The Rise, Fall, and Resurgence of "Self-Esteem": A Critique, Reconceptualization, and Recommendations

Abstract

Self-esteem, viewed for decades as psychology’s Holy Grail, has proved to be an elusive and surprisingly porous vessel. Despite popular beliefs that self-esteem plays a causal role in numerous social behaviors, research shows that it actually predicts very little beyond mood and some types of initiative. This is likely attributable to myriad conceptual and methodological problems that have plagued the literature. Consequently, this review proposes a new theoretical model that accounts for the construct’s heterogeneous and multidimensional nature. Self-esteem is defined as the appraisal of one’s own personal value, including both emotional components (self-worth) and cognitive components (self- efficacy). The multiple forms of self-esteem are a function of its accuracy, directionality, and level of stability. The permutations of these sorting variables deductively yield eight forms of self-esteem: optimal high, fragile high, accurate low, fragile low, non-compensatory narcissism, compensatory narcissism, pessimal, and disorganized.
Specific recommendations for clinicians and researchers are provided.

Full text

________________________________
Author info: Correspondence should be sent to: Dr. Tamara Levy Eromo,
drtlevyeromo@gmail.com
North American Journal of Psychology, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 2, 255-302.
© NAJP
The Rise, Fall, and Resurgence of “Self-Esteem”:
A Critique, Reconceptualization, and
Recommendations
Tamara L. Eromo and David A. Levy
Pepperdine University
Self-esteem, viewed for decades as psychology’s Holy Grail, has proved
to be an elusive and surprisingly porous vessel. Despite popular beliefs
that self-esteem plays a causal role in numerous social behaviors,
research shows that it actually predicts very little beyond mood and some
types of initiative. This is likely attributable to myriad conceptual and
methodological problems that have plagued the literature. Consequently,
this review proposes a new theoretical model that accounts for the
construct’s heterogeneous and multidimensional nature. Self-esteem is
defined as the appraisal of one’s own personal value, including both
emotional components (self-worth) and cognitive components (self-
efficacy). The multiple forms of self-esteem are a function of its
accuracy, directionality, and level of stability. The permutations of these
sorting variables deductively yield eight forms of self-esteem: optimal
high, fragile high, accurate low, fragile low, non-compensatory
narcissism, compensatory narcissism, pessimal, and disorganized.
Specific recommendations for clinicians and researchers are provided.
For nearly half a century, self-esteem
1
has been viewed as the
psychologist’s “…Holy Grail: a psychological trait that would soothe
most of individuals’ and societies’ woes. We thought that high self-
esteem would impart not only success, health, happiness, and prosperity
to the people who possessed it, but also stronger marriages, higher
employment, and greater educational attainment in the communities that
supported it” (Baumeister, 2005, p. 34).
One of the oldest concepts in psychology, “self-esteem” appears to
rank among the top three covariates occurring in personality and social
psychology research (Rhodewalt & Tragakis, 2003). As of 2003, it was
the subject of more than 18,000 published studies and, by 2017 that
number had increased to more than 24,000 publications (based on the
1
It should be noted that, for purposes of this article, self-esteem (without
quotation marks) will be used to refer to the construct, while “self-
esteem” (in quotation marks) will be used to refer to the term.

256 NORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
current researchers’ database searches). Yet, despite the profusion of
studies, self-esteem has proved to be an elusive and surprisingly porous
vessel, rife with a plethora of conceptual and methodological fissures. As
a consequence, this review seeks to critically analyze the literature on
self-esteem, to propose a new model for conceptualizing the construct,
and to provide a series of specific recommendations for both clinical and
research settings.
THE RISE:
HISTORY AND CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF SELF-ESTEEM
The term “self-esteem” can be traced to 1890 and the work of
William James, who is generally regarded as the father of modern
psychology. Not only was it the first recorded definition, James’
definition is supported by a considerable amount of research (Harter,
1999). James defined self-esteem as: successes divided by pretensions
2
(James, 1983). According to James, “Our self-feeling in this world
depends entirely on what we back ourselves to be and do. It is
determined by the ratio of our actualities to our supposed potentialities: a
fraction of which our pretensions are the denominator and the numerator
our success: thus,
Such a fraction may be increased as well by diminishing the denominator
as by increasing the numerator” (James, 1983, p. 296).
In other words, James (1983) described self-esteem as a ratio or
relationship between our achievements and our aspirations. Based on this
definition, the more success we have and the lower our expectations, the
higher our self-esteem. Said another way, one can raise self-esteem by
either lowering expectations or increasing achievements. Although
fluctuations of self-esteem might occur based on daily encounters, there
is an average tone that develops over time and that one’s self-esteem
seems to return to (Bednar & Peterson, 1995).
Martin Seligman, a long-time proponent of James’ definition,
maintained that James’ work on self-esteem was largely ignored for 75
years as a result of both academic and socioeconomic factors. Economic
depression and world wars did not create an environment characterized
by a focus on how people felt about themselves. Moreover, schools of
thought such as Freudianism and behaviorism dominated the field of
psychology, both of which essentially shared the common belief that
2
Although pretention can be defined in numerous ways, James used the
word to mean aspirations, as opposed to the common modern-day
meaning (i.e., pretentiousness or ostentatiousness).

Eromo & Levy RESURGENCE OF SELF-ESTEEM 257
individuals’ lives are determined largely by forces outside of their control
– either as internal unconscious forces (as per Freudianism) or as external
forces (behaviorism). A shift occurred in the 1960s, with the rise of
wealth and consumerism. Along with these social and economic changes
came the individual’s ability to see himself or herself at the center of his
or her own destiny (Seligman, Reivich, Jaycox, & Gillham, 2007).
As the focus shifted to concepts such as self-determination, the power
of free will, and human potential, humanistic psychology gained
popularity and, subsequently, self-esteem arose as an important and
popular idea. Carl Rogers, perhaps the most renowned figure associated
with humanistic psychology, believed that the self-concept is comprised
of three different components: (a) self-image (the view one has about
himself or herself), (b) the ideal self (what one wishes to be), and (c) self-
esteem or self-worth (how much value one places on himself or herself).
The closer our self-image and ideal self are to each other, the more
consistent or congruent we are and the higher our sense of self-worth or
self-esteem (Rogers, 1959).
Abraham Maslow, another prominent figure in the humanistic
psychology movement, assumed that all people are motivated by the
same basic needs, which can be arranged in a hierarchy (Feist & Feist,
2006; Maslow, 1970). The highest level of that hierarchy, self-
actualization, is characterized by self-fulfillment, the realization of all
one’s potential, and a desire to become creative in the full sense of the
word (Maslow, 1970). Based on Maslow’s (1970) theory, lower-level
needs must be essentially satisfied before higher-level needs become
motivators. The human striving for self-esteem, which immediately
precedes self-actualization, plays a key role in the hierarchy and includes
the need for self-respect, confidence, competence, and the knowledge
that others hold them in high esteem.
Bringing a humanistic perspective to family therapy, Virginia Satir
(1983) proposed that there is a bidirectional causal relationship between
self-esteem and communication. Specifically, high self-esteem and
healthy communication (and conversely low self-esteem and
dysfunctional communication) are both causes and effects of each other.
Within the parameters of her interactional approach to family therapy,
difficulty communicating is closely linked to an individual’s self-
concept, including his or her self-esteem (which Satir viewed as
equivalent to feelings of self-worth) and the individual’s self-image.
The Self-Esteem Movement
During the 1970s, when the self-esteem movement emerged as a
powerful social force, many Americans came to believe that we suffer
from a low self-esteem epidemic (Baumeister, 2005). Proponents of the

258 NORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
movement embraced a positive self-view as a panacea for a remarkably
wide range of social problems, from academic, occupational, and
interpersonal difficulties, to issues of public health, violence, and teenage
pregnancy (Dawes, 1994; Mecca, Smelser, & Vasconcellos, 1989).
In the 1980s, with this conviction as the driving force, the California
State Assembly established the California Task Force to Promote Self-
Esteem and Personal and Social Responsibility, which Governor George
Deukmejian signed into law in 1986 to fund its work (Dawes, 1994). The
task force had high hopes of pioneering the quest to identify causes and
cures of many social ills plaguing society, so much so that it compared its
efforts to both unlocking the secrets of the atom in the 1940s and
attempting to plumb the reaches and mysteries of outer space in the
1960s (Mecca et al., 1989). The results of its findings were published in
Mecca’s et al. (1989) book titled The Social Importance of Self-Esteem.
Despite the lofty aspirations of that wide-ranging investigation, results
failed to support virtually any of its assumptions and hypotheses.
These findings notwithstanding, the body of research and other works
on self-esteem continue to grow. Even in the face of scant empirical
evidence that self-esteem plays a direct causal role in most every social
sphere, countless efforts to boost self-esteem are still being made by
teachers, parents, and therapists alike (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, &
Vohs, 2003). As a testament to the ubiquity of interest in self-esteem, a
search conducted at the time of this writing in the WorldCat
3
bibliographic database yielded 6,177 books (both print and electronic)
the titles of which include “self-esteem,” and 18,365 books on the subject
of self-esteem.
Following the emergence of self-esteem as a widespread and popular
psychological idea, the term has been conceptualized and defined in
numerous ways, representing a wide range of theoretical models and
orientations. These are presented in the following section.
The Heterogeneity of Self-Esteem: Multiple Conceptualizations
One possible cause for the lack of empirical support for self-esteem
lies in the significant disparity and confusion surrounding its multiple
definitions and conceptualizations, with the research literature repeatedly
attesting to its heterogeneity. This section outlines (a) the most relevant
emergent themes regarding the numerous components of self-esteem, and
3 WorldCat, published by the Online Computer Library Center, is the
world’s largest and most comprehensive catalog of library resources from
around the globe, with more than 347 million bibliographic records that
represent more than 2.3 billion items held by participating libraries
(Online Computer Library Center, 2015).

Eromo & Levy RESURGENCE OF SELF-ESTEEM 259
(b) the key distinctions between self-esteem and conceptually
overlapping constructs.
Components of self-esteem
Trait versus state versus domain-specific. According to Brown and
Marshall (2006), at least part of the confusion in the field is a result of a
lack of agreement and consistency with regard to the definition of the
construct. The authors noted that “self-esteem” is used in at least three
different ways: (a) global self-esteem (aka trait self-esteem), (b) feelings
of self-worth (aka state self-esteem), and (c) self-evaluations (aka
domain-specific self-esteem). By outlining these three ways that self-
esteem can be defined, Brown and Marshall assert that, regardless of the
definition one chooses to use, they should not be used interchangeably.
These conceptualizations of self-esteem may be further classified as
either stable (i.e., consistent across time and situations) or fluid (i.e.,
varying as a function of environmental change; see Kernis, Cornell, Sun,
Berry, & Harlow, 1993; Kernis & Goldman, 1999; Kernis & Paradise,
2002; Wagoner, 2009).
Trait. Global, or trait, self-esteem, can be described as a personality
variable that represents the general way people feel about themselves
(Brown & Marshall, 2006). Whether defined through a cognitive lens
(i.e., thoughts people have about their self-worth) or an emotional lens
(i.e., feelings of affection people have for themselves that are not derived
from rational processes), global self-esteem is seen as being relatively
constant through adulthood, with a possible genetic component (Neiss,
Sedikides, & Stevenson, 2002). As such, it represents a more stable
(versus fluid) phenomenon.
State. On the other hand, state self-esteem is typically defined as self-
evaluative reactions to events or feelings of self-worth, which is more in
line with William James’ original definition of the term in 1890. Put
simply, trait self-esteem persists (stable) while state self-esteem may be
seen as more temporary (fluid).
Domain-specific. When self-esteem is defined in terms of self-
evaluations, it refers to the way people evaluate their abilities, physical
attributes, and personality characteristics within different specific spheres
(e.g., academically, physically, or artistically). Thus, one can have
different levels of self-esteem in different areas (Brown & Marshall,
2006). In this way, domain-specific self-esteem can be seen as more fluid
than stable.
Feelings versus behavior versus thinking. In his book, Self-Esteem
Research, Theory, and Practice, Christopher Mruk (2006) deduced that
social scientists define self-esteem in at least three very different ways,
each of which has been used in the field of psychology for more than a

260 NORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
century: (a) emphasis on feelings (worthiness), (b) emphasis on behavior
(achievements-aspirations ratio), and (c) emphasis on thinking (efficacy
and worth). He also provided an analysis of their relative strengths and
weaknesses.
Feelings. Mruk (2006) asserted that the first way of defining self-
esteem, as a feeling of worthiness, has numerous advantages when it
comes to designing research. In particular, a one-dimensional (or single-
factor) approach makes researching self-esteem relatively easy to do. For
this reason, defining self-esteem in terms of worthiness, or a favorable
global evaluation of oneself, seems to be the most commonly used
definition by far (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996). However,
conceptualizing self-esteem in terms of worthiness alone could lead to
serious problems. For example, oversimplification of the idea of self-
esteem in this manner can lead to programs and interventions designed
merely to make people feel good about themselves. Inherently, there does
not seem to be anything wrong with making people feel good about
themselves, but what if that self-perception is not warranted? As much
research has shown, feeling good about oneself without earning it can
lead to myriad problems, such as facilitating the development of
narcissism, risking an increase in the likelihood of violence, or tolerating
undesirable academic performance (Baumeister et al., 1996; Damon,
1995; Dawes, 1994).
Behavior. Mruk (2006) also addressed the potential pitfalls of the
second way researchers have defined self-esteem: as a ratio or
relationship between our achievements and our aspirations. This
definition is the one that can be traced back to William James’ original
coining of the term. Mruk points out that this approach to self-esteem
stresses a certain type of behavior rather than just affect, attitude, or
belief. To define the term in this fashion has numerous advantages when
it comes to research. For one, competence is tied to behavior, which is
observable, unlike feelings, beliefs, or attitudes. Moreover, it is part of
numerous developmental processes that have been clearly defined (e.g.,
mastering age-appropriate skills). However, as Mruk cautions, there are
plenty of behaviors that one could become very good at, but that are
undesirable. For example, one could become highly skilled at violating
the rights of others, but it would be antithetical to the kinds of
competencies we would associate with high (i.e., healthy) self-esteem.
Moreover, there are many people who are quite competent in a number of
areas (e.g., career, academia, athletics), but who have low self-esteem. In
other words, they don’t feel worthy enough to enjoy their success.
Thinking. Finally, Mruk (2006) distinguished the third way that self-
esteem is defined, namely as a relationship between “a sense of personal
efficacy and a sense of personal worth. It is the integrated sum of self-

Eromo & Levy RESURGENCE OF SELF-ESTEEM 261
confidence and self-respect. It is the conviction that one is competent to
live and worthy of living” (Branden, 1969, p. 110). In other words, self-
esteem defined in this way is the relationship between perceived
competence (cognitive) and feelings of worthiness (affective). This
definition is the one that Nathaniel Branden, one of the most prominent
leaders of the self-esteem movement, used and supported.
Secure versus fragile. Kernis and Goldman (1999) described self-
esteem in terms of secure versus fragile, which varies along four
theoretical components: stability, contingency, congruence, and
defensiveness. Secure self-esteem is characterized by positive feelings of
self-worth that: (a) show minimal short-term variability (stable), (b) arise
from satisfying core psychological needs versus attaining specific
outcomes (true), (c) are consistent with positive implicit feelings of self-
worth (congruent), and (d) are open to recognizing negative aspects of
the self (genuine). Conversely, fragile self-esteem is characterized by
feelings of self-worth that: (a) exhibit significant short-term fluctuations
from day-to-day (unstable), (b) depend upon achieving specific outcomes
(contingent), (c) conflict with implicit feelings of self-worth
(incongruent), and (d) reflect an unwillingness to admit to negative
feelings of self-worth (defensive).
Approaching the heterogeneity of self-esteem from a different
standpoint, Kernis and Waschull (1995) provided evidence that a full
understanding of self-esteem requires consideration of both the temporal
stability and the level (i.e., high or low) of self-esteem. The researchers
suggested that stability and level of self-esteem play interactive roles
with regard to one’s reaction to evaluative events, as well as one’s overall
psychological functioning.

262 NORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
Unidimensional versus multidimensional. A unidimensional
definition of self-esteem involves a single, global domain of self-concept,
whereas a multidimensional approach focuses on multiple, distinct
components of self-concept. For example, a unidimensional definition
might focus essentially on feelings of worthiness, whereas a
multidimensional definition could include feelings of worthiness,
cognitive appraisal of efficacy, and behavioral measures of success.
According to Marsh, Craven, and Martin (2006), appropriately selected
specific domains of self-concept are far more useful than a
unidimensional view of self-esteem in research settings. In fact, such
debates go beyond discussions of self-esteem and reverberate across
different psychological disciplines. For example, researchers have long
recognized the value of a multidimensional perspective when it comes to
multiple intelligences versus global measures of IQ when characterizing
intellectual abilities (see Gardner, 1983; Kaufman, Kaufman, & Plucker,
2013).
Contingent versus true. As another example of a theory that has
sought to explain the multifaceted nature of the construct, self-
determination theory distinguishes between two different types of high
self-esteem: contingent self-esteem (i.e., sense of self-worth based on the
introjection of externally defined standards) and true self-esteem (i.e.,
sense of self-worth experienced as inherent or given), with the latter
being considered more optimal (Deci & Ryan, 1995).
Genuine versus defensive. Along similar lines, Schneider and Turkat
(1975) hypothesized that high self-esteem can either be genuine or
defensive, proposing that individuals with defensive high self-esteem can
be identified as scoring high on both the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe,
1960).
Differentiating Self-Esteem from Conceptually Overlapping
Constructs
Self-esteem versus self-concept
Although the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably, it is
important to distinguish “self-esteem” from the more general term self-
concept. Self-concept can be defined as “the totality of cognitive beliefs
that people have about themselves; it is everything that is known about
the self, and includes things such as name, race, likes, dislikes, beliefs,
values, and appearance descriptions, such as height and weight”
(Heatherton & Wyland, 2003, p. 220). Self-esteem, on the other hand,
regardless of how the construct is defined, involves some level of
emotional response that a person experiences as he or she contemplates
and evaluates things about himself or herself. Although the two terms are

Eromo & Levy RESURGENCE OF SELF-ESTEEM 263
related, it is possible to believe objectively positive things about oneself
(e.g., academic skills, athletic skills), but not necessarily like oneself.
Conversely, it is possible to like oneself without objective indicators to
support one’s positive self-views.
Self-esteem versus self-efficacy
Also sometimes conflated with self-esteem is the concept of self-
efficacy, originally described by Albert Bandura as part of his social
learning theory. Bandura (1986) emphasized the human capability to
learn through both direct experience and vicarious experience. Rather
than focusing on self-esteem per se, Bandura examined self-efficacy,
which he defined as “people’s beliefs in their capability to exercise some
measure of control over their own functioning and over environmental
events” (Bandura, 2001, p. 10). As such, self-efficacy refers essentially to
cognitions about oneself, whereas self-esteem typically focuses more on
feelings about oneself. Further, although self-esteem may be viewed as
either global or context-specific, self-efficacy is almost entirely state
dependent or varying across domains or situations, depending on one’s
competencies, the presence or absence of others, the perceived
competencies of those other people, and accompanying physiological
states (Feist & Feist, 2006).
Self-esteem versus narcissism
It is also important to differentiate further the terms “self-esteem” and
narcissism, or, in its extreme form, narcissistic personality disorder,
which is characterized by a grandiose sense of self-importance, need for
admiration, sense of entitlement, fantasies of personal brilliance or
beauty, arrogance, and lack of empathy (see American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). With regard to their similarities, both self-esteem and
narcissism involve a positive self-appraisal as a fundamental component
of one’s global self-concept. In terms of their differences, self-esteem
(particularly in Western cultures) is typically viewed positively as an
aspirational goal, whereas narcissism is perceived negatively or even as
clinically pathological.
However, the comparisons are considerably more complicated,
entailing a potentially confounding conceptual overlap. Specifically, a
very positive attitude toward oneself, which some might label as high
self-esteem, is also one of the hallmark features of narcissism (Rhodewalt
& Peterson, 2009). Although some people with high self-esteem are
narcissistic, others are not. Yet the reverse is not true: There are very few
narcissists who report low self-esteem (Baumeister et al., 2003). In other
words, narcissism is a relatively reliable predictor of high self-esteem,
but high self-esteem is not a reliable predictor of narcissism. Further,
research has shown that the high self-esteem of narcissists tends to be
both unstable (Rhodewalt, Madrian, & Cheney, 1998) and self-defensive

264 NORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
(Paulhus, 1998). As a consequence, despite the fact that some research
has suggested significant correlations between narcissism and self-esteem
(Donnellan, Trzesniewski, Robins, Moffitt, & Caspi, 2005; Rosenthal &
Hooley, 2010), the average correlation value of the most commonly used
measures of self-esteem (the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale [SES]) and
narcissism (the Narcissistic Personality Inventory; Raskin & Hall, 1979;
Raskin & Terry, 1988) is not as high as one might assume (r = .26),
accounting for less than 7% of the variance between the constructs (see
Brown & Zeigler-Hill, 2004).
Numerous theories have been proposed to account for the
unexpectedly low associations between narcissism and high self-esteem,
such as being a function of the heterogeneity of both terms (see Bosson
& Weaver, 2011). Research has shown that further investigation is
needed in order to differentiate clearly between what we have come to
view as high self-esteem versus “the enigma that is narcissistic self-love”
(Bosson & Weaver, 2011, p. 268). Taken together, these lines of research
demonstrate that the category of people with high self-esteem is actually
a “mixed bag” (Baumeister et al., 2003, p. 6) of individuals whose self-
concepts and feelings of self-worth differ in significant ways. These
apparent discrepancies are addressed in the proposed model of self-
esteem, presented below.
Correlates of Self-Esteem: Summary of Major Findings
Although an all-inclusive examination of research studies on self-
esteem is beyond the scope of this paper, the main findings on the
correlates of self-esteem deserve mention here. In 2003, Baumeister and
associates published a comprehensive review of empirical research on the
relationships between self-esteem and numerous variables of broad social
relevance, including health, sexual behavior, financial status, grades,
intelligence, job performance and satisfaction, and interpersonal
relations. The results of their investigation, along with some more recent
findings of note, are summarized below.
Self-esteem and happiness
Baumeister et al. (2003) concluded that the strongest correlate of high
self-esteem is happiness. Across a number of studies cited, self-esteem
was shown to be one of, if not the, most dominant predictor of happiness
when compared to other predictor variables, including personality traits,
recalled parental rearing styles, and satisfaction in specific domains such
as finances and social support (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998; Diener &
Diener, 1995; Furnham & Cheng, 2000). Further research since 2003
(e.g., Cheng & Furnham, 2003; Cheng & Furnham, 2004; Denny &
Steiner, 2009; Lyubomirsky, Tkach, & DiMatteo, 2006) has validated
this conclusion.

Eromo & Levy RESURGENCE OF SELF-ESTEEM 265
Self-esteem and depression
Baumeister et al. (2003) also reported evidence showing that people
with high self-esteem are less likely to be depressed, either in general or
specifically in response to stressful, traumatic events (Murrell, Meeks, &
Walker, 1991; Robinson, Garber, & Hilsman, 1995; Whisman & Kwon,
1993). More recent research (e.g., Franck & De Raedt, 2007; Lee, Joo, &
Choi, 2013; Michalak, Teismann, Heidenreich, Ströhle, & Vocks, 2011;
Schmitz, Kugler, & Rollnik, 2003; Steiger, Allemand, Robins, & Fend,
2014; Takagishi, Sakata, & Kitamura, 2011) confirms the link between
low self-esteem and depression, showing that self-esteem and depression
are significantly, inversely correlated. Further, the relative predictive
weight of self-esteem on depression has been shown to be greater than
the predictive weight of depression on self-esteem (Sowislo & Orth,
2013).
Self-esteem and initiative
Baumeister et al. (2003) suggested that high self-esteem also appears
to be linked to “enhanced initiative” (p. 1), with respect to both antisocial
and prosocial actions. From their perspective, initiative was used to refer
to an extensive and heterogeneous list of situations and circumstances,
including bullying, academic cheating, starting relationships, speaking up
in groups, experimenting with sex, and trying harder in response to
failure. Specifically, individuals with high self-esteem have been shown
to be overrepresented among both the perpetrators of bullying and the
people who stand up to bullies and defend victims (Salmivalli,
Kaukiainen, Kaistaniemi, & Lagerspetz, 1999). Similarly, people with
high self-esteem appear to make up both the highest academic cheating
groups and the lowest academic cheating groups (Lobel & Levanon,
1988). People with high self-esteem have also been shown to initiate
interactions and relationships more than people with low self-esteem
(Buhrmester, Furman, Wittenberg, & Reis, 1988), to take more initiative
in extricating themselves from unhappy relationships (Rusbult, Morrow,
& Johnson, 1987), and to be more likely to speak up in work groups
(LePine & Van Dyne, 1998). People with high self-esteem have also
been shown to discount various health risks, including the risks
associated with sex (Gerrard, Gibbons, Reis-Bergan, & Russell, 2000).
People with high self-esteem appear to demonstrate more persistence in
the face of failure or try harder in response to failure (Cruz Perez, 1973;
McFarlin, Baumeister, & Blascovich, 1984; Shrauger & Sorman, 1977),
but are also willing to switch to a new line of endeavor if the present one
seems unpromising. Research since 2003 (e.g., Arbona & Power, 2003;
Donnellan et al., 2005; Ethier et al., 2006; Fox & Farrow, 2009;
Gendron, Williams, & Guerra, 2011; Lindsey, Colwell, Frabutt,
Chambers, & MacKinnon-Lewis, 2008; Menon et al., 2007; Seals &

266 NORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
Young, 2003) shows that, with the exception of the relationship between
high self-esteem and initiation of social interactions (e.g., romantic
intimacy), the links between self-esteem and initiative were mixed, at
best.
THE FALL:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The great tragedy of Science—
the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis by an ugly fact.
—T. H. Huxley (Bartlett & Kaplan, 1992, p. 505)
As discussed above, propelled by the self-esteem movement of the
1970s, it was popularly believed that not only does self-esteem play a
significant causal role in determining a wide range of both positive and
negative social behaviors, but that we also suffer from an epidemic of
low self-esteem. In the introduction to the California Task Force to
Promote Self-Esteem and Personal and Social Responsibility’s book, The
Social Importance of Self-Esteem (Mecca et al., 1989), one of the editors
declared:
“The causal link is clear: low self-esteem is the causally prior factor
in individuals seeking out kinds of behavior that become social problems.
Thus, to work on social problems, we have to work directly on that
which deals with the self-esteem of the individuals involved.…We all
know this to be true, and it is really not necessary to create a special
California task force on the subject to convince us. The real problem we
must address – and which the contributors to this volume address – is
how we can determine that it is scientifically true.” (p. 7)
This statement is remarkable for a number of reasons, not the least of
which is that the editors claimed to know something to be true, but they
had yet to determine that it is “scientifically true.” However, an even
more profound problem the editor and contributors faced is that what
they “knew to be true” turned out not to be scientifically true. In fact,
close examination of all the chapters in their book reveals a task force
report that does not at all support the basic assumption that self-esteem
plays a major causal role in determining nearly any significant social
behaviors, let alone that government programs designed to enhance self-
esteem would have beneficial social effects (Dawes, 1994; Mecca et al.,
1989).
Decades later, Baumeister’s et al. (2003) comprehensive review of
empirical findings on the relationship between self-esteem and numerous
variables of broad social relevance revealed a similar conclusion, that
self-esteem is not a major predictor of almost anything, with the

Eromo & Levy RESURGENCE OF SELF-ESTEEM 267
exception of positive feelings (i.e., happiness) and “enhanced initiative”
(p. 1). Although the researchers also reported some other findings
showing links between self-esteem and variables such as self-rated
physical attractiveness (Diener, Wolsic, & Fujita, 1995; Gabriel, Critelli,
& Ee, 1994) and self-rated intelligence and social skills (Gabriel et al.,
1994), when more objective measures of these variables are compared to
self-report data, people with high self-esteem do not emerge as any more
attractive, intelligent, or socially skilled than people with low self-
esteem. As a result, many psychologists’ faith in self-esteem has been
deeply shaken. Not only has the research shown that self-esteem fails to
accomplish what proponents of the movement hoped it would, but efforts
to raise self-esteem could, in some cases, backfire and contribute to some
of the very problems it was thought to thwart (Baumeister et al., 2003;
Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Crocker & Park, 2004; Kernis, 2003; Raskin,
Novacek, & Hogan, 1991).
In their essay on the nature of self-esteem and the ways it is
conceptualized, Brown and Marshall (2006) discussed the widespread
disagreements and divisions among psychologists with respect to self-
esteem’s function and benefits. While some argue that high self-esteem is
essential to human functioning (Pyszczynski & Cox, 2004; Pyszczynski,
Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004), others argue that it is of
little value and could even be a liability (Baumeister et al., 2003;
Baumeister et al., 1996; Crocker, 2006). For example, as mentioned
above, people with high self-esteem tend to overestimate their
intelligence, likeability, and attractiveness, making them less realistic
about their strengths and weaknesses than people who score lower on
measures of self-esteem (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Even the mere pursuit
of high self-esteem has been shown to interfere in several areas of
functioning, such as learning and mastery (Covington, 1984; Deci &
Ryan, 2000; Dweck, 1999). Moreover, when people pursue self-esteem,
interpersonal relationships can be hindered because they are focused on
themselves at the expense of others’ needs and feelings (Crocker & Park,
2004).
And what of the belief that we suffer from a low self-esteem
epidemic? There are ample data on the American population showing
that is not, in fact, the case; if anything, we tend to overvalue ourselves
(Taylor & Brown, 1988), with the average American perceiving himself
or herself as above average
4
(Baumeister, 2005). When looking at
4
This perception is, of course, statistically impossible. Most people
cannot be “above average.” This type of self-favoring bias is akin to the
research showing that 93% of the U.S. population consider themselves to
be better than average drivers (Svenson, 1981), an example of what social

268 NORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
structured scales designed to measure global self-esteem, research has
shown that the high scores on these measures are indeed high, but the
low scores are actually medium, with relatively few people scoring below
any self-esteem scale’s conceptual midpoint (Baumeister, Tice, &
Hutton, 1989). That most individuals in the United States score toward
the high end of self-esteem measures, therefore, casts serious doubts on
the key assumption underlying the self-esteem movement, namely that
there is a widespread deficit of self-esteem: How can American society
be suffering from a widespread low self-esteem epidemic if the average
American person regards himself or herself as above average?
One useful way to address this striking disjunction between popular
beliefs, “beautiful hypotheses” and “ugly facts” is to identify and analyze
the numerous methodological and conceptual flaws and shortcomings
extant in the literature (see Baumeister et al., 2003). In this section, we
briefly examine seven such issues, citing specific exemplars from the
self-esteem literature that demonstrate specific shortcomings: (a)
conflating correlation with causation, (b) misinterpreting statistical
significance and magnitude of correlation, (c) not accounting for the
influence of third variables, (d) underestimating methodological
problems with self-report measures, (e) generalizing findings based on
biased sample composition, (f) controlling for instrumentation variance,
and (g) establishing construct validity (such as accounting for conceptual
overlap between measures). Each of these issues is discussed sequentially
below.
Correlation versus causation
If two variables are correlated, then the presence of one provides us
with information about the other; however, cause and effect cannot be
proved simply by virtue of the correlation. Nevertheless, many studies
inappropriately imply a causal relationship between variables simply by
virtue of the correlational relationship shown between them. For
example, such erroneous inferences are reflected through unsubstantiated
conclusions and potentially misleading wording choices such as, “the
detrimental effects of low self-esteem on depression” (Michalak et al.,
2011, p. 751), “the effect of self-esteem on aggression was independent
of narcissism” (Donnellan et al., 2005, p. 328), and, “self-esteem has a
positive effect on starting romantic intimacy” (Eryilmaz & Atak, 2011, p.
599). In short, while research has shown statistical links between self-
esteem and other variables to be noteworthy in some cases, these
methodological limitations must be addressed prior to determining the
exact nature of the relationships among these variables.
psychologists have called the above-average effect or illusory superiority
(Hoorens, 1995).

Eromo & Levy RESURGENCE OF SELF-ESTEEM 269
Magnitude of correlation
A relationship that is statistically significant is not necessarily
substantive or useful, in that the actual numerical magnitude of the
correlations (i.e., effect size) being reported must be considered, above
and beyond whether it crosses the methodologically accepted threshold
of statistical significance. In other words, a statistically significant
correlation does not inherently equate to a meaningful correlation. For
example, in a study exploring the relationship between self-esteem,
narcissism, and aggression, Donnellan et al. (2005) reported a positive
correlation of r = 0.32 between self-esteem and narcissism, and an
inverse correlation of r = -0.30 between self-esteem and aggression.
These findings led the authors to report significant relationships between
self-esteem and both narcissism and aggression – despite the fact that
each of these correlations accounted for barely 10% of the variance. As
another example, Lyubominsky, Tkach, and DiMatteo (2006) reported a
correlation of r = 0.58 between self-esteem and happiness. Although the
magnitude of this correlation is certainly more than respectable in the
realm of social sciences, it still accounts for only approximately 34% of
the variance, thus leaving nearly two-thirds unexplained. Nonetheless,
based on this correlation, the authors reported that self-esteem was shown
to be a significant predictor of happiness. In sum, although technically
accurate, the wording of such conclusions can easily lend themselves to
misconstruing the strength of the relationship, thereby reducing their
applied utility.
Third-variable problem
Many investigations do not identify, control for, or rule out other
potential contributing factors, commonly referred to by researchers as the
third variable problem. While some studies on self-esteem (e.g., Cheng
& Furnham, 2004; Gendron et al., 2011; Lindsey et al., 2008; Steiger et
al., 2014) report correlations that may imply effects of self-esteem on
variables such as happiness, depression, bullying, or prosocial behavior,
these outcomes could be confounded by the influence of unrecognized or
unknown covariates; consequently, some of the apparent “effects” of
self-esteem might diminish or even vanish when other factors such as
cultural influences, family upbringing, successes or failures, peer
relationships, or physical attractiveness are taken into account.
Self-report methodology
Although self-report measures are common, inexpensive, and easy to
administer, they are subject to a host of methodological problems and
biasing factors (see Stone et al., 2000), which are the product of both
normal cognitive processing and psychologically motivated distortions.
These include reactivity, social desirability, demand characteristics,
inaccurate recollection or understanding, halo effect, response set, bias of

270 NORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
acquiescence, bias of extreme responding, bias to the middle, random
responding, faking good, and faking bad (malingering). As a result,
research studying the correspondence between what people report they
do versus what they actually do calls into question the validity of these
measures (Bellack & Hersen, 1977; Shiffman, 2000). As Baumeister et
al. (2003) noted, researchers consistently obtain more significant and
impressive evidence of the benefits of self-esteem when they rely on self-
reported outcomes than when they rely on objective outcomes. For
example, several studies have shown that people who score high on self-
report measures of self-esteem tend to rate themselves more favorably on
scales of physical attractiveness than their peers or judges rate them
(Diener et al., 1995; Gabriel et al., 1994). Similarly, people with high
self-esteem have been shown to exaggerate their level of intelligence
when self-reported intelligence was compared to scores on an objective
intelligence test (Gabriel et al., 1994).
Sample composition
Studies on the correlates of self-esteem often use samples that are
minimally generalizable. Some of the specific samples, for example,
included Stanford athletes (Denny & Steiner, 2009), retired employees
from one Southern California utility company (Lyubomirsky et al.,
2006), British adolescents (Fox & Farrow, 2009), Korean female nurses
(Lee et al., 2013), and, of course, undergraduate students enrolled in
introductory psychology courses (Cheng & Furnham, 2003; Donnellan et
al., 2005; Michalak et al., 2011). Such samples are not representative of a
diverse population with regard to a number of important socio-cultural
factors, such as age, gender, level of education, ethnicity, geographic
location, socioeconomic status, religion, nationality, and so forth.
Instrumentation variance
Some self-esteem researchers (e.g., Arbona & Power, 2003; Cheng &
Furnham, 2004; Franck & De Raedt, 2007; Gendron et al., 2011; Schmitz
et al., 2003; Steiger et al., 2014) have elected to use modified or short-
form versions of the Rosenberg SES and other measures. However,
empirical evidence showing the equivalence of the altered and original
forms is often limited. As such, direct comparisons call into question the
validity of their conclusions.
Construct validity
Construct validity refers to the degree to which a test actually
measures what it claims or purports to measure (Campbell & Fiske,
1959; Cronbach & Meehl, 1955), and is typically established by
demonstrating both discriminant validity (when two dissimilar constructs
are uncorrelated with each other) and convergent validity (when two
similar constructs are correlated with each other). There are unanswered
questions, for example, regarding the conceptual overlap between

Eromo & Levy RESURGENCE OF SELF-ESTEEM 271
variables such as high self-esteem and happiness, as well as between low
self-esteem and depression. For instance, much of the research does not
appear to consider to what degree the items on conceptually different
self-report measures (e.g., the Rosenberg SES and the Oxford Happiness
Inventory) could be measuring the same construct. As such, discriminant
validity would be problematic to demonstrate. Similarly, to what degree
is low self-esteem just one of the various symptoms of depression? This
confusion could result in overlap between constructs on different self-
report measures (e.g., the Rosenberg SES and the Beck Depression
Inventory).
Another concern related to construct validity pertains to the
operationalization of key variables of interest. For example, Menon et al.
(2007) operationalized antisocial behavior by the degree to which
children engaged in avoidance behavior with their mothers, and found
that self-esteem was inversely associated with caregiver avoidance.
However, not only were the correlations weak to modest at best, there
was a failure to provide conceptual or empirical grounding for the
assumption that avoidant attachment style is equivalent to—or predicts—
antisocial behavior. More broadly, there is ambiguity regarding the
conceptualization and operationalization of the term initiative. According
to Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, initiative can be defined as, “the
power or opportunity to do something before others do” (Initiative, 2016,
para. 4), “the energy and desire that is needed to do something” (para. 4),
or “a plan or program that is intended to solve a problem” (para. 4).
Baumeister et al. (2003) operationalized the term initiative in a very
loose sense, applying it to an extensive and heterogeneous list of
situations and circumstances, such as performing both prosocial actions
(e.g., offering peers emotional support) and antisocial actions (e.g.,
bullying, academic cheating), initiating relationships, speaking up in
groups, experimenting with sex, trying harder in response to failure, and
more. As a consequence, general conclusions that the findings discussed
here substantively contribute to an understanding of the relationship
between self-esteem and initiative on the whole must be seen, to a large
extent, as tenuous.
Problems with Measurement and Assessment of Self-Esteem
Both methodological and conceptual problems combine to make
valid, useful measurement of self-esteem difficult. Conceptual confusion
is exacerbated in that self-esteem, as with many important constructs in
the field of psychology, is used both colloquially as well as within the
realms of academic and clinical psychology. Thus, although research
would benefit from a standardized and widely used measure of self-
esteem, common-language notions of self-esteem are sometimes

272 NORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
substituted for more explicit, scientific definitions, which creates an
illusion of a universally accepted, well-defined entity (Wells & Marwell,
1976).
Measurement and assessment of self-esteem fall into two categories:
self-report measures and implicit measures. Blascovich and Tomaka
(1991) identified and reviewed the most frequently cited self-report
measures of self-esteem for adolescents and adults. Of those scales they
reviewed, the researchers found them of unequal quality and gave high
marks to only a few, specifically Rosenberg’s (1965) SES and a revision
of Janis and Field’s (1959) Feelings of Inadequacy Scale, which Fleming
and Courtney (1984) revised. The Rosenberg SES, by far the most
commonly cited measure, has been shown to be both internally consistent
and temporally stable; however, the test-retest reliability coefficients
reported were measured over such short periods of time (viz., one week
and two weeks) that it is unclear whether the measure is reliable over
longer periods of time. As a consequence, the test’s ability to predict
future outcomes (i.e., its predictive validity) is questionable (Blascovich
& Tomaka, 1991). Concurrent validity has been shown through
correlations between the SES and Lerner SES scores, the Janis and Field
Scale scores, and the Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory. However, the
external validity of the Rosenberg SES is questionable in that the original
standardization sample was composed of adolescents from 10 New York
State public high schools.
From a conceptual standpoint, although Rosenberg did not dispute
that people evaluate themselves differently in different domains, he took
the stance that this heterogeneity is difficult to assess accurately;
therefore, he maintained that an overall assessment of one’s feeling of
self-worth as a person (i.e., global self-esteem) was sufficient as a
predictor of other important life outcomes. It is still an open question as
to what degree this conceptualization is valid or useful. Not only can self-
evaluations vary in different domains of functioning, but high self-esteem
has repeatedly been shown to be a heterogeneous construct (Baumeister
et al., 2003). Thus, a unidimensional measure of global self-esteem, such
as the Rosenberg SES, does not inherently capture the critical
distinctions between being conceited, narcissistic, or defensive, on one
hand, versus accepting or valuing oneself with an accurate appreciation
of one’s strengths and worth, on the other.
Nonreactive measures of implicit self-esteem have increased in
popularity, although the vast majority of self-esteem researchers use self-
report measures (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000). Implicit
measures of self-esteem are designed to assess aspects of self-esteem that
operate outside of conscious awareness and control (Greenwald &
Banaji, 1995). Instead of answering direct questions about their self-

Eromo & Levy RESURGENCE OF SELF-ESTEEM 273
esteem, respondents ostensibly reveal their self-evaluations via reaction-
time tasks that utilize priming techniques, or use projective tests in which
they respond to ambiguous stimuli. The meaning behind the measure is
often masked, either by subliminal presentation of stimuli or by working
under time pressure or cognitive load (Bosson, 2006). Common measures
of implicit self-esteem include the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), cognitive priming tasks (Hetts, Sakuma, &
Pelham, 1999; Spalding & Hardin, 1999), word completion tasks (Hetts
et al., 1999), and people’s preferences for their birthday numbers and
name letters (Nuttin, 1985).
Recognizing the increasing interest in measures of implicit self-
esteem, Bosson et al. (2000) sought to investigate the reliability and
validity of seven of the most commonly used measures. Not only did the
various implicit measures not correlate with each other, but they
correlated only weakly with measures of explicit self-esteem. In general,
the implicit measures were shown to be limited in their predictive
abilities, unstable across time and measurement context, and low in
convergent validity. In 2011, Buhrmester, Blanton, and Swann evaluated
the construct validity of the two most common implicit measures of self-
esteem: the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998) and the
Name-Letter Test (Nuttin, 1985). Based on their review of the literature,
Buhrmester et al. (2011) concluded that the research failed to show
strong or consistent support for the validity of either measure. In
summary, although implicit measures of self-esteem may hold promise at
some future point, currently their psychometric properties fall far short of
acceptable methodological standards.
THE RESURGENCE:
PROPOSAL OF A NEW MODEL OF SELF-ESTEEM
Background and Rationale
Self-esteem is a complex construct, multifaceted and heterogeneous
in nature. To understand fully its role in psychological functioning, we
must go beyond whether it is simply high or low. Moreover, until
relatively recently, the belief that to have high self-esteem is
unmistakably a good thing has gone unchallenged, but recent theory and
evidence suggests that this characterization is not necessarily true. There
appear to be numerous forms of high self-esteem that vary widely in
terms of how closely they mirror optimal psychological functioning
(Kernis & Paradise, 2002). Whether one’s high self-esteem is considered
optimal or narcissistic, and the manner in which it contributes to one’s
psychological health, depends on a consideration of not just its level, but
also its characteristics.

274 NORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
The current researchers propose a new model for conceptualizing
self-esteem, one that captures the heterogeneous nature of the term. This
model seeks to integrate the various facets of self-esteem and to account
for the different dimensions on which self-esteem can vary, taking into
account and synthesizing the existing research findings, addressing and
resolving some of the gaps and inconsistencies in the literature, and
incorporating the central conceptual issues already discussed. In sum, the
model seeks to provide an organized system for deductively determining
various forms of self-esteem, and the manner in which they relate to
psychological functioning.
Self-Appraisal
In conceptualizing and introducing a new model of self-esteem, the
use of the term must first be addressed. As the literature shows, despite
the appeal, ubiquity, and importance of the concepts it embodies, the
term, and its ensuing research are plagued with confusion, discrepancies,
and disagreements. Nonetheless, self-esteem is far too embedded in the
literature and the concept is far too important to discard all together.
Thus, the current researchers propose a broader approach, taking a step
back to address the more fundamental concept of self-appraisal and the
various forms it can take. Whether the numerous existing definitions of
self-esteem are unidimensional or multidimensional; stable or fluid;
focused primarily on cognitive factors, affective factors, behavioral
factors; or some combination thereof, they all attempt to describe some
process or aspect of self-appraisal. In other words, virtually every
definition of self-esteem involves an act of a person judging the value,
condition, or importance of himself or herself. Therefore, as can be seen
in Figure 1, the current researchers have chosen to use self-appraisal as
the foundation and primary sorting variable from which the various
manifestations or forms of self-esteem stem.
Accuracy
From this starting point, the model depicts self-appraisal as branching
off into two pathways: accurate self-appraisal and distorted self-
appraisal. It should be emphasized that these are not mutually exclusive
categories; rather, they are conceptualized as end points on a theoretical
continuum, along which an individual’s self-appraisal may be located.
This dimensional (vs. categorical) approach is visually represented in
Figure 1 with a series of vertical grayscale bars, which also apply to the
subsequent sorting variables (see Levy, 2010, for discussion of
dichotomous versus continuous variables).
The current researchers assert that, although this distinction has been
virtually absent from existing models and research on self-esteem, it is a

Eromo & Levy RESURGENCE OF SELF-ESTEEM 275
fundamental one. In order to capture comprehensively the heterogeneous
nature of the concept – including everything from grandiosity to
unwarranted self-loathing to a valid appreciation of one’s strengths and
weaknesses – a consideration of accurate versus distorted is essential.
Without this distinction, the critical differences between such terms as
high self-esteem and narcissism, for example, are largely indis-
tinguishable. Similarly, the important distinction between a negative self-
appraisal that is valid versus one that is distorted could easily be lost.
FIGURE 1 A New Model of Self-esteem, Illustrating the Heterogeneous
Nature of the Concept
Further, as discussed earlier, the first known definition of self-esteem,
set forth by William James, may have been simple, but it has been
supported by a considerable amount of research (Harter, 1999). James
(1890/1983) defined self-esteem as successes divided by pretensions, or a
ratio between achievements and aspirations. Based on this definition, by
its very nature, level of self-esteem depends, in part, on actual objective
behaviors and outcomes (i.e., successes). Therefore, the more success we

276 NORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
have and the lower our expectations, the higher our self-esteem. As such,
one can raise self-esteem by either lowering expectations and/or
increasing achievements. Generally speaking, many of the definitions
that followed that of James, especially those that came out of the more
recent self-esteem movement, focused primarily on the cognitive and/or
affective factors influencing self-esteem, with very little consideration of
behavior, successes, or objective outcomes. For example, Nathaniel
Branden (1969), one of the most prominent figures of the self-esteem
movement, defined self-esteem as the result of two interrelated aspects:
“It entails a sense of personal efficacy and a sense of personal worth. It is
the integrated sum of self-confidence and self-respect. It is the conviction
that one is competent to live and worthy of living” (p. 110).
While the cognitive and affective facets of self-esteem are certainly
crucial to understanding the nature of the construct, the current
researchers assert that one’s external, measurable reality is equally
important. In other words, self-esteem is shaped not only by one’s
thoughts and feelings, but also by the objective outcome of one’s
behavior (e.g., actual achievements, measurable capabilities) and by
one’s interpersonal interactions (i.e., the level of congruence between
how one thinks he or she is perceived and how he or she is perceived). In
this model, accurate self-appraisal refers to one’s judgment of the value,
condition, or importance of oneself that is accurately based upon one’s
measurable reality (as just described). For example, a woman might
consider herself to be highly likeable with strong social skills and, based
upon reports of individuals in her social circle, she is in fact well-liked by
others (accurate self-appraisal). In this instance, there is congruence
between her self-appraisal and the manner in which others appraise her.
Conversely, distorted self-appraisal refers to one’s judgment of the
value, condition, or importance of oneself that is incongruent with one’s
measurable reality. For example, a man might consider himself to be
highly intelligent, but based upon an objective measure of intelligence
(scores on a measure of cognitive abilities), his level of intelligence is
actually below average.
The inclusion of this sorting variable is also essential to differentiate
two forms of low self-esteem: accurate versus distorted. As noted by
numerous researchers (see Baumeister et al., 2003), low self-esteem
generally does not seem to be linked to the reality of people’s objective
achievements. Specifically, low self-esteem people appear to be just as
intelligent, have just as high GPAs, and are just as attractive and
successful as high self-esteem people. Further, in the relationships field,
low self-esteem partners are loved just as much as highs—at least until
after a few years, when their distortions begin to compromise adversely
the quality of their relationships (Leary, 2002; Murray, Bellavia, Rose, &

Eromo & Levy RESURGENCE OF SELF-ESTEEM 277
Griffin, 2003; Murray, Griffin, Rose, & Bellavia, 2003; Murray, Rose,
Bellavia, Holmes, & Kusche, 2002). Further, as Swann’s (2012) self-
verification theory research has shown, low self-esteem people strongly
resist incorporating positive information about themselves. In short,
current theory and research assume that the very essence of low self-
esteem involves gross distortion in judgment about the self.
The current researchers suggest that these assumptions and research
findings relate only to one form of low self-esteem: distorted, or what our
model terms pessimal self-esteem (see discussion below). However, the
findings might not apply to a form of low self-esteem that does not
involve distortions: accurate low self-esteem. With this type of low self-
esteem, the individual’s negative self-perceptions are not inherently
distorted; in fact, they accurately reflect his or her reality (discussed
below).
The new model presents the opportunity to identify and explore the
correlates and consequences of nondistorted low self-esteem, which may
yield different outcomes than the current literature suggests. To take one
example, this distinction may have important implications for the
practice of psychotherapy. Specifically, for clients with pessimal self-
esteem, the therapy would take a more cognitive (internal) focus,
attempting to reduce their perceptual distortions. In contrast, for clients
with accurate low self-esteem, the clinical interventions would focus
more on behavioral (external) change, addressing ways they might take
actions to alter their actual situations and circumstances, from
relationships to academic or occupational.
Inclusion of the accuracy variable may also play a role in clarifying
previous research findings that show discrepancies between self-report
data and more objective measures, such as the links between self-esteem
and self-rated physical attractiveness (Diener et al., 1995; Gabriel et al.,
1994), self-rated intelligence, and social skills (Gabriel et al., 1994). As
noted above, people with high self-esteem do not emerge as any more
attractive, intelligent, or socially skilled than people with low self-esteem
when more objective measures of these variables are compared to self-
report data.
Directionality
As can be seen in Figure 1, both accurate self-appraisal and distorted
self-appraisal can be skewed in opposing directions, leading to the
secondary sorting variable of directionality. This next sequence
consequently gives rise to the following conditions: accurate positive
self-appraisal (self-appraisal that is positive and congruent with
measurable factors and/or the interpersonal perceptions of others),
accurate negative self-appraisal (self-appraisal that is negative and

278 NORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
congruent with measurable factors and/or the interpersonal perceptions of
others), distorted inflated self-appraisal (self-appraisal that is more
positive than is reflected by measurable factors and/or the interpersonal
perceptions of others), and distorted deflated self-appraisal (self-
appraisal that is more negative than is reflected by measurable factors
and/or the interpersonal perceptions of others).
Stability
Each of these four categories (accurate positive, accurate negative,
distorted inflated, and distorted deflated) is then further divided by a third
sorting variable of stability. Considerable research supports the
usefulness of distinguishing between stable versus unstable feelings of
self-worth (e.g., Franck & De Raedt, 2007; Kernis et al., 1993; Zeigler-
Hill et al., 2015). According to Kernis and Paradise (2002), for example,
the stability of self-esteem is determined based on the extent to which the
individual’s current feelings of self-worth fluctuate across time and
situations. More specifically, feelings of self-worth that are stable are
minimally affected by specific evaluative events, whereas feelings of
self-worth that are unstable are highly influenced by evaluative events,
both internally generated (e.g., reflecting on an earlier interpersonal
interaction) and externally generated (e.g., an evaluation from a teacher).
Along similar lines, other research and theory (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001;
Kernis & Paradise, 2002) have shown promising support for the
construct of contingent self-esteem and its assessment. Based upon Self-
Determination Theory, for example, self-esteem can either be contingent
(i.e., dependent upon matching some external standards or expectations
and requiring continual validation) or noncontingent (i.e., not dependent
upon matching some external standards and not requiring continual
validation; Deci & Ryan, 1995). While these two variables, stability and
contingency, have often been treated as separate constructs, the current
researchers assert that, by definition, if self-esteem is contingent, it is
also unstable. Conversely, if self-esteem is noncontingent, it is naturally
stable. Therefore, the current model defines stable as minimally
influenced by evaluative events (both externally and internally generated)
and low need to match external standards across time and situation, and
unstable as highly influenced by evaluative events (both externally and
internally generated) and high need to match external standards or
expectations across time and situation.
It should be noted that Kernis and Goldman (1999), and Kernis and
Paradise (2002), whose research has focused primarily upon
distinguishing between fragile versus secure forms of self-esteem, argue
that self-esteem varies along four theoretical components: stability,
contingency, congruence, and defensiveness. Specifically, fragile high

Eromo & Levy RESURGENCE OF SELF-ESTEEM 279
self-esteem is defined by these researchers as positive feelings of self-
worth that are unstable (i.e., fluctuates based on contextually based
feelings of self-worth), contingent (i.e., depends on the achievement of
specific outcomes), incongruent (i.e., are discrepant when compared to
implicit feelings of self-worth), and defensive (i.e., exhibit an
unwillingness to admit to negative feelings of self-worth; Kernis &
Goldman, 1999; Kernis & Paradise, 2002). Conversely, the authors
conceptualize secure high self-esteem as positive feelings of self-worth
that are stable (i.e., vary minimally across experiences), noncontingent
(i.e., result from the satisfaction of core psychological needs versus the
attainment of specific outcomes), congruent (i.e., are in line with implicit
feelings of self-worth), and genuine (i.e., open to recognizing negative
aspects of oneself; Kernis & Goldman, 1999; Kernis & Paradise, 2002).
Although the current researchers generally support this depiction of self-
esteem as a heterogeneous and multifaceted construct, the proposed
model does not include a discussion of either the congruent versus
incongruent variable, or the defensive versus genuine variable, for the
reasons below.
First, the distinction between congruent and incongruent, which refers
to the level of correspondence between explicit and implicit self-esteem,
has been made by theories such as Cognitive Experiential Self Theory
(Epstein & Morling, 1995). Cognitive Experiential Self Theory is an
example of one theory that centers around the assumption that self-
esteem should be understood as an interaction between two separate but
related systems, essentially conscious (i.e., explicit) self-esteem and
unconscious (i.e., implicit) self-esteem. Thus, theoretically, high explicit
self-esteem coupled with low implicit self-esteem would represent fragile
self-esteem; while high explicit self-esteem coupled with high implicit
self-esteem would represent more secure self-esteem. Explicit self-
esteem has traditionally been measured by self-report measures such as
the Rosenberg SES, whereas implicit self-esteem, as discussed above, is
measured more indirectly through nonreactive measures such as
projective tests, cognitive priming tasks, and implicit association tasks.
However, nonreactive measures of implicit self-esteem have been shown
to possess weak and/or inconsistent psychometric properties, and the
understanding of how to interpret these measures is cloudy at best
(Bosson, 2006). Therefore, given the lack of empirical support for the
reliability and validity of implicit measures of self-esteem, these
variables were not included in the proposed model.
Second, although the distinction between defensive and genuine high
self-esteem dates back as early as 66 years ago (see Horney, 1950), it has
not generated a large body of empirical support (Kernis & Paradise,
2002). In the research that has been done, defensive has traditionally

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been distinguished from genuine through measures of socially desirable
responding, such as the Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale (e.g.,
Crowne & Marlow, 1960). In other words, if one measures high in self-
esteem and high in social desirability, he or she presumably possesses
defensive high self-esteem as a result of being unwilling to admit to the
undesirable qualities he or she is likely to possess. Conversely, if one
measures high in self-esteem and low on a social desirability measure,
the person is presumably less likely to conceal negative characteristics
from others and, therefore, is thought to possess genuine self-esteem.
However, this idea notwithstanding, the current researchers would argue
that there are numerous ways of defining defensive, which lead to
undesirable ambiguity and confusion surrounding the term. Colloquially,
defensive is typically used to describe argumentative behavior (e.g., when
one person accuses another of being quarrelsome in response to
feedback). However, in the realm of psychological assessment, it is used
to refer to a tendency to respond in a deliberately socially desirable
fashion (e.g., as measured by the Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability
Scale; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), or to respond relatively
unintentionally in a manner reflecting social poise or reserve (e.g., as
measured by the K scale on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory-2 termed subtle defensiveness; Hathaway, McKinley, & MMPI
Restandardization Committee, 1989). In a different context, some
psychotherapists use defensive to refer to a client’s resistance or denial in
therapy. Because of this conceptual ambiguity, defensive and genuine are
not necessarily theoretical opposites; in contrast, stable versus unstable
(the third sorting variable of the current model) are. Moreover, the
current researchers would argue that a consideration of whether one’s
self-appraisal is accurate or distorted, and the direction in which it is
skewed, encompasses the distinction made by Kernis and Goldman
(1999) and Kernis and Paradise (2002) when they described the
difference between one who exhibits an unwillingness to admit to
negative feelings of self-worth versus one who is open to recognizing
negative aspects of oneself. In other words, if one’s self-appraisal is
defensive, regardless of which definition is being used, it is – by its very
nature – distorted. Therefore, for these reasons, defensive versus genuine
is not specifically included as a sorting variable in the proposed model.
A Comprehensive Definition of Self-Esteem
Based on the current research and model, the following is a proposed
definition of self-esteem: Self-esteem is the appraisal of one’s own
personal value, including both emotional components (self-worth) and
cognitive components (self-efficacy). More comprehensively, self-esteem
is a multifaceted and heterogeneous construct, the multiple forms of

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which are a function of how accurately or closely it matches an
individual’s measureable reality, composed of the objective outcome of
one’s behavior (actual achievements, measurable capabilities) as well as
one’s interpersonal interactions (i.e., the level of congruence between
how one thinks he or she is perceived and how he or she is actually
perceived). Self-esteem also varies in terms of its level of stability, or the
degree to which it is influenced by evaluative events or the need to match
external standards across time and situation. The permutations of these
sorting variables deductively yield eight forms of self-esteem: Optimal
High, Fragile High, Accurate Low, Fragile Low, Non-compensatory
Narcissism, Compensatory Narcissism, Pessimal, and Disorganized. A
detailed description of each of these eight forms, including examples, is
presented below.
FIGURE 2 Continuum of Accurate Low Self-esteem vs. Pessimal Self-
Esteem
For the purposes of simplicity and clarity, the forms of self-esteem
appearing along the right column in the current model may appear to be
categorical in nature. However, it should be emphasized that these are
not, in fact, categorical “types”; instead, as with the sorting variables that
precede them, the eight forms also are conceptualized as existing on
various dimensions. As such, assorted pairs can be extracted and placed

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on relevant continua. Although it would be cumbersome to represent
visually all possible permutations here, two specific pairs serve as
examples: accurate low self-esteem vs. pessimal self-esteem (Figure 2)
and non-compensatory narcissism versus compensatory narcissism
(Figure 3).
FIGURE 3 Continuum of Non-compensatory Narcissism vs.
Compensatory Narcissism
Optimal High Self-Esteem consists of self-appraisal that is accurately
based on the objective outcome of one’s behavior and one’s interpersonal
interactions, and is skewed in a positive direction (accurate, positive).
Further, one’s judgment of the value, condition, or importance of oneself
is minimally influenced by evaluative events (both externally and
internally generated) and/or by the need to match external standards or
expectations across time and situation (stable). The self-appraisal of
individuals within this category is based upon their measurable reality
(e.g., actual achievements, measurable capabilities), as well as a high
level of congruence between how they think they are perceived and how
they are actually perceived by others. Regardless of experiences or
information that might threaten, contradict, or challenge the individual’s

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overall positive self-appraisal, it remains relatively consistent across time
and situation.
For example, a woman in the Optimal High Self-Esteem category,
regardless that she is unhappy about recently gaining some weight and
being passed up for a promotion at work, maintains an overall positive
and accurate self-appraisal that is not significantly influenced by a desire
to match external standards of success or physical attractiveness. She
may experience a variety of emotions and she may even take steps to
better her situation, but the manner in which she judges her own value
and importance remains relatively consistent.
Fragile High Self-Esteem consists of self-appraisal that is accurately
based on the objective outcome of one’s behavior and one’s interpersonal
interactions and is skewed in a positive direction (accurate, positive).
However, one’s judgment of the value, condition, or importance of
oneself is highly susceptible to being influenced by evaluative events
(both externally and internally generated) and/or by the need to match
external standards or expectations across time and situation (unstable).
The self-appraisal of individuals placed within this category is based
upon their measurable reality (e.g., actual achievements, measurable
capabilities), as well as a high level of congruence between how they
think they are perceived and how they are actually perceived by others.
Despite these individuals’ susceptibility to adverse experiences or
information, they demonstrate high resilience in their ability to recover
relatively quickly from setbacks and return to their high baseline level of
functioning.
For example, a graduate student with Fragile High Self-Esteem might
react to mild criticism from her dissertation chairperson by experiencing
sadness, discouragement, and self-doubt. However, after a brief period of
time, she is able to recover from her negative emotions and get back to
rewriting her research without significant or lasting impact on her self-
appraisal, which is relatively high overall.
Accurate Low Self-Esteem consists of self-appraisal that is
accurately based on the objective outcome of one’s behavior and one’s
interpersonal interactions but is skewed in a negative direction (accurate,
negative). Further, one’s judgment of the value, condition, or importance
of oneself is minimally influenced by evaluative events (both externally
and internally generated) and/or by the need to match external standards
across time and situation (stable). The self-appraisal of individuals placed
within this category is based upon their measurable reality (e.g., actual
achievements, measurable capabilities), as well as a high level of
congruence between how they think they are perceived and how they are
actually perceived by others. Their self-appraisal remains skewed in a

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negative direction consistently across time and situation and is minimally
influenced by self-reflection or external feedback.
For example, a man with Accurate Low Self-Esteem who has been
highly unsuccessful in school, extracurricular activities, the workforce,
and his interpersonal relationships, may receive a call from his father
telling him he is proud of him for recently obtaining a job. However,
because his overall self-appraisal is negative and accurately based upon
his history, his self-appraisal remains unaffected by getting a job or by
his father’s feedback.
Fragile Low Self-Esteem consists of self-appraisal that is accurately
based on the objective outcome of one’s behavior and one’s interpersonal
interactions and is skewed in a negative direction (accurate, negative).
However, one’s judgment of the value, condition, or importance of
oneself is highly susceptible to being influenced by evaluative events
(both externally and internally generated) and/or the need to match
external standards or expectations across time and situation (unstable).
The self-appraisal of individuals placed within this category is based
upon their measureable realities (e.g., actual achievements, measurable
capabilities), as well as a high level of congruence between how they
think they are perceived and how they are actually perceived by others.
However, because of their self-appraisal being skewed in a negative
direction, they demonstrate low resilience in their ability to recover from
setbacks and return to their low baseline level of functioning.
For example, the same graduate student described above who
receives mild criticism from her dissertation chairperson, but is instead
within the Fragile Low Self-Esteem category, would experience much
more difficulty recovering from this setback. She is likely to take a
prolonged period of time to get back to rewriting her dissertation, taking
her chairperson’s feedback as disapproval of her global abilities and
struggling to return to her level of baseline functioning and self-appraisal.
Non-compensatory Narcissism consists of self-appraisal that is more
positive than is reflected by measurable factors and/or the interpersonal
perceptions of others (distorted, inflated). Further, one’s judgment of the
value, condition, or importance of oneself is minimally influenced by
evaluative events (both externally and internally generated) and/or the
need to match external standards across time and situation (stable).
Included within this category are individuals who would meet a
psychological description of narcissism, which is characterized by an
excessive self-admiration of one’s own attributes, and includes features
of grandiosity, arrogance, entitlement, and a lack of perceived need for
personal change (Pincus, 2013; Stolorow, 1975; Wrzos, 1987). In its
more extreme form, individuals may meet criteria for a diagnosis of
narcissistic personality disorder as set forth in the Diagnostic and

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Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). As noted in DSM-5, this disorder involves a pattern
that is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of interpersonal and
social situations, and is marked by a lack of empathy for others. Because
individuals in the category of Non-compensatory Narcissism are
minimally influenced by evaluative events or the need to match external
standards, this type of self-appraisal can sometimes involve delusional
thinking. The individuals’ firmly held, distorted beliefs and feelings of
superiority are stable across time and situation and, thus, are essentially
immune to criticisms, threats, or contradictory evidence. The current
researchers assert that, in contrast to Compensatory Narcissism (see
below), individuals in this category do not appear to be covering deficits
in self-perceptions; they are, in fact, quite secure in their beliefs.
For example, an attorney with Non-compensatory Narcissism who
receives harsh criticism from a judge is likely to respond unflappably,
leaving the courtroom with a smirk on her face, thinking that the judge is
incompetent and inferior. Regardless of how accurate the judge’s
criticism might be, she blithely dismisses it as being worthless and
invalid. Her self-appraisal is consistently more positive than is reflected
by her actual courtroom trial outcomes or many other judges’ perceptions
of her. As another example, a Non-compensatory Narcissist whose
longtime girlfriend tells him she is breaking up with him would likely be
unfazed and react arrogantly by condescendingly and smugly informing
her that the loss is all hers, without even the slightest consideration that
he might need to examine his own personality or behavior. Being
negligibly influenced by his girlfriend’s feelings or opinions, his self-
appraisal remains minimally affected, if affected at all, and continues to
be more positive than is reflected by his actual behavior or the
perceptions of his girlfriend.
Compensatory Narcissism consists of self-appraisal that is more
positive than is reflected by measurable factors and/or the interpersonal
perceptions of others (distorted, inflated), but, in contrast to Non-
compensatory Narcissism, is also fragile or highly influenced by
evaluative events (both externally and internally generated) and/or the
need to match external standards or expectations across time and
situation (unstable). Included within this category are individuals who
would meet a psychological description of narcissism (as described
above). Because of this emotional instability, the individual is in a
psychological state of insecurity, attempting to make up for the lack of
stability of his or her self-appraisal by erecting a false persona of
excessive confidence as compensation. Theoretically and historically,
narcissism has frequently been characterized by extreme emotional
reactivity. For example, Kohut (1976) and Kernberg (1975) both spoke

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of narcissistic rage and a more general emotional lability characteristic of
narcissism. More recent research has shown that high narcissism predicts
aggression (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Lobbestael, Baumeister,
Fiebig, & Eckel, 2014; Rasmussen, 2015; Reidy, Foster, & Zeichner,
2010). High scores on measures of narcissism have been empirically
linked to aggressive retaliation even though measures of self-esteem have
generally failed to predict objective behaviors when it comes to
aggression (Baumeister et al., 2003). According to DSM-5 (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013), “Vulnerability in self-esteem makes
individuals with narcissistic personality disorder very sensitive to ‘injury’
from criticism or defeat…[to which] they may react with disdain, rage, or
defiant counterattacks” (p. 671). The current researchers assert that it is
specifically Compensatory Narcissism (as compared to Non-com-
pensatory Narcissism) that can be characterized by this propensity toward
aggressive retaliation, as a result of the emotional instability and
psychological insecurity underlying compensating narcissists’ self-
appraisal.
For example, the same attorney described above who receives
criticism from a judge, if instead is placed within the Compensatory
Narcissism category, would likely respond with rage, criticizing the
judge and slamming the door as she storms out of the courtroom.
Although her self-appraisal is more positive than is reflected by her
actual courtroom performance or the perceptions of judges, it is insecure,
fragile, and highly influenced by the need to match external standards
and expectations, resulting in her aggressive, emotionally explosive
tantrum. As another example, the same man described above whose
girlfriend informs him she is breaking up with him, if he were a
Compensatory Narcissist, might frantically react with a sense of utter
panic, feeling deeply wounded and devastated at the very thought that
someone would reject him. Because of his self-appraisal being insecure
and highly affected by evaluative events and external standards, he would
be emotionally distraught and engage in frantic attempts to protect and
preserve his distorted, inflated self-appraisal.
Pessimal Self-Esteem consists of self-appraisal that is more negative
than is reflected by measurable factors and/or the interpersonal
perceptions of others (distorted, negative), and is also minimally
influenced by evaluative events (both externally and internally generated)
and/or by the need to match external standards across time and situation
(stable). An individual within this category appraises himself or herself
in a manner that is inconsistent with measurable factors (e.g., academic
success, occupational success) or the way he or she is actually perceived
by others. The individual’s self-appraisal remains distorted and deflated

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regardless of evaluative events or external standards, resulting in an
overall lack of hope.
For example, a professional athlete with Pessimal Self-Esteem may
have an impressive athletic record, a significant fan base, and close
friends and family members who are proud of him; however, he
consistently maintains a negative self-appraisal regardless of his
achievements or positive feedback from others.
Disorganized Low Self-Esteem consists of self-appraisal that is more
negative than is reflected by measurable factors and/or the interpersonal
perceptions of others (distorted, negative) and is fragile, or highly
influenced by evaluative events (both externally and internally generated)
and/or the need to match external standards or expectations across time
and situation (unstable). Therefore, individuals within this category may
seek or crave opportunities to elevate their overall self-appraisal by
matching various external standards or expectations of others; however,
with a baseline self-appraisal that is generally distorted and deflated, the
individual is likely to be untrusting and doubting of any evidence that
might contradict his or her negative thoughts and feelings; thus, the
individual’s self-appraisal remains in a chaotic state and generally
skewed in a negative direction.
For example, a man with Disorganized Low Self-Esteem may
experience some success in his career and within his interpersonal
relationships, but will still maintain self-appraisal that is skewed in a
negative direction. Being highly influenced by the need to match external
standards and expectations, he finds himself consistently trapped in a
chaotic, unstable state, torn between seeking opportunities to refute his
negative self-appraisal, but being wary of any evidence that contradicts
how he feels about himself and what he believes about himself.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR RESEARCHERS AND CLINICIANS
Self-esteem has not proved to be the Holy Grail that psychologists
and the general population alike once believed it to be, nor has the
research literature supported the notion that a low self-esteem epidemic is
the cause of a wide range of social problems. However, the term did not
become one of the top covariates occurring in personality and social
psychology research without reason. Regardless that the research has
been plagued with confusion, discrepancies, and disagreements, self-
esteem – both the concept and the term – is far too embedded in the
literature and mass consciousness to discard altogether. Rather than
abandoning or replacing it, the current researchers propose a
reconceptualization, illustrated by the new model described above, that

288 NORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
acknowledges and accounts for the heterogeneity of the construct. With
these ideas in mind, and based upon the findings of the current
investigation, the following are recommendations for researchers and
clinicians.
Reaching Consensus on a Definition
Given the long history of the term, the research on self-esteem has
given rise to a number of different definitions, based on different
assumptions and theories, and yielding different findings. This lack of
conceptual clarity and agreement is one of the primary reasons – if not
the primary reason – for the rampant confusion surrounding the
construct. Without a common language currency as a foundation, the
research is inevitably prone to be inundated with conceptual and
methodological problems. Just as agreed upon definitions enable
physicists to communicate with one another and with the public about
such basic concepts as heat, sound, or electricity, psychologists also must
strive for the same level of consensus with regard to self-esteem. With
the plethora of definitions of self-esteem that currently exist, we run the
risk of comparing apples to oranges to strawberries with regard to the
various self-esteem measures and research findings.
A comprehensive definition and theoretical model have been
proposed as part of the current review. Whether this particular version
becomes widely adopted, it is imperative that we reach consensus about
how we define and describe the term. Moreover, further research is
indicated that specifically focuses on the generalizability of the definition
and model across cultures. From a clinical perspective, reaching
consensus on the specific nature of self-esteem will assist professionals
in diagnostic clarification, treatment planning, and selecting appropriate
interventions. Understanding the multidimensional nature of self-esteem
and the full spectrum of ways that one’s self-appraisal can manifest itself
as opposed to the oversimplified view of high versus low – will assist
clinicians in becoming better diagnosticians and psychotherapists.
Developing a Measure of Self-esteem as a Heterogeneous Construct
Attempts to resolve the conflicting views of what exactly constitutes
self-esteem have resulted in many researchers – the current ones included
– suggesting that self-esteem is a multifaceted construct. What we have
come to think of as self-esteem is a complex, dynamic concept that
cannot be accurately summarized or confined to a definition that is
unidimensional and fixed, focusing on just one aspect of human
experience (such as simply feelings of self-liking). Therefore, an
assessment measure of self-esteem that captures the heterogeneity of the
term and accounts for multiple conceptual issues is greatly needed.

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Conceptual and methodological problems in the research have made
valid, useful measurement of self-esteem especially difficult. As a
remedy, the following are specific areas that should be addressed in
developing an improved self-esteem measure:
Based on the proposed definition, the new measure should account
for both the affective factors (feelings of self-worth) and cognitive
factors (self-efficacy) that constitute self-esteem.
The new measure should yield scores for all eight types of self-
esteem that have been identified in the proposed model. Ideally, each
score would fall along a different dimensional scale, given that the
sorting variables in this model are conceptualized as continuous, rather
than categorical variables. The resulting graph of self-esteem scores
might visually resemble the personality profiles found in the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (Hathaway et al., 1989) or the
Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (Millon, Davis, & Grossman, 2006).
The new measure should possess psychometric properties that surpass
those of current measures. In particular, the measure must demonstrate
greater evidence of construct validity, in terms of both convergent and
discriminant factors. This would best be achieved by utilizing the
multitrait-multimethod matrix paradigm (Campbell & Fiske, 1959), in
which the relationships among constructs (in particular, self-esteem,
social desirability, happiness, and narcissism) can be empirically
deconstructed using multiple methods, such as self-report, other report,
and behavioral observations. Because self-report measures are
particularly subject to the effects of reactivity (in which people alter their
responses as a result of awareness that they are being measured), these
complementary methods should, when possible, be minimally invasive.
The social desirability of high self-esteem in North American culture
generally leads subjects to respond to face-valid items accordingly,
thereby inflating self-esteem scores on self-report measures. It is,
therefore, recommended that future measures include a validity scale or
internal check for social desirability bias. An empirically based
correction scale (similar to the K scale in the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory-2) might be used to statistically deflate
respondents’ scores to reflect more accurately their true self-esteem,
were they not responding in a socially desirable manner. The inclusion of
peer or observer ratings is also recommended both (a) to attenuate the
effects of social desirability bias and (b) to assess the degree of
congruence-incongruence between one’s own appraisal versus others’
appraisals.

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Reducing the Indiscriminate Boosting of Self-Esteem
Some may argue that arbitrarily boosting self-esteem is harmless
because it feels good, it appears to be linked to happiness, and it might
even motivate people to accomplish things purely because they are
striving for the recognition associated with enhancing self-esteem.
However, it would be a significant mistake to ignore the ever-increasing
amount of recent literature (see Crocker, 2006; Crocker & Park, 2004)
that has focused on the ensuing potential costs of having, or even
pursuing, self-esteem. Some of these include breeding narcissism, more
biased perceptions of the future, increased tendency toward aggression,
interference with learning and mastery, and detrimental interpersonal
effects (e.g., people focusing on themselves at the expense of others’
needs and feelings). With these potential costs in mind, the current
researchers urge future clinicians and researchers to devote greater
attention to the second component of the proposed definition – namely,
self-efficacy – as well as to measurable behavioral outcomes. As
discussed above, self-efficacy refers to people’s cognitive beliefs
regarding their capability to accomplish a certain level of performance
and has been shown to be a useful and attainable clinical goal (Riggio,
2012). Focusing on one’s self-efficacy, along with one’s behavior, might
promote a more realistic and useful sense of competence that is less
susceptible to the costs associated with arbitrarily and non-contingently
attempting to make people simply feel good about themselves.
Disentangling the Links among Self-Esteem, Happiness, and
Depression
Based upon the current literature review, the research on self-esteem,
happiness, and depression emerged as yielding the only real consistent
findings by far. Thus, this area warrants further study. However, it is
important for future researchers to remember the scientific tenet that the
correlation between two variables is just that – a correlation, not
necessarily causation. Although the links between high self-esteem and
happiness, and low self-esteem and depression, appear strong, future
research should address the methodological shortcomings of the work
that has been done thus far to determine the exact nature of the
relationships between these variables, including pathways and direction
of causation. We must also remember that, although much of the existing
research makes claims of meaningful relationships between these
variables, statistically significant relationships are not necessarily
meaningful.
Future studies should attempt to identify (and possibly rule out)
potential third-variable causes. For example, research might be indicated
to determine to what degree the specific items on certain commonly used

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self-report measures (e.g., The Rosenberg SES, The Oxford Happiness
Inventory) could be measuring the same construct. For instance,
determining to what degree low self-esteem is just one of the various
symptoms of depression could account for the overlap between items on
self-report measures of both constructs (e.g., The Rosenberg SES and the
Beck Depression Inventory).
Devoting Greater Focus to the Intersection of Self-esteem and
Culture
The relationship between self-esteem and culture warrants much
greater attention, in both research and clinical contexts. Although these
areas are beyond the scope of this paper and have been reviewed
elsewhere (see, for example, Shiraev & Levy, 2017), the following issues
deserve particular consideration.
Further research is needed to address and incorporate cultural factors
in the assessment of self-esteem. Even an improved measure that
accounts for the heterogeneous nature of self-esteem, as proposed here, is
still subject to values-driven biases rooted within their cultural context.
For example, as noted above, the social desirability of high self-esteem in
North American culture typically leads subjects to respond to face-valid
items accordingly. More research is also indicated that specifically
focuses on the generalizability of assessment measures across cultures,
including culture-specific normative data.
With regard to advancing the conceptualization of self-esteem, it is
crucial to bear in mind that the quest for self-esteem is not necessarily a
universal human motive (Boucher, 2010); in fact, it appears to be a
relatively recent development in Western individualistic culture
(Baumeister, 1987). For example, the Judeo-Christian tradition has
historically considered excessive self-love to be suspect because it leads
to sentiments of self-importance and arrogance – as opposed to modesty
and humility – which are not believed to be conducive to spiritual
growth. Even currently, within many collectivistic societies (such as
Japanese, South American, or some African cultures), the drive to attain
high self-esteem is not highly valued (see Cai, Brown, Deng, & Oakes,
2007; Kitayama, 2006). In fact, when viewed through the lens of Asian
interdependent cultures, it is frequently perceived as a sign of insecurity,
incompetence (Kitayama, 2006), and psychological stubbornness (Miller,
Wang, Sandel, & Cho, 2002). Conversely, self-critical or self-effacing
self-perceptions – the very attributes that Western cultures might view as
low self-esteem – are often encouraged, reinforced, and eventually
internalized as a habitual response tendency (Kitayama, 2006).
As responsible clinicians, it is important to avoid presenting value
judgments as objective reflections of truth. Examining self-esteem

292 NORTH AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
through cross-cultural lenses highlights the importance of acknowledging
how our perceptions are inevitably influenced by our own personal
values and beliefs. In the United States and other Westernized societies,
countless psychotherapists, mental health providers, educators, and
parents are prone toward this culture-centric goal of self-esteem, but not
without cost. In a clinical context, what might be the consequences of a
psychotherapist consistently encouraging a client to strive for higher self-
esteem if, in fact, that client does not share the therapist’s Westernized
belief system? Similarly, how might a therapist in training be affected by
a supervisor or professor who regularly instructs her to work toward
increasing a client’s (or even her own) self-esteem, if she does not adhere
to the same socio-cultural beliefs? By conflating science with values,
clinicians are not only failing to uphold a commitment to cultural
awareness and sensitivity, but could also be contributing to or even
creating some of the clinical problems they are seeking to alleviate.
More broadly, the historical arc of self-esteem’s rise from promising
panacea to stubborn fall from grace is far from completed. As the
mythology surrounding self-esteem is gradually debunked and replaced
with more realistic conceptualizations along the way, it is essential to
incorporate cross-cultural factors – including both etic and emic
approaches – that better account for global diversity. In this way, self-
esteem can ultimately provide a more valuable and pragmatic foundation
for both professionals and the general population in the future.
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Acknowledgements: The authors wish to acknowledge the invaluable feedback
provided by Paul Eastwick, Anat Cohen, Dity Brunn, Barbara Ingram, Maria
Brahme, and two anonymous reviewers, as well as the work of Anthony
DiMaggio on the figure illustrations.