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Improving Corporate Political Donations Disclosure: Lessons from Australia
Abstract
One of the activities corporations should be accountable for is their level of political donations. This paper examines two mandatory corporate political donation disclosure regimes in Australia and identifies three important lessons. First, our review confirms that although few citizens may care enough to scrutinise donation disclosure, there are people interested in such information and we should take political donation disclosure regimes seriously. Second, a well-funded entity must be made responsible not just for administering the disclosure system, but also for reviewing and recommending updates to the system. One disclosure regime examined in this paper was never updated to reflect the existence of the internet until 2007, because no-one was responsible for monitoring the regime and suggesting necessary updates. Finally, details concerning the ultimate source of donations should be provided.
... At the early stage of IR, van Bommel (2014) advocated for compromising the valuation logic to make it a cognitive practice. Leong and Hazelton (2017) raised concerns about inadequate disclosures of political donations and tried to generate support from different stakeholders' groups demanding a detailed disclosure of such donations. SR can be seen as an accountability device to disclose an organization's level of political donations, which gradually turns into a taken-for-granted practice of expressing philanthropy. ...
Purpose
This review aims to summarize the extent to which sustainability dimensions are covered in the selected qualitative literature, the theoretical and ontological underpinnings that have informed sustainability research and the qualitative methodologies used in that literature.
Design/methodology/approach
This study uses a systematic review to examine prior empirical studies in sustainability reporting between 2000 and 2021.
Findings
This review contributes to sustainability research by identifying unexplored and underexplored areas for future studies, such as Indigenous people’s rights, employee health and safety practice, product responsibility, gender and leadership diversity. Institutional and stakeholder theories are widely used in the selected literature, whereas moral legitimacy remains underexplored. The authors suggest that ethnographic and historical research will increase the richness of academic research findings on sustainability reporting.
Research limitations/implications
This review is limited to qualitative studies only because its richness allows researchers to apply various methodological and theoretical approaches to understand engagement in sustainability reporting practice.
Originality/value
This review follows a novel approach of bringing the selected studies’ scopes, theories and methodologies together. This approach permits researchers to formulate a research question coherently using a logical framework for a research problem.
... This is in line with the neoliberal underpinnings of much anticorruption literature. As we know, however, corporate voluntary reporting suffers from self-bias and is of hardly any use in the actual detection of corruption (Leong and Hazelton 2017). Questions also remain about the extent to which such voluntary reporting initiatives, which rely on businesspeople's discretion, can deter illicit corporate spending. ...
Accounting and corruption exist in a tense relationship in which accounting is either the solution to or an accomplice of corruption. Diverse areas of accounting research have examined both sides of this relationship, but social and environmental accounting (SEA) scholarship has lagged well behind. This is unfortunate, as venality has dreadful impacts on society and the natural environment.
This commentary invites SEA scholars to shed light on the intricate bonds between accounting, corruption and sustainability. To support my argument, I explain why corruption matters to SEA and review prior studies that examine the intersection of these two areas. Building on extant accounting research on corruption, I argue that future research should explore the effects of the new public management (NPM) type of anticorruption reforms on the social and environmental agenda. I maintain that, when used, NPM practices should be adapted to local settings. I also make a case for exploring the potential of locally informed accounting practices to curb corruption that affects sustainability practices.
... Similarly, the 'Dollars for Docs' website developed by ProPublica in New York monitors pharmaceutical company gifting to medical practitioners (Ornstein, 2017). Current systems for recording gifts given to political actors-such as gift and political donation registers-where they do exist are often incomplete or inaccurate (Kypri et al., 2019;Tello et al., 2019). Furthermore, records of appointments between industry actors and their lobbyist with ministers or ministry officials tend to be incomplete and sometimes inaccurate (McKay & Wozniak, 2020). ...
The forms of regulatory interventions in the gambling market differ across countries, but two main types are distinguishable. One is a monopoly regime in which national governments carry the activities directly through companies fully controlled by the State (i.e., Finland, Norway). The other is a licence-based system in which private companies are allowed to operate in the market under public concessions or licences (i.e., Spain, Italy).In licensed markets, gambling companies are often multinational firms with holding, sub-holding and several controlled subsidiaries operating worldwide. States have not any direct or indirect participation as shareholders in these companies. Instead, they must seek financial capitals from the market. As a consequence, some of these multinational groups are listed, others are controlled by private international hedge funds and almost all are financed by private financial institutions, making the financial sector one of the main stakeholders of the gambling industry.This paper describes the corporate structure of multinational gambling groups on the Italian market with a focus on the direct and indirect participation of the financial sector. The main critical implications of the relationship between gambling companies and financial institutions include a lack of transparency and a great lobbying power that can be used to influence the regulator.
... In Australia, the source of donations and lack of real-time transparency of political donations remain a concern (Edwards 2017; Leong and Hazelton 2017). A 2019 bill, the Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Real Time Disclosure of Political Donations) did not pass which would have addressed this issue under the aegis of the election administration body, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). ...
Political corruption affects each nation-state differently, but the outcomes are nominally the same: a deficit of public trust, weakened government institutions and undermined political systems. This article analyzes issues of political corruption in Australia by framing them within a national integrity ecosystem (NIE) and addressing them against the proposed Commonwealth Integrity Commission (CIC) 2020 bill. It also discusses prevalent ‘grey’ areas of Australian politically-corrupt behavior where they interact with the private sector: the revolving door, political donations, and lobbying; and the state of Australia’s implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. This article argues for their inclusion within the mandated scope of the proposed CIC. There is a need for strong legislation, both domestic and international, to fight corruption. This article then discusses the application of the provisions of the draft Anticorruption Protocol to the UN Convention Against Corruption (APUNCAC) that may apply with respect to these ‘grey’ issues, and how an International Anti-Corruption Court may provide another institutional model for Australia to follow. Finally, this article links these proposals to the 2021 UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on Corruption and the 9th Conference of States Parties on the UNCAC (COSP9). These events illustrate multilateral momentum and progress on anti-corruption. As a country that has historically supported the UN multilateral framework and its institutions, this article recommends a proactive approach for Australia so that the passing of a strong domestic anticorruption initiative will contribute to the adoption, and eventual ratification, of the APUNCAC.
... Corruption causes decisions to be made according to criteria other than what is best for society. Sub-optimal decisions regarding budget allocation, environmental policy, and a multitude of other issues clearly have the power to cause real human suffering or fail to bring as much benefit to society as was otherwise possible (Leong and Hazelton 2017). ...
This article explores tax credits for political party funding in Aotearoa New Zealand (NZ). Participation in the democratic process is low and declining in NZ, as political party membership drops and parties increasingly focus their attention on small numbers of large donors. Advantages of tax credits include incentivising parties to engage with society to attract donations, encouraging individuals to participate in the democratic process and potentially providing greater financial support to parties. The primary disadvantage is that tax credits require at least a small financial contribution from a donor, which will not be possible for everyone. For a relatively low cost of approximately NZ$2.35 per voter, large donations could be eliminated from the NZ political funding system, along with the concomitant potential for undue influence. Using the Canadian model for comparison, a similar system in NZ may result in greater public political engagement and better funded political parties.
We recently published a comprehensive report on political party funding in Aotearoa New Zealand (Rashbrooke and Marriott, 2022). This article documents some of the issues we discovered in the process of writing that report and some of the solutions we propose to address these issues. We recommend stronger donation regulation: capping annual donations at $15,000 and donor identification for donations above $1,500. We also recommend increased state funding: for approximately $2 per voter per annum, ‘big money’ can be eliminated from the political finance arena. This improves transparency and – crucially – can significantly reduce the perception of influence from large donations.
This paper applies a utilitarian analysis to corporate political donations. Unlike the more common rights-based analyses, it is argued that the optimal policy is the one that best satisfies society’s rational preferences concerning donor influence, adequate financing, donor pressure and the cost of maintaining and enforcing the democratic system. This analysis suggests that a ban is best if it would be generally observed and sufficient financing from other sources is available, otherwise a donation cap is a better option. Further, lobbyists should be banned from donating small gifts and drafting bills for candidates. The impact of disclosure and other risk management mechanisms are also considered.
In Voting with Dollars, we urged progressives to move beyond the tired mantras of the campaign reform movement—including the holy-of-holies that demands mandatory publicity for all contributions. Though its appeal to transparency is attractive, mandatory publicity promises much more than it delivers.
To be sure, it enables the general public to learn who contributed how much to whom by consulting the information provided by the Federal Elections Commission (FEC). But very few ordinary people take advantage of this opportunity. Mandatory publicity provides transparency in name only (TINO, rhymes with RINO)—informational equality is provided de jure, but not de facto, and that's a big difference.
At the same time, TINO does nothing to change each candidate's information about her own contributor base. Though constituents may remain ignorant, Candidate Sarah Smith is perfectly aware that John Doe has just given her X thousand dollars, and she remains free to reciprocate by advocating positions that are in Doe's interests. Though TINO promises to put candidates and constituents on the same informational playing field, it actually creates radical asymmetries that politicians regularly exploit on behalf of special interests. Despite the cries of self-righteousness from generations of reformers, their heavy investment in TINO has made them apologists for a system in which special interests win a sustained, and appreciative, response from the political class through the expenditure of vast sums of money.
Sustainability and social responsibility appear to be occupying a place of increasing importance in the discourse surrounding business and organisation. As this discourse gains acceptance organisations seek for ways to measure and manage their interactions in the field. Simultaneously, societal concerns for the way in which organisations represent themselves with respect to social responsibility and sustainability stimulate a need for wider accountability. This essay joins a steadily growing trickle of papers which attempt to articulate and make sense of social accounting, accountability and reporting and, in so doing, offer suggestions for future directions in research, teaching and/or practice. The
primary purpose of this paper is to offer a view of developments in social
accounting in the last decade or so and to emphasise something I fear we
are in danger of losing – namely that sense of the importance of social accounting and the considerable critical potential of the social accounting project. The paper provides a brief introduction to the growth in the social accounting literature; a typology of research approaches to the area; and a polemic on the crucial potential importance of social accounting. With this
background, the essay then takes a broad review of the social accounting literature and seeks to offer some contentious perceptions on that research in the hope of stimulating debate.
Global knowledge management is crucially dependent on public access to information – in particular, information on environmental risks. Yet most existing systems of governance favour administrative or corporate secrecy, thereby monopolizing environmental information in the hands of governmental authorities or private stakeholders. This paper describes innovative initiatives to establish civil society's 'right to know', by mandatory disclosure of government-held information (from the 1966 US Freedom o f Information Act to the 1998 UN/ECE Aarhus Convention) and of industry-held environmental risk data (through the worldwide spread of Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers, and through court-enforced access to 'privileged' documentation – for example, o n tobacco-related health risks). These disclosure strategies have triggered a 'third wave' of environmental regulation, replacing or supplementing traditional command-and-control and market-based instruments. However, the paper also highlights continuing t ransparency deficits (sometimes resulting in 'manufactured uncertainty') with regard to risk-sensitive information of common concern.
Accountability is a cherished concept, sought after but elusive. New models of administrative reform promise to provide heightened accountability through managerial controls. Interviews with 15 Chief Executives of Australian public sector organisations reveal the chameleon quality of accountability. Accountability is subjectively constructed and changes with context Five forms of accountability identified in the interviews are explored: political, public, managerial, professional and personal Two discourses of accountability are also identified: a structural and a personal discourse. CEOs experience an accountability which encompasses multiple and conflicting meanings. The paper argues for a new conception of accountability and new approaches to enhancing it. Imposing managerial controls is less likely to be effective than informing the process by which administrators construct and enact a sense of being accountable.
/ The success of the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) stands in stark contrast to most other environmental regulations in the United States. Between its inception in 1988 and 1995, releases of chemicals listed on the TRI have declined by 45%. We argue the TRI has achieved this regulatory success by creating a mechanism of "populist maxi-min regulation." This style of regulation differs from traditional command-and-control in several ways. First, the majorrole of public agencies is not to set and enforce standards, but to establish an information-rich context for private citizens, interest groups, and firms to solve environmental problems. Second, environmental "standards" are not determined by expert analysis of acceptable risk, but are effectively set at the levels informed citizens will accept. Third, firms adopt pollution prevention and abatement measures in response to a dynamic range of public pressures rather than to formalized agency standards or governmental sanction. Finally, public pressure ruthlessly focuses on the worst polluters-maximum attention to minimum performers-to induce them to adopt more effective environmental practices. TRI has inadvertently set in motion this alternative style of regulation that has, in turn, dramatically reduced toxics emissions in the United States. By properly understanding the mechanisms that drive TRI's accomplishments, more intentional public policy designs can expand the system of populist maxi-min regulation and achieve even more rapid toxics reduction.
In the wake of Citizens United v. the Federal Elections Commission, more companies are spending heavily on political speech, but the moral implications of doing so are not clear. Few business ethicists have directly addressed the moral legitimacy of corporate political speech and the conditions under which it may be morally permissible. My goal here is to outline the moral hazards associated with engaging in corporate political speech. I argue that whether one takes a narrow Friedman-style shareholder primacy view of managerial duty, a broader stakeholder view, or an even more wide-ranging political corporate social responsibility view of the moral duties of business, various moral hazards must be taken into account in determining the moral legitimacy of corporate political speech. I discuss a number of moral hazards endemic to corporate political speech and suggest ways in which business practitioners might avoid those moral hazards.
Despite the Supreme Court’s acceptance of disclosure requirements, some donors have been able to remain anonymous through a combination of regulatory gaps, complicated financing schemes, and lags in when information is made public. As a first examination of the potential consequences of increased anonymity in political advertising we designed an experiment that varied the amount and format of information about the interests behind an attack ad sponsored by an “unknown” group. We find that participants were more supportive of the attacked candidate after viewing information disclosing donors, suggesting that voters may discount a group-sponsored ad when they have more information about the financial interests behind the message. We also find some evidence that the effect of disclosure depends on how campaign finance information is presented. Our study has implications for how (to this point, failed) congressional efforts to require greater disclosure of campaign finance donors may affect electoral politics.
We draw from prior research in political science, management, and accounting to develop a basis from which to examine how corporations try to influence legislation and legislators for their self-interest and deviate from their expected accountability [see Gray R, Owen D, Adams C. Accounting and accountability: changes and challenges in corporate social and environmental reporting. London, UK: Prentice Hall; 1996; Gray R, Dey C, Owen D, Evans R, Zadek S. Struggling with the praxis of social accounting: stakeholders, accountability, audits and procedures. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 1997;10(3):325–64]. Specifically, we investigate how PAC contributions, a type of corporate political strategy, can be used as a tool for business entities to deviate from their reporting responsibility.
Designed for introductory courses, this book strikes a balance between specific techniques and the underlying logic of social inquiry--the how-to and wherefore of research. Opening chapters illustrate the practicality of the study of research methods and the vital relationship between theory and research. Ensuing chapters follow the follow the ideal-typical research project--beginning with research design, measurement, and sampling, proceeding to data collection, and then to data processing and analysis. The authors focus on four major approaches to research--experimentation, survey research, field research, and the use of available data--and bring the material to life with numerous examples drawn from classic and current research. Advocating a multiple-methods strategy, the authors provide a full account of the benefits and drawbacks of using each approach, and describe the actual processes involved in conducting each.
This article describes two systems within which campaign finance laws seek to limit corrup- tion. One consists of the legal and ethical rules governing relations between individual politi- cians and donors. The other is the macro-level regulation of total campaign spending and the acceptable level of private influence over the public sector. Disclosure is integral to both. Looking at four distinct systems, the U. S., the U. K., Germany, and California, I assess the scope of corruption at the micro (legal) and macro (regulatory) levels. To assess micro level evidence of corruption, I focus on the U.S. and California. These two systems have long ex- perience with independent enforcement agencies. Both show evidence of effective and active enforcement of the laws, with violations of campaign finance laws on a very small scale. To assess the macro scale of corruption, I compare the growth of spending in all four systems. All four show an important regularity. Campaign spending is a very small fraction of national income (and of government spending) and it grows at the same rate of income. These facts are consistent with the view that corruption through campaign spending is a small societal problem. I conclude with a comment on why we should have disclosure, even though cor- ruption in this system appears to be on a very small scale.
As long as corporations have the freedom to engage in political spending - a freedom expanded by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. FEC - the law will have to provide rules governing how corporations decide to exercise that freedom. This paper, which was written for the Harvard Law Review’s 2010 Supreme Court issue, focuses on what rules should govern public corporations’ decisions to spend corporate funds on politics. Our paper is dedicated to Professor Victor Brudney, who long ago anticipated the significance of corporate law rules for regulating corporate speech. Under existing corporate-law rules, corporate political speech decisions are subject to the same rules as ordinary business decisions. Consequently, political speech decisions can be made without input from shareholders, a role for independent directors, or detailed disclosure - the safeguards that corporate law rules establish for special corporate decisions. We argue that the interests of directors and executives may significantly diverge from those of shareholders with respect to political speech decisions, and that these decisions may carry special expressive significance from shareholders. Accordingly, we suggest, political speech decisions are fundamentally different from, and should not be subject to the same rules as, ordinary business decisions. We assess how lawmakers could design special rules that would align corporate political speech decisions with shareholder interests. In particular, we propose the adoption of rules that (i) provide shareholders a role in determining the amount and targets of corporate political spending; (ii) require that political speech decisions be overseen by independent directors; (iii) allow shareholders to opt out of - that is, either tighten or relax - either of these rules; and (iv) mandate disclosure to shareholders of the amounts and beneficiaries of any political spending by the company, either directly or indirectly through intermediaries. We explain how such rules can benefit shareholders. We also explain why such rules are best viewed not as limitations on corporations’ speech rights but rather as a method for determining whether a corporation should be regarded as wishing to engage in political speech. The proposed rules would thus protect, rather than abridge, corporations’ First Amendment rights. We also discuss an additional objective that decisional rules concerning corporations’ political speech decisions may seek to serve: protecting minority shareholders from forced association with political speech that is supported by the majority of shareholders. We discuss the economic and First Amendment interests of minority shareholders that lawmakers may seek to protect. We suggest that decisional rules addressing political spending opposed by a sufficiently large minority of shareholders are likely to be constitutionally permissible, and we discuss how such rules could be designed by lawmakers.
Today, record sums of money are being spent in highly polarizing ballot measure elections. Disclosure laws, which require the sources of campaign funding to be publicized on the Internet, are exposing ballot measure donors to an unprecedented loss of privacy and harassment. As a result, a growing number of individuals are challenging these laws in court and pressing state legislatures to raise disclosure thresholds. On the other side, however, public access advocates are insisting that states continue to publish all campaign finance data in order to promote voter competence, preserve election transparency and maintain donor accountability. These two sides are debating the issue as if the only available options are disclosure according to current law or no disclosure at all. This Article mines the vast, unexplored middle ground between these options and offers three innovative solutions that would protect donor privacy without undermining the goals of disclosure. These solutions, which require states to revise the information they disclose about certain donors and the means by which they disclose it, are modeled on the public access policies federal courts have adopted for plea agreements.
This Article analyzes an underappreciated and oft-overlooked method of campaign finance regulation: the use of reporting and disclosure requirements. Although disclosure has long been overshadowed by more prominent forms of campaign finance regulation, disclosure requirements have recently begun to receive new attention as the Supreme Court has signaled an increasingly skeptical attitude toward direct restrictions on the use of campaign funds. This Article demonstrates that both sides of the campaign finance debate have failed to recognize the full range of possible disclosure schemes, and it argues that a particular set of disclosure requirements can have a much more dramatic effect on the legislative process than has previously been recognized. Applying these insights, the Article shows that a carefully crafted disclosure scheme can offer an effective solution to the problem of quid pro quo corruption (i.e., political bribery) and can overcome serious constitutional concerns about retaliation against those who support unpopular views, while at the same time providing public officials with more detailed information about the needs and preferences of the citizens they represent.
Because public accounting is a regulated practice, the profession actively manages its relationship with the state. While prior studies have analyzed the profession’s efforts to shape its regulatory environment, few studies have examined the profession’s pointed attempts to influence a specific regulatory policy that affects the practice of auditing in the United States. Drawing on extant theories of regulation and political economy, this study investigates the rationality and effectiveness of political action committee (PAC) contributions paid to members of the US Congress by the US public accounting profession during the policy formulation period of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. Based on the results of empirical tests, we conclude that the US profession strategically manages its relationship with the federal government, in part, through direct involvement in the financing of political campaigns. Furthermore, the profession’s pattern of contributions implies an ideologically conservative as well as a professional regulatory motivation for providing financial support to federal legislators. Thus, although the US profession continues to proclaim the primacy of its public interest orientation, it does not appear to be politically neutral when attempting to influence public policy.
The purpose of this study is to utilize prior research in US Congressional politics, the accounting/state relationship, and corporate political activity to analyze corporations' political activities during the development and passage of the United States' Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Our study provides evidence consistent with the notion that large corporations exercise considerable political power during the state's formulation of new tax accounting laws. These findings lead us to question the applicability of a strict pluralist model in accounting policy research and have implications for future research in corporate political activity, corporate tax accounting, and the political economy of accounting.
The U.S. public accounting profession commits substantial financial resources to federal election campaigns. In this paper, we explore the potential motivations for and consequences of those actions. We investigate the political contributions made by the profession during periods of proposed professional reform. We also analyze political contributions made during the 1997–1998 U.S. federal election cycle, with the intent of identifying systematic relationships between the levels of those contributions and the ideological profiles of the legislators receiving them. We argue that the profession is engaged politically in the management of its professional role in society and in the support of large clients’ interests. We also argue that the legislators supported by the profession have legislative agendas that are much broader than those of direct interest to the profession, and therefore the profession’s support may have unintended consequences. Our analyses of contributions data reveal that the profession shows preference for legislators who are sympathetic to pro-business agendas. At the same time, the legislators who receive financial support from the profession tend to favor conservative agendas, and tend to oppose agendas advanced by Civil Rights, Labor, Liberal, and Women’s groups. Our study provides insights into the fundamental role played by the accounting profession in U.S. society and the effects of the profession’s efforts to shape public policy.
Two fundamental business ethics issues that repeatedly surface in the academic literature relate to business’s role in the development of public policy [Suarez, S. L.: 2000, Does Business Learn? (The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI); Roberts, R. W. and D. D. Bobek: 2004, Accounting, Organizations and Society 29(5–6), 565–590] and its role in responsibly managing the natural environment [Newton, L.: 2005, Business Ethics and the Natural Environment (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford)]. When studied together, researchers often examine if, and how, corporations influence environmental policy decisions. Drawing from literatures onâ\x90£corporate political activity, corporate social and environmental performance, and corporate environmental disclosure, we develop and empirically examine two research questions concerning the relations between corporate political expenditures, environmental performance, and environmental disclosure. The questions are: (1) Do corporations that are poorer environmental performers spend more on political activities than their better-performing counterparts? (2) Is there an association between corporations’ spending on political activities and the extent of their financial report environmental disclosures? We investigated these questions through analyses of data we gathered on a sample consisting of 119 U.S. environmentally sensitive firms for the 2001–2002 election cycle. After controlling for firm size and specific industry effects, our tests reveal a significant, inverse relationship between firm environmental performance and political spending. This is consistent with the notion that U.S. firms with relatively poorer environmental performance records engage more intensely in corporate political activities as part of their overall strategic management of their relationship with the state. In addition, a significant and positive association between the amount of political spending and the extent of environmental disclosure suggests that environmental disclosure and political spending are both proactive, complementary tactics to strategically manage public policy pressure. If corporations’ strategies are intentionally designed to unreasonably limit their environmental responsibilities or to misrepresent firm environmental performance, then we argue that these activities reflect a significant lapse in ethical conduct. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006
Objective. Despite the rich discussions about the role of information disclosure programs in environmental policy, our theoretical understanding of how and why information disclosure programs work lacks a clear framework. This article begins to fill that void by laying out some fundamental theories and concepts that underlie the empirical work on the subject. Methods. Basic theories arising from our knowledge of economics, psychology, and politics are compared. Previous research is analyzed with these theories in mind. Results. Research results confirm the plausibility of each of these theories, though the most compelling evidence so far suggests that shock and shame are key motivating factors for improved environmental performance by industry. Conclusions. The argument is made that our theoretical foundations must be understood better if we are to make sense of the empirical work on the subject. Policy implications are addressed.
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