The June 1867 floods in NSW: causes, characteristics, impacts and lessons

Abstract

As its 150th anniversary approaches, this paper provides an overview of the disastrous June 1867 floods in NSW. A rich documentary trail of the event has facilitated an investigation of the flood-generating weather, the spread and intensity of the floods, and the consequences especially in terms of fatalities. Interpreting the material through a flood risk management prism enables some important lessons to be identified. The evidence suggests that the flooding was caused by prolonged heavy rain from an East Coast Low. Damaging floods were reported from the Hunter in the north to Moruya in the south and the Macquarie and Murrumbidgee in the west. The Hawkesbury-Nepean River system flooded to record levels, and is estimated to be between a 1 in 200 (0.5%) and 1 in 500 (0.2%) chance per year flood at Windsor. Over 30 fatalities were associated with the weather event, and the risk factors contributing to these deaths are described. Learnings from this event include:
1. Danger of East Coast Lows;
2. Spread and intensity of floods could stretch emergency services;
3. Importance of considering risks for full range of flood sizes;
4. Importance of identifying low flood islands;
5. Danger of wind, waves and cold;
6. Rescue cannot be guaranteed;
7. Need for early evacuation to land above the PMF;
8. Need for flood warning and emergency management systems;
9. Challenge of people being slow or unwilling to evacuate;
10. Integrated, risk-informed land use planning is vital.

Full text

The June 1867 Floods in NSW: causes, characteristics, impacts and lessons -1-
2017 Floodplain Management Australia National Conference, Newcastle
THE JUNE 1867 FLOODS IN NSW: CAUSES, CHARACTERISTICS,
IMPACTS AND LESSONS
S Yeo1, D Bewsher2, J Robinson3, P Cinque4
1Flood Focus Consulting, Sydney, NSW
2Bewsher Consulting, Sydney, NSW
3Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology, Sydney, NSW
4NSW State Emergency Service, Sydney, NSW
Abstract
As its 150th anniversary approaches, this paper provides an overview of the disastrous
June 1867 floods in NSW. A rich documentary trail of the event has facilitated an
investigation of the flood-generating weather, the spread and intensity of the floods,
and the consequences especially in terms of fatalities. Interpreting the material through
a flood risk management prism enables some important lessons to be identified.
The evidence suggests that the flooding was caused by prolonged heavy rain from an
East Coast Low. Damaging floods were reported from the Hunter in the north to
Moruya in the south and the Macquarie and Murrumbidgee in the west. The
Hawkesbury-Nepean River system flooded to record levels, and is estimated to be
between a 1 in 200 (0.5%) and 1 in 500 (0.2%) chance per year flood at Windsor. Over
30 fatalities were associated with the weather event, and the risk factors contributing to
these deaths are described. Learnings from this event include:
1. Danger of East Coast Lows;
2. Spread and intensity of floods could stretch emergency services;
3. Importance of considering risks for full range of flood sizes;
4. Importance of identifying low flood islands;
5. Danger of wind, waves and cold;
6. Rescue cannot be guaranteed;
7. Need for early evacuation to land above the PMF;
8. Need for flood warning and emergency management systems;
9. Challenge of people being slow or unwilling to evacuate;
10. Integrated, risk-informed land use planning is vital.
Introduction
June 2017 marks the 150th anniversary of the record Hawkesbury-Nepean River flood
in June 1867. This river valley on Sydney’s western fringe contains one of the largest
flood risk exposures in Australia. It is timely then to consider what flood risk
management learnings may be taken from this event. While the focus of this paper is
on the Hawkesbury-Nepean floodplain, we seek to place the event in its broader
context.
Limited hydrological data was recorded in 1867. Nonetheless, many articles were
penned for Sydney newspapers, which are now easily accessed through the National
Library of Australia’s ‘trove’ search. Several Hawkesbury district histories have also
devoted chapters to flooding (e.g. Bowd, 1982; Nichols, 2001). This rich documentary
trail has facilitated an investigation of the flood and its consequences. For insights into
the relief and recovery effort, readers are directed to Nichols (2001).

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Cause of flood
Descriptions of weather published in newspapers and official observations at Sydney
Observatory suggest that the June 1867 flood was associated with an East Coast Low
(ECL), sometimes described as the ‘Catherine Hill’ gale after one of the ships lost in
the storm (Callaghan and Helman, 2008; Callaghan and Power, 2014). The month of
June was dominated by westerlies, but the 19th to 23rd was marked by a strong easterly
gale, characteristic of an ECL (Figure 1; see also Appendix A). One report described
that at about 10am on Thursday 20th June, ‘the wind came on to blow furiously from the
north-east, driving before it sheets of rain; and this ultra-violence of the weather
continued … for several hours’.1 Similar reports of the ‘violence’ of the wind were
received from the Hunter Valley and Illawarra district.
Figure 1: June 1867 wind speed and prevailing direction, Sydney Observatory
Data source: Smalley (1867)
Note: E is taken to include NE to SE and W is taken to include NW to SW
Callaghan and Power (2014) used weather reports from towns in NSW to reconstruct a
synoptic chart for the event (Figure 2). They suggest that the ECL crossed the coast
north of Newcastle and became stationary over the Blue Mountains west of Sydney for
approximately 48 hours.
Available daily rainfall data is summarised in Figure 3. Rainfall at Bringelly in Sydney’s
southwest exceeded 100mm for three consecutive days. It is believed that the rain was
much heavier on the ranges to the west (Callaghan and Power, 2014), with substantial
runoff flowing to the west of the Great Dividing Range as well as to the east.2
Heavy rain fell on catchments that were already moist, with floods reported in the
Moruya district in March and the Clarence, Hunter and Hawkesbury-Nepean Valleys in
April. The spate of floods in 1867 may be associated with a strong La Niña event
(Gergis and Fowler, 2009).

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Figure 2: Schematic representation of June 1867 East Coast Low
Source: Callaghan and Power (2014)
Figure 3: Daily rainfall for available NSW stations, June 1867
Data sources: * from private gauges3; remainder from Bureau of Meteorology; Grafton also available

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2017 Floodplain Management Australia National Conference, Newcastle
Heavy rain associated with the ECL was the principal cause of the June 1867 floods.
Russell (1877, p.12), in his classic work on the climate of NSW, judged that such
‘easterly gales’, coming on without warning, were ‘by far the most dangerous upon our
coast, bringing with them in nearly all cases thick weather, torrents of rain, and a very
high sea on a lee shore’. A comparison of major Hawkesbury River floods at Windsor
since 1860 (based on Bewsher Consulting, 2012) to a tabulation of the weather
systems causing the floods (Callaghan and Power, 2014), shows that all but one of 13
major floods were associated with ECLs.4 The March 1978 flood was associated with a
tropical low. As noted in Callaghan and Power (2014), rain-bearing weather systems
that remain stationary or move very slowly, and wet catchment conditions are also
important drivers of major flooding in coastal catchments along the south east
Australian coast.
Flood characteristics
The magnitude and consequences of the flooding are arranged by catchment and
community (upstream to downstream) in Appendix B (see Figure 4 for locations). For
coastal catchments, the floods extended from the Hunter Valley in the north to the
Moruya Valley in the south. West of the Great Dividing Range, the Macquarie and
Murrumbidgee systems experienced high floods. Flood fatalities were recorded in the
Hawkesbury-Nepean, Macquarie and Murrumbidgee Valleys.
Figure 4: Locations in NSW described in text

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The flood in the Nepean River at Penrith and Hawkesbury River reached record levels,
and is estimated to have an average frequency of between a 1 in 200 (0.5%) and 1 in
500 (0.2%) chance per year flood (NSW Office of Water, 2014). It is difficult to know
with confidence which sub-catchments contributed to the record flows given the sparse
hydrological data, but the Warragamba catchment is believed to be the primary source,
with the Grose and Colo also contributing significant flows.5 There was also evidently
very heavy rain in the headwaters of the Macdonald River Valley, given the
descriptions of effects there.
Newspaper reports of flood heights at specified times (often with comparisons to the
1864 flood) were used to construct a flood hydrograph for the Hawkesbury River at
Windsor (Bewsher Consulting, 2012). This is compared to a 1 in 200 (0.5%) chance
per year flood hydrograph in Figure 5. Reported rates of rise at Windsor vary from
about 0.8m/hour early in the event to about 0.2m/hour closer to peak. The flood was
higher than 14.0m AHD for about four days.
Figure 5: Flood hydrograph, Hawkesbury River at Windsor, June 1867
Source: Adapted from Bewsher Consulting (2012)6
The flood was very extensive in the vicinity of Windsor (see also Figure 6):
‘The plain on which Windsor is partly situated unites with South Creek and Eastern
Creek to form a vast inland sea … A boat may now be taken through deep water
from Riverstone to the Blue Mountains - a distance of about 15 miles [24 km]; and
from Hall's at Pitt Town to the Kurrajong - some twenty miles [32 km]’. 7
The easterly gale generated sizeable waves on the surface of this large ‘inland sea’:
‘When the wind is high the broken crested billows roll with as much force and
volume as they do during moderately squally weather in Sydney Harbour’. 8
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
11.0
12.0
13.0
14.0
15.0
16.0
17.0
18.0
19.0
20.0
-66 -60 -54 -48 -42 -36 -30 -24 -18 -12 -6 0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42
Level (m AHD)
Hours relative to flood peak
1867 flood 1 in 200 chance per year design hydrograph (post-Warragamba Dam)
Pe ak 19.7m AHD, 5am
Sun 23rd June 1867
6am
Sun
23rd
6pm
Sun
23rd
6am
Mon
24th
6pm
Mon
24th
6pm
Sat
22nd
6am
Sat
22nd
6pm
Fri
21st
6am
Fri
21st
6pm
Thu
20th
?

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Figure 6: Extent of 1867 flood in vicinity of Penrith and Richmond-Windsor
Flood impacts
House and contents
An overview of the flood’s consequences is provided in Appendix B. Hundreds of
houses were flooded, and many destroyed. In the Hawkesbury-Nepean Valley (HNV),
the best estimates of numbers are available for the Windsor district (Table 1). Some
500 families between Cornwallis and Wilberforce were driven from their homes, and
some 250 of these were judged to be ‘in very great distress’ after the flood, requiring
relief supplies.9 A survey along the Lower Hawkesbury showed that at least 48 houses
were destroyed between Wilberforce and Wisemans Ferry.10 In the Penrith district, over
100 houses were flooded to great depths, forcing hundreds of residents to await rescue
and take shelter in Penrith Hospital or other places (see Figure 7).11 In the Richmond
district:
‘There is not now a farm along the river front … that is not, for the present, ruined;
not a homestead uninjured. Many houses are gone, with the ground on which they
stood, into the river. Many others are tottering shells or heaps of ruins. Some are
standing, but broken and dangerous, and to these desolate and unwholesome
tenements the owners are now returning without the necessaries of life for the
present, or the means of living in the future.’ 12

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Table 1: Displaced households in the Windsor district
Location Number of households driven from homes
Cornwallis 30
Wilberforce Road/Freemans Reach 42
Windsor 218
Richmond Road/Argyle Estate 18
McGraths Hill/South Creek/Eastern Creek 51
Pitt Town 54
Wilberforce 69
Data source: Sydney Morning Herald, Tue 2 Jul 1867 pp.2-3 ‘Windsor’
Figure 7: View of Penrith from the Great Western Road, 1867
Source: Illustrated Times (London), 7 Sep 1867 p.145; State Library of NSW
In addition to their houses, the residents faced the loss of all their possessions. This is
well summarised by observations from downstream:
‘At the confluence of the Mangrove with the Hawkesbury, the latter presented on
Friday, Saturday, and Sunday an awful sight - one that cannot be soon forgotten. It
was rushing on with astounding rapidity, conveying down houses, stacks, cattle,
pigs, ducks, geese, hens, chairs, tables, doors, boxes, beds, and bedsteads - even
a child, seated on a bag of flour, was seen going down the river.’ 13
‘There must have been awful havoc in the Hawkesbury, for all the beaches from
Barrenjoey to the Long Reef are strewed with fragments of houses, boxes, chairs,
door frames, dead pigs, hay, wheat, broken bedsteads, weather board sides of
houses, oranges with large branches, pumpkins, melons, corn cobs, and other
debris, that scarcely any portion of the beaches can be seen.’ 14
The losses reduced many people to a state of destitution:
‘The losses caused by this flood are fearful. It is impossible to estimate them.
Hundreds are rendered penniless and homeless. Many, from being well-to-do, are
reduced to abject destitution. It is pitiable to witness so much misery.’ 15

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Infrastructure
Among the most significant reported damages to infrastructure were the loss of
Denison Bridge across the Macquarie River at Bathurst, and the damaged western
approach to Nepean (Victoria) Bridge at Penrith. Railways were also reported damaged
at Maitland and at South Creek near St Marys (Appendix B).
Damage to telegraph lines was extensive: Singleton; Penrith; between Windsor and
Riverstone; Wisemans Ferry; Turon River near Sofala; and at Reedy Creek beyond
Yass.16 This had a disruptive impact on communications. Fortunately, only after an
urgent request for boats was sent was the line between Windsor and Sydney broken.
Windsor Gaol was flooded, obliging the gaoler to break a hole in the wall to liberate the
prisoners (Nichols, 2001).
Animal fatalities
Great numbers of cattle, horses, pigs and poultry were swept away.17 Upwards of
1,000 horses drowned in the vicinity of Windsor alone.18
Human fatalities
It is difficult to confirm the number of fatalities associated with the event.19 The table in
Appendix C lists 25 fatalities associated with riverine flooding, and another 8
associated with heavy seas. Most flood fatalities occurred in two incidents where
houses were inundated: the Eather families at Cornwallis (12 fatalities); and the Baker
family and Frederick Smith at Burrendong (9 fatalities – see Appendix D). The other
four flood fatalities were associated with personal behaviours: attempting to cross a
flooded river (1); property protection (2); and inebriation (1). Other deaths following the
flood were attributed to the adverse impacts on people’s health.20
The loss of life could easily have been much higher. Many reports describe how people
were rescued by boat in the nick of time (see Figure 8):
Penrith: ‘A settler named Morgan, his wife and two children, were flooded out of
their home, and took refuge on a hay-stack. The waters rose around them, and the
stack was just beginning to float away when a boat came and rescued them from
certain death. Scores of such stories are told.’ 21 (see Figure 7)
Shanes Park, South Creek: ‘If it had not been for the bravery and skill of Mr Harris
and his men, many would have met a watery grave on Saturday last…’ 22
Richmond: ‘Many families were rescued from the very verge of drowning, taken
from the tops of trees or the ridges of submerging and falling dwellings.’ 23
Cornwallis: ‘A man named Alfred Norris, trying to escape from the flood, climbed
up a willow tree and lashed his wife and two children to the branches. A third child
he held in his arms. When discovered the flood had risen to where he was, and he
was holding one of the children aloft in order to keep him out of the rising water.
Had he not have been rescued by a boat he must soon have dropped from
exhaustion or have been swept over by the rising stream.’ 24
McGraths Hill: ‘The residents … had a very narrow escape. One of the crews
happened to see the flickering gleams of a light burning very faintly and hardly
visible. It was about 3 o'clock in the morning when the boat pulled up and found
nearly eighty men, women, and children crowded into a few places. Thirty were
taken out of one loft, and there was just time for the return of the boats for the rest
before the flood rose above the building in which they had taken refuge. The poor
folks had given themselves up for lost.’ 25

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Several local boats were supplemented by Government boats sent via train from
Sydney to Penrith and Riverstone (then rowed to Windsor).
Information about the Eather family tragedy was obtained from the testimonies of
several witnesses: the widowed husbands, Thomas and William Eather;26 Dora Eather
at the time of her husband George’s death in 1912;27 and neighbours, especially Mrs
Smith of Cornwallis28 and Mr Brown of Freeman’s Reach.29 Table 2 sets out a timeline.
Table 2: Eather tragedy timeline
Time Event
Thu 20th
4pm
William took his family to his brother George Eather’s house ‘for safety’; Thomas,
in a house only 200 yards from George’s house, also brought his family to
George’s house
Thu 20th
4pm30
George’s wife Dora and their four children left by boat for Clarendon (George
remained at the house); William’s wife, Catherine, and Thomas’ wife, Emma, both
declined a seat on the boat
Thu 20th
~7pm
William Smith invited the Eathers to shelter with them at Mrs Smith’s house,
where they had sheltered in the 1864 flood; Thomas Eather said they would come
when the moon rose if there was a need
Fri 21st
all day Dora unsuccessfully tried to direct a boat from Richmond to rescue the family
Fri 21st
afternoon
Rising floodwater obliged family to fly to ridge pole of house, where they hoped to
be rescued by boat
Fri 21st
afternoon
Mr Brown at Freemans Reach observed a flag of distress at Eathers but boatmen
supposed it to have been forgotten when ‘all’ the Eathers evacuated Thursday
Fri 21st
afternoon
Mr Brown saw persons on Eathers’ roof through telescope; unsuccessfully tried to
find a boat; later, two men procured boat and navigated to point opposite
Fri 21st
7pm
Dora, in Clarendon, saw signal from Eathers and (later) heard their cries;
unsuccessfully tried to send a boat for their rescue
Fri 21st
9-10pm
Would-be rescuers on opposite bank described how tremendous gale burst upon
them; at height of gale, heard heart-rending cry from the Eathers, then silence
Fri 21st
~10pm
Mr Dight hired crew of three to row to the Eathers, leaving about 10pm; they
arrived about an hour too late31
On the Thursday, Thomas and William Eather evacuated their families to their brother
George’s house ‘for safety’, since it was a new slab hut and was regarded as the best
shelter. (Thomas and William’s houses had been destroyed in the 1864 flood.)32 Dora
Eather (wife of George) and her children evacuated by boat that afternoon. Emma
declined a seat on the boat due to the want of an empty house at Clarendon. An
invitation on Thursday night to shelter at the property they had sheltered in during the
1864 flood, and where the occupants survived in 1867, was not taken up. On Friday
afternoon, the waters continued to rise rapidly, obliging the family still on the flats to
retreat to the ridge pole of the house. There, the stranded family was spotted from the
other side of the river by Mr Brown, who tried to secure a boat for their rescue. Two
men managed to row to a point opposite the Eathers’ house but could not cross the
river due to the strength of the current and the violence of the wind. A ‘tremendous
gale’ burst upon them about 9pm Friday, and at its height they heard a loud and
prolonged cry. Likely this was the moment when, according to Thomas’ account, ‘the
violence of the wind and waves swept the building and the whole of us into the water’
(see Figure 9). Dora later explained that although the slab house was strongly built to
resist floods, the shingle roof ‘had not been strapped’ and collapsed (see Figure 10).
George, Thomas, William and another man found temporary refuge in a tree, until
rescued about an hour later by a boat dispatched from Richmond.33 Dora had spent all
Friday in Richmond attempting to get a boat sent over for their rescue. Only when Mr
Dight offered £50 was a crew secured to make the difficult and hazardous journey.

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Figure 8: Night
rescue scene
Source: Illustrated
Sydney News, 16
Jul 1867 p.1; State
Library of NSW
Figure 9: The
drowning of
the Eathers
Source: Illustrated
Sydney News, 16
Jul 1867 p.8; State
Library of NSW
Figure 10: The
ruins of the
Eathers’ house
and the finding
of the drowned
Source: Illustrated
Sydney News, 16
Aug 1867 p.8; State
Library of NSW

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Hindsight teaches that George Eather’s house was completely inadequate as a shelter
from a flood of this magnitude. However well-constructed (and of all components, it
was the roof that proved to be its Achilles’ heel), its relatively low-lying location at
Cornwallis (a maximum of about 12m AHD)34 means that such a deep flood could not
be survived. One article intimates that the Eathers’ considerable experience of floods
misled them to believe that ‘they could meet any difficulty’.35 But their previous
experience of floods in 1864 failed to prepare them for the higher and faster rising flood
in 1867.36
Flood Risk Management Learnings
1. Danger of East Coast Lows (ECLs)
An obvious lesson of the 1867 flood is the very serious flood threat to coastal (and
even inland) NSW catchments posed by ECLs. This was emphasised again by the
‘Pasha Bulker’ storm of June 2007 (e.g. Vernon-Kidd et al., 2016), the April 2015 ECL
that caused severe floods in the Lower Hunter and Dungog areas (e.g. Yeo, 2015) and
the June 2016 ECL (Bureau of Meteorology, 2016). Recent research has explored how
the behaviour of ECLs is influenced by large-scale drivers of inter-annual to
multidecadal climate variability (e.g. Power and Callaghan, 2016; Browning and
Goodwin, 2016). This may assist with seasonal forecasting. The Bureau continues to
advance the capability of numerical weather prediction, which will enhance the ability to
forecast ECLs and the associated rainfall and wind.
2. Spread and intensity of floods could stretch emergency services
Should a repeat of the 1867 flood occur, flood forecasting services would be required
across numerous catchments. The Bureau would need to utilise forecasting resources
across the country to provide the necessary surge capacity for such an event. Ten out
of 17 NSW SES Regions would experience serious flooding near-simultaneously (see
Figure 11). This would place a significant demand on the SES, including its flood
rescue teams, and limit options for out-of-area assistance. Fortunately, in 1867, the
record Hawkesbury-Nepean event was evidently not accompanied by flooding of
similar intensity in the Parramatta, Cooks and Georges River catchments (Appendix B).
The conjunction of severe flooding in these (now densely urbanised) floodplains has
occurred (e.g. June 1864, August 1986)37 and the potential for concurrent large
operations across Greater Sydney is recognised in the Hawkesbury-Nepean Flood
Plan (NSW SES, 2015, Vol 1, p.37).
3. Importance of considering risks for full range of flood sizes
The 1867 flood is a continuing reminder of the importance of considering risks for the
full range of flood sizes up to and including the probable maximum flood (PMF). One of
the driving forces for this emphasis in the NSW Government’s (2001) Floodplain
Management Manual was the appreciation of the very significant flood risks in the HNV
for events rarer than the 1 in 100 (1%) chance per year flood. The topography of the
HNV is such that sandstone gorges at Sackville limit outflows during floods, causing
floodwater to rise upstream at Windsor to extreme depths – to about 2m higher than
1% flood level for an event like the 1867 flood, and about 9m higher than the 1% flood
level for the PMF (see Figure 12). Comprehensive risk management requires
evaluating and treating to a tolerable standard the risks to life and property of ‘rare’
floods. This has been increasingly recognised as such floods are experienced (e.g.
Nyngan, 1990; Coffs Harbour, 1996; Katherine, 1998; Lockyer Valley, 2011 – see
Rogencamp and Barton, 2012; Dungog, 2015 – see Yeo, 2015).

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Figure 11: Current NSW SES Regions with serious flooding in an 1867 flood scenario
Figure 12: Comparative flood risk of three NSW towns
Source: NSW Office of Water (2014)

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4. Importance of identifying low flood islands
The 1867 flood led to the formation of shrinking islands, as vividly described for
Windsor (see also Figure 13):
‘Saturday 22nd, noon: The town is divided into islands, which are gradually and
terribly diminishing. The greater portion of the town is now inundated… The people
themselves are every hour being driven closer and closer together as the mighty
flood encroaches on the land. Houses are giving way before the sweeping
current… Unless a change takes place very soon… the whole town will be
deluged. Hairbreadth escapes are heard of from all points, and at best nothing but
utter ruin and desolation stares us in the face.’ 38
‘Every moment we saw the people crowding in upon one another, the water still
rising and making smaller and smaller that patch of dry land that was left to them.
Some … in the height of despair, were preparing to betake themselves to the
church tops and to the mountains… Two thousand people gathered together on
two small spots in Windsor at one time.’ 39
Fortunately, the flood peaked before the Windsor island was fully submerged, which in
all likelihood would have added significantly to the fatalities given the inadequate
number of boats available to rescue 2000 persons from the island. The Windsor
(central) island would be fully inundated at about 22.3m AHD (Bewsher Consulting,
2012), estimated as between a 1 in 2000 and 1 in 5000 chance per year event (NSW
Office of Water, 2014).
NSW SES investigations in the late 1990s and early 2000s of evacuation requirements
in the HNV formed the foundation for the classification of flood affected areas and
emergency response (DECC, 2007; AEMI, 2014), which is now a standard component
of best practice flood risk assessment. ‘Low flood islands’, or, in national parlance,
‘flooded-isolated-submerged’ (FIS) areas, such as Windsor, require evacuation prior to
the loss of evacuation routes.
Figure 13: View of the Windsor ‘island’ in the 1867 flood
Source: Illustrated Australian News, 27 Jul 1867 p.8; State Library of Victoria

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5. Danger of wind, waves and cold
A feature of descriptions and illustrations of the 1867 flood in the Hawkesbury and
Nepean districts is the wind and waves (see Figures 7,8,9,13). The potential for wind-
generated waves needs to be considered in the design of infrastructure. Significant
wave heights of 0.6m were adopted for testing the performance of wave deflectors at
Jim Anderson Bridge (completed in 2007) (MHL, 2004), and waves twice as high are
expected (Bureau of Meteorology, 2015). There is also a need to include an
appropriate freeboard in flood planning levels applied to new buildings, proportional to
the length of fetch across which waves can be generated, the wind speed and the
duration of flooding.40
In addition, wind and waves are hazardous to people forced to take refuge outside, and
may complicate and even prevent rescue (e.g. Eathers). That hypothermia is a real
threat to life in floods is particularly evidenced from the Baker family tragedy. Clearly,
being well away from floodwaters is safer than being exposed to wind, waves and cold.
6. Rescue cannot be guaranteed
As seen above, weather conditions may not allow for rescue by boat (or helicopter).
Conditions on the river and floodplain such as waves, submerged fences and debris
can complicate rescue by boats, endangering both the rescuers and their passengers:
‘The boats had to be shot round chimneys or gable corners, rowed over fences and
telegraph wires, or to be pushed through patches of forest’. 41
‘Eighteen in one boat narrowly escaped being capsized by the boat grazing the top
rail of a fence when crossing it.’ 42
‘Grono’s family at Cattai narrowly escaped being drowned, it appears that while
being rescued, their boat came in contact with a log and was stove in, she filled so
fast that the greatest efforts had to be put forth by all hands to reach the land,
when the parties had scarcely disembarked before she sank.’ 43
Also, the number of boats and crews available may be inadequate for the task of
rescue within the required timeframe. Confusion and miscommunication may mean
some needy people are overlooked. The account of the Eathers at Cornwallis and the
incredibly vivid account of Mrs Smith at Richmond Lowlands44 suggest that all these
factors delayed their rescue.
7. Need for early evacuation to land above PMF
Given the extreme depths of flooding in the Hawkesbury-Nepean floodplain, shelter-in-
place is not viable. This demands evacuation to appropriate areas located above the
PMF. It is true that high points in Windsor and Richmond formed vital refuges in the
1867 flood, but the residents and refugees trapped on these islands were subject to
inordinate worry that the floodwater would continue rising to swamp the islands. Now,
through modern hydrologic and hydraulic modelling, it is known that such an
eventuality is possible in floods larger than the 1867 event. Low-set evacuation routes,
the volume of evacuation traffic, and the loss of electricity, water and sewage means
evacuation must be commenced early. The complexity of assessing contemporary
evacuation needs for the Hawkesbury-Nepean floodplain has served to advance the
conceptualisation and practice of flood evacuation timeline modelling for Australia as a
whole (e.g. Opper, 2004; Opper et al., 2009; Molino et al., 2013).

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8. Need for flood warning and emergency management systems
An obvious constraint on early evacuation in the HNV in 1867 was the lack of flood
warning. It seems that people’s only warning of the flood were environmental cues,
particularly the rise of the river. On Thursday 20th June, the rising flood in the
Richmond-Windsor district saw preparations underway including relocation of animals
and furniture, as well as evacuations to the townships.45 Only on the Friday morning
was an urgent request for boats telegraphed to Sydney, by which time the flood level
had almost surpassed the peak level of the 1864 flood.46 Boats and crews from
Customs and the Water Police in Sydney arrived by 4.30pm, but the Herald’s Windsor
correspondent feared that they were ‘too late to be of much service’.47 The late
responses can be viewed as a result of the lack of formalised flood warning and the still
evolving emergency response systems, which in 1867 took advantage of the Blacktown
to Richmond railway opened in late 1864.
One post-flood editorial looked forward to an improvement in flood warning through the
advancement of meteorological science, and commended a proposal to attach rain
gauges to every telegraph station.48 The experience of another flood in 1869 led to the
formation of the Volunteer Windsor Water Brigade, which enhanced local rescue work
(Nichols, 2001). Now, 150 years on, flood warning and emergency management
systems are much more developed and advanced (e.g. NSW SES, 2015).
9. Challenge of people being slow or unwilling to evacuate
But for flood warning systems and regional evacuation plans to be effective, people
must evacuate in a timely manner when evacuation orders are issued. Human
behaviours in the 1867 flood suggest that persuading people to evacuate is far from
straight forward, even when floodwater is at their doorsteps:
One observer paints a fascinating picture of people’s ‘tenacity to home’:
‘Perhaps one of the most curious features in connection with this visitation was the
absolute refusal of some persons to leave the dangerous position in which they
were placed, thinking the waters would speedily subside. They could not be
prevailed on to desert their homes, even for the short time which must elapse ere
their houses were free from water. In this respect the men, who, at considerable
risk of their own lives, endeavoured to save others, were occasionally under the
necessity of using all the persuasion they could to induce these people to get into
the boat. This tenacity to home under such circumstances may be accounted for by
the fact, that many of the unfortunate people have been long resident on the spot,
many born in the hut overwhelmed, and it is the only portion of their property, save
the ground, not swept away by the flood.’ 49
Another observer highlights people’s attachment to their possessions and animals:
‘There were some few unfortunate folk perched on the roofs of their houses who
were loath to leave without their possessions. The boatmen appear to have
thought it uncommonly unaccountable that they should be accosted in this style:
“Oh, my poor pig! Aren’t you going to take my poor pig?” by a man whom they were
tearing from the grasp of death.’ 50
One possible factor influencing people’s evacuation decisions was their experience of
the June 1864 flood, which reached 15.05m AHD at Windsor (WMA, 1996). Residents
who repeated the shelter-in-place strategy that had worked in 1864 found their lives in
great peril in the much higher flood in 1867 (19.7m AHD).51

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Ongoing community engagement is required to remind today’s residents that floods
much higher than what they’ve experienced can and do occur. There is also a need for
social research to better understand reasons why people may be reluctant to evacuate
– for example, their ‘tenacity to home’ and unwillingness to leave animals – and to
address the reasons for this reluctance. Recent research, under the auspices of the
Bushfire & Natural Hazards CRC, has provided insights into human behaviours in
relation to managing animals in disasters.52 The need for an Agriculture and Animal
Services Supporting Plan is recognised (NSW SES, 2015, Vol 1, p.30).
10. Integrated, risk-informed land use planning is vital
A number of editorials addressing the question of land use were published after the
flood, with excerpts shown in Appendix E. Most preached against the ‘folly’ of
rebuilding dwellings within the flood line and called for prudent development, including
the separation of dwelling house from farm. ‘Fathers’ were called to select safe
dwelling locations for their families, landlords to act similarly for the safety of their
tenants, and the Government was urged to enact legislation to prevent the erection of
dwellings on dangerous land. The identification and publication of the ‘flood line’ was
seen as a priority. One letter-writer suggested that the Government make available
land on higher ground at Richmond Common for the purpose of homesteads for
dislocated lowland farmers.53
In their advocacy for dwellings to be located on higher land, the editorials reiterated the
same sentiments Governor Macquarie had expressed 50 years earlier in his General
Orders of 5 March 1817 (HNFMSC, 2006, p.13). Karskens (2016), however, argues
that despite frequent flooding, Macquarie’s ‘orders’ in the 1810s had little effect in
persuading riverside farmers to relocate to one of the allocated ‘highland’ towns of
Castlereagh, Richmond, Windsor, Wilberforce and Pitt Town. A number of reasons for
settlers’ ‘obstinacy’ are proposed: a need to defend property from bushrangers, and
unfenced crops from stock; the disinclination or inability to construct houses in the
towns to the stipulated standard; a system of local government that made it difficult to
enforce orders; people’s independence and resistance to authority; and the priority of
land ownership (Karskens, 2016). The impact on productivity and inconvenience of
travelling to distant farms was likely also a factor. It appears from the impacts of the
1867 flood (e.g. Table 1), that many settlers were still living on the lowlands at that
time. Indeed, the number of settlers on the flats probably increased prior to 1867 due to
the subdivision of big estates into small farms,54 and the apparent infrequency of
serious floods from 1819 to 1857 (WMA, 1996).
But the 1867 flood, or perhaps the series of devastating floods from 1864 to 1870, may
represent a turning point for land use in the Hawkesbury district. There is some
evidence of out-migration after the flood (Nichols, 2001, p.64), though a number of
other factors were acting to promote this too.55 Limited Census data hints at local
population shifts to higher land, and some people built homesteads separate from their
lowland farms (Nichols, 2001, pp.11,64).56 The suburb of Richmond Lowlands (which
for the purpose of the Census includes all the right bank river flats between Agnes
Banks and Windsor, including Cornwallis) contained just 74 occupied houses in 2011.
However, other land use changes since 1867 have been less welcome from a flood risk
management perspective. Notable among these is the subdivision of McGraths Hill
from the 1970s. Despite being completely flooded in the 1867 event, at the time of the
2011 Census, this suburb contained 819 occupied dwellings.

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As Sydney continues to grow, there is pressure for further residential development on
floodplains in the HNV. The 1867 flood is a tangible reminder of the exceptional flood
depths that can be reached, and the devastating and impoverishing impacts sustained.
A repeat of the 1867 flood in the HNV today would have profoundly damaging and
widespread consequences (Bewsher et al., 2013). For this reason, the ‘default’
residential flood planning level of the 1% flood plus freeboard is judged to inadequately
limit potential flood damages (HNFMSC, 2006; Bewsher et al., 2013).
Land use planning also needs to be cognisant of the constraints to evacuating the
floodplain, including low-lying access roads with limited traffic volumes (HNFMSC,
2006). The complexities and risks of managing large-scale evacuations require
application of an integrated, regional land use planning strategy, to ensure that current
evacuation route capacities are maintained (if not improved through new road
infrastructure). If ‘infill’ development or new urban releases erode this capacity such
that people are unable to evacuate in time, there is a real risk of a repeat (or worse) of
the loss of life sustained in the 1867 flood. Yet even the premise that the theoretical
existence of evacuation capacity means a proposed urban development is acceptable
requires critical examination. Despite the best efforts of the emergency services,
evacuation can fail because it involves so many human factors, including people that
disregard evacuation orders or are unable to self-evacuate.
Conclusion
As the record flood in Sydney’s Hawkesbury-Nepean Valley (HNV), the June 1867
flood is a landmark event. The flood risks in this Valley have spawned a great deal of
research that has served the industry as a whole, including the imperative of managing
risks for events rarer than the 1% flood (which may be much deeper), a method for
classifying emergency response and a method for modelling flood evacuation
timelines. One challenge that requires further investigation and planning is the demand
ECL-generated flooding can place on the emergency services through near-
simultaneous operations across multiple catchments. There is also a pressing need for
genuinely risk-informed land use planning policies to limit future risk to property and
life, including through the erosion of evacuation route capacity.
At a smaller scale, the 1867 flood highlights the dangers of wind, waves and cold, the
constraints upon boat rescues, and the danger of sheltering in place. Flood warning
and emergency management systems are required to facilitate timely evacuation, but
these will only be effective if combined with aware, prepared and responsive
communities. Evidence suggests that only a minority of HNV residents today consider
flooding to be a risk, which is not surprising given the last ‘major’ flood at Windsor
(based on NSW SES categories) occurred in 1990. The 150th anniversary of the 1867
flood represents an opportunity to raise awareness that very large floods are real
possibilities. As George Santayana famously wrote, ‘Those who cannot remember the
past are condemned to repeat it’.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to: Chas Keys for reviewing a draft, Professor Grace Karskens (University of
NSW) for insights into 19th century settler behaviours, Claudia Urzua (INSW) for
assistance with spatial data, Sue Ribbons (INSW) for locating reports, Denise Hayes
(Hawkesbury-Nepean Flood Mitigation Action Group) for information about the Eathers,
David Berg (State Library of NSW) for locating historical drawings, and Lucinda Coates
and Christina Magill (Risk Frontiers) for assisting with data on flood fatalities.

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Bewsher, D., Grech, P. and Yeo, S. 2013, ‘Hawkesbury’s flood risk management plan:
15 years in the making’: Presented at: FMA National Conference, 28-31 May 2013
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Bowd, D.G. 1982, Macquarie Country: A History of the Hawkesbury, Library of
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Bracewell, M.G. and McDermott, G.E. 1985, Report on the 1867 Flood, Metropolitan
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Physical Model, Report No. MHL1304.

The June 1867 Floods in NSW: causes, characteristics, impacts and lessons -19-
2017 Floodplain Management Australia National Conference, Newcastle
Molino, S., Morrison, T., Howard, M. and Opper, S. 2013, ‘A technical guideline for the
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Emergency Management, 30(4):8-10.

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Appendix A – Synopsis of Smalley’s June 1867 weather report
‘For the first sixteen days of the month the
wind was steadily west or west-north-west.
On the 17th, the wind suddenly shifted to
the south-east, but blew lightly, and with no
rain. The next day [18th] it veered to the
north-north-east. The velocity increased,
and there was a little rain. On the next day
[19th] the wind was a little more easterly,
and more than an inch of rain fell, the
violence of the wind still increasing. The
storm therefore came up very gradually. It
was not till the fourth day [20th] that the
storm burst in its fury, and then the velocity
of the wind and the fall of the rain was
nearly quadruple that of the previous day,
the direction of the wind being east-north-
east. On the following day [21st] the wind
scarcely abated, but the rainfall diminished
by nearly one-half. The wind lulled still more
on the next day [22nd], but with an increase
in the rainfall. On the succeeding day [23rd]
both wind and rain diminished, and on the
24th the wind chopped round again to the
west-north-west, and all was fine once
more.’57

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Appendix B – Summary of June 1867 Flood Magnitude and Consequences in NSW
Catchment Location Magnitude Consequences No.
Fat. Source
Manning Tinonee Rose about 12ʹ above ordinary level Little 0 58
Hunter
Merriwa Highest remembered* 0
59
Wollombi 3-6ʹ higher than Aug 1857; 6ʺ in Church of
England = 100.4m AHD = ~0.5% AEP
3 dwellings and chapel swept away completely; 5 lives
nearly lost 0 60
Fordwich,
Wollombi Ck Post office and store swept away 0 61
Singleton Rose 40ʹ in 27 hours Damage to town and household property relatively light;
telegraph wire over river carried away 0 62
Maitland 12ʺ higher than Aug 1857; 9.92m AHD at
Belmore Bridge gauge (highest since 1820)
Embankment gave way; 100s of houses up to roof in water
at Horseshoe Bend; damage to railway; 400 families
reduced to destitution; financial loss of £150,000
0 63
Morpeth 7ʺ higher than Aug 1857 Many rescues by boat crews dispatched from Newcastle 0 64
Paterson Peaked midnight Fri 21st, within a few inches
of great flood of Apr 1867
Several dwellings on Brown’s Flat inundated, forcing
owners to evacuate 0 65
Raymond
Terrace
Greater than any in memory of oldest
inhabitant; 9ʺ to 1ʹ higher than Aug 1857
Whole of lower streets inundated; debris destroyed doors
and windows; hundreds rescued by boat crews 0 66
Hawkesbury-
Nepean
Goulburn Mulwaree 6-7ʹ below floor of Fitzroy Bridge
(20th am); lower than Apr 1867 Through lower portion of town 0 67
Camden 5ʹ 6ʺ in Henry Thompson house; as high as
1864 [doubtful]
Almost all houses in town submerged except those in
middle of Argyle Street; flour mill flooded 0 68
Penrith
Unprecedented height; peaked 430pm Fri
21st, within 3ʹ of railway bridge = 27.474m
AHD69; floodwater within 200 yards of Penrith
station
100-200 houses from High Street to Proctor’s Lane filled
nearly to ceiling; some houses carried away bodily; 200+
families driven from homes with nothing; damage to
western approach to Nepean Bridge by lodging of punts
and logs; telegraph line swept away; many boat rescues of
trapped persons; many families left destitute
1? 70
Emu Plains Wholly inundated Many people flooded out; considerable distress; house fell
in river; little time to save moveable property 0 71

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Catchment Location Magnitude Consequences No.
Fat. Source
Hawkesbury-
Nepean
Castlereagh 2ʹ 6ʺ in Wesleyan chapel, which is on high
ground
Some houses washed away; several boat rescues of
trapped persons; several families left destitute; Howell Mill
destroyed
0? 72
Richmond
Lowlands 16ʹ higher than 1864 in Mrs Smith’s house All houses on the flat, about 100, under water; rescue by
boat of many persons trapped in roof at Mrs Smith’s 0 73
Richmond Record flood; peaked 4am Sun 23rd
Water first entered streets on south-east side (by 10am Sat
22nd); soon after dark on Sat 22nd, town intersected by
meeting of the waters; houses flooded to depths of 5-6ʹ
0? 74
Cornwallis 12 persons from two Eather families perished (see
Appendix B); several near misses 12 75
Freemans
Reach 23 out of 24 houses and schoolhouse destroyed; severe
agricultural losses 0 76
Windsor Record flood; peaked ~5am Sun 23rd, 15ʹ3ʺ
higher than 186477; 19.7m AHD78
Private boats and 4 Gov’t boats rescued 100s of people;
refugees brought to School of Arts, Courthouse, churches;
100+ houses damaged, some wrecked
0 79
Near St Marys,
South Creek A large portion of the railway embankment had given way;
debris on rails 0 80
Llandilo, South
Creek Peaked 4am Sun 23rd Entirely submerged with only one or two exceptions; many
boat rescues of trapped persons 0 81
Shanes Park,
South Creek Almost every house covered with water; many boat rescues
of trapped persons 0 82
Riverstone,
Eastern Creek
Large number of houses under water; one washed away;
several boat rescues of trapped persons; railway covered
with mud and rubbish
0 83
Mulgrave Station house under water 0 84
McGraths Hill Floodwater broke over McGraths Hill; many boat rescues of
trapped persons, just in time 0 85
Pitt Town
Bottoms Not a house undamaged 0 86
Pitt Town 15ʹ higher than 1864
Presbyterian manse submerged; most people in Pitt Town
taken to Anglican church and schoolhouse; 46 families
applied to Relief Committee for bread
0 87
Wilberforce 17ʹ higher than ever known before Many people rescued from lofts and roofs; many houses
washed away 0 88

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Catchment Location Magnitude Consequences No.
Fat. Source
Hawkesbury-
Nepean
Cattai Thomas Arndell’s house and orangery destroyed 0 89
Ebenezer Flood mark below Ebenezer Church; almost
entered school teacher’s house Many local families took refuge in Ebenezer Church 0 90
Sackville 16ʹ higher than 1864 St Thomas Church of England and Wesleyan chapel on
opposite side washed away 0 91
Lower
Portland St John’s Church of England and Wesleyan chapel washed
away 0 92
Macdonald
River 15ʹ higher than 1857
St Albans badly damaged with Courthouse, store, house
gone altogether; Central Macdonald house gone and public
school underwater; many boat rescues of trapped persons
0 93
Wisemans
Ferry
6.0m at Webbs Creek (Wisemans Ferry)
gauge (compared to 4.8m in Mar 1978 flood)
A house, new Walmsley hotel and Wesleyan church swept
away completely; telegraph posts over river gone 0 94
Mangrove
Creek 8ʹ higher than any previous flood Some narrow escapes 0 95
Parramatta
Seven Hills Roads ankle deep in mud; meadows flooded 0 96
Parramatta 15ʹ lower than 1864 (which had almost
reached top arch of Church Street bridge) 0 97
Duck Creek Overflowed, considerable area of land under
water 0
98
Cooks Marrickville Great accumulation of waters One house in middle of flat flooded to windows; family sat
in rafters then rescued by boat 0 99
Georges
Bow Bowing
Creek?
Country more or less inundated, flood rushing
along watercourses Little damage since mostly pastureland 0 100
Liverpool Rose 20ʹ on Thu night; large tracts under
water Wool-washing establishment completely flooded 0 101
Warwick
Farm? ‘One vast sea’ 0 102
Wollongong Albion Park,
Jamberoo Highest known Agricultural losses 0 103
Shoalhaven Terara Town submerged to depths of 6ʺ to 3ʹ Rapid rise cut off escape to Nowra; very few places not
flooded 0 104
Moruya Araluen Most severe of five floods in three months
prior
Near drownings; gold diggings severely damaged; 2 weeks
lost income; 1000+ fed rations 0 105

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Catchment Location Magnitude Consequences No.
Fat. Source
Peel/Namoi Tamworth River bank-high on Thu 20th 0 106
Macquarie
Bathurst Highest known; peaked Fri 21st pm
Houses flooded to 3-4ʹ and some washed away; several
near escapes; Denison Bridge destroyed due to debris
loading - had cost £13,000 in 1856
1 107
Rylstone Equal to or greater than 1857 flood; peaked
Fri 21st sunset
Bridge swept away despite attempts to keep it clear of
woody debris 0 108
Mudgee Lawson Creek rose first, then river on Fri 21st;
similar to record floods of 1857
House at foot of Cox Street completely flooded; boat
rescues of people trapped 0 109
Burrendong Flood rose afternoon/evening of Fri 21st;
peaked Sat 22nd am
Mrs Baker and 7 children, plus Mr Smith, perished mostly
of cold (see Appendices C and D) 9 110
Wellington Highest since 1844 on Sat 22nd pm Two huts carried away; Montefiores became an island 0 111
Dubbo Peaked 8-11am Sun 23rd; 4ʹ higher than
1844; most disastrous flood Several shops and houses flooded; two rescues 0? 112
Narromine Minor damage; rescue 0 113
Lachlan Forbes River overflowed banks 0 114
Murrumbidgee
Molonglo Nearly as high as great Gundagai flood of
1852 0 115
Yass Yass River within few feet of flooring of Hume
Bridge (Thu 20th am) Family escaped from flooded hut on night of Wed 19th 0 116
Gundagai Great flood, seven years since its equal 0 117
Wagga Wagga Peaked from midday Sun 23rd, 31ʹ 6ʺ above
summer level
Submerged part of town; houses in lower Fitzmaurice
Street flooded; telegram warning from Gundagai helped
reduce contents damages; men cleared timber from bridge
2 118
Notes:
ʹ = foot (1ʹ = ~0.3m)
ʺ = inch (12ʺ = 1ʹ)
AEP = Annual Exceedance Probability
m AHD = metres Australian Height Datum (approximately equal to mean sea level)
* Descriptions such as ‘highest known’ refer to people’s experience of floods from the time of European settlement up to 1867 (albeit sometimes drawing on imperfect memory). Only
in the Hawkesbury-Nepean is the 1867 known to be the flood of record up to the present time.

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Appendix C – Human fatalities associated with June 1867 East Coast Low
Number Location Date Name Gender Age Cause Comment
1 Hawkesbury River, Cornwallis Fri 21st Jun night Emma Eather f 36 flood wife of Thomas Eather, farmer119
2 Hawkesbury River, Cornwallis Fri 21st Jun night Annie Eather f 14 flood child of T. & E. Eather
3 Hawkesbury River, Cornwallis Fri 21st Jun night James Eather m 12 flood child of T. & E. Eather
4 Hawkesbury River, Cornwallis Fri 21st Jun night Elizabeth Eather f 10 flood child of T. & E. Eather
5 Hawkesbury River, Cornwallis Fri 21st Jun night Anne Eather f 8 flood child of T. & E. Eather
6 Hawkesbury River, Cornwallis Fri 21st Jun night Emma Eather f 3 flood child of T. & E. Eather
7 Hawkesbury River, Cornwallis Fri 21st Jun night Catherine Eather f 37 flood wife of William Eather, farmer
8 Hawkesbury River, Cornwallis Fri 21st Jun night Mary Anne Eather f 11 flood child of W. & C. Eather
9 Hawkesbury River, Cornwallis Fri 21st Jun night Catherine Eather f 9 flood child of W. & C. Eather
10 Hawkesbury River, Cornwallis Fri 21st Jun night Charles Eather m 6 flood child of W. & C. Eather
11 Hawkesbury River, Cornwallis Fri 21st Jun night Clara Eather f 3 flood child of W. & C. Eather
12 Hawkesbury River, Cornwallis Fri 21st Jun night William Eather m 1 flood child of W. & C. Eather
13 Macquarie River, Burrendong Fri 21st Jun night Mary Anne Baker f 43 flood
(exposure)
wife of Isaac Daniel Baker, shepherd
in employ of Mr Blunden120
14 Macquarie River, Burrendong Fri 21st Jun night Daniel Baker m 13 flood
(exposure) child of I. & M. Baker
15 Macquarie River, Burrendong Fri 21st Jun night Henry Shadrach Baker m 11 flood
(exposure) child of I. & M. Baker
16 Macquarie River, Burrendong Fri 21st Jun night Andrew William Baker m 9 flood
(exposure) child of I. & M. Baker
17 Macquarie River, Burrendong Fri 21st Jun night Charles Frederick
Baker m 7 flood
(exposure) child of I. & M. Baker
18 Macquarie River, Burrendong Fri 21st Jun night John Isaac Baker m 5 flood
(exposure) child of I. & M. Baker
19 Macquarie River, Burrendong Fri 21st Jun night Thomas Edwin Baker m 3 flood
(exposure) child of I. & M. Baker
20 Macquarie River, Burrendong Fri 21st Jun night Mary Anne Elizabeth
Baker f 8 mon
flood
(drowned?) child of I. & M. Baker
21 Macquarie River, Burrendong Fri 21st Jun night Frederick Smith m adult flood
(drowned)
went to aid of Bakers; could not
swim

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Number Location Date Name Gender Age Cause Comment
22 Macquarie River, below Kelso
(Bathurst) ? ? m adult
flood
(drowned)
shepherd in employ of Mr Walter
Rotten, drowned while endeavouring
to save sheep121
23 Murrumbidgee River, Wagga
Wagga Sun 23rd Jun night Mary Ellen Thompson f adult flood
(drowned)
drowned in bedroom at Prince of
Wales hotel; water only 7-8 inches
deep; inebriated122
24 Nepean River, Penrith Mon 24th Jun ? m adult flood
(drowned) attempting to cross Nepean River123
25 Pomingalarna, near Wagga
Wagga Wed 26th Jun day Samuel Chatto m 28 flood
(drowned)
hutkeeper and milkman in employ of
Mr HM Paul; attempting to evacuate
horse124
26 Offshore Newcastle Fri 21st Jun 7 am William Williams m adult
gale and
heavy sea
(exposure)
lifeboat crew volunteered to go
outside for practice in heavy seas;
unable to return due to river flow125
27 Offshore Lake Macquarie Fri 21st Jun day Thomas Heywood m adult gale and
heavy sea lost overboard in the process of
beaching the “Catherine Hill”126
28 Offshore Lake Macquarie Fri 21st Jun day John Doring m adult gale and
heavy sea
29 Bulli Coal Company's jetty Fri 21st Jun day Henry C Thompson m adult gale and
heavy sea
250 ft of jetty collapsed with men
and wagons on it; engaged in
protecting jetty127
30 Bulli Coal Company's jetty Fri 21st Jun day Andrew Fealing(?) m adult gale and
heavy sea
31 Bulli Coal Company's jetty Fri 21st Jun day James Roberts m adult gale and
heavy sea
32 Bulli Coal Company's jetty Fri 21st Jun day William Sykes m adult gale and
heavy sea
33 Wollongong Fri 21st Jun 3 pm William Edwards m adult gale and
heavy sea pilot attempting to aid a vessel128

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Appendix D – Loss of Baker family at Burrendong
Information about the Baker family tragedy is based on the testimonies of the widowed
husband, Isaac Daniel Baker, his two surviving children, George Moses Baker (17) and
Cecilia Baker (15), and neighbours Mrs Smith, John Blunden and Thomas Greenway at
the coronial inquest.129 Table 3 sets out a timeline.
Table 3: Baker tragedy timeline
Time Event
Fri 21st
5pm Macquarie River observed rising; sheep moved to a higher yard
After
supper Water from the river was rapidly backing up in gully, 200-300 yards from hut
After
supper Neighbour Mr Smith arrived to offer assistance
After
supper
Mr Baker told his wife to ready the children to move as the water ‘was coming
round fast, but there was still dry ground’
10 minutes
later Water had surrounded hut, 6 ft deep in gully, eliminating possibility of escape
20 minutes
later
Water began to enter hut; wife and children placed on loft; Mr Baker stood on
table; Mr Smith sat on beam of loft
Sometime
later Water reached table, forcing Mr Baker to sit on another beam
45 minutes
later
Water rose to top of wall plate, about 6 ft; Mr Baker cut hole in bark roof with
tomahawk; everyone evacuated onto roof
9pm Everyone on roof commenced ‘cooeying’
9.45pm Water about 10 ft above floor of hut; Mrs Smith answered; told her to go to Mr
Blunden’s for boat; Mrs Smith evidently did not hear this
Sometime
later
Water reached ridge pole on which they were sitting; Mr Baker cooeyed again
and Mrs Smith answered, showing she had not gone for boat
Sat 22nd
3.30am First of children died of cold, the greater part of his body being underwater
Sometime
later
Water rose nearly to necks, forcing Moses, Mr Baker and Cecilia to make for
tree; Mr Smith could not swim and drowned in the attempt
Sometime
later Water rose another 3 ft while in tree
After
sunrise Mrs Smith came alone in boat and rescued the three survivors from the tree
Sometime
later Mr Blunden came in boat, the water then about 6-7 ft over top of hut
It is clear from the descriptions that the Bakers’ hut was located on a ‘low flood island’
(DECC, 2007), where egress was cut prior to the house flooding. The Bakers failed to
evacuate in time and so were obliged to clamber to higher levels, eventually standing
on the ridge pole of the hut’s roof. Curiously, Mr Baker described how even when
putting his family into the loft, he was not afraid, hoping that the water would not rise
much higher. Only later with the water rising up the roof did he get frightened. Mrs
Smith heard the ‘cooeys’ but interpreted this as an indication of safety rather than
danger. Only at daylight did she sense their distress and rowed herself down the
flooded Mudgee (Cudgegong) River to rescue the survivors. Mr Blunden said he was
concerned about the Bakers on Friday night but thought that they would have
evacuated to high ground and that someone would have alerted him to any trouble.
Nearly all the fatalities were from cold from standing hours in water.

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Appendix E – Excerpts from post-flood editorials regarding land use
‘We believe that a level plain lying at the
foot of a range of hills always was and
always will be subject to an occasional
ducking. The vapour-laden clouds blown up
from the sea always did and always will, we
may expect, discharge their contents by
condensation against the cold hill ridges.
This water descending precipitously finds
its immediate way to the river, which, being
unable to void so sudden a contribution,
rises and overflows its banks. The adjoining
lands, their crops, dwellings, and
inhabitants must be in danger – sometimes
they are swept away, sometimes they are
not. Those who occupy the lands and the
houses know that this year, or the next, or
the year after a flood will occur… The game
carried on upon the lands just recovering
from inundation is a game of speculation. In
1864 there was a great flood – in 1867
there is a greater flood – what is to be in
1870? Who knows? … As no human device
can be made to compensate the loss of
human life, let the buildings be beyond the
reach of floodwaters.’ 130
‘We may reasonably conclude that, while
these extreme floods will not happen often,
they may occur once or twice in the
century, and of course the maximum line
must be considered the flood line. It is
important that this line should be distinctly
traced and marked on local plans, if not on
the ground, because, after what has
occurred, it would be folly, if not worse, to
build fresh houses within that line, unless
they are built upon piles, so as to raise the
floor level above the reach of floods. The
first flood took the settlers by surprise, but
no flood is now a surprise… Prevention is
at all times better than cure; and to help in
prevention is a more intelligent and useful
kind of charity than to help in cure… It
would be a dereliction of duty not to do all
that can be done to intercept similar
calamity for the future. And in this respect
the duty of those who receive aid is the
same as the duty of those who give it. All
are bound, as far as in them lies, to mitigate
not only misfortune but the causes of
misfortune.’ 131
‘While some houses have been built with a
moderate degree of forecast, others have
as undoubtedly been built without any such
regard. The recent calamity is a strong
remonstrance against such indiscretion,
and is an earnest exhortation not to repeat
the experiment. There is no law against a
man’s periling his property, or even his life,
and the lives of his family; but it is a moral
wrong to incur unnecessary peril of this
kind… This is the time to see that energy is
mixed with prudence… The Government at
present is armed with no power to
interfere… It would be justifiable to proclaim
certain special country districts as
dangerous and not to allow persons to
expose themselves or their property by
building or living within a certain margin…
[River floods] are to be looked on as
certainties coming at uncertain times…
There are conveniences, no doubt, in living
on the flats… But it is an inconvenience to
be drowned, and it is an expense to have
the granary stores spoilt and household
furniture saturated. The calculation is one of
a balance of advantages and
disadvantages. The alluvial land is very rich
and very fruitful; but these
recommendations are compensated by one
great disadvantage – a disadvantage that
cannot at present be detached from the
benefits, and the two, therefore, must be
taken together…’ 132
‘The lives that have been lost have been
mostly those of helpless families. Men can
often swim, but women and children
cannot. Fathers should see to it that they do
not build where, at a few hours’ notice, they
may find themselves unable to save those
dearest to them… Whatever may happen to
the crops, they should so select their land
as to have a safe place for the house and
barn. It is madness with the experience we
now have to build within the flood line.’ 133
Before the work of reconstruction has
proceeded far, we would suggest that some
endeavour should be made to adopt a
course that will expose the inhabitants of
the flooded districts to less danger and loss
in future. If nothing be said, if no
interference be made, it is fair to infer that
what has been done in the past will recur. It
appears that in this matter people will not,
at least do not, learn by experience; and
that as soon as possible they will
rehabilitate the tenements that have been
gutted, will rebuild those that have been
swept away, and will prepare for the re-
enactment of the same tragedy as that
which has just been witnessed. Let it be
considered whether the present site of the
building is the best that could be selected.
So far as the tenant is concerned, it is
doubtless in many cases the only one
available, for, save on the plot of ground he
occupies, he cannot build. To hire on
another plot in a more secure locality he
has neither the opportunity nor the means;

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and unless the landowner is inclined to
interest himself in the matter, the simple
tenant is powerless. The onus, therefore,
rests very much with the landed proprietors,
who should see it to be their duty, even
though they may not see it to be their
interest, to devise some means by which
the risk to life should be mitigated.’ 134
‘Even a few weeks’ delay will probably
create new vested interests in dangers
which another flood will reveal. People
return to their old haunts, rebuild their
demolished houses, and resume their old
ways. Their repugnance to any
interference, alter the sense of peril is
abated, becomes unconquerable. Indeed, it
may be asked what right has society to
come in and turn men out of their dwellings
when they have once incurred the expense
of erecting them, unless upon condition of
supplying better – a task which no one
would pretend to undertake. It seems to be
of first importance that the Government
should ascertain and publish in all places
now open to occupation and likely to be
occupied, the level to which floods rise and
the special dangers which attend them…
This knowledge would form the foundation
for other regulations of great importance.
No land ought to be alienated under such
liabilities unless subject to conditions
conservative of life.’ 135

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Endnotes
1 Sydney Morning Herald, Fri 21 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The wind and weather’.
2 Sydney Morning Herald, Sat 26 Oct 1867 p.6, editorial. An indication of the possible scale of 3-day
rainfalls at select locations in the Hawkesbury-Nepean Valley may be gained by examining the 2016
Intensity-Frequency-Duration (IFD) rainfalls (http://www.bom.gov.au/water/designRainfalls/revised-
ifd/?year=2016) for the 1 in 200 to 1 in 500 chance per year events. The results are: Warragamba Dam
433-494 mm (i.e. 144-165 mm/day); Katoomba 529-602 mm (i.e. 176-201 mm/day); and Mount Tomah
546-622 mm (i.e. 182-207 mm/day).
3 Windsor rainfall supplied by John Tebbutt and published in the Sydney Morning Herald, Fri 28 Jun 1867
p.5, ‘The weather at Windsor’. Parramatta rainfall supplied by ‘R.L.K.’ and published in the Sydney
Morning Herald, Thu 4 Jul 1867 p.6, ‘The late storm’.
4 Major floods at Windsor are defined as those exceeding 12.2m on the gauge, or 12.35m AHD (NSW
SES, 2015, Vol 2, p.17). These occurred in Jun 1864, Jun 1867, Apr 1870, Feb 1873, Sep 1879, Jul 1900,
Jul 1904, Feb 1956, Nov 1961, Jun 1964, Mar 1978, Apr/May 1988 and Aug 1990.
5 Mr Mark Babister, WMAwater, pers. comm., 2/3/2017.
6 Recent flood modelling means that the 1 in 200 chance per year hydrograph shown here for Windsor is
superseded.
7 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The flood at Windsor’. The reported distances cannot be
single straight-line distances, since, from GIS, the measured straight-line distance from Riverstone to high
land on the other side of the Hawkesbury (towards Kurrajong) is about 15 km.
8 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The flood at Windsor’.
9 Sydney Morning Herald, Tue 2 Jul 1867 pp.2-3, ‘Windsor’.
10 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 1 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘Windsor’. See also Sydney Morning Herald, Thu 4 Jul
1867 p.3, ‘The flood about Colo and the Lower Hawkesbury’.
11 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The Nepean’.
12 Sydney Morning Herald, Sat 20 Jul 1867 p.8, ‘The flood at Richmond’.
13 Sydney Morning Herald, Fri 5 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘The flood in Mangrove Creek’.
14 Sydney Mail, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.11, ‘Broken Bay’.
15 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 1 Jul 1867 p.2, ‘Disastrous floods’.
16 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.4, ‘Disastrous floods’.
17 Sydney Morning Herald, Wed 26 Jun 1867 p.2, ‘From Penrith to Bathurst’.
18 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 1 Jul 1867 p.2, ‘Disastrous floods’.
19 Risk Frontiers’ flood fatality database accepts a report from Wellington that a family (assumed by RF to
be three persons) was drowned near Dubbo (Sydney Morning Herald, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The flood at
Wellington’). But those fatalities are here judged to be spurious because they are not described in any
reports directly from Dubbo (e.g. Maitland Mercury and Hunter River General Advertiser, Thu 4 Jul 1867
p.2, ‘The flood in the Macquarie’; Empire, Fri 5 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘Effects of the flood in the western interior’;
Empire, Tue 9 Jul 1867 p.5, ‘The floods in the north-western districts’). Risk Frontiers accepts a report of a
drowning at Penrith after the flood peak, and although the evidence is thin (one report in the Sydney
Morning Herald, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘Notes of the week’, and without mention in the summary of fatalities
in the Empire, Fri 28 Jun 1867 p.4, ‘Lives lost’), that fatality is accepted here. Callaghan and Power (2014)
describe several other fatalities (totalling 36 freshwater fatalities), but in our opinion it is problematic to
attach these to the ECL with surety. Indeed, the Sydney Mail (Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The Nepean District’)
describes a report of two fatalities at Castlereagh – apparently accepted by Callaghan and Power – as
being ‘not of a reliable nature’. A report of a milkman named Mark Shepherd from the Richmond Common
having drowned is also cast in a doubtful light (Bega Gazette and Eden District or Southern Coast
Advertiser, Sat 6 Jul 1867 p.1, ‘Windsor’). The dangers of counting fatalities from early reports is well
illustrated by a case from near Singleton, where a couple heard ‘screaming’ and presumed dead (Maitland
Mercury and Hunter River General Advertiser, Thu 27 Jun 1867 p.2, ‘The late disastrous flood at Singleton
– supposed loss of life’) were subsequently reported to be ‘alive and kicking’ (Maitland Mercury and Hunter
River General Advertiser, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.2, ‘Original correspondence’). Some other flood fatalities
occurred but may not have occurred at the time of the flooding directly generated by the ECL. For
example, two boys drowned at Warrangong, between Cowra and Young (Empire, Tue 2 Jul 1867 p.3,
‘Back Creek, Lachlan’; Sydney Morning Herald, Sat 6 Jul 1867 p.4, ‘Notes of the week’).
20 Nichols, 2001, p.33; Windsor and Richmond Gazette, Fri 9 Dec 1927 p.12, ‘Windsor’s poet: the life of
Charles Harpur’.
21 Sydney Morning Herald, Wed 26 Jun 1867 p.2, ‘From Penrith to Bathurst’.
22 Queanbeyan Age, Fri 28 Jun 1867 p.3, ‘The floods’.
23 Sydney Morning Herald, Wed 26 Jun 1867 p.2, ‘Richmond’; Windsor and Richmond Gazette, Fri 11 Nov
1927 p.1, ‘Graphic story: great Hawkesbury flood of 1867 – the experiences of Mrs WM Smith and family’.
24 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The flood at Windsor’.
25 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The flood at Windsor’.
26 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 1 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘The flood at Windsor’ (see ‘Inquest on Six Bodies of the
Eathers, Lost in the Flood’).
27 Mrs Dora Eather, cited in Nepean Times, Sat 25 May 1912 p.3, ‘Death of Mr George Eather’.
28 Windsor and Richmond Gazette, Fri 11 Nov 1927 p.1, ‘Graphic story: great Hawkesbury flood of 1867’.
29 Empire, Tue 2 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘Freeman’s Reach’.

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30 The date of Dora’s departure from Cornwallis for Clarendon requires interpretation. Friday, as stated by
Nichols (2001, p.33), is too late. Given Dora’s statement that Thomas’ and William’s families arrived as
they were boarding the boat, and William’s testimony that they went there on Thursday, she and her
children must have left on Thursday.
31 Another report suggests that the wives and children were lost before the boat left Richmond (Illawarra
Mercury, Fri 12 Jul 1867 p.2, ‘The flood at Richmond’).
32 In the June 1864 flood, W. Eather’s house was ‘partly gone’ and T. Eather’s house was ‘gone’. Other
Eathers are mentioned (Sydney Morning Herald, Tue 21 Jun 1864 p.13, ‘Floods in the Cornwallis district’).
At least one of the Eather brothers was evidently a tenant farmer at the time of the 1867 flood (Sydney
Morning Herald, Tue 7 Jul 1868 p.2, ‘Windsor district court’).
33 Thomas Eather’s eldest son, Charles (16), survived the flood. The report on the coronial inquest states
that he was away from home and not in the flood. But Dora Eather states that he was on the next farm with
Bill Bailey, hanging onto a willow tree, and was rescued by the same boat that rescued his father.
34 The ground level, assuming no change since 1867, is taken from a LiDAR-derived digital elevation
model courtesy of NSW SES. The house was located along the river bank near the Eather memorial (see
Figure 6) (Denise Hayes, Hawkesbury-Nepean Flood Mitigation Action Group, pers. comm., 6/5/2017).
35 Cumberland Argus and Fruitgrowers Advocate, Thu 5 Sep 1929 p.21, ‘Biggest Flood on the
Hawkesbury’.
36 Queanbeyan Age, Fri 28 Jun 1867 p.3, ‘The floods’.
37 Sydney Mail, Sat 18 Jun 1864 p.6, various articles; Sydney Morning Herald, Wed 6 Aug 1986 pp.1-2,
various articles.
38 Sydney Morning Herald, Tue 25 Jun 1867 p.2, ‘The Floods – Windsor’.
39 Sydney Morning Herald, Tue 2 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘Public meeting at Windsor’.
40 McLuckie, D. 2016, ‘Freeboard – Why have it? When is it used? Why can it vary? What issues should
be considered in estimating freeboard?’, workshop presentation to NSW/ACT Chapter meeting, Floodplain
Management Australia, 23 February 2017.
41 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The flood at Windsor’.
42 Empire, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘Penrith, Emu Plains and Castlereagh’.
43 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 1 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘Windsor’.
44 Windsor and Richmond Gazette, Fri 11 Nov 1927 p.1, ‘Graphic story: great Hawkesbury flood of 1867’.
45 Windsor and Richmond Gazette, Fri 11 Nov 1927 p.1, ‘Graphic story: great Hawkesbury flood of 1867’.
46 Sydney Morning Herald, Sat 22 Jun 1867 p.4, ‘The weather’.
47 Sydney Morning Herald, Sat 22 Jun 1867 p.4, ‘The flood at Windsor’; Empire, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5,
‘The floods’.
48 Sydney Morning Herald, Tue 20 Aug 1867 p.4, editorial.
49 Sydney Mail, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.5, 'The Nepean District'.
50 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The flood at Windsor’.
51 Windsor and Richmond Gazette, Fri 11 Nov 1927 p.1, ‘Graphic story: great Hawkesbury flood of 1867’.
52 See articles in Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol 30 No. 2, April 2015.
53 Sydney Morning Herald, Fri 5 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘Windsor floods’.
54 Prof. Grace Karskens, UNSW, pers. comm., 24/4/2017.
55 Other factors promoting out-migration from the Hawkesbury district included: the Selection Acts of the
1860s that unlocked the interior lands for small farmers; the appearance of rust in the coastal wheat crops
in the 1850s; and the siltation of the Hawkesbury River, which meant large ships could no longer navigate
to Windsor (Prof. Grace Karskens, UNSW, pers. comm., 24/4/2017).
56 A letter published in the Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 26 Aug 1867 p.5 reports that settlers of Richmond
Lowlands had begun a petition urging the Government to make sites for homesteads available on elevated
portions of Richmond Common.
57 Sydney Morning Herald, Tue 20 Aug 1867 p.4, editorial.
58 Maitland Mercury and Hunter River General Advertiser, Sat 6 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘Manning River’.
59 Maitland Mercury and Hunter River General Advertiser, Thu 27 Jun 1867 p.3, ‘Merriwa’.
60 Maitland Mercury and Hunter River General Advertiser, Thu 27 Jun 1867 p.3, ‘The flood at Wollombi’;
Maitland Mercury and Hunter River General Advertiser, Thu 4 Jul 1867 p.4, ‘Wollombi’; Mr Darren Lyons,
BMT WBM, pers. comm., 1/3/2011.
61 Maitland Mercury and Hunter River General Advertiser, Thu 27 Jun 1867 p.3, ‘The flood at Fordwich’.
62 Brisbane Courier, Fri 28 Jun 1867 p.3, ‘Latest SMH telegrams from the flooded districts’; Sydney Mail,
Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.4, ‘Latest news from the flooded districts’.
63 Queanbeyan Age and General Advertiser, Fri 28 Jun 1867 p.3, ‘Maitland’; Sydney Morning Herald, Tue
2 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘The Northern Railway and the Late Floods’; Illustrated Sydney News, Tue 16 Jul 1867 p.7,
‘The floods’; Keys, 2008, pp.9,21.
64 Brisbane Courier, Fri 28 Jun 1867 p.3, ‘Latest SMH telegrams from the flooded districts’; Maitland
Mercury and Hunter River General Advertiser, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.4, ‘The floods’.
65 Sydney Morning Herald, Tue 23 July 1867 p.7, ‘Paterson’.
66 Sydney Mail, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.11, ‘Raymond Terrace’.
67 Maitland Mercury & Hunter River General Advertiser, Tue 25 Jun 1867 p.2, ‘Flood at Windsor’;
Queanbeyan Age, Fri 28 Jun 1867 p.3, ‘The floods’.
68 Sydney Morning Herald, Wed 26 Jun 1867 p.2, ‘Camden’; Goulburn Herald and Chronicle, Wed 26 Jun
1867 p.4, ‘Liverpool, Campbelltown, and Menangle’. The report in the GH&C that the river at Camden was

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as high as it was in 1864 is inconsistent with the estimate reported in Bracewell and McDermott (1985),
which puts the 1867 flood one metre lower than the 1864 flood.
69 The date, time and height of the peak at Penrith are based on a description in the Sydney Morning
Herald, Sat 22 Jun 1867 p.4, ‘The weather’. The calculation of the flood level is described in Bracewell and
McDermott (1985). The Sydney Morning Herald (Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The Nepean’) puts the
‘culminating point’ of the flood at Penrith on Saturday (rather than Friday), and observes it was within 5 ft of
the floor of the railway bridge at 3pm. Another newspaper report describes how the water rose ‘to within a
foot or two [0.3-0.6m] of the platform’ of the bridge (Empire, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, 'Penrith, Emu Plains,
and Castlereagh).
70 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The Nepean’; Queanbeyan Age, Fri 28 Jun 1867 p.3,
‘The floods’; Sydney Morning Herald, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The flood in the Nepean’.
71 Empire, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘Penrith, Emu Plains, and Castlereagh’; Sydney Morning Herald, Sat 29
Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The flood in the Nepean’.
72 Sydney Morning Herald, Wed 26 Jun 1867 p.2, ‘From Penrith to Bathurst’; Sydney Morning Herald, Sat
29 Jun 1867, p.5, ‘The flood in the Nepean’; Hawkesbury Regional Museum flood exhibition April 2017.
73 Queanbeyan Age and General Advertiser, Fri 28 Jun 1867 p.3, ‘Richmond’; Windsor and Richmond
Gazette, Fri 11 Nov 1927 p.1, ‘Graphic story: great Hawkesbury flood of 1867 – the experiences of Mrs
WM Smith and family’.
74 Sydney Morning Herald, Wed 26 Jun 1867 p.2, ‘Richmond’.
75 See ‘Human fatalities’ section for sources.
76 Empire, Tue 2 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘The floods’.
77 Tebbutt (1869). The Windsor-based astronomer wrote, ‘By careful determination on the 5th July 1867, I
found that the flood had risen 15 feet 3 inches above that of June 13th 1864’. This measurement therefore
supersedes his earlier report that the 1867 flood was about 14½ feet above the flood mark of June 1864
(Sydney Morning Herald, Fri 28 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The weather at Windsor’).
78 The adopted peak level of the 1867 flood at Windsor is based on astronomer John Tebbutt’s precise
reading at Peninsula House, which is added to the surveyed floor level. This is about 0.3m higher than the
surveyed level of the mark at Thompson Square, whose origin is unknown (WMA, 1996, Part D Design
Flood Estimation).
79 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The flood at Windsor’; Sydney Morning Herald, Tue 2
Jul 1867 pp.2-3, ‘Windsor’.
80 Empire, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The floods’.
81 Sydney Mail, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.11, ‘Llandilo near South Creek’.
82 Queanbeyan Age, Fri 28 Jun 1867 p.3, ‘The floods’.
83 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The flood at Windsor’; Empire, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5,
‘Riverstone’; Empire, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘Windsor’; Queanbeyan Age, Fri 28 Jun 1867 p.3, ‘The floods’.
84 Queanbeyan Age, Fri 28 Jun 1867 p.3, ‘The floods’.
85 Illustrated Sydney News, Tue 16 Jul 1867 p.7, ‘The floods’.
86 Sydney Morning Herald, Tue 2 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘Public meeting at Windsor’.
87 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The flood at Windsor’; Sydney Morning Herald, Wed 26
Jun 1867 p.5, ‘Floods relief fund’; Sydney Morning Herald, Tue 2 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘Public meeting at Windsor’:
The comparison with the 1864 flood level is taken from the baptismal register of St James Pitt Town
(WMA, 1996, Table D.A1).
88 Sydney Morning Herald, Sat 22 June 1867 p.4, ‘The flood at Windsor’; Sydney Morning Herald, Thu 27
Jun 1867 p.2, ‘Wilberforce’.
89 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 1 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘Windsor’.
90 Windsor and Richmond Gazette, Fri 10 Oct 1941 p.4, ‘Obituary: Mrs Sarah Brand’; Ted Brill, pers.
comm., 6/5/2017.
91 Sydney Morning Herald, Tue 2 Jul 1867 p.3 ‘Hawkesbury River’; Nichols, 2001, 2004.
92 Nichols, 2001.
93 Empire, Fri 5 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘Macdonald River’; Empire, Tue 9 Jul 1867 p.5, ‘Macdonald River’.
94 Gosford City Local Flood Plan, Vol. 2, Dec 2003; Sydney Mail, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.11 ‘Wiseman’s Ferry
and the Macdonald River’; Empire, Tue 9 Jul 1867 p.5, ‘Macdonald River’.
95 Sydney Morning Herald, Fri 5 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘The flood in Mangrove Creek’.
96 Empire, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The floods’.
97 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The Nepean’; Sydney Morning Herald, Tue 14 Jun 1864
p.5, ‘Parramatta’.
98 Empire, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The floods’.
99 Sydney Morning Herald, Fri 21 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘The wind and weather’; Mining Record and Grenfell
General Advertiser, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.2, ‘Epitome of news’.
100 Empire, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5 ‘Liverpool, Campbelltown and Menangle’. An observer reports that from
within about 5 miles (8 kilometres) of Campbelltown station, the country on the west side of the railway
was more or less inundated. The distance marker suggests that the observed flooding may have been
along Bow Bowing Creek from Ingleburn to Campbelltown.
101 Empire, Sat 22 Jun 1867 p.4, ‘The floods’; Empire, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5 ‘Liverpool, Campbelltown and
Menangle’.
102 Empire, Mon 24 Jun 1867 p.5 ‘Liverpool, Campbelltown and Menangle’. An observer reports that
travelling southwest on the train from Parramatta Junction to Campbelltown, ‘on nearing the valley of the

The June 1867 Floods in NSW: causes, characteristics, impacts and lessons -33-
2017 Floodplain Management Australia National Conference, Newcastle
George’s River, the country was one vast sea, and the land in the vicinity of Captain Sadleir’s farm was
covered with water’.
103 Sydney Mail, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.11 ‘Albion Park and Jamberoo’.
104 Sydney Mail, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.11 ‘Shoalhaven’.
105 Sydney Morning Herald, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.5 ‘The floods at Araluen’; Sydney Mail, Sat 29 Jun 1867
p.11 ‘Braidwood’.
106 Maitland Mercury and Hunter River General Advertiser, Thu 27 Jun 1867 p.3, ‘Tamworth’.
107 Sydney Morning Herald, Wed 26 Jun 1867 p.2, ‘From Penrith to Bathurst’; Sydney Mail, Sat 29 Jun
1867 p.11 ‘Bathurst Plains Inundated’; Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 1 Jul 1867 p.2 ‘Bathurst’.
108 Maitland Mercury and Hunter River General Advertiser, Tue 2 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘Floods in the Mudgee
district’.
109 Sydney Morning Herald, Fri 28 Jun 1867 p.3 ‘Mudgee’; Empire, Tue 2 Jul 1867 p.3 ‘The floods’.
110 See Appendix D for sources.
111 Sydney Mail, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.11 ‘Wellington’; Empire, Tue 2 Jul 1867 p.3 ‘The floods’.
112 Maitland Mercury and Hunter River General Advertiser, Thu 4 Jul 1867 p.2 ‘The flood in the Macquarie’;
Empire, Fri 5 Jul 1867 p.3 ‘Effects of the flood in the western interior’; Empire, Tue 9 Jul 1867 p.5 ‘The
floods in the north-western districts’.
113 Maitland Mercury and Hunter River General Advertiser, Thu 4 Jul 1867 p.2 ‘The flood in the Macquarie’.
114 Sydney Mail, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.4 ‘Latest news from the flooded districts’.
115 Queanbeyan Age, Fri 19 Jul 1867 p.4 ‘Molonglo’.
116 Sydney Morning Herald, Tue 25 Jun 1867 p.2 ‘Yass’.
117 Sydney Mail, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.12 ‘Flood at Gundagai’.
118 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 1 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘The Murrumbidgee’; Tumut and Adelong Times, Thu 4
Jul 1867 p.2, ‘Local and General Intelligence’; Maitland Mercury and Hunter River General Advertiser, Sat
6 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘Flood in the Murrumbidgee, and loss of life.’ It is difficult to estimate the flood magnitude at
Wagga Wagga given the conflicting reports of its height, being equal to 1844 (SMH; Smalley, 1867), 3ʹ
lower than 1863 (sic, 1864?) (TT), or 2ʹ higher than 1864 (MM). Gormly (1960) (reproduced in WMA, 2004,
Appendix A) placed it higher than the floods in 1864. However, he put the flood of 31 July 1867 as higher
than the 23 June 1867 flood, which newspaper reports do not support, since no houses were flooded in
the July event, unlike the June event.
119 See ‘Human fatalities’ section for sources. The ages are drawn from the coronial inquest.
120 See Appendix D for sources.
121 Sydney Morning Herald, Wed 26 Jun 1867 p.2, ‘From Penrith to Bathurst’.
122 Tumut and Adelong Times, Thu 4 Jul 1867 p.2, ‘Local and General Intelligence’; Maitland Mercury and
Hunter River General Advertiser, Sat 6 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘Flood in the Murrumbidgee, and loss of life.’
123 Sydney Morning Herald, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.5, ‘Notes of the week’.
124 Sydney Morning Herald, Wed 3 Jul 1867 p.1, ‘Family Notices’; Maitland Mercury and Hunter River
General Advertiser, Sat 6 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘Flood in the Murrumbidgee, and loss of life.’
125 Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 24 Jun pp.5-6, ‘Newcastle’; Sydney Morning Herald, Wed 26 Jun 1867
p.2, ‘Newcastle’; Sydney Morning Herald, Mon 1 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘The storm at Newcastle’.
126 Sydney Morning Herald, Thu 4 Jul 1867 p.4, ‘Loss of the Catherine Hill’; Maitland Mercury and Hunter
River General Advertiser, Sat 6 Jul 1867 p.3, ‘Newcastle’.
127 Sydney Morning Herald, Tue 23 Jul 1867 p.7, ‘Bulli’.
128 Sydney Morning Herald, Wed 26 Jun 1867 p.2, ‘Inquest on the body of Pilot Edwards’.
129 Sydney Morning Herald, Tue 2 Jul 1867 p.2 ‘Disastrous flood at Burrandong’; Sydney Morning Herald,
Fri 12 Jul 1867 p.2, ‘The Burrandong catastrophe’; Sydney Morning Herald, Tue 23 Jul 1867, p.7
‘Burrandong’.
130 Sydney Mail, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.3, ‘The land’.
131 Sydney Mail, Sat 29 Jun 1867 p.4, ‘Summary’.
132 Sydney Morning Herald, Thu 4 Jul 1867 p.4, editorial.
133 Sydney Mail, Sat 6 Jul 1867 p.4, ‘Summary’.
134 Sydney Mail, Sat 6 Jul 1867 p.9, ‘The land’.
135 Sydney Morning Herald, Sat 13 Jul 1867 p.6, editorial.