact that adaptation finance data according to the OECD Rio Adaptation Markerin principle the most comprehensive database on international adaptation finance globallyis oftentimes not reliable and consistent due to the fact that many donors tend to overcode and report committed rather than dispersed amounts (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011;Junghans and Harmeling, 2012;Nakhooda, 2013;Roberts and Weikmans, 2017;Weikmans et al., 2017). A more detailed account on bilateral adaptation finance trackingwhich is beyond the focus of this paperis provided in Doshi and Garschagen (2020). ...
The evolving architecture of global climate change adaptation finance is shifting towards fund mechanisms with competitive application and allocation principles. At the same time, prioritization of the most vulnerable countries is a key goal within this emerging architecture. The paper analyses whether the Green Climate Fund (GCF), by far the largest climate change fund, has so far delivered on its promise to prioritize the most vulnerable countries. For our analysis, we consider the USD 2.5 billion GCF funding allocated until the end of the first mobilization phase and disaggregate it project-by-project into its mitigation and adaptation related amounts. We then analyze the adaptation flows in terms of the recipient country’s level of vulnerability and institutional capacity. We further analyze whether funds are being accessed through independent national entities or international intermediaries and whether recipient countries have developing country priority status. The results show that funds-based adaptation finance creates an ambiguous picture: On the one hand, the GCF is on track in allocating its funds largely to country groups which its statutes aim to prioritize, particularly LDCs, African countries and SIDS. At the same time, the proposal process results in the fact that many countries with the highest climate vulnerability but weak government institutions and fragile state-bureaucracies have missed out and not been able to access project funding, mostly LDCs in Africa and conflict-ridden countries. Further, most countries have not yet been able to access project funds independently through their national entities, limiting direct access and country ownership – the strengthening of which is a major goal of the fund. The findings suggest that simplified approval tracks need to be strengthened in the emerging climate finance architecture so that populations in countries with the lowest institutional capacity but highest vulnerability are not being left behind in the long-run.
... We use the OECD external development finance data on committed climate-relevant ODA 29 to assess to which SDGs climate finance has contributed during the period 2010-2018. Here, we used finance data from recipients' perspective to enhance comparability with NDCs in view of disagreement between donors and recipients on reported ODA (Weikmans & Roberts, 2019 & Michaelowa, 2011;Roberts et al., 2021;Weikmans et al., 2017;Weinlich et al., 2020), it remains the best data source available. ...
... The definition of adaptation used by both methodologies leaves room for interpretation and the accounting methods differ (see Annex 4.C [online]). Several studies claim that the self-reporting of donors and the lack of independent quality control result in low data reliability and sometimes substantial overestimations of finance flows (Junghans and Harmeling 2012;Weikmans et al. 2017), especially for activities tagged as "significant" (Weiler, Klöck and Dornan 2018). Finally, historical data of loan amounts are reported by the funders at face value, instead of using the grant-equivalent amounts, resulting in overestimates of loan amounts (Oxfam International 2020; Roberts et al. 2021). ...
# Since the 2020 edition of the Adaptation Gap Report (AGR), there have been some new estimates of the costs of adaptation for developing countries, reporting higher figures than earlier studies. There are also new estimates of adaptation finance needs from some updated Nationally Determined Contributions and National Adaptation Plans, which report higher estimates for many countries.
# This new evidence indicates potentially higher adaptation costs and financing needs than indicated in previous AGRs. This emerging evidence requires a detailed updated stocktake of the costs of adaptation and finance needs.
# The costs of adaptation, and thus adaptation finance needs, will be much lower if the goals of Paris Agreement are met.
# The costs of adaptation, and thus adaptation finance needs, will be much lower if the goals of Paris Agreement are met.
# While there has been a trend of gradually increasing international public adaptation finance to developing countries in recent years (up to 2019), adaptation finance flows are projected to decline as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.
# Although final data still need to be prepared and analysed for 2020, unless it shows an increase in climate finance of 26 per cent between 2019 and 2020 (compared to just 2 per cent between 2018 and 2019), the US$ 100 billion target for 2020 will not have been met.
# There have been positive trends in the emergence of new instruments, actors and approaches to scale up adaptation, including in the private sector. These include opportunities to leverage private-sector investment with public finance. However, due to the barriers to private finance and the public intervention or finance needed to overcome these, the rate of upscaling remains slow. Furthermore, private-sector investment will be uneven across countries and sectors and is unlikely to target the most vulnerable.
# The available evidence has limitations but suggests that estimated adaptation costs, and likely adaptation financing needs in developing countries, are five to ten times greater than current international public adaptation finance flows.
# The evidence suggests that the gap is larger than indicated in the AGR2020 and is widening for two reasons. First, new bottom-up evidence indicates higher estimated adaptation costs/needs. Second, known finance flows seem broadly stable or may even be decreasing.
# There remains an urgent need to scale up and further increase international public adaptation finance, for both direct investment and for overcoming barriers to private-sector adaptation.
... However, a considerable number of projects might be wrongly tagged (Weikmans et al. 2017). Therefore, a preliminary list of projects will be obtained following (a) and (b). ...
International climate finance plays a key role in enabling the implementation of adaptation measures. However, while there is a common metric for gauging the effectiveness of finance for mitigation – greenhouse gas emission reduction per unit of funding – no corresponding metric exists for adaptation. Instead, assessments of what works best in adaptation finance focus either on procedural aspects of funding modalities, such as equity in the allocation of funding, or on the extent to which specific adaptation activities produce the desired results. This mixed methods systematic review aims to assess the effectiveness of adaptation finance and bridge the gap between those two approaches.
Note: The funding for this review has been discontinued, and as a result, the review will not be completed as described in this paper. The protocol developed for the review is presented here so that it may inform other future work.
... There is still no agreed definition of climate finance, even after a quarter century of negotiations. So each developed country can decide what it counts as such, why, and whether it can be considered as "new and additional" (Weikmans et al. 2017). This contributes to widely differing estimates by agencies, for example, of the Fast Start Finance of $30 billion, pledged at Copenhagen in 2009 as immediate delivery during 2010-2012, between 05 and 30% went to adaptation (Nakhooda et al. 2013;Buchner et al. 2019). ...
Beginning as an afterthought in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, adaptation as an agenda has come a long way since 1992. With no ambitious mitigation, recent years have witnessed an increasing frequency of extreme climate events, including cross-border or borderless climate risks. Accordingly, the Paris Agreement frames adaptation as a global goal and global responsibility. However, financing for adaptation continues to remain extremely poor, relative to the estimated needs, even though the regime has obligatory provisions for support by developed countries. Why is this so? Why should the majority of the countries, with an insignificant contribution to causing the problem, suffer from increasing climate impacts? How can adaptation finance be enhanced at scale? As a response to these queries, the paper substantiates three claims: (1) that poor funding can be attributed to the territorial framing under the regime that conceptualizes adaptation largely as a local or national public good and, hence, the inefficacy of market mechanisms, (2) that it makes conceptual and political sense to consider adaptation as a global public good, and (3) that such a reframing should make a difference in boosting adaptation finance. In a multi-polar world with different views on adaptation finance, multilateral agencies should lead in promoting the proposed framing.
Les théories de la justice climatique sont apparues au début des années 1990 avec les premières tentatives de coordination internationale dans la lutte contre le réchauffement planétaire. Elles s’intéressent notamment aux raisons de limiter l'ampleur du changement climatique et de limiter ou remédier à ses effets nuisibles, ainsi qu'aux principes qui doivent guider le partage équitable des droits et efforts qui y sont liés. Si ces théories se sont d’abord et surtout concentrées sur la question du juste partage des droits d’émission et des coûts de l’atténuation du changement climatique entre les États, elles prennent de plus en plus la mesure des limites d’une approche uniquement focalisée sur l’échelle internationale et interrogent désormais aussi les responsabilités d’autres agents comme les individus et les entreprises. Dans cette entrée, nous commençons par montrer la spécificité et la nécessité d’une problématisation du changement climatique à travers le prisme de la justice distributive, par contraste avec certaines approches économiques qui n’y voient qu’un échec à maximiser le bien-être agrégé ou à allouer les ressources de manière optimale. Nous analysons ensuite les principes élaborés par les philosophes pour répartir équitablement les responsabilités climatiques entre les États, par exemple en fonction de leurs contributions aux émissions de gaz à effet de serre ou de leurs capacités respectives. Enfin, nous mettons en évidence les difficultés structurelles et motivationnelles, notamment en raison de la dimension intergénérationnelle du problème climatique, qui font obstacle à la mise en œuvre d’une action collective efficace. Prenant acte de l’obéissance (au mieux) partielle des États à leurs devoirs de justice climatique dans notre monde « non idéal », nous interrogeons les obligations climatiques d’autres types d’acteurs comme les individus et les entreprises. https://encyclo-philo.fr/item/1751
Closing the funding gap for biodiversity conservation is one of the critical topics at the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP 16) to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), hosted in Colombia in October 2024. The funding gap has been estimated at 700 billion figure is based on highly dubious calculations and assumptions. The author argues the funding gap report is not a serious effort to estimate the needs for supporting conservation efforts. Instead, it is a performative publication marketing opportunities for private investment and market-based mechanisms. Therefore, the $700 billion figure should be rejected by those opposed to the continuing financialisation of conservation.
This article represents the first endeavor to establish a connection between foreign aid and Climate-Related Financial Policies (CRFP) within the European region. The findings are critical to suggest policy implications for governments in making capital flow effective, especially in mitigating environmental degradation. CRFP represents the count of climate-related financial policies implemented by 28 European countries annually from 2010 to 2021. We utilize four distinct indicators to capture foreign aid, namely net foreign aid, net Official Development Assistance (ODA) received development index, net ODA received share, and net ODA received per capita. Our research reveals that foreign aid has an adverse effect on Climate-Related Financial Policies, as evidenced across all four measures of foreign aid. Notably, the net ODA received share demonstrates a non-linear relationship with climate-related financial policies. Additionally, we conducted a study to examine how institutional quality moderates the association between financial aid and the implementation of climate-related financial policies. The findings suggest that good institutional quality amplifies the impact of foreign aid on CRFP.
Purpose of Review
Recent focus on loss and damage within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) follows decades of demands by vulnerable countries for compensation for losses due to climate change. Reviewing recent literature on loss and damage finance, we consider how the new UNFCCC Loss and Damage Fund could be transformative for climate finance.
Recent Findings
This article reviews developments within the UNFCCC, including the creation of the new Loss and Damage Fund and changes in the broader field of climate finance. Recent literature indicates that the factors necessary for just loss and damage finance include inclusive governance, new and additional funds, purpose-made instruments and channels, direct access to funds, and burden sharing aligned with the polluter pays principle.
Summary
We overview the history of loss and damage finance, suggest five criteria that could make the Loss and Damage Fund just, and discuss four potential catalysts for just loss and damage finance: ecological and climatic impacts, institutional developments outside the UNFCCC, Global South leadership on debt justice, and legal developments. As the Loss and Damage Fund is operationalized and the need for loss and damage finance grows, scholars must continue to ask whether loss and damage finance furthers core tenets of climate justice, including forms of restitution.
This study examines how geopolitical forces motivate public support for foreign climate aid among US residents. This is timely: the US and other advanced economies have committed to large transfers of aid to developing economies in order to speed climate mitigation and adaptation, reflecting the deep climate injustice at the center of global climate policy. Using nationally representative data (n=917), our research advances the budding scholarship on foreign climate aid by using an experimental survey design that frames foreign climate aid in geopolitical terms by comparing US aid to that of (a) allied nations and (b) adversarial nations. We find that, relative to a baseline informational frame, comparing US aid levels to geostrategic allies (e.g., UK, France, Germany, and Japan) doubles support among US residents for providing greater aid levels. We also find that comparing US aid levels to a geostrategic competitor—in this case, China—does not increase support for foreign climate aid. In a secondary analysis, we find that the effect of comparison frame is isolated to Democrats, with Republicans showing no sign of increasing levels of support regardless of framing condition. These results indicate that it is possible to raise support for foreign climate aid among (Democratic) US residents, primarily by linking existing levels of support to geostrategic allies. These results suggest that donor competition between the US and its allies may provide activists and policymakers an opportunity to increase support for the US to meet its existing foreign climate aid obligations.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) global stocktake tracks progress towards achieving the three global goals of the Paris Agreement — mitigation, adaptation and support. The global goal on adaptation is to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response. Attempts at demonstrating progress towards this imprecisely worded goal have revealed “methodological, empirical, conceptual and political challenges” that the 2021–2023 Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme aims to address1.
Adaptation in developing countries often occurs as discrete interventions via projects financed by public sources, including multilateral funds and bilateral donors. Evaluating these interventions could be an important contribution to the global stocktake2, which includes a review of the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation action and support. However, lack of reporting and evaluation rigour hinders the assessment of adaptation effectiveness. We identify four challenges related to the availability and quality of evidence for assessing adaptation progress, and propose solutions
Motivation
Most weather‐related disasters occur in the world's poorest countries, which have the least capacity to cope. Due to the absence of a clear classification of DRR aid, donors and recipient countries have not known the amount of DRR aid flowing or its effectiveness in terms of supporting disaster risk management in developing countries.
Purpose
In 2018, the OECD DAC created a new policy marker for DRR to help donor countries to monitor and report the progress made on mainstreaming DRR into their development activities. Drawing on this DRR marker, this study identifies trends and patterns as well as limitations in the DRR mainstreaming process to guide donor countries to successfully deliver the DRR goals.
Methods and approach
When reporting to the OECD DAC, donors are asked to provide information on the purpose of individual projects/programmes, and screen against all policy markers in the reporting system. Using this data, this study conducted an in‐depth analysis of donor countries' development portfolios to provide a comprehensive and granular picture of the funding streams and practices concerning DRR.
Findings
This study revealed that current spending on DRR remains a tiny fraction of total development aid. Even after the creation of the DRR marker, which raised donors' awareness of the importance of integrating DRR into development planning, no substantial increase in DRR funding has been made. This implies that most official development assistance from DAC members still fails to consider DRR in any meaningful way.
Policy implications
Important areas for improvement include a more comprehensive understanding of disaster risk, increased funding for activities that principally target DRR, financial stability, and further integration of DRR and climate change adaptation into development projects.
Billions of dollars are annually transferred to poor nations to help them adapt to the effects of climate change. This Element examines how the discourses on adaptation finance of many developing country negotiators, environmental groups, development charities, academics, and international bureaucrats have renewed
a specific vision of aid intended to respond to international injustices and to fuel a regular transfer of resources between rich and poor countries. By reviewing manifestations of this normative vision of aid in key contemporary debates on adaptation finance, the author shows how these discourses have contributed to the significant financial mobilization of developed countries towards adaptation in the Global South. But there remains a stark contrast between the many expectations associated with these discourses and today’s adaptation finance landscape.
▶ The number and financial volume of adaptation actions supported by the Adaptation Fund (AF), the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) have more than doubled between 2016 and 2018 and have remained constant since 2019 at an average of around US$500 million per year. Without further increases, increasing climate risks could outstrip adaptation actions and thus widen the adaptation gap even more.
▶ Only around one third (40 per cent in relation to funding volume) of the actions reported by bilateral climate finance providers as primarily aiming at adaptation were found to directly target climate risk reduction. Actions labelled as adaptation must better elaborate their contribution to adaptation.
▶ Not every climate action can be expected to deliver substantial co-benefits for adaptation or mitigation. The potential for co-benefits between adaptation and mitigation is higher in some sectors than in others.
▶ Attention needs to be paid to potential trade-offs in the implementation of adaptation and mitigation to avoid progress in one objective hampering another or hampering sustainable development. Trade-offs can occur despite substantial co-benefits and therefore need to be considered independently.
The report looks at progress in planning, financing and implementing adaptation actions. At least 84 per cent of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have established adaptation plans, strategies, laws and policies – up 5 per cent from the previous year. The instruments are getting better at prioritizing disadvantaged groups, such as Indigenous peoples.
However, financing to turn these plans and strategies into action isn’t following. International adaptation finance flows to developing countries are 5-10 times below estimated needs and the gap is widening. Estimated annual adaptation needs are USD 160-340 billion by 2030 and USD 315-565 billion by 2050.
Implementation of adaptation actions – concentrated in agriculture, water, ecosystems and cross-cutting sectors – is increasing. However, without a step change in support, adaptation actions could be outstripped by accelerating climate risks, which would further widen the adaptation implementation gap.
The report looks at the benefits of prioritizing actions that both reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help communities adapt, such as nature-based solutions, and calls for countries to step up funding and implementation of adaptation actions. Additionally, the report discusses adaptation effectiveness and looks at adaptation-mitigation linkages and co-benefits.
Full report: https://www.unep.org/adaptation-gap-report-2022
Formal deliberations for the new collective quantified goal on climate finance began at COP26 in Glasgow. This Perspectives article aims to inform this process by discussing the potential size and nature of is post-2025 target. We argue that the climate finance system around the current target to mobilise US100 billion target allow for multiple interpretations, reducing transparency and trust between countries.
• Climate finance targets can be interpreted in a dual and sometimes contrasting way: mobilising investment at scale and transferring resources from developed to developing countries. Recognising this duality may help to find common ground for a post-2025 climate finance target.
• Increasing the climate finance target may prove ineffective without further clarity on private finance mobilisation, the relation to Art. 2.1(c), and other priority elements.
• More detailed assessments of needs, priorities, costs, and support are needed to inform the post-2025 target and assess climate finance provision effectiveness.
• A sub-target for grants could increase accountability, trust, and transparency, and target the needs of the most vulnerable developing countries.
• Negotiations on the post-2025 climate finance target could also consider additional aspects such as access to and prioritisation of finance, and loss and damage.
Durch den Klimawandel entstehen insbesondere in Entwicklungsländern als typische Folgen residualer Klimarisiken zunehmend hohe Schäden und Verluste. Residuale Klimarisiken sind solche Klimarisiken, die nach Risikoreduzierung durch Anpassung und Klimaschutz verbleiben. Um die Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung zu erreichen, ist ein effektiver Umgang mit residualen Klimarisiken erforderlich. Bisher gibt es nur vereinzelt Evidenz zur Wirksamkeit von Instrumenten zum Umgang mit residualen Klimarisiken. Vor diesem Hintergrund schließt dieses Evaluierungsmodul die Wissens- und Evaluierungslücke zur Relevanz und Wirksamkeit der bislang angewendeten Instrumente im Umgang mit residualen Klimarisiken. Dafür wurde ein theoriebasierter Ansatz gewählt, der qualitative und quantitative Analysemethoden integriert. Die betrachteten Instrumente wurden vier Instrumentengruppen konzeptionell zugeordnet und analysiert: Drittfinanzierte Risikofinanzierung, Risikopooling, Risikovorsorge und Transformatives Risikomanagement. Übergreifend zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass die Relevanz der Instrumente stark von ihrer Konzeption und Implementierung abhängt, der Anspruch eines umfassenden Umgangs mit residualen Klimarisiken teilweise erfüllt ist und die deutsche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit bereits vielfältige Erfahrungen mit der Implementierung von Instrumenten zum Umgang mit residualen Klimarisiken hat. Sie erweisen sich als effektiv, wenn Eingangshürden überwunden werden. Basierend auf den Ergebnissen spricht die Evaluierung Empfehlungen in Bezug auf den Instrumenteneinsatz, die Bedürfnisorientierung, umfassendes Risikomanagement, die Portfolioausweitung und die Wirkungsausrichtung aus.
Small island developing states (SIDS) are recognized as being among the most vulnerable countries to climate change—many are highly exposed and sensitive to, inter alia, sea-level rise and increased intensity storms, yet often lack the human and financial resources needed for successful and/or effective adaptation. The international community has responded to SIDS’ precarious situation, in part, by establishing a suite of multilateral funding mechanisms to help finance costly adaptation projects and programs. However, to date, there has been a mismatch between the level of international climate finance mobilized and the scale of adaptation that is needed in SIDS. This paper reviews the relevant academic and policy literatures to provide a system-wide diagnosis of the institutional and conceptual problems plaguing adaptation-specific multilateral climate funds, which are often addressed in isolation. We show that, following the establishment of the Global Environment Facility, many multilateral climate funds have been rife with administrative issues, creating barriers to access for particularly vulnerable countries. The funding that SIDS do receive is often insufficient to meet the costs of adaptation, and funding allocations are demonstrably skewed amongst SIDS and amongst types of adaptation projects and programs funded. In concluding, we propose reorienting multilateral adaptation finance towards resilience as a means of improving the governance of international adaptation finance and increasing access for SIDS and other particularly vulnerable countries.
Surviving climate chaos needs communities and ecosystems able to cope with near-random impacts. Their strength depends upon their integrity, so preserving and restoring this is essential. Total climate breakdown might be postponed by extreme efforts to conserve carbon and recapture pollutants, but climate chaos everywhere is now inevitable. Adaptation efforts by Paris Agreement countries are converging on community-based and ecosystem-based strategies, and case studies in Bolivia, Nepal and Tanzania confirm that these are the best ways forward. But success depends on local empowerment through forums, ecosystem tenure security and environmental education. When replicated, networked and shielded by governments, they can strengthen societies against climate chaos while achieving sustainable development. These vital messages are highlighted for all those who seek or have already found a role in promoting adaptation: for students, researchers and teachers, government officials and aid professionals, and for everyone who is now living under threat of climate chaos.
Surviving climate chaos needs communities and ecosystems able to cope with near-random impacts. Their strength depends upon their integrity, so preserving and restoring this is essential. Total climate breakdown might be postponed by extreme efforts to conserve carbon and recapture pollutants, but climate chaos everywhere is now inevitable. Adaptation efforts by Paris Agreement countries are converging on community-based and ecosystem-based strategies, and case studies in Bolivia, Nepal and Tanzania confirm that these are the best ways forward. But success depends on local empowerment through forums, ecosystem tenure security and environmental education. When replicated, networked and shielded by governments, they can strengthen societies against climate chaos while achieving sustainable development. These vital messages are highlighted for all those who seek or have already found a role in promoting adaptation: for students, researchers and teachers, government officials and aid professionals, and for everyone who is now living under threat of climate chaos.
The Paris Agreement commits nations in Article 2(1) to “Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.” However there is an absence of internationally agreed accounting rules that would permit overall assessments of progress to this goal and any meaningful comparisons of performance between countries. This is true also for the quantitative Copenhagen/Cancún promise by developed nations to jointly mobilize US$100 billion by 2020. Our goal is to provoke discussion about the depth of the problems this lack of a functional definition and accounting system have created and perpetuated. We do so by describing the fragmented system of national reporting of climate finance and how the OECD’s Rio Marker system is serving neither contributors nor recipients. More than a trust issue between developed and developing countries, we argue that the lack of modalities to account for climate finance also considerably impedes the effective functioning of the bottom-up approach that now prevails under the UNFCCC. The deadline to propose "modalities of accounting climate finance" by 2018 is a crucial window in which to address this chronic issue in international climate policy.
Wealthy countries spend increasing amounts of aid to support adaptation to climate change in developing countries and have committed under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to prioritize adaptation aid to those “particularly vulnerable” to climate change. While research has started to track this aid, it has not yet examined its allocation across all donor and recipient countries. We thus do not know to what extent vulnerable countries indeed receive more support for adaptation. We address this research gap and ask: how does this commitment to prioritizing particularly vulnerable countries translate into actual adaptation aid allocation? To what extent do vulnerable countries receive more adaptation aid? We address these questions though a quantitative analysis of data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development on bilateral adaptation aid from 2011 through 2014. In contrast to other studies, we find that vulnerability—or more precisely, vulnerability indicators—matter for adaptation aid allocation. Countries that are more exposed to climate change risks, such as extreme weather events or sea level rise, receive more adaptation aid, both on a per capita basis and as a percentage of all adaptation aid. These results indicate that collectively (even if not at the level of each individual donor) donors align their bilateral adaptation aid allocation with global promises.
Submission by Brown University’s Climate and Development Lab on behalf of AdaptationWatch to the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on the development of modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Paris Agreement.
Pledges by developed countries to help poorer ones deal with climate impacts and
move toward low-carbon development pathways have been crucial to advance the
UN climate change negotiations in the run up to the landmark Paris Agreement of
December 2015. Yet sharply competing claims on the fulfilment of past climate
finance promises threatened one more time to derail the whole process. Observers
have for many years called for a robust accounting framework of climate finance
under the UN Convention. In this regard, a notable but little discussed decision was
reached in Paris to develop by 2018 a much-needed accounting framework for
climate finance under the UNFCCC.
Significant political challenges await negotiators on the road toward the elaboration
of robust accounting modalities. This brief aims at facilitating the future discussions
on that matter by making explicit two different purposes of a climate finance
accounting system: The assessment of developed countries’ financial effort toward
developing countries’ adaptation and mitigation on the one hand and the
assessment of resources devoted to climate activities in developing countries or in
the whole world on the other hand. We argue that these different purposes have
important implications for the features of the accounting systems that need to be
built. In addition, we illustrate how the fraught contestations around current climate
finance accounting practices can be understood as reflecting those two different
purposes. Finally, we call on UNFCCC negotiators to acknowledge the specific
features associated with each accounting approach in order to develop new systems
or improve existing ones to make them truly fit for purpose.
This empirical study assesses the relationship between the characteristics of developing countries and the amount of official climate mitigation finance inflow. A two-part model and robustness checks were used to analyse 1998–2010 Rio Marker data on 180 developing countries. The results show that developing countries with higher CO2 intensity, larger carbon sinks, lower per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and good governance tend to be selected as recipients of climate mitigation finance, and receive more of it. CO2 emission is not used as a determinant of mitigation finance until the actual financial disbursement. Poverty aid tends to be allocated to countries with low CO2 emissions, possibly to avoid diverting aid from poorer developing countries. However, such a diversion is unavoidable if the share of mitigation finance in climate finance and in overall official development assistance (ODA) continues to escalate. This study calls for an equitable allocation of total ODA mitigation and adaptation finance in addition to the 0.7% ODA/gross national income target, and for transparent criteria and the verification of reporting on the allocation of mitigation finance.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations are evolving to reflect changes in national and global economic circumstances. However, this shift has been far smaller in the critical issue of climate finance, which remains too mired in an increasingly antiquated North-South, developed-developing country dichotomy. This inertia poses a serious threat to our ability to mobilize the finance required to meet the climate challenge, and could hamstring the new climate agreement countries are seeking. However, an important new trend can help move this discussion forward: the rise of climate finance within and among developing countries. Far from diminishing the need for developed countries to increase their support for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries, so-called 'South-South Climate Finance' (SSCF) can help unlock much needed additional resources for the climate challenge. This article provides an initial mapping of SSCF and argues that: (1) the emergence of SSCF offers countries an opportunity to mobilize additional climate finance, including through multilateral development banks (MDBs); and (2) parties to the UNFCCC should track and foster the role of SSCF so as to more effectively align it with 'traditional' climate finance that flows from developed to developing countries.
During the last few decades, general awareness has increased that along with problems of international development, environmental problems, notably with respect to climate change, represent yet another global challenge. In an attempt to win further public support for aid expenditures, aid administrations may have tried to make use of this trend in public perception by labeling some of their aid activities as conducive to the mitigation of, or the adaptation to, climate change. In this case, whether a donor reports a project with a climate-related “Rio marker” should depend not only on the actual content of the project, but also on the national voters’ ecological preferences, meteorological extreme events, or the media coverage of international climate policy issues.In our paper we test these hypotheses using project-level aid data and country-level political data for 21 DAC donors from 1995 to 2007. Keyword search in the project descriptions of the PLAID database and complementary hand-coding allows us to assess all projects for their actual climate change-related content, and to thereby construct our most relevant control variables. We then econometrically analyze the impact of political factors on climate aid reporting, in a multilevel setting, controlling for a number of additional project-level and donor country characteristics. Our results reveal that indeed, coding is influenced systematically by political factors. Further factors are a misinterpretation of the Rio marker, and insufficient coding diligence.
Fit for Purpose: Negotiating the New Climate Finance Accounting Systems.” Climate Strategies Policy Brief 3CS-Fit-for-Purpose-Climate-Finance-Accounting-formatted-09
- R Weikmans
- J T Roberts
Environmental Statistics at Sida: A Review of Policy Markers on Climate Change Adaptation, Climate Change Mitigation, Biodiversity, Ecosystem Services, and Environment. Internal report by Sida Help Desk for Environment and Climate Change and SEI
- G Ö Wingqvist
- E César
- A Atteridge
- H Berg
- O Drakenberg
- A Axelsson
- M Schultz
Wingqvist, G. Ö., E. César, A. Atteridge, H. Berg, O. Drakenberg, A. Axelsson, and M. Schultz. 2011. Environmental Statistics
at Sida: A Review of Policy Markers on Climate Change Adaptation, Climate Change Mitigation, Biodiversity, Ecosystem
Services, and Environment. Internal report by Sida Help Desk for Environment and Climate Change and SEI.
Stockholm: SIDA.
2014. L’adaptation au changement climatique. Paris: Editions La Découverte
- Van Gameren
- Romain Valentine
- Edwin Weikmans
- Zaccai
Different Tales from Different Countries, a First Assessment of the OECD ‘Adaptation Marker
- L Junghans
- S Harmeling
Evaluation of the Environment Policy of the Austrian Development Cooperation and Its Implementation by the Main ODA Actors
- J-P Ledant
- B Schuh
- J Tordy
- K Gruev
- M Beck
Ledant, J-P., B. Schuh, J. Tordy, K. Gruev, and M. Beck. 2016. Evaluation of the Environment Policy of the Austrian
Development Cooperation and Its Implementation by the Main ODA Actors 2007-2014 -Final Report Volume 2:
Annexes. Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium: ADE -Analysis for Economic Decisions and Österreichisches Institut für
Raumplanung. Accessed August 3, 2016. www.entwicklung.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente/Evaluierung/
Evaluierungsberichte/2016/Evaluation_Environment_Policy_Annexes.pdf.
UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance 2014 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows Report Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Standing Committee on Finance
- Unfccc Scf
The Reality of Official Climate aid. Oxford Energy and Environment Comment Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies
- J T Roberts
- K Starr
- T Jones
The Landscape of Climate Finance. Venice: Climate Policy Initiative. van Gameren, Valentine, Romain Weikmans, and Edwin Zaccai. 2014. L'adaptation au changement climatique
- Cpi
CPI. 2015. The Landscape of Climate Finance. Venice: Climate Policy Initiative.
van Gameren, Valentine, Romain Weikmans, and Edwin Zaccai. 2014. L'adaptation au changement climatique. Paris:
Editions La Découverte.
Different Tales from Different Countries, a First Assessment of the OECD 'Adaptation Marker'. Briefing Paper. Bonn: Germanwatch
- L Junghans
- S Harmeling
Junghans, L., and S. Harmeling. 2012. Different Tales from Different Countries, a First Assessment of the OECD 'Adaptation
Marker'. Briefing Paper. Bonn: Germanwatch. Accessed August 3, 2016. https://germanwatch.org/en/download/7083.pdf.
Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks' Climate Finance. The African Development Bank (AfDB)
- Mdb
MDB. 2015. 2014 Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks' Climate Finance. The African Development Bank (AfDB);
OECD Comments on the CIS Working Paper 56, 2010 -Coding Error or Statistical Embellishment? The Political Economy of Reporting Climate Aid. Comments Provided to the Authors
- Oecd
OECD. 2010. OECD Comments on the CIS Working Paper 56, 2010 -Coding Error or Statistical Embellishment? The Political
Economy of Reporting Climate Aid. Comments Provided to the Authors (A. Michaelowa and K. Michaelowa) on 21
Climate Adaptation Marker: Quality Review. Document DCD/DAC/STAT(2013)5. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development -Development Assistance Committee Working Party on Development Finance Statistics
- Oecd
OECD. 2013. Climate Adaptation Marker: Quality Review. Document DCD/DAC/STAT(2013)5. Paris: Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development -Development Assistance Committee Working Party on Development
Finance Statistics. Accessed August 3, 2016. www.oecd.org/dac/environment-development/Climate%20Adaptation
%20Marker_Declassified.pdf.
Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies
- J T Roberts
- K Starr
- T Jones
- D Abdel-Fattah
Roberts, J. T., K. Starr, T. Jones, and D. Abdel-Fattah. 2008. The Reality of Official Climate aid. Oxford Energy and Environment
Comment, November 2008. Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Accessed August 3, 2016. www.oxfordenergy.
org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/November2008-ClimateAid-BenitoMuller-.pdf.
Africa's Adaptation Gap. Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation Challenges and Costs for Africa. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme
- Unep
UNEP. 2013. Africa's Adaptation Gap. Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation Challenges and Costs for Africa. Nairobi: United
Nations Environment Programme. Accessed August 3, 2016. www.unep.org/pdf/AfricaAdapatationGapreport.pdf.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Document FCC/INFORMAL/84/Rev.1. Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
- Unfccc
UNFCCC. 1992. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Document FCC/INFORMAL/84/Rev.1. Bonn:
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Accessed August 3, 2016. http://unfccc.int/files/
essential_background/convention/background/application/pdf/convention_text_with_annexes_english_for_
posting.pdf.
Addendum Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Fifteenth Session. Document FCCC/CP/ 2009/11/Add.1. Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
- Unfccc
UNFCCC. 2009. Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Fifteenth Session, Held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December
2009 Addendum Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Fifteenth Session. Document FCCC/CP/
2009/11/Add.1. Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Accessed August 3, 2016. http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf.
- van Gameren Valentine
- OECD-CPI