Serbia and Major Powers: Public Opinion on EU and Russian Influence

Full text

Milos Popovic
Serbia and Major Powers
Public Opinion on EU and
Russian Influence
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy

Summary
Acknowledgments 3
Introduction 5
Perception of Major Powers 7
Military Power ................................... 8
Economic Power ................................. 9
The Credibility of Investors .......................... 10
New Technologies ................................ 11
Political Power ................................... 12
Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights .............. 13
"The Good, the Bad and the Evil": Major Power Influ-
ence 13
EU, Russia or Neutrality? Cooperation with Major
Powers 18
Declining Support for EU Membership ................. 18
Demand for Cooperation with Russia .................. 22
Preference for Neutrality ........................... 24
Conclusion 26
2

Acknowledgments
My gratitude goes to BCSP Director Sonja Stojanovic Gajic and Executive Director (and
my mentor) Predrag Petrovic for giving me the opportunity to take part in the survey
and write this report; to my colleagues Radomir Cvetkovic, who first sparked the idea
for this report and encouraged me in the process, and Maja Bjelos, who engaged me in
a meaningful and fruitful discussion; to Sofija Mandic, Bojan Elek, Isidora Stakic, Sasa
Djordjevic, Katarina Djokic and Andrej Stefanovic who shared their supportive suggestions
along the way; to Vladimir Erceg for organizing a workshop in which I talked about survey
design; and to Viktorija Vuksanovic, Dragana Belanovic, and Dragana Milanovic for their
able administrative assistance.
My work at BCSP would not be possible without a generous support from Open Society
Institute through its Think Tank Young Professional Development Program. I am also
thankful to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their funding of the survey and
the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs for their partnership. This publication has
benefited from U.S. Department of Defense’s Minerva Initiative grant. These organizations
do not necessarily agree with my arguments, nor did I ask for or receive any suggestions to
frame it in current shape. The statements made in this report are solely my own.

Number of respondents
300
250
200
150
100
50

Introduction
As the preparations for new National Security Strategy are underway, Serbia finds itself
in a Europe rattled with the refugee crisis, looming terrorist threats, and fragile relations
between Russia and the West. While the government remains committed to EU membership
and cooperation with NATO, the post-Brexit EU seems reluctant to expand into the Balkans,
let alone defend decaying rule of law in its candidate countries. The EU’s wavering attitude
toward the membership of the Balkan countries allows Russia to play a more prominent role
in Serbia. Even though an alliance with Russia is not a viable alternative to EU accession,
Belgrade reaches out to its traditional partner for support over Kosovo, loans, and arms
sales.
1
Belgrade’s growing cooperation with Russian President Vladimir Putin is causing
concerns in Western capitals that Russia is trying to cleave the country from its EU path.
2
Belgrade plays down these ties by arguing that Russia is only one of its foreign policy
pillars,3and that Serbia’s policy of "military neutrality" precludes the country from joining
alliances.
However, there is a considerable uncertainty surrounding Serbia’s foreign policy, and
particularly its policy of "military neutrality" as well as the scope of its ties to Russia. The
lack of public debate about these issues creates a general confusion about the meaning,
utility, and consequences of Serbian foreign policy. Yet it is imperative to understand these
issues in order to make sound foreign policy decisions. Resolving these issues requires
in-depth analysis of how Serbia can best secure its own interests amid great tension between
EU and NATO and Russia in Europe.
This report
4
examines public attitude about key foreign policy issues ranging from the
perception of major powers to cooperation with EU and Russia. In particular, the report
asks:
•What do respondents think of major powers and their influence on Serbia?
5

•What kind of relations should Serbia develop toward major powers?
The major findings are as follows. First, the majority is still in favor of EU membership
and satisfied with the existing level of cooperation with Russia. Perception of EU has
recently deteriorated; it remains relevant only in the domain of democracy and rule of
law, and membership is expected to further economic benefits and international standing.
The majority demands a better definition of the policy of neutrality in Serbia’s foreign and
security policy.
Recommendations
Serbian government:
•Accelerate the work on National Security Strategy;
•
Include members of all political parties, civil society, academic community and in-
terested citizens in the public discussion on the potential options for the Strategy:
consensus through dialogue equals better quality;
•Better specify what neutrality means in a changing geo-political environment;
•
Align the national security policy with EU policy and determine best options for the
policy of neutrality and its compatibility with EU membership requirements;
•Make citizens more accustomed to benefits and costs of EU membership.
EU and International Donors:
•
Invest more into a straightforward and down-to-earth communication with young
people about the benefits of EU integration
•
Communicate the scope of EU contribution to a wider audience of non-academics and
non-policy makers.
6

Perception of Major Powers
The following set of questions is modeled after a 2013 survey by the Center for Free Elections
and Democracy (CeSID) where respondents were asked to use a 5-point scale to assess how
successful are five major powers (China, EU, Germany, Russia and the United States) in the
domain of:
•military, political, and economic power;
•credibility of investors;
•new technologies;
•and democracy, rule of law and human rights
The results demonstrate that the majority of Serbians see the United States and Russia as
supreme political and military powers, China as a technological powerhouse, and Germany
and the EU as the beacon of democracy, rule of law and human rights. Among these powers,
the United States ranks most prominently in domains ranging from military-political to
economic to technological. Russia is mostly perceived as a military and political power;
it is seen as less successful in the economic and technological sphere. The public opinion
perceives China as a successful economic and technological power; military and political
power are ranked lower than that of the United States and Russia. The majority trusts in
investors from EU and Germany and believes that their trademark is democracy, rule of
law, and human rights, but has little confidence in their military, political and technological
prowess.
7

Military Power
The majority believes that Russia, the United States and, to some extent, China are key
military powers, while the EU and Germany are regarded as military "dwarfs" (Figure 1).
More than three-quarters of respondents think that Russia is a successful military power,
which is largely in line with Moscow’s military-focused portrayal in pro-Kremlin media
such as Sputnik and Russia Today. Every second respondent views the United States as
a successful military power, while less than one-third believes that China is a successful
military power. More than two-thirds of the respondents do not recognize EU and Germany
as successful military powers.
The report also finds a temporal shift in public perception of the military power. In
the 2013 survey, the United States and China received a bit higher score (two-thirds and
one-half of positive responses, respectively).
3 3 12 30 41 11
3 4 13 37 32 11
7 22 36 14 10 11
26 32 22 5 4 11
52 27 7 3 3 8
EU
Germany
China
USA
Russia
%
5
43
21
Don't know
PLEASE EVALUATE THE MILITARY POWER OF THE FOLLOWING ACTORS
FROM 5 (SUCCESSFUL) TO 1 (UNSUCCESSFUL)
Figure 1: Perception of Military Power
8

Economic Power
The public believes that the United States and China are leading economic actors (see
Figure 2). More than a half of respondents see the United States as a successful economic
actor. Interestingly, the respondents are divided over the question whether Russia is a
leading economic power. Roughly one-third believes that Russia is successful, one-third
thinks that it is unsuccessful, and the rest are undecided. This is in stark contrast with
CeSID’s 2013 survey when over a half of the respondents thought of Russia as a successful
economy. Although nearly a half of the respondents believe that China is a successful
economy, this is a lower score compared to 2013 when every second respondent held a
positive view. One out of four respondents thinks that Germany has a successful economy,
which is a weaker score from that in 2013 (around 33%).
5 7 17 25 35 11
13 13 17 22 25 10
15 22 19 17 16 11
25 21 20 16 7 11
34 24 15 9 6 12
EU
Germany
Russia
China
USA
%
5
43
21
Don't know
PLEASE EVALUATE THE ECONOMIC POWER OF THE FOLLOWING
ACTORS FROM 5 (SUCCESSFUL) TO 1 (UNSUCCESSFUL)
Figure 2: Perception of Economic Power
The majority considers the EU as an unsuccessful economic actor similar to the 2013
9

survey (>10% of positive views). Perhaps the Eurozone crisis, as well as Brexit, have eroded
the confidence in EU.
The Credibility of Investors
The public more trusts Chinese and German investors than those from the United States,
EU, and Russia, as Figure 3 shows. Interestingly, Germany is the only actor with the clear
majority of positive responses. The public is, in contrast, largely split regarding the investors
from other powers, including China.
However, compared to 2013, there is more confidence in Chinese investors now than
four years ago, i.e. one-quarter versus one-third of positive responses. Russia experienced
the starkest fall in confidence from nearly one-half of positive responses in 2013 to only
one-third in 2017.
8 19 20 19 21 13
16 13 18 24 17 12
14 18 22 14 19 13
18 18 17 16 18 13
34 18 11 14 13 10
EU
Russia
USA
China
Germany
%
5
43
21
Don't know
PLEASE EVALUATE THE CREDIBILITY OF INVESTORS FOR THE FOLLOWING
ACTORS FROM 5 (SUCCESSFUL) TO 1 (UNSUCCESSFUL)
Figure 3: Perception of Credibility
10

New Technologies
The most innovative powers, according to the respondents, are China and the United
States (see Figure 4). The EU, Germany, and Russia are seen as less successful in this
domain. China and the United States are neck and neck with an approximately half of
positive responses each. Interestingly, there are more respondents who see Russia as a
technologically backward actor than those who believe otherwise. The same applies to the
EU and Germany both of which scored more negative than positive responses.
4 9 16 23 36 12
12 13 18 27 19 11
13 19 19 16 21 12
27 25 18 12 6 12
33 21 16 11 8 11
EU
Germany
Russia
USA
China
%
5
43
21
Don't know
PLEASE EVALUATE THE TECHNOLOGICAL POWER OF THE FOLLOWING ACTORS
FROM 5 (SUCCESSFUL) TO 1 (UNSUCCESSFUL)
Figure 4: Perception of Technological Power
The public view of technological power for the following actors has not significantly
changed compared to the 2013 survey. In fact, every second respondent believed that China
and the United States are the leading technological powers. One-third viewed Russia as
a technologically advanced country, while the EU and Germany received one-third and
one-fifth positive responses, respectively.
11

Political Power
Figure 5 shows that the vast majority of respondents views the United States and Russia as
the most powerful political actors, whereas China, EU, and Germany are seen as unsuccessful.
Over two-thirds of respondents believe that the United States and Russia are the most
successful political actors. This indicates that the public believes that these two actors have
stable political regimes and that they can decisively influence political actors and processes
in other countries.
3 7 18 26 34 12
3 11 26 20 28 12
5 9 25 28 22 11
36 34 9 9 3 9
44 26 11 5 3 11
EU
China
Germany
Russia
USA
%
5
43
21
Don't know
PLEASE EVALUATE THE POLITICAL POWER OF THE FOLLOWING ACTORS
FROM 5 (SUCCESSFUL) TO 1(UNSUCCESSFUL)
Figure 5: Perception of Political Power
Compared to the 2013 survey, China, EU, and Germany experienced a downfall in
public confidence. For instance, the positive view on China dissipated from a half of all
respondents in 2013 to less than 15% in 2017. Four years ago, one out of three respondents
saw Germany as a successful political actor. Now less than one-fifth shares this view.
12

Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights
The EU and Germany, followed by the United States, are supreme leaders in this domain
(see Figure 6). The clear majority of the respondents believes that China and Russia have a
poor record in terms of democracy, rule of law and human rights. However, Germany is
the only actor to receive fewer positive responses than in 2013. The respondents had more
confidence in Germany four years ago (around 66%) than they have today (56%).
4 10 8 17 48 13
13 11 17 36 10 13
19 14 31 14 12 10
25 26 15 10 12 12
30 26 17 9 6 12
China
Russia
USA
EU
Germany
%
5
43
21
Don't know
PLEASE EVALUATE THE DEMOCRACY, RULE OF LAW & HUMAN RIGHTS
OF THE FOLLOWING ACTORS FROM 5 (SUCCESSFUL) TO 1 (UNSUCCESSFUL)
Figure 6: Perception of Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights
"The Good, the Bad and the Evil": Major Power Influence
The survey finds that approximately one-third of the respondents identifies major power
politics as the greatest threat to Serbia’s national security. In this section, the report
inquiries into how the respondents see the influence of China, the EU, Germany, Russia,
and the United States on Serbia’s foreign policy. Figure 7 demonstrates that the public
13

holds that China, Germany, and Russia have a positive influence, while the EU and the
United States have a negative influence on Serbia’s foreign policy. More than a half of our
respondents perceive Chinese and Russian influence on Serbia as positive. This finding
is largely media-driven and reflects a dominant narrative of China and Russia as Serbia’s
friends.5
2 9 24 28 24 13
7 21 24 21 15 12
9 26 29 15 8 13
21 31 28 4 2 14
36 25 15 8 4 12
USA
EU
Germany
China
Russia
%
Good
Mostly good
Neutral
Mostly bad
Bad
Don't know
ASSESS THE INFLUENCE OF THE FOLLOWING ACTORS ON SERBIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Figure 7: Perception of Major Power Influence
The report also finds that more than a half of young people (ages 18 to 29) and female
respondents think that Russia has a good influence on Serbia. More than two-thirds of
students and male respondents agree with this view. Likewise, the analysis finds that the
largest share of the Russophiles is among the voters of the right-wing parties such as the
radicals (around 90%) and Dveri (two-thirds), and the socialists (three-quarters). More
than a half of the voters for the Prime Minister Vucic’s party, the progressives or SNS, is
fond of Russia’s influence. The only Serbian party in which the Russophiles are a minority is
the Democratic Party: only one-third of its voters favor Russia’s influence.
14

The U.S. influence is seen as dominantly negative across different categories of the
Serbian society. Only young people (ages 18 to 29) and students have a somewhat positive
view of American influence: one out of ten respondents each. The same proportion of
SNS voters holds the positive view despite the Prime Minister’s effort to improve Serbia’s
cooperation with the United States. Almost two-thirds of the respondents believe that there
will be no change in U.S. policy toward Serbia following the election of Donald J. Trump.
This result is somewhat surprising given the dominant pro-Trump campaign in Serbian
pro-government media at the moment of data collection for this survey.
With only one-fourth of positive responses and more than a third of negative ones,
Serbian youth is not very fond of EU influence. Only one out of five inhabitants of Belgrade,
one out of four in Vojvodina and one out of three in Central Serbia support EU influence.
Interestingly, EU influence is strongest in the countryside and weakest in the suburbs of
major cities. The Prime Minister’s party is deeply divided over the EU influence in favor of
the negative responses, i.e. one-third of negative versus one-fourth of positive responses.
Despite being one of the most pro-Russian parties in the Serbian parliament, the socialists’
voters hold that EU influence is more positive than negative.
China is least popular among the younger respondents (ages from 18 to 39). Only one
out of three young persons believe that the Chinese influence is positive; around a half of
respondents from other ages support Chinese influence. Two-thirds of Vojvodinians are fond
of the Chinese influence; less than a half of respondents from Belgrade and Central Serbia
share this view. Chinese influence finds support among the voters of nearly all of the parties
and especially among the radicals and liberals.
Women have a more positive view of Germany’s influence than men. One out of every
four male respondents believes that Germany exerts a bad influence on Serbia, while only
one out of every five women shares this view. The relative majority of young people (ages 18
15

to 29) welcomes German influence on Serbia. Approximately three-quarters of the liberals
have a positive view of Germany, as well as a half of the supporters of the Democratic
Party and the Socialist Party. Only 20% of the Prime Minister’s party approves of German
influence.
One of the overused and misused polarizations regarding Serbia’s foreign policy is
whether the country should side with the EU or Russia. Even though the majority may agree
this is a false dilemma, it persists in the absence of a clear dialogue on the pros and cons of
integration into EU versus a tighter cooperation with Russia. Leaving this gap unanswered
allows for speculations to thrive. This report, therefore, organizes its inquiry into five
themes (FDI influx, Employment, International Standing, Security and Political Stability),
which speak to the expected economic, political and security benefits. The respondents were
then asked to assess the benefits on a 5-point scale from "good" to "bad" (see Figure 10).
The findings suggest that the view of EU and Russia affects the benefits that the respon-
dents expect from each of them. The majority expects the integration into EU to benefit
Serbia’s economy by attracting FDI and improving employment. Previous surveys (2011-
2013) asked whether the respondents believe that EU membership would buttress Serbia’s
security. The 2017 results correspond to the 2011 and 2012 polls in that a bit more than a
third of the respondents thought that EU membership would improve Serbia’s security. In
2013, over a half of the respondents shared this view, indicating that the confidence in the
EU security capacity has deteriorated within last four years.
As a mirror image, the respondents believe that an alliance with Russia would bring
security and political stability. Simultaneously, they are more skeptical about the economic
benefits from a cooperation with Russia. This finding is generally congruent with the
respondents’ view of Russia as a political-military power.
16

14 22 21 14 13 16
17 20 20 11 16 16
17 23 24 9 11 16
18 23 20 11 14 14
21 27 20 9 9 14
Political stability
Security
Intl. standing
Employment
FDI influx
%
Good
Mostly good
Neutral
Mostly bad
Bad
DK
WHAT INFLUENCE WOULD EU MEMBERSHIP HAVE ON:
Figure 8: EU Influence
16 14 24 14 11 21
18 20 27 9 5 21
20 19 22 12 6 21
20 20 24 10 6 20
27 21 16 8 8 20
Intl. standing
Employment
Political stability
FDI influx
Security
%
Good
Mostly good
Neutral
Mostly bad
Bad
Don't know
WHAT INFLUENCE WOULD ALLIANCE WITH RUSSIA HAVE ON:
Figure 9: Russian Influence
Figure 10: EU and Russian Influence Compared
17

EU, Russia or Neutrality? Cooperation with Major Powers
How should Serbia position itself in relation to major powers? Since the democratic change
in 2000, Serbia’s key foreign policy goal has been an integration into the EU. In 2012,
Serbia received the candidate status, and this February the government opened two and
closed one chapter. EU is Serbia’s primary trade and investment partner.
6
At the same time,
Serbia fosters close relations with Russia. Moscow supports Serbia’s opposition to Kosovo
independence and owns Serbia’s oil monopoly. Recently, Russia has provided Serbia with
fighter jets, tanks, and combat vehicles.
7
Serbia is one of the rare European countries that
did not join EU sanctions against Russia for its annexation of Crimea and intervention in
the Ukraine conflict. The strategic orientation toward EU membership and cooperation
with Russia also includes Serbia’s policy of military neutrality. As Foreign Minister Ivica
Dacic summed it up: "[the] government has a clear policy based on military neutrality,
membership in the European Union and friendly relations with the Russian Federation."8
In this section, the report explores how the respondents view each of these facets of
Serbia’s foreign policy. Specifically, the report asks: (1) whether the respondents support
Serbia’s EU bid; (2) how cooperation with Russia should look; (3) whether there is a support
for the neutrality policy. The report finds that there is a relative majority for EU membership
but the gap between the proponents and opponents has significantly narrowed in the past
eight years. Next, the results show that the respondents are satisfied with the current level
of cooperation with Russia. Finally, there is a significant demand for a clarification of the
policy of neutrality.
Declining Support for EU Membership
There is a relative majority for EU membership, but the gap between the proponents and
opponents has narrowed to an all-time low (see Figure 11). According to the Serbian Euro-
18

pean Integration Office (SEIO) surveys from 2009 to 2016, the support for EU membership
has plummeted from two-thirds in 2009 to less than a half of favorable responses in 2016.
At the same time, the number of the proponents has increased three-fold in the observed
period.
67
16
58
25
51
33
41
31
51
22
44
25
48
28
47
29
43
35
December
2009
December
2010
December
2011
December
2012
December
2013
December
2014
December
2015
December
2016
January
2017
%
a
aYes
No
HOW WOULD YOU VOTE IN A REFERENDUM ON EU MEMBERSHIP?
Figure 11: Preference for EU Membership (2009–2017)
The results show that the decline in the share of the proponents of EU membership
continues into 2017. Figure 12 depicts the geographical distribution of "yes" versus "no"
votes per municipality. The proponents are the strongest in southeastern and eastern Serbia,
Raska (Sanjak), and northern Vojvodina, while the opponents are strongest in the rest
of Vojvodina, and Central Serbia. The proponents and opponents of EU integration are
neck and neck in Belgrade, a result that has drastically shifted since 2012. Five years ago,
two-thirds of Belgrade respondents were in favor of EU membership as opposed to barely
50% in 2017.
19

Supporters of
EU membership
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Figure 12: Preference for EU membership
20

Whereas Belgrade experienced a sharp drop in pro-integration responses over last five
years, the majority of the respondents from rural areas has shown unwavering support for
EU membership since 2012. Among other social categories, the staunchest supporters of EU
integration are among the respondents ages from 30 to 39 (50%), highly-educated individ-
uals (47%), the democrats and liberals (three-quarters each) as well as the progressives
and socialists (nearly a half of the respondents each). In contrast, the voters of right-wing
parties, young people (ages from 18 to 29), and uneducated male respondents are largely
against EU membership.
The deterioration of the support seems to be associated with the slowing speed of
Serbia’s integration into the EU. The majority believes that Serbia’s current accession speed
is either halted or extremely slow. There are a handful of respondents who conceive of a
faster accession speed. There is a demand for a faster integration into the EU with nearly
one-third of the respondents.
However, there are more "pessimists" than "optimists" with regard to the prospects of
joining EU. The clear majority of the respondents believes that Serbia will never join the
EU. The number of the "optimists" is extremely low; only one out of ten of the respondents
believes that Serbia would join the EU within 3-5 years. The least optimistic are young
people (ages from 18 to 29), males and highly educated individuals.
Despite the staggering pessimism, the EU is still perceived more in positive than negative
terms, as Figure 13 shows. The respondents mostly see EU as a generator of a healthy
economy, freedom of travel, peace, and democracy. Fewer dissenting voices are concerned
with the loss of cultural identity and an increase in crime.
21

19
15
6
8
6
5
4
3
1
5
4
3
3
2
2
14
DK
Poor border control
Unemployment growth
Bureaucracy
Waste of money
Increase in crime
Loss of cultural identity
Adopting euro
Social protection
More equality
Democracy
Stronger voice
Cultural diversity
Peace
Freedom of travel
Good economy
%
WHAT DOES EU MEAN TO YOU PERSONALLY?
Figure 13: Associations with EU
Demand for Cooperation with Russia
Russia enjoys traditionally high popularity among Serbian population, and close ties with
Belgrade. In 2008 Russia’s Gazprom purchased Serbian oil monopoly allegedly as a com-
pensation for Moscow’s support of Belgrade’s non-recognition of Kosovo. In turn, Serbia is
one of the rare European countries that refused to introduce sanctions against Russia for its
annexation of Crimea and support for rebel forces in Eastern Ukraine.
9
Even though Serbia
is an EU candidate country with more robust trade ties to Germany and Italy than Russia,
Belgrade has a free-trade agreement with Moscow and heavily depends on Russian energy
exports given that 80% of its gas imports come from Russia. In 2012, Moscow offered
Belgrade a USD 300 million bailouts amid a tension with the IMF and extended its hand to
Serbia’s banking, defense and railway sectors. Russia opened a humanitarian center in Nis
to facilitate Serbia’s purchase of Russian military equipment. Some believe that Serbia as an
22

EU member is poised to be another Cyprus, advancing Moscow’s interests in the Union.10
The scope of Russian influence is reflected in the survey results. As Figure 14 demon-
strates, the majority of the respondents is satisfied with the current level of cooperation
with Russia. Only one out of five would see this cooperation evolve into an alliance. Men
are more in favor of such an alliance than women (one-quarter versus one-fifth). One out
of four young persons (ages 18-29) is in favor of an alliance with Russia. Highly educated
individuals are less interested in an alliance with Russia: only every sixth is in favor, while
one-third of students and individuals without education are in favor of closer cooperation.
23 48 10 4 15
%
They should form a political alliance
Existing cooperation is satisfactory
Serbia is Russia's puppet
Russia's influence is bad
Don't know
HOW DO YOU SEE POLITICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN SERBIA AND RUSSIA?
Figure 14: Cooperation with Russia
Between a half and two-thirds of voters of pro-Russian, right-wing parties, the radicals
and Dveri, support an alliance with Russia. One-quarter of the Prime Minister’s progressives
also favor tighter cooperation with Russia. Other opposition parties do not prefer an alliance
with Russia.
23

The report also explores whether the respondents support integration into an alternative
economic and political bloc, the Russia-led Eurasian Union (see Figure 15). If an alliance
with Russia would entail an integration into the Eurasian Union, around one-third of the
respondents would vote "yes", while one-fifth would be against, and nearly a half would not
vote.
'RQWNQRZ/
:RQWYRWH
46%
<HV 32%
NR 22%
+2::28/'<28927(,1$5()(5(1'80216(5%,$¶6
0(0%(56+,3,15866,$/('(85$6,$181,21"
Figure 15: Alliance with Russia
Most supporters are among the elderly men (around one-third), whereas the least are
among the highly-educated respondents (nearly one-fifth). The voters of right-wing parties
are overwhelmingly in support of the integration. Even half of the progressives are fond of
the integration with Russia.
Preference for Neutrality
The concept of military neutrality was promoted in a 2007 Parliamentary resolution and
soon garnered considerable support across the political spectrum. Apart from a unilateral
24

resolution, there is neither a strategy nor a legal basis on the nature and scope of the
policy. It is, therefore, unclear whether Serbia aims to pursue neutrality in a systematic
fashion, and whether the neutrality implies isolation or active cooperation with NATO and
other countries. To add more to the confusion, Serbia has already concluded a series of
agreements with NATO and held military exercises with both NATO and Russia.
We should keep it,
but specify what we
mean under neutrality
38%
No, we should stay away from
any center of power 21%
Yes, we must choose
sides 21%
Don't know 20%
SHOULD SERBIA CHANGE ITS POLICY
OF NEUTRALITY IN THE FOLLOWING PERIOD?
Figure 16: Neutrality
The overall confusion over the policy has influenced the respondents, the majority of
whom (more than one-third) support neutrality but demand a clear definition of the concept
(Figure 16). About a half of young people (ages 18-29) support the policy, but one-third
demands a clear definition. The democrats, progressives, and socialists are largely in favor
of the policy, while the voters of the liberal and right-wing parties believe that Serbia should
choose sides.
Despite the favorable attitude toward the policy of neutrality, slightly more citizens
are in favor of Serbia’s engagement in peacebuilding/peace-keeping missions especially
25

if it brings economic and political benefits. Nearly a half of young people (ages 18-29)
and highly-educated respondents favor some kind of engagement, while women are more
supportive of engagement than men (49% vs. 45%).
The majority has no opinion on whether Serbia should participate in foreign-led missions.
Every fifth respondent believes that Serbia should engage only under UN umbrella. The
strongest supporters of this position are highly educated respondents (25%), Belgrade
inhabitants (32%) and men (22%). Nearly one out of five respondents support joint
operations with Russia, among them, being students (25%) and young people (24%). Every
sixth respondent thinks that Serbia should take part in both EU- and UN-led missions.
Conclusion
The Serbian government is keen on joining the EU and cooperating with NATO, even as it
pursues closer ties with Russia under the policy of military neutrality. Belgrade will need
to determine its foreign policy priorities beyond tactical balancing, and particularly define
neutrality in the wider context of its relations with Brussels and Moscow. The lack of clarity
in foreign policy is already taking a toll on public support for EU membership. Despite being
Serbia’s major donor, trading partner, and investor, the Serbian public is becoming more
skeptical of EU’s intention to accept Serbia as its full-fledged member, and more open to
the Russia alternative. Given Serbia’s long-standing preference for EU membership, these
results are defeating.
The Serbian government needs to think through its priorities in the upcoming National
Security Strategy. It is critical that the government facilitates an open dialogue on the
Strategy that would include members of all political parties, civil society, the academic
community and interested citizens. Decisions should follow consensus through dialogue
as this would improve the quality of the final document. The strategy should, among
26

other things, specify what neutrality means in a changing geopolitical environment. The
aim of the document should be to align the national security policy with EU policy and
determine best options for the policy of neutrality and its compatibility with EU membership
requirements. Beyond Strategy, the government needs to make the public more accustomed
to benefits and costs of EU membership.
While the absence of public debate on a range of foreign policy issues is Serbia’s key
pitfall, EU’s approach to the Balkans is not without its weaknesses. EU’s top-down approach
in the accession process has failed to communicate its message to the audience beyond state
bureaucracy, civil society organizations, and academic community. EU should communicate
the scope of EU contribution to a wider audience of non-academics and non-policy makers.
As support for membership shrinks among young people, students and the urban population
more should be done to bring EU values closer to this population. This should include
investment into a straightforward and down-to-earth communication with young people
about the benefits of EU integration. EU would benefit from expanding exchange programs
with Serbian students and from organizing travel programs for youth as impoverished
Serbians are unfamiliar with institutions, practices, and life in EU countries.
27

Notes
1
Recently, Serbia received six Mig-29 planes from Russia. Belgrade has also shown interest in purchas-
ing Moscow’s S-300 surface-to-air missile system. Samuel Ramani, "Why Serbia is Strengthening its Al-
liance with Russia," Huffington Post, 16 February 2016,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/samuel-ramani/
why-russia-is-tightening-_b_9218306.html, accessed 26 April 2017.
2
"Merkel Concerned about Russian Influence in the Balkans," Spiegel, 17 November 2014,
http://www.
spiegel.de/international/europe/germany-worried-about-russian-influence-in-the-balkans-a-1003427.
html, accessed on 26 April 2017.
3
"Nikolic says Serbia linked its fate to EU", World Affairs, 24 January 2014,
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.
org/content/serbian-president-nikoli%C4%87-says-serbia-linked-its-fate-eu
, accessed 26 April 2017.
4
The survey includes 135 question conceived by BCSP that was carried out from 26 December 2016 to 14
January 2017 on a face-to-face basis and includes a random sample of 1403 adult respondents from Serbia
(excluding Kosovo). Sample: Sex: 52% of women and 48% of men. Age: 18-29 (26%), 30-39 (17%), 40-49
(16%), 50-59 (16%), 60-69 (14%) and over 70 years (11%). Education: elementary school and less 12%
respondents, two years/three years high school 8% respondents, four years high school 44% respondents,
higher school/faculty 28% respondents, pupil/student 8%. Employment status: self-employed 9%, employed
34%, pupil/student 9%, unemployed 22%, pensioner 21%, housewife 4%, Other 1%. Nationality: Serbian
89%, Hungarian 2%, Bosnian 3%, Romany 2%, Others 3%, do not want to declare 1%. Religious preferences:
Orthodox 86%, Islamic 3%, Catholic 4%, Atheists 4%, Others 1%, do not want to declare 2%. Regional
distribution: Belgrade 22%, Central Serbia 51%, Vojvodina 27%. Residence: big city 38%, a suburb of big city
8%, small town 27%, village 27%. Average income per member of household (in households whose examinees
were included by research): less than
e
100 (22%),
e
100-200 (30%),
e
200-400 (23%),
e
400-600 (5%),
e600-1000 (2%), over e1000 (1%), cannot calculate/do not want to say 17%.
5
Tamara Skrozza finds that 21.4% of media content is pro-Russian followed by 11.6% of pro-American
and 10% of the pro-EU content. Source:
http://www.mc.rs/mc_press_centar/dogadjaji.4.html?eventId=
10457.
6
The Observatory of Economic Complexity,
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/srb/
,
accessed 26 April 2017.
7
Juliusz Sabak, "Russian ’Gift’ For Serbia. Tanks, Armoured Vehicles, Fighter Jets," Defence24, 26 December
2016,
http://www.defence24.com/515109,russian-gift-for-serbia-tanks-armoured-vehicles-fighter-jets
,
accessed on 26 April 2017.
8
"Serbia Stands Firmly on Position of Military Neutrality", 17 February 2016,
http://www.srbija.gov.rs/
vesti/vest.php?pf=1&id=114772&change_lang=en&url=%2Fvesti%2Fvest.php%3Fpf%3D1%26id%3D114772%
26change_lang%3Den, accessed on 26 April 2017.
9
Even though the Prime Minister pledged support for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity in the
aftermath of the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, the government has tolerated Serbian paramilitaries
fighting openly in Donetsk. Aleksandar Vasovic, "Serbian paramilitaries join pro-Russian forces in Crimea,"
14 March 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-crimea-volunteers-idUSBREA2D0C020140314
, ac-
cessed 24 April 2017.
10
"A new era in Russian-Serbian relations?", 12 September 2012, Economist Intelligence Unit,
http://
country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=939550278&Country=Serbia&topic=Politics
, accessed on 20
April 2017.
28