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Trade unionism and social pacts in Spain, 1996-2016. From competitive consensus to
confrontation Marcial Sánchez Mosquera
University of Seville
Abstract
This paper presents the study of the most representative Spanish trade unions, Comisiones Obreras and
Unión General de Trabajadores, with regard to their participation in social pacts (and stages of
confrontation) from 1996 to 2016. First, the paper determines the stages of agreement (competitive
corporatism) and confrontation. Second, the impact of the competitive agreements and the subsequent
breakdown of tripartite social dialogue on these organisations are examined. The study conducted has
made it possible to explain why these unions accumulated so little strength during the period of
consensus, and their evident weakness and the risks incurred since the start of the crisis and the stage
of confrontation.
Keywords: Competitive corporatism, collective bargaining, most representative unions, employers’
organisations, labour disputes, economic crisis.
Corresponding author
Marcial Sánchez Mosquera, Department of Economy and Economic History. Faculty of Work Sciences, University of Seville.
Calle Enramadilla, 18. 41018 – Seville, Spain
Email: msm@us.es
Introduction
A review of the literature on trade unions in Western Europe in the last thirty years reveals that they have lost union
density, representation and collective bargaining coverage. Meanwhile, studies on tripartite social pacts show the
vital importance of such agreements for these organisations, as well as the type of pacts signed and the general
periods of agreement and confrontation.
In the case of Spain, as in other Southern European countries, this has been especially important. From the
beginning of the present democracy, the two major unions, Comisiones Obreras (CC OO) and Unión General de
Trabajadores (UGT), have undergone significant development and achieved institutional presence through social
pacts (Guillén Rodríguez and Gutiérrez Palacios, 2008). Social concertation was also a key factor in the governance
of the country from the transition to democracy until accession to the then European Economic Community
(Martínez Lucio, 1998; Alonso, 2007: 187-188; Molina and Rhodes, 2011; and Molina and Miguélez, 2013).
Taking social concertation in its broadest sense and at different levels (from macro to micro), the literature
indicates a positive impact on unions. Among the institutional factors, participating in social pacts can have the
beneficial effect of involvement in the development of certain policies (training, gender equality, etc.), and the
corresponding funding. Regini (2002) and Beneyto (2008) suggested that this was the Spanish case. However, as
well as policies agreed by consensus, subsequent policies implemented unilaterally by governments must also be
taken into account, especially if they both, although to a different extent, contributed to the deregulation and
flexibilisation of markets.
This paper studies the major or “most representative” Spanish trade unions,1 CC OO and UGT, with regard
to their participation in tripartite social pacts, with two distinct stages, consensus (1996-2009) and confrontation
(2010-2016), in a comparative perspective with Western Europe. Despite specific agreements in Spain, such as the
pact on pensions in 2011, and also in Portugal (Da Paz Campos Lima and Martín Artiles, 2011), the general
atmosphere since 2010 has clearly been one of confrontation. The widespread crisis of corporatism has created a
disturbing scenario for European unions, and especially for the Spanish ones, which have been designed to exercise
political influence.
The paper is structured as follows. The review of the literature enables an analysis of the situation of trade
unionism in Western Europe. This approach will be complemented by an examination of the key incentives and
outcomes of the social pacts developed from the 1990s onwards. In this respect, the concept of “competitive
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corporatism” is particularly interesting (Rhodes, 2000). A review of the union’s position in the breakdown of
consensus (confrontation) that began in Western Europe in 2009 completes this section.
The next section deals with the design of the research and the variables used to present the case of the
Spanish unions in a comparative perspective with Western Europe. The results of this analysis are considered in the
following sections, in which worker representation though elections, collective bargaining coverage and
confrontation are examined. After analysing the regression of the unions during the stage of crisis and
confrontation (2010-2016), a discussion section debates the possible strategies of unions that are as dependent on
the (tripartite and bipartite) institutional role as the Spanish and other Southern European unions.
The study conducted has led to the conclusion that the long period of social pacts did not seem to
sufficiently strengthen the main Spanish trade union organisations, dependent on consensus with the incumbent
government, which did not accumulate enough strength to change a policy that, since spring 2010, they have
considered to be regressive and detrimental, above all socially and in terms of employment.
Theoretical framework. Trade unions, competitive corporatism and crisis in Western
Europe
Trade unions in Western Europe have greater representation and capacity to intermediate and conclude collective
agreements than in any other region in the world. Since 1980, however, they have experienced a continuous
regression and weakening of their position. Over the past decade, union density in Western Europe has practically
fallen to the rates of the 1950s. Likewise, collective bargaining coverage has contracted (Waddington, 2015). The
progressive weakening of these organisations has affected their capacity for representation and intermediation, with
an evident effect on social dialogue.
The factors that explain this regression are to be found in the poor economic growth of the 1980s and
1990s, the persistence of relatively high unemployment, triumphant supply-side policies and economic
deregulation, and the new competitive demands and progressive deregulation of markets. The increasing
internationalisation of the economy makes state regulatory frameworks less operative and, consequently, national
tripartite agreements are less effective. This has led to a series of institutional changes that have justified
privatisation (Alonso, 2007: 198) and have reinforced corporate authority (confirmed by the latest labour market
reforms, Rocha, 2014). The dominant economic policy has given prestige to a vision of the market as a self-
regulating mechanism for relationships between individuals, and corporate profits as the origin of economic growth
and employment. A managerial viewpoint, according to which labour is secondary and dependent on economic and
technological factors, and never an essential element for economic and technological development (Alonso, 2007:
63). By taking on board, at least in part, this view, European social democracy has contributed to undermining the
traditional alliances between trade union confederations and major left-wing parties. Unions should therefore
maintain a more independent position (Martínez Lucio, 2008: 125; Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2010). On
the other hand, the financialisation of the economy has made governments increasingly susceptible to the demands
of the financial sector to deregulate industrial relations (Prosser, 2014). Finally, dependence on international
institutions and the EU has generated external pressures in favour of austerity and flexibility policies, specifically
on the governments of Southern European countries, affected by the sovereign debt crisis and their external
financing needs (Molina, 2014: 22).
The transformations outlined above affected social pacts, which did not disappear, but certainly changed.
In Western Europe from the late 1980s – and above all in the 1990s – tripartite agreements were notably different
from the general agreements on income, welfare and demand-side policies developed in the 1960s and 1970s,
which coincided with the period of greatest affiliation and union power.
This new concertation has been called “competitive corporatism” (Rhodes, 2000: 165), or “supply-side
corporatism” by Traxler (Siegel, 2005:107). With the basic aims of creating employment and preserving the
Welfare State in the countries where they have taken place, competitive social pacts have promoted less radical and
less harmful forms of deregulation and flexibility through social models referred to as ‘least-worst options’ (Hyman
and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2013: 117). These pacts also have a lower political and economic cost for governments
and companies and, moreover, they have fragmented and decentralised towards the local/regional and sectoral
levels (Alonso, 1994: 47-50).
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These competitive pacts spread in the 1990s, above all in countries with high unemployment, favoured by
the profound institutional reforms and macroeconomic changes the European Union (EU) demanded from Member
States, and by the economic crisis of the first years of the decade (Rhodes, 2000: 166-167; Hancké and Rhodes,
2005; and Baccaro and Simoni, 2008: 1341-1343). In Italy, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and, initially, the Netherlands
the “orthodox” criteria of economic convergence of the Maastricht Treaty were met through forms of tripartite
agreement (Regini, 2003: 258). Furthermore, the EU’s European Employment Strategy recommended national
adaptation to its directives by means of social pacts. Collective bargaining has also been subject to directives issued
by Brussels requiring flexibility (Léonard, 2005). The EU backed a tripartite and bipartite institutional design
centred on criteria that clearly favour employers and competitiveness.
Nevertheless, the political situation and the institutional framework of each country also played a key role,
in which the anticipated electoral costs and the correlation of forces between social agents and the government
were determining factors (Hamann and Kelly, 2007). The case of Spain (and also Italy, Molina, 2005) is
illuminating in this respect. Despite its adherence to the Maastricht Treaty, and the fact that it had suffered high
unemployment since 1993, it did not join the wave of social pacts until 1996 (Molina and Rhodes, 2011: 182-185).
This highlights, therefore, that the combined factors of weak governments and an intermediate level of union
centralisation were conducive to signing social pacts (Avdagic, 2010 and 2011). The weakness of the social agents,
particularly the unions, has also been indicated as favouring the conclusion of agreements (Baccaro and Lim, 2007,
and Zambarloukou, 2006). Moreover, this strategic approach has enabled an improvement in the major unions’
institutional position in the system of labour relations through participation in corporatist agreements, as can be
observed in Southern European countries, and especially in Spain (Molina, 2014: 25-27 and 35; 2006: 660-662; and
2005: 18-23).
The culminating point was reached in 1996, with the greatest prevalence of negotiated and signed tripartite
agreements since the late 1970s. Viewed as a whole, social dialogue in Europe was more widespread in the period
1990-2007, during which there were 80 negotiations and 54 social pacts were concluded, than in the period 1970-
1989, when there were 70 negotiations and 34 social pacts were signed (Visser and Rhodes, 2011: 63-69).
In 2008, at the outset of the economic crisis, neo-Keynesian policies were initially implemented in
European and other countries, as an alternative to the supply-side policies, competitiveness and deregulation
underway since the 1980s. The unions hailed the return of demand-side policies that could lead, as in earlier times,
to a reinforcement of social protection systems and improvements in employment.
However, in the biennium 2009-2010, EU authorities and Member State governments initiated policies of
deregulation of the labour market and fiscal tightening (adjustment and reduction of social expenditure). It has been
the EU, through the Council and the Commission, the ECB, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (the so-
called Troika) that have promoted large-scale adjustment policies based on internal devaluation, in a context
dominated by high unemployment, government deficit and public debt. In Southern European countries, repeated
reforms to deregulate their labour markets have accompanied and favoured such internal devaluations (Marginson,
2015: 107-108).
Unions have not been able to endorse these policies. Despite the fact that they had been part of the
competitive consensus, they were left with no room whatsoever for negotiation. Corporatism has entered a
generalised crisis (Urban, 2012).
In spite of the tradition of consensus, social dialogue in Ireland was cut short in 2009 by the unilateral
government decision to raise taxes, lower the salaries of public employees and reduce pensions (O’Donnell et al.,
2011). In Finland, raising the retirement age led to a general strike. In the Netherlands, the trade union
confederation did not give in to the increased retirement age. In the first half of 2009, the unions in France, Ireland
and Finland called general strikes. The exception was Belgium, with an agreement that included measures to
provide workers with support in response to the crisis (Hyman, 2010: 4-8), although in 2012 the unions called a
general strike against the reform of unemployment protection.
The Southern European countries soon joined this wave of general strikes. There were general strikes in
Italy in 2009, 2011 and 2014, although not all of these managed to unite all three of the main union confederations.
In Greece, the tremendous economic recession and the dissension between the union confederation and the
government led to the outbreak of a succession of general mobilisations that soon surpassed a dozen, and in 2013
there were more than thirty.
In Spain and Portugal, in spite of the social pacts signed in 2011, in what has been called an ambiguous
union strategy that combined agreement and confrontation (Campos Lima and Martín Artiles, 2011), the general
trend of the period has been one of significant confrontation. In Portugal, the unions called a general strike in 2010
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against the general state budget, and they continued with other general strikes in 2011, 2012 and 2013 against the
policies and reforms being implemented. There have been three general strikes in Spain, one in 2010 as a response
to labour market reform, and two in 2012 against the prevailing economic policy and further labour market reform.
The general strike of 14 November 2012 took place within the framework of a call for strikes by the European
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), as a day of “Euro-Mediterranean” protest and demands against austerity
policies (González Begega and Luque Balbona, 2014).
In the southern countries, labour reforms have constituted a frontal assault on the intermediary role of the
unions, as they have significantly weakened collective bargaining, above all at sectoral level, and they have
strengthened employers' unilateralism (Rocha, 2014, and Cruces et al., 2015).
The Spanish unions. Study approach and variables analysed
The belated participation of these organisations in tripartite social dialogue is nevertheless representative of the
cycles of agreement and dissension developed in Western Europe and, particularly, in the southern countries.
Furthermore, the national social pacts – and also regional agreements – reached in Spain from 1996 to 2009, and
the one signed in 2011, are clearly defined within the concept of competitive corporatism.
An analysis of the Spanish unions in a comparative perspective with Western Europe for the period 1996-
2015 is proposed, divided into two stages: consensus and confrontation. The variables of analysis selected are, on
the one hand, those of the overall economy and the labour market, such as the annual variation in Gross Domestic
Product per capita and the unemployment percentage. It is interesting to locate the stages (and intensity) of growth
and contraction of the national economies (and unemployment).
On the other hand, in order to examine union evolution, the variables chosen were union density, collective
bargaining coverage, worker representation (union elections) and the level of disputes. The variables have been
analysed from 1979 to 2014. This period exceeds the chronology of the study, but enables us to take into account
the evolution prior to the stage of competitive consensus, and also to establish an overall average as a benchmark
(1979-2014). Only the results of the union elections are studied, without paying attention to European comparison,
as this is not a homogeneous criterion of representativeness in Europe and as these results are significant in
themselves.
Spain had a model of union representation with high rates of collective bargaining coverage and low union
density, quite common throughout Southern Europe, in which we can include France, Portugal and Italy (Beneyto,
2008: 67).
State, competitive consensus and duality in the labour market, 1996-2009
As with other Southern European countries with an authoritarian past, the state presence - legal statism - in the
Spanish system of labour relations was quite considerable (Molina, 2007: 466). Until the 1980s, tripartite pacts
articulated the labour market, collective agreements, the institutional role of the social agents and the basis of their
power. And, moreover, management of the welfare system (Guillén Rodríguez and Gutiérrez Palacios, 2008: 173).
The pacts soon had a clear orientation towards supply – flexibility and deregulation – compensated by a universal
social protection system. An orientation towards the market that was accepted by the unions in order to preserve the
social dialogue (Martínez Lucio, 2016).
In 1996, the starting position of the Spanish unions had regressed compared to the second half of the 1980s.
The strategy of confrontation against the last Socialist governments (1987-1996) and other factors led them to lose
power in the union elections of 1994-1995, losing more than 40,000 delegates (Table 4).
In Western Europe, membership rates have fallen regardless of whether there were stages of consensus or
dissension. This fall was more drastic, however, with the breakdown of competitive consensus.
Table 1 about here
In contrast, the Spanish unions have maintained a higher average membership since 1994 than that shown
in their reference period, 1979-2013. The fact that the relative evolution has been positive needs to be related to an
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exceptionally low starting point and higher membership among workers less affected by unemployment
(“insiders”) in a context of a radical increase in unemployment. The period 1994-1996, a time of high
unemployment rates, also experienced a higher rate of unionisation than the overall average of the period 1979-
2013 (Figure 1 and Table 3).
Figure 1 about here
In Spain, dissension did not entail a radical reduction in membership, but rather less influence and funding.
The government’s unilateral reform of the labour market in 1994 favoured disorganised decentralisation (Molina,
2005: 17). The result was damaging for unions, based on the representation obtained through the election of
workers’ delegates in a fragmented and dual labour market, with very high rates of temporary contracts from the
beginning of the 1990s (according to Eurostat, permanently above 30%, almost triple the EU average). In this
context, the major unions were the most interested in rejoining the social consensus. They avoided signing global
agreements, which entailed policies of short-term cuts and at a great cost to their prestige and credibility (Molina,
2006), and opted for fragmented pacts, including one that had recentralising and articulating collective bargaining
as its objective (Molina, 2005: 22). This was a ‘functional adaptation’ to the situation in which ideological
independence and a professional commitment favourable to services were foremost, to the detriment of their socio-
political profile (Martínez Lucio, 2008: 125). This change was particularly evident in CC OO. The new Spanish
conservative government, for its part, was also interested in restoring the social consensus and, moreover, the
positive attitude of the Spanish Confederation of Employers' Organizations (Confederación Española de
Organizaciones Empresariales, or CEOE) towards the reforms that had to be carried out, and the beginning of
economic recovery and the consequent generation of resources, were also contributory factors.
This stage, consequently, produced a number of tripartite agreements of a competitive nature. These were
the Agreement on the Consolidation and Rationalisation of the Social Security (1996), Agreement on Continuous
Vocational Training (1996 and renewal every four years), Agreement on Employment and Social Protection of
Agricultural Workers (1996), Agreement on Out-of-Court Dispute Resolution (1996), Agreement on Stable
Employment and Collective Bargaining (1997), Agreement on Part-Time Work (1998), Agreement on Continuous
Training (2000), Agreement on Out-of-Court Labour Dispute Resolution (2001), Agreement on the Improvement
and Development of the Social Security System (2001) and Agreement on Collective Bargaining (2002) (Guillén
Rodríguez and Gutiérrez Palacios, 2008: 175; González Begega and Luque Balbona, 2014: 87).
The reform of collective bargaining in 1997 did not go as far as the recentralisation and articulation the
unions aspired to, unions that were especially weak in small and medium-sized enterprises. Elements of
fragmentation and a lack of articulation persisted, and the modification was more apparent than real (Molina,
2007). However, an intense period of bipartite social concertation between unions and employers’ organisations
was initiated, which continues up to the present in the form of agreements within a national collective bargaining
framework.
There was only one important disruption of the social dialogue during this period, which was caused by the
government proposal for labour reform in spring 2002 and the consequent general strike of 20 June.
In 2004, with a new Social Democratic government, social dialogue was re-launched. Two years later, an
agreement was reached on labour market reform (Agreement on Improving Growth and Employment) which,
although it limited the concatenation of temporary employment contracts, also consolidated and extended the
flexibility achieved by the conservative governments in terms of workers joining and leaving companies. The
agreements, from thereon, were extended in areas such as dependence, equality for women and a reform of the
Social Security (González Fernández, 2010: 122-126; and González Begega and Luque Balbona, 2014: 87).
Table 2 about here
The reduction of the percentage of workers covered by collective bargaining has not been generalised. The
situation has been relatively stable in the period 1979-2013 in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Norway
and Portugal, and has even improved in Finland, France and the Netherlands. There has been a fall, however,
especially in the confrontation stage (2009-2013), mainly in Germany, the United Kingdom and Greece, and to a
lesser extent in Spain, Sweden, Norway and Ireland, (Table 2 and Figure 2). In Spain, this reduction started in
2004, during the stage of competitive consensus, when the inter-confederal collective bargaining bipartite
agreements were in full force.
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Figure 2 about here
In Spain, the period of social pacts coincided with economic growth based on infrastructures and
construction. In fact, this country’s economy has suffered important shortcomings with a clear impact on the level
and quality of employment: sectoral specialisation with low or intermediate technology and low added value;
fragmentation of the labour market; low levels of productivity; significant inequality in incomes, associated with
wage moderation and stagnation; and high private debt (companies and families) (Rocha, 2014: 175-176; and along
similar lines, the importance of the productive system is highlighted in Prieto, 2014). These are structural
characteristics that explain the imbalanced growth in the expansion phase and the profound recession and the
substantial impact on the labour market after the onset of the crisis. The average in the period 2008-2011 is
eloquent: during which a drop of real GDP growth per capita of 1.7% led to an increase in unemployment of 8
percentage points (Table 3). This substantial adjustment in the labour market was related to the previous high rate
of temporary contracts, over 20%, and this also explains why the rates of unionisation and collective bargaining
coverage did not receive a boost in the expansionary phase of the cycle.
Table 3 about here
The onset of the economic crisis initially reinforced tripartite social dialogue. At this time, the Social
Democrat government introduced the “Spanish Plan to Stimulate the Economy and Employment”, with an increase
in expenditure intended to stimulate economic growth and put a brake on the increase in unemployment. The
sound public finances and reduced public debt at this time made these measures of a neo-Keynesian nature
possible. The major unions supported these measures, which they interpreted as being in the general interest and
which favoured them particularly, following a strategy centred preferentially on institutional relations, as opposed
to other alternatives for strengthening their organisations (as other Southern European unions, Molina, 2014: 35).
Throughout 2009 and the first months of 2010 social dialogue remained active in Spain, although without
agreements being reached due to the CEOE’s reluctance to endorse fiscal stimulus policies.
The number of delegates obtained in the electoral processes certainly showed clear advances for the
majority organisations in the stage of competitive consensus. The start of the crisis and confrontation, on the
contrary, coincided with a marked downward trend until the worst result of the series was reached in 2015, with a
clear relative advance of the other non-majority organisations and non-union delegates touching on 31%. This
included both the advance of company and sector unions (a problem already raised back in the 1990s, Alonso,
1994) and more radical minority unions.
Table 4 about here
Confrontation and the breakdown of competitive consensus, 2010-2016
The fiscal stimulus policies turned out to be totally ineffective in terms of stimulating economic growth and
curbing the rise in unemployment. The financial year 2009 registered the worst annual data in Spain for real
GDP per capita (-4.4%) and, moreover, unemployment increased by 6.6 percentage points. As a result of increased
public spending and the fall in revenue there was a sudden marked increase in the public deficit, as well as an
equally rapid growth of the national debt, which degenerated into the so-called “public debt crisis”.
In May 2010 Spain's socialist government, under pressure from the EU – with a key role in financing the
public debt – made a U-turn in its economic policy, implementing budgetary adjustment measures, and it
committed itself to a set of reforms aimed at liberalising and flexibilising, or in other words, deregulating markets,
particularly the labour market.
The unions responded to the labour reform with a general strike on 29 September 2010. In 2011, however,
a tripartite agreement was reached to reform the pension system. This consisted in raising the retirement age,
making eligibility for maximum benefits stricter and cutting the average income of future pensioners. This
agreement, presented as the precursor of another more ambitious agreement to address the economic crisis, did not
restore social concertation in spite of the interest shown by the unions.
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After the victory of Partido Popular with an absolute majority in the 2011 general elections, a strong
conservative government was formed that confirmed budgetary restrictions and deregulation. The government’s
lack of interest in negotiating its economic policy and the unilateral reforms undertaken have also affected the
bipartite agreements between the major unions and the employers’ organisations (Molina and Miguélez, 2013). The
labour reform undertaken in Spain in 2012, like those in Portugal (2011 and 2012, partially reversed by the new
left-wing government) and Greece (2010 and 2012), confirmed the return of state unilateralism in the regulation of
industrial relations initiated in 2010, which poses important questions about the autonomy of collective bargaining
and the role of unions (Molina, 2014: 22-27). The new regulation reinforced the decentralisation of collective
bargaining and even the unilateralism of employers in the interests of flexibility. In a context characterised by a
fragmented or small-scale and divisive approach by employers and a weak representative structure, these changes
have favoured a process of “de-collectivisation” of labour relations and authoritarianism (Rocha, 2014).
The unions responded by calling two general strikes, on 29 March and 14 November 2012. The impact,
although greater than that of 2010, was limited, with an estimated participation of less than 25% (González Begega
and Luque Balbona, 2014: 96). The three general strikes did not disrupt the direction of the policies drawn up in the
slightest. The absence of further strikes in the next years confirmed this ineffectiveness.
Meanwhile, the overall level of labour disputes, measured by working days lost due to strikes or lockouts,
has followed a general trend of a constant and sharp decline in Western Europe, unaltered despite the onset of the
crisis and the breakdown of competitive consensus.
Figure 3 about here
The period 2009-2013 yielded the lowest average of working days lost of the period under study. The case
of Spain is a prime example of this constant decline in labour disputes since 1996.
Figure 4 about here
The productive structure, with the predominance of micro and small companies, and the pronounced
duality of the Spanish labour market, and the tradition of consensus, have meant that the unions’ capacity to
mobilise workers and channel industrial and social conflict into strike action has been significantly curtailed.
Conflict and unrest have been redirected towards demonstrations and protests including citizen protests (social and
labour related, as well as political), particularly those fostered by citizens’ movements such as 15M, started in
Spring 2011 and from which has emerged a new left-wing party (Podemos). In 2007, there were a total of around
10,000 demonstrations, of which over 2,000 were motivated by labour issues. In 2012, the total rose to 45,000 and
those motivated by labour issues were up to 15,000 (González Begega and Luque Balbona, 2014: 97). The
demonstrations are composed of a wide range of citizens, not just workers, and they do not take place in the
workplace. Furthermore, in these types of protests, the unions are not the only organisations that call for, organise
and lead the demonstrations.
The last attempts to restore consensus have failed. The declaration made by the government and the
interlocutors regarding the recovery of social dialogue in 2014 (Rocha, 2014: 175-176) came to nothing. In
November 2016, the unions have tried to reopen a productive social dialogue, but a government with a weak
position in parliament has rejected it.
Discussion: assessment of, and alternative to, the breakdown of consensus
The major Spanish unions, like those of other European countries, have been in an unfavourable environment since
the 1990s. The breakdown of competitive consensus and the unilateralism of the governments of the last six years
with respect to reforms have only further exacerbated the situation and hindered union action. Competitive social
concertation and institutional proficiency had enabled them, from the second half of the 1990s, to experience a
growth of their influence over and above that of the organisations of other Southern European countries, as Visser
and Regini indicated (Beneyto, 2008: 68-73). Hence the current interest in restoring consensus. The main unions
attempted it in 2011, 2014 and 2016, but without success.
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The changes in the patterns of conflict analysed have affected and will affect any social pacts that may be
signed by the Spanish unions in the future and their organisational model. But they are also affected by a labour
market that is especially fractured and dual (Martínez Lucio, 2008: 123) with greater duality in recent years
(Fernández Rodríguez, Ibáñez Rojo and Martínez Lucio, 2016: 268) and a collective bargaining framework which,
as in countries with a strong statist tradition (Portugal and Greece), has once again swung towards state
interventionism (Molina, 2014), authoritarianism and employer unilateralism (Rocha, 2014).The debate goes well
beyond the old duality of confrontation or agreement, or between prioritising union services to members or socio-
political unionism (Martínez Lucio, 2008).
Within national boundaries, responding to the challenge that is posed entails a triple course of action: seek
to gain greater presence in companies, unionise and defend precarious workers, and establish much-needed
alliances with other citizen-based, but not union-based, organisations. Government reforms have also limited the
right of free expression and the right to demonstrate (a tougher Penal Code), which has met with strong social
rejection, extending well beyond the world of labour. The major Spanish unions could intervene and form alliances;
what is more, they are impelled to do so. The 15M movement has exerted enormous pressure, like that caused by
other social movements in Southern Europe (the Geraçao a Rasca movement in Portugal) and in contrast to the
Irish case, while the main unions have been able to maintain an ‘institutionally responsible’ and moderate position
(Geary, 2016).
The interest in preserving an institutional presence cannot neglect the social mobilisation in the midst of a
clear change in the patterns of conflict, with a redefinition of alliances with left-wing parties (the ‘mosaic left’) and
other social movements that until now had apparently aroused the distrust of unions (Hyman and Gumbrell-
McCormick, 2010 and 2013: 145-151). It is pertinent to take a look back, to the socio-political origins of these
organisations (Pérez de Guzmán, Roca and Díaz-Parra, 2016).
Although proposed by some European unions, attempts to approach and involve precarious workers, very
few of whom are unionised, have run into considerable organisational problems (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011). The
deteriorated Spanish labour market makes it even more necessary to affiliate precarious workers. A comparative
study with Italy reveals that Spanish organisations have a lower capacity to respond, as they are much more
dependent on social dialogue for taking union action (Pulignano, Ortiz Gervasi and De Francesci, 2016). This
course of action, however, has been seriously undermined by the crisis and the reforms undertaken.
Finally, despite the evident institutional difficulties, alliances and actions within the EU should be studied
(Lehndorff, 2015). The unions, through competitive social pacts, shared the objective of improving national
competitiveness and, therefore, competition between the workers of different countries (Antenas Collderram, 2008:
46). However, the breakdown of national consensuses and governmental unilateralism in favour of austerity
policies have sparked joint international action, such as the European Action and Solidarity Day against the policies
of fiscal adjustment and consolidation on 14 November 2012, especially well-supported in Southern Europe.
Union alliances at European level and the operational revitalisation of the ETUC should confront an EU
project that has accentuated its neoliberal character (Hyman and Grumbrell-McCormick, 2013: 190) and is
especially detrimental for the southern Member States in the form of pressure and the imposition of reforms on the
governments of Portugal, Greece, Italy and Spain.
Conclusions
Competitive social concertation was an appropriate model for promoting policies of limited flexibility and
deregulation in the cycle of expansion, but it has collapsed in the current economic crisis. In Spain, in terms of
growth and quality employment, the social pacts signed (1996-2009) were unable to bring about a significant
improvement.
The Spanish unions’ participation in competitive social concertation gave important backing to the policies
of deregulation and flexibility implemented from 1996 to 2009, and even the restrictive agreement on pensions in
2011, and enabled an improvement in the institutional position of the unions until 2010, but it did not entail an
improvement in terms of membership and collective bargaining coverage. These variables have been seriously
affected by the poor quality of the labour market. The regression since 2009 has been very clear in all the variables
analysed.
The strength accumulated by the two major trade union organisations during the cycle of concertation, and
the increase in elected workers’ representatives (trade union delegates), financing and institutional influence, were
9
so negligible that their capacity to respond since the end of this cycle in May 2010 (confirmed in 2012) has been
extremely limited. Industrial conflicts, measured in working days lost due to strikes and lockouts, have not
increased as could be expected in a crisis situation. What has increased, however, is social conflict, which is not led
by the unions. The labour reform of 2012, moreover, has limited their capacity to intermediate and conclude
collective agreements. The representation both in companies and in sectors has fallen to its lowest point of the
period under consideration.
The main Spanish unions must confront the challenge of changing their organisation and forms of union
action to preserve their representativeness. As proposed in the discussion section, the strategic debate needs to go
beyond the restoration of consensus with governments that are determined to maintain the reforms that weaken
social dialogue and are not interested in restoring the tripartite agreements.
Acknowledgements
I express my gratitude to referees for their helpful comments and to the editor for his suggestions.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of
this article.
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research of this article: Plan Propio
University of Seville (PP2014-2982)
Notes
1. These unions are the only ones that have the capacity to conclude an agreement with the national government.
The most relevant aspect here is that worker representation through elections – and not union membership in
general – is the exclusive instrument for measuring representation.
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Author biography
Marcial Sánchez Mosquera is assistant professor at the Department of Economy and Economic History, University
of Seville, Spain.
12
Table I. Union Density in countries of Western Europe, average rates for the following periods
1979-83
1984-88
1994-98
1999-03
2004-08
2009-13
1979-2013
Austria
55.4
50.6
45.6
40.0
36.1
31.5
41.0
Belgium
50.2
49.0
51.2
52.5
55.3
54.3
52.5
Denmark
79.2
76.3
75.2
75.8
72.9
68.7
73.6
Finland
68.6
70.2
76.0
79.7
74.4
70.5
72.7
France
17.6
12.8
9.8
8.5
8.0
7.6
10.3
FRG/ Germany
35.1
34.0
33.1
28.1
24.0
20.7
27.6
Greece
39.0
37.5
35.8
29.3
24.9
23.9
30.4
Ireland
56.9
52.7
51.1
44.9
36.1
32.2
44.0
Italy
47.9
41.6
39.0
37.2
34.4
33.9
38.6
Netherlands
33.5
26.7
24.6
24.8
22.2
20.2
24.4
Norway
57.6
56.9
58.1
56.5
54.5
53.9
55.8
Portugal
53.2
41.3
28.1
25.1
21.7
21.0
29.9
Spain
12.4
12.4
15.1
17.1
16.4
15.4
15.1
Sweden
78.4
82.8
84.0
84.7
78.9
73.5
78.7
United Kingdom
51.3
45.8
39.7
33.4
29.6
27.4
36.2
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS Data base. version 5.0. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies AIAS.
October 2015. Open access database at: www.uva-aias.net/208
Figure I. Differences between average union density for periods 1994-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2008 and
2009-2013 and the average for the entire period, 1979-2013
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS Data Base. Version 5.0. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies AIAS.
October 2015. Open access database at: www.uva-aisas.net/208
13
Table 2. Collective bargaining coverage in countries of Western Europe, average rates for the
following periods
1979-83
1984-88
1989-93
1994-98
1999-03
2004-08
2009-13
1979-2013
Austria
95.0
95.0
98.0
98.0
98.0
98.0
98.0
97.1
Belgium
96.0
96.0
96.0
96.0
96.0
96.0
96.0
96.0
Denmark
82.0
83.0
82.9
85.0
85.0
83.3
83.0
83.5
Finlandia
70.0
77.0
85.0
83.0
89.0
89.0
86.0
82.7
France
78.9
87.8
94.9
93.4
ND
97.9
98.0
91.8
FRG/ Germany
85.0
85.0
85.0
76.2
68.5
63.4
59.3
74.6
Greece
ND
85.0
85.0
85.0
82.0
82.4
60.0
79.9
Ireland
ND
ND
ND
ND
44.2
41.7
40.5
42.1
Italy
80.0
80.0
80.0
80.0
80.0
80.0
80.0
80.0
Netherlands
77.5
73.0
75.0
80.0
85.1
79.2
85.5
79.3
Norway
70.0
70.0
70.0
71.0
70.5
70.0
67.5
69.9
Portugal
70.7
75.0
78.0
77.5
75.4
82.0
75.4
76.3
Spain
79.0
86.0
87.0
92.4
82.0
76.9
78.3
83.1
Sweden
88.0
91.0
91.0
94.0
94.0
92.5
88.5
91.3
United Kingdom
68.0
64.0
47.0
36.9
35.7
34.2
30.7
45.2
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS Data base. version 5.0. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies AIAS.
October 2015. Open access database at: www.uva-aias.net/208
Figure 2. Difference beetwen average rates of collective bargaining coverage in countries of Western
Europe in the periods 1994-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2008 and 2009-2013 and the entire period 1979-
2013
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS Data Base. Version 5.0. Amsterdam:Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies AIAS.
October 2015. Open access database at: www.uva-aisas.net/208
Table 3. Annual average percentage change in Real GDP per inhabitant and unemployement rate
14
in EU average, Eurozone average and countries of Western Europe in the following periods
1996-1999
2000-2003
2004-2007
2008-2011
2012-2014
GDP
UR
GDP
UR
GDP
UR
GDP
UR
GDP
UR
EU 28
2.5
ND
2.0
9.0
2.3
8.4
-0.3
8.8
0.2
10.5
Eurozone
2.3
10.1
1.5
8.7
2.0
8.6
-0.5
9.4
-0.3
11.7
Austria
2.8
4.6
1.4
4.3
2.4
5.3
0.4
4.7
-0.1
5.3
Belgium
2.5
9.1
1.4
10.0
2.3
8.2
-0.1
7.6
0.0
8.2
Denmark
2.4
5.4
1.0
4.7
2.1
4.5
-1.3
6.1
-0.1
7.0
Finland
4.6
12.2
2.7
9.3
3.6
8.0
-1.0
7.7
-1.4
8.2
France
2.3
10.4
1.2
8.2
1.6
8.7
-0.2
8.8
-0.1
10.1
Germany
1.5
9.1
0.8
8.5
2.3
10.1
1.0
7.0
0.5
5.2
Greece
3.1
11.6
4.0
10.5
3.4
9.5
-5.0
12.0
-2.8
26.2
Netherlands
3.8
5.9
1.1
3.8
2.6
5.2
-0.2
4.5
-0.5
6.8
Ireland
9.6
8.7
4.8
4.3
3.2
4.5
-2.2
11.8
2.0
13.0
Italy
1.6
11.2
1.3
9.0
0.9
7.2
-1.6
7.8
-2.1
11.8
Norway
3.1
3.7
1.3
3.6
2.2
3.7
-1.2
3.2
0.8
3.4
Portugal
3.7
6.8
0.8
6.0
1.5
8.7
-0.7
11.1
-0.9
15.4
Spain
3.4
17.1
2.7
11.4
1.9
9.2
-1.7
17.6
-0.8
25.1
United Kingdom
2.8
6.7
2.7
5.1
2.0
5.1
-1.1
7.3
1.4
7.2
Sweden
3.2
8.6
2.4
6.0
3.3
7.1
-0.1
7.7
0.2
8.0
Source: Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat
Table 4. Number and percentage of delegates in electoral processes 1990-2015
Age
Delegates
CC OO
UGT
OTHERS
Number
Percentage
Number
Percentage
Number
Percentage
1990
237,261
87,730
36.9
99,737
42.0
49,794
20.9
1995
204,586
77,348
37.8
71,112
34.7
56,126
27.4
1999
260,285
98,440
37.8
96,770
37.2
65,975
25.0
2003
280,396
109,431
39.0
102,93
36.7
68,055
24.3
2007
310,231
121,556
39.2
114,269
36.8
74,406
24.0
2011
308,188
116,414
37.8
110,228
35.8
81,546
26.5
2015
261,237
94,263
36.1
85,917
32.9
81,057
31.0
Source: Jódar (2013: 543) and Secretaría de Organización y Comunicación Comisiones Obreras.
15
Figure 3. Average working days lost due to strikes or lockouts in countries of Western Europe for the
following periods
Countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, FRG/Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, United Kingdom and Sweden. No Data from Italy (2009-2013) and Greece (1999-2013).
Source: ILOSTAT, European Trade Unions Institute (ETUI), Wirtschafts- und Sozialstatistisches Taschenbuch de Austria,
Statistics Finland, Central Statistics Office Ireland, Centraal Boreau voor de Statistiek Netherlands, PORDATA Portugal.
Figure 4. Working days lost due to strikes or lockouts in Spain, 1996-2015
Source: Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad social del Gobierno de España http://www.empleo.gob.es/es/estadisticas
