Intelligence services intervention: constraints in Portuguese Democratic state

Abstract

The current national, international, transnational and global within the sector of security and information, either in terms of knowledge or in terms of sector development, is no longer the same in comparison to the reality of previous decades. Accordingly, it's intended to reflect the importance of the relationship between concepts associated with security, the utilization of information, the democratic state and the fundamental rights to personal privacy. Since our approach concerns a sensitive topic, an integrative review approach, in an inductive an exploratory study is made, to understand the state of the theme and allowing us to expose some critique questions. In a changing world that faces emergent forces of internal security, disturbance requires that democratic states, including Portugal, comprise strategies that flow from Intelligence Services to be able to be preventive, proactive, predictive according to patterns. Smart Policing is possible to do in compliance with the norms and providing citizens’ rights are met.

Full text

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Sérgio Mendes
Polícia de Segurança Pública, Portugal.
samendes@psp.pt
Sónia Morgado
ICPOL, Instituto Superior de Ciências Policiais e Segurança Interna, Lisboa, Portugal.
smmorgado@psp.pt
Intelligence services intervention:
constraints in Portuguese Democratic state
Intervenção em serviços de inteligência:
restrições no Estado Democrático Português
RESUMO
O panorama atual nacional, internacional, transnacional e global no âmbito do sector da segurança e
informação, quer em termos de conhecimentos, quer em termos de desenvolvimento da área, transmutou-
se. A abordagem destes elementos requer um enfoquen a congregação dos diferentes domínios envolvidos,
isto é, serviços de segurança, Estado democrático, informação e direitos pessoais. Por se tratar de um tema
sensível, a reexão elaborada sustenta-se numa abordagem integrativa de revisão, realizando-se um estudo
indutivo e exploratório para a análise do estado de arte e avaliação de questões e contextos críticos. Num
mundo que se transforma e enfrenta complexas formas de perturbação da segurança interna requer que
os estados democráticos, incluindo Portugal, incluam estratégias decorrentes dos uxos de informação
dos Serviços de Informações, para encetar estratégias preventivas, proactivas, preditivas de acordo com
padrões. Smart policing é possível dentro das normas sem comprometer os direitos fundamentais.
Palavras-chave: direitos, estado democrático, informações, Portugal, segurança.
ABSTRACT
The current national, international, transnational and global within the sector of security and information,
either in terms of knowledge or in terms of sector development, is no longer the same in comparison to the
reality of previous decades. Accordingly, it’s intended to reect the importance of the relationship between
concepts associated with security, the utilization of information, the democratic state and the fundamental
rights to personal privacy. Since our approach concerns a sensitive topic, an integrative review approach, in
an inductive an exploratory study is made, to understand the state of the theme and allowing us to expose
some critique questions. In a changing world that faces emergent forces of internal security, disturbance

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requires that democratic states, including Portugal, comprise strategies that ow from Intelligence Services
to be able to be preventive, proactive, predictive according to patterns. Smart Policing is possible to do in
compliance with the norms and providing citizens’ rights are met.
Keywords: rights, democratic state, intelligence, security, Portugal.
1. Introduction
Intelligence enrolls an important task in the denition of security for a community, country, continent and
world. In this perspective, intelligence embraces a side of objectivity, as a mean to maintain order and peace,
as a compensation of insecurity episodes, as its own ground for building a safer society. In line with James
(2013) “intelligence has always been core business for the armed forces and for the security services” (p. 5).
In the alterations trend of the quantum enemy face (the orbit of frontiers, uniforms, structured military
and ideological organizations, fade away in a society technological dependent and developed), political
actors present an emergent need of “profound, complete and wide knowledge” (Carvalho, 2014, p.1).
Intelligence dened according with the needs, provides support and context for risk analysis of the benets
and probable outputs (Lowenthal, 2012), id est, is the research and exploration of information helping the
State (Carvalho, 2014).
The ambiguity of the relation between quantity and quality of intelligence necessary for the Intelligence
Services is a matter of discussion. In fact, not every information has the same value, as so the recollection
and segregation implies material analysis to encounter which one is important and necessary.
In dierent historical time frames (terrorist’s attacks, war scenario, international conicts, civil wars, ghting
organized crime and “white collar” crime) intelligence services are the key element for governmental action
in keeping order and peace of the countries and world, and therefore is considered the rst line a State
defense.
The current national, international, transnational and global within the sector of security and information,
either in terms of knowledge or in terms of sector development, is no longer the same in comparison to
the reality of previous decades. This evolution engages in what James (2013) calls “plethora information”,
which increases the transparency of police work. Additionally, the approach to this sector it’s not advisable
to be made by isolating the dierent areas involved: security services, democratic State, information’s and
personal rights - citizenship. Policing with intelligence is the driven force of security force, to undermine the
misuse and proclivity of not sharing information.
As an integrative element of secret services, that guarantee the “privacy of nations” (Shore, 2011),
intelligence services are a legal and rational tool of government that provides apparatus for state operations
and analysis. Per Carvalho (2014) it’s entwined with the core of sovereignty powers, being also a true a
noble public service.
The desire to improve the Intelligence performance needs to come from within (Johnson, 2010), deprived
of compromising the citizenship and personal rights. The power encapsulated in intelligence services, in
dierent political schemes, depend on legislation and executive orders. The relation between intelligence

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gathered by services, the democratic control and the human rights is not peaceful (Brodeus, Gill, & Tolborg,
2003). Secret activity role on safeguarding democracy might be wounded in is legitimacy if they violate
the human rights, namely the article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) “arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence” (ONU, 2014). This is one of the rst constraints
of intelligence services.
As the emergency and importance of this symbiosis, security or security functions and limits to intelligence,
the paper is presented in ve sessions. The rst section includes an introduction, whereas we nd the
objectives and methods. The state of art, that presents a revision of studies and reexions of the thematic, is
in the session two and three. Pondering the sensitiveness of the topic an integrative review is used in section
4. Following is presented the results and nally in the last section, the conclusion.
2. Intelligence and Information
Chronologically, intelligence services date to XVI century, as a specialized tool for Spanish and |Italian
Monarchy. Afterwards, the institutions of legitimacy mechanisms of State intervention, has been developed
in security and defense, and its importance has grown sustained by the emergence of new military (armed
conicts, civil wars), security (violent extremism, terrorist attacks, namely 09-11-01), and maintenance of
world order and peace (Afghanistan and Iraq interventions). This approach consolidates the Weberian model
in which the historical evolution is a consequence of luck, disorder, irrationality and latent politicization
(Laurent, 2013).
Intelligence and Intelligence Services has a historical model on the precept of security operating in
dierentiated strands and executing multi-tasks, imposing strategies to a greater or lesser extent of control.
The strategies are embedded with a proactive concept and the reduction of the risk perception amongst
the society. In fact, the main core is the individual manifestations of State power and national interest
(Herman, 1996; Lander, 2004). For this reason, intelligence encapsulates a key role in modern society
(Scott & Hughes, 2009; Scott & Jackson, 2004).
In a task conglomerate, oriented to prevention and protection of individuals, states, and behaviors of criminal
nature, anchor the notion of national security (Götz, 2006; Pieroth et al., 2005; Roggan & Kutscha, 2006).
In this process, the traditional dividing lines between distinctive stakeholders (security and military forces,
judiciary branch) will vanish, and interactions tend to fuse (Hetzer, 1999; Sieber, 2005, & Sta, 1999(cited
by Engelhart, 2010).
The utilitarian instrument of information’s emerges in a security context that Bono (2006) considers
as “emergent in contemporary state and that intrinsically denes the coercive use of state organisms,
and actors with similar functions, for internal and external threats” (p. 234). Ratclie (2008) considers
intelligence as “the product of systematic gathering, evaluation, and synthesis of raw data individuals or
activities suspected of being or known to be, criminal in nature. Information is compiled, analyzed and/or
disseminated in an eort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal activity” (p. 92).
Intelligence services operate in environments of constant uncertainty and change, in a global scenario that
forces the readjustment of intervention and its partnerships. The conduct transcends national space, and
includes the transnational one, allowing the development of a global security frame. The existence of a
global world, considered by Friedman (2005) a at world, and by Scholte (2000) as supra-territorial space
that coexists with national sovereignty denes the targets and operations of intelligence services and its
agencies (Aldrich, 2009). The work is “to serve the national (security) interest by maximizing the state’s

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advantage (power and inuence) over others.” redening as “critical element of maintaining and expanding
their power” (Munton & Fredj, 2013, p. 668).
“The process of creating, capturing and using knowledge to enhance organizational performance’ (Collier,
2006, p.109) is the perfect denition for knowledge management. Its use is of added value for the
organization “given context and meaning by the additional of organizational wisdom” (Ratclie, 2008,
p. 98). Related to knowledge management and organizational memory, intelligence services result in an
intense activity for policing in intelligence-led atmospheres.
Globalization and trans-nationalization induces new challenges for intelligence services, since the means
available to organized crime, terrorists, violent extremism and individual’s that out the law, serve their intents,
feasibly the coordination by technology that wire the world (smartphones – disposable or not –, encrypted
electronic mail and SMS, internet and chat rooms – dark web and deep net –, ash drives, and so on).
It’s in this set-up that subordinated services to the pillars of Democratic and law State, that include defense
and security structures, are a staunch defender of democratic legality, internal security guarantee (proactive
and reactive) and human rights. Individual rights and freedoms shall be ensured every time state ay
regulates public and private life while respecting their freedom (Zucca, 2009). These principles are highly
valued, in times of constant mutations, derived from an economic crisis, technological changes, unstable
peace environment, rapid information ow, that represent the society of uncertainty and “times of late
modernity” (Costa, 2010, p. 10).
Thus, the intensication of the utilization of intelligence has been a pretext for various approaches to the
growth of the complexity of the elements that causes insecurity (terrorism, arms smuggling, human being
and drug tracking, cyber-crime, human exploitation, violent extremism, warlordism). Consequently, based
on the fundamental right, security, state legislators tend to open precedent by restricting fundamental
rights and freedoms, and thereby infringing article 12.º (UDHR). Acquiring knowledge or other skills and
competencies for understanding the reality is the heart of procedure and measures of intelligence, engaging
in a qualied knowledge of secrets (how, whom, why, where, what). The formalities start with reserved or
undercover forms for recollecting information (Carvalho, 2014).
The cyclical and continuous process of intelligence embodies in interconnection of dierent states, from
the demand and need of information – threats to security, warnings –, to management, planning,
collecting, analysis and production of results and its dissemination (Ivanov, 2011; Matei & Bruneau, 2011b),
countenancing value to intelligence for decision making process.
Fig. 1 Intelligence Cycle
Fonte: (Matei & Bruneau, 2011b)

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Given this quintet, Herman (1996) describes it only in three stages, which were, without the doubt, the
stumbling-block for intelligence services scrutiny. The trilogy refers the collecting, analysis, and dissemination.
In common, the increase value for state intervention is the base of prevention and guarantor of security.
This guarantee can be obtained through covert action – under covered action, that enables inuence
over politics, economics, and militaries in an external ecosystem in which the role of government is not
apparent or of public knowledge. Does not include counter-espionage, diplomacy, military and security
forces intervention (Scott, 2004).
Information usage, by intelligence services of the republic, as a promoter of truth discovery, citizens’ rights
and freedoms (social, cultural, economic, political-ideological, spiritual or religious), lasting legal concord,
shall be only eective on the basis of Aquilani’s prudence motto (Aquino, 2016). This entail is necessary to
ensure that the eect of a more rigorous application of the legislation, that promotes a bigger increase in
security levels, doesn´t tend to a systematic reduction of citizens’ rights and freedoms and consequently
in predisposition on them for a confrontation with the State. Also, so that cognomen of “peace villains”
(Aldrich, 2009, p. 35) fades away by the eectiveness and eciency of the intervention.
The axiological duality is achieved if covert action is set as the soul of “state secrecy – the intelligence
services, classied information, or diplomatic discretion” (Horn, 2011, p. 104), being unanimously accepted
that the maintaining secrecy levels are appropriated (Chesterman, 2011).
The judicial-criminal space for intelligence services intervention as “an instrument of state power”, “a force
multiplier”, that “augment that power” (Munton & Fredj, 2013, p. 668), and as armed force of democratic
legality, must be reected not only in the utilization, or actuation across borders, to guarantee compliance
with fundamental rights. In the end, they turn their backs to what Rovner (2011) considers the manipulation
of intelligence information as images of ideologies or politics – top down politicization.
Behind this lies the States undertaking to the responsibilities of improving the normative, thus facilitating
compliance of constitutional exegesis in fundamental rights and freedoms, tolerance, and legitimacy, in
moments of dispute and propitious to social conict and criminological conducts.
3. Intelligence Services, Information Sensitive, and Limits
Both internal and external threats in the complex, at all levels, contemporary world imprints a social
contract whose debut coexists with the narrowing of the private sphere (video surveillance, digital print, full
body scanners at airport checkpoints, DNA database) along with rational appliance of intelligence, ensuring
benets at security level (Chesterman, 2010). Although obtaining intelligence (intel) is transparent and
public, within the legal normative and adjacent accountability, Westin (1971) considers that in a free society
shouldn’t have to choose between rational appliance of authority and citizen privacy.
In western world prevails the democratic State, in which, security and liberty tend, in some cases, to be
antonyms. In a liberal society that values such as law, individuality, auto-determination and democratic
politic institutions (Kantner & Liberatore, 2006), the perception of threats, might expand the intelligence
services intervention, so be able to proactive in anticipation of real concretization of threats to national
security. In light of recent events (terrorism, violent extremism, migration ows). Westin (2003) states that
using tools for intelligence at the disposal of law-enforcement, intelligence services, such as “adoption of
biometric identier systems” and “some form of national ID system seems (…) inevitable” (p. 450).
The exacerbation of intelligence service expertise in collecting useful knowledge is grounded in the
appropriateness of means to new realities inherent to new intervention landscapes. The technological

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improvement in collecting information, storing data, retrieving and analyzing data, allowed a more widely
data gathering from trac stops to suspicious activity, criminal complaints (Goldstein, 2003), terrorist
threats and dangers. The appropriated use of data, concerning the good quality, “rigorously developed,
carefully presented, can be very powerful in altering public attitudes and pressures. Aected citizens can
become an important force in support of good practice” (Goldstein, 2003, p. 34).
The relevant information cipher to be held by states or his actors is a sensitive matter, changing over time,
levels of literacy and culture (Martin & Rabina, 2009), democracy, and technology development.
As the rst instrument of the mechanism of intervention, intelligence services, as a prima ratio of State, sets
forth, some limitations. In accordance with Carvalho (2014), Levi & Wall (2004) e UN (2014), which are:
(i) constitutional order; (ii) social and cultural matrix; (iii) eective capability of intelligence services; (iv)
citizens’ rights, freedoms and guarantees; and (v) condence of civil society.
The occurrence of events, already mentioned, inuential in the perception and awareness of security might
entail to modifying those limits, embodying as essential a higher level of readiness for successful security
strategy. However, this path may not be lead to a higher level of security in comparison with the previous or
existing now (Peissl, 2003).
Achieving the balance between eectiveness of the function, its own boundaries, and democratic control is,
in countries with established democracies or in new democracies, a constant challenge (Matei & Bruneau,
2011a). Nonetheless, Manning (2001) alerts to the fact that the intelligence embracement as a police
mandate might not result in eciency of action because information-based policing doesn’t necessary
imply security enhancement. Still, information is essential to intelligence-led policing, to new public
management, because it combines the need for reliable intelligence, as also promotes attitudes changes in
public, becoming a useful mean to good practice (Goldstein, 2003).
Cogitating in a world that embodies the panopticon metaphor (Foucault, 1977), representing both
summations of power/knowledge, aims to induce a state of conscious and permanent visibility to assure
functioning of power. Intelligence gathering from surveillance is the key element to intelligence services
intervention, allowing police ordering, investigation development, capillary extensions of state power.
Bearing in mind the ancient Egyptian symbol, the Eye of Horus, that oer protection, state power and good
health, one could say, that in a panopticon world, intelligence services are the main vehicle for democratic
states to ensure national security, by ensuring safety and protection before dangers, security and good
health of the states concerning threats by reinstating its power validated with information’s obtained.
The desideratum evolves for a continuum of two binomial concepts: secrecy (condition for intelligence)
– openness (a necessary condition for performance improvement) (Johnson, 2010); proactive approach
(strategic planning) – reactive approach (traditional ‘re brigade’ style of policing) (Maguire, 2008).
4. Methodology
Bearing in mind that our approach concerns a sensitive topic, an integrative review was undertaken as
the appropriate method, to understand the state of the theme and allowing us to expose some critique
questions.
In an inductive, and exploratory study, the integrative literature review enables us to make a comprehensive
knowledge of the matter. In fact, the holistic conceptualization and synthesis of the literature to date
(Torraco, 2005), benets the theoretical approach to the subject, creating the desired knowledge.

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The design was informed by contemporary guidance in an integrative review. The aim was mitigating the
risks of bias and inaccuracy that can be associated with interrogating literature of this nature (Whittemore
& Kna 2005), making it more rigorous.
The search methods were based in reviewing diverse literature, from of Europol, national ocial journal,
the web of science, Scopus, Thomson Reuters, science-direct, and other documents considered relevant,
was recognized as central to providing a comprehensive understanding of the phenomena, constraints for
intelligence services intervention.
Exploratory engagement with existing literature enabled the reviewers to identify subjects to exclude,
enabling focus to be retained on examining the most relevant literature.
The search strategies were based on databases literature previously mentioned, for articles or any
documentation published along the years. Social science, police science, intelligence science databases
were included to ensure relevant literature was not omitted.
The necessity to narrow the scope to develop practicable search of parameters was made, and therefore,
were used relevant keywords that produced primary research studies that investigated the limitations to
intelligence services.
This strategy ensured the comprehensive identication of papers, helping to mitigate potential limitations
caused by inconsistencies in the indexing of the review topics (Whittemore & Kna 2005).
Recognizing the challenges associated with gauging the quality of sources each article, document, scientic
paper was read, critiqued and systematically assessed for purpose statement or research questions,
characteristics of the subject, method of data analysis, results and common ground. Following Kirkevold
(1997) method, the authenticity, methodological and informational quality and representativeness of the
papers were considered during synthesis
5. Results - Practical Implications and new guidelines
The intelligence services interventions are an area of interest to researchers as well to every stakeholder,
namely, security forces, government, citizens, organizations, and every member of the society.
In a changing world, where security concerns grow, either from homegrown oenders, or terrorist attacks,
with the compliance of high unpredictability and unknown risks (oenders with/without criminal record,
either migrants or home grown, with and without religious convictions, and other factors), requires that
democratic states, including Portugal, comprise strategies to face the challenges. Prevention, proactivity,
predictively according with patterns (4 P’s) it’s only possible with data information. The ways that the
gathering is made needs to be in strict compliance with the norms, providing citizens’ rights are met.
In times of geo-globalization and stratospheric approaches to security, the three securities rationalities –
populist, technic-tactical and political, are the foundation of mission denition, risk management (defense
of critical actives) and selection of countermeasures suitable to the threats. This strategy is only feasible if
intelligence is gathered, and used as knowledge to a more ecient and proactive decision-making process.
In the absence of a coherent high-level evidence base, it is worth noting that there is much agreement about
the limitations to intelligence services. The substantial crossover of conceptual responsibilities between
crime analysis and intelligence within the Australian Crime commission - ACC’s enforcement theories need
not be a problem for clients if the strengths and limitations of each process output are understood (Ratclie,
2008).

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5.1. Portugal: Intelligence Services and its limits
As a fundamental role that no nation cannot abdicate, because doing so means not knowing (Bruneau,
2001) and consequently being unable to detect potential threats. Therefore, Portugal is not unaware of this
reality.
Regardless its territorial (internal or external) scope, powers, and competences (restricted and operative
execution), the constitutional legislator dened the model, with the creation, in 1984, of the Intelligence
System of the Portuguese Republic – SIRP (Lei n.~30/84, od 5 September), and the Constitution of
Portuguese Republic – CRP, article 164(q), denes that the “SIRP regimen and state secret” are within
“absolute reserve legislative responsibility”.
The constitutionalization of SIRP’s mission (since its creation, 1984, and the adjustments, organic Law n.
º4/2004, 6 November, regulated by Law n. º 9/2007, 19 February) lled the existing gap in this eld, that
had been secured by military services.
Subordinated to pillars of the democratic state, SIRP
has the responsibility to ensure the production of
intelligence necessary to guarantee the national
independence and internal security (article 2(2)). The
adoption of the exclusivity principle (article 6º, 20º
and 21º) enables other services to pursue activities
identical referred in the law. This constitutional and
legal principle had an objective bipolarisation. On
one hand sealing certain capacities and ways of
intervention to intelligence services (Carvalho, 2014)
and on the other hand, prevent third parties in tailing
same tasks.
The composition of legal system concerning the
respect: (i) for the Constitution, (ii) to the law and
legality; (iii) rights, freedoms and guarantees; (iv)
functional specicity; (v) limitation in intervention;
(vi) exclusivity; (vii) reciprocal cooperation between
services, is not only the foundation for SIRP, but also its
rst set of limitations (Carvalho, 2014).
Fig. 2 Pillars and SIRP
Fig. 3 SIRP Foundations

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It is in this set of principles that arises the following limitations for Intelligence Services (Carvalho, 2014):
1. Conditioning of tools for collecting information (article 34 (4), CRP), which inhibit the activity of Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) and Communications Intelligence (COMINT). The impossibility of recollecting
information with interference in telecommunications, electronic means or any another mean, comes
from the historical reality, which the stigmatizing synopses of Political Police of the Dictatorial Portuguese
Regime – PIDE/DGC, are still being felt, and there aren’t major incidents of eective threats to national
security;
2. Dubious interpretation of information and criminal investigation in covert actions;
3. Fiscalization, control and previous authorization of activities and means utilization;
4. SIRP operating mode (dependence on other services).
To this of limitations, of normative order, there are the ones of operational nature. These ones dene the
endogenous limits to the information production: (i) existence of practice and habits deeply roots; (ii) ab
initio denition of information intelligence – political, jurisdictional or self-control (decentralisation versus
centralization) and (iii) demarcation of competences, powers and hierarchical dependence (internal versus
external logic),
The historical, cultural and social matrix is the third limit, that it might be considered as exogenous to
intelligence production. Also, the ones stemming from the economic and worldwide conjuncture is also a
boundary (Carvalho, 2014). Realistic in a transnational world the juridical order is not a limitation per se,
to which we might add the countries determinants as a full-edged European member, and as “region”
in the global dimension. The economic, political and social factors, understood as scal austerity policy,
encroachment on areas, such as human resources (recruitment, selection, career management, human
resources retention, training, and actors’ actualization), strategic management (periodization of activities,
monitoring and follow-up, performance) and facilities equipment’s and management (technology
renovation, development and development of management and data processing systems).
The described limits are in the matrix of origin because aggregates levels of juridical and constitutional
order, historical and cultural context, and the eective capacity for intelligence services, fundamental rights,
freedoms and guarantees of citizens and trust of civil society.
Despite the accordance with the precepts and limitations of intelligence services in a democratic state,
Portugal presents specic patterns related to its own evolution, from a dictatorial state to a democratic
one. However, the triad – democratic control, eectivity and eciency of security forces (Matei & Bruneau,
2011a) – is fundamental in the prosecution of the responsibilities and competencies of the services, in order
to ensure the principles of the democratic state.
6. Conclusion
In the contemporary global world intelligence services are subjected to great pressure and enormous
surveillance of the society actors.
Bonding intelligence services to intelligence-led policing, it’s possible to derive that both are “business model
and managerial philosophy where data analysis (…) are pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework
that facilitates (…) problem reduction, disruption and prevention through both strategic management and
eective enforcement strategies that target prolic and serious oenders” (Ratclie, 2008, p. 89), and
provide safety and national security.

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The dilemma between the guarantee and eective action in combating innumerable threats – security –
and dangers – safety – that present themselves to a state or nation, and the guarantee of fundamental
rights, entails in a fundamental notion of limits, and structures that assess the accountability of their action.
Para Aldrich (2009) the accountability as a slow a process, that is, in most cases, determined by civil society.
By contrast the democratic control of prosecution functions and consequent accountability it’s not a
complacent process because presents a prerogative of the state, conditioning the involvement of parliaments
and citizens. On the other hand, the adjustment of measures and legislative powers of security forces is
entailed by the reduction of human rights, privacy and free movement of people and goods (Bono, 2006)
(for instance Schengen space and free circulation of human capital).
The main challenges and threats of states are strengthened by radicalism and technology. This premise is
the fundament of the use of information and all procedures concerning the maintenance of liberty, security
of a democratic state.
The state, represented by their national governments, hold, in their jurisdiction, the largest collection of data
that can be transformed into useful information, for a proactive intervention to face the enemy, whether is
an internal or external threat. Even though legislative dierentiation between democratic states, it does not
imply dissimilar behaviors concerning the solutions for intelligence services from normative-constitutional
and technological measures.
In comparison with democratic States, Portugal present precincts arising from cultural stigmatization about
the lesser transparency of intelligence services in the period of 25 of April of 1974. One of those boundaries
is referred to communication interception and covert action. The data collection obtained by electronic
transference or phone communications are found to be an interference, only possible to be executed in
criminal law proceedings through a judge warrant. Apropos the covert action are only developed in criminal
proceedings, even if they are the vital core of the operationalization and dierentiation of services (Carvalho,
2014).
The challenge imposed by global society places human rights and citizens guarantees in a ne and volatile
line of equilibrium alongside the need for secrecy, authority and intelligence services. With the technology
development and with moments of tension and national and international threats and dangerous,
supportive of social conict unusual epidemic phenomena, imposes that security shouldn’t be restricted to
state, therefore, the recurring and crescent need for intelligence. These imperative changes the equilibrium
between the two forces, projecting them in legal and supra-constitutional law, of democratic regulation,
contrary to the belief of Locke (1952) that imposed limits to legislative and normative production, defending
that it should be conned or incorporated the nature of law.
In a democratic state, the knowledge obtained with the collecting process analysis and dissemination is a
process systematic, interactive and ethical, essential for the development of a strategic and tactical planning
in favor of decision-making process. The categorical process of decision making is the result of forecast of
future (potential) events, prior notice, and awareness for potential threats. The constraints to intelligence
services (gathering, data management, data processing, reports) enable a proactive intervention in the
mitigation of possible and potential risks. For this reason, intelligence and intelligence services reveal
themselves as a critical capacity in a changing world.
Intelligence plays an important role in security aairs. The provocativeness or fruitfulness of this approach
it’s the capacity to generate new background, ideas, directions and discussion for the eld. In a democratic
State, such as Portugal, it’s desirable Smart Policing, where can be applied the Boyd’s OODA (Observe-
Orient-Decide-Act) Loop (1987), without compromising the privacy, and fundamental rights of citizens.

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